Pre-U European Paper 2c Section 4 1815-1862

The Unification of the German States, 1815–1871

The origins, nature and development of German nationalism – strengths and weaknesses The containment of nationalism up to 1848 The German Confederation and the Zollverein The Revolutions of 1848–9 and legacy Austro-German relations, Austro-Prussian relations 1849–63 The emergence of Prussia, its strengths The policies and actions of Bismarck to 1871 – political, diplomatic, military – and the actions of other groups The Wars of 1864, 1866, 1870–1 North-South relations, the North German Confederation, the creation of the German Empire

Readings

Alison Kitson, Germany: 1858-1990 – Hope, Terror, and Revival (Oxford), chapter 1, pp. 8-27. T. A. Morris, European History, 1848-1945, chapter 5: ‘Germany Unification’, pp. 78-95. David Cooper, John Laver & David Williamson, Years of Ambition: European History, 1815-1914, chapter 6,

Germany 1815-71, pp. 156-206. Alan Farmer and Andrina Stiles, The Unification of Germany, Access to History, 4th edn, chapters 1-4. Jonathan Steinberg, ‘How did Bismarck do it?’ History Today, 2011. Stephen J. Lee, Imperial Germany, 1871-1914, chapter 1: ‘The Formation and Structure of the German

Empire’ (especially first section dealing with unification).

Past Questions

2010: How important was German nationalism in the unification of Germany in the period 1848-71?2011: Assess the view that Bismarck’s contribution to German Unification has been exaggerated2012: How important were economic factors in the creation of a united Germany in the period 1862 to 1871?2013: NO QUESTION ON GERMAN UNIFICATION2014: Why was a united Germany not achieved before 1871?2015: How much did the unification of Germany owe to the growth of German nationalism?2016: How much did Bismarck’s success in unifying Germany by 1871 depend on the weaknesses of his opponents?Specimen: How important were economic factors in the creation of a united Germany in the period 1862 to 1871?

Synoposis

A. Background: Germany before 1848

1. The political background to German unification: Germany before 1815

Austrian and Prussian responses to Napoleon involved a mixture of reform and repression, but mainly repression. The 1815 Holy Alliance and the German Confederation, which emerged out of the Congress of Vienna were both designed to oppose nationalism and to fight revolution wherever it arose.

2. The nationalist background – Liberals, Radicals and the Conservative reaction, 1815-1847

Nationalism emerged in Germany around the end of the 18th century and in the early 19th century first as an intellectual idea that became popularised by opposition to Napoleonic invasion and occupation. It was inextricably linked to liberal notions of individual rights and freedoms. This was in itself a barrier to the possibility of a united Germany since the most vested interests were conservative.

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3. Economic background: Prussian industrialisation and the Zollverein, 1815-1847

The Zollverein and the industrialisation process contributed to Germany unity. Railways complimented the road building begun by Napoleon; and made transportation of goods cheaper, increased demand for commodities; made Germans more mobile and created demand for iron, steel and coal. It broke down geographic barriers – like the Elbe and the Main. It helped turn Berlin into a major centre of commerce and industry long before it became the imperial capital, with lines radiating out to all parts of Germany. Most of all, it promoted Prussian economic power – and the Zollverein represented the only Germany-wide institution apart from the Confederation, but it was a power that was more tangible and real than anything possessed by Austria as chair of the Federal Diet.

B. The process of Unification

German unification was produced by the removal or the reduction of a series of barriers: conservative opponents of nationalism, led in particular by Habsburg Austria whose very survival depended upon the elimination of nationalist ideas; Prussia’s conservatism and alliance with Austria within the German Confederation; Russian support for Austria; the opposition of kings, princes and dukes in other German states to Prussian dominance and finally the linkage between nationalism and liberalism. Some of those obstacles were removed by economic change whilst others were removed by the intervention of political actors, and of Bismarck in particular. The opposition of Austria in particular to the spread of nationalist ideas and its alliance with Prussia in the context of the German Confederation meant that nationalist ideas were of limited use by themselves to idealists seeking the unification of Germany.

1. 1848 marked a turning point because it helped remove or reduce two key barriers to unification: the opposition between nationalists and monarchists, and the Prussian-Austrian alliance. Frederick William IV recognised the need for compromise with the middle classes who were increasingly influential in the Prussian economic growth and the Zollverein, and they in turn recognised the need of royal protection and political stability. It was from 1850 that Prussia clearly began to pursue policies that were different from Austria and embracing ideas of national unity as a means of bolstering its own power. Nationalism underwent a transformation after this time, and one that was reflected in the Nationalverein of the 1850s, a movement that was focussed less on romantic and political ideals and more on economic advantages of political unification.

2. Economic change – Prussian industrialisation and the Zollverein. Prussian industrialisation gave it multiple advantages and promoted unification in several ways:

i. Overcoming geographic barriers between the north and south and the east and west;ii. Creating a stronger middle class who saw the benefits of a nation state and the virtues of

Prussia over Austria; iii. Creating the industrial basis for a stronger Prussian military;iv. Overcoming two further barriers to unification by encouraging the Prussian monarchy to

turn away from Austria and toward bourgeois industrialists as a means of promoting its own power.

3. The Weakness of other German states - The increasing conservatism within Austria compared with the apparent liberalisation within Prussia confirmed the notion among liberals that if unification was to occur it would be at Austrian expense; externally, the collapse of Austria’s international position following the Crimean War and the Italian War of 1859 made unification on the basis of a Prussian-led kleindeutsch a possibility.

4. The role of the Prussian army both in terms of organisation and technology which enabled it to overcome enemies that had previously been considered stronger than Prussia (France and Austria);

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5. The role of Bismarck and his military allies was to overcome the last remaining barriers to unification in its Prussian form. Bismarck resisted pressure from liberals in the Prussian Landtag, and following victory over Austria, resisted pressure from conservatives to abolish the constitution. Instead Bismarck went further, developing a constitutional framework for North German states that would involve compromise between liberal and conservative interests. Finally, he used the ‘stick’ of popular nationalism as well as the carrot of a federalised Germany to overcome the resistance of southern states to unification under the Prussian crown in 1870.

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A. The Background to Unification

1. The political background to German unification: Germany before 1815

Prior to 1806, ‘Germany’ was a geographic rather than political expression: 314 individual states, including 1400 towns with varying degrees of autonomy. Holy Roman Empire – under the Austrian Habsburg dynasty Imperial Diet – ineffective The Holy Roman Empire lacked natural frontiers and included range of different linguistic and

ethnic groups – German, French, Dutch, Danish, Polish, Czech. Religious differences – Catholics in the South, Protestants in North. Prussia: Austria’s only rival in terms of size and clout in international affairs. Economic and social situation –

Feudal system; Aristocracy own most of land and held all key posts in courts, armies and administration; 80% of population work the land; peasantry heavily burdened by tithes, rent, labour

dues or in the East; Huge range of currencies, weights and measures, customs barriers, internal taxes; Guild system - most skilled workers belonged to these, tended to reduce competition

and blocked economic progress. The hotchpotch of German states lacked the ability and unity to resist Napoleon.

Germany after Napoleon

French annexed territory on west bank of Rhine in 1803 May 18th, 1804, Napoleon proclaimed himself emperor (his coronation took place in Notre Dame

December 2nd – bourgeois intellectuals in Germany who had previously welcomed him as a liberator, began to see him as a betrayer of the ideals of freedom.

Defeat of both Austria and Prussia in December 2nd 1805 (Battle of Austerlitz) brought an end to the Holy Roman Empire.

Napoleonic invasion produced greater cohesion – reducing the total number of states to 39 (e.g. Bavaria now included 80 previously autonomous political states. Bavaria, Wurttemberg Baden and 13 other German states were formed into the Confederation of the Rhine.

At the Treaties of Tilsit (the first was on 7th July 1807, when Napoleon met Tsar Alexander on a raft in the middle of the Neman River; the second was signed with Prussia on 9 th July), Prussia lost territory.

Frederick William III (reigned 1797-1840) lost about half of his pre-war territories, including all of his territories west of the Elbe (which became part of Kingdom of Westphalia); and Prussia’s eastern, Polish territories became the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. New client states of France were created, and further lands were awarded to Russia.

Austrian resistance resulted in a further crushing defeat at the Battle of Wagram in 1809. Prussia lead War of Liberation

Napoleon’s disaster in Russia weakened his grip on Europe; King William Frederick III called for a people’s war of liberation; joined by Austria and Russia,

defeated Napoleon at Battle of Leipzig, 19th October, 1813 (the costliest land-battle of 19th century with 60,000 lives lost on both sides); invasion of France and occupation of Paris forced Napoleon to abdicate.

