Youth transitions and social inclusion Outcomes and determinants of transition policies in Austria Early draft. Please do not cite – comments are welcome! Abstract Youth unemployment is very low in Austria and school-to-work transitions are in general rather smooth. However, youth transitions are rather stratified, the social background of young people has a strong effect on their chances of successful transitions. Against the background of an overall favourable situation, disadvantaged groups are at a high risk of social exclusion. While overall youth unemployment strongly depends on macro-economic context conditions, disadvantages and social exclusion are often the outcome of the institutional structure of transition policies. This paper argues that it is necessary to take a more differentiated view on transitions policies and the interactions between the education system and labour market policies. The analysis shows that Austria has a rather internally-fragmented transition regime with a strong focus on remedial measures. Although social exclusion for young people in Austria is mainly produced by the selective and stratified education system, the problem is almost exclusively addressed via labour market policies. The simultaneous existence of reform dynamics and impediments within one transition regime seems possible. In order to explore this imbalance and its reform potential, the paper argues that beneath “big pictures” (e.g. varieties of capitalism) there might be diverging logics within sub- fields of transition policies. In borrowing from comparative welfare state research, potential causal factors such as electoral
Transcript
Youth transitions and social inclusion
Outcomes and determinants of transition policies in Austria
Early draft. Please do not cite – comments are welcome!
Abstract
Youth unemployment is very low in Austria and school-to-work transitions are in general
rather smooth. However, youth transitions are rather stratified, the social background of
young people has a strong effect on their chances of successful transitions. Against the
background of an overall favourable situation, disadvantaged groups are at a high risk of
social exclusion. While overall youth unemployment strongly depends on macro-economic
context conditions, disadvantages and social exclusion are often the outcome of the
institutional structure of transition policies. This paper argues that it is necessary to take a
more differentiated view on transitions policies and the interactions between the education
system and labour market policies. The analysis shows that Austria has a rather internally-
fragmented transition regime with a strong focus on remedial measures. Although social
exclusion for young people in Austria is mainly produced by the selective and stratified
education system, the problem is almost exclusively addressed via labour market policies.
The simultaneous existence of reform dynamics and impediments within one transition
regime seems possible. In order to explore this imbalance and its reform potential, the paper
argues that beneath “big pictures” (e.g. varieties of capitalism) there might be diverging
logics within sub-fields of transition policies. In borrowing from comparative welfare state
research, potential causal factors such as electoral incentives, veto points and path
dependency are discussed. Preliminary findings for Austria suggest that a strong
partisan/federalist logic has largely impeded reforms in the education system. On the other
hand, the corporatist/centralist logic of active labour market policies has left more room for
action to support disadvantages of young people. Although there has been considerable
policy effort to address social exclusion of young people, this imbalance has led to mostly
Empirical research on the basis of survey data however showed that there are
considerable cross-national differences in the degree that unemployment and precarious
work leads to social exclusion (Paugam/Russel 2004, Gallie/Paugam 2004). Social status
and social relations of individuals are much less affected by precarious work and
unemployment in countries where unemployment has been more widespread and
conventionally regarded as the consequence of low economic development. Although
material living standards of unemployed people in these countries are usually low, they affect
integration in social networks to a lesser degree. On the other hand, in those countries where
the majority population is still rather well integrated into labour markets, unemployment often
leads to stigmatization, loss of social status and strain on social relations.
Aside from cultural factors Gallie and Paugam (2004) locate the likelihood of such
cumulative deprivation in the predominant model of social regulation of unemployment.
Particularly in those countries, where social status and social rights are heavily tied to the
employment and occupational position – which is the case in continental welfare states like
Austria – social exclusion risks for unemployed might be very high. It can also be argued that
for young people in such countries entering the labour market and becoming economically
independent is of specific importance in obtaining a full citizenship status, including access to
social rights.
The paper therefore argues, that paradoxically the low overall level of youth
unemployment together with the strong employment-focus of the Austrian welfare state are
likely to increase social exclusion risks for those young people that have difficulties entering
the labour market.
2.2 Transition policies and regimes
Transitions from youth to adulthood are structured not only by individual decisions but
primarily by social expectations and structures (Kohli 2003, Fend 1994, Cain/Leonard 209).
Regulations on the duration of compulsory schooling, the minimum age of entering the labour
market or for receiving social assistance benefits are examples of institutionalized societal
expectations on “normal” youth transitions. Characteristics of the education system, labour
market regulations and social policies shape “average” transitions patterns as well as
individual paths to a considerable degree (Bois-Raymond/Lopez Blasco 2003, Reiter/Craig
2005). While the overall rate of youth unemployment is highly determined by the overall
macro-economic context, social exclusion is produced by the complex interaction of
institutional settings and policies – in the case of youth transitions mainly the education
system and labour market policies.
