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DOC l VlE"1 RETAINS CLASSIFICATION,--THIS EX( ERPT IS DECLASSIfIED lAW
.!!::t EO 129~8 REVIE\\ ER # 61___ D<\ FE L1. """ 15'19
et.ASSIAED "'~bQ;",.",;-:.;f/~C:;i:DicC'ATiiON-SUBJECT TO G CLASSifiCATIONSCHEOULE Of EXEC DER 11652AUTOMATICAllY TWO.YEAR
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NTIS DISCLAIMER
! This document has been reproduced from the very best copy that was furnished by the Source Agency. Although NTIS realizes that parts of this document may be illegible, it is being released in order to make available as much information as possible.
Directorate of Operations AnalysisCHECO /CORONA HARVEST DIVISION
HAND' ING REQUIREDEA5ABlE T
1
Prepared by:
MAl BARNETTECAPT BARROW
18 FEB 73Project CHICO 7th AF, CDC
.2S· s ... • .. St4
This page intentionally left blank.
OEel'SS F '0r .n
UNCLASSIFIEDDEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
H£AOQU"""TERS ..... C .... IC .... Ill' "'OReES
""0 ~"N ""'''''''CISCO e6!l!l3
P<UJL.' CHEca RCPO"T~
.~
e ou~ter nSurgency ana unconventional warfare environment ofSou ~ast As~a has resulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet amu \.Ide f requirements. Tl1ese varied applications have involved thefu "P.l trJJm Of SAF dl:!fOSpaCe vehicles, support equipment, and manpower.As e)u r. ")perattonal data and experiences have accumulated which shouldbe ectf'd. documented, and analyzed for current and future impact uponUSA es, oncepts. and doctrine.
r t ~are I, ·~e value Of collecting and documenting our SEA experlences wo') recogrdzed at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directedfIIK H flUb tsh an act lity which would provide timely and analy-tied ..J elI. Of JSAF" combat operations in SEA and would be primarilyres PO" v€' 0 A,.. taff "'eQufrements and direction.
er~ HEC. an ~,ronym for Contemporary Historical Examinationof rprt' peratfons. was established to meet the Air Staff directive."lanage-d 1>)' 'Q PACAF. wlth elements in Southeast Asia. Project CHECaprov a~ ~ scnolarly 0"-901ng~ historical examination. documentation.and r""oort ng on SAF polictes, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. T'hisCHEe repgrt is part of the overall documentation and examination whichis b~ ng accomp1tshed. It 1s an authentic source for an assessment ofthe effecttveness of USAF airpower 1n PACOM when used 1n proper context.The r~aaer must view the study in relation to the events and circumstancesat the ime Qf its preparation--recogn1zing that 1t was prepared on acontemoorary bas s WhlCh restricted perspective and that the author'srespc1 ...as 1m 1 tpd to records available within his local headquartersarea
ZJt-~ROBER 'LL rRDireer r of ~pera iQns Ana'ys sOCI) pP at ns
,JI
,. O(Cl~SSIF'EO
8000 Oir 51uo10y "'~SHnc .
D"~,,. (•
• UNCLASSIFIED•
&DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
• •
... EAOOUA"TERS P"CIFIC AIR FORCES
APO SAN FRANCISCO Sle553
OOAD18 February 1973
Proje' • IC Qeport. Base Defense in Tha11andll
SEE u BL TI II PAGE
1. Atta he • a SECRET NOFORN doc_nt. It shall be transported.storeG. a&equa~edt and accounted for in accordance with applicablesecurl j recthes SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TOFOREIGt ~TI ~LS 'e ;nformat10n conta1ned 1n this document willnot be sc osed to ~oreign nat'onals or their representatives.qetai destroy in accordance with AFR 205-1. 00 not return.
2.dechc
~tter does not contain classified information and may bef ed f " .. ta rroent is removed from it.
COR ~~ , .. J'fJI?d.J a ~~~.L.~ --:-: <l". 0 one1, USAFChie'" URONA HARVEST 0;Y1s10n01rec1'Q,.ate 1')4' .lpt"rat~ons AnalysisoCS/Ope. os
5. MILITARY JEPART~ENTS, UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED CDMMA~DS, AND JOINT STAFFS Ia COMUSJAPAN J3 · . . · • • 1 Ib ... 'NCPAC J301 ) · · · • • • 2c C NCPACFlT (Code 332) 1d CO~~SKOREA IATT~ J-3) • • • • • 1e, C USMAC HA I ~ACTJ3 • 1f. CllMlJSTDC 3 • · • • • • • 19 SC ICEUR ECJ8 · · . · • • 1h. : tlCLANT C · . . • • 11. CHIEF. IJ\VAL OPERATIONS · . . • • 1j. CQMMA'IDAIl • ~ARIIlE CORPS (ABQ) • 1k. CINCONAO COOP, • • · · · • • • • • • 11. OEPARnlErli OF THE A~Y (ASH-Ol • • • • 1M. o ~ HIEFS OF STAFF (J3RR&A 1n. uSTPS . . . · . • · . · . • • • • 1o. SECRE ARY OF DEFENSE (OASO/SA) • • • 1p. CI~(STRIKE (STS, •• · . . . 1q. CItlC.AL 2 . . • · · · . . • 1r. MAAG CI I iA /lGOT.LA) • · · · · . . · . · . . . . · . · • 1s. DOC J/IWTS OFF ICE. HQ ALL! EO FORCES NORTHERli EUROPE • 1
6. SCHlX'
I 5en r ~AF Representative, National War College. . . • 1b. Sen or SAF Representative. Armed Forces Staff College. 1c, en or SAF Rep, Industrial College of the Anned Forces 1d. Sen or SAF Representat;ve. Naval Amphibious School • 1e. Sen or SAF Rep. U.S. Harine Corps Education Center. • • 1f. I:en or lSAF Representative, U.S. Naval War College. . 1g. Sen or SAF Representative. U.S. Ar~ War College • • 1h. Sen or ,SAF Rep, U.S. Anny C&G Staff College. • . • • • 11. (jer or JSAF Representative, U.S. Army Infantry School • 1j. Sen or SAF Rep, USA JFK Cen for M11 Asst • • . • . • • .• 1k. Sen or ,SAF Representative, U.S. Anny Field Artillery School 11. Sen or SAF Representative. U.S Lialson Office ••.•.•• 1m. Sen , SAF Pep. U.S. Ar~ Annor School. Comd and Staff Dept 1
7. SPECIAL
I. h@ AAN orporat1on 1
•
, ;
UNCLASSIFIED
-
UNCLASSIFIED
'ltroductfon .. " .Ban:ground of ISAF Presence 1n Thalland ..I3a 1l:gl'"Ound of OITmunist Act1v1ty in ThailandA~~~CkS on JSA~ Resources
HAPT R RA~E OEFENSE PERSONNEL ANO PROGRAMS
Page
xi
xi;
• )( iii
1
1135
569
1013
14
18
1818
181921232627
30
303131
35
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
••
•
•
•
•
• •
•THE THREAT
darn 1965 Attdckbon 969 Attack •.
n 1970 Attack •-Tapa. 972 AttackbOn 1972 Attack •.
JSAr Security Police.r~al security Guards.,entry Oog (K-9) Teams ••.
Roya 1 Tha t Government FcreesV1C Act~on Programs •"to tngef"lcy Forces "
n oduct~on ••••••...••Vi' and P,3'ii'ive Defense Measurestat on!. •
!a e Ana Iys,·s .•..
I
•••••••••,-
Page
36
364142464952
• 57
57576468
68697072
• 7374
76
79
90
••
•
••
•
4 • • •,
Kara" R"AFB .••"4akho" Phanom RTAFBTak,,' RTAFB.
bOn RTAFB ••do'n RTArB
T,3pao RTNAF
K ,.t RTMB ••••~khon P"dnom RTAFB•• " RTAFB.bOn R AFBde RTAFB
"apo RTNAF
NC. <jON
,. A a
A
FOG ~I
x
UNCLASSIFIED•
•
Page
Fronti spiece
7
8
37
38
• 43
44
45
50
• 53
59
60
65
•
. . . .
•
. . .
nalland Areas of Significant Ce:mnunist Presence
TilEi' tlOSf' £ffeethe Defense Team Yet Devised . ...
Tnai and Military Airffelds
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
UNCLASSIFIED
TYPHa One Sector Operat1on
~rat RTAFB
dorn RT~FB
•'"ak.. RTAF8
p.-1meter Defense System
If'fEi'ns1ve Perimeter Fences
~akhon Phanom RTAFB
4
•,••
•,
xi
UNCLASSIFIED
IIIIIIIIf
II
--.,-.. ...
UNCLASSIFIED
A ~OT[ ABOUT THE AUTHORSHIP
A )l€, t me r..hlS HECO Report was written, Captain James R. Barrow
was a s gned to the Farul ty of the United States Air Force Academy as
an Assoc a"e Praftssor of law. After completing undergraduate training
1n Pta SClen e at the Un1versity of Hawaii, he received his Air
Fa • om- "ton In 1964 as a 01stlnguished Military Graduate of AFROTC
prog~am ~p rece1ved his 1egal education and a Juris Doctor Degree with
Honor from the Tu ane Un1versity of louisiana in 1966. Since then he
t\as sP~Pct as Ass stal"lt Staff Judge Advocate and Staff Judge Advocate of
a SLA !)aSP ~ S JI'",.-ent ass ignment to the Department of law at the Academy
came FI 969 ltD a n Barrow is a Judge Advocate, a certified trial and
defe~~. ouns~l. and nas been designated a Military Judge by the Judge
Advoratp ene~a f he Air Force.
nde~ ~e TD¥ avgmentee program to Project CHECa, officers occasionally
f1nh t~~ es~arc.n and a draft. but are unable to complete the report due
to t 1M" tat ons. In this lnstance, Major Benjamin H. Barnette. Jr. t
turrpn+ y e pe~nent member of the CHECa staff, assumed the task of putting
the study n f "al form and of ensuring its coordination. Major Barnette
15 a §;~ or navtgator and a recent Distinguished Graduate of the Air Corrmand
and taf' ege AC,:)( • and holds a Master of Science degree in Counsel ing
and Gu :iam p from roy State Un1versfty. Prior to attending ACSC, Major
8arne·~e SD@nt severa years as a navl9ator in the Military Airlift Command
(HAC dO e~vea 1n va r DUS capacltles in the personnel career field, includ-
ing a the DeS Personnel staff at Hq MAC.x 11
UNCLASSIFIED
I
•
UNCLASSIFIED
FOREWORD
s CHEeO report addresses the development of USAF base defense in
~ha,land from the initial attack on Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB)
'rou9h 30 June 1972. The 26 July 1968 attack on Udorn RTAFB ..s the first
vert. hostile actton by either communist-inspired insurgent forces or
; ury untts of Horth Vietnam against United States Air Force personnel
and resou~ces located in the Kingdom of Thailand. Between then and 30
une 197,. small enemy sapper units made four other attempts to gain access
'0 u5Ar-lenanted Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) bases. In some of those
at empts, vSAF personnel were killed or injured and resources either
amrlged or destroyed; 1" others, Thai and U.S. base defense personnel
uC essfu 1)' thwarted the attempts. In addition, base defense planners
fe ~t realistic, effective base defense programs forestalled other
4 t on y et1emy forces during the same period.
8dse defense is a function of three factors: The perceived threat
~ st Ie enemy action; the responsive actions thought necessary to
~f~e(t1vely counter that threat; and the various political. economic and
eoqraohlc constraints imposed upon those desired responses.
he n~eat of hostile enemy activity directed against USAF resources
'hc1 and s explo~ed in Chapter I. Emphasis is given to a brief analy
f he f've attacks agaInst U5AF resources at Udorn RTAFB, Ubon RTAFB •
•n apao Royal Thai Naval Air Field (RTNAF), as well as intelligence
s ma·es f the threat of such activity 1n the first six months of 1972.
xiii
UNCLASSIFIEDj
•
UNCLASSIFIED
FOREIoIJRO
"' HECO report addresses the development of USAF base defense in
~ a d from the 'nltial attack on Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB)
'h "9h I "ne 912. The 26 July 196B attack on Udorn RTAFB was the first
~r hOS e actton by either communist-inspired insurgent forces or
m ~r) ~ t~ f ~orth Vletnam against United States Air Force personnel
and resour es located In the kingdom of Thailand. Between then and 30
U"~ sma ' enemy sapper units made four other attempts to gain access
a SAf tenanted Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) bases. In some of those
a "~'1lp \AF personnel were killed or injured and resources either
da~ ~d r de~troyed; in others, Thai and U.S. base defense personnel
SU e f y thwarted the attempts. In addition, base defense planners
f,:. hat eat sti . effective base defense programs forestalled other
d "'I pr'1emy forces dud"9 the same period.
~ (>0 dEi'f!:'nse 15 a function of three factors: The perceived threat
of has e enemy a't1on; the responsive actions thought necessary to
effp t ve y ounter that threat; and the various political s economic and
geog~~pn constralnts imposed upon those desired responses.
