THE NOT-SO-HAPPIEST PLACE ON EARTH
MKTG 371MW 10:00-11:50 AM
HaddockNovember 18, 2013Robin BersierCollin BrownSean Chang
Dominique HillJessica Vargem
YaoYao Wu
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THE NOT-SO-HAPPIEST PLACE ON EARTH
Introduction and Background
Walt Disney Studio was formed in 1923 by brothers Walt and
Roy Disney in Hollywood, CA. Disney’s first sound film,
“Steamboat Willie” was released in 1928 and was an instant hit.
Since its conception Disney has continued to push the boundaries
of animation year after year. Their first feature-length
animation film, “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,” premiered in
1937 and became the highest-grossing film of the era by 1939
(Pomerantz, 2010). Countless “American classics” have been
released since, resulting in the Disney brand as well as its
reputation having become infamous worldwide. Although the history
of Disney is filled with success stories, there is one which
failed to meet expectations: Euro Disney.
Financial and Personnel Resources
Around the world the brand name Disney evokes memories of
childhood films as well as those of recent times. However, Walt
Disney as a conglomerate does much more than just produce
animated films. Subsidiaries owned by Disney include Walt Disney
Pictures, Walt Disney Animation Studios, Walt Disney Theatrical,
Walt Disney India Ltd, Pixar Animations, Marvel Entertainment,
Lucasfilm, The Muppets Studio, ABC, Radio Disney as well as an
80% share in ESPN and a 27% share in Hulu (Columbia Journal Review,
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2013). Walt Disney also provides both services such as
licensing, as well as products and services in other industries
such as cable television, publishing, broadcasting, radio, and
web portals (Walt Disney Company, 2013). Given the massive size
of this conglomerate, Disney holds substantial power within all
industries in which they operate. Revenues for 2012 were posted
at $42.278 billion USD. This large amount of revenue allows for
investments in research and development, undertaking risky
investments, and allowing for innovation in all sectors.
The first Disney theme park, “Disneyland”, located in
Anaheim, California, was opened to the general public in 1955.
The cost to build the original theme park was $17,000,000 USD
(Cal State Sacramento, 2013). The theme park was financed through
revenue generated from previous animated films.
Research Methodology and Research Findings
The methodology to the Walt Disney Company’s research when
planning Euro Disney was clearly not as sufficient as it needed
to be. Disney examined their past experience with other theme
parks and film success in foreign markets and made the assumption
that success in Paris would follow suit. Especially after Tokyo
Disneyland had opened in Tokyo, Japan in 1983 and was a huge
success (Burgoyne, 1995). This immediately made the Walt Disney
Company start thinking about opening a fourth theme park in
another foreign country. According to Burgoyne, the Disney
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executives believed that they had learned so much about operating
a theme park in another country, thanks to the success of Tokyo
Disneyland, that they decided to start looking for other
locations for a new park right away (1995). They instantly
thought of Europe as the home for the new theme park and plans to
build a European version of Disneyland had actually started in
1975 (Disney Vacation Planner, 2006). Europe was also thought of
first because Disney films have historically done better there
than in the U.S. (Burgoyne, 1995).
After they had chosen Europe, the executives searched
Britain, Germany, Spain, France, and Italy as possible sites
between 1983 and 1987, but finally narrowed it down to Spain and
France, since the others lacked a suitable large expanse of flat
land (Disney Vacation Planner, 2006). Spain was ultimately
counted out as well, even though it had the better climate,
because France had a larger population and a remarkable
transportation network (Burgoyne, 1995). The French location also
won because the executives believed that since Tokyo Disneyland
was located in a cold weather climate and had done so well, that
they would be able to operate in similar weather conditions in
Paris (Burgoyne, 1995). In addition to all of these reasons, The
French location had another major edge because of its close
proximity to Paris and its central positioning within Western
Europe. The proposed and ultimately realized location put the
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park within a 4 hour drive for about 68 million people and a two
hour flight for 300 million or so others. This was an attractive
element to the executives for future potential guests and
employees (Disney Vacation Planner, 2006).
