VOLUME 36, NUMBER 1 2011 Vol 36 No 1.pdfFortitudine, history.

FORTITUDINE

BULLETIN OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAM

VOLUME 36, NUMBER 1 2011

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution isunlimited.

PCN 10401220100

HISTORYDIVISION

PRESIDENTMARINE CORPS UNIVERSITYMajGen Thomas M. Murray

DIRECTORDr. Charles P. NeimeyerDEPUTY DIRECTOR

Paul J. WeberCHIEF HISTORIAN Charles D. Melson

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANTCynthia M. Meyer

HISTORIES BRANCHCharles D. Melson (Branch Head); Dr.Fred H. Allison; Dr. Thomas M.Baughn; Maj David W. Kummer; Dr.Nicholas J. Schlosser; Charles R. Smith;A. Rob Taglianetti; Paul W.Westermeyer

HISTORICAL REFERENCE BRANCHRobert V. Aquilina (Branch Head);Annette D. Amerman; Beth L. Crumley;Kara R. Newcomer; Shelia Phillips

FIELD HISTORY BRANCHLtCol David A. Benhoff; LtCol GregoryS. McCarthy; Maj Robert F. Williams;CWO-4 Timothy S. McWilliams; GySgtBradford A. Wineman

EDITING AND DESIGN BRANCHKenneth H. Williams (Branch Head);James M. Caiella; Andrea L. Connell;Dr. Stephen E. Evans; W. Stephen Hill;Robert A. Kocher; Gregory A.Macheak; Vincent J. Martinez; Wanda J.Renfrow; Jeanette L. Riffe; Shawn H.Vreeland

Marine Corps History Division3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, Virginia 22134Telephone (703) 432-4877http://[email protected]

Motto of the United States Marine Corps in the 1812 era

Historical Bulletin Vol. 36, No. 1 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

About the Cover: The cover, by then-Major Albert“Mike” Leahy, combat artist, depicts a captainemerging from the jungle, showing the signs ofwar in his face. His company rescued anothercompany that had sustained 48 casualties. The bat-tle occurred in Hai Lang Forest, Quang TriProvince, then-South Vietnam. Lieutenant ColonelLeahy recently died, and his Marine Corps story istold on page 23.

From the Director: African-American MarinesDr. Charles P. Neimeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

National Museum of the Marine Corps: Arms Assembled: The RichmondRifle Musket

Bruce A. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4Reference Branch: Notes of the Wounded: Captain Robert S. Hunter and theBattle of La Flor, Nicaragua

Amanda J. Rowley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6National Museum of the Marine Corps: Battles Captures the Scenes and aPromotion

Gregory A. Macheak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Reference Branch: Every Marine a Historian—Revisited: The Unit Historianand Command Chronology

Annette D. Amerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Reference Branch: Adapting to the Foe: Cultural Intelligence and the MarineCorps Intelligence Activity

Abbi N. Molzahn and Nicholas J. Schlosser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16First to Write: Operation Provide Comfort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20In Memoriam: Lieutenant Colonel A. Michael Leahy III and Captain Cyril J.O’Brien

Annette D. Amerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

This bulletin of the Marine Corps historical program is published for Marines, at the rate of onecopy for every nine on active duty, to provide education and training in the uses of military andMarine Corps history. Other interested readers may purchase single copies or four-issue sub-scriptions from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. The appro-priate order form appears in this issue.

“We can only know who we are by being certain ofwho we have been.” Gen Leonard F. Chapman Jr.

24th Commandant of the Marine Corps

2 Fortitudine, Vol. 36, No.1, 2011

Fortitudine, Vol. 36, No.1, 2011 3

From the Director

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

African-American Marines

Recently, the Marine Corps HistoryDivision proudly joined allAmericans in the celebration of BlackHistory Month. However, fewAmericans may realize that BlackHistory Month was originally knownas Black History Week. In 1913, on the50th anniversary of the EmancipationProclamation, Dr. Carter G. Woodsonand other black leaders put together ahistorical display that celebrated theprogress of African-Americans sincethe end of slavery along with the his-torical contributions of the African-American community throughoutAmerican history. Presented to stand-ing room only crowds, Woodson’s dis-play was a tremendous hit with theAmerican public and convinced himand other scholars to advocate a spe-cific time of the year to celebrateAfrican-American history. It was saidthat Woodson’s group selected themonth of February as the appropriatetime for annual recognition due to thefact the African-American communityalready celebrated the birthdates ofPresident Abraham Lincoln and notedAfrican-American social reformer, ora-tor, and writer, Frederick Douglass, on12 and 14 February, respectively.Officially recognized by Congresssince 1976, Black History Monthremains an important celebration ofthe history and contributions of thenation’s African-American communitysince its founding. And while somerightfully argue that the celebration ofAfrican-American history needs toexpand beyond a single month, fewdispute the wisdom of revisiting thisimportant topic on a regular basis.

In keeping with this tradition, dur-ing July 2011 a display will beunveiled at the Pentagon honoring theservice of early African-American navalofficers—both Navy and Marine Corps.The Navy’s section will predominatelyfocus on a pioneering group of

African-American officers knowntoday as the “Golden Thirteen,” whowere commissioned in 1944 into theU.S. Navy. The Marine Corps officerprogram did not have a similarly iden-tifiable cohort. Nevertheless, the earli-est African-American Marine Corpsofficers, through their persistentcourage, diligence, and professional-ism, overcame the worst racial barriersto progress existing at that time. It isimportant that all Marines of today,whatever their gender, race, or ethnic-ity, be aware of the pioneering effortsof these early African-American offi-cers in breaking down the barriers ofinequality.

Here is a quick look at some of theMarine Corps vignettes in the pro-posed display. In 1944, the firstAfrican-American Marines were as-signed to the Navy’s V-12 program,which was designed to provide quali-fied enlisted men with both a collegeeducation and ultimately a commissionin the Navy or Marine Corps Reserve.Private First Class Frederick C. Branch,born in Hamlet, North Carolina, andformerly of the 51st Defense Battalion,became the first African-Americancommissioned Marine Corps officer inNovember 1945. Although he immedi-ately went on inactive duty, Branchstayed in the reserve, commanded areserve unit in Philadelphia in 1949,and returned to active service duringthe Korean War. Today, “Branch Hall,”located at the Officers CandidateSchool, Quantico, Virginia, is named inhis honor.

In 1946, Herbert L. Brewer of SanAntonio, Texas, was one of threeAfrican-American Marines who hadbeen enrolled in the V-12 program andcommissioned as reserve officers oninactive status. Brewer served onactive duty in the Korean War and in1973 was a reserve colonel in thePhiladelphia area and was the highest

ranking African-American officer in theMarine Corps Reserve at the time. Theother two Marines commissioned wereCharles C. Johnson of Washington, DCand Judd B. Davis of Fuquay Springs,North Carolina. All three were priorenlisted Marines who had passedthrough the famous Montford Pointtraining program at Camp Lejeune. In1947, Charles Johnson transferred hiscommission to the U.S. Public HealthService where he performed duties asan engineering officer and ultimatelyrose to the rank of rear admiral andassistant surgeon general.

The first African-American to obtaina regular officer’s commission wasJohn E. Rudder of Paducah, Kentucky.Rudder enlisted in the Marine Corpsand served during World War II as acorporal. After the war, Rudderentered the Navy Reserve OfficersTraining Corps program at PurdueUniversity and graduated in June 1948shortly after being commissioned asecond lieutenant in the RegularMarine Corps. He left the service in1949.

William K. Jenkins, a former Navyenlisted man, was commis-sioned in the Marine Corps Reserve inJune 1948 and placed immediately oninactive duty. Jenkins was recalled toactive duty at the start of the KoreanWar in 1950 and served as machinegun platoon leader and rifle platoonleader. He was the first African-American Marine officer to serve incombat. Also in 1950, Annie L. Grimesof Chicago, Illinois, was the thirdAfrican-American woman to enlist inthe Marine Corps. She ultimatelybecame one of the first African-American women to join the officerranks when she was promoted to chiefwarrant officer during the VietnamWar.

The first African-American officer,


Kenneth H. Berthoud Jr. of NewYork City was the second officer toreceive a regular commission andserved in Korea and Japan as a tankplatoon leader and battalion staff offi-cer. He later served in Vietnam as agroup and battalion operations officer.Hurdle L. Maxwell was the firstAfrican-American officer to commanda Marine infantry battalion. Maxwellhad been an enlisted Marine beforebeing commissioned in 1953. Duringthis same period, women African-American Marines such as GloriaSmith, a graduate of Central StateCollege in Ohio, were entering theofficer corps as well. Smith was pro-moted to captain in 1973 and was, atthe time, the most senior African-American woman in the Marine Corps.Indeed, pioneers like Gloria Smith andAnnie Grimes led the way for otherAfrican-American women to maketheir way upward in the officer ranksin the years to come.

While not commissioned during the1950s, new heights were reached in1981, when then-Major, Charles F.

