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FORGING AN EMPIRE; THE ROMAN ARMY OF THE LATE REPUBLIC;390 B.C. TO 14 A.D.
Tom Degenhart Hist-510 Graduate Seminar in World History K001 Spr 12
August 23, 2012
1
After the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390 B.C., the Romans
weighed one thousand pounds of gold in tribute to their enemy in
order that they leave Rome. However, they were angered when
observing Brennus, the leader of the Gauls, using heavier scales
than what was standard to weigh the gold. In response to their
protests, Brennus placed his sword on the scale and replied, “Vea
Victis,” or “Woe to the vanquished.” Despite this disaster in
Roman history, the Romans would prove then and continually
afterward, that their ability to adapt and learn from their
losses would be one of the trademarks to their military success
as an empire. 1
From 390 B.C. through the era of Augustus Caesar ending in
14 A.D., Rome would suffer several defeats and adversities that
1 K.W. Meiklejohn, “ Roman Strategy and Tactics From 509 to 205 B.C.” Greece & Rome ,Vol. 7, No. 21 (May, 1938), 170-178, http://www.jstor.org/stable/641877(accessed July 23, 2012).
would have often crippled many ancient states, yet Rome
flourished. Through it all, the Roman Army would be at the center
of Rome’s power and become the standard used by the emperors to
establish imperial order. But it was not by mere design and
tactic alone that made the Roman legions the dominate force of
the Mediterranean, many factors would influence the development
of the Roman army into the first professional and versatile power
it eventually became under Augustus. In many aspects, Rome’s army
developed out of necessity. The following will demonstrate that
political, social and military burdens during the late Republic
were the central dynamics causing Rome’s military to advance into
the first professional army which helped topple the Republic and
forge the Empire.
To begin, the greatest quality of a Roman soldier lay not in
his armor or military strategy but rather in a martial attribute
known as vitrus, what we would most commonly associate with
valor. Romans were of a competitive stock, eager to seek single
combat and prove their virtus. Accounts of individual bravery are
noted within Livy’s works; such as Marshalls Marcellus and
Servilius, who killed twenty-three men in various duels and
donned their spoils around their armor, during the Second Punic
War. When the Pyrrhus of Epirus invaded Italy he was said to have
nervously turned over his helmet with its enormous crest and goat
horns to a friend after a
2
Roman cavalryman was killed charging after him. His friend, was
subsequently slain in battle after receiving his helmet. To a
Roman, discipline was paramount to victory and staying within the
lines was demanded. For others, this may have been a matter of
fighting the urge to flee in the midst of battle, but for Romans,
their virtus was such that it often meant restraining oneself
from breaking from the line and charging after the enemy. 2
In this sense, Rome differed from the Greeks, though they
often studied Greek battle tactics and formations, their methods
and ideals for war dictated a different standard. During their
encounter with Hannibal of Carthage in the Second Punic War (218-
201 B.C.), Rome found itself at the brink of annihilation. The
Carthage general had defeated them in several encounters and
closed within miles of Rome itself. Though Hannibal seemed
virtually invincible, his one weakness lied in his misconception
of Roman resolve. Hannibal had been trained in the Hellenistic
tradition of warfare and believed he could secure a Carthage
2 .E.J. Lendon, 2005. Soldiers and Ghosts : A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, (Yale University Press, 2005), 172-176, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed July 11, 2012).
victory over Rome by success on the battlefield, which would
ultimately lead to Rome’s surrender, followed by a negotiation
for peace under Hannibal’s terms. Yet, despite Rome’s
catastrophic losses suffered in battle, they refused surrender.
War in the eyes of Romans, meant the victor conquering, occupying
and exploiting their enemy and Rome would suffer at any cost to
avoid this happening to them; the only occurrence when
negotiations took place was with a Roman Victory.3
Though Roman virtus was an important aspect in their society
and the early Roman army was derived of a citizen militia, not
everyone was allowed to partake in battle. Initially, Rome’s army
included only those with enough wealth to provide for their own
armor and weaponry. The peasant class or plebeians, who could not
afford their own equipment were not allowed to participate.
