: Final After Action Report

: Final After Action Report I Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Exercise Date: December 13, 2017

I August 24, 2018

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: Final After Action Report I Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: December 13, 2017

I August 24, 2018

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

After Action Report 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

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After Action Report 201 7 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Table of Contents Page

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Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview .................................................................................. : ...................... 7

1.1 Exercise Details ............................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ................................................. , ........................... 8 1.3 Participating Organizations ........................................................................................... 9

Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ........................................................................................... 11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design ...................................................................................... :11 2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities ...................................................... 11 2.3 Scenario Summary ....................................................................................................... 13

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ............................................................................................... 15 3. I Exercise Evaluation and Results .................................................................................. 15 3 .2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .................................................................... 15 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................. 17

3.3.1 State of Tennessee ........................................................................................... 17 3 .3 .1.1 State Emergency Operations Center .............................................. 17 3 .3 .1.2 Joint Information Center ................................................................ 19 3.3.1.3 Dose Assessment ........................................................................... 20 3.3.1.4 Central Emergency Control Center ............................................... 21 3.3.1.5 Regional Coordination Center/Radiological Monitoring Ctrl Ctr .22 3.3.1.6 . Environmental Response/Health & Safety Capability Summary: .22 3.3.1.7 Field Monitoring Teams ................................................................ 23

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions ............................................................................................. 24 3.3.2.1 Rhea County, Tennessee ................................................................ 24

3.3.2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ...................................... 24 3.3.2.1.2 Emergency Worker & Vehicle Monitoring & Decon ... 26

3.3.2.2 Meigs County, Tennessee .............................................................. 27 3.3.2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ...................................... 27

3.3.2.3 McMinn County, Tennessee ........................................ : ................. 28 3.3.2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ...................................... 28

3.3.3 Host Jurisdictions ............................................................................................. 30 '

3.3.3.1 Roane County, Tennessee .............. ~ ............................................... 30 3.3.3.1.1 Reception and Congregate Care Center. ....................... 30

Section 4: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 33 Appendix A: Exercise Timeline ................................................................................................... 35 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders .................................................................. 37 Appendix C: Extent of Play Agreement .................................................................................. , .... 39

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Executive Summary

On December 13, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a plume exposure pathway exercise for the 10-mile emergency planning zone of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The evaluations of out of sequence activities that occurred during the weeks of July 17-21 and November 6-10, 2017, are included in this report.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess state and local preparedness in responding to a potential radiological emergency at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. It was held in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federal evaluated exercise was conducted in November 2015. The original federal approval of those plans and procedures was granted on July 8, 1985, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on July 25, 1985.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them during the exercise. The responders demonstrated their ability to mobilize, communicate with, and augment the onsite response to protect critical infrastructure, thereby protecting the health and safety of the general public. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report~

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This exercise included the State of Tennessee's emphasis on post plume recovery planning and operations, supporting the Tennessee Valley Authority in the mitigation of the event. These highlights demonstrate the commitment of all of the jurisdictions involved to improve their preparedness.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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1.1

Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Details

Exercise Name 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Type of Exercise Functional Exercise

Exercise Date December 13, 2017

Exercise Off Scenario/Out of Sequence Dates July 17-21, 2017 November 6-10, 2017

Program United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Mission Response

Scenario Type Plume Exposure Pathway Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness·Program

After Action Report

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

Kevin Keyes· Section Chief FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker .Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

Tim Holden State of Tennessee REP Program Manager TEMA 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204

Scott Schiel Emergency Preparedness Manager Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP6-B Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

Jacky Reavley Director Rhea C:ounty EMA 8860 Black Valley Road Evensville, Tennessee 37332

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2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Lorenzo Lewis Site Specialist FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

Kevin Penney State of.Tennessee Exercise Officer

.TEMA 3041Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204

Tony Finnell Director Meigs County EMA 14816 Hwy 58-S Decatur, Tennessee 37322

Tom Trotter Director McMinn County EMA 1107 S. Congress Parkway Athens, Tennessee.37303





1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Exercise.

State Jurisdictions:

Tennessee Military Department, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Tennessee.Department of Agriculture, Division of Forestry Tennessee Department of Public Safety Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health Tennessee Department of Health Tennessee Department of Transportation Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency

Risk Jurisdictions: ·

"Rhea County Meigs County McMinn County

Host Jurisdiction:':

Roane County

Private Organizations:

American Red Cross, South East Tennessee Chapter

Federal Agencies:

Tennessee Valley Authority

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2.1

2.2

Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

Exercise Purpose and Design

The Federal Emergency Management Agency administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations parts 350,351,352,353, and 354. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations 350 codifies sixteen planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. also codify the sixteen planning standards for the licensee. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with review oftherndiological emergency response plans, and verification of the periodicrequiremehts set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, along with supplements through the annual letter of certification and staff assistance visits, enabled the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken off site in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The Tennessee Multi-Jurisdiction Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant was formally submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency by the State of Tennessee on July 8, 1985. In accordance with 44 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 350, formal approval of those procedures was granted on July 25, 1985.

FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and encompass the emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Tennessee and the participating counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this

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Radiological Emergency,Preparedness Program

After Action Report . 2017 Watts Bar.Nuclear Plant

exercise were:

Operational Coordination: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Situational Assessment: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects; and the status of the response.

Public Information and Warning: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

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Environmental Response/Health and Safety:. Conduct appropriate measmes to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected

· . communities.

,On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and secure . environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Mass Care Services: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population; to include hydration; feeding, sheltering, temporary housin.g, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution. of emergency supplies.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide direction and control and make protective action decisions through the state emergency operations centers, county · emergency operations centers, and field activities by exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective,-action decisions affecting state and county emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

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After Action Report · 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

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Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system utilizing the primary notification system and the emergency alert system through exerdse play.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures in the joint information center for public and private sector emergency information communications.

Objective 6: Demoilstq1te.the ability to·monitor, decontaminate; register, and shelter evacuees.