Against the background of recent socio-economic developments inclusive and coherent
education and labour market policies might be increasingly necessary to assist youth
transitions. However, the structure and interaction of education and social policies can also
produce disadvantages and exclusion risks for specific groups. It can be expected that
different national “transition policy regimes” have different outcomes not only in terms of
facilitating overall youth transitions but also on the relative position of disadvantaged groups.
Most research has either focused only on one particular sub-field, e.g. active labour market
policies or very broad perspectives on “youth policies” (Wallace/Bendit 2009).
The furthest attempt to classify transition policies focussing especially on
disadvantages for young people can be found at Walther/Pohl (2005, for Austria: Steiner
2005). Several European transition regimes are classified based on the main characteristics
of school and training systems, labour market organisation, the main provider(s) of social
security, the degree of female employment, main explanation of youth unemployment and
prevailing concepts of youth. The authors show that different policy mixes do indeed produce
different outcomes, especially regarding disadvantaged groups.
However, in order to fully grasp the interaction between different policy areas in
producing or preventing social exclusion as well as scope for political action, a closer look on
the underlying logics of different policy areas within transition regimes seems necessary.
2.3 Explaining cross-national variety in transition policies
Most research on youth transitions, even from comparative perspectives, has remained
rather descriptive or focused on effects of policies on social outcomes (see also
Buesemeyer/Trampusch 2011 on a review of research on education policy). There has been
little attempt to explain national varieties in transition policy regimes or discrepancies in
reform success in one area compared to reform impediments in another – e.g. In the area of
education policy vs. youth labour market policies.
Approaches that do discuss explanatory factors for policy development have often
remained limited to individual policy areas, most importantly vocational education and
training systems, where “varieties of capitalism” approaches have been dominant (Soskice
1999). From a neo-institutionalist perspectives it is argued that the respective institutional
context matters for company’s and employee’s educational and training decisions and
respective strategies that lead to the development of specific “skill formation systems” (e.g.
the prevalence of apprenticeship systems in coordinated market economies like Austria) (see
also a recent compilation on VET policies edited by Busemeyer/Trampusch 2012).
These perspectives do provide important insights in the general complementarities
between industrial relations, training systems and welfare policies but they remain rather
general and distinguish only between liberal and coordinated market economies.
In order to discover specific logics within transition regimes it might be useful to look at
theoretical findings of comparative welfare state analysis. Although theoretical and empirical
research on causal mechanisms for social policies is rather advanced, education and (to a
lesser extent) labour market policies have been rarely addressed (Buesemeyer/Trampusch
2011). Education is often not even regarded as part of social policy, irrespective of its
influence on shaping social outcomes and status positions (Opielka 2011).
Classical research in the area of comparative welfare state analysis has been sought to
determine causal factors for the emergence, expansion and cross-country variation in the
expansion of welfare states in Western countries (Esping-Andersen 1990, Huber et al. 1993).
Instead of being solely the outcome of socioeconomic conditions (e.g. industrialization,
economic development), welfare state regimes are said to be structured by the dominant
distribution of power between major social actors, especially trade unions, employer
organisations and political parties. Other perspectives have highlighted the importance of
institutions that filter external and internal pressures and may enhance or prevent
possibilities to reform (Immergut 1992).
Later research found that in the contemporary context of fiscal austerity and welfare
state cut-backs different factors play a role for policy reform (Pierson 2001). Two spheres are
often highlighted that might be useful to analyse reform dynamics of transition regimes: the
importance of electoral politics and the characteristics of political institutions (and different
degrees of institutional “stickiness”).
The first perspective argues that politicians have rather short-term horizon and are
conscious of the possibility that they are punished by voters for unpopular reforms. Voters
are said to exhibit a strong “negativity” bias and are more afraid of potential losses than
eager on potential gains. Concentrated losses for specific groups are also perceived much
stronger than diffuse benefits for the majority of the population. To reform the status-quo is
particularly difficult in areas that affect the majority of the population (either directly from
receiving benefits or by building expectations on future benefits) (Pierson 2001).
Impediments for reform can also come from “institutional stickiness” of the respective
program. One perspective argues, that the capacity of governments to steer political
developments depends on the concentration of power which is shaped by institutional “rules
of the game”. Institutions determine how much influence oppositional parties, external groups
and other levels of government have. Determining the existence of so-called veto points
(Immergut 1992, Tsebelis 1995, Bonoli 2001) allows to assess how easy reform initiatives
can be blocked. Possible veto points are for example the need to form a coalition
government, the possibility of referenda, strong federalism, etc. Concentration of power and
the existence of veto points influences the political strategies that governments adapt to steer
their initiatives. In fragmented systems governments often include external interests in policy
making in order to prevent reform blockages. However, this usually involves negotiation and
quid-pro-quo offers and can slow reform processes (Bonoli 2001)
Aside from veto points in the decision-making process, the respective policy area can
itself display certain resistance to reform or path dependency. Original decisions on the
design of a specific program are likely to create lock-in effects in the long run and prevent
future path changes (Pierson 2001).