Traditionally, farmers who owned their own land, up to the higher
levels
3
of the aristocracy were conscripted into the army and
systematically placed into separate legions. When men from a
tribe were conscripted and brought in for the levy to the 3 Richard A.Gabriel, Hannibal : The Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy [eBook], (Potomac Books Inc., 2011),211-212 http://apus.eblib.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=864597(accessed July 27, 2012).
tribunes, they were separated into groups of four, with each man
being as equal to physical fitness as possible. The tribune of
the first legion had first choice of the four men, followed by
the second, third and fourth tribune for each legion
respectively. The second round began with the tribune of the
second legion and continued on in sequential order. This insured
an equally capable assortment of each legion.4 Though this proved
a unique method of assorting their army, the army of the early
Roman Republic resembled that of the Greek phalanx, a citizen
militia army fighting as one large body, formed of several ranks
deep and protruding spears with overlapping shields. From the
beginning, Rome made use of foreign strategy and most likely
adopted the phalanx from their Etruscan neighbors. Adversely,
this style of warfare demanded much of the Roman mentality of
charging forth and proving one’s virtus, so much so that in 432
B.C., a dictatorship under Postumius Tubertus, had his own son
put to death for breaking rank and sallying forth at the enemy.
In the old style of ancient warfare, individual combat was a
common mode of battle, however, such an extreme consequence of
4 S.E. Stout, “Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion,” The Classical Journal, Vol. 16, No. 7 (Apr., 1921), 424, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3288082 (accessed July 19,2012).
falling out of line indicates Rome’s conversion to Greek phalanx
methods.5
Additionally, training for the citizen army was conducted at
a level increasingly difficult to that of real life conditions.
Soldiers trained with practice shields and swords made heavier
than their real counterparts. Marches consisted of varied speeds
that would extend up to twenty-four roman miles in a five hour
period. They also built themselves from physical labor; carrying
heavy loads, digging ditches while contending with the sun and
dust, often on limited rations of food to prepare them for times
of adversity during a campaign.
4
Training for the physical hardships was just as imperative as
preparing for the battle itself.6
Yet, despite Rome’s remarkable ability to implement foreign
military tactics and highly discipline training, flaws in their
phalanx formations would ultimately be exposed in 390 B.C. when
an army of Gauls, who had settled in the northern Italy, led by
Brennus, marched on Rome and were met by six Roman legions near
5 Martin P.Nilsson, “The Introduction of Hoplite Tactics at Rome: Its Date and Its Consequences,” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 19, (1929).1-11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/297312(accessed on July 24,2012).
6 Stout, “Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion,” 427.
the Allia river. The uneven terrain proved unfavorable for the
Roman phalanx and they were routed back to the Capitoline Hill in
Rome, where many of the citizens took refuge. However, the city
was subsequently sacked and looted; many documents that could
have been of historical value were destroyed during the raid. 7
Moreover, if Rome did not learn from their shortcomings in
390 B.C., they finally came to the realization that their armies
must become more flexible during the Samnite Wars, beginning with
the first conflict in 343 B.C. and the third culminating in 290
B.C. The Samnites were an aggressive tribe from the Apennines
Mountains, pressing down to south-east Italy in Campania.
Accustomed to battle on uneven ground and hillsides, the Samnites
fought in separated units for better flexibility. Though Rome
would eventually conquer the Samnites, they proved a formidable
rival, defeating the Romans in several engagements and dispensing
heavy losses on their forces. In response, Rome sought to
reform its army after the Second Samnite War from the larger,
fixed body of the phalanx to a more flexible contingent contrived
of many separate units referred to as, ‘maniples,’ literally
meaning, ‘handfuls.’ 8 The maniple units were a product of social
division as much as military tactic; deployed in three main 7 Meiklejohn, “ Roman Strategy and Tactics From 509 to 205 B.C.” 170-178.8 William E.Dunstan, Ancient Rome, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 60, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost, (accessed July 26, 2012).
echelons and an additional line of skirmishers, all divided by
their social status and wealth. In the conscripted army of the
republican era before the first century B.C., soldiers were
expected to pay for their own armor and weaponry. The maniples
were assembled in groups of one hundred men known
5
as a century and were under the command of a centurion. Gaps were
left between each maniple and the maniple of the echelon behind
covered the gaps between the maniples proceeding them. The
skirmishers or velites, were of the lower class and could afford
little if any armor. They normally donned wolf skin, so to be
recognized by their commanders. The velites fought in loose
formation, carrying a javelin, sword and usually a smaller
shield. Their main use was peppering the enemy lines with
javelins to cause disruption and quickly retreating between the
gaps of the maniples, where they could fall back or continue to
support the main lines. The next line consisted of twelve hundred
Hastati or spearmen, who could afford better armor such as the
roman oval shield,(scutum),a helmet, breast plate, sword and
heavy throwing javelins known as pila. They were followed by a
second line of twelve hundred men known as Principes or first men.