CEO/Important Leader Profiles
Disney’s leadership team is divided into two major parts:
(1)board of directors and (2)management (Walt Disney Company,
2013). The board of directors, currently consisting of 10
members, are those who have exceptional knowledge and
considerable experience to guide the company to a better way of
operating and delivering long-term value of the company to the
market. The management of the company is a unique group that aims
to create and lead creativity and innovation globally in order to
better position the company for future success.
Michael Eisner served as Chief Executive Officer for The Walt
Disney Company during the product failure’s inception, launch,
and for a small time during the successful turnaround of the
product. Previous to The Walt Disney Company, Eisner had held
substantial positions within organizations including NBC, CBS,
and Paramount Pictures. Eisner was appointed CEO in 1984 and
helped Disney grow immediately with successful releases such as
The Little Mermaid and Who Framed Roger Rabbit (Michael Eisner
Foundation, 2010). It was under his leadership that Disney would
increase their product and service lines by acquiring new media
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firms such as ESPN and ABC. His position as CEO would come to an
end in 2005 with his resignation from the firm.
Philippe Bourguignon was appointed President of Euro Disney
in 1993 in an attempt to turn the product failure into one that
could thrive in the international marketplace. Bourguignon had
previously held high-profile positions at other organizations
including Accor Group, Club Méditerranée, the World Economic
Forum, and Miraval Resorts (Business Week, 2013). It was under his
strategic vision and guidance that Euro Disney would eventually
become a success, as will be discussed further within this
document.
Bob Iger currently serves as chairman and CEO for the
conglomerate that is The Walt Disney Company (Walt Disney
Company, 2013). He was named President of Disney in 2000 and
succeeded Eisner as CEO in 2005. Under his leadership Disney has
thrived in the numerous sectors in which they compete,
demonstrating strong leadership ability and capitalizing on the
competitive advantages Disney has in each respective segment.
Major acquisitions such as Marvel Entertainment in 2009, and
Lucasfilm in 2012 has helped Disney hold its top positions within
each sector.
Competitors
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Disney is currently the largest media conglomerate in the
world in terms of revenue. Disney is able to command a strong
market share because of the amount of capital they have to fund
research and development, as well as undergo massive marketing
campaigns for its services and products. Currently, “Dreamworks”
is Disney’s largest competitor in terms of motion picture
animated films (Walt Disney Company, 2013). Pixar Animation
Studios has been another large rival in the modern era of Disney,
however in 2006 Walt Disney announced the acquisition of Pixar in
a deal worth $7.4 billion USD (Holson, 2006). This demonstrates
the aggressive strategy which Disney employs in order to remain
the largest media conglomerate.
Because of Disney’s diversification into so many industries,
its competitors are too many too list in this document. Some of
these competitors within different sectors include CBS, Fox, NBC,
all other Broadway firms, any station which broadcasts sports,
and the list goes on. However, focusing on the theme park
industry, specifically relating to Euro Disney, the main
competitors would be “le Parc Astérix" which is also located in
Paris and “Le Futuroscope” which is located a little farther in
Poitiers, France. “Le Futuroscope” is an audiovisual and robotic
technology park based on multimedia and innovative films. Other
competitors could be "Port Aventura" in Spain and “Europa Park”
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in Germany. Although these parks are not as famous as Disney
theme parks, they attract a significant number of tourists.
If Disney had decided to bring Euro Disney to Spain, its
major competitors would include: Cortylandia, Isla Magica, Monte
Igueldo, Parque de Atracciones de Madrid, Terra Mitica, Tivoli
World, Universal Port Aventura, Aqualandia, Aquopolis, L’Aquarium
de Barcelona, and Zoo de Madrid. As demonstrated, Euro Disney has
major prospective competitors no matter where the company chooses
to place theme parks (The Best Theme Parks in Spain, 2004).
Disney operated theme parks compete with other attractions
such as rival theme parks, water parks, and amusement parks.