J,•
•,
lI
•I•f
1
s
es
~. .
hp threat of hostile enemy activity directed against USAF resources
P\d explored in Chapter Emphasis is given to a brief a04ly-
p f Vp a tacks against USAF resources at Udorn RTAFB, Ubon RTAFB s
a oyal Tha, Naval Air field (RTNAFJ. as well as intelligence
f h ttlreat of slJch act vity in the first six months of 1972.
x ; i
UNCLASSIFIED
c.' _, ~,.on' ._--
UNCLASSIFIED
__._••,_,,~," l'~'''••'~' •
emcha
In ... .utl z
d's
thp
"'1 uS
the po
ubsequent hapters deal with the responses of the planners in the
~Y"'Da'" 10fl of adequate defenses of vital resources and personnel. Chapter
exc rpS the USAF and Royal Thai Government (RTG) forces committed to
base defen3e and tne utilfzation of these forces. The chapter also dis-
s~s som~ of the problems encountered in coordination of defense efforts
bP.tween Sand Tha; forces, as well as some of the other constraints
imposed on oefense plannlng in this area. Chapter III is concerned with
thr phys a1 defenses of the bases. Detailed comparisons are made of the
S J. 1M or qoy! 1 ~a t ba ses has t i ng tenant USAF comba t operations. Spec; a1
5 9 ve~ to the employment of various devices and tools useful
Of base defense. Again, the constraints on the effective
" f su<n devices are considered. Both Chapters 11 and III
~he nnovd t 1ve programs developed by base defense planners in
t~pts to ~prove base defense Chapter IV is a statement of con
~~d an a~a 1S1S of those conclusions in light of the experiences
anCl eons earned ,. air base defense in the Republic of Vietnam over
•IIrII1tI
•,••
, ,
UNCLASSIFIED
I
III
IIII
r~
I~
1
~
~
~~ - ---
UNCLASSIFIED
I
•
.e
UNCLASSIFIED
•,II..••••
•
CHAPTER J
THE THREAT
n 9 June 972, Major General Dewitt R. Searles, the Deputy Commander,
>f'ypntn Tn,rtpe,.th Alr Force (7/lJAF) at Udon Royal Thai Air Force Base.
Shortly after my arrival in-country it was obviousthat a threat to our Thailand bases existed from acommunist-inspired insurgency. There were areas infu~l control of the insurgents and Royal Thai Government forces were not in full control of the situa-
ion. I therefore emphasized base defense.
yI'\e enera 1 a so observed that
hp retent deployment of USAF resources to Thailandhave sic) caused threats to our bases to go up. Thebulk ~f the United States Air Force strike force isnow 1n Thailand. By the end of the month, 100% ofthls strIke force will be here. This fact wll1 notbe lost on North Vietnam. There have never been morelucrative targets 1n all of Southeast Asia than areour Thal bases right now. Our greatest threat istra inei3 sapper and mortar teams infi 1trated fromCambodia and laos, who, wtth local contacts. can bemet, noused, and fed without detection until sucht1~ as they are ready to strike.
Ba,~round Of J5Af Presence tn Thailand
A t"Ollg" there were a few USAF units in Thailand as early as 1961.
th~ r t sign fltant 1ntrease of resources began in June 1964 with the
jp ,,",p ~f tile first tactical aircraft. The Gulf of Tonkin incident
n qu ~ '164 fgnalled the beginning of a period of signtficant growth.
1
a "p d f Qt;4. there were over 6,000 USAF personnel in Thailandj
R \PS dt d rn. Ta~hl;, I\orat, Ubon and Do" Muang all hosted USAF
u , t f lose of 1966, nearly 26,000 personnel and 416 USAF air-4'
".r • e ., hd 11a.nd. By December '967, two more bases, Nakhon
IIJ
••••II
••••••II
••.,f
only been reopened71
tanker aircraft.-
rdered a halt to the bombing of North Vletnam. Sub-
H'AfB. By 24 May Ta'hli RTAFB had not
j' held 74 F-4D fighters and 16 KC-135u
•• 4» J! E'Q?se:
"ns
r Vlet~amese lnvaSlon of South Vietnam in 1972 resulted
'€ ponse to the communist invasion had increased USAF forces
2
Ii ·Tapao RTAAF. were added, bringing to 505 the number of§I
if nduCting operatIons from Thailand. Then, in 1968,
epa tJnent of Defense press releases repeated in local Thai
'>A forces 1" Thailand were gradually reduced. Operations
, ,e er at Takh11 RTAFB, and by 1 April 1972 there were only
a" .ft In Thailand, inclUding 42 B-52 bombers and 3D KC-135
pa RTNAF. JSAF personnel were also reduced significantly.
UO',lU r n Tha land between 1961 and 1970 has been chronicled~
H rpports.
, une revealed that several, if not all. remaining USAF units
BIne utt Jletnam would soon be redeployed to Thailand.-
Ov ,pp I"lent of additional USAF units to Thailand. By 24 May
a a d rcraft, including 52 8-52 bombers and 62 KC-135 tankers,
erso,ne. Probably the most spectacular example of the deploy-
n
ea
e u
p
to
a
19
a"d
to
ment lIII
F'urth~
~. .,. ~'III - ('
•e t "ldt
1
'1t} the effect that this deployment had on base defense. the'ij
t f e ..Irlty P'lllC.e. 7/13AF. said
np threat to Our resources at the Thai bases has1M ena 1 lnCreasl'd since 1 Aprl J972. The build
.. 5 nee then has made them IOOre lucrative targets.~ mportance of these bases in the interdiction of
....e t.lrrent oHenSHe is not lost to the Nort'e .,arnese.
Se f World War II~ they were not very active until the 1965
, jeve Plng an insurgency movement in Thailand had been underway
•
ija~ u"E...... f OfTlTlunlst A.ctivity in Thailand
he S bet of CDmmun"s1-inspired insurgency has been discussed in10/
era H( ~eports.-- These reports indIcate that although communist•
e t tr..., war 1" ')outh Vietnam. There had been only 16 COOlTlunist
11/' 1n idents 1n Thatland between 1962 and 1964.- But between
d 'lv ties were directed against USAF resources until the 26 July
ear) absence of attaCks should not be interpreted as an indica_
uri S :hslnterest n USAF activities. One CHEeO report noted
ed SA ?peratlOns in Thailand in support of the war in South
v PSppclaJ y in the northeastern provinces, no overt. hostile
IS d NO\lember 1966, there were 136 armed encounters between CT and
9h d r a k on dorn
~ ,r P 11"1 the northeast provinces where four of the RTAF bases with1JJ
J')A Oppr,st,ons were located. Despite conSiderably increased cOOITJunist• t
t
~~a ~un S' 11$Plred lnSurgency was at least in part directly relatedt
f
I
r
••
rJ
)Il'JTl rJpaq dd exploitatl0n of the U.S. presence. These ROE will
b~ u sequent chapters.
oer ppeared Sllght, the exlstence of "Insurgency-Threatened Areas"
•••••••••IIIIIIJ!
•
10 1968 by the corrrnunist "Voice
4
radio broadcast111
stated:
afloes t we
es further motivated communfst propagandists. several
"gagement (ROE) Which prohibfted certain USAF activities
f Tnailand"
potent d dan9~r. In fact, several aircraft reported
'"
t
d e ~f nse may well have sprung from a desire to minimize
v 11 • the number of communist-inltiated encounters witn
nee ~ Amerlcans have invaded and occupied Thailandv d as their base for aggression they have
u h dlsdster to the nation and the people. u.S.d efS have not only barbarously tramped upon the
a 1 ~ ~ sovereignty and independence. they haveso t.dU!>ed severe hardships for the Thai people.~y ~ave debased our society. This is Why peopleave expanded their resistance against them.
dd r ~en aJarmlngly There were 3400 such incidents in 1971
OL ~ 1970. Further, estimates of CT main-force strength
r lv1 es of the country as II Insurgency. Threa tened Areas."
,"C ud~ every JSAF lnstallation in Thailand except Takh1i and
A th ~h the lmmedldte. direct threat to USAF assets and
a e(] presence in '""halland and U.S. participation in counter-
p D1f"
•
•Of
v •
re
0'
RT
in ~~ no thPdSt alone showed an increase from between 1400 to 1600 men~
in t .t.e.n 1525 to 1775 1n 1971. In 1970, the RTG had designated
3'>
,om~
•
ta II r'l ~F Resources-
fa ks 01 curred during the hours of darkness and all were Con-
'f.'curity Guard 'T5G). fatally Wounded a USAF Crew chief,
J6<; Attdck On 26 JUly 1968, at 2230 hours, a CT "Oac Tong"
esp tp aetect1on, reached and damaged some USAf afrcraft.
rr'ld doper unlts armed with a vanety of explosive deVices.
b )dlnst Jdorn RTAFB. Subsequently, Ubon RTAfB was attacked on
6 an 1970. dno 4 June 1972, dnd U-TapdO PTNAF on 10 January
n U (Psstully penetrated the defenslve perimeter of Udorn
I""'-~n f • n dreds Of hlgh communist dctivity dnd even in close proximity
~r ~gn 3u June 1972, communist forces ~de fi~e attacks on USAF
ur cHeer at three RTAF bases. The flrst such attack was on
"lame P onn.... nist pt.:.ns and activities. a Slgn1_f ant fac~or in asSesslng the security threat not
y t darn but a Jso at Nakhon Phanom dnd Ubon4 s. dppear to have been revital ized Since the
~ Olog f 1968. wlth ?reater emphasis being
or "dses. trlgureS on fOllowing pages show the areas of highest
n " n f c('·"'un'st dctlvlt,es and the locations of USAF operations.)
• W n e WQ 'PturJty pol'ce defenders. A C-141 aircraft and an F-4D
a ,. wer. he.v, y damaged. (An in-depth dnalysis of this first attack17/
W(l to u t"l.t of a CHElD report.-....)
~ ~ th $ attack. the Off1ce of Special Investigation (051)18/lS,yp dr 4 d ySls f the inCldent. and concluded;--
II
•II
••••,I
I
•IrI
,
•
-
-,~.,,, .4 ..
III
•••••••••••••••ET
•..L-
b
ve ,.me.Kploded charges were discovered. Initially,
t if' werp' to come true to a large extent in the next four
r~
a~~d n future joint cooperation with Thai insur-~ ~.~nt forces. Current communist propaganda appears
t h w a growing emphasis on activities againstf' forces in Thailand and the bases from which
ht'y perdte. Perhaps the most significant factor in)lTJ'Tlun; st plans for future attacks on the bases
"" e the reaction and effectiveness of Thai Govern-e r f r es in suppressing and/or punishing the
pa· pants -ttl the flrst attack. The absence of anyHe the retal 1ation. other than the killing of two
t~p group during the attack, will likely lead to aepe· tl0n of the same type activity if presently
rea sed security procedures have been relaxed.ee: on .f:actors discussed in the above paragraph.
h re a tve vulnerability (given in descending order)f thE' dlr bases in Northeast Thailand to a futureHa ~ of tile saflle type appears to be as follows.d r I NakhoJ'l Phanom, Ubon and KoraL Although some"~a atlons 1" other regions of Thailand, such as
Pd Airfield, possibly offer a more desirable£It tnan do the bases in the Northeast, available
e gence does not indicate either the presence~ ~uerrl1la unlts within a reasonable distance of~ e basps or the existence of C~nist support
·h vl11ages near their perimeters. This would, prp( ude a possitl1e one time strike at any ofese stallations by a highly trained raidinguad ~ nee lnexper1ence and faulty explosive
~v e dppear to have helped minimize the damage~u plj 1" this first attdck, a repetition of the
1'1lP uld be vastly more destructive.
H".Q ~tt.d k. The next attack on USAF facilities came at Ubon
u Y '969. A security police sentry and his dog were
t E'y p~ected ~he sappers exfiltrat1ng the base. Half an
t pr were flve e~plosions which damaged two C-47 aircraft
•
ne
ye
R A
n
•
•
••
SVN
CN130lJIA
/
AREAS OF SIGNIFICANTCOI1.'·:WHST p~ESE\tE
(November 1972)rOTAL ,AR1·'i:n :. hWJGTI1
16Q.'.O--v.70 I
•
\
J ,.AC'"'Il If d t 0'1 (
r er 6 lp 978
,f
•••
~ .' ....lus , p
ubJecSCl1edu
I las
••p
••
I
rI
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,.
f I tan't OfIJr!unist Prf' ent'E'
r Rf c
L
•
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" • ry Alrf e1ds
r 4 bon "Ar> dorn R A£ _ 'T aD 0 ~A
• >
.. P"" • - .....-#~
III -I'
III./
",n
,
• • - .. ,-,
• •,...
r
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•
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Also, "petlmeter vegetat10n COntrol and the training,
, ,nIts "eSponded to predetermined perin~ter defenstve POsitions
" Qu Pmen"
~ --. <,.-...../~tn, det,nattons were mtstakenly tdentified as mortar explosions. ThaI
4 "ures of eo notifieatton of the attaCk. The sappers, numbering an
e ,.. ted thr.. fndlvtduals, Suffered no casualties and escaped. The
e 'pc"r ty Pol'ce, Bth Combat SUPPOrt Group, Ubon RTAFB stated
tn, uc essf", and undetected penetration and sabotage reflected a
e u need f r lla se defense personnel to ut i t ze avo ilab I e ni ght obser_va
e a y for ne K-9 sentrtes, was highly deficient." The need for
lYe 00'd no "" wIth local friendly forces was also emphasized .
•••••
•
By the time the Sentry notified other defense forcesf' f f '"e.