They typically were on equal social status as the Hastati but
usually in their prime and more experienced than their younger
counterparts. The last group of maniples consisted of six hundred
Triarii or third men. These units were typically older and higher
in social status, donned with stronger armor and carrying a hasta,
a longer thrusting spear.9 The cavalry consisted of the higher
aristocratic classes and in many cases, the horses were
considered of such high value that they were not even used in
battle but rather rode onto the field and dismounted before
engagement.10
This deployment of the maniple legion offered a flexible
assortment of units that could act independently and fight on
uneven terrain if necessary. With gaps between each maniple, it
allowed avenues for an orderly retreat and opportunity to reform
while the other maniples engaged the enemy. Additionally, the
maniples could easily extend or compress their lines depending on
the given circumstances.
6
9 Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts : A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, 179-18010 “Gaius Marius:The Reforms and the Man” http://faculty.vassar.edu/jolott/old_courses/republic1998/marius/ (accessed August 14,2012).
This system proved to be ideal throughout the third century
and late second century B.C. Rome ultimately conquered much of
the Italian peninsula; defeating their Latin neighbors during the
Roman-Latin War, (340-338 B.C.) and overcoming their strongest
rivals, the Samnites, in a series of three wars from 343 to 290
B.C.
Yet, the true test of Rome’s maniple formations would come
against Pyrrhus of Epirus, who invaded Italy in 280 B.C., in
response to a call for aid by Tarentum, a Greek colonized city in
southern Italy. Pyrrhus’ army mirrored that of Alexander the
Great’s Hellenistic forces, which included a Phalanx formation,
war elephants, slingers, archers and cavalry. 11
Pyrrhus encountered the Roman legions in two major contests,
once in Heraclea and again in Ausculum. Though Pyrrhus won both
engagements, his losses were severe, particularly in Ausculum.
The Roman maniples used their flexibility to their advantage,
demonstrating they could retreat units without completely
breaking while sending numerous waves of maniples back at
Pyrrhus.12 More importantly, Pyrrhus could not recover from his
casualties while Roman losses, although heavy, were able to
replenish their numbers from their abundant citizen body and
11 Dunstan, Ancient Rome, 61.12 Meiklejohn, “ Roman Strategy and Tactics From 509 to 205 B.C.” 170-178.
receive aid from alliances they created throughout the Italian
peninsula. From then on, victories that came at such high of a
cost would be known as a, “Pyrrhic Victory.”
Furthermore, what Hannibal would come to learn of Roman
resolve nearly a half century later ,Pyrrhus discovered during
his attempts to negotiate with the Rome for peace. A proposal to
end further hostilities if Rome would cease aggression upon
Tarentum, along with offering captured hostages back to Rome was
met with complete rejection. Even a proposition from Pyrrhus’
doctor to poison him was turned down; Rome did not desire victory
in such a treacherous manner, only one outcome would result in
peace, the acceptance by Pyrrhus to
7
Rome’s unconditional terms that he leave Italy with his army.13
In the end, due to the casualties he had already suffered,
compounded by a new threat to Syracuse from the Carthaginians,
Pyrrhus eventually opted to cut his losses and set sail from
13 Mary R.Lefkowitz, “Pyrrhus' Negotiations with the Romans, 280-278 B. C.”Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. Vol. 64, (1959),147-177,http://www.jstor.org/stable/310940 (accessed July 30, 2012). 14 Phillip Sabin, “The Face of Roman Battle.” The Journal of Roman Studies Vol. 90 (2000). 1-17, http://www.jstor.org/stable/300198 (accessed July 18,2012).
Italy in 278 B.C., leaving Rome’s dominance over the peninsula
intact. Moreover, the maniple formations withstood possibly the
most powerful army in all of the Mediterranean, but many scholars
have since speculated on how an army divided into so many
separate units could be successful in battle, when maintaining a
single line and not exposing the flank seemed to be the favored
adage.
What historians have discovered is the victor in ancient
battle typically only lost roughly five percent of its forces to
casualties as opposed to over thirty to fifty percent by the
loser. It is difficult to comprehend how a line stretching up to
a mile long, consisting of thousands of soldiers fighting at
close range would lose only five percent, even for the victor. It
is most likely due to the engaging and retracting of the lines
during battle, a surge and defaulting of periods of fighting as
opposed to a continuous, on-going assault of opposing forces. The
emphasis most likely was also placed on defending oneself or
staying alive, as opposed to lashing out aggressively, there-by
exposing one’s self to enemy.14 This may explain some of the
strategy behind the maniple formation. If battles consisting of
a waxing and waning pattern lasting for hours were typical of
ancient warfare, then it made perfect sense to use the maniple
14
lines; having each rank line six feet behind the one before, so
as to not block the previous line from pulling back when needed.