Disney also competes within service sectors such as recreational
facilities, cinematics, sporting events, and vacation travel.
Theme parks are also affected by economic conditions that include
gas prices and the general spending habits of consumers. Theme
parks remain competitive by finding ideal locations,
appropriately pricing products, and by differentiating said
products through innovation and research and development (Six
Flags, 2009).
Euro Disney and Why it Failed
After seeing the success of Disney theme parks within the
continental United States, Disney decided to venture into the
international marketplace. The first of these, Tokyo Disneyland
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in Japan, was met with near instant success, which further pushed
Disney to pursue other international theme parks and resorts.
On April 12, 1992 the Euro Disney Resort and Euro Disney
theme park officially opened to the general public. Initial
expectations for the theme park were extremely high, with daily
attendance predicted to be 60,000 visitors per day (Cateora &
Graham, 2007). Because of success in Japan, Disney assumed that
Euro Disney would follow suit. These expectations were short-
lived however, as Disney had made many critical errors in the
development and research of the park when planning the
introduction of the new theme park and resort. By the next month,
daily attendance was averaging 25,000 visitors a day, less than
half of what was predicted. The poor attendance can be attributed
not only to improper research but also to external factors such
as the economic recession which France was experiencing at the
time.
External Factors
Ethnocentrism played a major role in the failure of Euro
Disney’s launch which is defined as, “having or based on the idea
that your own group or culture is better or more important than
others” (Merriam-Webster.com). “Americanism” is a term used by
many across the globe to describe the spread of American cultures
imperialistic style. Disneyland Tokyo is one successful example
of Disney benefiting from this spread of “Americanism”. Japanese
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consumers are naturally curious about American culture and have
regarded America as a capitalistic model since World War II.
However, Michael Eisner personally believed that American culture
must be welcomed with open arms no matter the location. It was
because of this mentality that Eisner thought Disney would see
immediate success in Paris as it had in Japan. A major oversight
is that Eisner failed to realize that French consumers possess
very different historical backgrounds and cultural values. French
history indicates that it was twice occupied in the last century,
resulting in a deep national commitment and high insecurity
towards the invasion of foreign cultures. This principle was
displayed through the first year of operations at Euro Disney.
Local French consumers did not feel a cultural connection with
the elements at the theme park and resort. This is displayed in
the fact that American Disney characters and the arrangement of
dining areas clearly represented “Americanism”. Rather than
implement these attributes, Disney would have been better served
conducting sufficient research concerning the ethnocentrism
present within not only the French, but European culture as a
whole (Cateora & Graham, 2007).
A famous Disney theme song states, ”It’s a small world after
all,” which emphasis the important trend of globalization,
however, the world does remain quite diverse. Disney failed to
properly understand the fundamental differences between its new
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and current target markets. Recognizing that the world we live in
is more globalized than ever is key to sustaining a competitive
advantage internationally.
Cultural Norms and Fundamental Mistakes
Disney leaders, such as CEO Michael Eisner, assumed that
cultural norms and values from the United States would be
accepted and embraced by the French, which we define as the
“assumption of similarity”. Much like the United States, France
has a deep sense of pride pertaining to their identity and
liberty; this stemming from having been occupied by foreign
nations twice in the last century, as mentioned above.
Organizational policies, such as English being the only language
spoken at the park by employees and the prohibiting of alcohol
sales and consumption, were not only conflicting with cultural
norms in France, but also served as an insult to the French
(Cateora & Graham, 2007). In the United States, a cultural norm
within society is that it is bad practice to consume alcohol
(especially excessively) when children are present. Therefore the
banning of alcohol consumption in some areas where children are
present has not been met with much opposition. An example of this
is that Disneyland Anaheim does not serve any alcoholic
beverages, however, there is alcohol served at the neighboring
California Adventure theme park, which has a more young
adult/adult theme. Cultural norms of the French & European
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cultures, on the other hand, embrace and view the consumption of
alcohol in a much different manner. Drinking alcohol such as wine
is a family affair in many European nations, as reflected in
their lighter laws regarding the sale and consumption of it. An
example of the differing cultural norms considering alcohol can
also be found within the legal systems of each nation. In the
United States, drinking in public is illegal in most places,
although there are exceptions such as the cities of New Orleans
and Las Vegas. In contrast, although municipalities within French
cities can decide through an "arrêté municipal" to implement a
'no drinking in public places' law in their town, it is generally
accepted to enjoy a bottle of wine while having lunch in a park.