9ntf dnt s delight on the attack was that the K-9 sentrY_dog
e who ec., teo the escaping sapper< did not immed1ately fire on
tn"", 0 "POrt tnelr presence to Central Securtty Control (CSC) because
he as "~d that '''1' was part of a scheduled exerCise. He later withheld
f r. ven tn ugh ne realIzed tney were hostile, because "ht s dog was inthe
and riley were ObI. to respond, the enemy had escaped through the perimeter
•rr
te base was tn a "YelJew Alert" posture of increased
etnamese were observed Only three kilometers (km) from the
"r.pared~ss !lecause of a local Villager s report, relayed to the
n 97 At tal'. Ubon was again attacked by enemy sappers at 0201,11 Jan a v 97
secur
base • e oea Thai PrOVInCial Police (TPP), that at 2030 hOurs16 anne
i.... ~ ,-..r. H:t;:<,rrCn
~Q.o""'~~~3se. At the tlme of the attack, 363 security personnel. including 157
• Wf>rp on duty. .~ 1<.-9 sentry detected the first of six enemy 10fi1
rator snort y after the sapper had penetrated 10 yards inside the peri-
ter e f.I ftre was exchanged and the sector security alert team (SAT)
k re~pDnded to ttle scene. A 23-minute fire fight ensued in which
vP e Pmy wpre killed. one security policeman and one dog were wounded.
uper r antral, and qUlck response were credited with the detection
sld Plltr,Y .:log was le.t' ed. ttO USAF aircraft were damaged. although 35
t he ~dr es were found. Timely intelligence. excellent training, IJ
J
1]
IJIIIIII
extreme satisfaction with the professional response?1J
forces. In the six months which had elapsed follow-
10
apable of detect1ng and repelling such an attack •
he f rst attaCk. the secority forces had become a well-trained, cohesive
•
apao 972 Attack. Throughout 1970 and 1971, U-Tapao RTNAF was
P hav'"g the l_st threat potential of any air base in Thailand.
nqrat dltons and
Q
Pf" Jf1 'I;. that were spec1ally trained and targeted by cOlT11lunist forcesW
u t 1p hd land. Both the Coomander-1n-Ch1ef, Pacific Air Forces
Nf ALAf,. and the Deputy Commander, 7/13AF, sent messages expressing
y the ase dp.fense
nt.! nment .:;f the enel1'lj'. Only poor 1ig ting and several duds in
tl~Ufflinatlon rounds were cited as significant deficiencies.W
"" rtar
A 'lies aqe from tne U S. Embassy to the Department of State indicated that
ana y s ~ rh,S and the July 1969 attack strongly indicated that both
a ~ k ~ere arr1ed out by either the same, or closely coordinated,
I
1.-
tIiIiIY ",'.
2
I:fCl~"o ....4QP/~
However. without any prior intelligence alert. a communist sapper unit
penetrated the base perimeter without being detected. then 'Infiltrated
.. w"h n c1 few hundred yards of park.ed 8-52 aircraft before they were
spotted by a ~e~try dog patrol.
5m41 arms fire was reported from positions off-base during the attack.
RTG f ref" reSponded to the area very quickly. and a Provincial Police unit
11
At 0222 nours. 10 January 1972, 4 K-9 patrol detected three sappers
abOut S feet ahead when his dog "alerted." The sappers fired at him and
O@ too~ cover. trying unsuccessfully to have his dog attack the sappers.
One sopper ••1dently fled and the other t.., ran toward the 6-52 parking
ramp They were next seen by a TSG who withheld fire "because there were
B·1j afrcfc1ft 1n a line behind the infiltrators." Another TSG tried to
f p on t~ Sipper5 as they ran down the ramp, but his M-16 jammed. The
sa vers tnrew ~.tchel charges and one Chinese~de hand grenade into three
rf''vttments .. The grenade was a dud, but four charges detonated, causing
1no dal'lll.ge to tlf<> 8-52s and more substantial damage to a third. The
e.p sans ciused an estlmated S26,ooo damage. One sapper tried unsuccess
fu J to flre a revolver. at several maintenance pt!rsonnel in the area.
esc d1spatehed SAT> and Quic" Reaction Teams (QRTs) to the scene. In
the ensu ng Ict10n, one of the enemy was wounded at the perimeter but
esca~d. Another was killed while attempting to exit the fenced Munitions
Ma 1 ntrnance end Storage (MMS) area. about 100 yards from the perimeter
fenl.f The re were rtO USAF or' Tha 1 easua 1t1 es •••~II
.•..II..•••
~" ..
12
III
••••••II
••••II
••,.
-"..
base defense. He also singled out the inadequate
effect;ve vegetation control as additional weaknesses.~
...-
t"lt' use 'Jf TSGs in
~~:~ /J.Jh.._~~, v,l ,I..L ~-
"f'ZJ"-conducted sweeps outside the perimeter within 30 minutes of the inception
fen n9 nd ~ la k of
past .,Jenera 1 eades also ccmnented on the IIcal cu lated risk'l inherent
for a four chanlle radio cOlTITlunlcation systemi the lack of a joint U.S.-
Howe~er. t~e Deputy Commander, 7/13AF, in a lengthy message to the
7AF ommander. revealed several existing deficiencies. He noted the need
Overa 1, the attack was considered a failure and several levels of
~ommand Qu1ckly sent commendations t~the defenderSi Special emphasis'liJ r
was g ve te t~e ~TG 5 prompt response.
f the attack. later. RTG military units also participated in searches.24/
T~e ast enemy contact was at 0235.--
RTG base oefense v ani and the lack of joint training exercises in the
Another ~rob em was the fallure of the sentry dog to close wlth the
enemy when coornanded to. attack. Higher headquarters took several steps
to emphaslze attack training and gunfire familiarization for sentry dogsill
tu aW'o d Slmilar problems. Additionally, an examination of the after-
~C~ on evalua~lons raised a series of questions: How had the three enemy
agents ~enetrated the base perlmeter undetected? How had they infiltrated
so e to the bOmbers before they were spotted? Then, once they were
lde~t f ed as host e. now did two of them still manage to go several
hundr yards _ e ..11- It 8-52 parking area, hurl explosive charges
at tlree, supposedly well-defended aircraft, and then escape? Even the
BsSSL:
..
..r~
r~sapper who was k,11'ed went several hundred
'#
...yards from the ramp and pene-
•..•..
••m
•I
I,
trated the d~fended MMS area before he was finally stopped.
Wconcluded:
ine relatlve degree of success or failure of the~apao attack depends on who is making the assess
mpnt. From the communist standpoint, they infiltrated three intruders into a heavily defendedu.~. posltion. damaged three expensive U.S. aircraft, and recovered two of the attackers. The loss~f orly one man. when measured against the satisfaction aod propaganda value derived from such aneffort, clearly marks the success of the mission.From the American side, the early detection of theintruders and their failure to significantly affectU S combat posture makes the attack a failure .Re9~rdless of whie" viewpoint is accepted_ the-Tapao attack serves to reaffirm the contention
thal small groups of well trained. dedicated individuals can penetrate U.S. tenanted installations1" Tha I dnd.
Jbon 97 Attacll:. Un 1 June 1972. the local OSI detachment at Ubon
~TA~8 r~ce ved r~l able nfonmation that there were 12 Vietnamese in
t~e nm~d1ate al"N of Jbon who had been previously repatriated from
Thai dnd to North Yletnam. trained as sapperS I and infiltrated back into
Tha and "ith +he specific mission of attacking USAF aircraft at UbonrY
RTAF5 At 0003 hours 4 June 1972, two RTG "liaison patrols"· returning
to ber- ~ AF8 on tt~ perimeter road s.w an unidentified man running about
.rivE' ards 'insMe ttle base perimeter fence. He was challenged by the police
-A 1 a son patrlt was a eep patrol operated by the Thai Provincial policethat made nightly s"eeps within a 16km circle around the base. It consistedOf thrpe armed POll ernen and one unarmed USAF security policeman who providedcommun cations and oordlnation with the base esc.
13
I
,.---po",
~ •• '':It'~~ • 1" ~(~ r"-~
,..0 r'\l~~
rbut dld not stop. Instead, he ran toward the AC-130 gunship revetments
abo t" ya"d'i away. After prompting by the USAF member of the patrol,
the pol e opened fire over the head of the intruder. Shortly thereafter,
a u In d random post opened fire. The sapper dropped to the ground and
returned f re at the polICe. whO then shot him. Inspection of the body
revea ed that t~p sapper carr led eight highly sophisticated satchel charges.
Ourlng the lnCldent. at least one other suspected sapper was detected out
slde another sector of the perimeter, and several sentry-dog handlers
reee ved strong a erts" from their dogs in that area. An AC-l30 on final
approach ~as directed to drop flares in the area, but there was no further
ntdC No USAF or RTG personnel were injured and there was no damage30/
t f"a it es.- An analysis of the incident indicated that the
~ead sapper was arrying out an intended diversion and that the prompt
rea tlOtl by defen~e forces and the AC-l30 flareship probably prevented alY
r PI"':.iS CJappe attack.
Threat Estlmate, Jan-Jyne 1972
Jur'ng the t rst half of 1972, Hq 7/13Af Ground Combat Intelligence
sted he overt articn threat to USAF tenanted bases by enemy forces as
fal aws the tnrpat of enemy reconnaissance of all bases was listed as
hlg~, the threat of large-scale mass attacks against any base was low;
"hf' threa f nternal sabotage at dll bases was high; and the threat of
sma r, t sapper attacks was hlgh at Ubon RTAFB, moderate to high at
N~P ArB, mOderate at Udorn RTAfB and U-Tapao RTNAF, and low at Karat
RTAFB dnA aknl RTAFB. Additionally, the Joint United States Military
14
III
•••••••••••••••
~aos Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, itself, was within range of various weapons
mar ars were read; y available from several communist controlled areas of
••IJ
•,•••••II
•••••,
•....
lliPhanom RTAFB.
Range
150-180 Meter5500 m
4375 m6675 m1790 m3040 m5700 m8300 m
10,073 m10,607 m
• the B-40/RPG-2 rocket type, attacked an RTG Village
har~f..ter led the risk of a stand-off attack. "as a distinct possi-4
Jefer~e orps un t near Na Kae, less than 3Skm from Nakhon
The potential for a stand-off RAM attack was also proven to be within
The t were a so "firmed reports of the use of 82mm and 60mm mortars bym
QfTITIunts forces. aga,nst RTG forces. Additionally, heavier rockets and
'he enemy 5 capab,l'ty. On 31 May 1972 over 100 CT, usin9 rocket-propelled
from the Jrnmun1st positions across the Mekong River in Laos. On 30 June
9 ,~e able i~formatlon was received about the first introduction of
b1 tv
pl M
conslderatlon of the effective ranges of the several RAM weapons
known to have been used by communist forces during that time frame empha
S led the mogn1tude of the danger.
~un s~ Ltmm rockets into Thailand from Laos, approximately 45 miles~
'lor t1 10rthwest f Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. Consequently, USAF defense
•
In 1972, the Hq 7/13AF Directorate of Security Police ;ssued warn-
ng~ to th~ ~1~ Air Force installations in Thailand of grave danger from
d t~rent q;arter. Reliable intelligence reports from U.S. civilian
nte 11qence gencies. a~ well as OSI sources, indicated that the Communist
arty f ThaI and had made plans to infiltrate three USAF bases. Enemy-
9ntro ed ag~nts were tdrgeted against Ubon RTAFB. Udor" RTAFB. and
akhon Phanom RTAFB. with instructions to secure Jobs as Thai employees.
)"(eal W€dpans and explosive and. thus. be in a position to conduct acts
f nte'~a' abotage on the bases. Consequently. 7{13AF gave great emphasis
the Ifed f ~ controll1ng the movement of Thai nationals, especially in~
r~as ~roun~ pr1mdry JSAF resources.
Cledrly, however, the focus of USAF defenses in the first six months
f 97, entered on 5apper units attempting surreptitious penetration and
tnat year gave c ear evidence of that threat
Perhaps the best summary of the importance of the total threat was
on~alned in messages from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
abotage Tne t.o attempts of such action at u-Tapao RTIiAF and Ubon RTAFB
The threat is expected to increase. it couldbecome Lritical with very little. if any warning.44/
~~e to the importance of Thai based air support. insurgent actIVIty in Thailand is being followed veryt10sely here [JCS] as • successful attack againstthese bases would have serious implications. Inthis regard. it fs essential that all feasible actionsbe taken to assure the security of U.S. forces andeQUlpm~nt.~
17
---~
CHAPTER II
BASE DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND PROGRAMS
I n trod uc t100
direl" r'e'iponse to the pstimate discussed 1n the previous chapter.
bas~ ~efense dnners developed programs to counter all facets of the
threat. especially sappe~ penetration. This chapter includes: an exam
jnat'o~ of the base defense force; a base-by-base analysis of special
prliblp.fTl!> al1d 'the programs designed to counter them; a discussion of Tha;
O~S ooperatlon, and the limitations imposed by the rules of engagement.
Ava able Uef~nse orees
~l Security Pol1ce~ As of June 1972, there were only 22 USAF Security
P')11 e C;P off cer and 641 security policement authorized for all of
T~allanc Because of the deployment of USAF augmentees to Thailand in
the r"9 f 1972. tnere were additional SP forces in-country on TOY.