Objective 7: Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projection and protective action decision making for the plume phase. ,

Scenario Summary · --

The following is a brief summary of the scenario developed by the Tennessee Valley Authority to drive exercise play. All scenario events are simulated and times are . approximate,

The exercise began at approximately 0800 Eastern Standard Time. At 0805 high turbine vibrations develop, and operators initiate a rapid load reduction. At 0815 the turbine trips the high vibration alarm and an Anticipated Transient without Scram occurs. Manual

· reactor trip switches do not work. Loss ofvacuum power occurs. Manual reactor;trips do not work and a loss ofvacuum power occurs,, causing reactor coolant system radiation levels to rise.

Man'ual safety actions are initiated when a rupture to the steam generator occurs and causes the turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump to fail. With the loss of fuel cladding and containment, a radiological release.occurs .. In addition to these·conditions a,refueling water storage tank leak occurs.

These scenario conditions and occurrences are mitigated and reported by Tennessee Valley Authority operators. The exercise will terminate at approximately 1330.

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Radiological,Emergency Preparedness Program

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3.1

3.2

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the December 13, 2017, full participation plume exposure pathway exercise and out of sequence activities on July 17-21 and November 6-10, 2017.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, capability targets, critical tasks, and the underlying Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria as delineated in the FEMA REP Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

• M: Met (no unresolved level 1 or level 2 findings assessed and no unresolved findings from prior exercises)

• 1 : Level 1 finding assessed • 2: Level 2 finding assessed or an unresolved level 2 finding(s) from a prior exercise • P: Plan issue • N: Not demonstrated

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are listed in Section 3 .3 of this report.

Operational Coordination: Key leadership personnel from the participating agencies established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure, which provided effective and responsive direction and control. The overall decision-making process integrated critical stakeholders, enabling protective actions and subsequent decisions to be made in a sensible and timely manner.

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Situational Assessment: Decision makers were provided with relevant information regarding assessed radiological and plant conditions. This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the hazards, any cascading effects, and to make the appropriate protective action decisions. Tennessee Emergency Management Agency and county staff were in constant communication with each other and were informed of all current circumstances which pertained to plant conditions. They made sound protective action decisions which protected-the public within the emergency planning zone surrounding the plant.

Public Information and Warning: Alert and notification of the public was made using simulated siren activation and emergency alert system messages, followed by supplemental news broadcast messages, media releases, and formal media briefings in the joint information center. These processes enabled a coordinated, prompt, and reliable public messages to be delivered to the public-and media. Public information staff demonstrated the ability to perform critical tasks associated with emergency notification ,and public information.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety: This particular core capability was demonstrated across,several disciplines to include dose assessment, radiological . monitoring control ceriter, emergency worker decontamination, and evacuee monitoring and decontamination: Personnel assessed radiological and plant conditions and made well-reasoned recommendations. and decisions. Roane, Rhea, McMinn, and Meigs County's emergency worker decontamination stations demonstrated their ability to perform.radiological mC>nitoring and decontamination of emergency workers. They were all conversant with personal protective measures and professionally execut~d assigned

. · responsibilities.

· On-Scene.Security, Protection and Law Enforcement: .The ability to ensure a safe and . .

secure environment ofan affected community-was notion~lly demonstrated during the establishment of traffic control points and the clearing of impediments. Rhea, Meigs, and McMinn Counties law enforcement representative's described theicprocedures to implement and support other counties in traffic and access control and. removal of impediments.

Mass Care: Roane County successfully demonstrated the ability to provide evacuee reception, radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees at the Roane Community College Agricultural Center reception and congregate care center as an out sequence demonstration. Roane County was the only county to demonstrate this capability during this exercise cycle. · · · · · ·

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Radiological· Emergency Preparedness Pro gram

After Action Report

3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.3.1 State of Tennessee.

3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:


The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, state emergency operations center staff · successfully demonstrated response to a radiological incident at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The staff maintained a unified, coordinated operational structure and process throughout the exercise.

State emergency operations center and TennesseeValley Authority staff were alerted and ·. mobilized in a timely manner. Staff also effectively integrated liaisons from other state

agencies and the utility. All staff members wete well trained, performed their duties in accordance with plans and procedures, and carried out their responsibilities efficiently.

The direction and control officer and assistant immediately established and maintained effective·direction and control. They kept the director and staff informe,d of evolving

·. conditions through the initial staff orientation, ,situation and staff briefs, flash reports, coordinated conference call summaries, and protective action decisions with state and local officials. The protective action decision making process effectively used and

· · coordinated all available information to make timely and well-informed 1decisfons

The state emergency operations center had sufficient space and backup power to support emergency response activities. All communication systems worked throughout the exercise, Informative displays and maps'placed throughout the facility helped staff

· remain aware of ongoing activities and enhanced situational awareness. ,I-: I

Forthis demonstration, the·following Radiological.Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.l; l.c.l, Ld.l, l.e.l, 2:a.l, 2.b.2, 3.a.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. L~vel 2 Finding: · N orie

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings:.... Resolved: None ..

e. Prior Level 2 findings - Unresolved: None

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Radiological .Emergency Preparedness Program


Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Public information officers at .the state emergency operations center successfully demonstrated the capability to deliver emergency public information. This effort was led by the state emergency information director, who participated in all of the decision group telephone conference coordination calls.

Public information, management was demonstrated at the state emergency operations center and provided necessary public messaging using a virtual joint information system until the joint information center was activated. The state emergency information director and his staff kept the state emergency operations center staff up to date on the process, used appropriate development and approval protocols, and performed media monitoring of radio, television, websites, and social media sites for awareness of any public emergency information needs. ,

Primary alert and notification of the public was demonstrated through the simulated sounding of sirens and dissemination of three,emergency alert system messages. The messages were developed consistent with language from pre-scripted templates and

-effectively informed the media and the public. The first message contained all the required elements of information .