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Battle of Waterloo was fought after Napoleon returned from exile in 1815. Battles of Leipzig (1813) and Waterloo (18th June, 1815) were romanticised and mythologised by

German nationalists; in fact most army leaders were Prussian, not German nationalists.

The Aftermath of Napoleonic wars: In Austria, the Habsburg rulers, Francis I (1804-35) and Ferdinand I (1835-49) were determined to

keep absolute power. All but four German states remained dynastic (i.e. ruled by the family). Absolute rule was restored in

most German states in 1815; Austria remained an inefficient police state in which the aristocracy retained its privileges; In Prussia, King Frederick William III (1797-40) showed little interest in liberal reform; and Prussia

remained a state without a constitution until 1848, although reforms were passed to strengthen the state and to appease the liberals between 1806-13:

o Hardenberg advised Prussian King Frederick William III in 1807 ‘we must do from above what the French have done from below’:

Abolish serfdom; free peasantry; equality before the law Power of Prussian guilds broken in 1810 Church lands secularised; Military reformers reorganised the army – purged the officer corps and made

commissions dependent upon competitive examinations. Government overhauled – civil service thrown open to all classes Wilhelm von Humboldt introduced elementary schools for all children; state

certification for teachers; est. University of Berlin; Towns given elected municipal councils. Stein envisaged creation of elected national assembly – but this was a step too far

for king and aristocracy, but reforms to date made Prussia the most modern state in Germany.

Metternich’s Europe - The German Confederation and the Holy Alliance Metternich – the leading statesman of the multinational Austrian empire - believed that the

maintenance of international peace was directly linked with the prevention of revolution in individual states, seeing liberalism and nationalism as the forces of destruction against which the social order had to be defended.

The defeat of Napoleon led to the Congress of Vienna (November 1814-June 1815):o Interrupted by Napoleon’s comeback tour (the so-called 100 days when he returned from exile on

Elba and raised another revolutionary army that was decisively defeated at Waterloo on 18 th June 1815. Nonetheless the agreements of the Congress survived all that).

o It led to the creation of The German Confederation – comprising the 39 remaining German states - a kind of zombie Holy Roman Empire, in which Austria was expected to maintain its traditional authority over the German states.

o The ‘Act of the Confederation’ called for many things that would have pleased/appeased liberals: each state should develop a Constitution of Regional Estates’, Free trade, communications,

navigation, freedom of the press etc. A federal defence providing a uniformly organised federal force; Maintain ‘the external and internal security and the interdependence and integrity of

individual states.’

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o But its real aim was – from Metternich’s point of view – to maintain Austrian supremacy by preventing unification and liberal revolution.

It sought to uphold the status quo through system of mutual assistance between the feudal kings, princes and dukes in times of danger – including internal rebellion or external aggression.

Boundaries were those of the old Holy Roman Empire, and included many other linguistic groups (including French, Poles, Czechs, Danes) were included whilst other areas with German speaking populations in parts of Prussia and Austria were excluded; some parts ruled by foreign rulers – e.g. British king ruled Hannover.

The Bundestag or Federal Council, which met at Frankfurt was the executive body presided over by the Austrian representative in recognition of the imperial power traditionally held by the Habsburg emperors.

It was a permanent conference of representatives who were not elected but sent by the governments of each of the 39 states with instructions on how to act.

The main power of the Confederation was to prevent the making of foreign alliances that might threaten the security of the Confederation.

Despite the constitution (the Federal Act) empowering the Bundestag to organise a federal army and to develop commercial and economic co-operation between the states, local jealousies prevented the Confederation achieving a unity in military or economic terms.

The defence of the Confederation depended upon the continued co-operation of Austria and Prussia. At the same time, rivalry between Austria and Prussia as well as other divisions dashed nationalists’ hopes of unification.

Prussia was compensated for land it had lost at Tilsit in 1807 by acquiring new lands in the Rhineland palatinate. This seems to have been intended by Metternich as more of a damper than a boost to Prussian ambitions, since many of its new subjects were catholic and was also considered to be the most liberal of German territories. Responsibility for the border with France would mean that Prussia would bear the brunt of any future French invasion. Metternich was not aware of the industrial significance of the region and that he had in fact given Prussia the means of its future ascendancy over Austria.

o The Holy Alliance and the Congress system Three months following Napoleon’s final defeat on June 18th 1815, on September 26th, the

Emperors of Russia and Austria and the king of Prussia signed the so-called ‘Holy Alliance’. Its purpose was much the same as that of the German confederation: to frustrate the rise of

nationalism and liberalism and to resist revolution in all of its forms. The alliance was explicitly designed to uphold the divine right of kings and Christian values in

European political life, with all three signatories agreeing to act on the basis of ‘justice, love and peace’ both in internal and foreign affairs, for ‘consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections.’

In practice, it was intended as a bastion against democracy, revolution and secularism, and it was of course, a bastion against dreams of nationalist unity.

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2. The nationalist background – Liberals, Radicals and the Conservative reaction, 1815-1847

By 1815, the idea of a unified German state had emerged and found support amongst members of the bourgeoisie. But it remained merely an idea and there were at least two barriers to unification – the German Confederation and the Holy Alliance. A third barrier was the rivalry between Austria and Prussia and the resistance among German princes to any attempt to reduce their power. Another barrier was the lack of cohesion among those calling for German unity – some wanted a kleindeutsch, others a grossdeutsch; there were political divisions amongst radicals and moderates. There were geographic obstacles in the form of the Main and the Elbe; religious boundaries in the form of the Catholic South and the Protestant North; and there were class boundaries between the bourgeoisie in the west who were the main proponents of liberal ideas and the aristocracy in the east. By 1815, therefore, national unity was little more than a romantic idea.

Hatred of French rule led to the rise of German Nationalism and was almost inextricably bound up with liberal ideals.

In particular, the imposition of heavy taxes and Napoleon’s continental blockade against British goods; military conscription into Napoleonic armies, caused even the most liberal of Germans to hate the French and to seek a national awakening to resist him.

18th century German intellectual tradition, philosophers like Johann Herder, Johan Fichte and George Hegel developed view the German speakers were a unique volk who should belong to the same state. Ernst Arndt, poet and pamphleteer who called for a German Fatherland.

Ironically, France became a model – Napoleonic codes ensuring equality before law and end to aristocratic and church privileges; increased middle-class involvement in government and administration; end of feudal restriction and secularisation of church lands.

Many states emerged from the years of war more organized and with stronger bureaucracies. This was the result of French occupation, imitation of French methods, or simply financial necessity.

Some rulers ignored the Federal Act’s injunction that each state should develop a Constitution of Regional Estates’; with some northern states paying lip service and more compliance in southern states like Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg, which created elected assembles with control over laws and taxation. Suffrage was restricted, however, and monarchs continued to appoint ministers.

At the Wartburg Festival in October 1817, Student societies (Burschenshaften) met to celebrate the 300th anniversary of Luther’s stand against the Pope, and the 5th anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig. The festival became significant because it turned into a stand against the princes.

Metternich used the murder of August von Kotzebue in 1819 (a German dramatist who was also one of the Tsar’s informers on German affairs) by the nationalist student Karl Sand, to persuade the Bundestag to issue the Carlsbad Decrees, which increased press censorship and banned student societies at the universities. These:

o Provided inspectors for universities (to seek out any nationalist activities among teachers and students)

o Ensured that student societies were disbandedo Threatened radical university lecturers with dismissalo Introduced press censorshipo Essentially it turned some states in the confederation into police states.

At the Congress of Troppau in 1820, in response to revolutions in Spain, Portugal, Piedmont and Naples, Tsar Alexander I proposed that Russia, Austria and Prussia agree to restore any government overthrown by violent reaction and to oppose any reduction in monarchical

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July Revolution in Paris of 1830 sparked off a series of uprisings across Europe, a profusion of folk festivals in southern Germany, including one at Hambach attended by 30,000 in 1832;

o The Duke of Brunswick was driven out and successor was forced to sign a liberal constitution;

o Saxony and Hesse-Cassel – obtained liberal constitutions; o In Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg – liberal opposition parties gained parliamentary seats

and greater freedom of the press;o In 1832, 30,000 artisans, peasants and students meet at the Hambach Festival in the

Rhineland-Palatinate (region on the border with France under Bavarian control, heavily influenced by revolutionary ideas, resistant to the high taxes of the Bavarian king Ludwig I and also fiercely nationalistic) and to talk, listen to nationalist orators and plan revolution…

o The black-red-gold flag was again hoisted as a symbol of a democratic movement for national unity. The main demands of the meeting were liberty, civil and political rights as well as national unity and popular sovereignty against the European system of the Holy Alliance

This panicked Metternich, into persuading the Bundestag to pass the Six Articles, which: Increases the Bundestag’s control over states’ affairs; Imposed more sanctions against universities and the press; Encouraged the use of military force to break up demonstrations.

o As a result of these measures, the Prussian army subdued the Palatinate violently.