The difference in cultural norms stems from the enforcement of
the law rather than from the law itself. The prohibition of
alcohol at Euro Disney not only deterred adults in the region
from the theme park, but demonstrated the lack of proper consumer
profile research done by Disney prior to launch.
Another example of differing cultural norms can be found in
the way Disney planned the resort aspect of Euro Disney. Disney
assumed that consumers would seek the three day vacation stays at
Euro Disney as they do in the United States, however this was
very far from the truth. Cultural norms in Europe often consist
of Europeans only taking a single day to visit a theme park. “The
French however were not accustomed to such practices and held
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true to their customs of a month long vacation in August”
(Cateora & Graham, 2007). The failure to recognize this
fundamental difference in vacationing norms lead to the Euro
Disney Resort not being able to profit in the way it had in the
United States.
Relating to cultural norms regarding vacations, Disney
failed to account for the fact that European parents behave
differently than their American counterparts. Europeans are more
reluctant to take their children out of school to visit a theme
park. Although there is no empirical evidence to point to such a
conclusion, it seems that French parents may in fact view
schooling and education in a much more serious light. This
resulted in the further eroding of Euro Disney attendance,
especially during the long 10-month period when schools are in
session.
Marketing Issues
Disney’s insufficient marketing effort also heavily
contributed to the product failure. This lack of adequate market
research resulted in Disney marketing primarily towards children,
as how it’s done within the United States. This marketing was not
effective because French culture dictates that the final decision
on product consumption is made by adults, whom must be convinced.
This type of marketing strategy is effective in the United
States because Disney theme parks are well-established and adults
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already have positive associations with Disney theme parks by way
of their own fond childhood memories. French theme parks lack
such a well-established presence, and therefore must go above and
beyond expectations in order to convince consumers to consume
their products and services.
Planning Issues
Disney expected that consumers attending the park would
have a global experience and were expected to sleep in the
resort’s hotels and eat in the park restaurants. The company
wanted visitors to view their stay at the resort as a complete
“holiday experience”. A locational issue which was encountered
was that the park was located just 35 minutes from Central Paris,
one of the most visited cities in the world. This resulted in
many travelers preferring to visit iconic Central Paris rather
than Euro Disney during their stay. Another issue which Disney
encountered was the pricing strategy that it pursued. Prices for
a stay at the Euro Disney resort were similar to the costs of
staying in a high class hotel in Paris. This resulted in many
tourists opting to choose to spend their discretionary income on
a “genuine” Paris hotels stay rather than at the Disney theme
park.
Weather Issues
Unlike in California, Paris’s weather is not very welcoming
during a large part of the year. Disney had underestimated the
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impact of the Parisian climate—cold and rainy—during this period.
Between September to April attendance was depressed far below
normal expectations.
Management Conflict
Unlike Disneyland Tokyo, which had been locally owned and
operated, Euro Disney was owned largely by foreign investors. An
issue was that the management was outsourced and operational
decisions were made by a management team with little
understanding of the European culture or market.
Disney should have considered opening a new park in Europe
as a new experience from which it could learn from, rather than
applying of a simple model which was originated in the United
States.
Difference in European and American Standard of Design
Historically, France is a nation whose past involved
kingdoms. Because of this distinct French history, Disney had to
adapt the design of its Magic Kingdom. This change incurred
financial costs, which included an increase in budget from $2 to
$3.8 billion USD. This resulted in breakeven parameters
increasing, perhaps beyond its ability to deliver.