It also allowed for entire units to retreat and replace one
another during the moments when the battle lines fell back to
their default positions. When one side finally tired, causing a
collapse in the line, a route would usually ensue, this is often
where many of casualties
8
of the losing army occurred. Men attempting to flee from battle,
sometimes dropping their weapons were then run down from behind,
mostly by cavalry.15 In a fine line between a victory and a
route, the Roman maniple’s interchanging formations gave them the
edge to outlast their enemies.
However, Rome eventually learned a harsh lesson in the
importance of tactical maneuvering at the hands of a brilliant
general from Carthage named Hannibal Barca, beginning in 218 B.C.
In what would become the Second Punic War, or sometimes referred
to as the, Hannibalistic War,” Rome’s legions were handily
defeated by Hannibal in the battle of Lake Trasimene, (217 B.C.)
and then utterly destroyed in the battle of Cannae (216 B.C.).
Rome’s aggressive nature to track down and attack their enemy
15 Ibid.,14.
head on, with a full frontal assault, played directly into the
hands of their Carthaginian nemesis. At Lake Trasimene, Hannibal
lured the Roman Consular Army under Flaminius into the narrow
passage way between the lake and a set of steep hills on the
opposing side, where the bulk of his forces waited; while several
other units exposed themselves to draw in Flaminius, who thought
he was attacking Hannibal’s rear, only to have his flanks
assaulted from the hill side. At Cannae, Hannibal deployed his
army in an outward bow formation, retracting in on itself when
the Roman maniples pressed forward, thus surrounding the Romans
and compressing their maniples into one, un-organized mass.
Further, Rome’s lack of cavalry met losing their flanks to the
Carthage horses, consequently leaving the rear of their maniples
open to an enemy charge. 16
Yet, despite these major setbacks, Rome refused to surrender
and Hannibal would not attack the city, either due to a lack of
siege works or a refusal on the part of Hannibal himself, to
which his brother Maharbal responded, “So the gods haven’t given everything
to one man, you know how to win, Hannibal, but you don’t know how use a victory!”
9
16 Richard A. Gabriel, Hannibal : The Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy [eBook], ( Potomac Books Inc., 2011), http://apus.eblib.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=864597.(accessed July 27, 2012).
While Hannibal was eventually bogged down in Italy with Rome
denying him another head-to-head confrontation, newly elected
Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio, advanced an army to attack
Carthage in Africa and began mounting multiple victories. In
response, Hannibal, with a beleaguered army and unable to
transport much of his cavalry, returned to Africa to face Scipio.
Like King Pyrrhus before him, his quest to conquer Rome would end
in failure, despite several defining victories.
Subsequently, Scipio had built an experienced army and
recognized the importance of tactic over brute force. His cavalry
units numbered in the range of six thousand, nearly twice the
amount Hannibal could place on the field. Although he managed to
replenish his forces, many of the soldiers lacked training.
Regardless, Hannibal brought his army forth against Scipio on the
battle plane of Zama, near Carthage in 202 B.C. However, this
time it would be Scipio, not Hannibal, that became the clever
tactician of the battle. Scipio altered his maniples to line one
directly behind the other, to create lanes for Hannibal’s
elephants to run through, while having his velites spear them as
they passed. He also used Hannibal’s own tactic against him;
having his cavalry overwhelm the enemy and eventually turn back
to attack Hannibal’s rear guard. Moreover, to avoid having his
men become surrounded and closed off as they had in Cannae,
Scipio kept the length of his lines separated at a farther
distance.17
Though Hannibal escaped, it marked the close of his campaign
and an end to a nightmare for Rome. Hannibal forever taught Rome
that one cannot win on military might alone, but need strong
generals on the field to make innovative decisions and to their
credit, they eventually found one in Scipio, who would be dubbed
as, “Scipio Africanus,” following his victory in Africa. However,
Rome’s struggles with Carthage were not over; they would fight
yet again in a Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.), ending in the
destruction of Carthage and the surrounding territory falling
under Roman control.