Nationalist sentiment in German territories was again aroused by external threat – from France (under the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe) in 1840, and from Denmark in 1846 (which wished to incorporate the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein into the Danish kingdom).

In addition, liberal hopes were heighted by the death of Frederick William III and the succession of Frederick William IV in 1840 raised hopes;

o He released political prisonerso He abolished censorshipo In 1842 he arranged for the Prussian provincial Diets to elect representatives to meet as an

advisory body on a temporary basis in Berlin;o He extended the powers of the provincial Diets and allowed them to publish reports of their

debates. However, Frederick William IV took fright when he found himself under attack from Junkers who were

critical of these liberal developments. There was talk of a coup to replace him with his brother William. In 1847 he called the Diet to raise money for a railway connecting Berlin and East Prussia; when the 600

delegates insisted on a guarantee that the United Diet should meet on a regular basis, Frederick William sent the Diet away and strengthened the determination of Prussian liberals to push for constitutional change.

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3. Economic background: Prussian industrialisation and the Zollverein, 1815-1847

Prussia’s ascendancy over Austria after 1848 was built upon its early and rapid industrialisation. Prussia benefitted from several factors that made it the centre of European industrial revolution:

i. Firstly, geographic advantages: The very territories which were given to Prussia in 1815 – in the expectation that they would keep the Hohenzollerns busy rather than powerful, became an economic hub. The Ruhr and the Saarland lay within Prussian territory; giving it a plentiful supply of coal, iron ore and chemicals without need to import. Prussia already contained the other key area of raw materials and industrial development: Silesia. Finally, Prussia contained Germany’s three most navigable rivers: the Rhine, the Main and the Elbe, making communication and transportation of goods more efficient.

ii. Secondly, Prussia developed the Zollverein, which was to have enormous implications for German unity.

a. The origins of the Zollverein lay in the fact that Prussia received Rhineland territories at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 but was divided from these by the states of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. In order to integrate the western provinces with the rest of Prussia and to stimulate economic development throughout the country, the Prussian government needed to develop communications links through the territories of these other stats and to break down customs barriers which impeded trade.

b. Prussia’s motives were therefore initially pragmatic and to do with her own internal needs rather than notions of German unification – In 1818 Prussia introduced a liberal tariff regime that abolished internal customs barriers and reduced import and export duties within its own territory. This Zollverein was extended in 1819 to include the enclaves of other states’ territories within Prussia’s borders and, in 1828, to include Hesse-Darmstadt.

c. However, the political advantages accruing from such a policy was not lost on the Prussians. As early as 1830 the Finance Minister Motz pointed out to his king as early as 1830 that a free trade organisation would not only bring property to Prussia it would also isolate and eventually weaken Austria’s political influence within the Confederation.

d. A much enlarged Zolverein was formed in 1834 when eighteen other states, including Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Thuringia and Saxony, joined. Prussian leadership was assured by the fact that it was the Prussian tariff which was adopted by the other member states and that Prussia represented the other states in trade negotiations with foreign powers.

e. At first had Austria refused to join the Zollverein because it disagreed with the policy of free trade and adopted a protectionist stance for its own markets within the Austrian Empire.

f. The arrangement was not permanent. Initially the Zollverein was to last for 8 years: thereafter it was renewed every twelve years. By 1844 only Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, the Hanseatic towns and Austria were not members. Member states still retained their sovereignty over their economic affairs, but in practice, Prussia usually won any arguments by applying pressure on the smaller states.

iii. Thirdly, Prussia pioneered railway building within Germany from 1835. Within the Zollverein - Railways began to link effectively the coal of the Saar basin, the iron ore of Luxembourg and the growing market of the Zollverein states in general – paving the way for a great expansion of iron production in the 2nd half of 19th century. Railways not only broke down geographic distances but also created huge demand for iron ore, coal and steel – thus stimulating industrialisation further. Railway production really promoted the rise of Krupp for example.

iv. Fourthly, Prussia had intellectual advantages: the Zollverein had more and more active entrepreneurs than France and Austria. The Prussian education system also favoured technical training to university level. This period saw the emergence of pioneers like Krupps of Essen (pioneer in steel production techniques – and

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would move into armaments production), Borsig of Berlin (began to rival British locomotive manufacturers) and Siemens (Werner Siemens, inventor of the Dynamo), all of whom became known outside Germany as world leaders in their respective fields. An example of German technology leading the way was given at the Crystal Palace exhibition in 1851 when Alfred Krupp startled British ironmasters by showing a block of cast steel weighing two tons, an achievement they could not match. In addition, it wasn’t just the middle classes who were becoming involved: In the growing Silesian industrial area the technocrats were often noble landowners – e.g. Count Henckel von Donnersmarck.

Conclusions

The Zollverein and the industrialisation process contributed to Germany unity. Railways complimented the road building begun by Napoleon; and made transportation of goods cheaper, increased demand for commodities; made Germans more mobile and created demand for iron, steel and coal. It broke down geographic barriers – like the Elbe and the Main. It helped turn Berlin into a major centre of commerce and industry long before it became the imperial capital, with lines radiating out to all parts of Germany. Most of all, it promoted Prussian economic power – and the Zollverein represented the only Germany-wide institution apart from the Confederation, but it was a power that was more tangible and real than anything possessed by Austria as chair of the Federal Diet.

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B. The process of Unification, 1848-1871

1. The political shift 1848-1850The Revolution of 1848 was of course a failure, but it was nonetheless a turning point in German history. It marks the point at which Prussian and Austrian rivalry becomes explicit and the co-operation against the forces of liberalism that existed before 1848 breaks down. The acceptance of the idea of a constitution – albeit one imposed by the monarchy rather than imposed upon the monarchy – marks a turning point in Prussian history and will form the basis for Bismarck’s constitutional compromises later on.

The Revolution of 1848The 1848 Revolution was perhaps never likely to succeed. There were many reasons for this – including internal differences among the revolutionaries and the fact that they were hardly representative of the majority of people in German territories. Another, more fundamental reason for its failure was that the armies – particularly the army in Prussia – remained loyal to the monarchy throughout, so the basis of royal power was never truly threatened. Although the revolution failed, however, it marked a turning point in German history, one that was revealed by the behaviour of Frederick William IV on the one hand and by the bourgeois revolutionaries themselves on the other. On both sides there was increased recognition of the need for co-operation. Austria’s vulnerability to nationalist fragmentation became more obvious, as did its dependence upon an ally it no longer trusted.

The development of a capitalist economy brought a new vulnerability to the forces of the market. The backdrop to the 1848 revolution was formed by economic and social problems –created by harvest failure due to a potato blight in 1846 and 1847. The price of cereal crops increased by 50% and led to decreased demand for manufactured products, which in turn led to unemployment.

In 1847 liberal and nationalist sentiments found expression in the foundation at Heidelberg of a newspaper with the prophetic title of Die Deutsche Zeitung (‘The German Newspaper’).

In the same year, representatives of the south-western states met at Hippenhelm and demanded an elected national Diet and detailed their complaints which were published in Die Deutsche Zeitung – that far from fulfilling the tasks set by the Act of the Confederation – the press is harassed by censorship, the discussion of the Frankfurt Diet are enveloped in secrecy.

The Hippenhelm meeting called for: o The liberation of the presso Open judicial proceedings with juries,o The end of feudal restrictions;o Reduction of the cost of the standing army and the creation of a national guard;o Reform of the system of taxation.

Events in France (fall of Louis Philippe) sparked revolution in Austria, with mass demonstrations on 13 March; Metternich fled to Britain and army was withdrawn from capital. Austrian rule was under attack in northern Italy, Hungary and Prague.

On 13 March, there was also a demonstration in Berlin by workers – mostly self-employed craftsmen. This was replicated in other states in Germany; Bavarian King Ludwig was forced to abdicate but most states retained their monarchies and most revolutionaries were peaceful.

Declaration of Heidelberg, 5th March 1848: 51 representatives from six states discussed changes to Germany’s political situation. They agreed that Vorparlament (a preparatory parliament) should be formed in Frankfurt. Elections were arranged and carried out successfully in all 39 states.

The Parliament was essentially moderate, liberal and nationalist, seeking to establish a united Germany under a constitutional monarch who would rule through an elected Parliament.

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It hoped to create a constitution that would ensure freedom of press; fair taxation; equality of political rights without regard to religion; German citizenship for all. Lacking the discipline of established political parties or clear leaders, the Frankfurt Parliament became a talking shop.

Nonetheless it produced 50 Articles of the fundamental rights of the German citizens – which became law.

The Frankfurt Parliament was unsympathetic to the claims of Poles, Czechs, Danes for territory; ethnic/nationalist tensions were unleashed at this time.