Although these theoretical arguments have been developed mainly for the politics of
large transfer programs (e.g. pensions), electoral incentives, veto points and path
dependency might be useful to analyse reform dynamics and impediments in the area of
education and labour market policies as well (see chapter 4).
The next two chapters will use these theoretical findings as a starting point in order to
assess the case of transition policies in Austria. The next chapter will give an overview over
the interaction and outcomes of transition policies and its main strengths and weaknesses in
terms of social inclusion of young people. The last chapter will address recent reform
initiatives and discuss potential explanations for different reform dynamics.
3 Youth transition in Austria
3.1 Transition policies
a) Education system
The Austrian education system is characterized by its segmentation in a variety of
different vocational (VET) and general educational tracks at the lower and upper secondary
level. After four years of primary school the first separation in different tracks occurs at the
comparatively early age of 10 years. Compulsory schooling lasts 9 years in Austria which is
somewhat lower than in most European countries.
Between the ages of 10 and 14 children either attend lower secondary school
(Hauptschule) or level I of academic secondary school (Gymnasium). The selection is mostly
based on primary school grades and recommendations of school teachers. The second
separation takes place at the age of 14. Possible tracks are:
one year pre-vocational school (prior to apprenticeships)
company-based apprenticeship (for those with already 9 years compulsory
schooling),
VET schools or VET colleges
Academic secondary schools (level II)
Vocational education and training has a long tradition in Austria. In 2010 about 73 per
cent of all pupils at grade 10 have chosen a vocational track (EU-average about 50 per cent)
(BMUKK 2011). What distinguishes Austria from other countries with a strong focus on
apprenticeships is the existence of two parallel tracks of VET at upper secondary level:
company-based training tracks (apprenticeships, dual-system) and school-based vocational
education (VET schools and colleges).
About 40 per cent of each year’s 10th graders choose to start company-based or “dual”
apprenticeship. Apprentices spend 80 per cent of the training time in training company and
20 per cent in a part-time vocational school and receive a monthly remuneration. Trainings
last between 2 and 4 years and ends with a so-called apprenticeship leave examination,
which gives access to specific occupations in Austria’s strictly regulated occupational
system.
School-based vocational education takes place in VET schools (berufsbildende mittlere
Schule) and VET colleges (berufsbildende höhere Schulen). Students spend about 90 per
cent of their time in school and 10 per cent in practice (internships etc.). VET schools last 3-4
years and offer access to specific regulated professional activities (similar to
apprenticeships). VET colleges last 5 years and award a double qualification: in addition to a
VET diploma for higher specialised occupations they also give access to tertiary education
(for a more detailed overview see Tritscher-Archan/Nowak 2011).
Graduates from lower secondary schools and academic secondary schools show clearly
differentiated educational paths (for details see Wintersteller 2009, BMUSKK 2011). There is
no core curriculum for different tracks of upper secondary educational level and only
academic secondary school and VET colleges provide direct access to tertiary education
(“Matura”-exam). Although graduates from lower secondary school have the possibility to
change to academic secondary school (level II) or VET colleges, in practice the rate is rather
low. Only 37 per cent of lower secondary school graduates change to educational tracks that
lead to a Matura compared to 92 per cent of the graduates from academic secondary
schools (level I) (BMUKK 2011).
This selective distribution of students in different tracks shows that educational “choice”
made at the age of 10 highly determines the probability of having access to tertiary education
later on. Horizontal mobility is possible, but as the data shows limited in practice. This has
not only been criticized from a social inclusion perspective but in terms of overall
disappointing educational outcomes. The PISA studies clearly showed countries where the
education system reduces inequality of social backgrounds (usually by comprehensive
schooling) have better average outcomes than (mostly German-speaking) countries with high
inequality in educational opportunities (Eder 2009). These results did trigger a reform
process in Austria, but progress to introduce comprehensive schooling from the age of 10 to
14 (“new middle schools”) has been limited (see next chapter).
b) Labour market policies
Although levels of youth unemployment (and unemployment in general) have been lower
than in other European countries in the past decades, youth unemployment has been an
important political concern in Austria (Lassnigg 1999, Mayer 1997). Since the so-called
“apprenticeship crisis” in the second part of the 1990s the main concern of youth labour
market policies has been to assure adequate supply of apprenticeship training positions
(Dornmayr/WIeser 2010). The range of measures has been broadened since, but the focus
remains of providing (mainly company-based) apprenticeship training.
