Party Behaviour in Quebec: Ownership, Contagion, and
Multi-dimensionality of the National Question
ric Blanger
McGill University
Paper presented at the 2014 EPOP conference, University of
Edinburgh,
12-14 September.
1. Introduction
While the national question is very much on the agenda in
Scotland ever since the election of a first SNP government at
Holyrood in 2007, in Quebec the issue has experienced two decades
of slowly declining salience following the 1995 referendum defeat.
In some ways, the record-low electoral support recently received by
Quebecs two most prominent separatist parties the Parti Qubcois
(PQ) in the subnational election of 2014 (25.4%) and the Bloc
Qubcois (BQ) in the statewide election of 2011 (23.4% within the
province, representing only 6.1% of the Canada-wide vote) can be
interpreted as a symptom of a larger mobilization problem that
faces the nationalist movement in Quebec at the beginning of the
21st century.
Yet, political parties in Quebec still compete on the issue.
They still talk regularly about the national question, even if for
some of them it is to say that Quebecers need to focus on
priorities other than independence for the time being. Seeking or
preserving Quebecs autonomy within the Canadian union remains a
fundamental aspect of the parties discourse in the province. The
resilience of the national question as an electoral issue in Quebec
is understandable. It has underpinned the substate party system
ever since the socioeconomic and political modernization of the
province starting in the 1960s (Blanger and Nadeau 2009; Pelletier
2012). With the advent of the PQ, the first serious political party
advocating independence, the question has polarized the party
system around two poles: sovereigists gravitating towards the PQ
and federalists mainly represented by the Parti Libral du Qubec
(PLQ). In other words, the issue has structured the party system
for so long, it is no wonder why it is difficult for the parties to
get rid of it or to simply stop addressing it. Some of them might
even believe that they still benefit from the issue in that it
allows them to keep their core supporters mobilized. Even at the
state level, the question of the defense of Quebecs interests
continues to structure the competition between federal parties in
the province, especially since the arrival of the BQ in the 1993
election (Johnston 2008). Almost all statewide parties feel the
need to propose one form or another of collaborative approach to
Quebecers while the BQ continually tries to keep the idea of
political independence, or the very least autonomy, on the
agenda.
The purpose of this paper is to understand to extent to which
the national question still dominates party behaviour in Quebec,
and to analyse the ways in which substate and statewide parties
articulate their views on the national question and on its various
dimensions. In doing so, we pay special attention to whether
nationalist parties act as owners of the territorial issue and
whether the other parties discourse is contaminated by this issue,
in part as a reaction to the behaviour of nationalist parties. We
also pay attention to the behaviour of parties at the two levels of
government, that is, the substate (provincial) and state (federal)
levels.
The main source of data for this paper comes in the form of
semi-structured elite interviews with senior party officials. The
interviews, which were based on a series of questions organized
around the three themes of the national question the constitutional
issue, the identity issue and territorial interests were asked
consistently of each participant involved. Interviews were
conducted between February and December 2013 with at least one
member from the four most important parties on each level of
government in Quebec. This included Members of the National
Assembly (MNAs) for the Parti Qubcois, Parti Libral du Qubec,
Coalition Avenir Qubec (CAQ) and Qubec Solidaire (QS); in addition
to Quebec-elected Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ottawa for the
Bloc Qubcois, Liberal Party of Canada (LPC), Conservative Party of
Canada (CPC) and New Democratic Party (NDP), for a total of nine
interviews. (To help keep intact the anonymity of our interviewees,
we use the masculine throughout the paper when we report their
words even though we interviewed both men and women party
representatives.)
We first propose a brief account of the historical development
of the substate party system in Quebec and of its statewide
counterpart, leading up to the 2011-14 period that is the focus of
this Scotland-Quebec research project. We then assess the question
of issue ownership and contagion in the context of Quebec politics.
This is followed by a contemporary analysis of the three dimensions
of the national question based on our interview data: party
positions on the constitutional issue, on Quebec identity, and on
regional interests. We complete this analysis by examining the
multi-level dimension of the national question debate in Quebec. We
summarize our main findings regarding party behaviour in Quebec in
the papers concluding section.
2. Overview of the National Question in Quebec Politics
The roots of the contemporary substate party system in Quebec go
back to the 1960s and the rise of the national question that
accompanied this period of socioeconomic development in Quebec
(otherwise known as the Quiet Revolution). In 1968, former PLQ
member Ren Lvesque created a brand new party, the Parti Qubcois,
aimed at realizing the independence of Quebec. Upon taking power in
1976, the PQ ended a period of realignment in the provinces party
system (Lemieux, Blais and Gilbert 1970). The new two-party system
would be based around two clear alternatives: the secessionist PQ
and the federalist PLQ. As Premier, Lvesque was able in 1980 to
hold a first referendum on independence, asking Quebecers whether
they agreed to let the government negotiate a new political and
economic partnership with the rest of Canada what Lvesque called
sovereignty-association. In the end, the Yes campaign managed to
secure only 40% of support in the referendum.
The PLQ came back to power in 1985. Despite the referendum
defeat, the national question was still very much at the forefront
during Robert Bourassas Liberal governments years. In 1982, the
federal LPC government of Pierre Trudeau repatriated the Canadian
constitution from London without the Quebec governments consent.
The grievances that this decision created in Quebec allowed Brian
Mulroneys Conservative party to return to power in Ottawa in 1984
with the promise of reopening constitutional talks so as to satisfy
the Quebec governments demands. Premier Bourassa was thus able to
negotiate a new constitutional agreement with the rest of Canada
that would satisfy Quebecs demand of being formally recognized as a
distinct society within Canada, a new official status that had the
potential of granting the province additional or special powers.
Called the Meech Lake Accord, this agreement was signed in 1987 but
needed to be ratified by each of the provincial legislatures within
the next three years.
By the deadline of June 1990 the Meech Lake Accord was still
missing ratification by two of the ten provincial legislatures, and
so it became null. The failure of the Accord sparked a rise in
independence support among Quebecers, with public opinion polls
reporting clear majority support for this constitutional option
between 1990 and 1992 (Pinard, Bernier and Lemieux 1997; Yale and
Durand 2011). A second constitutional agreement, the Charlottetown
Accord, was rejected in a pan-Canadian referendum in October 1992.