. The second; protection action decision required the :modification of the pre-scripted · . , message.· The message was distributed with descriptions of the sectors and a statement

which said to use ''controlled evacuation routes." However, it did not include a , description of the evacuation routes ... Staff identified the inaccuracy,· self~correct_ed, and . quickly distributed. another emergency alert system message with that information.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.:a.1, 5.b.1;

a. Level lFinding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c .. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 findings - Unresolved: None

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Radiological-Emergency Preparedness Program


3.3.1.2 Joint Information Center · " ,·


Participants from the State of Tennessee, the risk counties of Rhea, McMinn, and Meigs, as well as the Tennessee Valley Authority collaborated to successfully demonstrate the ability to provide accurate, timely, and coordinated emergency information to the public and the media. In accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, most staff were prepositioned near the joint information center and arrived shortly after receiving notification of the Site Area Emergency on their mobile electronic devices. ·

Participants used an extensive array of electronic and static visual aids. A large centralized electronic status board provided good situational awareness. The joint information center contained multiple redundant communications. Network-connected computers were the primary method for exchanging documents, while both wired and wireless telephone·s were.used to participate in regular conference calls and to facilitate · quick clarification of information received from the internet.

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'The team demonstrated effective collaboration and coordination of messages prepared by the individual jurisdictions that comprise the joint information center. No joint news releases were created; rather, each jurisdiction developed emergency public information news releases that addressed the needs of their particular jurisdiction. Those.were then coordinated with all other participants., This method allowed each-jurisdiction to "stay in their lane" and remain responsible for the content of their messages. Seven news releases were created by the state and localjurisdictions along with two created by the Tennessee Valley Authority. · All news releases were disseminated to predefined email addresses in redundant ways, and all news releases were made available to media.

Following the escalation to a General Emergency, the staff recognized that' a pre--scripted message consistent with the protective action decision was not included in the plan. The state joint information center director and assistant collaborated with the state emergency operations center public information officer to modify a pre-scripted emergenGY alert system message from the plan. This was an effort amidst one of the busiest moments of the emergency. Staff later discussed and identified more efficient practices to meet this need. ''f '

Two effective media briefings were conducted .. For both briefings, the participants first met to discuss the consistency and prioritization of the intended messages. This resulted in well-organized and confident demeanors before assembled media. Consistent with their practice for written messages, spokespersons for each jurisdiction were careful to present emergency information and instructions specific to their jurisdictions. Questions from media were similarly directed to the spokesperson best suited to answer the question.

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Co-location of the rumor control element within the.joint information center enhanced the call-takers situational awareness and their ability to provide the latest and most accurate information. Nine call-takers efficiently managed rumor control and provided valuable input to the media briefings.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria was MET: 5.b.l.




d. Prior Level 2 Finding - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Finding- Unresolved: None

3.3.1.3 Dose Assessment

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

Division of Radiological Health personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to _conduct dose assessment activities, in order to provide appropriate protective action recommendations to decision makers. Assigned personnel to the state emergency

·, operations center responded-and staffed the dose assessment function when they were notified of the Site Area Emergency declaration .. The facility had adequate equipment,

. supplies, plans; procedures, and communication capabilities to support dose assessment .. tasks. ' ·

The radiation control officer directed dose assessment staff to gather plant information and field monitoring data to adeqmitely,assess-the radiological release. Dose projections were performed using a computerized tool for making independent dose and consequence projections during radiological incidents and emergencies, including '.'what if' dose projections and back calculation from field measurements for source term estimates. The radiation control officer worked closely with the Tennessee Valley Authority technical liaisons regarding plant status, and dose assessors coordinated with their utility , counterparts at the central emergency control center regarding dose as~(!SSII1ent and development of protective action recommendations. · · · ,

The radiation control officer provided effective technical consultation to Tennessee Em~rgency Management Agency decision makers regarding the level of radiological health hazards and associated protective aetion recommendations for the general public. Following the General Emergency declaration, the dose assessment staff determined that public ingestion of potassium iodide was not warranted since committed dose equivalent values were only a fraction of Environmental Protection Agency protective action guide standards.

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After Action Report.•, 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Dose limits were in place for emergency worker exposure control, as well as an approval process and methodology for e.xceeding limits for protecting valuable property or·for lifesaving activities. State field monitoring team personnel doses were routinely reported via environs radiological monitoring record forms transmitted from the radiological monitoring control center. By procedure, emergency workers in the field were authorized to self-administer potassium iodide, which was done following the.Site Area Emergency declaration.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 2.a.l, 2.b.l, 2.b.2.





e. Prior Level 2 Finding - Unresolved: None

3.3.1.4 Central Emergency Control Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:·

The Tennessee liaisons at the central emergency:control center effectively facilitated dissemination of information between the centr~lemergency control center,director, the state emergency operations center staff, and the regional coordination .center/radiological monitoring control center. Information provided to state emergency operations center dose assessment personnel expedited development of the protective action

· recommendations based on plant conditions,,.field monitoring data; .iicensee,dose, . projections, and the known·environmental.conditions.

For this capability the following RadiologicaLEmergency Prepar,edness criteria was MET: 2.b.1.


b. L~vel 2 Fin:ding: None


d: Prior Level 2 Finding ~ R~solved.: None

e. Prior Level 2 Finding - Unresolved: None , , · ·

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3.3.1.5 Regional Coordination Center/Radiological Monitoring Ctrl Ctr


The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency staff successfully demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain the regional coordinat~on center in support of emergency response to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This facility was located at the Eastern Region Office of the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency in Knoxville, Tennessee. Personnel were notified by the state emergency operations center through standardcalldown lists and telephone notification systems. Responders were notified and responded in a timely mahner, and were furnished all.necessary equipment and reference materials upon their arrival. Primary and l?ackup communication devices were available and used

· effectively to manage emergency operations.