A considerable share of labour market policies for young people consists in financial
subsidies for companies that offer apprenticeship training. There are also some additional
subsidies for training girls in male-oriented occupations or providing training positions for
disadvantaged groups (people with low educational outcomes, difficult social background,
various forms of disability etc.) (Schneeberger 2009).
Due to the decreasing supply of training positions, a supra-company scheme of
apprenticeships has been introduced in the end of the 1990s. This scheme has been
expanded several times and finally formalized in 2008, now called “Training guarantee for
15-18 year olds”. It provides training in supra-company training centres for all graduates from
compulsory education who cannot find a company-based apprenticeship position. Although it
is now possible to finish the whole apprenticeship in these training centre, the aim is still to
transfer apprentices to regular company-based training. Supra-company training provides
important entries into training for disadvantaged groups (often with migration background),
but there are some concern about the general lower reputation of such training and reduced
labour market chances for graduates (for a recent evaluation see Bergmann et al. 2011).
In order to increase reputation of apprenticeship training and to increase permeability it
is now possible to combine apprenticeship training with general qualification for university
access (Lehre + Matura). Graduates from apprenticeship training can also take extra courses
to pass a processional baccalaureate that gives access to tertiary education (Berufsmatura).
A second strand of labour market policies for young people has been support for school
or apprenticeship drop-outs. Measures include a (cost-free) second chance to receive lower
secondary education degree, other pre-vocational and preparatory measures, job coaching,
production schools etc. Young people between 19-24 who cannot be placed directly are
guaranteed to receive a qualification or employment offer within 6 months after registering
with PES (Aktion Zukunft Jugendliche).
The strong focus of labour market policies on supporting apprenticeship training as well
as on the younger age group is visible in spending shares. In 2010 teenagers from 15 to 19
years “received” 22 per cent of the total budget, while their share of all registered
unemployed is only about 6 per cent. Spending on 20 to 24 year olds, who represent about
15 per cent of all registered job seekers, amounts to about 14 per cent of the total budget.
Almost half of all expenses for 15 to 19 year-olds were spent on supra-company training and
integrative training (AMS 2011, BMASK 2011).
3.2 Outcomes
3.2.1 Youth transitions in comparison 1
From a comparative perspective, the employment situation of young people in Austria is
very favourable. Austria has currently the second-lowest youth unemployment rate in the
European Union. 8,3 per cent of all young people between 15 and 24 (who are not in
education) are unemployed compared to 21,4 per cent on average in the European Union.
1 If not stated otherwise data is from Eurostat database
Although the recent economic crisis did hit the Austrian youth labour market, from 2008 to
2009 youth unemployment “only” increased by 2,0 percentage points compared to 4,2
percentage points in the European average. On average it takes young people 3,4 months to
find their first job after leaving formal education (EU-27: 4 months). The share of young
people in fixed-term employment is 37 per cent compared to 42,5 per cent in the EU.
In general, school-to-work transitions for Austrian youth seem rather uncomplicated and
the incidence of precarious employment is (although increasing) still lower than in the
European average. Austria also holds rather good positions regarding formal educational
attainment. 86 per cent of young people in the age of 20-24 years have at least higher
secondary educational attainment (EU-27: 78,6 per cent, 2009). The share of early school
leavers is 8,3 per cent and the share of young people neither in employment, education or
training (NEET) 6,9 per cent (compared to 13,5 per cent and 12,9 per cent at the EU-
average).
However, from a longer term perspective youth unemployment is clearly an increasing
phenomenon. Between 2000 and 2005 the youth unemployment rate doubled from 5,3 per
cent to 10,3 per cent (a similar increase has not been measured in total unemployment
during this period). Youth unemployment has since then fluctuated between 8-10%. Although
data are not completely comparable before and after 2004, there are indications that the
distance between unemployment risks for the young and the population in general has
increased (Statistik Austria 2011). From the 1970s to the 1990s youth unemployment has
remained on average about 1,5 percentage points higher than total unemployment
(according to the Austrian definition of unemployment). Eurostat data shows that the average
distance between youth and adult unemployment (25-64 year olds) increased from 2,0
percentage points between 1996-2000 to 5,1 percentage points between 2006-2010.
Data on the de-standardisation of employment suggests similar findings. In general
atypical employment has spread less in Austria than in other European countries, but it is
clearly concentrated on young people. Out of all young adults (15-34 years old), who entered
the labour market between the end of the 1990s and the second quarter of 2009, 27 per cent
were atypically employed in first job (Statistik Austria 2011). If taking into account all
employment of young people, 37 per cent had a fixed-term contract compared to only 5 per
cent of the 25 to 64 year olds (Eurostat).
3.2.2 Youth transitions from a social inclusion perspective
However, despite the overall favourable situation, labour market chances and risks are
clearly unequally distributed among young people. Educational level and social background
(income, occupation and ethnic origin) are the most important dimensions predicting labour
market opportunities of young people in Austria.