By then, the path seemed cleared for a return of the PQ to power in
Quebec and for the holding of a second referendum on independence.
This is exactly what happened in 1994-95. The referendum battle of
October 1995 was closely fought, almost resulting in a draw: 49.4%
of Quebecers supported the option of sovereignty-partnership. The
PQ was re-elected in the 1998 provincial election but started to
experience a slow decline in its electoral support in the years
that followed. It briefly came back to power, with only a minority
of seats, during the period under study (2012-14) before being
voted out of office in the April 2014 election, receiving its
lowest support since 1970.
As can be seen, the PLQ clearly flirted with autonomy during the
1980s up till the spike in independence support that followed the
failure of Meech Lake. By then, Premier Bourassa had backed down on
autonomy but this decision left many nationalist members within the
PLQ deeply dissatisfied. In 1994 a splinter group decided to create
a new party, the Action Dmocratique du Qubec (ADQ), dedicated to
pursuing Quebecs political autonomy in place of the PLQ. Over the
years the ADQ came to take a number of controversial stances on the
questions of immigrant integration (arguing for a stricter model)
and governance (pushing for cutbacks in Quebecs welfare state and
questioning the interventionist model of economic development).
After several years of ups and downs (see Blanger and Nadeau 2009)
the ADQ finally decided in 2012 to merge with the Coalition Avenir
Qubec (CAQ) newly created by former PQ member Franois Legault.
Together with the PLQ, PQ and CAQ, a fourth party is currently
being represented in Quebecs National Assembly, namely Qubec
Solidaire (QS). This party was created in 2006 as a reaction to
what it perceived as a drift towards the socioeconomic right within
the Quebec party system, including within the traditionally
progressive PQ. While QS is in favour of Quebecs secession, its
main axis of competition thus remains the left-right dimension of
politics.
The national question has not evaded statewide parties either.
As underlined above, during the 1980s the Progressive Conservative
party (renamed Conservative Party of Canada in 2004) has sought to
respond positively to the province of Quebecs constitutional
demands but ultimately failed on that goal. Following the 1980
referendum the Liberals (LPC) have shown some willingness to renew
Canadian federalism although the end result of such reform, the
1982 Constitution Act, did not satisfy the government of Quebec
(who refused to endorse the Liberals repatriation project). Since
then, the LPCs stance on the national question has mostly been a
non-accommodative, or at best a dismissive, one. For its part, the
New Democratic Party (NDP) has shown openness to Quebecs demands
for more autonomy. Although the NDP has never been into power and
thus has yet to be in a position to act on this issue, this more
accommodative stance has nonetheless informed the partys discourse
over the years. The fourth and final competitor in the state-level
party system is the Bloc Qubcois. Ever since its creation in 1990
as a direct reaction to the Meech Lake Accord collapse, the BQ has
acted as the owner of the national question in Ottawa, as much
promoting independence as defending Quebecs regional interests in
the Canadian Parliament (Nol 1994; Young and Blanger 2008).
3. Issue Ownership and the Contagion Effect
Our analysis of party behaviour in this project is guided by
specific theoretical expectations about the competitive behaviour
of parties. The first two of these hypotheses need to be addressed
in the context of the historical evolution of the party systems
that we have just started to describe in the previous section. To
recall, the first hypothesis stipulates that nationalist parties
own the national question in substate politics; and the second
hypothesis suggests that nationalist parties have a contagion
effect on other parties in the substate party system. Does the
Quebec case conform to these expectations?
To a large extent, it does. Ever since its creation in 1968, the
PQ has acted as the owner of the national question issue. The
nationalist party has acted as the clear catalyst, to the extent
that the two-party competition at the substate level in Quebec has
realigned from a PLQ-Union Nationale[footnoteRef:1] competition to
a PLQ-PQ one polarized around the national question, and
particularly around its constitutional dimension. The new PLQ-PQ
duopoly that emerged during the 1970s is still more or less in
place today, although the PQ has started to show signs of weakness
over the past decade and a number of new parties have appeared on
the provincial scene (but have yet to really break through
electorally speaking). [1: The Union National was a right-leaning
autonomist party that held power in Quebec for large periods
between 1936 and 1970 (mostly under Maurice Duplessis leadership).
It quickly vanished at the end of the 1970s once the PQ broke
through the party system.]
In addition, it can be argued that the PQ has led to a contagion
of the other subnational parties, but more so during the periods
surrounding the two independence referendums. By the end of the
1980s the PLQ had very much become an autonomist party. But, when
faced with the failure of constitutional talks, the PLQ stopped
pushing for more autonomy, a decision that led to the defection of
its more nationalist members who went on to create the ADQ (which
would eventually merge with the CAQ). In more recent years the PQ
continued to be a catalyst, with the newly created QS and Option
Nationale[footnoteRef:2] acting as sovereignist alternatives to the
PQ. [2: Option Nationale is a splinter party created in 2011 by
former PQ MNA Jean-Martin Aussant, who felt that the PQ was not
pushing hard enough for independence. The new party received 1.9%
and 0.8% of the vote in the 2012 and 2014 provincial elections and
has no representation in the National Assembly (hence the reason
why we do not consider Option Nationale in our analysis).]
At the state level, there is less competition for party
ownership of the national question, and there is less contagion as
well. There is one clear nationalist party in the federal party
system, the Bloc Qubcois. The BQs ownership of the national
question is less contested that what we observe at the substate
level with the PQ. In fact, the competition at the state level has
revolved more around the dimension of territorial interests; and it
has actually been the case long before the arrival of the BQ on the
federal scene. For most of the 20th century, the LPC has claimed to
be the best defender of French-Canadians interests in Ottawa. And
indeed, Quebecers have regularly voted in masse for the Liberals
before the adoption of the 1982 Constitution Act. After 1982, this
block support shifted over to the Conservatives as a reaction to
the Trudeau governments repatriation of the constitution and the
willingness of Conservative leader Brian Mulroney to accommodate
Quebecs demands by negotiating a new constitutional act. Following
the failure of those negotiations, Quebecers shifted again their
support, this time to the newly created BQ. The Bloc Qubcois has
been dominant in the province until the 2011 election, where
Quebecers decided to abandon it and vote massively in favour of the
NDP, in a vote that seemed more driven by left-right considerations
than by the national question itself (Fournier et al. 2013).