~ost f hese were at T akhl1, which was defended solely by 368 SPs on46
JrI T")Y Natura' Y. not a1' SPs were avallable for base defense. law
~nforc~nt, drug programs, customs. and disaster control responsibilities
.il1l requ red the assigrrnent of men who otherwise would have been available
to dete<' and repel the enemy. The majority of the SPs had attended either
the OZR 'S9t and above) or AZR (SSgt and below) Combat Preparedness Course.
hese thr e-week curses at lakeland AFB were mainly in weapons familiariza-
n. W SOIl very boS1C training in the concepts of base defense and
igt'lt nfantry taLtics useful in a hostile environment. One base Chief
18....,. "
as
••n••••••n••••••••
..•....
p
•II
•••
of Security Police (CSP) in Thailand felt that these two courses should be
e1panded to lnclude more training. especially in infantry-style tactics,
n ,rde,. to properly prepare SPs for the role of base defense in areas£I
such as Vietnam and Thailand. Most CSPs rated ,"orale of their personnel
as 'good or better. ana all indicated that they had sufficient security
forces ava"able to perform their defense role. They also asserted that
massive TOY deployments of mochines and men had not (with the exception
of akhlf. which 15 discussed in detail later) created any significant
prOD ems. Nor nad the deployments required fundamental policy adjust-
~n s or Changes The maJor personnel problem experienced by most CSPs
was the annual summer rotation of experienced officers and senior NCOs.
n ne squadron alone, the ratio of experienced NCOs (HeOs with over three
mon·Os ~n statlon fe'l from over 90 percent in May to less than 30 percent$
une during t~ critical period of the deployment.·
fhai Security Guards. In order to augment the SPs available in
Tha and wfth well-trained. effective military forces under the opera
t10na 1 control of base-level defense planners, the United States Government
and tne RTG entered into a contract on 1 February 1966. Under the tenns
of th s agreement. the Commander. U.S. Military Assistance Command. Thailand
(COMU"IACTHA:1 .nd the Thai Government agreed that the RTG would establish
a param 1 11tary force which would be manned by Thai military reservists
and D) regular hat 'lltl i tary officers and HeOs. Units of this force.
-All tachn cal serqeants in the unit rotated.
19
... ---
known as Thai Security Guard (TSG) companies, were detailed to each USAF
~enanted Thai ba~e. The TSGs were under the operational control of the
SAr base commander. through his esp. The U.S. had expended over $15.000.000~
~nder this contract through June 1971. The function of these companies
WdS pmphas1Zed n a memo from the Thai Supreme Corrrnander, Air Chief Marshal
Oawee I to all frAF ba se coomanders: liThe securi ty guardi n9 in the allies'50/
base 8 1'he lotto f the Tha1. Security Guard Regiment. n (His emphasis.)-
~r1ng t~e f rst few years of the TSG program, difficulties were
encountered. h efly In the training of the guards and in problems of
()fTIn\.lfl atlon SAF ccmnanders initially showed a reluctance to fullyW
ntegrate these f re1gn" forces into their base defense units. However,
from h~ ate 9bOs through June 1972. special 7/13AF command emphasis on
oea tra',,1ng M'd tjut integration and utilization of forces created a52/
high respected fJnct ona1 unlt of the total base defense force.-
When properly utilized on any given base. the greatest strength of
the 'i forte was ts flexibility. The TSG cOO1panies. as USAF "employees,"
were e r rp y ~nder the vperational control of USAF defense planners.
Howpve I the RTG attempted to implement in June 1972 a program that would
nave ~erlOus y jeopardized this command and control arrangement and would
have ~rive y 11m ted the forces' effectiveness The Thai Supreme Command,
operat tlrough th~ Thai Security Guard Regiment Corrmander t issued Order
"265 h s or-der d rectecl local TSG company coarnanders to implement
a Supn~ If' ",Ql'11fIand d1rpc t 1 'lie tha tall TSGs wau1d henceforth be housed on-base
20
---
II
•J
•••••p
•••..•..
..•..
"lth only one day off a week. (At the time the order was given, about 40
~rcent ~f the TSG resided off-base with their families.) Additionally •
he ",rdel j rected TSGs to work a four-hour-on, four-off, four-on shift,
ather than the eight-on. 16-off shift then in effect.
USAF officers at operational and command levels expressed extreme
concern. and because of firm opposition by the 7/13AF Deputy Commander
d'1d the Uirectcrate of Security Police, the order remained unexecuted.
he • Army had imp 1ernented the plan dur; 09 the 20 days it was in effect,
and. ~s had been predicted by USAF officials, severe morale and efficiency53/
problems QUi kly became apparent.--) Thus a potential problem affecting
one of lhe most ~mportant segments of the base defense force was preclUded
·~~Juqh prompt actl0n by USAF and RTG authorities.
21
A' the beg1nnln9 of the USAF deployments 1n 1972, there were 2407
T~Gs a~t~orlzed and 2263 present for assignment. The total of 2263 was
"creased by 88 in June. Excess TSGs from the Camp Friendship training
ce"~pr at Karat RTAFB filled the increased manning requirements brought~
on y tne SAF deployments.
Sentry Oog IK-9) Teams. A specially-trained dog was a valuable adjunct
to l1e detection ability of a hlRniln guard. known as sentry or patrol dogs
jepen1tng on their training. these canines vastly enhanced the effectiveness
~ perlmeter guards in their vita 1 role of detecting enemy penetration
dt·~npts. Although the attention span of dogs is limited. and is dulled
. " ; ..
•
iter evera hours on duty, especially during inclement weather. they
e ~everthe ess an important part of the defensive posture at U.S.
~ ~ ~t, ~~ Perhaps the best proof of their effectlveness was the
fa at every base attack (except the one in 1972 at Ubon RTAFB) a
e ·ry d09 f rs· alerted defense personnel of an enemy presence. Even
hf' ~ '" bon RTAfB intruslon, the base coomander credited a series
f K-9 er 'i' 011 the perilfleter with forestal11ng a major sapper attack.55/
f:rn e ~uar"er .mile a sapper created a diversion elsewhere.-
h t e e,-eptl0n of Takhli RTAFB. each base had an average of 50 to
22
It uld no· be used close to the flight line since aircraft noise and
.ana i tegr"r::lon of: TSGs into the K-9 program in 1972 to enhance the image
IIIIIIIIIII
in the program,~
dogs.
T~e '13AF Director of Security Pollce directed the utilization
s ~ap led all 2l dogs. Generally the dogs were German Shepherd,
aras ~es as wel as a particularly deadly form of Leptospirosis
a ~ld n reducing retraining problems with assigned
Hf'a th ilnd I'loise constraints 1imited the dogs somewhat in their use.
effe t vene~s of TSGs, to provide greater continuity
evera
a IlfOr jlsease simtlar to human hepatitis) were very prevalent in Thailand.
F y~ oqs dled ~f this disease at Nakhon Phanom in early 1972.) Additionally.
t r 1 nq
J.( fB,
W h entry )r patrc trainl~9 at either Okinawa or Lackland. plus in-country
6 dogs ano a 6 percent SP/40 percent TSG ratio of d09 handlers. At Takh1i
an
and
"-e 'S"dflt 'f1(lv~ent of maintenance personnel severely redlJced the dogs';7/
d y 0 je"ect ntruder'S.-
•
-_.-- -_•• 0"_.' _
~n~ given by the handler. ThlS intensive training was diffi_
In early 1972, PACAf Manual 207-25. ~erospace Systems Security, was
upplpmented ~o require that all sentry dogs be retrained to be patrol
gs T S G ~ect1ve presented some difficulty since there were only
.. ree QUd 111ed trainers in Thalland at the time. The senior handler felt
t"11 e tra n '19 C1nd would "patrol- while off-leash and attack only on a
t1(lt h d f":prence between the two types of dogs was essentially one of
t1egree £Ontry dogs were trained to attack inmediately while Off-leash.
anc t a Prt ooIhile on leash. In contrast. patrol dogs, especially use-
~~1 tn a ~w ~nforcement role, were subjected to much mOre intensive obed-
spec 1f
and eng "1, with the result that all Thailand base .• except Takhll.~POsse ~ed ~sr'y sentry-tra1~ed dogs.
..
er t"a n"nq emphasis included attack and gunfire familiarization.
was d I Psu t ')f the J-Tapao experience where the dog failed to close
23
w th thp intruders upon command.
Royal Tt1al Government Forces. In the period discussed in this report,
thp IPG had a\'aflable several military and paramilitary forces Which could
be "'ed n base security. These inclUded the largest of the military forces,
ttle ~oya Ttla AnIljI (RTAJ. as well as infantry cOOlpanics of the RTAf. The
Roya t'Ja1 ~4avj InN) and lts marines had troops around U-Tapao and Nakhon
Ptlanom on 'he Mekong ~lver. Additionally, the Thai Provincial Police (TPP),
"'0 po p. an t'l€' Theil Border Police Patrol (BPP) were trained para-
III
R
•
-
~ oe Ql?
·1
IIIIIIII
••••••11
•
held at every Thai base exceptexercises were§2J
Takhl1.
The order directed RTARF area commanders to immediately
24
The v 'til need for off-base support by RTG units was reemphasized
a e·ter from Jeneral Searles to Major General Evans, COMUSMACTHAI61
hp recently expressed concern about base defense byGeneral Kraian9sak/Lt General Deputy Chief of Staff,
ha' Supreme Command, corresponds with a period ofncreased threat to our bases. They are now such
omb1ned l' brlng about the drafting of the remaining joint plans. In addi-
SAF/RTG response to any threatened enemy activity against the base.
nf rtunately. t S order was slow in being executed. By June 1969. although
p • pernaps because they ~ere not effective instruments for obtain59!
9 tjpfenSl"e fJrc.es. Contlnued efforts by USAF and embassy personnel f
[n AU9ust 968, after the Udorn RTAf8 attack, the RTG issued Thai
r~mP omm3nd Headquar ers Order N340/2S11 which specifically tasked
RT ~RF JfTIT1ander wlth res pons i bil i ty to prav; de defense security for U. S.-
pre~are J nt base defen~e p'ans for the external patrol and defense of
tt1€ base ey were to establ ish a Base Defense Securi ty Center (BOSe)
at each base w~ h would act as a coordination center for directing joint
a fuw plans had been drafted, not a single base had implemented such a
~owever p JS ~ added urgency given the subject by subsequent base attacks,
"1 n. su essfu oint defense
• dor R AFB presented spec~al problems which will be discussed later in thisrpp
•
was dlsbanded in 1971 because of various problems. including budgetary
rest-nctlons.,
'" -'
Our ng the 1968·1970 time period. 7/13AF also recognized the very
real need for a reserve force that could be deployed in the event of an
emergency. u.s. Embassy and RTG officials agreed. with certain restric
tiors. to thp air deployment of TSG units to relieve USAF forces which
mlght come under d continuing attack. Prior permission from the U.S.
Embassy and the R'G. however. was required prior to any deployment of67/
out-of- ountry re'ief forces.-- With the phase-out of the Safe Side
forces. Headquarters USAF defense planners perceived a need for some form
~ ~ontlngenc) reserves that would operate as a self-contained mobile
defe~5e force. ThlS force would be available for immediate deployment
in 5Jpport ' weapons systems in hostile environments. civic disasters.
and ldre base defense. There was also a need to avoid the difficulties
that brought about the deactivation of the Safe Side program.
n ~7l USAF published AFR 125-32, Security Police Elements for
Cont1ngenc1e5 Each major command was required to develop a Security
POll e Elements for Contlngencies (SPECS) force within its command by
task ng varlOuS subordlnate bases with providing special units, such as
a ComPOSltf' "PrOVIsional Security Police Squadron.·' as well as all equip
ment and weapons for the personnel and mission of that particular unit.
Jnder PACAr ~lanual 207-25. each unit was to receive special combat tactics
tra1ning 1n at cordance with the principles of base defense in an insurgency
28
I
•••••••••••••Ii
•••
....
env ranment. Thts was to prepare them for the vastly different role of
~efens~ 'n the SEA environment as opposed to typical air base security
under t~e proviSions of AF Manuals 206-1 and 207-1. The latter two docu-
ments were essentially concerned with only vital resource defense and did
not ~ns'der t~e problem5 of a total base defense posture. All personnel
snd equIpment were to come from in-house resources and no extra funds or68/
mann n9 \We"" authorized.-
~ 1ri~tfc ipplication of the SPECS concept came during Operation
O~STAN IAI{. This operation demonstrated the ability of the USAF to
r~s~ond i~edlateJy to sudden requirements for the large-scale deployment
.f SAF unit's In iccordance with the decision of the President of the
nlt~d ~tat-s to assist the RepUblic of Vietnam in resisting the North
1~t .~s~ jQgress10n of April 1972, the USAF deployed massive forces
n an mpressl~e display of combat preparedness and mobility. Much of this
manpow,." ind a rcraft strength was sent into Thai land a. part of CONSTANT
.JJARQ he ~ffect1veness of thIs deployment was best measured by the fact
that these units were flying combat missions within f;~e days follow
"9 thel r deployment closure dates. (A CHECa report dealing with this~
~f'ra"lon WiS prepired in 1972. )
29
ever. I'lC ude·j U1~ react vation of USAF flying operations at Takhli RTAFB
Part of the CONSTANT GUARD operation, how-o ddO tlona ~rsonne
he deplo~ent of these forces necessitated little adjusbment by
h,. se\ ur'ty poPce at the established Thai air bases other than a need70/
during the f'fst week of May. Most of the physical defenses had either
bee~ removed )r rendered useless by deterioration during the year that71/
-akh 1 had been ... osed to USAF aperations.- Further, there were no io-
placp exper1en ed base defense forces at Takhli. In a series of TOY actions,
PACAf and Headquarters USAF sent several teams of SP personnel, as well as
some support equipment. to Takhli. Initially, these forces were drawn
from SAr url1ts \OI1thin Thailand. Later. PACAF detailed forces from Clark
AFB and other non.~EAsia areas of PACAF, and, on 14 May 1972, Hq USAF sent
the ont1flgent ,f state-side SPECS.