Educational attainment clearly determines labour market chances. In contrast to other
countries where unemployment risks are also high for persons with higher educational level
in Austria they are strongly concentrated on those with low educational attainment. In 2009
13 per cent of young people with lower secondary education or less were unemployment
compared to only 4 per cent of graduates from tertiary education (Statistik Austria 2010).
Young people with low education need on average 5 months longer to find their first job than
graduates from universities. Austria has the fifth highest difference in job search duration
between low and high skilled youth (Eurostat)2. Education matters highly for later incomes.
In Austria the difference in income levels between those with highest and those with lowest
educational level is the highest in the European Union (Lassnigg/Vogtenhuber 2009b).
These strong nexus between educational level and employment chances has important
consequences for social exclusion risks for those with low education. However, it seems that
in Austria educational attainment is less a question of meritocracy, but of “inheritance”.
Educational choice and attainment is strongly passed-on form one generation to the next.
Education, occupation and income of the parents highly determine educational attainment of
children; social mobility between generations is low in Austria (Lassnigg/Vogtenhuber 2009c,
Statistik Austria 2010, Bacher 2008, 531, Bacher/Tametsberger 2011, Schreiner 2009).
Fessler et al (2012) found that of all European countries and the US Austria holds the
third rank on persistence of educational attainment. In a comparative study based on PISA
outcomes Field et al (2007) similarly find that Austria belongs to those countries where
differences between schools (less within-schools) are large and to a high degree linked to
the socio-economic background the students and their peers (group effects). Austria is found
to have the fifth highest degree of social differentiation in the education system of all OECD
member states according to PISA outcomes (OECD 2010, OECD 2012).
Disadvantages from a social background are not compensated in the education system
but instead reinforced by the early and repeated selection processes within the secondary
educational level (Lassnigg/Vogtenhuber 2009d, Pechar 2010). Although tertiary education is
cost free and theoretically accessible for early school leavers and apprentices via external
entrance examinations the shares on incoming students confirm the high determination of
school careers at a very early age. Only 3 per cent of new university students and 7 per cent
of entrants in tertiary vocational education enter via external exams. The overwhelming
majority of university students are – apart from foreign students – graduates of academic
secondary schools or VET colleges (Wintersteller 2009).
2 For further data on labour market chances for young people with low educational attainment see Dornmayr et al 2006, Gregoritsch et al. 2009, Bacher/Tamesberger 2011.
These educational and labour market disadvantages are highly coupled for young
people with migration background. 53 per cent of young people (15-34 years) with migration
background reach only lower secondary education, compared to 14 per cent without
migration background (Statistik Austria 2010). Early school leaving is also more concentrated
on young people with migration background: about 23 per cent of the first generation and 15
per cent of the second generation compared to 6 per cent of young people without migration
background drop out of school before end of secondary level. Although young people with
migration background chose more often vocational education then general education tracks,
they are underrepresented in apprenticeship training. Other indicators also show that
educational participation of young people of the second generation has increased but there is
still considerable distance to young people without migration background
Weiß/Unterwurzacher (2007) found that cultural factors play some role in educational
choices of young people with migration background, but that similarly to Austrian children it is
mainly income and occupation of parents that determine educational outcomes.
These educational disadvantages have clear negative effects on labour market chances.
Data for the second quarter of 2009 shows that the unemployment rate for young people with
foreign citizenship was 11 per cent compared to 6 per cent for people with Austrian
citizenship. Only about 43 per cent of young people with migration background achieve a fast
transition into first job (max. three months to first stable job), compared to 72 per cent without
migration background (Statistik Austria 2010).
Aside from social background, there are also important gender differences, although
these stem only partly from the education system and more from the organisation of the
labour market which exhibits a srong gender division in occupations and pay levels.
After considerable educational expansion since the 1970s educational qualifications of
young women are now on average higher than for young men. However, transitions from
school to employment seem more complicated for young women. Although unemployment
for young women has been only slightly higher than for young men, only 55 per cent find
their first job after school within three months, compared to 76 per cent of young men. For 13
per cent of young women the first job is on temporary basis, compared to 6 per cent of young
men (Statistik Austria 2011). School choices also display strong gender differences in
Austria. Girls are clearly underrepresented in male-dominated vocational training tracks
(technical and production oriented apprenticeships) and over-represented in VET schools
and colleges (especially in social and economic disciplines). Although women are the only
group that could significantly increase their education participation and qualification level
since the 1970s, this did not lead to more income equality in Austria. Women do earn on
average only about 60 per cent of male yearly income in all educational. Together with
Germany, Switzerland and United Kingdom Austria has the highest gender pay gap – in all
educational levels (Lassnigg/Vogtenhuber 2009b).