In sum, while there was no real nationalist catalyst in the
federal party system until 1990, the debate over the national
question at the substate level nonetheless spilled over to the
statewide party system to a limited extent, although it mostly
involved the issues of autonomy and regional interests. Once a
nationalist issue owner appeared on the scene, its contagion effect
remained limited in the sense that its existence led some statewide
parties (the NDP and, to a lesser extent, the CPC) to defend a more
accommodative approach towards Quebec, although only the NDP
appears (timidly) open to the idea of more autonomy for the
province.
The next four sections directly put to the test our third and
last hypothesis which posits that the national question has become
a multiple-ordering dimension, which supersedes and structures
other cleavages in the party system. They will also allow us to
flesh out a bit more the various parties current stances on the
national question within the Quebec context.
4. The Constitutional Issue
The first dimension of the national question that deserves
attention is the position of the various political parties on the
current and future constitutional status of Quebec. Is there
disagreement (or polarization) among the parties stances on this
aspect? Or does it take on characteristics of a valence issue?
On surface, there is no denying the fact that there is a clear
polarization among substate parties on the question of whether the
province of Quebec should separate from the rest of Canada. As the
PQ representative states: Lobjectif du Parti Qubcois, sa raison
dtre, cest de faire lindpendance politique du Qubec (interview, 15
August 2013). On the other hand, the Liberal MNA claims that his
party demeure une option fdraliste lintrieur de lAssemble
nationale, alors notre prfrence est toujours de maintenir le lien
avec le Canada (interview, 13 May 2013). The latter even goes as
far as saying that his involvement in politics is primarily
motivated by the threat to the Canadian federations integrity posed
by the PQ. Between these two poles, the other parties navigate less
easily. While QS sides with the PQs pro-independence option, its
representative is quick to add that the partys preference is for
the maintenance of an association between the two states, with the
sharing of a number of core responsibilities (currency and defence)
and possibly the creation of some form of supranational
representational institution. For its part, the CAQ refuses to take
a position on the constitutional future of Quebec, with one
representative stating that this lack of position actually
constitutes the founding axis of their new party (interview, 22
February 2013). This particular take stems from the CAQs view that
the national question in Quebec has reached a temporary dead end;
so Quebecers ought to start dedicating their time and energy to
other policy priorities.
That said, if one leaves aside the issue of whether Quebec ought
to separate or not, one finds that there is a relatively large
consensus among Quebecs substate parties when it comes to the
broader constitutional aspect of autonomy, with all parties seeking
to increase powers. Put differently, while there are various
positions taken by the parties on whether separation per se should
be sought, all substate parties are in favour of more autonomy.
While in power between 2012-14, the PQs strategy in that sense even
had a name, that of gouvernance souverainiste. The PQ
representative defined sovereignist governance as follows: dfaut de
pouvoir faire lindpendance, on va exercer la souverainet
provinciale que nous avons au maximum le Qubec est dj souverain sur
un certain nombre de points alors il faut occuper nos champs de
comptence, lespace de souverainet que nous avons dj. The PQs turn
in power was too brief for the party to really put this doctrine
into practice, but sovereignist governance is the principle that
guided the PQs ideas and strategies under Pauline Marois
tenure.
The CAQ is also very much pro-autonomy. One of its
representatives underlines the fact that autonomy had always been
the constitutional position of the ADQ, the party that merged in
2012 with the newly-formed CAQ; and in that sense the CAQ remains
truthful to the legacy of its parent party. In his words, it is a
Quebec first approach whereby the CAQ pledges to defend Quebecs
interests first and foremost (interview, 22 February 2013). The
second CAQ representative who was interviewed concurred, adding
that autonomy is to be sought within the framework of Canadian
federalism in the form of additional powers: On va aller chercher
le plus de pouvoirs dans le cadre de cette fdration pour amliorer
le sort du Qubec. Je pense que cest a notre priorit absolue.
(interview, 22 March 2013).[footnoteRef:3] [3: It is worth noting
that the two CAQ representatives do not differ much in their
assessment of the national question and the need for more autonomy
and powers. The only slight but notable differences in their
viewpoints are twofold: the former adquiste always prefers to use
the term autonomist while the former pquiste never uses it,
preferring instead the label nationalist; and the former pquiste
seems more willing than the former adquiste to keep the door open
to the idea that Quebecers hold a new referendum on independence
once the other, more pressing policy priorities have been
effectively addressed (by a CAQ government of course).]
Both the PQ and the CAQ seem to adopt a more powers approach at
least partly as the result of the continued existence of a public
opinion minority supporting outright independence for Quebec. But
the PQ sees the glass as being half full while the CAQ sees it as
being half empty. One one hand, according to the PQ representative
the core question facing his party is: Comment tu fais pour tre
indpendantiste dans un tat qui pour le moment na pas lappui
ncessaire pour faire son indpendance? Comment tu fais pour tre
indpendantiste et jouer le jeu canadien? Seeking more autonomy thus
becomes the de facto strategy in this context. On the other hand,
for the CAQ the problem resides in the fact that there will always
be a sizable constituency in favour of independence in Quebec: ce
nest pas une minorit ngligeable et donc, il faut composer avec a
(interview, 22 February 2013).
For its part, QS is also in favour of more autonomy for Quebec,
although for that party the issue of power devolution is not as
central as for the PQ or the CAQ. According to its representative,
the QS party ne se pose pas la question sur les prrogatives quil
faut aller chercher dans le cadre actuel, cest--dire regarder quels
champs dactivit occupe le fdral et voir si on peut lobtenir ou pas
(interview, 27 February 2013). The party is much more concerned
with establishing what it calls a souverainet populaire, that is, a
genuine grassroots sovereignist movement in which the whole
independence process is controlled by the population through a
constituent assembly that would provide a counterweight to the
influence of big businesses and financial interests over Quebecs
national debate.