The failure of the Frankfurt Parliament and the limitations of liberal nationalism

The Frankfurt Parliament was weak. o Opposed by Austria, it lacked foreign recognition, the ability to tax, or to raise an army;

moreover it was out of tune with a large segment of working class because it rejected the Industrial Code put forward by the Artisan Congress in Frankfurt.

o Moreover it was itself divided – a Republican minority and a more moderate majority; there was also a conservative group who wanted to see rights of individual states preserved. In addition, there were divisions between Kleindeutsch and Grossdeutsch supporters, Protestants and Catholics.

o Also, liberals joined forces with conservatives to put down radical uprisings; Frankfurt’s weakness was demonstrated by the Schleswig-Holstein crisis – Known to Danes as

the First Schleswig War. o Denmark absorbed the two provinces based on the principle of succession through the

female line; and Germans opposed it on the principle of succession through the male line. The Frankfurt lacked army to enforce its opposition; Prussian army occupied them April-May but withdrew in face of Russian, French and British opposition; leaving Frankfurt with little choice but to accept the Treaty of Malmo, which undermined public support for Frankfurt and resolved none of the issues. (War was to be renewed in 1849 before another truce in July and again in 1850. It ended in 1852 with the London Protocol, which announced that the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were joined by a personal union with the King of Denmark.)

Slow progress made by Frankfurt Parliament lost support; forced to accept Treaty of Malmo; liberals sided with conservatives against radicals and therefore again undermining popular support.

External problems - Germany was still agrarian in 1848; harvests of ‘47 and ‘48 were reasonably good; rural population was not in desperate economic situation. Peasantry had little in common with and little sympathy for liberal, democratic ideas or the national question.

Well-trained and loyal army gave monarchy the military advantage over revolutionaries. Once restored, Austrian monarchical policy remained that of ruling over a divided Germany. On 3rd April 1849 the Frankfurt deputies offered Kaiser Frederick Wilhelm IV the office of

emperor which he declined, arguing that he could not accept the crown without the agreement of the princes and the Free Cities – but in reality he could not accept a ‘crown from the gutter’. The rejection of the crown was taken as a sign that the political scales had tipped against the liberals.

On 5th April all the Austrian deputies resigned their mandates, on the 14th May the Prussian deputies resigned theirs. In the following week nearly all the conservative and liberal bourgeois deputies left, leaving only the hard left.

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In May 1849, the Frankfurt Parliament was dissolved by the Prussian military, acting under orders from the German Confederation. The ‘rump parliament’ fled to Stuttgart where it was tolerated for a month before its final dissolution.

Revolution in Prussia in 1848-9

– In a bid to prevent violent revolution and to hang on to his power, Frederick William ‘wrapped himself in the revolutionary flag’, appointed a liberal ministry and agreed to an elected assembly to draw up a new constitution.

– The new Parliament met in May, dominated by liberals and radicals who were unable to reach agreement about a new constitution; except that the feudal privileges of Junkers be abolished.

– On the 26th July finally published a draft, moderate, liberal constitution unacceptable to conservatives and radicals alike.

o Riots by workers in Berlin in October pushed middle classes back towards the monarchy and the forces of repression.

o November – martial law was proclaimed; o December – Prussian parliament dissolved by royal degree; but having rejected the

constitution of the revolutionaries, Frederick William IV proclaimed his own constitution, which eased tensions; it confirmed king’s divine right to rule whilst limiting his freedom to act. A genuine parliament was created, albeit subservient to the crown.

o Prussian troops dealt with industrial unrest in Rhineland and Silesia and set about crushing the revolutions in other parts of the German Confederation.

o Once power had been fully consolidated in the hands of the Prussian military, Frederick William IV modified the constitution in ways that he thought would stifle liberalism. In particular, he introduced a three class suffrage system for the Prussian lower house which would survive until the end of WWI. But it had the unexpected effect of promoting liberal interests; Police powers increased and local government powers reduced.

Revolution in Austria 1848-9

– Austrian forces crushed major risings in Prague and northern in Italy in the summer of 1848. – In December the mentally defective Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his 18 year-old nephew Franz

Joseph whose forces regained all of the Austrian Empire, including (with the help of Russia) Hungary by mid-1949, ending all hope for the Frankfurt experiment.

– By 1850 it seemed as if the events of the previous two years had never been; Metternich returned from exile to Vienna to live as a revered ‘elder statesman.’

– Yet Austria was now more aware of its vulnerability to fragmentation. Only with Russian help was powerfully restored.

The Erfurt Union and the Humiliation of Olmütz

Just as Frederick William IV rejected the liberal constitution offered to him by revolutionaries within Prussia, and replaced it with his own, so he decided to reject the offer of an imperial crown from Frankfurt only to create a plan for a different kind of union at Erfurt.

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• Frederick William IV persuaded the rulers of Saxony and Hanover to join him a Driekonigsbundnis (League of Three Kings).

• The rulers of 17 other German states were bullied into joining too – creating a larger German Union.

• A congress was planned to meet at Erfurt in May 1850 to draw up a constitution. • From the beginning, the union looked shaky.• Saxony would only join if Bavaria would join; Hanover insisted on Austria’s inclusion;

• The new Austrian foreign minister – Schwarzenberg’s negotiated a temporary agreement whereby Prussia and Austria would administer Germany together until May 1850;

• Bavaria, Wurttemberg then refused the invitation to join; which led Saxony and Hanover to secede.

• Schwarzenberg then revived the old German Confederation and its Federal Diet (Bundestag at Frankfurt) under the presidency of Austria. All states were invited, but Prussia refused.

• A crisis in Hesse-Cassel brought matters to a head.• It mattered because Hesse-Cassel sat between Prussia’s eastern territories and the

western territories it had acquired at Vienna in 1815.• The roads between the Prussian provinces of Brandenburg and Rhineland passed

through Hesse-Cassel.• The Elector of Hesse-Cassel faced rebellion and fled to Frankfurt where he asked the

Federal Diet for assistance.• Austria, Bavaria and Wurttemberg signed an alliance and theDiet authorised an Austrian

army to march northwards into Hesse-Cassel. • This was a serious challenge to Prussian authority and Radowitz urged Frederick William to

prepare for war.• However, he was warned by Russia that it was prepared to support Austria in any conflict.• Radowitz resigned and Frederick William signed an agreement at Olmultz in November in 1850

in which he agreed to abandon the Erfurt Union and accept the restoration of the Confederation.

Long-term significance of the 1847-1850 period

Virtually all monarchical regimes across Germany recognised need for reform and modernisation and conservatives accepted need to show interest in social problems of lower classes; many influential Germans were determined to continue the fight for democracy and national unity.

By offering an imperial crown to Frederick William IV, the liberals were acknowledging the importance of monarchical authority and were ready to compromise with it.

By granting his own constitution, Frederick William IV was acknowledging the need to appease the liberals if he was to harness their support for his regime.

Despite its triumph at Olmütz, the Habsburg dynasty’s experience between 1848-50 was to increase its sense of vulnerability not only to revolution and to national fragmentation but also to relative economic decline. It set her on a path of political conservatism and a belated bid for economic liberalisation.

1848 brought an end to close co-operation between Prussia and Austria – a barrier to unification in the past.

The Erfurt Plan reveals that Prussia was by this stage willing to make German unification a vehicle to project its own power, and to harness the interests of liberal subjects to promote unification under its guidance.

When nationalism was to emerge as a powerful popular force within Germany once again in response to external threat in the 1850s – and again from France - it was to take a slightly different form. In 1859 the German National Association (Nationalverein) was formed, stimulated by the

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success of Italian Nationalism, it promoted the idea that Prussia should lead the German cause. It was a different nationalism from the burschenschaften or student fraternities that promoted nationalist ideas at the Wartburg festival in 1817 or at Hambach in 1832. It was an organisation that represented a different demographic too – the capitalist class of industrialists rather than the poets and philosophers of the earlier period. One of its leading spokespersons – Frobel wrote ‘The German nation is sick of principles and doctrines, literary existence and theoretical greatness. What it wants is power, power, power and whoever gives it power, to him it will give honour, more honour than he can imagine.’ Where liberals and industrialists clearly looked to Prussia, conservatives looked increasingly to Austria alone as the defender of feudal power. This shift in nationalism reflected changes in the economy, which marked out Prussian ascendancy and Austrian decline.

Later, Bismarck would be able to make use of nationalist sentiment, in creating the conditions to fight the war with Denmark in 1864 and with France in 1870-1; he was also able to make use of national sentiment during the victorious war over the French to persuade the southern German states to join a Reich under the Prussian King. Bismarck hung the threat of revolution over them – by threatening to call upon the people to throw off the yoke of their governments who were resisting unification. Does this mean that nationalism was a direct force for unification or was its influence in the end only indirect? Bismarck himself was no German nationalist, and his use of nationalism was that of realpolitik – he cynically exploited its potential for Prussian interests.