Effective direction and control was provided by the regional coordination center director. He was supported by an assistant director and several agency personnel. The facility was well equipped with maps, displays, and electronic projection equipment that provided excellent visual representation of pertinent reference materials. No decisions for protective actions were made at this location and there was no need or requirement for dosimetry or potassium iodide for responders at this facility,

For this demonstration the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.1, l.e.l, 2.a.l, 3.a.l.




d. Prior Level 2 Finding- Resolved: 'l'•fone .

e. Prior Level 2 Finding-Unresolved: None

3.3.1.6 Environmental Response/Health & Safety Capability Summary:

The State of Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to coordinate field monitoring activities from the radiological monitoring control center in response to an event at Watts Bar·Nuclear Plant The radiological monitoring control center was co-

, located.with the regional coordination center. ·Personnel reporting to the radiological monitoring control center would respond from Division of Radiological Health offices in

· Nashville, Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Memphis for 24.-hour staffing.·

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The facility was sufficiently equipped for field monitoring team management. The radiological monitoring coordinator, Division of Radiological Health coordinator, and his assistant worked as a team to manage field team operations, The radiological monitoring coordinator was knowledgeable of the administrative dose limits for emergency workers and the process to authorize radiation:exposure in excess ofthese·limits. He provided a deta.iled radiological briefing to the field teams. Potassium iodide ingestion was authorized for the field team members upon dispatch. The radiological monitodng coordinator monitored meteorological conditions and directed field team traverses, surveys, and sampling. Throughout the exercise; he locatedthe teams·at the appropriate downwind locations to verify and quantify the radiological release. The field monitoring teams made and recorded radiation survey and air sample rri:easurements at appropriate locatfohs to' locate the plume edge boundaries. Air sample particulate and cartridge net counts were converted to particulate and radioiodine concentrations and transmitted to the state emergency operations center personnel for comparison with dose projections.

For this demonstration the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 4.a.2.


b. Level 2 Finding: None ·




3.3.1.7 Field Monitoring Teams

Environmental Response/Health & Safety C3:pability Summary:

The.State of Tennessee radiological field monitoring teams successfully demonstrated use and supply of equipment, the ability to define and sample the radiological plume, and monitoring of radiological exposure .. Two teams consisted of staff from the Tennessee· Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health, prepositioned· at the radiologicalm0nitoring·c0Iitrol center. The·field monitoring teams explained- their normal activation process. , -

The teams were supplied with communieation equipment prior to deployment.. All other equipment and supplies were brought from the regional offices, The teams inventoried, prepared, and checked·all equipment, dosimetry and radiological survey instruments prior to field deployment. Each team was equipped with sufficient supplies and equipment to perform field monitoring and sampling. The teams were briefed on plant status, traffic alerts, meteorological conditions, and dosimetry issues. Each team described and demonstrated proper use of dosimetry, exposure monitoring, record-keeping, and the use of potassium iodide. Although workers wore their daily occupational permanent-record

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dosimeters, the plan was to provide event-specific dosimeters for field teams. In accordance with the extent-of-play agreement .these were simulated.

0nce deployed, the field teams used proper monitoring and air sampling techniques to track and determine the edges of the plume, limiting the exposure they would receive. Monitoring and samplingresults were forwarded to the Division-of Radiological Health coordinator. Eachteani followed their procedures to collect an air sample per instruction from the radiological monitoring control.center. The samples were-transported to a background location and counted, and results were transmitted to the coordinator. The two teams delivered samples to the sample collection facility and demonstrated proper chain-of-custody procedures.

For this demonstration the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: La.I, l.e.l, 3.aJ, 4.a.3.



c. Not.Demonstrated: None·



3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Rhea County, Tennessee

3.3.2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability So.m~ary: .

The Rhea County Emergency Maliagentent'Director and staff demonstrated effective procedures to establish and mai_~tain a unified and. CO<Jtdinated operaf10nal structure.

. Alert and notification o,f the emergency operations center staff was .timely. There were multiple communications systems available, and all functioned throughout the exercise ~itho~t fail;. The. facility was adeq~ate ~a.nd had sufficient equipment available, which included maps and implementing procedur·es for each agency. Said facility was

. augrrientedby an autbrriated information ~~agement system, which provided the director 'and staff. with sufficient inf.on.nation to support emergency operations. . .

• • ••• ' •. '!. '\. • •• : ••• ,,, • ' • . .

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Radiological 'Emergency Preparedness Program


Rhea County demonstrated the capability to implement protective actions to protect emergency workers and the general public. The radiological officer issued dosimetry and potassium iodide to emergency workers in accordance with their plans and implementing procedures. The Rhea County Sheriffs Office called in off-duty and reserve deputies to stage at the Training Center where they were issued emergency worker,exposure control equipment. Dosimetry was checked at 15-minute intervals throughout the exercise and records were kept of the readings. Potassium iodide was available in the event of a decision to recommend ingestion, which did not occur during this exercise.

Protective actions for persons with disabilities and access or functional needs, which involved sheltering and evacuating, were taken in the sectors affected. Support staff identified transportation assets to support the relocation of schools and access/functional needs populations. • In order to facilitate the protective action decision to evacuate sectors within five miles of the plant, traffic and access control points were.notionally established. Injected impediments to evacuation, to include a tractor-trailer explosion on State Route 56 and Garland Lane, were identified, worked, and collaboratively resolved.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: I.a.I, l.c.l, l.d.l, l.e.l, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.






Public Information and Warning Capability ~umiµary:

The Rhea County Emergency Operations Center staff delivered coordinated, prompt, and reliable inforination to the, communi(y during the: exercise. The emergency management director effectively conferred with the state and ,risk c;:ounties on the status of t,he incident at the plant and the resuiting protective action decisions, which included both sheltering and evacuation of ~ectors within five miles of th~ plant. The sirens were riotfo:qally activated and an' emergency alert system Ill.essage was broaq.cast (simtil~ted) by the state emerg~ncy operations center staff. No· siren faUwes were ideritifi(!d, although officers in Rhea County were standing by to peifoqn route alerting if siren: fi:tilures had occurred. The Rhea County Public Information Officer was in freque~t communication with the joint information center, and kept the emergency management director informed of actions being taken to communicate emergency information to the public.

25



For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.a.l, 5.a.3, 5.b.1.



c.. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Finding-.Resolved: None


3.3.2.L2 Emergency Worker & Vehicle Monitoring & Decon

Environmental Response/Health & Safety Capability Summary:

Monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their vehicles was· successfully demonstrated by members of the Rhea County, Emergency Services, Sheriffs Office, Tennessee Department of Agriculture-Forestry, and Tennessee

· Department of Health- Rhea County.

Personnel from the agencies demonstrated.that procedures and resources were sufficient to accomplish the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their vehicles. Emergency workers received a safety briefing on exposure control and cross · contamination concerns; and theywere;issued personal and pertnanent-record dosimetry. Radiological survey instruments Were properly inspected and put into operatioh by those who were using them. Participants demonstrated appropriate survey and decontamination techniques. All activities were completed in.accordance with county procedures as they would be in an actual emergency, and demonstrated .the county had adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and vehicles.