The PLQ appears to resist the autonomy drive most strongly out
of all parties, but even then, it does not publicly come out
against wanting more powers for Quebec. Its representative
indicates that the party wants provincial competencies to be
respected by the federal government and is in favour of more
provincial powers in the domains of health care, education and
culture. This position is in line with the nationalist demands
formulated by the PLQ in 2001 in the Pelletier
Report[footnoteRef:4], which remains the reference point for the
party according to this interviewee. More importantly, the party
wishes to rectify an important historical grievance of the Quebec
state: veux/veux pas, on a rendez-vous avec 1982 un jour ou lautre,
parce quil y avait limposition par les neuf provinces dun
rapatriement de la constitution sans le consentement du Qubec et a
demeure un problme. Il demeure un souhait de notre formation quun
jour on puisse rsoudre a (interview with PLQ representative, 13 May
2013). [4: See Pelletier (2001).]
It is worth noting that party positions on the constitutional
issue have been fairly static, at least since the 1995 referendum
on Quebec sovereignty. There have been minor adjustments, mostly in
light of the decreased salience of the issue among public opinion
following the unsuccessful referendum. But overall, the positions
and arguments expressed at the substate level during the 2012-14
period do not present any important change compared to positions of
the recent past.
Shifting the focus to statewide parties, one finds an opposite
portrait. That is to say, statewide parties mostly tend to agree on
the separation issue, but clearly disagree on the question of
Quebecs autonomy.
All three statewide parties are against the idea of Quebecs
separation from the rest of Canada. For the LPC, la place du Qubec
dans le Canada, pour nous, il ny a pas de problme; cest l quon peut
se dvelopper. Cest un pays quon a fait avec les autres Canadiens.
tre Qubcois et tre Canadien nest pas une contradiction, cest une
formidable complmentarit (interview with LPC representative, 13
March 2013). The Conservative party representative concurs with
this view: jestime que le Qubec tire grand profit de se dvelopper
au sein de la fdration canadienne (interview, 6 December 2013); but
he still finds that the question of whether Quebec should separate
or not is a perfectly legitimate one that ought to be debated. As
for the NDP, its representative suggests that there will always
remain a number of staunch independentists in the province, but
that Quebecers in general have priorities that are more important
than the national question such as health care, the economy, and
environmental protection (interview, 16 August 2013). In short, at
the state level only the BQ is in favour of Quebecs
independence.
The statewide parties views on autonomy are much more varied,
however. In one corner, the BQ is very much pro-autonomy. In fact,
it is exactly because Quebec has not been able to become more
autonomous within the Canadian federation that the BQ advocates its
independence: chaque fois que le Qubec a voulu se distinguer, il
sest toujours fait dire non. Alors je pense que le conflit vient de
l (interview with BQ representative, 22 March 2013).
In the opposite corner, the LPC and the CPC are against more
autonomy for Quebec. As the LPC representative argues, Canada est
dj une fdration trs dcentralise, sur plusieurs aspects la plus
dcentralise qui soit. La province de Qubec utilise pleinement la
marge de manuvre que la Constitution lui donne. Il y a aussi des
reconnaissances de la spcificit qubcoise dans la Constitution,
comme sur le code civil, des amnagements linguistiques, etc.
(interview, 13 March 2013). The CPC representative considers too
that the Quebec government already has ample powers, and claims
that the more important question in his partys view is that the
central government be respectful of Quebecs areas of jurisdiction a
position that actually forms the core of the Conservative partys
approach of open federalism (interview with CPC representative, 6
December 2013).
In between these two extreme positions, one finds the NDP. While
the party considers that Quebec is already quite autonomous, it
remains in favour of further decentralization in some policy areas.
This constitutional position was defined in the so-called
Sherbrooke declaration adopted at the NDPs 2005 general meeting of
its Quebec wing.[footnoteRef:5] According to the NDP representative
that we interviewed, the declaration remains the partys official
position regarding the national question. The Sherbrooke
declaration reconnat limportance davoir un fdralisme coopratif et
asymtrique. a reconnat aussi, bien entendu, le Qubec comme une
nation; et puis a en fait ctait reconnu par le NPD depuis sa
fondation, depuis le CCF. La vision des deux nations fondatrices,
cest quelque chose qui fait vraiment partie des principes du NPD
(interview with NDP representative, 16 August 2013). It is on this
basis that the NDP considers the demands for more power devolution
as a legitimate prerogative of the Quebec government demands that a
central government of the NDP would be open to discuss and
negotiate, especially if they involve allowing Quebec more
political and financial freedom to create its own institutions and
policy programs. [5: See Policy Committee of the NDP (2005).]
To sum up, with regards to the constitutional dimension of the
national question, we can see the clear contours of a
centre-periphery cleavage. On one hand, substate parties are all
pro-autonomy and two of them are in favour of Quebecs independence
(the PQ and QS). On the other hand, only two statewide parties are
open to more autonomy for the Quebec government (the BQ and the
NDP) and only one advocates independence (BQ). Hence, the party
system at the substate level pulls more in one direction while the
statewide party system pulls more in the other. This cleavage will
materialize itself again when we examine the multi-level dimension
later in this paper.
5. Identity
5a. Cosmopolitanism
This first aspect of the national questions identity dimension
turns out to be highly contested in Quebec among substate parties.
We find two opposing blocs. The PQ and the CAQ are in favour of a
distinct model of integration based on interculturalism. The PLQ
and QS meanwhile remain supportive of a multicultural approach to
integration. The clash between these views was very much at the
forefront during the time period under study because of the PQ
governments proposal (made public in fall 2013 and de facto
abandoned after the PQs electoral defeat of April 2014) that Quebec
adopts a charter of secularism, whose most controversial provision
was the ban of any conspicuous religious signs for all public
sector employees.[footnoteRef:6] [6: Government of Quebec, Bill 60:
Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious
neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a
framework for accommodation requests, National Assembly of Quebec,
40th Legislature, 1st Session, November 2013.]