Yet there remained powerful barriers to unification:o Feudal princes held on to power and were willing to make only limited concessions to

liberalism;o Rivalry between princes prevented a consolidation of political power under one ruler;o In the face of Prussian economic expansion, and the growth of the Zollverein, state

governments in Bavaria, Wurttemberg and elsewhere were determined to retain their political independence.

o Austria had a crucial ally in Russia, which would support Austria in the face of Prussian aggression because – like other German states – they began to see Prussia as a force for unbridled liberalism.

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2. Prussian industrialisation in the 1850s and 1860s Support for the Zollverein among German states did not imply support for Prussia’s political

ambitions. In fact, it was precisely because of Prussia’s growing economic influence and their desire to preserve their independence that most of the smaller states in the Zollverein, including Hannover, supported Austria in the war against Prussia in 1866.

In a gesture of resistance, Hannover formed a rival customs union with a number of smaller states, but they were persuaded to merge their union with the Zollverein in 1852, by which stage the only major German states outside the Zollverein was Austria.

Austria proposed a new customs union in 1852 called Mitteleuropa and received support from many German states. Prussia initially refused to negotiate and then compromised – making a commercial treaty with Austria in 1853 and the Zollverein but blocking its formal membership. As a result Prussia’s economic leadership of Germany was assured.

Industrialisation contributed directly to Prussia’s ability to force German unification. i. Industrialisation produced a kind of military-industrial complex. Prussia’s superior railway

system enabled it to overcome greater Austrian numbers in 1866. Krupp of Essen produced its canons in the lead up to the wars of unification. It was Krupp’s breech-loading canon that annihilated the French at Sedan in 1870; and his canons that would shell Paris from an incredible 75 miles away in 1918.

ii. It gave Prussia a military advantage over its neighbours for whom the significance of industrialised warfare was about to be realised. The early railway lines were not built with strategic considerations in mind but the value of railways in moving armies to the front with speed and efficiency was quickly understood by the Prussian army’s General Staff. This was confirmed for them by the French victory over the Austrians in 1859, which was in part explained by the speed with which they were able to assemble their forces using railways.

iii. Railway building within Prussia was already far in advance of other German states by the 1850s. The early years of the 1860s saw a boom in the building of strategic railway lines in Prussia, a process in which the army General Staff played a leading role. In 1865 Prussia possessed 15,000 steam engines with a total horsepower of 800,000 compared with 3400 steam engines with a horsepower of 100,000 in Austria. In 1866 the Prussian army had 5 railway lines at its disposal to move its troops into a position over a front of 350 miles; the Austrians only had two. The mobility of the Prussian forces was a factor in their victory.

ConclusionsIn sum, economic developments promoted German unification by:

Overcoming geographic barriers between the north and south and the east and west through railways;

Creating a stronger middle class who saw the benefits of a nation state and saw the virtues of Prussia over Austria;

Creating the industrial basis for a stronger Prussian military; Encouraged the Prussian monarchy to look to the middle class as a means of promoting or at least

preserving its own power.

By the mid-1860s, Prussian economic growth had outstripped that of Austria and France, producing more coal and steel than FranceNew mines, ironworks were opened in the Ruhr; new railways, new steel mills, new factories manufacturing textiles, chemicals and electrical equipment. This period coincided with Prussia’s emergence as continental Europe’s largest producer of key industrial commodities such as coal and iron overtaking France and Belgium’s combined production by 1870. By 1870 the Zollverein was already producing 38 millions of tonnes of coal compared with 13 million tonnes by France; though it still lagged behind Britain at 118 million tonnes.

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3. The weakness of other German states The opposition of other German states was of course a barrier to unification; but their relative weakness compared to Prussia after 1850 meant that this barrier was not as difficult to overcome as it once was. Austria was of course still the biggest opponent, but despite its triumph at Olmütz, Austria’s fortunes went into steep decline during the 1850s. This would reduce its power and significance as an opponent of unification. Its economy remained largely agricultural. Austria saw some growth during this period – industrial expansion; rising exports; and peasants were freed from feudal dues; taxes were increased and expenditure reduced but there was already a massive deficit left over from Metternich era.

• Despite the defeat of nationalist revolts in Italy, Bohemia and Hungary in 1848-9, the Austrian Empire continued to experience difficulties with its subject nations. 1848 marked a turning point in Austria’s sense of internal security.

• Domestically, the Austrian government remained fearful of liberal ideas and fought a rear guard action against their spread. In 1849, Austria suspended its 1848 constitution; without replacing it with a new constitution – as in the case of Frederick William IV in Prussia.

o Under Austrian guidance, the Federal Diet proclaimed the ‘Fundamental Rights of the German People’ drawn up by the Frankfurt Parliament, as null and void.

o From 1851 the young Emperor Franz Joseph ruled Austria as an absolute monarch with this ministers Schwarzenburg and Bach concentrating decision making at the centre. The army acted as a police force and martial law was enforced in its own regions deemed to be infected with liberalism. Austria remained determined to dominate Germany by keeping it weak and divided; Perhaps Bismarck, a representative at Frankfurt, already recognised an opportunity to harness liberal desires for unification as a means of furthering Prussian interests at Austrian expense.

o Schwarzenberg proposed a Zollunion whereby Austria would join the Zollverein, but this failed.o At a meeting at Dresden in 1851, the Prussians, fresh from their humiliation at Olmutz, did not

accept the Austrian Mittleleuropa plan and instead Prussia agreed to the reinstatement of the German confederation of 1815.

o 1852 The Austrian finance minister – Bruck – tried to persuade the Zollverein to broaden its membership join their customs union

o The Prussian Foreign Minister Delbruck persuaded Hannover and Oldenberg to join the customs union instead of joining a Mitteleuropa led by Austria.

o In 1853, Prussia persuaded German states to renew the customs union for 12 years in 1853 – giving Austria a concession in return for dropping plan for European customs union. It was renewed again on Prussian terms in 1865.

o Austria was increasingly worried by Russian influences in the Balkans and partly for this reason sided with the British and French against Russia – but without committing any troops.

o Austria asked the Diet to mobilise half the Federal army in January 1855 for intervention in Crimea but Bismarck, the Prussian minister at the diet bitterly opposed it.

o Austria found itself isolated and outmanoeuvred.

o In 1855, liberals were further alienated from the Austrian government by its Concordat with the Catholic Church.

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o In 1861, the first steps were taken by Emperor Franz Josef toward reform by building an elected imperial council known as the Reichsrat. This was the first parliamentary institution for the Austrian Empire but its powers were limited.

o The Hungarians in particular refused to recognize its authority or send delegates to it. Here was widespread refusal to pay taxes, and 150,000 troops had to be kept in Hungary in order to maintain Austrian control.

o During the conflict of 1859 large numbers of Hungarian and Italian troops deserted.o Whereas Bismarck could appeal to nationalism as a means of bolstering enthusiasm for war;

nationalism lay at the heart of Austrian problems.o Hungarians refused to pay taxes, adding further economic pressures on the imperial government

which could not afford to modernize its army.o In 1866 the army was still led by officers whose position depended upon social rank rather than

ability, and equipped with out-dated muzzle-loading rifles.

• Internationally, Austria became isolated when it failed to support its Russian ally against the French and British in 1853; its bid to make new allies with Britain and France then failed when Bismarck opposed Confederate intervention against the Russians. It became clear that Austria’s polyglot nature required foreign policy moves that were different from those needed by the rest of Germany.

• 1859-61: the North Italian War: when Austria fought to maintain its Great Power status by fending off the French and the Piedmont attempts to take its north Italian territories, the Prussians refused to assist its southern neighbour and the Austrians were defeated and virtually bankrupted in the process. Austria’s other ally – Russia – was not inclined to support her either and the Austrians were defeated by the idealistic Napoleon III, suffering a loss to prestige and to its economy in the process.

• Napoleon III did not appreciate that by weakening Austria in this way, he was empowering a more dangerous foe on his borders. But then again, he was not alone. Prussian power was consistently underestimated. Britain felt it had nothing to fear from Prussia and it could prove a strong bulwark against France and Russia.

• When later the Polish revolted against Russian rule in 1863, Bismarck would offer Prussian help the Russians put it down. This was refused, but an important diplomatic point had been scored and it provides an indication that Bismarck was preparing the road ahead, but Bismarck’s tough diplomacy depended upon military force to back it up.