For this capability the following Radi~16gical .Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 1.e.l, 3.a.l, 6.b.1.


b. Level 2 Finding: None .· !' . ,, ' •,

. , c. , Not Demonstrated:, None . .

d.• P~fo~ Level 2'Findiiig., Re~ofveci:' None

e. Prior Level 2 Finding- Unresolved: ·None

... ,. ,·r· ..

26



Radiolo·gical Emergency Preparedness Program

After Action Report

3.3.2.2 Meigs County, Tennessee

3.3.2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center


2017 Watts -Bar Nuclear Plant

The Meigs County Emergency Operations Center staff demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The emergency management director conducted frequent and timely staff updates and discussions. The staff operated as a cohesive unit, following procedures to arrive at and implement protective action decisions. Multiple communication systems were demonstrated insuring dependable, redundant capabilities. Office equipment and office supplies were more than adequate to support extended operations.

The director actively participated in the conference calls with the state and risk counties to discuss and formulate protective action decisions. The Meigs County Radiological Officer effectively managed radiological exposure control equipment, supplies, and training: Meigs County Emergency Medical Services staff identified and assisted access and functional needs individuals. The county school liaison simulated the mobilization of buses and coordinated a timely evacuation of schools. The Sheriffs Office deputy worked well with the Highway Department to-identify and resolve traffic impediments and to activate appropriate traffic control points.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: La.I, l.cJ;, l.d. l, l.e.l; 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.l, 3;a.l,3.h.1, 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, 3.d_.2.: ·

· a. Level 1' Finding:' None

b. Level 2 Finding! None ' I ' '


d. Prio,r Level 2 Finding - Resolved: None . . - .. .



The activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public were completed in a timely manner following the initial decision: formulated ori the conference call with Rhea County, McMinn County, and the Tenness~e E.:mergency Man4gement Agency. All of the county schools were notified by telephone, tone alert }aaios, and the activation of the prompt notification system (done at the state emergency·operations center). County public information liaisons maintained close contact with their counterparts at the state emergency operations center and the joint information center. The Meigs County Public Information Officer provided information about the actions taken in Meigs County as a result of the protective action decisions.

27



Meigs County successfully demonstrated the ability to manage and perform backup route alerting both by interview and demonstration. Personnel interviewed were familiar with personal dosimetry and procedures for consuming potassium iodide. They were aware of the reporting and documentation requirements relating to radiation exposure and consumption of potassium iodine. Route alerting was performed by the county sheriffs office vehicles with public address systems. Communications with the officers and their dispatch was redundant. The law enforcement officers were issued packets which included operationinstructions. Each packet had a pre-scripted message to be read over the public address system with specific instru.ctions for freq11ency of the announcement. They were briefed on the specific routes to follow based upon the individual siren failure. The route was a residential area, which took five minutes to reach, and the area could be covered in 20 minutes with one vehicle. Law enforcement officers were knowledgeable of their mission and performed their assigned tasks in a professional manner.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.a.l, 5.a.3, 5,b,l.


b .. Level 2 Finding: None


· d .. PriorLevel.2 Finding - Resolved: None ' . ( . ,',:,

e. Prior Level2 Finding-Unresolved: None

3.3.2.3 McMinn County, Tennessee

3.3.2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ..

Operational Coordination Capability Summary: -.

The McMinn County Emergency Management Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the ability to respond to a radiological incident at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. They successfully established and maintained a unified,.coordinated operational structure and process. ' · ·' · ·

The director explained the alert, notificati_on, and mqbilization procedures to activate the emergency operations center. Staff would have. been Contacted by telephone using a 24-hour staffing roster. Multiple communication systems were available and operated properly. Appropriate links were established and maintained with appropriate locations over landline telephone, cellular telephone, emergency services radio networks, and amateur radio networks. Electronic communications over various computer systems were used and observed. There were no failures during the use of these systems. The emergency operations center had sufficient equipment, maps, displays, monitoring

28


I I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I



instruments, potassium iodide, dosimetry, and other supplies to support emergency operations.

The McMinn County Director, under the direction of the county mayor, had the primary leadership role in providing effective direction and control to the county response effort. This leadership ability was demonstrated when the county had to pause their exercise play midway through the exercise in order for staff to respond to a real-life emergency at a local manufacturing facility. Using actual information obtained earlier during exercise play, they assisted in a large scale medical response thafsaw approximately 18 people transported to three area hospitals .. This response' saw action from the staff including the county director, mayor, sheriff~ fire chief, emergency medical services chief, hospital representative, City of Athep.s Fire Chief, and various other support staff. The director and his staff then smoothly returned to exercise pa~icipation.

Effective radiation exposure controls were in place. The director ensured that dosimetry and potassium iodide was available for county emergency workers, and managed radiological exposure of emergency workers in accordance with plans arid procedures. Although no emergency workers were issued equipment, the staff was prepared to ensure they would periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate forms, to include appropi:iate record-keeping of the administration of potassium iodide. · ' · · ·

The county was capable of implementing appropriate protectiv~ action decisjons for both persons with disabilities and access or functionaf needs. Pota~sium iodide and appropriate instructions were available should a decision to recommend the use of potassium iodide for the general public and institutionalized individuals be made. One public school was in the affected area; effective planningand comdination resulted-in.the· safe relocation of the students and faculty. The staff established appropriate traffic and access control, and the ability to identify and resolve traffic impediments.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.l, l.c:1, l.d.l, l.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.



c. Not Demonstrated: None . . , . . . .

d. Prior Level 2 Finding - .Res,olved: None


29



Pt1blic Information and Warning Capability Summary:

McMinn County Emergency Management Agency was primarily responsible for ensuring that the county received public information and warning notifications. However, the responsibility for activating,the 101 sirens comprising the Public Notification System for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, as well as issuing Emergency Alert System messages, resided with the State of Tennessee out of the state emergency. operations center, Rhea County served as the backup for the state in activation of the sirens and messages. There were three simulated activations of the sirens and Emergency Alert System message broadcasts during the exercise. There were no siren failures in McMinn County for this exercise. Through interview, the McMinn County Sheriffs Office representative described how backup route alerting would be accomplished by law enforcement personnel should siren failures occur.