4 Austrian transition policy and diverging logics
4.1 Transition regime in Austria
Empirical findings presented in the previous chapters clearly show an ambivalent
pricture of youth transitions in Austria. The overall situation is – especially from a
comparative perspective and despite the crisis – rather favourable. Youth unemployment has
remained one of the lowest in Europe. In international assessments Austria is often
presented as a best practice example for successful school-to-work transitions (Quintini et al
2006, Scarpetta et al 2010).
Apart from the overall favourable economic and labour market conditions the strong
tradition of vocational education and training has been easing labour market entry for a
considerable share of young people. The existence of a parallel system of company-based
apprenticeship training and school-based training schemes provides wide range of vocational
tracks for different areas and skill-levels (Graf et al 2012, Walther/Pohl 2005, Steiner 2005,
Graf et al 2012, 150, European Commission 2012, OECD 2010, Dornmayer/Wieser 2010,
Hoeckl 2010). Although there are clear signs of decreasing willingness of employers to
provide apprenticeship training, public responsibility to address youth unemployment and
integrate disadvantaged youth – if necessary via supra-company vocational training – is still
high.
While in some countries unemployment is a “normal” interim status in the transition from
school to work, in Austria most young people reach rather high educational attainment and
enter the labour market relatively easy. However, this beneficial situation also leads to a
higher risks of social exclusion for those who do not manage successful educational and
employment careers (Steiner 2005, Gallie/Paugam 2004). In their classification of Austrian
youth transition regime3 Walther/Pohl (2005) and Steiner (2005) argue that especially in
employment centred transition regimes youth unemployment is mostly perceived of as an
individual problem caused by socialization deficits (low skills and motivation).
However, labour market risks and affiliated risk of social exclusion of young people in
Austria to a large degree produced within the education system. The high degree of “social
3 Characteristics of employment-centred transition regimes are among others: a selective school system, standardised training mainly via companies, regulated and closed labour market, occupational segmentation of social positions, importance of state and family in social security provision, medium level of female employment, few alternatives of entrance and social security for disadvantaged youth, pre-vocational routes often not being accredited but stigmatised, social assistance is not universally accessible
inheritance” of educational attainment is largely the consequence of a strong status hierarchy
between and within general and vocational education tracks (visible in enrolment
requirements, future occupational possibilities and pay), the early age of the first selection
and the low permeability later on (Graf et al 2012).
The biggest challenge for Austrian transition policies in order to reduce exclusion risks
is therefore to mitigate the influence of social background on educational qualification and
the inclusion of people with migration background. However, these of disadvantages and
social exclusion of young people have not been addressed via educational reforms, but in a
rather compensatory way via active labour market policies. Both policy areas remain rather
detached and coordinated initiatives to reduce disadvantages remain limited.
In sum, chances for successful youth transitions are stratified in Austria. Exclusion risks
are not addressed in the education system where they are produced, but via labour market
via compensatory and second-chance measures.
The Austrian transition regime can therefore be defined as an internally fragmented
regime with a strong focus on remedial measures.
4.2 Recent reform dynamics
Recent reform proposals point to an overall increased problem awareness of inclusion
problems for young people in Austria. But movement towards more coherent, inclusive youth
transition policies has remained slow. Two recent reform processes4 illustrate the potential
existence of different logics underlying education and labour market policies.
Educational reforms have been a highly ideological controversy over the past century.
Critique of the segmented education system in Austria has been a long-standing issues.
Already in the 1902s the social democratic party intended to introduce a comprehensive
school for all 10 to 14 year olds. Conservative opposition has been fierce and successful. In
order to solve the long-standing controversy the two main parties gave the status quo
constitutional status in 1962. Since then any reform touching on the structure of the
education system need a two-third majority. Reform initiatives in favour of comprehensive
schooling in the 1970s only led to school experiments and subsequent reform of lower
secondary schools without joining them with academic secondary schools.
The rather unfavourable educational outcomes measured by the PISA study in 2003
brought the issue back to the agenda. After the Social Democratic party came to power again
in 2006 (in coalition with Christian Democrats), their education minister proposed far-
reaching educational reform with compulsory schooling as a centrepiece. The initiative has
4 As analytical research on education policy in Austria is rare, information of this section is based on media coverage (Austrian Press Agency)
been supported by a broad coalition of actors comprised of all social partners, most
education experts and progressive media. However, Christian Democrats opposition against
joining the two tracks of lower secondary level has been fundamental (even against the term
“comprehensive school” itself). This has been supported by conservative media, some
catholic groups and most importantly parts of academic school teacher unions (whose leader
figured as education spokesman and chief negotiator for the Christian Democrats). The
provinces, whose consensus was needed in order to implement the reform, reacted mostly
according to party colour of their governments, but also displayed additional particularistic
interests regarding regulation and financing.