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4. The role of the army

The wars of 1865, 1866 and 1870-1 all resulted in decisive victories for the Prussian armies in the field. Only tin the war against Denmark was there an overwhelming superiority in numbers for the Prussian forces and that was because Prussia was in alliance with Austria. In the wars with Austria and with France it was speed of mobilisation rather than numerical advantage that gave Prussia the advantage, enabling it to outnumber its enemies on the front line.

Organisation and planningThe Prussian Chief of Staff, von Moltke, made a major contribution to Prussia’s military victories through the preparation and planning, which he had instigated since the early 1860s:

Increased the size of the army; Improved tactical mobility on the battlefield by giving greater responsibility to junior officers and non-

commissioned officers (NCOs); Greatly improved the provision of supplies for an army in the filed by establishing separate supply units,

specialist railway units and field bakeries. Field commanders were given more initiative within the overall strategic plan; Prussian army was able to supply its field commanders with detailed and accurate maps of the areas in

which they were fighting, both in 1866 and 1870. The French officers were only supplied with maps of German territory despite the fact that they were

actually fighting in France. The French had no detailed mobilisation plan and their supplies were inadequate to maintain an army in

the field.

Technology The technological gap between the Prussian army and its adversaries also played a part in the victories. In particular, the Prussian General Staff played a key role in the boom in strategic railway development in

the early 1860s, giving the Prussians an advantage of having 5 railway lines supplying a front line of over 350 miles, compared with Austria’s two railway lines.

A similar situation enabled Prussia and its allies to overwhelm the French by the speed and mobility of its army.

Prussia had introduced the breech-loading Dreyse gun in 1843 when other armies were still equipped with muskets.

In the war of 1866, Prussian soldiers had 3 times the rate of fire with their weapons compared with the Austrians;

This superiority was a major factor in the stunning victory of the Prussian army at Königgrätz, near Sadowa.

The Prussians also used artillery with rifled barrels for the first time in 1866; These weapons had a longer range and greater accuracy Austria’s smooth-bored canons; In the years after 1866, the Prussians undertook a major training programme to improve their use of this

technology, which wasn’t exploited fully in the war with Austria. In the war of 1870, the French had the advantage in firepower, with their chassepot infantry rifle, but the

speed and mobility of the Prussians on the front line proved decisive.

Once the wars began, the quality of preparation and planning, weaponry and tactics became decisive factors in the outcome of battles. The wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870-1 were all won by Prussian advantages over their opponents, but they were also won because of favourable diplomatic situation in which they were fought.

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5. The Role of Bismarck

Bismarck was appointed to the presidency in the midst of the constitutional crisis within Prussia – in which the king’s right to reform the army was challenged by the liberals. In his first speech to the Landtag, Bismarck hoped to conciliate his liberal opponents: ‘it is not by speeches and majority resolutions that the great questions of the time are decided – that was the big mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by blood and iron.’ With hindsight, the speech looks very fitting; but at the time it caused uproar. The divisions of 1848 had not gone away. In addition, by 1866, most Zollverein states were allied with Austria AGAINST Prussia, because they were trying to politically counterbalance the economic subordination to Prussia. If Bismarck was to unite those states to Prussia, he would clearly have a job of persuasion to do. Bismarck took advantage of a series of crises - with Denmark, with Austria, and then over Luxemburg and the Spanish succession, to isolate opponents and conciliate potential allies.

A major obstacle to German unification under Prussian power had been in the past the intervention of other states. This had been the obstacle in Prussia’s plan for a political union in 1850 (the Erfurt Union) and in the war with Denmark in 1848-52. Bismarck’s diplomacy and political control was crucial in ensuring that enemy states were isolated before war could proceed and then once it had began, preventing other states from becoming involved. The Treaty of London of 1852 made Great Britain a guarantor of the peace and the status of Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck was offered an opportunity when Denmark decided to breach this treaty in 1864, and was fortunate that Britain was more favourably disposed towards Prussia by that stage because of the marriage of Queen Victoria’s eldest daughter and the Crown Prince Frederick. However, Bismarck restrained Moltke and the Austro-Prussian armies from invading Denmark proper during the war of 1864 – a move that would have widened the conflict. Similarly, in 1866 he restrained both von Moltke and King Wilhelm from pressing on to Vienna in 1866 – which would threaten the very existence of the Austrian Empire (creating chaos on Prussia’s borders). It was Bismarck who pressed von Moltke to bombard Paris with his artillery in January 1871 in order to bring about an end to the war (before other states became involved) and it was Bismarck who decided to stop the bombardment when French political representatives indicated their willingness to negotiation. A final obstacle to unification – in the form of Wurttemberg, Baden and Bavarian opposition to Prussian dominance – was broken down by the threat of revolution on the one hand and by diplomacy and constitutional arrangements on the other.

Prussian Constitutional crisis 1860-2 and the appointment of Bismarck

The mobilisation of Prussian troops in 1859 brought home the need for reform among army generals General von Roon, minister of War, proposed reforms: he wanted to double army size, increase military service from 2-3 years; improve equipment and reduce role of the citizen’s army, the Landwehr. Why did this matter so much? The loyalty of the army had saved the monarchy in 1848. It was a test of where real power would lie and a reduction in the significance and status of the Landwehr meant decreased parliamentary influence over the power of the state. Parliament refused to agree; fresh elections in May 1862 led to a majority for Liberal Progressives.

• The intervention of outside states prevented Prussia’s plan for a political union in 1850 (the Erfurt Union) and thwarted Prussia’s ambitions in the war with Denmark, 1848-52.

• Bismarck’s diplomacy and political control was crucial in ensuring that enemy states were isolated before war could proceed and then once it had begun, preventing other states from becoming involved.

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1862 On advice of Roon, Bismarck was appointed minister-president of Prussia; maiden speech ‘blood and iron’. Bismarck’s solution was to act as if Parliament didn’t exist; raised money by taxation and threatened military action if people refused to pay. Civil servants who objected were dismissed. But few were willing to risk a repeat of 1848.

Bismarck’s philosophy was Realpolitik – a pragmatist and cynical about nationalism – but prepared to harness its energy to serve interests of Prussian power.

1863 Polish revolt – Bismarck offered Russia help, which is declined but makes the Tsar more favourably disposed toward Prussia than to Austria;

November – the succession of Christian of Glucksburg to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein re-opened the conflict with Denmark that had done so much to discredit the Frankfurt parliament in 1848. A revolt in favour of the former Duke of Augustenborg was passionately supported by German nationalists. Christian’s response was to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark, thereby violating the 1852 Treaty of London.

Bismarck won Austrian help in a joint effort of the German Confederation ostensibly in support of Augustenborg’s claims, but as far as Bismarck was concerned, in support of Prussia’s expansion. Military action led to Danish surrender in July 1864 and the Treaty of Vienna.

Bismarck engineers feud over Schleswig-Holstein to bring war with and defeat for Austria

1864 Victory secured the Schleswig and Holstein duchies for the German Confederation. This now became a source of severe tension between Austria and Prussia. Neither wanted war at this stage (Austria was bankrupt; Prussian army not yet strong enough).

• After the war with France and Piedmont in 1859, Austria was virtually bankrupt.

• Austria had lost Lombardy but still held its other north Italian possession, Venetia.

• Bismarck pursued diplomatic links with both Italy and France.

1865 Convention of Gastein – agreed to split responsibilities – Austria to administer Holstein; Prussia to administer Schleswig – with joint sovereignty over both. Bismarck’s motives at this stage have been subject to debate – was there a master plan (Bismarck) or was it merely opportunism (AJP Taylor)?

• Bismarck no doubt provoked Austrian anger by publishing new proposals to reform the Confederation by expelling Austria and introducing universal male suffrage and all troops to be controlled by Prussia.

• Austria asked the Bundestag to reject Prussian proposals; Prussia withdrew.

• But it was Austria that broke the terms of the Convention of Gastein by asking the German Confederation to decide the future of the duchies.

• At Biarritz in October 1865 Bismarck hinted that he would help France take the heavily fortified duchy of Luxemburg in return for her neutrality. Austria lacked allies to the East and West and Holstein was sandwiched between Prussian territories.

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1866 April – Bismarck made a secret alliance with Italy (thus creating a scenario where Austria might face a war on two fronts) and then deliberately stoked up tensions with Austria by publishing new proposals to reform the Confederation by expelling Austria and introducing universal male suffrage and all troops to be controlled by Prussia. Austria asked the Bundestag to reject Prussian proposals; Prussia withdrew; most states allied with Austria, but Prussian troops were able to defeat northern states very quickly.

1866 June – Start of Seven Weeks’ War.

Austria had almost double Prussia’s population (roughly 44 million to Prussia’s 24 million in 1866)) and had more soldiers (400,000 to 300,000), and additionally the support of most German states. It occupied a central geographic position; and many Prussians were lukewarm about war with a fellow German state.

• The German army under the command of General Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), was in the hands of military genius.