Me problems .lnd accomplishments of these TOY units will be discussed
greater deDth 1n this report under "Base Analysis. 1i At this point.
it 1 SUff;l.lent to say thdt the SPECS concept had yet to be fairly tried.
Slnce AFR c~ 1 had not been fully implemented by the major commands by
May 197 PACAF. for example, was just in the process of coordinating
its cwn regu atl)n lmplement1ng AFR 125-32 with a target publication date12
of t, u y n (.. -
I
•J!
••••~
•••l irnnat·, on
>evera' ~o~straints upon the maximum utilization of personnel have
already been addressed, chiefly those involving the ability or willingness
of the ~nll to use ts forces for base defense.
Headroom
number f
LJ mbassy.
Another limitation was the ceiling placed on the total
tary personnel allowed in Thailand by the RTG and the
The manning authorization for the SP squadrons reflected
30
•••••IIlB:'
Concept of Use
PACAFM 207-25 stated that defense forces would be used to defend the
.Mses. n essf"t'ltially four areas. The base's exterior would be defended
wIthIn a b'm area from the perimeter by Free World Military Forces (FWHF)
"tner tnan "SilF personnel. In Thafland this role fell to the RTA, RTAF,RTN I Tapao Rr~F), 8PP. and TPP.
he ba~e defenses themselves were divided into sectors in order to
pr vide be ter Command and control within each area, as well as to permit
the for.es w thIn a given sector to be more familiar with the terrain andef~nses d"'Ouod them.
Each 'ector nad three lines of defense (1) an exterior perimeter
fen p wnere ae'e t on and containment of enemy forces was expected; (2)
a m ddln, secondary defense with rOVing security alert teams (SATs).
worklnJ 'entrIes and patrols dogs to detect any penetration of the base;
and (l, ose-In" site defense with defensive POSitions. roving patrOls,
and sentrIes posted wIth the aircraft. There was one sentry per eight
aircraf' tn daylight hours and one per four at night except for 8-52 and
~C-ll5 aircraft, for which the Coverage was dOUbled. Careful circulation
control to prevent 'abotage was to be maintainod by restricted entry points
~manned by guards wno were to deny access to unauthorized personnel.
The < gurp on 'ne fa 11 OWl ng page ill ustra tes the app lica t i on of these Conc~pts
35
briefly exam;ne base defense personnel problems
". smu thC. £'r
Compari sons
.............4 ......~•
Base Analysis
TMs s.ection ~n
and programs in light of PACAFM 207-25 and local agencies.
36
six months of 1971.
Karat had the h'ghest ratio of TSGs to USAF SPs of any base in Thailand.
(1) available defense personnel as of mid-1972,tion wl11 be given to
Karat RTAFB. This base was in a "low threat" area and had not under-
both R G and USAF/TSG, (2) coordination and cooperation between RTG and
betwee~ bases are made to illustrate common areas of concern. Considera-
USAF units, \3, special base programs to increase effective utilization
of those forces. 4) emphasis on defense in the petroleum. oil. and
lUbricants (POL) area, the HMS area, and the flight line area; and (5)
circulatlon contro' in these areas The main emphasis is on the first
gone an attack as of June 1972. USAF security stren9th as of 15 May 1972
was 277 assl9ned SPs (155 authorized) including 39 SP K-9 handlers, 484
TSG, and l5 TSG (K.9) with 63 dogs. A total of 312 augmentees were avail
able but except for an Inltial six-day training period and periodicW
retra1n1ng. they had not been used before the aircraft deployment.
Then. a few ~nned extra posts until an addition 48 TOY SPs arrived.
Tne RT~ presence was very pronounced. On one side of the perimeter
was Fort ~urana~i. the headqoarters and camp of the 2d Army (RTA). Camp
Friendship. an RTA fort and training center for several hundred TSGs.
bordered Karat on another section of perimeter. The RTAF's Wing 3 was
Intelligence-gathering efforts appeared to be spotty. The Ground
Combat tntell1gence (G(l) section received little meaningful information.
They were confldent. however, that this was due to the low threat, friendly
envtronmen~. Once a week. Gel would make a daylight tour of the perimeter
in an HH-43 f1re-a·ert helicopter. More frequent day and evening patrols2lI
werti' not conduc ted because of the "low threat .. 1/
The sec.ortty -forces ot Karat deviated significantly from the "three
flOgS of defense O11cept set forth in PACAFH 207-25. The perimeters
shared .ith RTu forces were under surveillance but were generally undefended.
The midd e line o~ defense was a,most non-existent. The close-in. site
defense was concentrated around the outside of the aircraft parking areas,
but there were few sentries among the aircraft. This was especially critical
'n the ~C-115 park nc area closest to the perimeter and the open RTAF sec
tion Of the perimeter.
The MMS and POL area$ received strong sentry and K-9 close-in defense
with the RTAF providing most of the POL security. This was significant
in 1;ght of the fact that POL was in the RTAF sector and the main MMS area
was ~our and one-half miles off-base. However, it was clear that POL andW
MMS defense was considered secondary to the resources on the flight line.
nf part1c~lar1y unique agreement between the RTG/RTAF and the USAF
existed at Karat Jd:e entry control on most bases was performed by the
RTAF. as 'as been previously discussed. By a 1969 order of the Thai Prime
M1n1ster. the ~F base commander was given exclusive control over entry
40
II
••••••III
••••••....
•••
•III
•••••..•..•,,---
on the USAF "Slde" of Korat RTAFB. including the right to stop and search
anyone. This aided USAF defense personnel in their efforts to counter any93/
internal sabotage threats.-
Ndkhon Phanom RTAFB. This base was considered to be a "high threat U
area because of its proximity to Laos (14km) and the high level of CT acti
vity In nearby vil10ges .
In April 1972, USAF SPs numbered 354 and TSGs numbered 379. The
RTG had committed an RTAF infantry battalion to the base area for defense.
There were 151 TPP in the NKP District. and they provided three, six-man
foot patrols "1ghtly within a 16km circle around the external base perimeter.W
Both the RTA and RTAF also provided regular day and night external patrols.
RTG support and cooperation were good, although their actual effectiveness95/
was difflcult to judge.-
HH-53 helicopters from the local Rescue Squadron enabled the GCI
pe~50nnel to conduct twice-nightly, three-hour reconnaissance patrols,
~ithin an area 16km from the perimeter. GCI personnel utilized night
observation devices to increase the effectiveness of the patrols. Close
coordination between RTG ground forces responding in base-defense roles961
and the HH-53 had been practiced and ~as highly effective.-
Th~ base employed the "three-ring" defense concept, with K-9 patrols
supplying the majonty of the middle 11ne. The "close-in" site defense
of d vital resource areas was, however, inadequate. The lack of close-in
41
JIt
•..•..IQ
•••••••u
L
r; r PTAFB
I'\t POL area,..t MMS aread mahlng lnner jefellsf 1 It
GIIRE 7
...
..
..JII
-
III
..-
BON RTAFB
POL areat. "'1MS area
ff-Base MMS area, 6 miles
L
..•••~.-•III
•~ P'AFB
Off-Base ~·~s Area , 1 mi le4 A1 r I\rner Cd pera n
) RE Q
•
There were also two off-base MMS areas--one a few hundred meters
from the perimeter dnd the other about a mile from the gate. Both were
very ightly defended and were highly vulnerable to attack and destruc'14/
ticn. -
~ regu'ar use of the HH-43 helicopters was undertaken for exterior
patrol efforts. although it was available to ucheck-out any suspicious.ill!
act1vltles~ I
Because of the limited base area. the lIthree rings of defense" concept
was not fol'owed 10 all areas of the perimeter. Additionally. Udorn shared
a sect or. of the perimeter with Air America, a U.S. Government-owned airline
operat1on There was no existing defense of that common perimeter although
an agreement was -eached in June 1972 between USAf and MACTHAI whereby
the JSAF could 1nft'ate lim1ted defense of that area in July There was
a very sophis t 1ca ted "el ose-1 n" defense around the aircraft cons i st1n9
of per~meter sentries who had excellent circulation observation and con-3
trol. There was a danger. however, that an enemy who had penetrated
this far might then be too close to vital resources for their successful
defense.
"-Tapao RT~F Once thought to be the most secure base in Thailand,
this tnsta'latioo re~e1ved what could have been a devastating lesson early
n 1972 Fortunately, the attack did IIlOre damage to the illusion of safety
than the str'ke capabil ity of this vital USAF installation, The attack
52
\
.1~....•••....•.-••III
•....•~
..
..
JII
..
'l ~REA 3 ~n-Base ~hai Villaqe'N \REA 4 B-52 Ramp
PA -NAf
RE a
~ , ·.....".,.,~_w •
I
I
•
Regular HH-43 he11copter patrols of the perimeter were made at night.
Add,tionally, defense personnel were coordinating plans with the RTNM to
conduc t E'yen 1ng i d 1son pa tro1s II of off-ba se areas around the perimeter.
This concept was similar to that developed at Ubon RTAFB.
Several s1gnificant personnel actions resulted from lessons learned
'n the January attack. First, despite the large defense force, the 19·1/2km
perlmeter, taken with other geographic constraints discussed in Chapter Ill.
made perimeter defense difficult. The ease with which the January sappers
mov~d once they penetrated the base clearl~ demonstrated the inherent risks
of an U egg _shell' perimeter defense posture. An effective, in-depth. middle-
tne-of-defense was developed for personnel utilization. Plans were made
for sophist,cated physical barriers in this manageable middle ring. Addi
tiona' close-in defenses were tightened and strengthened. Each aircraft
revetment was guarded by either an SP or TSG, and K-9 patrols were concen-.!!21
trated In the middle defenses and in areas around the resources. Several
ambush s1tes were manned in the large. densely foliated regions inside the
perImeter Regu'ar full-field exercises were conducted on the seashore
per1meter with llve fire from machineguns, grenades, and small arms used120/
to orovide tactIcal experience with these weapons.----
rculatlon control in the aircraft area was generally excellent,
possibly reflect1ng the several years' experience that the Strategic Air
Command had with th,s type of defense measure. The POL and MMS areas,
howp~er. were not defended in the depth evident on the flight line. This,
55
I,
II
••••••I
••••I
•••
f cour~e, was typical of the majority of Thailand bases and reflected
he relative priorities dictated by resource limitations. Circulation
antrol tn the MMS area was tightened after the January intrusion. Various
nte 1gen e sources indicated the threat of sapper penetration of the
base ~ ate hundreds of trucks that each day delivered bombs to the
base tflS. wh' h was adjacent to the 8-52 parking ramp. Careful searches121{
f these trucks were routinely perfonned.-
III
•••....
til.
The ~Jor problem fac 1 ng security forces in 1972 was summed up by122{
hief of Security Police at U-Tapao RTNAF in the folloWing words:----
Mission motivation is critical. The security pol ice""'" would want to do a good job if they fel t thesituation called for it. But thTS is hard becausethe small threat here gives rise to apathy; morale~s ~ot a prOblem. boredom is!
This place is not indefensible. It is a littleharder than mortother bases. but it can be effectively and adequately defended with presentlyavalldble resources if our people believe it can!
56
,
Introduction
An effective base physical defense environment has as its goal four
objectives: the detection, detention, and destruction of the ene~; and,
of greatest importance, t~ preservation of vital resources while accom
Two CHECO reports on base defense concepts and measures in the123/
Republic of Vietnam provide additional infonnation.
This chapter briefly considers four aspects of physical defenses as
they existed in Thailand from 1968 to 1972. First, it examines active
defense systems designed to aid personnel in the detection, containment,
and response to an en~ intrusion. Then, the chapter details passive
defense measures designed to protect personnel and vital resources durin9
an attack. It explores the limitations imposed by natural conditions
as well as political and economic constraints on the use of defensive
devices. Finally, it briefly discusses some of the specific difficulties
and achievements. No'effort is made to duplicate concepts discussed in
Active and Passive Defense Measures
The first 'ring of defense" within the bounds of USAF responsibility
was the base perimeter, usually composed of fence lines and other integrated
..