10
Although this provided Rome with an additional province and
abundant food resources, such far flung territories as Carthage
required longer military campaigns; the citizens conscripted for
such endeavors were spending longer periods of time away from
their lands, which were turning fallow. This in turn caused many
soldiers returning from war to sell their lands, for they would
starve before they were able to yield any crops. Though the
treasury paid the soldiers a stipendium while they were involved
17 Ibid.,196.
in a campaign, it was not nearly enough. During Rome’s earlier
wars, campaigns resolved around the crop cycle to allow for an
army to be levied for a war and return home for the harvest; an
ideal method when the campaigns were confined to the Italian
peninsula. However, with the final defeat of Carthage and
additional campaigns against Hellenistic enemies such as Phillip
II, along with Germanic invaders infringing on Roman provinces,
soldiers could not re-cultivate their lands in time and frontiers
of the provinces needed permanent garrisons. Consequently, a new
urban poor, resentful of the conditions they were encountering
and armed with the knowledge of military training, placed the
senate and subsequently, Rome’s entire social system in a state
of crisis.18
Yet, as Rome demonstrated their tenacity to overcome defeat
and adapt from their weaknesses in warfare, they also adapted to
the mountainous task of maintaining provinces all across the
Mediterranean, as well as dealing with their angry proletariat at
home. Yet, no Roman had a greater impact on changing the face of
the Roman Army and thus, providing the foundation that would
become the Roman Empire, than a member of the municipal
aristocracy of Arpinum and a military talent named Gaius Marius.
18 “Gaius Marius:The Reforms and the Man.”
Marius was named Consul for the first of his seven terms in
107 B.C. and with the help of his quaestor Sulla, he defeated
Jugurtha, thus ending the Jugurthine War. During this time
Marius began to deal with issues of the urban poor and distant
frontiers with one stroke. He
11
started by breaking a long time tradition of allowing only
landowners or members of aristocracy to be levied into the army.
Under Marius, the urban poor could be recruited as well, which
pleased many landowners, especially those of the aristocracy who
could now stay home and see to their lands. For the plebian
classes, this offered an opportunity to be taken care of, for the
state would provide the soldiers the costs of equipment and
weapons. They also joined eager at the prospect of obtaining
booty and land from victories during campaigns; an excellent
motivation to obtain victory. The new volunteers also were
required to take an oath of loyalty, a sacramentum, which served
more to the interests of the army commander than the state
itself. 19
19 Ibid.
Additionally, these systematic changes of recruitment
directly influenced the tactical approach of the army. Now that
volunteers were allowed to enlist and provided for by the state,
soldiers of a legion were equal in terms of equipment and the
separate lines for each social class was no longer required. What
followed was a tactical innovation by Marius to switch the
maniples into a formation known as the cohort.
The cohort intermixed what was the velites, hastati,
principes and triarii into one formation containing four hundred-
eighty soldiers that could act independently and fight their own
smaller battles upon engagement. This made the legion more
manageable and all units equal in strength. Further, Marius
required his men to carry much of their own supplies, as opposed
to a train of mules that often slowed the pace of the march. Each
soldier was given a pila muralia, or a long pole with a fork at one
end for bagging basic supplies.20 Furthermore, soldiers usually
put in a service of sixteen years but were no longer under the
care of the state following their tenure. This often meant
relying on their generals to provide land for them after a
campaign, thus converting the loyalty of the army further from
the state and more to their commanders, who in turn known to
20 Ibid.
bribe them for votes or use them as muscle to intimidate
political enemies.
12
This would gradually bring about a new course for Rome, one
that would ultimately see the fall of a long standing republic
and the rise of an empire. In the years (89-82 B.C.), Rome
encountered a new threat from the east; Mithridates VI Eupator
Dionysus. He ascended to the throne of Pontus and sought to take
control of Roman provinces in the Asia Minor and coast of the
Black Sea. He gained control of Bithynia and seized power in
Athens and eventually most of Greece. In Rome, Gaius Marius and
newly elected Consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla, rivaled for the
right to lead Roman forces against Mithridates. Between the on-
going threat in the east and the heated contests of whether non-
Roman Italians should be incorporated as citizens with voting
rights, tensions between the Optimate and Populare parties rose.
Eventually, Tribunate Sulpicius Rufus moved to have the eastern
command placed under Marius, which received harsh resistance from
the consuls and ultimately, a violent clash broke out in the
forum, with Sulla fleeing to the south to meet with his legions.
21
21 Dunstan, Ancient Rome, 153.
Following this episode, Sulla used the reforms of the
army to his advantage by promising them loot from the east if
they would attack Rome. Consequently, in 88 B.C., Rome fell under
the invasion from one of their own armies. Sulla left destruction
in his path, burning homes of those who resisted and taking the
head of Sulpicius Rufus; Marius managed escaping to North Africa.