Although Social Democrats were finally successful in introducing and extending the
school experiment of “new middle schools” to all lower secondary schools, the Christian
Democrats successfully prevented the unification of the segregated education system.
Although the access of “new middle school” graduates to upper level of academic secondary
schools has been expanded, the academic secondary schools remain untouched. The
current outcome are even more (regionally) fragmented regulations for the lower level of
secondary education and no comprehensive schooling for all 10-14.
In comparison, labour market policies show a rather high activity rate to mitigate
disadvantages for vulnerable groups. Most reform efforts in the area of labour market policies
for young people are based on prior social partner consultations (e.g. the training guarantee
for all 15-18 year olds in 2008). Funding has increased in recent years, mostly to subsidise
company-based apprenticeship training and providing supra-company apprenticeship
positions. But there was also a range of experimental measures in the area of counselling
and qualification. There are some controversies if focus should be providing more incentives
or putting more pressure on companies to train (e.g. via a compulsory training fund) or
extending supra-company training (Schneeberger 2009, Tritscher-Archan 2011, Graf et al.
2012). However, overall there seems to be a high consensus that labour market policies
should address social exclusion risk of young people. There are much less controversies on
the course of action compared to the education system.
4.3 Logics and determinants
How can these differences in reform dynamics and impediments be explained? Graf et
al (2012) highlighted different political logics of policy-making in school-based VET vis-à-vis
company-based apprenticeship training in Austria. In taking this as a starting point this
section discusses in how far the policy areas education system and labour market policies
differ in their underlying “logic” and if this matters for reform probability. However, due to
limited existing research on this area, this section will remain a preliminary and discussion of
potential factors for the case of Austria
Considerations of comparative welfare state research on electoral politics, veto points
and path dependency as important factors enabling or preventing reforms seem a fruitful
starting point to explore causal mechanisms within the Austrian transition regime. However,
when adopting such findings it should be kept in mind that most theories where developed
and tested for large social transfer programs especially pension system. Education and
labour market policies are mostly social services not transfers. Interests of political parties
and organized interests may diverge from findings from pension politics. Issues at stake
might be more complex than questions of more or less social spending, more or less
generous benefits. Similarly the distributional impact of educational reform is often more
complex. Composition of reform coalitions might not follow conventional pro- or anti-welfare
cleavages, where unions are in favour of welfare state expansion and employers against.
Employers might approve of reforms that benefit disadvantaged groups if these
accommodates their strategically interests (e.g. public spending on human capital formation),
as the varieties of capitalism literature suggests (Soskice 1999). On the other hand, unions
are not necessarily very active in promoting policies that benefit others than their core
membership base (where young people are often underrepresented). Similarly in a
comparative perspective the position of parties regarding transition policies might not be pre-
determined. A more exploratory approach regarding positions and reform coalitions might
therefore be necessary when analysing these still under-researched policy areas.
From a general perspective, some important veto points can be discovered in Austria’s
policy-making system. The representative electoral rule leads to a predominance of coalition-
governments. Although bicameralism does not play an important role, the Federal States to
exert considerable influence via political parties and via public administration and the
bureaucracy. In many policy areas unitary government action is impeded by fragmented
responsibilities and complex regulations regarding decision-making, implementation and
financing. Representatives of employers and employees are highly organized, closely linked
to political parties and to a high degree included in policy-making processes. In some areas
corporatist policy making partly replaces parliamentary politics. The dominant policy-making
style in social and labour market policies has traditionally been rather consensual (with the
exception of the years 2000-2006) (Tálos/Obinger 2010).
Although the responsibility for the school sector is highly centralized, the Ministry of
Education shares considerable responsibilities with the nine federal states (via the regional
school boards). Responsibilities and regulation regarding decision-making, implementation
and financing differ strongly between education level but also between school types on
secondary level. Regulation is rather strong. A further veto-point has been created by the
constitutional status of the structure of the school system (that requires a two-third majority to
change). In this highly fragmented institutional arrangement consensus for reforms has to be
found between the two main political parties and all Federal States. Additionally, the trade
union of academic teachers exerts enormous influence on one of the two main parties and
on the public discourse. It can be regarded as an additional veto player (Graf et al. 2012,
Lassnigg 2009, Pechar 2010).
On the other hand, in labour market policy-making and the apprenticeship system the
involvement of social partners is high with less influence of the Federal States. The overall
responsibility for company-based vocational training lies with the Ministry of Economy, but
some administrative and decision-making responsibilities are delegated to social partners
(especially the Economic chamber). Labour market policies, including additional financial
support for apprenticeship training, is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labour. Implementation is the responsibility of the Public employment Service whose
decision-making boards composed of representatives from government, trade unions and
employer associations. The only veto players are the social partners, however regarding the
need to re-integrate disadvantaged groups their ideological distance seems relatively small
(Graf et al. 2012, Tritscher-Archan/Nowak 2011).