Bolden, became the first African-American astronaut. A resident ofHouston, Bolden received an appoint-ment to the U.S. Naval Academy andafter graduation was commissioned asa second lieutenant in 1968. He flewmore than 100 combat missions inNorth and South Vietnam, Laos, andCambodia. After 34 years in the MarineCorps he retired as a Major Generalfollowing his command of the 3dMarine Aircraft Wing. After militaryretirement, Bolden was selected as the12th administrator of the NationalAeronautics and Space Administrationin 2009.

In conclusion, the many contribu-tions of early African-American MarineCorps officers represent a proud chap-ter in the history of our Corps. Rolemodels such as Frederick Branch,Frank Petersen, Annie Grimes, andCharles Bolden continue to inspireyoung American men and womenwho wish to share in the commonbond and honor of serving in theUnited States Marine Corps.

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Frank L. Petersen, to be commissionedin the Marine Corps from the NavalAviation Cadet Program soon becameone of the Marine Corps most accom-plished officers. He was originallyfrom Topeka, Kansas, and had enlistedin the Navy after a year of college andthen entered the cadet program. Hereceived both his wings and his com-mission at Pensacola, Florida, on 1October 1952 and served with MarineFighter Squadron 212 during theKorean War. During Vietnam in 1968,Lieutenant Colonel Petersen com-manded Marine Fighter Squadron 314.During his service as an aviator, heflew in excess of 350 combat missionsand during his career commanded atthe squadron, group, amphibiousbrigade, and Marine Aircraft Wing. Heretired from active duty as a LieutenantGeneral following his command of theMarine Corps Combat and Develop-ment Center at Quantico, Virginia.Lieutenant General Peterson estab-lished so many “firsts” that is difficultto list them all in this space. He wasand remains a Marine’s Marine.

National Museum of the Marine Corps

Arms Assembled: The Richmond Rifle Musketby Bruce A. AllenMuseum Specialist

During the American Civil War, thearmories of both the North andthe South produced tens of thousandsof firearms of all kinds. The style offirearm most widely made and usedby soldiers on both sides was thethree-band–muzzle-loading firearmknown as a “rifle musket.” Rifle mus-kets, produced in .58-caliber, fired theminie ball projectile, a conical-shapedbullet. While undersized to the boreof the firearm, the minie ball had ahollow base that expanded andengaged the rifling, which increasedboth accuracy and speed of loading.Some of the first rifle muskets to beproduced by the Confederacy wereknown as the Confederate Model1855, or the Richmond rifle musket.

The Confederate Model 1855 riflemusket was a .58-caliber muzzle-loader, weighing 9.25 pounds. It was56 inches long and used a service load

of 60 grains of black powder. The riflemusket could hit a target up to (butnot limited to) 500 yards. The rearsights were set up for 100, 300, and500 yards. The Confederate Model1855 was almost an exact copy of the1855 Springfield rifle musket, for goodreason!

Confederates made them fromexcess parts and machinery takenfrom the Federal armory at HarpersFerry, Virginia (now West Virginia) in1861. Two years earlier, a detachmentof U.S. Marines under the command ofColonel Robert E. Lee, had ended theraid of abolitionist John Brown and hisfollowers at this very location. On 18April 1861, Virginia forces, led byCaptain Turner Ashby under the com-mand of Colonel T. J. Jackson, tookcontrol of the armory. United StatesArmy Lieutenant Roger Jones, in com-mand of the arsenal, tried to set fire to

the armory and thus destroy theweapon-making equipment to keep itfrom falling into enemy hands. But theattempt was sabotaged by workerswho remained loyal to Virginia.Confederate forces extinguished thefire and saved much of the machineryand gun parts recently manufactured.Three months later, Confederate lead-ers decided to relocate the parts andmachinery to Richmond.

Initially set up in a tobacco ware-house, the Richmond Armorybecame one of the most productivefacilities created by the Confederategovernment. Production of Richmondrifle muskets began under the supervi-sion of Lieutenant Colonel James H.Burton, using the parts from HarpersFerry. Eventually, the equipment wasmoved from the tobacco warehouse tothe Old Virginia Armory after renova-


tions had been made to that building.The armory was under the ownershipand control of the Commonwealth ofVirginia until August 1861, when thebuilding and its equipment wasloaned to the Confederacy for theduration of the war.

For two good reasons, theRichmond armorers replaced the1855 Springfield’s Maynard tapeprimer with a percussion cap. TheMaynard primer was comprised oftwo paper strips glued together withsmall amounts of priming compoundplaced in between the paper at setintervals. The percussion cap wasmore reliable, and it saved time. Thepercussion cap ignition system used acopper or brass cap filled with fulmi-nate of mercury. When the musket’shammer struck the cap, it created aspark, which ignited the black powderwith far more reliability than the tapeprimer, which would not function atall when wet. Confederate workersalso spent less time machining thelock plates, allowing those machinesto be used elsewhere.

Three different Richmond rifle mus-ket types were built. Type 1 incorpo-rated what was known as a high-hump lock plate. These lock plateswere marked with the year of manu-facture behind the hammer and“RICHMOND, VA” directly behind thefront lock plate screw. This designwas put into production quickly,using the machinery taken fromHarpers Ferry. When the Confederacytook control of production in August1861, the armory began turning outthe Type 2. The letters “CS” werestamped into the lock plates directlyabove “RICHMOND, VA.” In March1862, the Type 3, with its low-humpprofile, was created. This model close-ly resembled the Model 1861 that wasbeing produced at the Federal armoryin Springfield, Massachusetts, andelsewhere. It was easier to prime andde-prime the lower-hump model,another improvement in the weapon’shistory.

Thanks to the equipment takenfrom Harpers Ferry, the RichmondArmory was able to produce thefirearms needed by Confederate sol-

diers for four years: 11,762 rifle mus-kets. Firearms coming out of theRichmond Armory had a reputationfor being the best made in the South,due largely to the armory’s use of steelbarrel bands, trigger guards, and othercomponents, unlike other southernarmories, which were using brass orbronze. The only brass on theRichmond rifle muskets was at theirnose caps and butt plates, althoughsome sported iron butt plates fromsurplus parts that came from HarpersFerry. Iron was scarce in the Southand was saved for barrels and bayo-nets.

Walnut stock blanks were alsohard to come by in Richmond.Georgia’s Macon Armory suppliedcompleted stocks, and Danville,Virginia, provided stock blanks. Thesupply was especially affected in 1864when Union General William Shermanmarched his troops through Georgia.

In 1862, the Richmond Armoryshifted its primary function from pro-duction to refurbishing firearms col-lected from battlefields. In July, thearmory produced 471 rifle musketsand refurbished another 1,050. TheRichmond Armory also created theRichmond carbine, as well as theRichmond rifle, a shorter two-bandversion of the rifle musket, usingstocks that had defects and were nolonger suitable for the longer riflemusket.

The Type 2 rifle musket with itshigh-hump lock plate, brass nose cap,and iron butt plate, equipped with anoriginal Confederate canvas sling, ison exhibit in the Civil War exhibit atthe National Museum of the MarineCorps. This exhibit is part of a newgallery, “Defending the New Repub-lic, 1775-1865,” which opened in June2010. q1775q

Photo by Christina Johnson

Detail of the Richmond lock plate

Richmond rifle musket as displayed at the National Museum of the Marine CorpsPhoto by Christina Johnson


Paper that is old, creased and fold-ed, and marked up with pencilsand smudges can be typical or extra-ordinary depending on its purpose. InJune 2010 I reviewed historical docu-ments that became extraordinary as Idiscovered their history. One of thedocuments was an envelope simplylabeled on the outside with the fol-lowing:

PersonalLa Flor

16–18 May 1928Notes written to E.S.P. by Capt. Hunter

after he was wounded.

This envelope contained fourpieces of old paper with six noteswritten on them. The handwritingwas hard to read in places, andthe paper appeared rather dirty.The file that held these copieswas labeled “Battle of La Flor” soI assumed the notes might havesomething to do with that skir-mish. I looked for clues as to whoCaptain Hunter and E.S.P. were inthe patrol report, discoveringthey were Captain Robert S.Hunter and Lieutenant Earl S.Piper.

As I read the patrol and com-bat reports, a picture began toform, and these seemingly ran-dom notes began to take life.Captain Hunter’s last words werewritten for he could not speak,having been shot through theshoulder and neck in an engage-ment between the Marines andNicaraguan bandits on 13 May1928. He died five days later fromhis wounds. These pieces ofpaper are some of the last thingshe touched and contain the lastwords of a man struggling tospeak and to survive.