However, when Sulla left Rome to deal with Mithridates in 88B.C.,
Consul Lucius Cinna annulled Sulla’s laws that conflicted with
the Populares’ interests and summoned Marius back from Africa,
who subsequently marched on Rome and commenced with a systematic
butchering of his opponents and Sulla allies. Yet, to the fortune
of both Marius and Cinna, they died before Sulla returned to Rome
to enact vengeance upon his enemies.22
However, the proceeding Consuls Gnaeus Papirius Carbo and
Marius’ son Gaius Marius, would not share in such fortune. In 85
B.C., Sulla completed his conquest of Mithridates,
13
allowing him to return to his Kingdom in exchange for paying a
small reprimand and giving back the control of the Roman
provinces. Thus, in 82 B.C., Sulla, along with Marcus Licinius
Crassus, a member of a consular family and the son of a previous
22 Ibid., 154.
military commander, named Gnaeus Pompeius,(Pompey), assembled an
army and destroyed the forces of Carbo and Marius to re-take
control of Rome. Following the victory, commenced witch hunts of
those who opposed Sulla and black lists were placed on walls with
the names of those who were to be killed; in return, rewards were
provided for the executioners. Sulla was subsequently proclaimed
dictator and remained in power until in 79 B.C., before retiring
to Valeria and dying the following year, leaving a legacy of fear
in the senate and ambition for military commanders that followed.
Yet, another consequence of the Sulla regime existed in
nearer Spain, where the Governor, Sertorius, romanized many of
the Spaniards and was a brilliant military trainer and commander.
He declared opposition to the Sulla Regime residing in Rome and
defeated several armies attempting to overthrow him. In 76 B.C.,
Pompey, now known as Pompey Magnus, a name given to him in
mockery by Sulla but kept by Pompey because of the term meaning,
“Great,” set forth to defeat Sertorius’ armies. However, One of
Sertorius’ junior officers killed Sertorius at a banquet and one
year later, Pompey claimed victory over the Spanish Territory. 23
Pompey’s rise to power was just beginning; Mithridates VI
was supporting piracy from Crete and Cicilia and the Roman grain
supply was being attacked. This, along with the threat of a 23 Ibid., 158.
famine, urged the senate to give Pompey unyielding power to clear
the waters of pirates and then sweep the east clear of
Mithridates. In 66 B.C., he destroyed Mithridates’ forces and
pushed further, engulfing Armenia into Roman control and united
Bithynia and Pontus as a joint Roman province. Soon after, the
Syrian city of Antioch fell to Pompey and the following year he
entered Judea and eventually conquered Jerusalem, making it an
additional client kingdom. In
14
the end, Pompey Magnus extended Roman control of the east from
Northern Asia Minor close to the borders of Egypt. 24
With such popularity and power, it was feared that Pompey
would return as a dictator, however; he came back to Rome in 62
B.C. and disbanded his army, though strong opposition from the
senate cut down his political wishes and desires to provide his
soldiers with lands. One of his political rivals, Crassus, along
with thirty seven year old Ponitfex Maximux, Gaius Julius Caesar,
were all pressing for power and in 60 B.C., the three formed a
pact known as the Triumvirate. With the united power of the
Triumvirate, Caesar locked his position as Consul in 59 B.C. and
24 Ibid., 162.
sought military conquest in Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul.
Provided with a governorship in Gaul and an army, he began a
conquest of the Gallic regions, defeating several tribes and
bringing further territory under the Roman Domain. Caesar’s stern
governorship of the newly conquered Gallic lands, along with
stripping their people from much of the produced grain during a
poor harvest, led to an uprising behind a young Arvernian
aristocrat named Vercingetorix. Vercingetorix had an
understanding of Roman military power, avoiding head to head
confrontation on many occasions, opting instead to ambush Roman
lines from the rear and deprive the Roman legions from their
supplies, while conducting slash and burn tactics on several
towns. The climax of the Gallic war occurred at the town of
Alesia in 52 B.C., where Vercingetorix and his army took refuge
against Caesar while waiting for re-enforcements to arrive. The
Roman army displayed their supreme ingenuity, building siege
works that surrounded the entire town, all the while building
palisades and ramparts in preparations of becoming sieged
themselves. As several Gallic tribes gathered into a force stated
by Caesar in his commentaries of two hundred-fifty thousand
warriors, Caesar’s army fended off attacks from both an exterior
assault and a cooperated attack by Vercingetorix from within the
town. But lack of communication between the Gallic armies, along
with the strategic lay of the fortification,
15
crippled Vercingetorix’s chances of cracking the enemy siege.