Economic Climate
Poor financial understanding of France’s economy had a major
impact on Euro Disney. During the time that Euro Disney opened,
France was experiencing an economic recession; with its property
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market collapsing during the early 1990’s. Disney had based
roughly 45% of its projected revenue on this market, and failed
to forecast the impact that the economic climate could have on
business in the region. Park passports at Euro Disney were priced
30% higher than those at other Disney theme parks, which provided
little incentive for locals to pay a premium to visit a local
attraction. Rather, many opted to spend the extra money and
travel to Florida’s Walt Disney World, partially because it was
viewed as “the real deal”.
What the Company did to Remedy the Problem
In 1993, The Walt Disney Company named Philippe Bourguignon,
a Frenchman, President of Euro Disney in hopes of regaining
profitability and success (Cateora & Graham, 2007). Bourguignon
immediately implemented a new marketing strategy in Europe which
was designed to target specific nations and cultures, learning
from the previous mistakes of the first year. In 1994, the name
of the park was officially changed to Disneyland Paris. This was
a necessary decision because during the first year of product
failure, the brand “Euro Disneyland” had developed a negative
brand image in the minds of consumers. “The name “Euro” was
considered as having a connotation of “business and commerce”
while the name of Paris held a connotation of romance and magic,
which was considered closer to the image that Disney wished to
project” (Liu & Wong, 1999). By using this, Disney executives
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hoped to get closer to the local French culture and that way it
would be more easily adopted by the French people.
After these changes, public perception and financial outlook
on the new product, Disneyland Paris, were much more positive. By
1996, Disneyland Paris had become the most visited theme park in
France, a remarkable turnaround from what seemed like a complete
failure just three years prior (Cateora & Graham, 2007).
Other changes within the company have also helped to sustain
the success of Disneyland Paris. The opening of Walt Disney
Studios in close proximity to Disneyland Paris, having
incorporated French filmmakers into Walt Disney Studios, has
shown local consumers that the attraction is no longer one that
is based solely upon American history and cinematic success. Even
seemingly small changes in food served has helped Disneyland
Paris become now the largest attraction in Europe (Cateora &
Graham, 2007).
In March 1994, the Disney Team publicly announced that a
restructuring of bank loans was necessary to prevent closure on
the theme park. Disney needed the banks to agree to a
restructuring of the loans which were acquired prior to the
product launch. The banks would eventually reach an agreement to
Disney’s demands. On March 14th, the banks effectively wrote off
or deferred virtually all of the next several years worth of
interest payments, and a three year postponement of further loan
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repayments. In return, the Walt Disney company wrote off $210
million in unpaid bills for services, and paid $540 million for a
49% stake in the estimated value of the park; as well as
restructured its own loan arrangement for the $210 million worth
of rides at the new park (Barrett, 1994).
To address the issue of the high entrance fee, Disneyland
Paris decided to slash admission prices by 22% in April
(Shepherd, 1995). In addition to that, the prices of restaurants
and hotels were also cut down; some hotel rooms reaching a price
reduction of up to 30% (Gail & Bloomberg, 1993). The Disney
company believed that cutting prices would help take the
threshold down and they would regard it as the first effective
strategy. In order to further fit into the French culture,
Disneyland Paris even cancelled the ban of alcohol in the theme
park and provided more French food to fulfill people’s needs.
Considering the different structure of workforce in France,
Disneyland Paris made a maximum working sheet, which allowed
French citizens to recognize their standard French job
classification. Moreover, Disneyland Paris changed their original
marketing plan to extend outside of France, which would focus
more on those who have a month-long vacation and made Disneyland
Paris as one stop of their European trip.