Nicaragua had been in a con-tentious condition with revolu-tions and counterrevolutions withon-again–off-again intervention

from the United States since the 1890s.In 1926, more Marines arrived inNicaragua to protect the United Statesnationals living there from banditswho were destroying their propertyand threatening their lives. TheMarines participated in regular patrolsof the countryside to learn the where-abouts of the bandits and their leader,

Augusto C. Sandino. The Battle at LaFlor was fought on 13–14 May 1928between bandits, and Marines andNicaraguan National Guard (Guard)members while they were on patrol inthe Cua River region in northernNicaragua. It had been three monthssince the last bandit engagement, andthe Marines needed to know where

the bandit leader, Sandino, hadrelocated his men. This patrolwas sent from the Quilali garrisonalong with patrols sent fromMatagalpa and Corinto Finca. Thepatrol of 38 men, under the com-mand of Captain Robert S. Hunterand Lieutenant Earl S. Piper, lefton 9 May from Quilali to recon-noiter and attempt to make con-tact with the bandits.

The patrol passed manynatives in their homes, andsome shots were fired by mem-bers of the Guard, but no firmcontact was made until 13 May.At 1540 the Marine patrol wasambushed atop a hill near theBocaycito River by a bandit forceapproximately 75 strong. Duringthe battle, Corporal William R.Williamson was shot and killed.Captain Hunter, seeing thatCorporal Williamson was deadand knowing that his men need-ed the use of Williamson’sThompson submachine gun, ranback to procure the weapon. Hebegan firing and was in turn hit inthe neck and then in the shoul-der. The shot to the neck dam-aged his voice box, making italmost impossible for him tospeak. Hospital Corpsman OliverL. Young reported that whiletreating Captain Hunter, “Heraised up on his left elbow andsaid ‘Can’t go back go ahead.’This was practically the last sen-tence he was able to speak.”

Reference Branch

Notes of the Wounded: Captain Robert S. Hunterand the Battle of La Flor, Nicaragua

by Amanda J. RowleyReference Branch, Intern

Capt Robert S. HunterMarine Corps Photo


Fighting continued for fifty minutes,ending when the bandits ceased fireand retreated. The patrol quicklyregrouped at the top of the hill wherethey treated Captain Hunter andanother wounded Marine, PrivateDubois, and buried CorporalWilliamson. As they made camp forthe night, their concerns were evacu-ating the wounded and fighting offany additional attacks from the ban-dits.

In the morning, Lieutenant Piperordered reconnaissance of the area.Seeing no danger, they began theirmarch back to where they had comethe previous day, carrying CaptainHunter on a litter. The patrol wasagain attacked as they made their waydown the hill; the Marines took coverin the stream bed, but many of theGuard scattered. Despite beingseverely wounded, Captain Hunterattempted to rise up and join the fight.He was finally returned to his litter byhis men. The bandits were repulsedby expert firing with the Thompsonsubmachine guns and the finegrenade-throwing of Sergeant GeraldR. Brown, a skill that caused his fellowMarines to ask if he was a worldchampion discus thrower. The patroltried again to resume their march butwas again hindered by bandits’ gun-fire. At 1030, 14 May, as a Marineplane flew overhead, all fightingceased. The patrol continued on until1600, stopping due to exhaustion andthe critical condition of CaptainHunter.

The notes lack any dates, and assuch, have been organized as closelyas possible with the timeline of eventsas stated in the patrol report.Furthermore, the following pictureshows only one of the six notes thatare quoted in this story.

SunCold

Let me have waterget ready for planes

they will probably come early–La Fluer–

Guadalupe ZelayaI think you could get that old man

below here to run us down by boat and would

be safeThe carrying is killing

hurting me–let me try the milk

soon

Hurry and get started get me off of the ground

do you think I couldswallow water

On 15 May the patrol reached LaFlor finca (farm) at 1040 with CaptainHunter weakened, and the men thatwere carrying him exhausted.“Realizing that Capt. Hunter could notbe moved for several days and thatwe could not move without reinforce-ments we asked for same and alsorations, when planes appeared at 1100and when we found it was impossibleto arrange a pick-up at this place.”The report states, on 16 May, thatwhen the planes returned, theyrelayed the information that reliefcolumns were heading to the patrol’slocation and to wait. The followingday the planes dropped medical sup-plies and rations and “Captain Hunter[was] resting more easily and evident-ly gaining strength, as he was nowable to swallow a few liquids andcould talk much better.” The nextnotes show that Captain Hunter was

improving and was involved in decid-ing how to get back to the garrison.

Did they make pickup [?]We better go to JinotegaThey may be dry–we must take chance

road goes up west sideof Gusineru. This is

bound to be more directJinotega

road wetbetter take down

Cua by boatplane will

land [impossible]maybe on

sand in Coco

This road leadsdown the

Bocay[cito] which we crossed

talk in morning

When the planes flew overheadthat afternoon they signaled ifthe patrol thought Captain Huntercould be evacuated via the CocoRiver. The patrol responded yes andmade plans to move the followingmorning; however, Captain Hunter didnot see the sun rise. He died at 1525on 18 May 1928. Lieutenant Piperwrote in his report: “Captain Hunter’scourage and fortitude were inspiringup until his death.” In a letter toCaptain Hunter’s family, LieutenantPiper wrote that he was buried at thecamp in La Flor “simply but reverent-ly by his men who offered [a] silentprayer.” The Battle of La Flor was onlyone of many encounters with theSandino bandits during 1926–28 andcould be viewed as a failure becauseof the loss of life. But the legacy ofCaptain Hunter and CorporalWilliamson as men who fought wellfor their country is of more value thanthe piece of ground temporarily lost.The Marines did not come away fromNicaragua ending the country’s inter-nal strife, but the training and experi-ence gained in the battles and skir-mishes would prove invaluable inWorld War II.

The Marines also do not forget their

Marine Corps FileHandwritten notes by Capt Hunterafter he was wounded


own. In the personal papers of RobertS. Hunter, kept at the archives at theGray Research Center, it was discov-ered that Captain Hunter did make ithome to the United States. When Mrs.Emma Hunter received a telegramstating that her son had died in com-bat in Nicaragua, she requested thathis body be returned to the UnitedStates so he could be buried at home.The brigade surgeon replied that thebody could not be moved for at leastone year because the location wasinaccessible due to continuing

encounters with Sandino’s bandits.The Marine Corps ultimately disin-terred Captain Hunter’s remains andreturned them to the United Stateswith a Marine Corps escort, CaptainJames W. Webb, for reburial inKansas. He arrived home 6 June 1929and was buried next to his father inthe Mulberry cemetery in Kansas.

Captain Hunter was awarded theNavy Cross, posthumously, on 28September 1928. The citation reads asfollows: “For extraordinary heroism in

battle when on the occasion of anengagement with armed bandits in thevicinity of Pena Blanca, Nicaragua, 13May 1928, he carried a machine gunforward to a position from which todeliver an accurate and active fire onthe enemy. Although receivingwounds at this time which later result-ed in his death Captain Hunter con-tinued in the fight to the last, display-ing the type of grit, determination andcourage which characterizes conductabove and beyond the call of duty.”

q1775q

Marine Corps Photo

Map of Capt Hunter’s grave site drawn by Lt Piper


National Museum of the Marine Corps

Battles Captures the Scenes and a Promotionby Gregory A. Macheak

Editor

In honor of his service to the MarineCorps as a combat artist and in recog-nition of his promotion to StaffSergeant, Fortitudine is pleased to show-case Staff Sergeant Kristopher J. Battles’work from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti.The picture to the right shows Battlesdrawing while a captain sleeps. His otherfeatured works show his pencil draw-ings, and watercolor and oil paintings.

Staff Sergeant Battles has traveled totraining exercises, such as Mojave Viper,and forward operating bases in Iraq andAfghanistan, taking pictures and drawingMarines, living and working—sleeping,fighting, or talking with the indigenouspeople throughout the world. His tripshave also taken him on humanitarianmissions, the latest to Haiti, where hehas painted the landscape and lives ofpeople being helped by Marines.Wherever he goes, Staff Sergeant Battles,carries the time honored call issued tothe first Marine combat artists in WorldWar II: “Go to war, do art.” q1775q


“Chances are, the opportunity toimprove official history will come yourway during your career; make themost of it!” Colonel Frank C. Caldwell

It has been more than forty yearssince the publication of ColonelFrank C. Caldwell’s “Every Marine anHistorian” in the March 1966 MarineCorps Gazette. A recent request fromthe operating forces about the variedresponsibilities of a unit historian,coupled with last summer’s 45thanniversary of the Command Chron-ology Program, seems a fitting occa-sion to re-examine part of the themeof that article, the responsibilities ofthe unit/staff historian and the com-mand chronology. The historians ofthe Marine Corps History Division arecharged with the responsibility of col-lecting, researching, writing, and per-petuating the history of the Corps andits Marines. However, just as ColonelCaldwell explained forty-four yearsago, “the official histories are only asgood as the material that forms theirbasis. Marines provide that material.”It is the responsibility of all Marines toensure that the historians have accu-rate information and proper documen-tation to do their jobs acceptably.