• The Prussian General Staff planned the mobilisation, deployment and provisioning of Prussia’s forces by exploiting Prussia’s superior railway network.

• The decisive battle was fought at the village of Sadowa in July, northwest of the Bohemian town of Königgrätz.

• Prussia held 5 railway lines leading down to the Bohemian war zone, compared with one serving Austrian needs. The Austrian troops were thus able to mobilise themselves in half the time it took the Austrian forces.

• By splitting the army into three units along a front 200 miles long, Moltke was able to increase its speed of movement and flexibility.

• Breech-loading rifles gave the Prussians an ability fire at five times the rate of the Austrian’s muzzle-loading musket. (7 shots a minute; 5 times faster than the Austrians, leading to 5 times more casualties on the Austrian side).

• Once again, Bismarck had been fortunate in some of the events that led to the war with Austria, and once war began, events were controlled by Moltke.

• However, before the end of the war, Bismarck exercised control over both Moltke and the King.

• Moltke wanted to march to Vienna and maximise the gains of the Prussian military.

• Bismarck persuaded the king that caution was necessary. Prussia did not need the collapse of the Austrian empire, which would create instability on the Prussian frontier.

• Moreove, a neutral Austria was far more useful to Prussia than a hostile one. Bismarck recognized the utility of a future alliance with its southern neighbour.

• Once again, it was Bismarck’s caution that mattered more than his aggression.

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August – Treaty of Prague;

Prussia annexed a great deal of territory from its northern rivals; all other German states north of River Main were to form a North German Confederation under Prussian leadership.

Four (Catholic) South German states (Bavaria, Wurttemburg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt) remained independent – but signed a secret military alliance with Prussia.

Bismarck insisted on clemency to help ensure that Austria would not ally with France against Prussia (an idea abhorrent to Austrian Germans anyway).

• The Treaty of Prague was therefore lenient to Austria, so when the peace terms were developed, no territorial acquisition and no indemnity was demanded.

• Austria only lost the duchy of Venetia (to France, who then gave it to Italy) as a result. • Nonetheless, the Habsburgs were permanently excluded from German affairs, and southern

German states that had sided with Austria were required to pay an indemnity.• States in the north that had sided with Austria – particularly those which sat between

Prussia’s east and western territories (e.g. Hannover, Hesse Cassel, Hesse Darmstadt), were absorbed into Prussia, thus removing a strategic weakness in the heart of the state.

Outcomes• Given all the difficulties with the Landtag, Bismarck’s Conservative contemporaries expected him to tear

up the constitution and start again, now that he had so much popular support.• Once again Bismarck confounded expectation and did the very opposite – he used Königgrätz to

negotiate, from a position of strength, a new political alliance with the Liberals.• He presented an Indemnity Bill in which the Prussian executive recognised that its four years of

rule without a parliamentary approved budget had been without ‘legal foundation.’ and sought Parliament’s assurance that no action would be taken against it.

• The result was the National Liberal Party – committed to consolidating the drive towards unification, and supporting Bismarck.

• This would become Bismarck’s main political ally in the early years of the Second Reich after 1871.

• In fact, Bismarck went even further.• As well as retaining the existing constitution in Prussia, and designed a new ‘federal’ constitution

for the North German Confederation based on the Prussian Constitution, with an assembly elected by universal male suffrage.

• Bismarck persuaded the remaining states in the north to join a new North German Confederation by means of a federal constitution that would give a measure of democracy whilst preserving the position of dukes, princes and kings.

• The new Confederation included a Reichstag which was democratically elected.• Government remained in the hands of the king and his appointed chancellors.• But key pieces of legislation set about unifying these territories:• Free movement of the citizens within the territory of the Confederation (1867)• a common postal system (1867/1868)• common passports (1867)• Prussian military laws replacing local military regulation (1867)• equal rights for the different denominations (1869)

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• The North German Confederation offered northern states like Saxony, the ability to preserve a measure of their sovereign independence whilst accepting the Kaiser as Supreme Ruler.

• After 1871, after the final war of unification with France, the same constitution would be extended to include the southern German kingdoms, consisting of Bavaria (Catholic), Wurttemberg (Protestant), Baden (Protestant) and the Grand Duchy of Hesse.

• Further still, Bismarck then created yet another level of government – the Zollparliament – that would include ALL the states of the Zollverein, including the southern states mentioned above.

• Bismarck hoped this would help get the southern states used to working nationally but it was not to prove easy - elections from the southern states returned opponents of Prussia.

1866-7 Luxemburg crisiso Bismarck began by helping Napoleon persuade the Netherlands to renounce claims to Luxemburg, but

refused to give up rights of Prussians to garrison a force there. o Napoleon stirred up demonstrations against the Prussians in Luxemburg and in response Bismarck began

to refer to Luxemburg as German and to talk in terms of national honour.o March 1867 Bismarck released texts of secret military alliances he had made with the south German

states.o Bismarck appealed to the Great Powers to settle the question – and it was agreed that the Prussian

garrison should be withdrawn but that the Great Powers would guarantee Luxemburg’s independence and neutrality.

o Franz Joseph twice met with Napoleon III. o Luxemburg is often seen as the point at which B. stopped being a Pr. Patriot and became a German one.

But it is more likely that he was manipulating nationalist sentiment to further Prussian goals.

1868-70 Spanish Candidate crisis1868 Queen of Spain, Isabella was driven out of the country by revolution and the Spanish government made efforts to find a new monarch among the royal houses of Europe. In February 1870 an official offer was made to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. The question was referred to William as the head of the house. Bismarck persuaded him that it was in Germany’s political interests to have the house of Hohenzollern become heir to the Spanish throne.

1870 3rd July News reached Paris and as anticipated N. regarded Leopold’s candidature as totally unacceptable.

1870 12 July Ems TelegramLeopold’s candidacy withdrawn by his father and the affair appeared to have reached a conclusion; but France demanded a full renunciation from William I himself; the latter found this deeply insulting. Even so, his response was conciliatory and sent a telegram to Bismarck at Ems notifying him of the day’s events. The latter released an edited version to the press in which William’s response appeared more uncompromising and even insulting towards the French ambassador, whilst also giving the impression that the latter had insulted William. Prussian embassies received a copy of this version of the telegram and were instructed to communicate its contents to foreign governments. There is some debate as to whether the French were committed to war even before the Ems Telegram.

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1870 July 19th Outbreak of Franco-Prussian WarNapoleon III declared war on Prussia; Bismarck claimed that France had ‘committed a grievous sin against humanity’ and called upon the south German states to support Prussia in accordance with the 1866 military alliances. They agreed to do so.

o This was the 1st war in which all German states (apart from Austria) fought but it was dominated by the Prussians; but by the end all Germans were proud of it and wished to be associated with Germany’s triumph.

o Austria was restrained - Hungarian government bitterly opposed to war; Russia promised to fight on Prussia’s behalf if Austria became involved;

o Denmark toyed with idea of becoming involved but did nothing; o Italy’s demands upon France in return for her so support were so outrageous that Napoleon rejected

them.o Britain was mistrustful of Napoleon III’s ambitions; moreover Bismarck published in the Times

documents received from the French ambassador in 1867 when discussing possible ‘compensation’ for French neutrality during the 7 weeks’ war which suggested that France might violate Belgian neutrality. It seems that Bismarck kept these documents carefully for use in in just such circumstances as arose in July 1870.

o Prussian victory once again depended upon Moltke’s strategic use of railway lines (French were outnumbered 6-2 here); the Germans mobilised 470,000 troops compared with 300,000 for the French;

o 1st September Battle of Sedan – German artillery had longer range and a higher rate of fire than the French and the Krupp breech loading rifle proved more efficient than its French equivalent.

o Napoleon was imprisoned on 2nd and taken prisoner; he was deposed by a revolutionary government that continued to fight on until 20th September.

o The German armies surrounded Paris on 20th September and defeated the French army at Metz in October, but the French fought.

o On the 18th January Wilhelm I was proclaimed German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles. 10 days later the French finally agreed to accept an armistice.

o Moltke’s grand strategy was initially bungled but eventually Krupp breech-loading artillery proved more powerful than the French Chassepot rifle equivalent; German forces were victorious at Spicheren (5th August) and Worth (6th August).

o Napoleon III ordered troops from Metz to join attack; but Germans advanced beyond Metz to cut off French escape route and defeated them at Mars la Tour (16 august) and at Gravelotte 918 August) putting the majority of French troops out of action.

o 1st September Battle of Sedan; German artillery had a longer range and a higher rate of fire; N. agreed to surrender terms on 2 Sept. NIII remained a prisoner until 1872 before exile in England.

o 4th Sept. N was deposed by revolutionary government; French 2nd Empire abolished and the Third French Republic was proclaimed.

o Bismarck’s intention to annex Alsace and Lorraine and French determination not to cede territory meant that the war continued; by 20th September Paris was surrounded;

o October – French army at Metz.