All news releases were prepared and issued from the joint information center. McMinn County had a public information officer assigned to this location. During the exercise, there were seven public inquiry injects-at the county emergency operations center .that were referred to the county public information officer. at the joint.information center for response.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: .5.aJ, 5.a.3; 5.b. l.




d. Prior Level 2 Finding- Resolved: None


3.3.3 Host Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Roane County, Tennessee

3.3.3.1.1 Reception and Congregate Care Center

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

Roane County Emergency Management successfully demonstrated their ability to conduct reception center monitoring and decontamination. The reception area had sufficient parking and space to handle vehicles and evacuees. Equipment and supplies were available to handle the expected number of evacuees. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of exposure and contamination limits and the need to read their dosimeters frequently. Emergency workers in the decontamination stations were

30





knowledgeable of how to place instruments into service· and how to use them to perform surveys. Signage and plans were well placed in the decontamination areas to help workers perform their tasks. The Roane County Sheriff's Office and Roane College Police Department law enforcement officers provided effective seburity. All staff members of the reception center performed their duties and responsibilities according to their plans and procedures.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.l, l.e.l, 3.a.l, 6.a.L ·

Mass Care Services Capability Summary:

Roane County Emergency Management successfully demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain a congregate care center. Staff of the East Tennessee Chapter of the American Red Cross demonstrated their ability to register evacuees,- issue potassium iodide, and conduct shelter operations.• The congregate care portion of the facility had ample space to provide for the temporary needs and services of evacuees.· Roane County Sheriffs Office and the Roane College Police Department provided security for the congregate care center. All staff members performed their duties and responsibilities effectively.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.e.l, 3.b.l, 6.c.l.




d. Prior Level 2 Finding - Resolved: Norn,! '.' ,, j !


,')

31




32





Section 4: Conclusion

Overall, the exercise was a success. State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. Highlights of the exercise included the State of Tennessee's emphasis on post plume recovery planning and operations supporting the Tennessee Valley Authority. The highlights demonstrated the commitment of all jurisdictions involved to improve their preparedness to respond to an incident at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency would like to acknowledge the exceptional efforts of the many individuals who planned, prepared for, and participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still, others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. The countless hours of training, facilitated discussions, tabletop exercise, and integrated training drill were well-worth the time and investment of all who participated.

33

Radiological' Emergency Preparedness Program


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·34 '..


-------------------Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

After Action Report

Emergency Time Utiliti Classification Declared -·

Level or Event --

Notification of Unusual Event NIA Alert NIA Site Area Emergency 0821 General Emer2encv 1052

Simulated Rad. Release Started 1049

Simulated Rad. Release Ended Ongoing

Facility Declared Operational NIA Exercise Terminated 1305

----------------Declaration of State of Emergency Precautionary Actions: clear waterways, stop rail traffic, clear <!-irspace, relocate schools 1st Protective Action Decision: Stay tuned

1st Siren Activation

pt EAS Messages: 4, 7

2nd Protective Action Decision: Evac: Al, Bl, Cl, Dl Shelter: A3, A2, B2, B3, B4, C4, C5, C7, C8, D2, D4, D5, D7

2nd Siren Activation

2nd EAS Message: 43; modified

3rd Protective Action Decision: Evac: Al, A2, A3, Bl, Cl, DI, D3, D5 Shelter: B2, B3, B4, C2, C4, C5, C7, C8, D2, D4, D7

3rd Siren Activation

3rd EAS Message

KI Ingestion Decision: no KI (except field teams)


Appendix A: Exercise Timeline Watts Bar 2017

Time Notification Was Received or Action Take_ri

SEOC DOSE- . JIC CEC€. "RCC RMCC Rhea

.. : · County NIA NIA NIA NA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NA NIA NIA NIA 0832 0832 0834 0830 0835 0835 0835 1109 1109 1104 1052 1110 1110 1110

1102 1102 1050 1049 1102 1102 1102

Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing

0827 0827 1000 0901 0849 0830 0853 -·

1329 1329 1330 1330 1335 1310 1335

0832 0832 0834 0834 0834 0834 0834

0832 NIA NIA 0854 0830 NIA 0902 .. -

0846 0846 0846 0846 0846 NIA 0846

0850 0850 0850 0850 0850 NIA 0850

0853 0853 0853 0853 0853 NIA * ..

1117 1117 1117 1132 1117 1117 1117

1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 NIA 1130

1137 1137 1137 1152 1137 NIA *

1310 1310 1310 1320 1310 NIA 1310

1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 NIA 1320

1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 NIA * 1205 1205 1205 0930 NIA 0930 NIA

McMinn County

NIA NIA 0835 1110

1102

Ongoing

0856

1337

0834

0847

0846

0850

*

1117

1130

*

1310

1320

* NIA .

EAS broadcast time was not relayed to the counties by the State

35

.

Meigs County NIA NIA 0835 1110

1102 --

Ongoing

0845

1340.

0834-.

0852

0846

0850

*

1117

1130 ·

*

1310

1320

* NIA


After Actiori Report 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

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36


I 1,

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I


After Action Report 2017 Watts Bar. Nuclear Plant

Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders

Regional Assistance Committee Chair: Randall L. Hecht

North Section Chief: JT Ackermann Site Specialist: Lorenzo Lewis

Location / Venue Evaluation Team Core Capabilitv State of Tennessee:

Odis Spencer,

SEOC Candace Burrell Operational Coordination Mark Christiansen, Public Information and Warning Danny Loomis

Dose Assessment BradMcRee Environmental Response/Health and Safety John Simpson

Joint Information System Brenda Rembert, Public Information and Warning Tom Hegele

CECC Marcy Campbell Operational Coordination

RCC Mark Dalton Operational Coordination

RMCC Jill Leatherman Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Field Teams (2) Deborah Blunt,

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Bart Ray Rhea Countv;

Lorenzo Lewis ; Operational Coordination EOC

Rebecca Thomson Public Information and Warning

JT Ackermann, EWD (OOS) Matt Bradley, Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Lorenzo Lewis Mei!!s Countv: ,,