Losses to the Company
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By the end of 1993, the outlook for Euro Disney was grimmer
than what anyone within the firm had predicted. During its first
year of operation, the theme park and resort suffered, losing
more than 1 billion dollars; a stark contrast from the financial
success the firm had grown accustomed to within the United States
and Japan. Euro Disney had also faced persistent problems since
it opened its theme park amid great hoopla; in the year 1993,
“creditors of Euro Disney discussed a restructuring of the firm,
as the company's shares lost nearly 19% of their value. Within
the French market, Euro Disney stock fell to a record low of
$4.61; but on the New York Stock Exchange, Walt Disney's shares
were unaffected, edging up 12.5 cents to close at $39.” (Reuters,
1993)
Company Reputation
During the years of failure, the Disney reputation took a
minor hit. The largest impact in regard to reputation was
isolated largely in Europe. After the turnaround, reputations
among Europeans became much more positive. Americans and Japanese
still viewed Disney as a very positive brand during the Euro
Disney failure stage and since have grown into strong, brand
loyal consumers.
Consumer Behavior Principles that Led to the Failure
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The biggest reason for the failure of Euro Disney was the
lack of research that the Walt Disney Company had done on the
cultural values of its French consumers. It completely
disregarded what was important to the French and what types of
things defined them. Instead, Disney had an assumption of
similarity between the two cultures, thinking that since the
French culture is similar to the American culture, then they must
also think, feel, and behave the same way, or similarly to,
Americans. This is just not true. Every culture is different,
even if they may seem similar on the surface; it’s the different
histories and experiences that a culture undergoes that defines
them, and makes each culture inherently different. Disney forgot
to consider this fact when planning Euro Disney, as was
exemplified by the blatant use of American traits, such as: the
initial prohibition of alcohol, vacationing assumptions, lack of
real French culture, and clear dominance of an American culture.
The company also over-estimated the connection that Europe and
the French had with the Disney brand. These consumers clearly did
not have that extended self, “this is me” relationship with
Disney or Euro Disneyland, and this was shown through the lack of
support for the resort when it first opened. Had the company done
its research beforehand, it would have found that the French
culture is actually pretty ethnocentric, meaning that they prefer
products from their own country, and that they actually despise
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having other cultures forced upon them, since they had been
invaded by other nations in the past. The overlook of all of
these factors ultimately-and shortly-led to the failure of Euro
Disney.
Current/Future Status of Disney
It seems that the Walt Disney Company has overall learned its
lesson on building international theme parks. Since the opening
of Euro Disney (now Disneyland Paris), the company has gone into
two other international theme park ventures, both of which are in
China. Hong Kong Disneyland was the fifth Disneyland theme park
and resort to be announced (in 1998), built (beginning in 2003),
and opened (in 2005) (History, 2013). Shanghai Disneyland was
announced shortly after with construction starting in 2011 and is
set to open in 2015 (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). In the planning
of both of these new resorts, the Walt Disney Company took the
Chinese culture into greater consideration than it had with the
French/European culture when it created Euro Disneyland. For
example, Hong Kong Disneyland was “a joint venture between the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government and
Disney under the banner of Hong Kong International Theme Parks
Limited;” with the SAR Government holding 57% control of shares
and Disney holding the remaining 43% (History, 2013). Also, the
Disney Imagineers considered “feng shui, the ancient Chinese
tradition of placement and arrangement of space to try and
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achieve a kind of harmony with the environment,” during
construction; using this principle, they made sure that neither
of the hotels at the resort had a level “four,” since this number
is considered unlucky in Chinese culture because of its close
resemblance to the word “death” (History, 2013). In addition to
this, the opening of Hong Kong Disneyland featured a mix of
Disney parades and Chinese traditional celebrations.
Despite these attempts at harmony, the general reaction to
the resort was still mixed. The main reasons were the small size
of the park and underestimating the size of the crowds (the
opposite of the problem Disney had with the attendance in Euro
Disney). Surprisingly though, even with the crowding of the park
it was still producing lower than expected sales, just like Euro
Disney (History, 2013). But it was able to bounce back from these
problems faster and easier than its European counterpart, and has
remained a financial and critical success overall. Increased
ticket sales and a steady flow of people through the gates were
the results of a “combination of local and international tourist-
targeted promotional activities,…ticketing strategies, holiday
themed activities, and a genuine attempt at meeting customer
needs” (History, 2013).