Staff Historian

Marine Corps Order 5750.1H(Manual for the Marine CorpsHistorical Program) outlines the rolesand responsibilities for command his-torical programs and staff historians atthe unit level. Each unit is required toassign a staff historian who has theresponsibility to maintain unit histori-cal summary files and to prepare andsubmit command chronologies. Thestaff historian, usually a Marine withinthe unit’s S-3/G-3 section, takes onthese responsibilities—of course, asan additional duty to their assignedprimary functions within the unit.Ideally, the primary duties of the des-ignated staff member should be such

that the staff historian is involved in,or can observe, key command activi-ties. Selecting a Marine with excellentwriting skills, a keen eye for detail,and the ability to collect appropriateinformation and documents, hasproven invaluable in maintaining afirst-rate historical program. The staffhistorian is also the unit’s liaison withthe Marine Corps History Division—arelationship that flows both directions.Questions regarding the history andhonors of the unit are often directedby the commanding officer to the staffhistorian, who then typically contactsthe History Division’s HistoricalReference Branch. When the same his-torians have questions while prepar-ing the unit lineage and honors certifi-cates, the queries flow in reverse.

The Marine assigned the role asstaff historian is responsible for pro-moting a general awareness of theunit’s historical achievements, main-taining any historical property at theunit, and managing command pro-

grams such as Lineage and Honors,Commemorative Naming, historicsites, and oral history. Documents,such as streamer entitlements, copiesof unit lineage and honors certificates,and relevant news articles should bemaintained in the file. Notes, personalobservations by the staff historian, andcopies of after-action reports, letters ofinstruction, and other key documentsroutinely prepared by the unit shouldalso be retained in the file and canoften aide in preparation of the com-mand chronology. The staff historianis the commanding officer’s principalpoint of contact for informationregarding the history of the unit. Adetailed historical summary file shouldbe maintained so that requests fromthe commanding officer can beanswered expeditiously.

Command Chronology

The Marine Corps has required var-ious types of historical reports fromunits—after-action reports, command

Reference Branch

Every Marine a Historian—Revisited: The UnitHistorian and Command Chronology

by Annette D. AmermanHistorian

Marine Corps Photo

Second Marine Division Chief of Staff, Colonel David M. Shoup, at work onTinian in 1944. “Every Clime and Place” had new meaning when paperworkneeded to be completed, even in the Pacific during World War II.


diaries, special action reports, etc.Regrettably, though, there was no sin-gle program or report which wasrequired of all units, bases, air sta-tions, and commands prior to 1965.For this reason, there is a large gap inthe history of the Corps for significantperiods of time. In an attempt to rem-edy this omission, historians andarchivists of the Corps created thecommand chronology. The Comman-dant approved the new report andsubsequently issued MCO 5750.2 inJuly 1965, which formally establishedthe Command Chronology Program.It not only replaced the commanddiary, but also required all Marineunits down to the battalion/squadronlevel, separate posts and stations, andspecial detachments to submit com-mand chronologies at least twice ayear. Those units engaged in combator other operational deployments(e.g., humanitarian) were required tosubmit command chronologies on amonthly basis.

While each unit’s historian respon-sibilities are generally the same, thetype of information retained andincluded in a command chronologyoften differs based on the type ofunit—aviation, infantry, artillery, orcombat service support. Where fightersquadrons report the number of sor-ties flown and targets eliminated,heavy helicopter squadrons mayreport tons of cargo or number of per-sonnel transported or evacuated, andartillery units may report number ofrounds fired and other missionsaccomplished. Tailoring the commandchronology, based upon the type ofone’s unit, aids historians and plan-ners in the future immeasurably.While simply “cutting and pasting”information from one submission tothe next may seemingly save time, ifspecifics on operations, problemsencountered, and solutions achievedare omitted, they remain forgotten for-ever.

Purpose and Uses

The command chronology is THEdocument for historians—it is the pri-mary source. Command chronologiesare the garden from which numerousproducts grow, such as official histo-ries, monographs, and battle studies.

History Division historians also minethe command chronologies for infor-mation needed to prepare the officiallineage and determine battle honorsfor eligible units through certificates ofLineage and Honors. Well-writtencommand chronologies that includean array of supporting documentssuch as Letters of Instruction,Operation Orders, After-Action Re-ports, and other supplemental reports,created by the unit during the report-ing period, are an invaluable source tomore than just historians. The recordsare heavily used by elements ofHeadquarters Marine Corps such asthe Military Awards Branch, Man-power Support Branch, Plans, Policiesand Operations Branch, as well asother government agencies and veter-ans. Units are also beneficiaries of thecommand chronologies when usingthe historic documents during profes-sional military education programs.

Seemingly a wearisome and onerousrequirement, the command chron-ology is the foundation documentupon which many rely—including theunits themselves. Units have oftenqueried History Division about histor-ical events, names of previous com-manding officers, requested verifica-tion on dates of activation, andspecifics of past operations for profes-sional military education and esprit de

corps. Without the command chronol-ogy, historians would be unable torespond positively to a unit’s request.

Room for Improvement

Excellent command chronologysubmissions have become the excep-tion, instead of the norm, over thepast two decades. The advent of com-puters and the ease of “copy/paste”and the reliance upon technologyinstead of writing skills has succeededin degrading the quality of the all-important reports. Since Desert Shieldand Desert Storm, command chronol-ogy submissions in times of conflict,war, and deployments, have suffereddue to the mistaken belief that thereport is a frustrating and burdensomerequirement that is less important inthe bigger picture of the unit’s respon-sibilities. While some still adhere tothe belief that “paper-work will ruinany military force,” without a detailed,official record of events, one can notlearn from the lessons of the past. It iswell and good to remember the Latinphrase, “Vox audita perit, littera scrip-ta manet” (“The spoken word perish-es, the written word remains.”) withregards to the history of the MarineCorps.

To ensure the quality of the com-mand chronology submitted, a fewsuggestions are offered to thoseassigned the task of preparing thechronology:

wFull names and ranks of all staff:Ensuring that full names and ranks areused can save historians hours ofsearching for the elusive “Lt. J. Smith.”

wDo not recreate the wheel: Whencompiling and preparing the commandchronology, a quick reference toreports or lengthy documents in thebody of Section II or III, and thenincluding the cited reports in SectionIV, can save a great deal of writing timeand effort.

wLess is not more: Including supportingdocuments is an excellent means ofeasing the writing effort; however, ifsupplemental documents are not avail-able, include the necessary informationand details within the appropriate sec-tions—even if it seems excessive.Tailor the report to include informationspecific to your type of unit.

wSpecific dates and locations:Streamers such as the Iraq and

“Artistic” example of the cover to 1stBattalion, 3d Marines, Op-Order 321-63, submitted in 1963


Afghanistan Campaigns have specificcampaign periods; without exact datesof arrival in, or departure from opera-tional areas, units can find themselveslacking enough information for histori-ans to determine participation credit.

wSize of detachments: Streamers, againsuch as the Iraq and AfghanistanCampaign streamers, are percentagebased streamers—for example, battal-ions and squadrons are required (byMCO P10520.3B—Flag Manual) to haveat least 50 percent of the unit deployedin the operation for the entire unit to beentitled to the streamer. Knowing theexact strength of detachments deployedis critical to making the above determi-nation.

Another disturbing trend has beenthe tardy submissions of commandchronologies. Timely submissions areimperative to writing relevant andwell-timed battle studies, reports, anddecision papers. Biannual commandchronologies cover the reporting peri-ods of 1 January to 30 June and 1 Julyto 31 December each year; units have90 days to submit the hard copies, viatheir chain of command, to the MarineCorps Archives at Quantico, Virginia.Many reports are delayed while mak-ing the way through the chain of com-mand; therefore, a simultaneous elec-tronic submission directly to theMarine Corps Archives is encouraged.To arrange this option, units shouldcontact the Marine Corps Archives forfurther instructions.

Afew attendees of the CommandersCourse may recall hearing thestatement that “the Marines that servein your command are forever andalways your Marines. If you fail toensure that their deeds, accomplish-ments and operations are recorded inyour command chronology, you failthem again in the future.” Marines areresourceful, and if the record lacks thenecessary information, the veteranwill seek out their former comman-ders for the “eye witness” or “person-al” account of events for their variousDepartment of Veterans Affairs’ claims.Relying upon one’s memory is unnec-essary when the well-written and doc-umented command chronology is onfile in the Marine Corps Archives. Forspecific information relating to theCommand Historical Program or the

submission guidelines for commandchronologies, please visit and review MCO5750.1H (Chapter 5 and Appendix A).

Specific questions regarding submit-ting the command chronology shouldbe directed to the Marine CorpsArchives at (703) 784-4685 and otherquestions regarding the program orthe Marine Corps historical programshould be directed to the MarineCorps History Division at (703) 432-4874.

Frequency of CommandChronology Reports

Task-organized units activated forspecific missions, exercises, ordeployments of short duration willsubmit a single command chronologyimmediately upon completion of theactivity for which they were estab-lished. If activated for more than sixmonths, reports will also be submittedfor regular reporting dates and uponcompletion of the mission. Units con-ducting operational deployments,engaged in combat operations, or inother special situations will submitcommand chronologies monthly.

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OrganizationAnnual

(1 Jan–31 Dec)Annual

(1 Jan–30 Jun)(1 Jul–31 Dec)

Operating Forces (formerly FMF) including MEF,MEB and MEU and down to and including battal-ions/squadrons, and separate companies/batteries.