.....•.-•••••••-•,•
..... ".~ ....... ...---.,..;"'.,=%w=.' 'eecli'"
defenses. all designed to expose the en~ to an increased risk of obser
vation and detection. No base considered itself secure because of an
impenetrable perimeter, for as one Chief of Security Police stated: "Fences
only keep honest people and cattle out. they don't stop determined sapper124(
squads. I'
Perimeter lines at most bases consisted of various combinations of
rolls of concertina wire, "tangle-foot ll barbed-wire barriers, and, occasionally,
chain-link fences. Some bases placed trip-flares among the fences. These
had wires which. when distrubed. would trigger the flare. (The figures on
the following pages illustrate some of the typical perimeter defense con
cepts.) All bases (except Takhli RTAFB) had generally adequate lighting
on the perimeter fences and several had NF-2 Light-All units to provide
additional illumination as backup or in critical areas. Most of the bases
had Xenon lights with the capability of lighting several hundred meters with
either infrared or visible light; however. not a single base was able to
fully utilize these unit•• either because of maintenance difficulties or
insufficient manning. Most installations also had various night observa-
tion devices (NODs) such as starlight scopes or the more expensive tower
mounted NODs. Unfortunately. no base had sufficient numbers of these devices
to permit visual observation of the entire base perimeter. To further aid
in observation. herbicides were employed to assist in the difficult task
of vegetation control. Use of these agents was limited by such factors
as the ROE and supply problems.
58
,
•••••..••
Perimeter Defense System
UNCLASSIFIED
LEGEND
@ Bunker
~ @Tower
6> Field of Fire.'fJ-
<C t M60 ~;.chjne Gun
~ B1 M/1 Mort. r
'G'\1 Mines
):~ Fe;lc~ lines
fiR'; ~Bi ~J Reserve/Unmanned Positions
A
<~,
"',,<>-<'",
..•n••••III
•••.-,..II..It-
FIGURE 11
UNCLASSIFIED
......._----------------_._--
••UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 3-2. Double Apron Fence.
Figure 3-1. Triple Standard Conc.ertina Fence.
tEN€MY
I
FIGURE 12
"2
ENEMY
UNCLASSIFIED
Defensive Pertmeter Fences
2
lor 'V
~.o.m~
PLAN
PflON
AEAHAP N
FENCE
•
2 PACES 2 PACESL~.. li5m
CROSS SECTION
..""
:! PACESl...1.51'1 I
N01"E:EYES Of ALL PICKETS POINTIN DIRECTION FROM WHICHfENCE IS BEING ERECTED.
SECTiON
IIfUT HORiZONTAL SUPPORTIRE RACKED TO UPPERONCE:lTINA HALFWAYBETWEEN PICKETS .,....,~
-----.......... ' 90cm
"'-f~._",,;9f,_TAUT HORIZOtnAl"... SUPPORT WIRE
IIII ENEMYIIII
•..••III..•••••..•••
..
.....-..JIll....JD
•
Only one base made use of any form of Tactical Security Support Equip
ment. In January 1971, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB was the test base for the
westinghouse AN/GSS-15 Alarm Set. This system of intrusion detection used
the Balanced Pressure System (BPS). Test results were highly satisfactory.
From January 1971 through June 1972, the system averaged 90 percent opera
tional effectiveness. Future plans called for the late 1972 completion
of the NKP perimeter and the installation of equipment at U-Tapao, Ubon,125/
and Udorn RTAFB. The system at Nakhon Phanom was not really an inte-
grated part of the base defenses in mid-1972. The system covered about
30 percent of the base perimeter, but all of the sensory "actuators" or
alert lights were located in one observation tower. That tower had no
opportunity to observe all portions of the perimeter covered by the BPS.
Effective use would have required that each section of the perimeter be
under observation by a tower guard who would be alerted by an alarm
triggered by any intrusion in his sector. Oelay in communicating an
alarm from one tower to the sector guard in the area being penetrated126/
would have effectively prevented detection.---
Great variations 1n perimeter defenses and detection devices were
evident in 1972. PACAFM 207-25 and periodic staff visits by 7/13AF
Security Police personnel provided the only command guidance. Variations
in amount and types of fencing, use of trip-flares, tower height and
positioning, and circulation control procedures were in evidence from
base to base. Inner defenses also varied significantly, both from each127/
other and from PACAFM 207-25. No base had close-in defense perimeters
61
meeting the manual IS standards, and none possessed intrusion detection
devices, such as trip-flares, around the vital resources. Further,
defensive fencing around such resources was generally incomplete or non
existent, thereby limiting the site defenses to reliance upon human sentries
alone. Even this detection capability was hindered by inadequate lighting
around the perimeter of the close-in defenses, and aircraft noise also
served to complicate detection. This absence of in-depth site protection
was not due to any lack of perception by defense planners, but, rather,
was dictated by various practical considerations such as access to the
flight-line areas by maintenance personnel and equipment.
The second and third objectives of active defense were to contain
an enemy and respond with adequate forces to destroy or repel him. Both
fencing and illumination were significant in providing this ability. Slap
flares and 81mm mortars with illumination rounds were available at all
bases for use during any attempted or suspected penetration effort by
sappers.
Two significant deficiencies in base defenses existed throughout
Thailand and seriously limited the response capability of defense forces.
The first was a lack of adequate communications, and the second was vehicle
problems. Most bases had radios with only a two-channel capacity; while
adequate under normal conditions, the urgency created by an emergency plus
the difficulties of a multilingual defense force seriously overburdened128/
this system at times.---- Further, maintenance problems and lack of
62
••
•••••
j
I•
!
I
i
Passive defenses for RAM attacks, such as revetments for aircraft and
personnel shelters, differed widely. A1rcraft dispersal, another effective
passive protection measure. was 11mited by the severe restrictions on
available ramp parking space. POl and MMS areas were likewise provided with
what few revetments and whatever dispersal space was possible under the
circumstances. Another example of the varied responses of defense planners
was "stand-off" fencing. Des1gned to shield defens1ve bunkers from an RPG
attack, this concept of defense initiated 1n early 1972 by 7/l3AF SP had
yet to be fully implemented at base level by June. Indeed, several bases135/
had hardly begun the project.
A ser1es of reports from the bases to CDMUSMACTHAI deta1led the multi
m1llion dollar impact of upgrading the physical defenses of USAF/Tha1 bases
IIIIIIIII
~I
,I'I
1:,
s1nce 1968. Also. the first attack caused defense planners to realize
that adequate base protection required much more than a few armed sentries I136/
with rifles walking posts after dark beh1nd a three strand barbed-wire fence.----
However, a fully sta.dardized base defense posture had not yet been attained Iby mid-1972.
Lim1tat10ns
Geograph1c constraints prov1ded many problems in the USAF base defense
posture in Thailand. Contiguous populat10n centers at many of the bases
severely limited opportunities for both observation and effective counterfire.
Further. tropical vegetation aided by seasonal monsoon rains grew almost
.. faster than it could be controlled. Dense Jungles were rated as the greatest137/
threat to the defenses at U-Tapao. Other natural features such as streams
64
--
--•..•III
••••••d
•..•
NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB 1966
FIGURE 13
...--•.....•Jd
••••••...•..•,
and drainage ditches, known as "klongs." provided concealment and thus were
natural points of entry for enemy sappers. Most bases relied on extra
illumination to counter the threat in those areas. The extent to which
vegetation has been cleared is graphically illustrated in the case of NKP.
The photograph of that base on the following page shows the extent of vege
tation inside the base perimeters in the early days of construction when
the airfield was carved out of virgin junglea An interesting comparison
between NKP 1966 and NKP 1972 can be made by reference to the picture of
that base that appears earlier in this report. (see Figure 6.)
Other constraints were imposed by various economic and political con
siderations. There was a relative scarcity of resources and money which
forced defense planners to establish priorities in the areas of the base
they were able to defend in depth. Thus POL and MMS areas had to compete
with aircraft, which past experience had shown were more lucrative targets.
Local USAF base commanders' emphasis on defense often varied. For
example, prior to the June 1972 attack, the base commander of Ubon RTAFB
directed that a triple concertina barrier be removed from an area between
aircraft revetments and the base perimeter, just 100 meters beyond. The
df recti ve order; 09 the remova 1 of the fence was part of a current 'Ibase
beautification" effort. This very area became the penetration point for the138/
sapper attack.---- Occasionally, higher command also diverted defense
resources to areas with higher threat estimates. Barbed-tape, considered
the most effective anti-penetration barrier available for use along
66
•! - -------.. . -...---..
I
'J
The perimeter was heavily wired with trip-flares to assist in detecting
intruders. Unfortunately, there was no use of NODs despite their avail
ability. Additionally, most of the perimeter observation towers were
unusually low and several were set back from the perimeter, thus hindering
effective observation of parts of the perimeter lines. Also, in June
1972, the base began the construction of Blmm mortar pits.
Physical protection in the HMS area had the potential of becoming highly
effective. Higher towers and adequate fencing surrounded the area; unfor
tunately, several sections of lights were inoperative because required parts
were on back order from supply. Large areas of the defense perimeter were149/
dangerously darkened.---
Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. NKP also had the usual rainy season vegetation
problems, but heavy use of herbicides kept the growth under control in the
fenced areas. Interior vegetation was usually kept closely cut. Lighting
around the straight perimeter was excellent and NF-2 Light-All units were
placed at the drainage ditches which went through the fences. High obser
vation towers located close to the perimeter afforded excellent visibility
at all points.
As previously mentioned, a limited BPS detection system was installed
in 1971 around portions of the outer perimeter fence. Full coverage was
planned for late 1972. The aircraft on the flight lines were generally
69
......, .J; ,t - ...> .lit: .•
~
•D
••••••II
••••IIII
III
••...••••••••II
•••
unrevetted and parked in line, which made them highly vulnerable to a stand
off attack or sabotage. However, the special Task Force Alpha Project,
located on the base, was protected by high revetments and was thus impervious150/
to all but direct hits.----
Takh1i RTAFB. When Takh1i was reactivated in May 1972, a "bare-base
defense" concept was implemented. Designed for locations where defenses
were non-existent, the concept envisioned rapid deployment of fully-equipped
security personnel. Defense personnel were drawn from the SPECS program and
equipment was to have either been brought with the units or supplied from
other PACAF resources. Unfortunately, in several cases the SPECS units
came without any support equipment and in no case did they bring vehicles
or communications equipment. Consequently, they were dependent on PACAF
support. Extra equipnent was drawn frQO several bases, including those in
Thailand, but the timeliness and quality of the support was frequently
less than desirable. For example, several battery chargers for the por
table radios were 1noperative when received, as was one of the H-60 machine.ill.!
guns. Ubon and NKP both sent base communications stations to Takhli,
but both were received without any transistors or tubes. The mobile radio152/
unit from Karat was inoperative when received.----
On 15 Hay the base defenders, possessing only 15 portable radios,
were severely limited due to the communications deficiencies. They received
29 more in early June, but there were over 100 defensive posts to be manned
during the critical evening hours. Finally, on 1 July, Takh1i received an153/
additional shipment of 220 surplus radios from Vietnam.
70
-- -,.- - ------ ~---,--.--,....-.-.-~
- -. __",w"_"_,_".~,,,.__,,,~_.__• .,,,_----...
Recognizing the critical communications problems, 7/13AF SP recommended
that all future SPECS planning include four-channel radios in mobility154/
equipment.
Takhli defenses were rebuilt by massive self-help operations using the
TDY security forces. However, 13AF staff inspectors reemphasized the same
admonition voiced earlier concerning the necessity to coordinate work order
requests with Civil Engineering for support in constructing physical defense155/
aids.-
The single greatest problem faced by the defense unit was lack of
vehicles. There were no tracked Hl13 armored personnel carriers available
for Takhli. This restricted troop deployment during the rainy season.
Of the four smaller personnel carriers the SPs had, only one was operative.
In mid-June, over 55 percent of the few vehicles available were inoperative
due to maintenance difficulties. The defense force had the use of only a
few "H" series combat Jeeps. However, the wing and base commanders had
each indicated command interest in solving this problem by recalling such156/
Jeeps from other mission elements on the base.
Since the security forces did not wish to use them, the base made no
use of trip-flares in its intrusion detection system. Nor were there any
perimeter lights installed as of June, although a proposal had been sub157/
mitted to 13AF for approval.
lack of sufficient vehicles and communications equipment in the early
days of the defense construction had severely hampered the defense posture.
71
.......•
.........••••..•••
158{Fortunately, that posture was not tested. The greatest remaining problems
in June were the inadequate numbers of vehicles and the lack of perimeter
1ighting.
Ubon RTAFB. In the opinion of the defense personnel at Ubon RTAFB
in 1972, the proximity of the perimeter defenses to the primary resources
constituted a serious weakness at this base. At the point of penetration
in June, the perimeter was less than 300 feet from the AC-130 parkin9 revet
ments. This area compression limited the effective application of the three
defensive-rin9 concept and seriously limited the fields of fire. The type
of perimeter fences varied; some sections of the fence consisted of two
lines of triple concertina wire, While, in other sections, the fence was
much less of a barrier•
lighting on the perimeter was adequate under normal conditions, but
heavy rain frequently shorted out large sections of the lights. Back-up
light-All units were in short supply, even during periods of heightened•
security. Ordinarily, 81mm mortars were available to provide illumina-
tion when needed. Unfortunately, observation devices were in short supply,
and the base only had 12 NODs available. Four Xenon lights were on t~e
base, but were not used either because the unit or its generator was
inoperative, or the special binoculars were not functioning .
A BPS intrusion detection system was programmed for October 1972, and
plans had been made to fence the close-in defensive perimeter.
72
....
The MMS area, six miles off-base, was defended in-depth with good
fighting positions and excellent observation towers. It was probably the159/
most secure MMS area in Thailand.