As for Shanghai Disneyland, it is following suite in trying
to cater more to the Chinese culture by using “cut-in Chinese
cultural elements” (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). It will “include
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signature Disney experiences and feature exciting new elements
that will be unique to the Shanghai Disney Resort; and will be
authentically Disney, yet distinctly Chinese” (About the Resort,
n.d.). According to Disney, it will be a blend of “classic
Disney storytelling with all new attractions and experiences
designed specifically for the people of China” (About the Resort,
n.d.). The resort is already being met with mixed reviews though.
Some are saying that it will boost tourism, service, estate-
industries, and provide job opportunities, but will rival Hong
Kong Disneyland, whose investment has yet to be recovered
(Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). Other “voices from China say that
Disneyland is the symbol of American pop culture, an American
cultural spaceship of a successful joint of Commerce and
Entertainment, thus its settlement in Shanghai is a form of
“cultural aggression”” (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). Another
controversy is that the resort will be unfavorable for social
harmony because it will be “the land of happiness for children in
rich families and the land of grievance for children in poor
families”,even though Shanghai Disneyland tickets are the lowest
priced (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013). Despite all of these
negativities surrounding the resort already, “many visitors,
especially Chinese citizens, are excited about the construction
of Shanghai Disneyland” (Shanghai Disneyland, 2013).
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Even though these other Disney international theme parks are
being met with problems as well, it seems that the company learns
a new lesson with each venture it takes and applies this acquired
knowledge to its next endeavor. Same as the company’s past
experiences have gone, it is sure to turn any mistake into an
opportunity and ultimately be successful. Apparently these
problems do not hinder or discourage the company, but rather
inspires it to do better. Besides Disneyland in Anaheim, CA, Walt
Disney World in Florida, Tokyo Disneyland in Japan, Paris
Disneyland in France, Hong Kong Disneyland in China, and now
Shanghai Disneyland in China as well, the Walt Disney Company has
also expanded into other vacation ventures. It has its own cruise
line with eight destinations and four cruise ships (complete with
its own island). It has also recently opened a new spa and resort
in Hawaii called Aulani and just within the past few years it has
renovated and expanded its California Adventure park at the
Disneyland Resort in Anaheim. In addition, it is also currently
discussing plans to expand the Walt Disney World Resort in
Florida by adding a new land. In 2011, Disney held 11 of the top
25 spots for global theme park industry attendance: spots #1, 6,
7, and 8 are from parks in Walt Disney World in Florida; #2 and
14 are from the Disneyland Resort in Anaheim; #3 and 4 are from
Tokyo Disneyland; #5 and 20 are from Disneyland Paris; and #16 is
Hong Kong Disneyland (Niles, 2012). Clearly it is doing something
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right and there is no doubt that the Walt Disney Company will
continue to expand its empire, especially in the theme park and
resort industry, domestically and internationally, far into the
future.
In addition, Disney currently is experiencing massive
success in both the cinematic industry as well as in many other
industries in which it conducts business, as mentioned before.
According to the Walt Disney Company’s Annual Financial Report
and Shareholder Letter, the company realized revenues of $42.278
billion USD in 2012. This demonstrates that Disney is clearly
doing very well. Because of this success they are able to
differentiate their products and invest heavily within research
and development, giving them a competitive advantage in order to
continuously innovate existing and projected products or
services. The results are that The Walt Disney Company is the
second largest media and entertainment company in the world.
Because of the excellence they have achieved in their respective
industries the future for Disney looks very bright.
References
About the Resort. (n.d.). Shanghai Disney Resort. Retrieved from
http://en.shanghaidisneyresort.com.cn/en/about/
Barrett, Frank. (1994).Lost in France: one damp mouse: Euro
Disney is very sick. It looks like time to go home.
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Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/life
style/lost-in-france-one-damp-mouse-euro-disney-is-very-
sick-it-looks-like-time-to-go-home-frank-barrett-reports-
1396121.html
Bloomberg. (2013, November 18). Executive Profile. Retrieved
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