X

4th Marine Division X

4th Marine Aircraft Wing X

4th Marine Logistics Group X

Marine Corps Districts X

Marine Corps Combat Development Command X

Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps X

Bases and Air Stations X

Marine Detachments X

Marine Corps Reserve Units down to and includingbattalions/squadrons, and separate companies/bat-teries regardless of geographic separation from par-ent command

X

All other command organizations

Marine Corps Embassy Security Group X

Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion X

Marine Corps Forces X

First page of the Historical Report sub-mitted by 1st Marine ParachuteRegiment in October 1943


“Therefore, just as water retains no con-stant shape, so in warfare there are noconstant conditions. He who can modi-fy his tactics in relation to his opponentand thereby succeed in winning, may becalled a heaven-born captain” Sun Tzu

More than two millennia ago, thegreat Chinese military theorist SunTzu declared that “Military tactics arelike unto water . . . Water shapes itscourse according to the nature of theground over which it flows; the soldierworks out his victory in relation to thefoe whom he is facing.” Thousands ofyears later, U.S. commanders wouldconfront this challenge in theAfghanistan and Iraq Wars. The al-Qaeda terrorist network, the Taliban,and the Iraq insurgency all constitutedunconventional threats far removedfrom the regular military forces the U.S.military and intelligence gathering agen-cies had trained to fight during the ColdWar. Both conflicts thus spurred a rangeof significant changes in how the UnitedStates military prepared for and wagedwar against irregular threats. It soonbecame clear to planners that a rapidadaptation of the existing U.S. intelli-gence structure was needed to success-fully fight against such enemies. For theMarine Corps, this entailed using theMarine Corps Intelligence Activity tobetter provide cultural intelligence forMarines in the field of operations.

As with all modern military organiza-tions, the Marine Corps has used dedi-cated units and staffs to obtain, inter-pret, and disseminate intelligence nec-essary for conducting operations. Eachof the three Marine expeditionary forceshas an attached intelligence battalionand all divisions, aircraft wings, regi-ments, aircraft groups, battalions, andsquadrons have a chief of intelligenceand staff (the S-2 or G-2). Each Marinedivision also fields reconnaissance bat-talions and, before the creation of theMarine Special Operations Command,

force reconnaissance companies. Theaviation combat elements of the MarineAir-Ground teams also include mannedand unmanned aerial reconnaissanceand electronic warfare assets.

However, the Marine Corps did notcreate a central intelligence organizationalong the lines of the venerable Officeof Naval Intelligence until the 1980s. In1988, the Commandant, General AlfredM. Gray, established the Marine Corps’Intelligence Center to serve as theCorps’ service level intelligence organi-zation, to support the commandant, andto aid the Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command. In 1993, theorganization was renamed MarineCorps Intelligence Activity. Based inboth the National Maritime IntelligenceCenter and Marine Corps BaseQuantico, the Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity became one of three maritimeintelligence organizations, alongside theOffice of Naval Intelligence and theCoast Guard Intelligence CoordinationCenter.

As with scholars studying any one ofthe other 17 organizations that comprisethe U.S. Intelligence Community, manydifficulties confront historians chroni-

cling the activities of the Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity. Most of their oper-ations and the documentary sourcesthat tell those operations and activitiesremain classified. Nevertheless, theorganization made important contribu-tions to the Marine Corps as it adaptedto fight the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan. The Marine Corps is pri-marily an operational and tacticalwarfighting organization. Consequently,the principal mission of the MarineCorps Intelligence Activity has been tocollect, analyze, and produce intelli-gence for operations, pre-deploymentplanning, and training in order to allowthe intelligence battalions to accomplishmore mission specific duties. This focusproved particularly useful during thewars in Central Asia and the Middle Eastin the first decade of the twenty-firstcentury. The Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity’s decentralized approach andfocus on providing detailed yet compre-hensive information about an area ofoperations consistently contributed toMarine Corps successes in both Iraq andAfghanistan. Many longstanding intelli-gence organizations saw the MarineCorps Intelligence Activity as an effec-

Photo by LCpl Dexter S. Saulisbury, VIRIN: 110128-M-KC852-019

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity frequently cooperated with FemaleEngagement Teams in Afghanistan, providing them with useful cultural intelli-gence. Here, Corporal Kelly Gates, a member of a team attached to the 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, speaks with an Afghan man during a health initiative atPatrol Base Uzmon in the Sangin District of Afghanistan in January 2011.

Reference Branch

Adapting to the Foe: Cultural Intelligence and theMarine Corps Intelligence Activity

by Abbi N. Molzahn, InternNicholas J. Schlosser, Historian


tive example to follow as a result. During the Cold War, both the United

States and the Soviet Union danced astrategic two-step, realizing that any sig-nificant escalation in tensions betweenthe two superpowers could result innuclear war. However, the possibility ofwar spurred the United States intelli-gence community to stay one stepahead of the Soviets in order to ensurecomplete military preparedness. UnitedStates analysts focused their efforts onmonitoring Soviet nuclear develop-ments and troop movements. As aresult, information could be drawnlargely from aerial and satellite recon-naissance and the majority of intelli-gence analysts remained in the UnitedStates and not in the field. Intelligenceagencies did carry out clandestine oper-ations however, sending specializedpersonnel to track enemy actors withinthe traditional hierarchical power struc-ture of the Soviet Union. With intelli-gence being collected through eithertechnological or specialized means,only a small number of collectionexperts and analysts were needed toprocess the information and produce itfor the development of military opera-tions. While this centralized structurewas effective against the Soviet Unionand the Eastern Bloc, it could onlyacquire limited information on terroristand insurgent groups such as al-Qaeda.

In his study The Sling and the Stone,Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (retired)argued that unlike the Soviet Union,insurgents did “not function within clearbureaucratic boundaries” but insteadthrived “on the seams between variousgovernmental security organizations” inhopes of gaining the upper hand.Militarily speaking, insurgents realizedAmerica would dominate them in a tra-ditional battle space and thereforeworked to avoid major engagements.Instead, terrorists and insurgents carriedout quick, sporadic attacks giving U.S.forces little, if any time to prepare andcircumvent them. Hence the irregularityof insurgent tactics forced militarystrategists to reform their tactics.

The intelligence services were alsoforced to adapt, as insurgent and terror-ist tactics and strategies undermined thetraditional means of acquiring informa-tion. Since insurgents operated withouta centralized power structure or base of

operations, aerial and satellite surveil-lance was no longer as viable a meansof gathering information on enemyoperations. Terrorist and insurgent cellswere frequently hard to locate, oftenrendering clandestine operations futile.With insurgents living within populatedareas, the local population had trans-formed into a haven and center of oper-ations. Consequently, the populationbecame the primary source for informa-tion on enemy activity.

The 2008 U.S. Army’s OperationIraqi Freedom/Operation EnduringFreedom Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures in a COIN Environmenthandbook stated that locals often had“better human intelligence collectioncapability” than even military and intel-ligence personnel due to their culturalknowledge and awareness of whoamongst the population were sympa-thizers to their cause. With “all of theinformation needed to produce intelli-gence and focus combat power on theenemy” now existing in the immediatearea of operations, primarily in the formof human intelligence, engaging thelocal population was an absolutelyessential component in waging the“Long War.” In other words, the ColdWar mentality needed to be replaced bythe complete immersion of militaryforces and intelligence personnel intotheir adversary’s target population.

Thus, new means and more efficientmethods of collecting human intelli-

An important characteristic of counterinsurgencies remains the necessity of oper-ating amongst the populace. In this image, Lance Corporal Andrew J. Brodehl(left) and Corporal Jason T. Guiliano of Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,conduct a patrol through a bazaar in Afghanistan in 2008.

Photo by Sergeant Ray Lewis, VIRIN: 0810008-M-2322L-273

gence on a large scale had to be creat-ed. There was no doubt that extractinginformation on enemy activity from thepopulation would help to piece thepuzzle of enemy operations together.However, that was only one type ofintelligence and one facet of waging asuccessful counterinsurgency. As theNATO commander in Afghanistan from2009–10, General Stanley A. McChrystal,USA, stated that “the conflict will bewon by persuading the population, notby destroying the enemy.”Nevertheless, this was quite a new con-cept for intelligence agencies. Beforethe emergence of insurgent tactics on aglobal scale, interest in social, political,economic, religious, and cultural infor-mation had been considerably less thanin enemy activity. Yet, engaging thelocal shopkeeper, farmer, and familieswould not only allow military and intel-ligence personnel to more accuratelyand effectively attain strategic intelli-gence on enemy operations, but cultur-al engagement would also help them topreemptively combat insurgent opera-tions by increasing trust between U.S.forces and the local populace throughhumanitarian means. This approachwould potentially minimize the insur-gent hold over the population anddecrease the odds of insurgents gainingnew recruits from among the popula-tion. As a result, it was imperative togrant equal focus to both culturalawareness and to enemy activity.