As the PQ representative explains, the idea of adopting a strict
secular model stems from the perception that Quebecers values are
very different from those of other Canadians. It is mainly for that
reason that the Quebec model of integration ought to be distinct
from Canadas multiculturalist one, so as to better accommodate this
difference in values. Quebecers souhaitent que les nouveaux Qubcois
sintgrent un systme existant, et donc lidologie multiculturaliste
qui consiste dire que tu peux continuer entretenir ta diffrence
culturelle en marge de la culture majoritaire nest pas partage par
les Qubcois (interview with PQ representative, 15 August 2013). In
particular, the idea of non-Catholic religions requesting some form
of accommodation for their specific values is problematic in the
eyes of the PQ because it goes against the Catholic French-Canadian
majoritys century-long efforts at asserting their own set of
values: La plupart des gains ont commenc avec la Rvolution
Tranquille et on ne souhaite pas que ces gains-l soient remis en
question parce que le religieux veut se rintroduire dans la sphre
tatique et demande des traitements diffrencis qui remettent en
question (ces valeurs).
For the most part, the CAQ agrees with these views. The partys
opposition to multiculturalism is as clear as with the PQ: je ne
pense pas que les Qubcois ont adopt la politique de
multiculturalisme de monsieur Trudeau. Le Qubec et lensemble des
Qubcois nont jamais adhr cela On croit, nous, davantage la thse de
deux nations fondatrices plutt quune nation multiculturelle ou dune
nation la vision de Trudeau (interview with CAQ representative, 22
March 2013). Accordingly, the party expressed support for the
proposed secularism charter, although argued that the prohibition
from wearing religious signs should only apply to authority figures
such as judges, police officers, prison guards, and (more
controversially) education workers. The CAQ does not support the
removal of the crucifix from the wall of the National Assembly,
seeing as it represents Quebecs history, its patrimony, and what we
are (interview with CAQ representative, 22 February 2013).
It is important to note that the CAQs position regarding the
accommodation of religious values is consistent with that developed
by its parent party, the ADQ, during the so-called reasonable
accommodation crisis around 2006-07. In many ways, it can also be
argued that the ADQs anti-multiculturalism position expressed at
the time greatly influenced the discourse adopted by the PQ on this
issue in the aftermath of its 2007 electoral defeat. In other
words, there has been a contagion effect from the ADQ to the PQ on
the issue of cosmopolitanism, since the PQs turn towards a less
inclusive definition of immigrant integration arguably crystallized
in the charter of secularism project has been viewed by some in
Quebec (e.g., Dupr 2012) as an abandon of the civic nationalist
discourse that was put forward by the party in the years that
followed the 1995 referendum (and PQ leader Jacques Parizeaus
infamous speech).
In contrast to the views expressed by the PQ and the CAQ, one
finds more support for multiculturalism among the PLQ and QS
parties. The Liberal MNA remains cautious regarding the question of
whether Quebec has values that are distinct from those found in the
rest of Canada: je ne vois pas quon ait une socit ici qui soit
compltement diffrente; il y a des diffrences, mais les grandes
valeurs sont partages dun ocan lautre. He goes on to argue that
Quebec does not need more powers in the area of immigrant
integration (il y a une limite car les gens immigrent quand mme au
Canada) and does not need to adopt more stringent rules regarding
integration (we need to tre le plus respectueux possible dautrui).
The QS representative claims that his party puts forward a view of
openness to the world. He feels that the Quebec model of
integration is in no need of distinction nor revision; instead the
problem lies with the actual means for applying the model: On ne
veut pas imposer une identit, une langue, une culture; mais on veut
rparer, rduire les rsistances de nos institutions to allow a better
integration. Like the PLQ, QS was a staunch opponent to the
proposed charter of secularism.
At the federal level, there is more agreement regarding the
multiculturalism model. Only the BQ opposes it, seeing the model as
Pierre Trudeaus way of culturally marginalizing Quebec within the
greater Canadian ensemble. The other three parties are clearly in
favour of multiculturalism and believe that Quebecers values are
closer to those of other Canadians than what is generally claimed.
An interesting nuance however is suggested by the NDP
representative who argues that in practice the multicultural and
the intercultural models are almost identical, in the sense that
they both try to respect individual differences but also to ensure
that there is a minimal adherence to the dominant culture
(interview, 16 August 2013).
5b. Language
This second aspect related to the identity dimension definitely
proves to be more consensual in Quebec, among both substate and
statewide parties. All of them are in favour of defending and
preserving the French language in Quebec, with the PQ and the BQ
wanting slightly more protection. As the PQ representative points
out: Lune des raisons pour lesquelles les Qubcois se dfinissent
dabord et avant tout comme Qubcois cest parce quils ont le
sentiment dtre diffrents. Pendant de nombreuses annes, et cest
encore vrai jusqu un certain point aujourdhui mme si a lest moins,
la langue a t le principal facteur de diffrence culturelle entre
les Qubcois et le reste des Canadiens.
While language remains at the heart of the PQs identity
politics, it is interesting to note that the PQ representative
remains more or less silent during the interview regarding his
governments proposed changes to Quebecs language
policy.[footnoteRef:7] The Marois governments Bill 14 was abandoned
in November 2013 due to a lack of support from the opposition
parties. It aimed at updating the Charter of the French language
(also known as Bill 101) with a number of controversial coercive
provisions such as introducing a mandatory French proficiency test
for Quebec high school and CEGEP graduates and preventing
businesses with more than 25 employees from using English in the
workplace. The use of additional coercive measures in the area of
language management in Quebec is decried by virtually all of our
other interviewees. According to a CAQ representative, the current
version of Bill 101 is perfectly fine (interview, 22 March 2013).