Consequences of the Waro Against a backdrop of German nationalist sentiment, separate treaties were signed with each of the

four southern states by which they agreed to join the German empire; B’s trump card was the threat to call on the German people to remove those rulers who stood in the way of unity. The Federal

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constitution allowed each state to keep its monarchies and power over internal matters but real power was in the hands of emperor, army officers and his handpicked ministers.

o Ludwig II who had been bribed with monies Bismarck had taken confiscated from the king of Hannover in 1866, agreed to write a letter asking William to accept title of emperor and other princes were persuaded to add their names and

o December 1870 - this appeal was seconded by a deputation from the North German Reichstag.o January – Paris was short of food and subject to German bombardment. o 18th January William was proclaimed German emperor at Versailles;o 28th January 1871 the French agreed to accept an armistice

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ConclusionsBismarck’s contribution was multi-faceted:

He studiously ignored pressure either from below (the Landtag, and popular opinion between 1862 and 1866), or from above (the Kaiser and Moltke’s demands for a harsh peace on Austria, realising that once Prussia had defeated Austria its next goal must be to secure Austria’s neutrality in a war with France and that an enemy on the southern border would do Prussia no good in the long-term). He was not afraid to disappoint liberal and nationalist sentiment when necessary, nor was he afraid of disappointing conservative opinion.

As a diplomat he knew when to isolate and when to conciliate with potential enemies/allies; Napoleon’s neutrality was secured in the war with Denmark and with Austria; Austria was isolated and faced a potential pincer movement in 1866; but was dealt with fairly after Königgrätz. Opportunities – like the Luxembourg and the Spanish succession affairs were seized upon. The Ems Telegram was manipulated to build a case against France.

Thirdly, he was able to create a constitutional framework that allowed both conservatives and liberals to feel able to work together, and thereby overcome one of the last and most significant hurdles to German unification

In his memoirs published in the 1890s Bismarck presented himself as a statesman who foresaw events and brilliantly achieved his goals, which he worked on from the start – principally German unification.

o Not all historians are convinced. AJP Taylor saw his as an opportunist; most historians think it unlikely that Bismarck depended upon luck; and the consensus is that he had an outline view of what he wished to achieve from 1862 but did not have map of specific moves at that stage;

o Rather he reached limited but well-defined goals by taking advantages of situations he had either helped create or that presented themselves to him.

Did Bismarck make Germany or did Germany make Bismarck? A number of factors helped:

o German nationalismo Prussian economic growtho Political change before 1862o Austrian decline and the changing international situation before 1862o Prussian military strength and Moltke’s strategic planning 1862-1871

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Practice questions

1. How accurate is it to say that Bismarck’s political skills were primarily responsible for the success of German unification in the years 1862-71?

2. ‘The Prussian army, rather than Bismarck’s diplomatic skills, brought about German unification.’ How far do you agree with this statement?

3. How far was Bismarck’s diplomacy responsible for the unification of Germany in the years 1862-71?4. Evaluate the interpretations in the following two passages and explain which you think is more convincing

explanation of Bismarck’s actions prior to the Franco-Prussian War.

AJP Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, 1955

Bismarck had neither planned the war nor even foreseen it. But he claimed it as his own once it became inevitable. He wished to present himself as the creator of Germany, not as a man who had been mastered by events. Moreover, attention had to be diverted from his carelessness in giving France an opportunity to humiliate Prussia and from his discreditable manoeuvres to shift the responsibility from this on to the king. Therefore, against the King. Therefore, against al the previous statements, the war with France had to appear necessary and inevitable, long-planned by the master-statesman. Bucher, his closest associate, was soon calling Leopold’s candidature ‘a trap for France’; and Bismarck himself claimed to have provoked the war by the Ems telegram. Probably he came to believe his own story and spoke in all sincerity on 30 July 1892 when he declared: ‘We could not have set up the German Reich in the idle of Europe without having defeated France….. the war with France was a necessary conclusion.’ Yet Germany had not reason for a war against France; and its gains proved a perpetual embarrassment. In truth, the French blundered into a war which was not unwelcome to them; and Bismarck, though taken by surprise, turned their blunder to his advantage.

M. Kitchen, A history of modern Germany, Blackwell, 20065, pp. 115-17

For Bismarck, 1866 had only brought a temporary solution to the German problem. Having once conjured up the support of liberal nationalists, nothing short of the creation of a nation-state would suffice to integrate them in a monarchical and conservative system dominated by Prussia. Bismarck had no idea how or when this national policy could be realised, and he was secure enough to wait upon events. He was ready to seize any opportunity to secure this ultimate goal. Above all he was determined to maintain to maintain firm control and not allow liberal nationalists or public opinion undue influence. His was a revolution from above that could not be allowed to slip out of his hands…

The gridlock over German unification was broken by events outside its borders. In 1868 the Spanish army deposed the absolutist queen and sought ot establish a constitutional monarchy. The French supported a Bourbon candidate, but the military preferred the German Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the south German and Catholic branch of the Prussian ruling house. At first Bismarck paid little attention to the Hohenzollern candidature but by the winter of 1869, when it was clear that the Spanish were anxious to go ahead, he lent it his full support…. Bismarck hoped to gain support in the south for his German policy by backing the prince and to mobilise German national sentiment by confronting France.

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Summary

• Bismarck could not have achieved unification without:

– Political will of Prussian monarchy (Bismarck was not proposing a change of direction);

– Zollverein and industrialisation (the basis for Prussian power);

– The role of the army (e.g. role of personnel, technology and tactics)

– The weakness of other German states (especially Austria itself, bankrupt after 1859);

– The fluidity of the international situation.

• Failure of nationalism – 1848 revolution

– However it was a major turning point

• Economic change – makes Prussia really strong

• Weakness of Austria and other states – and changes in the international situation

• A final obstacle to unification – in the form of Wurttemberg, Baden and Bavarian opposition to Prussian dominance – was broken down by the threat of revolution on the one hand and by diplomacy and constitutional arrangements on the other.

• On the one hand, Bismarck threatened to call upon the people of the southern states to overthrow the princes who stood in the way of German unity;

• On the other hand, he offered those German states to preserve their institutions within a federal framework in which the King of Prussia would become Kaiser.

Big turning points that you must know about: 1848 (revolution), 1853-4 (Crimea), 1862 (Constitutional Crisis), 1864, 1866 and 1871 (Wars of unification).

Significance of Bismarck

• Bismarck’s policies were not unique to him or original. Prussian ambition reached back to Frederick the Great in the 18th century;

• Prussia’s ability to challenge Austria depended upon its military strength and economic resources.

• Bismarck’s diplomacy was assisted by:

– Crimean War of 1853-4;

– Almost universal mistrust of Napoleon;

– British isolationism.

• Bismarck played one power off against another; but was also an important in exercising restraint in 1866; instead of rejecting liberalism and nationalism, Bismarck compromised with them but ultimately exploited them.

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Depending on the question, the main factors appear to be:

– Nationalism – propaganda, literacy, education, romantic, poetic, economic, political could/should be considered; the Nationalverien; How had nationalism changed between 1848 and 1871?

– Economic change – Prussian power vs Austrian weakness affecting the attitudes of other states and making military success possible.

– Political change and the weakness of rivals- Prussian ambition and change (political, economic, military) vs Austrian decline; attitudes of other German states (north and south).

– The role of the Prussian Army – technology and tactics – Moltke’s use of railways and Prussian steel.

– The role of Bismarck’s diplomacy in enabling Prussia to overcome international barriers (e.g. role of Russia) isolate its enemies (e.g. Denmark, Austria and then France); his role in ‘de-coupling’ liberalism and nationalism; his use of nationalist sentiment to further Prussian ambition. The role of other Prussian agents – e.g. Helmut von Moltke (the elder); Rudolf von Delbruck; Albrecht von Roon; William I.

How important was nationalism compared to these other factors? All of these factors contributed, but what is their relative importance? Was nationalism, Bismarck/ Economic change/political change/the Prussian army more important? Equally important? Less important? Most causes are necessary but not sufficient by themselves. Could unification have been achieved without any one of these? Which was the least important? Which was the most?

You should always seek to explore the debate – therefore a two handed strategy usually works best:

Introduction – outline debate and give line of argument (e.g. on the one hand… on the other… but x was decisive etc.)

On the one hand – factors or range of factors that are probably not decisive – 1-3 paragraphs

On the other hand – the factor(s) you think are decisive 1-3 paragraphs

Conclusion – re-statement of line of argument and decisive considerations.

Read through the questions at the beginning and think about other possible formulations of question on this topic before the exam.

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