EOC James Greer, Operational Coordination Meg Swearingen Public Information and Warning

Backup Route Alert (OOS) Lorenzo Lewis Public Information and Warning

McMinn Countv:

EOC· Gary Bolender, Operational Coordination Bruce Swiren Public Information and Warning Lorenzo Lewis,

EWD(OOS) Walt Cushman, Environmental Response/Health and Safety JT Ackermann

Roane County: JT Ackermann,

Environmental Response/Health and Safety RCCC (OOS) Matt Bradley, Lorenzo Lewis Mass Care

37

Radiological Emergency Preparedness.Program

After Action Report ' 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

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38




After Action Report. 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Appendix C: Extent of Play Agreement

:m De~a:tmentof I TEMA - .M1L1tary -

Patrick C. Sheehan TEMA Director

Major General: Terry Max Haston The Adjutant General

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

GRADED EVALUATION EXERCISE (Full Scale Plume Phase Exercise)

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

2017 FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual event. This extent orplay_agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception, it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard or suggested operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated if allowed by the RAC Chair or as listed herein. This allowance rhay be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and mutually agreed to by the TEMA lead controller and FEMA lead evaluator, as designated by the RAC Chair.

- .

The State of Tennessee and TVA have prepared goals addressing respective obligations. Both reflect the necessary.interactions between the State and local governments as well as TV A as set forth in the Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) for the TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

NOTE: All exercise times are Eastern Standard/Daylight Time (EST).

Exercise Date: December 13, 2017 Exercise Start Time: 0800

Exercise Objectives

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Direction and Control and make coordinated protective action decisions through the State Emergency Operations Centers, County Emergency Operations Centers, and Regional Coordination Center by exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies)-Response / Operational Coordination

39



Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers, access/functional needs, schools and the public through applicable exercise demonstration.

Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies) - Response/Environmental Response Health & Safety; OnScene Security, Protection & Law Enforcement; Critical Transportation.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to perform plume-phase field measurements and analysis utilizing simulated State field team data artd discussion of plans and procedures. Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies)-Response / Situational Assessment; Environmental Response Health & Safety

Objective .4: Demonstrate ability to notify the public via silent activation of the Prompt Notification System (PNS) to include the simulated release of an Emergency Alert Sy~tem (EAS) message. Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies)-Response / Public Information & Warning

Objective 5: Demonstrate the ability to formulate, coordinate and release public information in a timely manner. Mission Area / Core Capability (ies) - Response/ Public Information & Warning

Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, decontaminate and register and provide mass care of evacuees, emergency workers. arid their vehicles. Mission Area / Core Capability (ies) - Response / Mass Care

Exercise Evaluation Criteria

Capability: Operational Coordination

Establish and.maintain.a unified and coordinated operational struc;ture and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

This capability will be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center, Forward Coordination Center, Central Emergency Control Center, Rhea, McMinn and Meigs County EOCs.

Target:. Emergency Operations Management

: Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert; notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (Criterion 1.a. l ).

Participants may be prepositi9ned inproximity to their assigned response locations. Participants will not be allowed to enter their assigned ex,ercise location prior to receiving activation/notification in accordance with plans and procedures.

40



Radiological Emergency Preparedness ·Progr'am


All notifications to adjacent states,: Federal government agencies and railroads will be simulated and verbalized-to evaluators.

Discussion of agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staff may be discussed with participants as appropriate.

Critical Task: Key personnel with leadership roles for the Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654 A.l.d; A.2.a, b;·A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion l .c. l ).

Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations · (Criterion l.d. l ). ·

In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support ·emergency operations (Criterion l.e. l ).

· In ·accordance with plans and procedures. State and county Staff Assistance Visits(SAVs) were completed during the week of April 3-7,'20]7.: .TEMA Radiolqgical Shop will be week of July 1 ?h. McMinn EMA was April 3r~ Meigs and Rhea Co. EMA ·,s April 4th, Bradley County and Hamilton EMA April 5th.

Target: Protective Action Decision Making

Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that ati exposure control system; including the·use of . KI (if appropriate), is in place·for EW s including provisions to authorize radiation · exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a. l ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. This critical task will be demons'frated atthe SEOC and risk county EOCs, (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea).

Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make Protective Actions Decisions for the general public (including the recommendation for the use· of potassium iodine (KI), if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.b.2).

In accordance with plans and procedures at the SEOC and risk counties .. At the .SEOC, solely from the DACO 's perspective.·

41



Critical Task: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs ( Criterion 2.c. l ).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs in accordance with plans and procedures.

Target: Protective Action Implementation

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and·manage radiological exposure to EW s in accordance with the plans/procedures. EW s periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1).

In a.ccordance with plans and procedures from a managementperspective. Issuance of Kl,to emergency workers will be explained and completed during out of sequence activities.

Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to.recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for · institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.l).

If applicable, this critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures. The issuance of Kl will be simulated.

.. · Critical Task: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.other.than schools within areas subject to protective actions (Criterion 3.c. l ).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate. Personal information relatiye to access and functional needs individuals ·will not be copied or removed from the EOC by the FEMA evahfation team.

Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Criterion 3.d.l) .

. Critical Task: Impedim:ents to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654 '. I 10.k; Criterion 3 .d.2) ..

42

V


I




This critical task will be demonstrated at the :risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate.

Capability: Operational Communications

Ensure the capability for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC, RCC, McMinn, Meigs and Rhea County EOCs.

Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communications links are·established and·maintained.with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations ( Criterion 1.d. l).

Capability: Situational Assessment

Provide aH decision makers with decision-relevantinformation regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

This capability will.be demonstrated at the·SEOC by Dose Assessment. . \

Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination,- to ensure that an exposure control system, including-the use of

· Kl, is in place for EWs including provisions to'authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a.l).

In accordance with plans and procedure's.

· Critical Task: Appropriate PARs are based'on available information on plant condition, field monitoring data,and licensee andOROdose prbjecti0ns, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions (Criterion 2.b.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures.'

Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make P ADs for the general public· (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.b.2).

In accordance with plans and procedure

43



Capability: Public Information and Warning

Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC, McMinn, Meigs and Rhea County EOCs, and Joint Information Center.