The QS representative states that il y a une limite la coercition
Cest sr quil faut dans le contexte canadien, qubcois,
nord-amricain, rivaliser avec lattrait culturel des tats-Unis Mais
le Qubec a bien fait, il sest bien dbrouill, somme toute, comme
plusieurs petites nations, petites identits culturelles ont russi
le faire. The PLQ representative concedes that ce sera toujours une
charge essentielle de responsabilit primaire pour tout gouvernement
du Qubec dans ce domaine but considers that sometimes coercive
measures that are too excessive actually damage the image of Quebec
abroad. [7: Government of Quebec, Bill 14: An Act to amend the
Charter of the French language, the Charter of human rights and
freedoms and other legislative provisions, National Assembly of
Quebec, 40th Legislature, 1st Session, December 2012.]
Statewide parties also agree with the goal of French protection
in Quebec. In the words of the LPC representative, il faut rester
vigilant, la force dassimilation de langlais est norme; mais dans
lensemble, une des russites a t de faire en sorte que la langue
franaise soit la langue du Qubec (interview, 13 March 2013). That
said, all the federal-level politicians we interviewed underline an
additional reason for why it is important to keep the French
language alive in Quebec. As the Conservative MP states, on a
plusieurs francophones partout travers le Canada et ces gens-l
comptent sur le Qubec pour continuer assurer un rayonnement et une
diversit linguistique et culturelle francophone (interview, 6
December 2013). The NDP representative adds that all Francophones
across the country share a number of common interests and that this
sharing is part of what defines the Canadian identity (interview,
16 August 2013).
In short, language is clearly a valence issue in Quebec even
though there remains some disagreement over the use of coercion.
Another small point of divergence between the substate parties has
to do with the notion of promoting the use of English. Both the PLQ
and the CAQ are clearly in favour. As stated by the CAQ
representatives, English is the language of the 21st century
(interview, 22 February 2013) and we need to take into account that
French is not the only language in Quebec (interview, 22 March
2013).
6. Regional Interests
6a. Supranational Interests
The third component of the national question that we are
interested in is the question of regional interests. Three aspects
of this question are worth exploring. The first one involves the
supranational dimension of regional interests. In the particular
context of Quebec, supranationalism essentially refers to the
provinces North American economic integration. This integration is
achieved since 1994 via the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) which creates a trilateral rules-based trade bloc on the
continent between Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
Aside from Quebec Solidaire whose position we address below no
substate parties want to pull out of membership into NAFTA and all
parties see general benefits for Quebec from being a member of this
free trade bloc. This inter-party consensus in Quebec is consistent
with the previous analysis of Martin (1997). One CAQ representative
believes that dans lensemble, lALNA a t profitable pour le Qubec.
Le Qubec est un petit march; on a besoin de nos relations
conomiques avec les tats-Unis pour effectivement faire grossir
notre produit intrieur brut (interview, 22 March 2013). The PLQ
representative concurs and even sees in Quebecs economic
integration a kind of inevitability: on navait pas grand choix
dembarquer dans ce genre de choses parce que les conomies isoles
sont de moins en moins nombreuses. Je pense que notre march
domestique est insuffisant alors il faut une certaine intgration
avec lAmrique du Nord. In fact, another CAQ representative
underlines that the first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiated in
1988 between Canada and the United States was made possible because
of Quebecs strong support for it, coming as much from secessionists
as from federalists (interview, 22 February 2013).
And indeed, the PQ remains firmly in favour of Quebecs North
American economic integration, going as far as seeing in it a
future strategic advantage for the independence movement. In the
words of the PQ representative: le Qubec, de par ses ressources,
est appel jouer un rle de plus en plus important dans lquilibre
gostratgique des Amriques les nergies qubcoises, surtout avec les
surplus quon a, vont devenir ou redevenir attrayantes pour lconomie
amricaine. Je pense que le Qubec a l un avantage intressant, une
nergie propre dont les Amricains vont avoir besoin. In his view,
this likely strengthening of economic and energy ties may help
secessionists to gain the confidence of Americans in an eventual
process of recognition of independence. It may also reassure
Quebecers about their level of integration in the North American
economy, possibly making them more immune against arguments of
economic fear that are used by the opponents of independence.
The position of QS regarding Quebecs economic integration breaks
with this inter-party consensus, however. This left-wing partys
representative clearly states that QS is against trade agreements
of the NAFTA type because Quebecs farmers and small entrepreneurs
have not benefited as much from free trade as big businesses have.
This view is consistent with the general ideology of QS according
to which le vritable adversaire de lindpendance du Qubec, ce nest
pas le pouvoir fdral. Ce nest pas ltat fdral Ottawa. Cest les
milieux daffaires, cest le pouvoir conomique au Canada, dont une
partie est au Qubec.
Among statewide parties, the issue of supranationalism is
clearly a valence one since all four parties are in favour of NAFTA
and believe that most of Quebecs economic sectors actually gain
from being part of the agreement. Two distinctive viewpoints are
also expressed on this issue by the MPs we interviewed. First, both
the CPC and LPC representatives underline that being part of the
Canadian domestic market provides Quebec with a strong insurance
policy against possible economic turmoil coming from the American
partner south of the border. Second, the BQ representative argues
that the main strategic reason for why the United States is not in
favour of Quebec secession is because the US establishment thinks
an independent Quebec may be too unpredictable in terms of its
foreign policy positions. For example, an independent Quebec might
take the defense of left-wing Latin American countries at the
United Nations, or might side with Palestinians in the Arab-Israel
conflict (interview with BQ representative, 22 March 2013).
6b. Social Interests
The so-called Quebec model of governance is usually
characterized by an interventionist state. For example, in contrast
with the governing approach that prevails in the rest of Canada,
the Quebec state does not shy away from subsidizing a number of
domestic economic sectors and industries. In addition, since the
mid-20th century it has established a series of progressive social
policies that now form a far-reaching provincial welfare state. In
this subsection we focus on the latter aspect of the Quebec
model.
In recent years the Quebec model has come under questioning.