Though the number of Gauls indicated by Caesar are probably
highly exaggerated, his victory at Alesia still demonstrated the
dominance of the Roman Army over an enemy that was determined,
but lacked the organization and ingenuity of their Roman
adversaries.25 During the war with Gaul, Caesar also demonstrated
Rome’s ability to use their allies to his advantage, often
recruiting Germanic cavalry units that drove off attacks from
Vercingetorix when attempting to attack Roman supply lines and
additionally providing aid to cement victory at Alesia. Caesar
also kept alliances with certain Gallic tribes early in the war,
for Gaul was not a united body but an assortment of tribes that
banded together too late to drive off their Roman enemies.
Despite Caesar’s noteworthy accomplishments, his terms of
governor were past and he was ordered to disband his army and
return to Rome. Yet, like Sulla and Marius before him, he defied
the senate and marched on Rome in 49 B.C., provoking yet another
25 Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, Caesar : Life of a Colossus. n.p.: (Yale University Press, 2006,) 138-140, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed August 1, 2012).
civil war, this time, against his longtime ally of the
triumvirate, Pompey Magnus. In response to Caesar’s return to
Rome, Pompey and much of the senate fled, opting to develop their
army in Greece. Caesar soon followed, facing Pompey at Pharsalus.
Leading up to the conflict demonstrated the true spirit of Roman
soldiers, particularly on Caesar’s side. His troops suffered
through long periods of low food rations, reduced to eating
barley typically reserved for animals. Further, to hide
themselves from enemy arrows, they often slept far away from the
camp fires in the cold, all the while knowing they were heavily
outnumbered by Pompey’s forces at least two-to-one. Yet, this did
not discourage them to desertion, for many of Caesar’s men even
threw away their loaves of charax into Pompey’s lines as a sign
of their determination to persevere. 26 Ultimately, their
resolve served its purpose, Pompey’s men were beginning to deal
with similar hardships and pressure was mounting on Pompey to
act. Finally, on August 9, 48 B.C., the legions of Pompey
16
and Caesar stood face-to-face in the open plain of Pharsalus. If
this battle demonstrated anything in particular, it upheld the
importance of experience and tactic over the might of numbers.
Caesars men, many of which were combat war veterans, drove into 26 Ibid., 416.
the Pompeian lines while Pompey’s cavalry charged hoping to route
Caesar’s horses and expose his flank, but instead ran directly
into a line of six cohorts using their spears to repel the horse
and then flank Pompey’s right wing. Though the Pompeian lines
fought bravely, once their flank fell, the rout began and
thousands were slaughtered during the retreat.27
Although Caesar’s grand campaigns gained him territory and a
dictatorship in Rome from 49 to 44 B.C., the rivalry for power in
Rome was not quelled by any means; his assassination by his
rivals among the senate in 44 B.C. spurred on further civil war
between Optimates Brutus and Cassius against Caesar’s second in
command, Marc Anthony and Gaius Octavian, Caesar’s adopted heir.
In the end, Octavian, who took the name of Caesar and ultimately
given the title Imperator Caesar Divi Filius Augustus, won out,
defeating Marc Anthony in the battle of Actium in 27 B.C., ending
over fifty years of continued civil war and bloodshed.28
Through it all, the Marius reforms, along with the expansion
of Rome’s provinces, placed the soldiers of the Roman army into 27 Julius Caesar, “Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars: with the SupplementaryBooks Attributed to Hirtius.” Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library, http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/CaeComm.html (accessed August 17,2012).
28 David Shotter, Augustus Caesar, (Routledge,1991),27-28, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/apus/docDetail.action?docID=10099228 (accessed July28, 2012).
an advantageous position to gain lands, obtain treasure and
receive care from the state. However, this conversion also placed
military commanders in an even greater advantage to use the
loyalty of the armies to seize power, feeding into their lustful
ambitions and resulting in a tumultuous period of incessant
violence.
Yet, when the dust from the civil chaos settled,
Octavian sought to stabilize the Empire, all the while expanding
the function of the army to a more professional and permanent
standard.
17
However, Octavian was fully aware of the dangers of having such a
powerful force at his disposal. As the Roman army proved to be
the dread of many foreign enemies, it could be equally
threatening to Rome if placed under the wrong command.
To resolve such concerns, Octavian carefully selected
Legates he knew and who were loyal to him to command his legions.
He also significantly downsized the army from fifty legions to
twenty-eight; war time was over and an army of that size would be
difficult to manage and become a huge strain economically.