Furthermore, it also became appar-


ent that analysts deployed in the theaterof operations would be able to moreeffectively process intelligence material.By retaining only a small number ofpersonnel in the continental UnitedStates, intelligence organizations lackedsufficient resources to efficiently collectand accurately process such volumes ofintelligence in a timely fashion. Sendinganalysts to the theater of operationsplaced them closer to their sources andallowed them to rapidly provide unitsin the field with information and action-able intelligence. With forces operatingin such a rapidly changing environmentwhere battle was sporadic but intense,intelligence agencies could not afford tohave a lack of or delay in producingaccurate and actionable intelligence.

Beginning with the insertion of TaskForce 58 into Afghanistan in 2001, andcontinuing through the wars in boththat country and in Iraq, it quicklybecame apparent to Marine Corps plan-ners that grasping and understandingthe culture of the area of operationswas necessary for devising effectivecounterinsurgency plans and tactics.Planners quickly realized that under-standing the cultural terrain, local cus-toms, religion, and traditional powercenters of a particular region was a crit-ical element in operational planning. Tomeet these challenges and fulfill theserequirements, the Marine Corps createda number of new organizations such asthe Center for Advanced OperationalCulture Learning in 2005 and the Centerfor Irregular Warfare in 2007. It alsorevised the curriculum of the Commandand Staff College in 2005 and trans-formed the Combined Arms Exerciseinto Exercise Mojave Viper between2004 and 2005 to better prepareMarines for fighting in a counterinsur-gency environment.

The Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity’s nature as a decentralizedorganization comprised of both Marinesand civilians made it a particular valu-able asset as the Marine Corps strength-ened its interest in cultural intelligence.In 2010, Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity (MCIA) analyst Dan J. Darlingsummarized the unique placement ofthe organization within the MarineCorps’ intelligence gathering opera-tions:

. . . there was always sort of a chal-lenge for MCIA, finding its nichebecause you have the existing intel-ligence support battalions alreadywithin the Marine Corps. And sothe idea is ‘well then what do youguys do, that the intel battalion isn’talready doing?’. . . and sort of ourview, as has been articulated byleadership, is that MCIA is an insti-tutional preservation of knowledgefor the Marine Corps . . . and tiebetween the Marine Corps and thebroader Intelligence Community.

It was evident that Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity would have tobecome an even more “agile” anddecentralized enterprise in order to“effectively manage disparate functionaloperations, fuse and interpret theirinputs, and rapidly disseminate preciseintelligence,” into actionable informa-tion for Marines in the field.Recognizing the need for fast, accurateintelligence for forward-deployed units,the Marine Corps Intelligence Activityexpanded its personnel base, began for-ward deploying analysts, and made surethat its vast collections of data andinformation were easily and readilyavailable to Marines in the field of oper-ations.

The Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity hired a mix of Marines andcivilians. One of these civilian analysts,Larissa M. Mihalisko, commented thatthe Marine Corps Intelligence Activitywas able to effectively produce morecomprehensive and thorough intelli-gence by drawing from a larger skillbase and more experience by “bringingin civilian expertise and combining itwith Marine expertise.” The organiza-tion also began forward-deploying cul-tural intelligence teams to areas whereMarines forces were operating. Analystsdeployed as part of Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity Cultural Intelli-gence Teams (Cultural IntelligenceTeams) to theaters where Marines wereoperating in the field. This had fourmajor effects. First, it gave the analystsan opportunity to be truly immersed inthe cultural and interdependent aspectsof the society in which Marines wereoperating, integral to acquiring accurateintelligence in a population-centric war.Second, civilian analysts were better

able to understand specific intelligenceinquiries, gear studies in support of par-ticular tactical needs, and produce read-ily useful intelligence. Third, asMihalisko noted, the Cultural Intelli-gence Teams presence helped existingMarine intelligence battalions look at“the cultural and non-kinetic issues onthe ground,” and assess “who the pop-ulation is, who the key power brokersare, etc. in order to help answer someof those questions.” In doing this, theMarine Corps Intelligence Activity great-ly alleviated additional intelligenceduties placed on strained intelligencebattalions and intelligence staffs.

While this close relationship helpedto maximize both the amount of intelli-gence being collected and processed aswell as the time in which it could bedisseminated to the troops, MarineCorps Intelligence Activity realized thesuccess of engagements and speed withwhich analysis could be produced uponarrival to the theaters depended on thelevel of cultural training their collectionexperts and analysts received before-hand. Moreover, since Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity functioned as theMarine Corps’ own intelligence organi-zation, its top priorities mirrored that ofthe Corps as a whole. So as MarineCorps Intelligence Activity began work-ing with the Center for AdvancedOperational Culture Learning tostrengthen cultural intelligence, thefocus of their initiatives was just asmuch to prepare Marines within theCorps as it was to provide informationfor intelligence agencies as a whole.

After receiving training, analystsdeployed to areas of operations inAfghanistan, Iraq, and other countrieswith the intention of establishing rela-tionships with the Marines and localpopulation. By doing so, analysts suchas Mihalisko found there was a whole“web of people to tap into.” FirstLieutenant Chase Reeves agreed in thearticle Off Target with Intel that suchmethods “drastically” helped to “narrowthe scope” on who the enemy was.With regards to enemy activity theywere able to find out “when and how”insurgents placed “[Improvised explo-sive devices], what direction theMunafakeen come from, how many ofthem there are, what vehicles they


drive, what they look like, and wherethey live.” All were pieces of impor-tance which helped transform anambiguous and complex battlespaceinto an understandable and manageablearea of operations, while simultaneous-ly increasing the accuracy of their intel-ligence information. Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity analyst Mihaliskonoted that engaging the population was“critical to help us really understandHelmond and Afghanistan in general,”later adding that it was “a Rosetta Stone”which “opened our eyes to a wholeother network that we just never wereaware of before,” providing intel per-sonnel “little nuggets” of informationthat were so “key to understanding” andproducing accurate analysis.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activityanalysts also interacted with thelocal populations in Iraq andAfghanistan. A particular example ofthis was Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity’s cooperation with the MarineCorps’ Female Engagement Teams inwhich Mihalisko assisted during herdeployment. First employed inAfghanistan in February 2009, theFemale Engagement Teams representedthe Marine Corps efforts to access thepopulation, attempt to forge relation-ships, and access potential sources forintelligence. Both Marines and theMarine Corps Intelligence Activity joint-ly wielded humanitarian efforts to fostera stronger spirit of cooperation withlocals which in turn discredited insur-gent propaganda. For example, whileone of Mihalisko’s friends was workingwith a Female Engagement Team, a fewAfghan men began laughing uponentering her medical clinic. When askedwhy, they stated “the Taliban told usthat you’re here to rape our women andthat you’re going to hurt our women,but now we see that you have womenhere working and that you’re going todo good things for our women. Sowe’re going to bring our wives to theclinic.” Moreover, analyst Dan J. Darlingstated that while at a meeting in Marjah,a district administrator held upMihalisko as an example of what edu-cated women could accomplish. Hewent on to note that engaging the localpopulation “in that kind of capacity atleast indicates for me, what, if properly

done, you can achieve through FemaleEngagement.” Thus, somewhat natural-ly, engagement with the populace wasan important means for achieving victo-ry in a population-centric war.

While working to build trust and arapport with the local populacewas important, the Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity also recognized thenecessity of adapting to the insurgents.Marine Corps Intelligence Activity ana-lysts realized that their methods of dis-semination and operation needed tomirror that of their adversary. Therefore,although insurgents operated in adecentralized fashion, they werenonetheless connected through technol-ogy. Hence, the very same technologi-cal advances and degree of global inter-dependence which had spawned andenhanced the insurgents’ ability to fightwere likewise the very tools with whichto combat them. For instance, MarineCorps Intelligence Activity made itsdatabases readily accessible to Coalitionforces, enhancing their ability to battleinsurgents. The organization alsostrengthened its ability to provide up-to-the minute geospatial and terrain analy-sis to forces in the field.

As Darling stated, the importance ofdisseminating cultural and intelligenceinformation could not be overrated, say-ing that “one of the things that welearned when we were out there, wasthat a lack of information can kill you,and that’s not an exaggeration. I meanthere were some places that peoplehave died in because they didn’t havethe access to the right information. Theydidn’t understand who they were fight-ing or what the operating environmentwas like and what tools can be used.” So“forcing information out” is really how“you win these types of conflicts . . . itwon’t be a purely kinetic victory.”

Darling compared the amount of cul-tural and intelligence informationencased “throughout both our govern-ment and other governments” to the“last scene in Indiana Jones and theRaiders of the Lost Ark where all thisvaluable stuff was just sitting in a base-ment somewhere and no one knows it’sthere . . . and so frequently what I’vefound is that what might seem obscurewas really priceless data.” Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity began producing a

diverse series of products gearedtoward meeting the particular needs ofU.S. and Coalition forces, ranging fromcountry handbooks, culture smart cards,tribal databases, terrain, weapons, andterrorist assessments, and analysis. Allof these were made available in differ-ent forms to suit various clearance lev-els and interests and produced througha collaborative effort with other agen-cies.

The Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity’s decision to focus on deploy-ing civilian collection experts and ana-lysts to the theaters of operation, in tan-dem with their comprehensive culturaltraining won the organization accoladesfrom both military personnel and thegreater intelligence community. In 2002Secretary of the Navy Gordon R.England awarded the Meritorious UnitCommendation to Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity for its ability to“direct operational and tactical levelintelligence support” and “rapidly reor-ganize personnel and resources to meetthe unique challenges encountered inproviding intelligence support” in the“Long War.” In 2005 Secretary Englandalso awarded Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity the Navy Unit Commendationfor the “critical intelligence support thatgave U.S. Marine forces tactical advan-tage on the battlefield.”

The innovative spirit that pervadesthe United States Marine Corpsstrongly shaped the Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity and led it toevolve new concepts and techniquesto better serve the Corps’ counterin-surgency efforts in Iraq andAfghanistan. By forward deploying itsanalysts and helping to provideMarines with cultural intelligence, theMarine Corps Intelligence Activityparticipated in a broader shift whichsaw Marine planners focusing on howan understanding of languages, localcustoms, and religion are as importanton the counterinsurgency battlefieldas a mastery of marksmanship, com-bined arms operations, and close airsupport. In short, the Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity contributed tothe mission of all supporting branch-es in the Marine Corps: it served theMarine Corps rifleman in the field.

q1775q


helicopterborne task force to Zakho.Company G landed just outside the city.The heavily laden Marines (some carry-ing more than 60 pounds of equipmentand ammunition) moved to the highground and occupied overwatch posi-tions which gave them a clear view ofthe objective. The remainder of theforce included the BLT Alpha CommandGroup, Company F, and an 81mm mor-tar section. Lieutenant Colonel Tony L.Corwin noticed Iraqi soldiers still in theobjective area, despite the fact theyshould have been gone. Reports fromthe reconnaissance teams confirmed thepresence of many Iraqis and a fewarmored vehicles. The Marines andIraqis were soon standing eyeball-to-eyeball with neither side about to blink.

Lieutenant Colonel Corwin gave clearinstructions for the Iraqis to moveout of Zakho. At first, the Iraqi com-mander belligerently replied he knewnothing about Operation ProvideComfort and had no orders to vacate.However, some menacing overflights byheavily armed American A-b Warthogs

humanitarian nature of the operation,but made it very clear that Iraqi inter-ference risked military confrontation.The noise of American jets passingoverhead reinforced this point, provid-ing overall an excellent example of“aggressive restraint.”

General Shalikashvili went overplans to build refugee camps, and theprospective sites were located on amap. To ensure the safety of therefugees and the combined task force,General Shalikashvili also requestedinformation about Iraqi minefieldsaround Zakho. He reminded GeneralNashwan about the limits on Iraqi mili-tary operations and inquired about thescheduled withdrawal of troops.Nashwan balked at the request to pullback, stating Iraqi “police” were neededto ensure public order, but promised toprovide information about the mine-fields. In closing, General Shalikashviliproposed establishing a MilitaryCoordination Center (MCC) to preventfuture misunderstandings.

At 1330 on 20 April, HMM-264 deliv-ered the first wave of a two-company

First to Write

Operation Provide Comfort

Painting by Col Peter M. “Mike” Gish

As part of the British-conceived plan to provide a safe haven for the Kurds innorthern Iraq, the allies built three large refugee relocation camps in the vicini-ty of Zakho. The Marines of 24th MEU (SOC) built the first of these in mid-April,then turned it over to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees in May 1991.

“First to Write” highlights HistoryDivision’s past work through excerptsfrom earlier publications.

Following the 1990–91 Gulf War,Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was rackedby popular uprisings in the southamongst the Shia Iraqis, and in thenorth amongst the Kurds. It quicklybecame apparent that these revolts,inspired in large part by America’s vic-tory over Iraq in the Gulf War, weregoing to lead to a massive humanitariancrisis. Eventually, “no fly zones” wereestablished over northern and southernIraq and in the north an internationalcoalition launched Operation ProvideComfort.

Begun in April 1991 OperationProvide Comfort established a safehaven for Kurdish civilians and provid-ed the resources required to alleviatethe humanitarian refugee crisis. TheMarine Corps played a large role inOperation Provide Comfort, primarilythrough the efforts of the 24th MarineExpeditionary Unit (Special OperationsCapable) under the command ofColonel James L. Jones Jr.

This excerpt is from LieutenantColonel Ronald J. Brown, Humanitar-ian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991:With Marines in Operation ProvideComfort. (History Division, Quantico,VA, 1995) pp. 62–66. The book abovecan be found in PDF format at under Pub-lications.

Into IraqAt noon on 19 April 1991, Lieutenant

General Shalikashvili was escorted by aMarine security detachment when hemet with Brigadier General NashwanDahnoun, the senior representative ofthe Iraqi Army General Staff. The meet-ing was held near Zakho and wasdescribed as a “polite, proper, frank[discussion that] clarified all views.”Rather than beat around the bush orengage in lengthy pleasantries, GeneralShalikashvili told the Iraqis what wasgoing to happen in a straight forwardmanner. He outlined CTF ProvideComfort’s mission. He emphasized the


and Sea Cobra helicopter gunships con-vinced the Iraqis to sling arms and hitthe road. As soon as the Iraqis left, theMarines began building a refugee campto demonstrate their humanitarianintent. Before nightfall, a dozen brightblue and white tents had been erected.These were the first of more than 10,000tents that would be put up in threecamps that eventually housed morethan 180,000 refugees! The BLT BravoCommand Group, Companies E and H,the artillery, assault amphibians, and alight armored vehicle detachmentremained at the Iraqi border ready tomove into Zakho the next day.

Lieutenant Colonel Kohl, command-ing officer of MSSG-24, was given anunusual operational mission by ColonelJones. The Turkish-Iraqi border crossingat Habur was closed, but had to beopened to allow overland supply of theassault force. This task would normallyhave been given to the ground combatelement, but Lieutenant Colonel Corwinwas busy conducting the assault, soKohl was tasked to do this. LieutenantColonel Kohl, First Sergeant Delgado, afive-member civilian relief team, and arifle squad departed Silopi for Haburduring mid-afternoon of 20 April.

During Desert Storm the Iraqis had

dropped both bridge spans at Haburand mined the roadway leading toZakho, but since the cease fire, a fieldexpedient bridge had since beenthrown across the river. Reports indicat-ed the Iraqis had removed some, butnot all of the mines. At Habur,Lieutenant Colonel Kohl located aTurkish lieutenant who spoke brokenEnglish. Kohl patiently explained thecrossing was to be opened to allied traf-fic the next morning. The Turkish offi-cer escorted Kohl to the center of thebridge where they met an Iraqi borderguard. Kohl again explained the situa-tion, then indicated he was concernedabout explosives on the bridge andalong the main supply route. The Iraqiremained silent about the mines, butstated he did not have the authority toallow the Americans to cross and wouldhave to check with his superiors. WhileKohl waited for an answer, Iraqi rein-forcements occupied the heights over-looking the road. To counter this showof force, Marine Sea Cobras, ArmyBlackhawks, and Air Force Warthogsdroned ominously in the sky overhead.About 20 minutes later the Iraqireturned and granted permission tocross the bridge. For the second timethat day, the 24th MEU (SOC)’s policy ofaggressive restraint paid big dividends.

Unfortunately, the Turks had neitherinstructions nor authority to allow theAmericans across the border. About 90more minutes lapsed before Turkishpermission to cross was granted. On thebridge, several Iraqis worked with anAmerican explosive ordnance demoli-tion (EOD) team. They discovered nomines but found explosive chargesunder the bridge and removed them.Lieutenant Colonel Kohl’s mission was asuccess; the first American convoymoved into northern Iraq at 0800 thenext day (21 April).

During this time, the MEU CommandElement, the Aviation Combat Element,and MSSG-24 settled in at Silopi, whileback at Iskenderun convoys carried thefinal Marine increments forward. TheCharleston and the Austin were com-pletely offloaded and the MEU’s 15-dayLanding Force Operational ReadinessMaterial (LFORM) was on shore. TheGuadalcanal remained nearby to pro-vide aviation support. Messages to theUnited States requested further logisticsand combat support. Included in theserequests were those for additional fire-power control teams from 2d ANGLICO,an RPV detachment from 2d SRIG, andmore engineer assets. It was also hopedthat an AV-8B Harrier II detachmentmight be made available.

Securing ZakhoOn 22 April, a Military Coordination

Center was established at Zakho. ArmyColonel Richard Naab, a team chief, twoliaison officers, and two linguists com-prised the allied team. A similar Iraqicontingent was led by Brigadier GeneralNashwan. The Center operated 24 hoursa day to provide face-to-face discus-sions during tense situations, kept bothsides informed about future operations,and acted as a sounding board foropposing views about current opera-tions.