Target:· Emergency Notification and Public Information

Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed·in a.timely manner following the ini.tial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public. must include, ·at a minimu.m, the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Criterion5.a.1) ...

This critical task will be demonstrated during the graded exercise on December 13, 2017. As part of out of sequence demonstration on.July 19, 201 ?, ,Rhea County participants . responsible for the activation of the PNS will discuss procedures for activations and demonstrate same up to the point of activation. Sirens will not be activated. The State Emergency Information Director or designee will discuss procedures for the formulation, approval, release, receipt, acknowledgment/validation and broadcast of an EAS message. EAS message will not be transmitted or.broadcast. · ·

As part of the graded evaluation, the initial activation of the PNS to include EAS will be simulated by the State Emergencylnforination Director or designee as applicable. Applicable EAS message formulation(s) and approval(s) will be demonstrated. EAS message(s) will not be given to. the watch point.

Critical Task: Backup alert notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (Criterion 5.a;3):.

Backup route alerting will be demonstrated out of sequence by Meigs County on July 19, 2017.

As part of the graded evaluation, McMinn, Meigs and Rhea County participants will discuss backup route alerting with evaluators as applicable.

44





Critical Task: Ensure OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner (The responsible ORO ' ' ' personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Criterion -5.b.l).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the SEOC, risk County EOCs, and Joint Information Center.

The Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel, State/local and TVA, can be prepositioned in area. Using a virtual joint information system, public information management will be demonstrated and provide the necessary public messaging until the JIC is activated and made.operational in:accordance.with established procedures. Locally available State PIOs may be utilized in the JIC to supplement TEMA PIOs.

Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

!

Ensure the· availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous · materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support.of the responder operations and the affected commuriities.

This capability will ·be demonstrated at the RMCC, by the radiological field monitoring teams and Rhea and McMinn-Counties.as applicable.

The following task will be demonstrated byDRH RMCC.

Critical Task: Field teams (two) are managed to obtain sufficient information tQ help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure (Criterion 4.a.2).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the RMCC in accordance with plans and procedures. '

The following three tasks will be demonstrated by the State Radiological Field ·· Monitoring teams. ,

'\ .

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1.e.1).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent-record dosimetry and Ki may be used

45

(_


\ After Action Report 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

I

Critical Task: OROs.issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read. their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KJto EWs (Criterion 3.a.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent-record dosimetry and Ki may be used.

' . Critical Task: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low-background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected o,nthe sampling media (Criterion 4.a.3).

In accordance with plans and pro.cedures.

The following three tasks will be demonstrated out of sequence by Rhea County on July 18, 2017 at the Rhea Central Elementary School EWD site. Due to location change of decontamination point a non-graded drill will also· take place on July 20, 2017 at the new McMinn County High School EWD site.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KL and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1. e. l ).

In accordance withplans and procedures. A prop for permanent-record dpsimetry and , . Kl may be ·used.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (Criterion 3.a. l).

In accordance with plans andprocedures. A prop for permanent-record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task: The facility/ORO had adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination .of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles (Criteria 6.b.l). ·

Monitoring of emergency workers and their vehicles will be demonstrated in accordance with plans and procedures. The set up and operational checks of radiological monitoring instruments is an evaluative component and will be completed with an evaluator. Decontamination of emergency workers, at least one, will be simulated in accordance

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with plans and procedures. Simulated contamination will be given by controller inject. Physical decontamination of an emergency worker vehicle will be demonstrated in

·. accordance with plans and procedures.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be availablefor wear in accordance with plans and procedures. Actual donning/doffing of PP E will be a lead controller and lead evaluator decision at the time of the activity. ·

Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement

Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all

_ traditional arid atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence on July 18, 2017 by the Rhea County EMA and Rhea County Sheriffs Office during the Emergency Worker Decontamination · evaluation at Rhea Central Elementary School.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments; dosimetry, KL and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1. e.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent-record dosimetry and KI may be used '

Critical Task: OR Os issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3. a. I).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A-prop for permanent-record.dosimetry and KI may be used

Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access'control personnel (Criterion 3 .d. l ).


Critical Task· Impediments to evacuation are identified and .resolved,(Criterion 3 .d.2).


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Capability: Mass Care

Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding and sheltering to those who have the most need as well as support for .reunifying families.·.

This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence during the week of November 7, 201 7 by the Roane County EMA and Roane County Health Department at Roane State Community College. These activities are done in conjunction with the State Health department.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and ·other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1. e.1 ).

In accordanee with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent-record dosimetry and Kl may be used. ·

Critical Task: OR Os issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/proc.edures. EWs periodically and at the end of each .mission read their dosimeters and record the readings 'on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OR Os maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (Criterion 3. a.I).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent-record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.1).

In accordance with plans and procedures. Kl will not be distributed but procedures for distribution will be discussed.

Critical Task: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees (Criterion 6.a.1 ).

Radiological monitoring, decontamination and registration facilities for evacuees will be set up in accordance with plans and procedures. The set up and operational checks of radiological monitoring instruments is an evaluative component and will be completed with an evaluator. Counties will have one-third of the resources available at the facility for this demonstration as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period. The remaining two-thirds of the necessary resources will be demonstrated by the counties providing valid documentation reflecting how/where the equipment and staff will be procured/stored/respond from.

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After ActionReport·. 2017 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

A minimum of six evacuees, of which at least one being a female and tw<? of which will be contaminated (simulated) including the female, be available for monitoring, registration and decontamination as applicable. A minimum for two evacuee vehicles, one of which will be contaminated (simulated) will be availablefor monitoring, registration and decontamination as applicable. Simulated.contamination will be given by controller inject. Physical decontamination of evacuees and vehicles will be simulated.and in _ accordance withplans and procedures . .

PPE will be available and will be used at the controller/evaluator's discretion.

Critical Task: Managers of congregate care·facilities demonstrate that the centeys have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedure~ to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities (Criterion 6.c. l ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. Each shelter is Red Cross certified and a , limited demonstration of services will be provided A valid and current LOA or MOU between the county and American Red Cross will be provided to the evaluation team either prior to the demonstration or atthe time of the demonstration.

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: Final After Action Report

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