Regarding electoral incentives, it can be argued that reforms within the education
system need a longer time-horizon as possible outcomes will manifest with a considerable
time lag. This might provide policy-makers less possibilities for credit claiming and a
considerable potential risk of voter punishment. The importance of education systems in
allocating life chances and status positions might make educational reforms particularly
politicized, as practically the whole population is potentially concerned by reforms (via their
children). Future benefits for the general public might be diffuse, current losses for specific
groups more visible. Active framing of reform discourses might be therefore be particular
important.
In the recent education reform in Austria the middle class seemed to have been very
concerned about the future outcomes for their children. The public discourse has been
dominated to a large share by a small highly organized group (the teacher’s union) that
successfully captured middle class fear and presented the reform as distributional issue. In
the reform discourse both sides of reform campaigners and opponents have made strong
recourse to broader notions of social justice (equality of opportunity vs. “performance
fairness” and freedom of choice). Consensus could not even be reached on the “problem”
itself, even less on the measures to tackle it.
On the other hand, labour market policies have been much less prominent in public
discourse, as reforms concerned only specific groups. But as youth unemployment seems
broadly regarded as social ill in public opinion in Austria, credit claiming might be easier in
active labour market policies. Between participating actors (mostly social partners and Public
Employment Service) it was apparently easier to find a consensus on the origin of the
problem as well as the solution. The participating actors shared a broad consensus on the
importance of combating youth unemployment and the importance of the dual system of
vocational education to combat youth unemployment (Graf et al. 2012). Labour market
policies for young people have been less discussed as distributional issues, but as win-win-
situations (although there are controversies about the costs of financing measures).
Interestingly, both policy areas exhibit rather high path dependency. Although the
experimentation with new approaches seems easier in the area of labour market policies,
reforms did not touch the underlying structure of the dual system of apprenticeship training
(e.g. the strong orientation of apprenticeship training on manufacturing sectors). The clear
focus of labour market policies remained in supporting this system. “Institutional inertia in
apprenticeship is reinforced by the relative dominance of SMEs, which are more cost-
sensitive than large firms” (Graf et al. 2012, 157). While there might be consensus on the
need to support disadvantaged youth, the corporatist structure might not lead to a more
inclusive approach overcoming segmentation on the labour market (Walther/Pohl 2005, 14f).
As research on causal mechanisms underlying Austria’s education and labour market
policies is extremely limited, this discussion has been remained preliminary and partly
speculatively. Further research should be carried out on a more systematic approach and
information sources. It would also be very interesting to compare these findings with reform
dynamics within other national transition regimes.
However, for the Austrian case it seems fair to say that the two policy areas of education
policies and youth labour market policies do indeed follow to different logics. While the
education system is highly influenced by a “partisan/federalist” logic, labour market policies
exhibit a strong “corporatistic-centralist” logic. Although path dependency seems strong in
both areas, the room to implement supporting measures for disadvantaged groups is higher
in the area of labour market policies. As major social exclusion risks for young people are
primarily produced in the education system these findings might explain the rather remedial
strategy to fight social exclusion. Although much more effectiveness in reducing social
exclusion for young people can be expected of reforms that reduce the selective nature of
the Austrian education system, such reforms are confronted with considerable impediments.
5 Conclusion
The empirical evidence shows that although youth transitions are in general rather
smooth in Austria they are also rather stratified and highly determined by the social
background of young people. Education, occupation, income of their parents as well as
migration background play an important role. Within this overall favourable situation where a
majority rather easily enters the labour market the risk of social exclusion is particular high
for disadvantaged groups.
The analysis of the education system and the labour market showed that while in Austria
social exclusion of young people is mainly produced within the selective and segmented
education system, measures to address exclusion are almost exclusively undertaken in the
field of labour market policies.
Instead of simply classifying Austria as a successful transition regime, a closer look on
the interaction of transition polices shows that Austria has an internal-fragmented transition
regime with a strong focus on remedial strategies. The simultaneous existence of reform
dynamics and impediments within one transition regime seems possible.
In order to explore this imbalanced policy output and its reform potential, the paper
showed that there can be different logics within sub-fields of transition policies. In borrowing
from comparative welfare state research, potential causal factors such as electoral
incentives, veto points and path dependency have been discussed.
Preliminary findings for Austria are that the strongly partisan/federalist logics in the
education system has impeded reforms by and large. On the other hand, the
corporatist/centralist logic of active labour market policies has left more room for action to
support disadvantages of young people. Although there has been considerable policy effort
to address social exclusion of young people, this imbalance has led to mostly compensatory
and remedial measures.
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einer Governance-Reform am Beispiel des österreichischen Schulwesens, in:
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