General Nashwan used the firstmeeting to announce that Iraqiforces north of the 37th Parallel hadbeen ordered to pull back and that Iraqicommanders were cooperating com-pletely. However, despite these conge-nial relations at the MCC, the Iraqisquickly tested the coalition’s determina-tion. Although all Iraqi troops hadallegedly left Zakho, more than 300“policemen” wearing military uniforms

Col Mike Gish portrays the entrance to Camp Sommers in Zahko, Iraq. CampSommers, named for Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, David W. Sommers,housed the 24th MEU (SOC) headquarters, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion133, the U.S. Army 18th Engineer Brigade and 18th Military Police Brigade, andthe Joint Civil Affairs Group.



and carrying automatic weaponsremained. Major Raftery’s intelligencesection later confirmed that they weresoldiers from the 66th Special AssaultBrigade. At the next meeting ColonelNaab reiterated the coalition’s insistencethat all Iraqi forces be moved at least 30kilometers south, but he was answeredby silence. The second major incidentof the day occurred that evening whena flight of Iraqi MI-8 helicopters headedfor northern Iraq was intercepted by F-16 fighters from Incirlik. The incidentwas quickly resolved when the heli-copters landed and offered no resis-tance.

The American Marines in northernIraq were joined by their foreignbrothers-in-arms when the British 45thCommando, Royal Marines, was placedunder the tactical control of the 24thMEU. This battalion-size unit of 637Royal Marine “Booties” was command-ed by Lieutenant Colonel JonathanThompson. Lieutenant ColonelThompson established his commandpost in an abandoned school about 10kilometers outside Zakho. Thompson’sheadquarters section was joined bythree rifle companies: X, Y, Z, andCompany M (the British CommandoMountain and Arctic Warfare TrainingCadre). Historically, British and DutchMarines worked closely together andhad often formed combined UnitedKingdom-Netherlands landing forces.This tradition continued in northernIraq. On 23 April more than 400“Cloggers” of the 1st AmphibiousCombat Group (1st ACG), RoyalNetherlands Marine Corps, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Cees VanEgmond, arrived in northern Iraq. Withthese attachments, the 24th MEU (SOC)formed an unofficial “internationalbrigade” that mustered about 3,600 per-sonnel.

At first, the 24th MEU (SOC) andJoint Task Force Bravo shared the for-mer headquarters of an Iraqi infantrydivision on the northwestern edge ofZakho, but they had to part companywhen troop numbers increased. JointTask Force Bravo increased in size dur-ing the latter part of April. It soonincluded the 4th Brigade (Aviation), 3dInfantry Division; the 18th EngineerBrigade with Naval Mobile Construction

Battalion 133 (SeaBees) attached; the18th Military Police Brigade; the 432dCivil Affairs Company; and theCanadian 4th Field Ambulance (a battal-ion-size mobile medical unit). The 3dBattalion, 325th Infantry (Airborne)Combat Team (3-325th ABCT) from aduty station in Italy was expected toarrive on 27 April. It was a reinforcedinfantry battalion commanded byLieutenant Colonel John P. Abizaid,USA, that included a headquarters com-pany, three rifle companies, 20Humvee-mounted TOW antitanklaunchers, an 81mm mortar platoon, a105mm artillery battery (Battery D, 319th Field Artillery), and small supplyand reconnaissance detachments. ASpanish expeditionary force and anItalian airborne brigade were also onthe way and were scheduled to land thefollowing week.

Despite the presence of multination-al security forces, many Kurds wereunwilling to return to Iraq. Kurdishelders reported that the Iraqi policeintimidated them during an exploratoryvisit to Zakho and stated they wouldreturn only if the Iraqis evacuated andan allied security force remained.General Shalikashvili felt the problemwas the continued presence of Iraqitroops in and around Zakho. In additionto the “police,” an infantry strongpoint

was located only two kilometers fromthe city and three artillery batteries werein the hills south of Zakho. GeneralJohn R. Galvin (CinCEur) directedGeneral Shalikashvili to begin planningfor forcible removal of the Iraqis shouldit become necessary. Concurrently,Colonel Naab and General Nashwanreached an agreement to defuse the sit-uation.

General Garner (CG, JTF-B) orderedColonel Jones to occupy the townof Zakho. During the evening of 25April, BLT 2/8 cordoned off the north-ern, eastern, and southern approachesto the city, the Dutch covered the west,and the 45th Commando cleared thecity. This was a most appropriate taskbecause the British had just seen duty inNorthern Ireland and were adept at lowintensity urban warfare. Calling onrecent experience battling the illegal,underground Irish Republican Army,the British used a unique combinationof force and tact to patrol the streets.They gently reassured the civilians andsent the previously arrogant Iraqis scur-rying out of town. By sundown Zakhowas in allied hands. The 24th MEU(SOC) and its attachments promptlybegan a rigorous security program usingsquad-size patrols to criss-cross the areaof operations. q1775q


A U.S. Marine from BLT 2/8 and a French soldier from the 8th Marine ParachuteInfantry Regiment stop a vehicle at a jointly manned checkpoint near Zakho.


Lieutenant Colonel A. Michael LeahyIII: It was with deep sadness that theMarine Corps History Division learnedof the passing of our friend and combatartist, Lieutenant Colonel A. Michael“Mike” Leahy III on 15 October 2010,peacefully and surrounded by his fami-ly, at the age of 77. Born on 19 January1933, in Cambridge, Massachusetts,Leahy grew up in nearby Somerville,MA.

He served two periods of active dutywith the Marine Corps. In addition tobeing a combat artist, Leahy was a heli-copter pilot, and had the honor of fly-ing three presidents: Eisenhower,Kennedy, and Nixon. He was a gradu-ate of the Philadelphia University of Artand retired from the Marine CorpsReserve in 1980 as Lieutenant Colonel.At the time of his death, he was paint-ing commissions full-time at the LeahyStudio/Gallery in Cary, North Carolina.

Throughout his career, his artworkwas featured on television, includingdocumentary art for the Nataline Seriesduring the 1973 Watergate delibera-tions. His artwork appeared in manymagazines, including U.S. News &World Report and All Hands Magazine.His paintings have been exhibited atthe National Museum of the Marine

Corps in Quantico, Virginia, and inother venues. His many awards includethe Bronze Star with Combat “V” andthe Presidential Service Commendationfor Executive Flight, DetachmentMarine Helicopter Squadron 1. He wasawarded numerous awards for his art-work to include being named theMarine Corps Combat CorrespondentsAssociation Combat Artist of the Year in1969, the Department of DefenseThomas Jefferson Awards for artworkin 1986, and the National NavalAviation Museum’s Merit Award in1993.

He was predeceased by his daugh-ter, Kris, in 2008. Surviving is hisbeloved wife of 56 years, Patricia, theirchildren, grandchildren, and onegrandchild. He is also survived by fivebrothers and two sisters.Captain Cyril J. O’Brien: It was with

heavy-heartedness that the MarineCorps History Division learned of thepassing of our friend and colleague,Captain Cyril John “Cy” O’Brien on 31January 2011 at the age of 92—a dayafter his birthday. Canadian by birth, Cygrew up in Camden, New Jersey, andgraduated from St. Joseph’s Universityin Philadelphia in 1942. A month later,he enlisted in the United States MarineCorps stating that he had been rejectedas an officer candidate for being a halfinch too short.

A veteran of Bougainville, Guam,and Iwo Jima, Cy was assigned to a linecompany at Bougainville where he par-ticipated in many patrols, often as ascout. While at an interim rest area onGuadalcanal, it was discovered that Cyhad been a newspaper reporter prior tothe outbreak of the war, and he wasoffered the opportunity to become acombat correspondent. It was as a com-bat correspondent that Cy participatedin the battles for Guam and Iwo Jima.After the war ended, he continued as anewspaper reporter, earned a mastersdegree from American University and

continued on in the Marine Corpsreserves, attaining the rank of Captain.

With first-hand knowledge of thebattle for Bougainville, Guam, and IwoJima, and his experience as a combatcorrespondent, it was only natural thatCy was prolific in writing variousaccounts of these aspects of World WarII: numerous articles in Leatherneckand Naval History magazines, and hispublished histories, Liberation: TheMarines in the Recapture of Guam andTwo Score and Ten. Cy proved eagerand able to tell the tale of his fellowMarines whenever given the opportuni-ty. He remained active with numerousMarine Corps and veterans’ organiza-tions especially the U.S. Marine CorpsCombat Correspondents Associationthroughout his life.

Cy may have been short in stature,but he was larger than life in deeds,accomplishments, and in spirit. I per-sonally will forever miss his boomingvoice over the phone identifying him-self simply as “O’Brien!” Cy was prede-ceased by his beloved wife Elizabeth,originally of Philadelphia, and is sur-vived by his children Anthony O’Brien,Bridget Turow, Johnine Meehan, andPatricia Cahill as well as seven grand-children. q1775q

In Memoriam

Lieutenant Colonel A. Michael Leahy IIIand Captain Cyril J. O’Brien

by Annette D. AmermanHistorian


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