Ubon had undertaken a unique approach to solve one of its problems,
that of controlling off-base vegetation. The ROE prohibited the use of
herbicides outside the perimeter, but Base Civic Action undertook the
project of having vegetation cleared 100 meters from the 11'15 area fence
and had additionally contracted with local villagers to clear 150 meters of
dense underbrush from around the base perimeter. The project was inexpen
sive, cleared a wide field for observation, and put money into the local160/
villages, thereby helping to create good will.
Udorn RTAFB. Udorn City abutted a large area of the base, creating
detection problems. The perimeter was also very close to the aircraft
at several points, denying the defenders the necessary lIbattle room ll to
employ the three-defensive-rings technique. Describing the situation•
there, the chief of security police stated: "Internal defense is fnade-ill!
quate because of the geographic problems. we are just too small'"
Deep drainage canals, or "klongs." created further limitations on
the detection ability, but a BPS was scheduled for installation in December
1972 to help alleviate some of those problems.
As previously mentioned, a long section of the perimeter was shared
with commercial airlines, specifically, Air America and Continental Airways.
73
....-... ..
~
•....•III
•••••..••••••
This section was not defended in-depth, but fencing and some bunkers were
present. More active defense of this sector was planned after July.
The POL area was in a corner of the base next to the town. Several
of the fuel storage tanks were less than 100 feet from civilian housing.
The "'S areas, both off-base, were very small and vulnerable to attack.
The interior munitions were revetted, but the openings to several of the
revetments faced the fence, greatly limiting the effectiveness of that
protection against a RPG attack.
The flight line area was well revetted, but there was little use162/
of wire fencing to give depth to the close-in defenses.----
U-Tapao RTNAF. Unlike Udorn and Ubon, which suffered from too little
battle space, U-Tapao defenses were almost engulfed by territory. Such
a massive amount of real estate forced dilution of both people and resources
committed to the defense effort. That dilution contributed to the weaknesses
demonstrated in January 1972. However, by June, the defense concepts were
altered and the main line of resistance was planned around the middle
defensive positions. Construction of physical barriers in this region
and installation of lighting still lagged. A BPS was scheduled to ring
the close-in aircraft area defenses, the MMS area, and the POL site. Pop-
up mines had also been approved for those areas.
The base had another unusual problem. There was a Thai village located
on the base inside the perimeter. This created difficulties, especially
in pilferage control.
74
~---,.".,..,...... ... ~ ~--'"'"f'''_.J,
Vegetation control was all but impossible over the entire reservation.
Vegetation control was further hindered by the inability of the base to
get herbicides through supply channels during the entire first half of
1972.
Despite the eighteen and one-half miles of perimeter, U-Tapao possessed
only six NOOs, and of those, only two were operative. The typical vehicle
maintenance difficulties also existed.
Essentially, U-Tapao's defenses were being restructured in mid-1972
in response to the lessons learned during the January attack. The plans
had been made and the defense forces were occupied 1n constructing the163/
physical barriers to prevent another penetration attempt by the ene~.----
,
75
••~
~
~
•~
••~
~
•••-
..
..
..
..••
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
In 1968, air base defense in Thailand was in its infancy. A series
of daring sapper attacks over the next four years did much to hasten the
evolution of defense concepts that were adapted in the effort to protect
vital USAF resources from such surreptitious assaults.
The Oirector of security Police, 7/13AF, tasked each base to develop
a plan stressing flexibility within certain set standards in preparing
their defenses. Although forced to counter the enemy threat from behind
static defense lines, base security forces demonstrated positive and inno
vative thinking in reassessing and strengthening the physical fortifications
of the installations. Continuing consideration was given to more effective
utilization of the limited personnel and equipment resources available.
Various deficiencies existed, but they were recognized, and command con
cern was focused on their elimination.
If any lag in response to a perceived enemy threat existed, it was
in the preparation of effective countermeasures to enemy action other than
sapper attacks. Circulation control in flight line. POL, and MMS areas
to protect against a sabotage threat was often inadequate. Also, the
risk of stand-off attack was not matched by effective defenses. As was
observed in Vietnam in 1969, "The stronger USAF internal base defense forces
have become, the more the enemy has relied on stand-off attacks, and the
76
77
destroy fuel or munitions before." Of course, history has recorded many
II
•~
•..•
,161/
has diminished." Unfortunately,threat of penetration by sapper squads
Prime attention and interest has been rightly focusedon base perimeter defense and the capability todetect and deal with hostile forces at this pointlong before they have a chance to get to vital missionresources. we have, however, at the same time failedin some cases to provide adequate attention and securitycoverage around and adjacent to vital mission resources.Without jeopardizing our perimeter defense, we must takea close look at the security being provided aircraft andessential mission items. In looking at this problemwe must take into consideration factors which limitour control over who comes and goes on base and ourresulting lack of knowledge of who may be secluded on
the best security against such a threat was beyond the control of the USAF;
a vigorous and regular presence by friendly armed forces in areas around
the external perimeter of the bases would have provided a powerful deterrent
to any hostile activity, but adequate RTG presence was often lacking.
I
Security for the more obvious aircraft targets was generally good,
but in other areas also important to the combat mission, it was often
unsatisfactory. This deficiency was commonly justified on the premise
that defense resources were l1m1ted and lithe enemy had never chosen to
attacks that were "the first of thefr kind." Fortunately, such llreaction_
type" planning was the exception and not the rule in Thailand base defense.
and the vulnerability of such targets was recognized.
Perhaps the best example of the attitude taken toward security on
the Thai bases was stated in late Hay 1972 by the senior USAF Security• 165/
Policeman in the country.
,
,..........
,
base at the end of the day. We must also considerpenetration of our defense and security through useof subterfuge as well as outright undetected penetration of the perimeter defense. Our circulationcontrol. security coverage and placement of sentriesin and around those areas must be such that it insuresthat we detect and deal with hostile elements beforethey destroy our resources. We must be as well prepared as our security force. equipment and thesituation will permit••••
78
,
UNCLASSIFIED
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER I
1. (5) Interview, Hajor General Dewitt R. searlesl
Deputy Commander 7/1lAF,9 Jun 72. (Hereafter cited: H/G Searles Intervtew
2. (5) Ibid.
3. (5) CHECO Report, USAF Posture In Thailand, January-December 1967,Hq PACAF, 25 Har 69, pp. 5-6.
7. (5) 8rleflng. subj: "Counter Offensive Air Operltlons 5U111Nlry," presented to Hr. Lowenstein and Hr. Hoose, U.S. Senate Foreign RelltlonsCommittee by Mojor Generll Hlrsholl and Lt Colonel Harper. 8rleflng Division, Hq 7AF, 25 Hay 72.
8. (U) NewsPlrr Irtlcle, "Viet Air Operltlons to Have to Thll 8lses,"Bangkok Post, 1 Jun 72.
9. (C) Interview, Lt Colonel Wlllll~ H. Derrington, Director of SecurityPolice, 7/l3AF/SP, 11 Jun 72. (Herelfter cited: L/C Derrington 7/l3AFInterview)
10. (5) CHECO Report, Counterinsurgency In ThltllndA
12. (5) 8rlefln9. presented to Preparedness Investlgltlon Subcommitteeof the Senate Committee on Armed Forces by Major Generll Charles R. Bond.Dep Cmdr, 7/13AF, 2 Nov 66.
13. (5) CHECO Report, Thai COIN 1966. p. 2; (5) CHECO Report. Thll COIN67.68, p. 12,
14. (5) lli.!!..79
UNCLASSIFIED
I
'.
•
80
UNCLASSIFIED
15. (C) Coomand Briefing, prepared by Dep Cmelr, 7/13AF by Captain JohnC. Hunt, Ground Combat Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Security Police,7/13AF/SP, sUbJ: "Ground Combat Intelligence SUI1II1lry 1972," g Jun 72.(Hereafter cited: 7/13AF Commend Inte11. Briefing); Is) Report, subJ:"Insurgent Threet in Thailand," MACTHAI/JUSGMAGTHAI, 6 Ju1 72 •
•
16. (U) Regulation, USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI Regulation 500-5, "Arming ofU.S. Military Personnel and Rules of Engagement," 28 Mar 70. (Hereaftercited: MACTHAI Reg 500-5 ROE)
17. (S) CHECO Report, Attack on Udorn, 26 July 1968, Hq PACAF, 27 Dec 68.
18. (S) Report, subJ: "Insurgent Attack on Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, 26July 1968," OSI District 51, reference number 51-68-830, undated. p. 12.
19. (C) Report, subj: "Combat.After ActIons Report" made to 7/13AF/SPby Major Eugene A. Lamar, Chief of Security Police, BCSG/SP, 20 Aug 69;(Sl Report, subJ: "Sapper Attack, Ubon RTAFB, Thailand, 28 July 1969,"
'OS District 51, reference number 51-69-1168, 5 Aug 69.
20. (S) Msg, subJ: "Enemy After Action Report," BCSG/SP to CINCPACAF/IGS, 28D8oo2 Jul 69.
21. (C) Report, subJ: "Combat After Action Report" made to 7/13AF/SPby Captain John R. O'Leary, Chief security Police, BCSG/SP, 6 Feb 70.(Hereafter cited: Ubon 197D Combat After Action Report); (S) Report,subJ: "Sapper Attack, Ubon RTAF8, Thailand, 13 January 1970," 'OSI District51, reference number 51-70-0018, 22 Jan 70; (S) MS9, subJ: "Sapper Attackon Ubon Afld, 13 Jan 70," BCSG/SP to CINCPACAF, 1311102 Jan 70.
22. (S) Msg, subJ: "Ubon Attack, Intelligence Wrap-Up," COMUSMACTHAIto Sec. of State, WashIngton, D. C•• 1508002 Jan 70.
23. (U) Msg, subJ: "Sapper Attack," CINCPACAF to 8CSG/SP, 1421352 Jan70; (C) MS9. subJ: "Attack at Ubon RTAF8," Dep Cmelr, 7/13AF to BCSG/SP,1807002 Jan 70.
24. (S) Msg, sUbJ: "Enemy Action Report," 635CSG/SP to CINCPACAF/IGS,101312Z Jan 72; (S) Report, subj: "Combat After Action Report" madeto 7/13AF/SP by Major G. B. Stackhouse, Chief of Security Police, 635CSG/SP,3 Feb 72; (S) Report, subJ: "Sapper Attack, U.Tapao Airfield, Thailand,10 January 1972," OSI District 51, no reference number, no date. (Hereaftercited: OSI U-Tapao Report) ,
25. (U) MS9, subJ: "U-Tapao Attack," Cmdr, 13AF to 635CSG/SP, 1303002Jan 72; (S) Tele9ram, subJ: "Air Base Intrusion, U-Tapao," U.S. AmbassadorUnger to Sec. of State, 10 Jan 72.
.~
UNCLASSIFIED
-Jl
UNCLASSIFIED
26. (Sl Msg, subj: "Sapper Attack on U-Tapao Alrfleld, 10 January 1972,"Oep Cmdr, 7/13AF to Cmdr, 7AF, 1020052 Jan 72.
27. (Cl Msg,subj: "Sapper Attack," Chlef of Staff, USAF to 635CSG,1119322 Jan 72; (Ul Msg, subj: "Sapper Attack,' CINCPACAF to CSAF,1223052 Jan 72.
28. (Sl OSI U-Tapao Report, pp. 21-22.
29. (Cl Msg, subj: "Securlty Police Spot Inte111gence Report 71-3,"8CSG/SP to 7/13AF/SP 0206002 Jun 72.
30. (S) Msg, subj: "EneI1\)' Act10n Report," BCSG/SP to CINCPACAF/lGS,0412402 Jun 72; (S) Msg, subj: 'Ubon Spot Inte1l1gence Report 72-4,"BCSG/SP to 7/13AF/SP, 0309oo2 Jun 72.
31, (cl Msg, subj: "Sapper Attack," Cmdr, 8TFW to 7/1JAF/OO, 0401152 Jun 72.
32. (C) 7/13AF Comnand Inte11, Brleflng.
33. (Cl L/C Oerrlngton 7/13AF Intervlew; (S) MIG Searles Intervlew.
34. (Cl MSg, subj: "Alr Base Intelllgence Sunmary," Comnunlst Suppress10nCommand (RTG) to 7/13AF/SP, 0903102 Jun 72.- .35. (Cl MS9, subj: "Air Base Defense Intell1gence Sunmary," Comnun1stSuppress10n Command (RTG) to 7/13AF/SP, 1607452 Jun 72.
36. (C) Report, subj: "Vletnamese Refugees ln Tha1land: Fund CollectlonActlvltles," OSI Dlstrlct 51, reference number 1-656-0023-72, 20 Mar 72.
51. (S) CHECO Report, 7AF Local Base Defense Operations, July 1965-December1968, Hq PACAF, 1 Jul 69. (Hereafter cited: CHECO Report, RVN 65-68 BaseDefense)
52. (U) Ltr, subj: "Thai Security Guards," 7/13AF/SP to all base SPSs,7 Jun 72.
53. (C) Msg, subj: "Thai Security Regiment Conmander's Message 1265/15dated 10 June 1972," 7/13AF/SP to CDMUSHACTHAI/J-36, 131015Z Jun 72; (C)MS9, subj: "Insurgent Situation in Thailand." 7/13AF/SP to CINCPACAF/IGS,2809552 Jun 72.
57. (Cl Ibid.; (Cl Interview, TSgt Robert A. Van deRiet, senior K-9Trainer in-""'iland, 56SPS, Nakhon Phanom RTAF8, 14 Jun 72.