Further, Octavian was their sole commander and he reserved the
right to intercede in any issues that arose in the provinces. His
army was now beginning to transform from a conquering, offensive
army, to a defensive, frontier army and was the key to security
of the Empire as well as political security for Octavian. 29 But
in order to secure the loyalty of the army and maintain the
frontier, Octavian needed garrisons, with soldiers who would be
stationed there on an indefinite basis. Consequently, he often
granted citizenship to those joining the army immediately. In the
Augustus reforms, soldiers initially served a sixteen year term
that eventually increased to twenty years, with a generous
pension of three thousand denarii or thirteen years pay at the
end of service. The legates usually served on two-to-three year
terms, most likely to avoid zealous commanders and were often
appointed by Octavian directly.
The second branch reformed was the auxiliary forces,
comprising one hundred-fifty thousand soldiers. Octavian backed
his main army with these secondary units consisting of citizens
of the provinces, who found a career in the auxiliary army a
suitable way to advance themselves both politically and
financially. Following the reign of Augustus, members of the
auxiliary forces were granted full citizenship, as was their
children. 30
29 Ibid.,32.
30 Dunstan, Ancient Rome,235.
18
The third branch devised under Octavian served as a
specialized, minor unit of nine cohorts known as the Praetorian
Guard. This branch, consisting primarily of native Italians
served as the Octavian’s personal body guard. Typically, they
served only sixteen years and received a higher pay grade.
Additionally, these branches did not come at a great cost to the
provinces, the army was but a small fraction of the imperial
taxes imposed upon the people of the Empire.31
Though the reforms made the Roman legions adaptable to
protecting the frontiers and offered a profession to many non-
citizens of the Empire, Rome’s era of expansion was beginning
reach its limits and a foreshadowing of what was to come
centuries later, presented itself 9 A.D. during the Battle of
Teutoburg Forest. Rome’s grasp over Europe had now pushed all the
way to Elbe and Rhine Rivers and Germanic tribes were beginning
to settle deeper into the provinces. Three legions, the
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth, led by Publius Varus,
marched into Teutoburg Forest under false pretenses by a Roman
Aristocrat of Germanic stock named Arminius. Arminius betrayed 31 Richard Alston, Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt : A Social History, (Routledge, 1995. eBook Collection), (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed July 14, 2012).
Varus, deploying a German army throughout the forest which vastly
outnumbered the Roman legions. As they entered the forest, with
their lines stretched over many miles, they fell under attack and
were successively slaughtered. The loss proved to be so great
that Rome would never assign the numbers of these three legions
again, nor would they ever make a full scale effort to campaign
in the German frontier. Instead, Octavian would displace other
legions and move them to the western frontier for additional
security, while remaining three legions short due to the
financial burdens of having to replenish such significant
losses.32 In perhaps a case of irony, just as Rome was at its
height, amidst the dawn of an empire, its army were already
wearing thin over the grand territory it ruled.
19
Yet, the Roman Army during the era of Octavian Augustus
preserved the Empire, guarding the frontier while keeping the
peace between multi-cultural provinces, which flourished within
the framework of imperial Rome. The army’s dynamic structure made
Rome the ultimate power of the Mediterranean World; furthermore,
it became the first professional standing military that would
32 W.A. Oldfather, “The Varus Episode,” The Classical Journal .Vol. 11, No. 4 (Jan., 1916), 226-236, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3288096 (accessed July 29,2012).
influence many great nations that followed. The individual
soldiers who served are often forgotten, shadowed by the
omnipotence of their commanders, and often laid to rest in mass
burials so that the legions could move swiftly on to their next
undertaking. For in Rome, it was not customary to focus on what
was lost, only what was gained, along with the accolades of the
victors, as seen in so many triumphs. Yet, for those soldiers
who set aside enough funds, there were instances of monuments
erected by their comrades honoring the deeds of their fallen
brothers in battle. 33
From the time of the early Republic to the birth of the
Empire, these men joined the ranks of an army that was as
distinctive as the soldiers who fought for it; molded by the
dynamics of its social structure, tempered by the sting of its
defeats and broadened by the ambitions of its commanders. It was
through the peril of such adversities that the Roman army was
forged, ultimately ending the Republic and preserving one of the
greatest empires the world has ever known.
33 Valerie M. Hope, “Trophies and Tombstones: Commemorating the Roman Soldier,” World Archaeology Vol. 35, No. 1, The Social Commemoration of Warfare (Jun., 2003),79-97, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3560213(accessed July 31, 2012).
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