Mario Dumonts former ADQ took a big part in this nascent reform
movement. The CAQ has taken up this mantle in the current substate
party system. As one of its representatives indicates, the Quebec
model in its social dimension is not necessarily as distinct from
the rest of the country as is often claimed. He highlights the
existence of a vigorous left in some English-Canadian provinces,
and sees as many right-leaning people in the province as there are
outside Quebec (interview, 22 February 2013). The other CAQ
representative observes that the federal Conservative government
does have some support base in Quebec contrary to the popular image
(interview, 22 March 2013). In short, the CAQ calls into question
the image of Quebec as a more socially progressive province. The
party does concede that Quebecers pay for social programs that
other provinces do not have, but considers that this situation
needs to change if only because Quebecers do not have the financial
means to sustain social protection in its current form (interview
with CAQ representative, 22 February 2013). The PLQ representative
broadly shares the CAQs assessments and tends to reduce the Quebec
model to a mere tradition of social policy innovation within the
Canadian federation.
The other two substate parties appear much more favourable to
social issues. According to the PQ representative, le centre de
gravit idologique au Qubec est plus prs du centre gauche que le
centre de gravit politique dans le reste du Canada la valeur de
solidarit est plus forte ici quailleurs. He links this solidarity
to Quebecs historical past, when French-Canadians who were in a
position of social and economic inferiority had to stick together
and create their own institutions, leading to the development of a
conception of civic life that puts more emphasis on sharing than
elsewhere in the country. The QS representative adds that Quebecers
solidarity trait comes also from their European heritage,
especially French republicanism, which contributes as well to the
definition of a progressive social model that is distinct from the
rest of Canada and that needs to be nourished and preserved.
To sum up, on social interests we definitely observe
disagreements among substate parties along class lines, with a
sharp divide between left-of-centre (PQ/QS) and right-of-centre
(CAQ/PLQ) camps on a Quebec social model. We find this cleavage to
be mirrored in the statewide party system. In fact, it is striking
how the viewpoints expressed by MPs are practically identical to
those held by MNAs. Both the BQ and the NDP representatives argue
that the Quebec social model is distinct from the rest of Canada
because it is adapted to Quebecs society, its history, and its
specific interests. The BQ representative mentions the creation of
Quebecs firearms registry and the more positive attitude towards
euthanasia among Quebecers as recent examples of this
distinctiveness in terms of social policies and interests
(interview, 22 March 2013). By way of contrast, both the CPC and
LPC representatives offer a more nuanced assessment of the Quebec
models distinctiveness. They highlight the existence of even more
progressive provincial governments outside of Quebec, and they
emphasize the contemporary convergence of social interests between
Quebecers and other Canadians in terms of health care, crime,
security, and sustainable development. The Liberal MP claims that
the Quebec model of governance was actually more distinctive before
the onset of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, at a time when
there were no professional state bureaucracy and the health and
education systems were under the control of the Catholic clergy
(interview, 13 March 2013).
6c. Economic Interests
The economic aspect of Quebecs interventionist approach to
governance is now the focus of this subsection. According to the QS
representative, le cooprativisme est trs fort au Qubec. a a marqu
la socit du Qubec et a a permis son dveloppement bien des gards. He
cites as evidence the Caisse de dpt et placement du Qubec whose
creation he sees as having been inspired by the French model of a
socialist state. He goes on to explain why, in his view, having a
strong state in Quebec is a necessary condition for guaranteeing
individual freedom and emancipation: un tat fort assure lessentiel
de notre confort pour librer notre temps, notre nergie pour le
consacrer dautre chose qu notre survie dans une espce de grande
bataille permanente de tous contre tous. The PQ representative also
sees the interventionist state as necessary, particularly with
regard to guiding the development of the provinces energy
resources.
That said, as was observed above with regard to social
interests, we find that the other parties tend to disagree with the
relevance of economic interventionism. Again, the CAQ leads the
charge and claims to be the only party that has the courage to say
that we must revise our state aid to companies (interview, 22
February 2013). In broader terms, the PLQ and the CAQ each try to
convince Quebecers that economic development is their top priority.
The PLQ has traditionally enjoyed the reputation of being the best
party at dealing with the economy in Quebec (see Lemieux 2006;
Blanger and Glineau 2011). But the CAQ is clearly contesting
ownership of the economic issue: On veut que les gens reconnaissent
que cest nous le parti de lconomie au Qubec et que lducation cest
notre priorit. Il y a aussi des problmes aprs a que ce soit en sant
ou en garderies, mais dabord et avant tout, ce que lon veut que les
gens reconnaissent, cest quon est le parti en conomie et quon peut
relancer le Qubec (interview with CAQ representative, 22 March
2013).
Thus, the substate picture with regards to economic interests is
also one of disagreement along class lines. Right-of-centre parties
emphasize economic development and wealth creation while
left-of-centre parties remain in favour of state intervention in
Quebec economy. Among statewide parties, we notice the same
difference in viewpoints, although it remains less pronounced than
within the substate party system. Both the NDP and the BQ agree
with the notion of Quebecs economic model being significantly
different from the rest of Canada and view this distinction in a
positive light. The Conservative MP disagrees, arguing that the
Quebec government is faced with the exact same economic challenges
as the other Canadian provinces and must address them more or less
in the same ways. The LPC representative also tends to downplay the
differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada when it comes to
their approach towards the economy.
7. Multi-level Dimension
The third dimension of the national debate that interests us is
the multi-level context in which political parties and politicians
compete in Quebec as in Scotland. Is there a clear territorial bloc
in Quebec that opposes, or diverges from, state-level government
policies?
To a large extent, there is one. Almost all substate parties
emphasize the importance for Quebec of maintaining a balance of
power (un rapport de force) vis--vis the federal government in
Ottawa. In the period under study, the PQs approach of sovereignist
governance embodies this philosophy the most clearly. As the PQ
representative explains: la gouvernance souverainiste, cest une
posture de rapport de force permanent; tu dois tre constamment en
rapport de force par rapport au gouvernement central. pour un
indpendantiste qui vise la totalit des pouvoirs, qui vise la
totalit de la souverainet, plus tu vas chercher des nouveaux
pouvoirs, plus tu te rapproches de lobjectif ultime qui est davoir
tous les pouvoirs.