58. (Cl Ibid.
59. (S) CHECO Report, RVN 65-6B Base Oefense.
60. (Cl Msg, subj; "Air Base Defense Posture," Oet II, Army AdvisoryGroup to COMUSHACTHAI, 12~555Z F.b 72; (C) Msg, subj: "InsurgentSituation in Thailand," 7/13AF/SO to CINCPACAF, 2B0955Z Jun 72.
61. (C) Ltr, no subject, emdr 1113AF to COMUSHACTHAI, 6 Jun 72.
64. (C) Memo, subj; "Policy Guidelines for U.S. Military Assistance toThai Counteri nsurgency Efforts," U.S. Embassy Bangkok to Oep Cmdr, 7113AF,2 May 6B; (C) MACTHAI Reg 500-5 ROE.
65. (C) Ubon 1970 Combat After Action Report.
66. (S) CHECO Report, RVN 65-68 Base Defense, Chapter IV, "OperationSafe Side. II
67. (C) Memo, subj: "Mission Policy on Base Defense," para II F, COMUSHACTHAI/JUSGMAGTHAI to 7/l3AF, 1 Nov 69; (C) Memo, subj; "Mission Policy on BaseDefense. II para II F. II G. Hi n1 ster/Counselor for Counteri nsurgency. U. s.Embassy, Bangkok to COMUSMACTHAI and Dep Crodr, 7/l3AF, 4 Mar 70. (Hereaftercited: Embassy 1970 ROE)
68. (U) Regulation AFR 125-32, ,ubj: "Security Police Elements forContingencies (SPECSl," date unknown, c.72; (U) Regulation, (draft 8 June1972), PACAFR l25-XX, subj; "Security Police Elements for Contingencies(SPECS)," proposed publicatio" date; lS Jul 72.
69. (TS) CHECO Draft, "The USAF Response to the Sprin9 1972 NVN Offensive;Situation and Deployment," 9 Sep 72. (Material extracted from this reportwas classified no higher than Secret.)
72. (U) Ltr, subj: "Security Pol1ce Elements for Contingencies (SPECS),"PACAF/IGS to 5AF/IGS, 13AF/IGS and lSABWg/SP, 30 May 72.
73. (C) 7/13AF COIIII1lnd Intell. Briefing.
74. (C) L/C Oerrington 7/13AF Interview.
75. (C) Ltr, subj: "Mission Policy on Base Oefense," (contains U.S.Embassy directive on same subject) USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI to 7/13AF, 1 Nov69. (Hereafter cited: Embassy 1969 ROE)
76. (S) M/G Searles Interview; (C) L/C Oerrington 7/13AF Interview.
77. (S) Memo, subj: "U.S. Mission Policy Guidelines for U.S. Counterinsurgency Support in Thailand," SA/CI, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, to COMUSMACTHAIand 7/13AF, 4 Mar 6B. (Hereafter cited: Embassy 1968 ROE)
78. (S) Ibid.
79. (s) Embassy 1969 ROE.
80. (C) Embassy 1970 ROE.
81. (C) MACTHAI Reg 500-5 ROE.
82. (C) Ltr, subj: "Mission Policy on Base Oefense," (containing anaddendum from the U.S. Embassy to its Policy Oirective) COMUSMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI to 7/13AF.
83. (C) ~., footnotes 76, 78-83.
84. (U) Manual, PACAFM 207-25, subj: "Security Policy and Guidance forGuerrilla/Insurgency/Limited War Environments," PACAF, 15 Feb 71. (Hereaftercited: PACAFM 207-25) 13AF Supplement 1 thereto, 25 Mar 71.
85. (S) M/G Searles Interview; (C) L/C Oerrington 7/13AF Interview.
88. (e) Interview, Major John W. Gordon, Chief Security Police, 388 SPS,Kora t RTAFB, 28 Jun 72. (Herea fter cited: Maj Gordon Kora t Intervi ew) ;(Ul Msg, subj: "Security of Installations," 3BB SPS to COMUSMACTHAI3006102 May 72. (Hereafter cited: Korat Security Msg); (C) Msg, subj:"Air Base Defense Posture," Det II, ARAG to COMUSMACTHAI, 1215552 Feb 72.(Hereafter cited: Air Base Defense Posture Msg); (Cl Ltr, subj: "Resultsof Exercise," Colonel Jugchai, Chief of Staff, 2d Anny, RTA to CSP,388 SPS, 27 Jan 72; (C) Operational Order 173/2514, Cmdr, Hq ProvincialPolice Region 3, subj: "Scouting for Air Base Defense," 21 Apr 71; (C)Operational Order 1/2814 RIA, Major General Chamlong, Cmdr 2d Army, RTA,subj: "Combined Area and Security and Defense Plan," 30 Apr 69.
B9. (C) Ltr, subj: "Providing RTAF Security Patrols," reference MO 03B2/6571, Cmdr, Wing III, RTAF to 3BB CSG, 27 May 71.
90. (Cl Major Gordon Korat Interview; (cl Interview and day/night tourof facilities by author and Captain Annin A. Krueger, Operations Officer,388 SPS, Korat RTAFB, 27 Jun 72. (Hereafter cited: Korat Inspection)
91. (C) Ibid.
92. (C) Ibid.
93. (U) Memo, subj: "Letter of Understanding Between III Wing, RTAF and3B8 CSGjSP," undated, (Jun 70); (U) Ltr, subj: "Access Control Procedures,"Colonel C. C. Mish, Cmdr, 388 TFW to Cmdr, III Wing, RTAF, 10 Jul 71.
94. (C) Plan, subj: "Base Defense Security Plan," reference MO -3B2/119,1 Jul 71; (C) Air Base Defense Posture Msg; (C) MS9, subj: "Securityof Installations Occupied by U.S. Forces in Thai," 56 SPS to COMUSMACTHAI,2909202 May 72. (Hereafter cited: NKP Security Msg); (U) History, "56 SPS,1 March 1972-31 March 1972," 8 Apr 72.
95. (C) Ibid., Air Base Defense Posture Msg; (C) Interview, Major JamesS. Barger,~ef of Security Police, 56 SPS/ Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, 14 Jun 72.(Hereafter cited: Maj Barger NKP Interview)
96. (C) Maj Barger NKP Interview.
97. (C) Ibid.; (C) Interview and day/ni9ht tour of facilities by authorand Captai~ed Riccardi, Operations Officer, 56 SPS, NKP RTAFB, 14 and 15Jun 72. (Hereafter cited: NKP Inspection)
102. (U) Report, subj: "B1-Monthly Security Pol1ce Hanning Report."B SPS to 7/l3AF/SP, 1 Jun 72.
103. (C) Interview, Lt Colonel Robert J. Foy, Chief of Security Police,S SPS, Ubon RTAFB, lB Jun 72. (Hereafter cited: L/C Foy Ubon Interview);(C) Haj Hedsker Ubon Interview; (U) Ltr. subj: "Security of InstallationsOccupl ed by U.S. Forces 1n Thalland," B SPS to ClJo1USHACTHAl, 4 Jun 72.(Hereafter clted: Ubon Securlty Hsg)
104. (C) L/C Foy Ubon Interview.
105. (C) Intervlew and day/nlght tour of fac1lit1es by author and L/CFoy, CSP, 8SPS, Ubon RTAFB. 18 Jun 72. (Hereafter clted: Ubon Inspection)
106. (C) Ltr, subj: "Base Oefense," Major General Searles to Cmdr, 432TRW,Udorn RTAFB, 8 Oct 71.
107. (S) Hsg, subj: "Base Defense," 7/13AF/SP to all Thai Bases, 290935ZJan 72.
108. (C) Intervlew, Major Kenneth J. Kw1atkosk1. Chief of Security Police.432 SPS, Udorn RTAFB, 13 Jun 72. (Hereafter cited: Maj Kwlatkosk1 UdornInterview); (S) Plan, subj: "Joint Base Defense Plan," reference TacticalOps Plan 9/305 UMD. 2d Regimental Army, RTA, May 72.
109. (C) Alr Base Defense Posture Msg.
11 O. (C) Hsg, subj: "POL for Jo1 nt Defense Plans," 13AF to ClJo1USHACTHAI,100700Z Jan 72.
111. (C) Msg. subj: "Thai Reactlon to Udorn Alert," Cmdr, AAAG toCOMJUSHAGTHAI, 10 unk Z Jan 72.
112. (C) Intervlew and tour of facl1lties by author and Captain John S.Campbell, Operatlons Officer, 432 SPS, Udorn RTAFB, 12 Jun 72. (Hereafterclted: Udorn Inspectlon)
\l117. (Cl Interview and day/night tour of facilities by author and Captain "Brian Y. Shlroyama, Operations Officer, 635 SPS, U-Tapao RTNAF, 20-21Jun 72. (Heraafter cited: U-Tapao Inspection); (U) Msg, subj: "security L-of Installations Occupied by U.S. Forces In Thailand,· 635 SPS to COHUSHACTHAI,2903302 May 72. (Hereafter cited: U-Tapao Security Msg); (C) Interview,Major James E. Strayer, Chief of Security Police, 635 SPS, U-Tapao RTNAF, \;21 Jun 72. (Hereafter cited: Haj Strayer U-Tapao Interview)
118. (S) Msg, subj: "Insurgent Situation In Thailand,' 635 SPS to 7/1JAF/SP.0807002 Jul 72.
123. (S) CHECO Report, RVN 65-68 Base Oefense; (C) CHECO Report, LocalBase Oefense In RVN. Januar.l1 1969-June 1971, Hq PACAF, 14 SIp 71. (HereaftercHid: CHECO Report: !IV" 09-71 ~se Defense)
124. (C) Mej Barger NKP Interview.
125. (U) Contract Proposal, subj: "A Proposal to USOAf/AFSC for Installation and Maintenance of Sensor Array," Westinghouse Corp to Oept of Defense,undated, 70; (C) Report, subj: "Safe Look/Have Levy· 56 SPS to Air BaseDefense Program Office, Hanscom Field, AFSC, 28 May 72.
160. (U) Mlnutes,subj: "Quarterly Base Defense Council Meeting," UbonRTAFB, 19 Jun 72.
161. (C) Maj Kwlatkoskl Udorn Intervlew.
162. (C) Udorn Inspection.
163. (C) Maj Strayer U-Tapao Interview; (C) U-Tapao Inspection.
CHAPTER IV
164. (5) CHECO Report: RVN 65-68 Base Defense.
165. (C) Ltr, subj: "Base Defense/Security Pro9rams," Lt ColonelDerrington, Director of Security Police, 7/13AF/SP to all Thal bases,28 May 72.
89
UNCLASSIFIED
,
.,
'-.,..-
-"
I•
II
~
•.. J-
.I
,'-..)
"~
.'
I,,
III
APCARAG
BahtBOSCBPPBPS
CINCPACCINCPACAFCOINCOMUSMACTHAICONSTANT GUARD
CSAGCSCCSGCSPCT
FIoI'IF
Gel
Hq
IGS
JCSJUSMAGTHAI
kmK-9
MACTHAI"'"'S
NCONODNKPNVA
OSI
UNCLASSIFIED
GLOSSARY
Armored Personnel CarrierA~ Advisory Group
Unit of Thai Currency, Approximate Value of $.05Base Defense security Center, JointTha i Border Police Patro1Balanced Pressure System Intrusion Detection Device
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific CommandCommander-in-Chief, Pacific Air ForceCounterinsurgencyCommander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, ThailandCode Na... for Deployment Operations in Spring 1972CounteroffensiveChief of Staff of the Air ForceCentral security Control, Security PoliceCombat Support GroupChief of Security PoliceCommunlst Terrorist
Free World Ml1itary Forces
Ground Combat Intelligence, Security Pollee
Headquarters
Director of Security Police
. Joint Chiefs of StaffJoint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
KilometerSentry Dog
Military Assistance Command, ThailandMunitions Malntenance and Storage
Non-Commissioned OfficerNight Observation DeviceNakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force BaseNorth Vietnamese A~
Office of Speclal Investigations, USAF
90
UNCLASSIFIED
.... ~--_/
QRT
RAMROERPGRTARTAFRTAFBRTARFRTGRTNRTNAFRTrtI
SAFSafe SideSATSEASPSPSSPECSStand-off
TOYTPPTSG
USAUSAF
7AF7/13AF13AF
•UNCLASSIFIED
Quick Reaction Team
Rocket, Artillery, and MortarRules of EngagementRocket Propelled GrenadeRoyal Tha f AmyRoyal Thaf Afr ForceRoyal Thai Air Force BaseRoyal Thai Afr Reserve ForceRoyal Thaf GovernmentRoyal Thaf NavyRoyal Thaf Navy AfrffeldRoyal Thaf Navy Marfnes
Special Actions ForceCode name for Combat Securfty Pol fee SquadronsSecurity Alert TeamSoutheast AsiaSecurity Pol feeSecurfty Pol fee SquadronSecurfty Pol fee Elements for ContingencfesRocket or Mortar Attack from the Exterior of the Base
Temporary DutyThaf Provfncial Pol feeThai Securfty Guard
Unfted States AmyUnfted States Afr Force
Hq. Seventh Afr Force, Tan Son Nhut Afr Base, RVNHq. Seventh/Thfrteenth Air Force, Udorn RTAFB, ThailandHq. Thfrteenth Afr Force, Clark Afr Base, PI