Several of the parties have grievances against the 1960s-1970s
era of centralization under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. One CAQ
representative argues that Trudeaus approach, which he describes as
one of provocation and confrontation, has been responsible for
fuelling the independence movement (interview, 22 February 2013).
The QS representative agrees, claiming that Canadas centralizing
tendency goes contrary to the true spirit of federalism and that it
creates a significant gap between Canadian policies and the
traditional policy aspirations of Quebecers. As another CAQ
candidate puts it: il y a des visions assez diffrentes,
paradoxales, entre le Canada et le Qubec (interview, 22 March
2013). These grievances are largely shared by the federal-level
independentist Bloc Qubcois. The BQ representative we interviewed
even went as far as to describe the central governments attitude
vis--vis Quebec as a colonialist one whereby it seeks to impose its
vision through its policies and its money (interview, 22 March
2013).
The only dissenting voice on this issue at the substate level is
that of the PLQ. The provincial Liberals tend to break away from
this territorial bloc, as they prefer to see the economic benefits
of maintaining strong links with the provinces east and west of
Quebec. At the very least, by emphasizing inter-provincial trade,
the PLQ representative somewhat downplays the centre-periphery
tensions within the Canadian federation. He even praises the
growing worldwide move towards the adoption of federal-type
institutional arrangements, believing that federalism is the most
modern style of governance. He also claims that being part of a
larger ensemble provides Quebecers with a greater sense of security
since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 south of the Canadian
border.
How do statewide parties react to this territorial bloc? Some of
them respect, even understand, the existence of such a
centre-periphery cleavage. The CPC and the NDP try to accommodate
it, to some extent, by proposing a collaborative approach whereby
areas of substate jurisdiction are better respected. No matter how
it is called (the Conservatives use the expression open federalism
while the NDP talks of asymmetrical federalism), the idea is to
offer Quebecers a more flexible and pragmatic kind of
federal-provincial relationship one that does not call for a
renegotiation of the Canadian Constitution. For its part, the LPC
tends to adopt a dismissive attitude, viewing the rapport de force
strategy more as a ploy for boosting independence support: ceux qui
veulent pousser le sentiment national jusqu lindpendance vont
utiliser des dsaccords en matire de partage des comptences comme
preuve que le Canada ne marche pas. Ce qui a pour effet de
permettre aux partisans de lindpendance de ne pas avoir justifier
leur projet (interview with LPC representative, 13 March 2013). The
Liberal MP goes on to argue that substate federalist parties tend
to fall into the trap of asking for more devolved powers because
they hope that it will quash the independentists arguments and
assuage the Quebec populations nationalist fever, which the MP
thinks is a miscalculation.
8. Conclusion
There is no denying that over the past half century, the
national question has been at the heart of party politics in
Quebec. Ever since the emergence of Lvesques Parti Qubcois at the
end of the 1960s, the issue has become a salient one for political
parties competing at the substate or at the state level. In that
sense, it is safe to conclude that the rise of the secessionist PQ
has had a contagion effect in Quebec insofar as the national
question is concerned. Every substate or statewide political party
has had to position itself on this issue, and the national question
regularly comes to the fore during election campaigns in Quebec
ever since. In other words, establishing itself as the owner of the
national question the PQ has initiated a movement whereby the other
parties have all tried to compete on the PQs issue to one degree or
another. To some extent, this movement has spilled over to the
federal scene, especially once a federal-based secessionist party
the Bloc Qubcois was created at the beginning of the 1990s and was
thus claiming ownership of the national question within the
statewide party system.
What our analysis of party behaviour in Quebec has been able to
show is that the national question is clearly a multifaceted
political issue. Reducing the issue to the single question of
whether Quebec ought to secede from the rest of Canada provides an
incomplete picture of the party dynamics at work. We have seen that
beyond the general disagreement about the secession goal itself,
all substate parties are in favour of more constitutional autonomy
for Quebec. In its autonomy aspect, then, the national question can
thus clearly be characterized as being valence in nature. The
picture is the reverse among statewide parties. To the exclusion of
the secessionist BQ, all of them are against independence. But
there is clear disagreement among statewide parties on the question
of whether Quebec ought to have more autonomy or not, with two of
them actually arguing that Quebec already enjoys enough autonomy
within the Canadian federation. In short, on the dimension of
constitutional autonomy we find a clear centre-periphery cleavage
at play in the Quebec case.
The same kind of centre-periphery cleavage is also observed on
the multi-level dimension of the national question. With the
exception of the PLQ, all other substate parties form a quite
strong territorial bloc that opposes Canadian policies in general.
To the exclusion of the BQ, the statewide parties for their part
tend to form a counter-bloc, although two of them (the NDP and the
CPC) show some willingness to respect Quebecs jurisdictional
authority, in what is termed a spirit of collaboration.
The valence nature of the national question in Quebec is most
clearly observed in its two other key dimensions, identity and
regional interests. Among statewide parties, there is virtual
agreement regarding all three aspects of the regional interests
dimension (albeit with some reservations on the part of the LPC and
CPC when it comes to define the distinctive nature of Quebecs
social and economic model of governance) as well as on the issue of
French language protection. In other words, on four of the five
aspects of these dimensions there has been contagion from the
secessionist party to the mainstream parties. On cosmopolitanism,
only the BQ does not support the multiculturalism model of
integration, and thus finds itself isolated on this aspect of the
identity dimension.
At the substate level there is agreement on the language and
supranational aspects as well, but there is less so on
cosmopolitanism and on the governance model. On the former aspect,
we find that the PLQ and QS support multiculturalism while the PQ
and the CAQ oppose this integration model and prefer a more
distinct Quebec approach whereby immigrants are asked to adopt the
French-Canadian majoritys values. On the latter aspect, we find
that the left-right cleavage tends to supersede nationalist
contagion: left-leaning substate parties support the Quebec model
in both its social and economic dimensions while right-leaning ones
(especially the CAQ) oppose it, or at least are more willing to
question its degree of distinctiveness as compared to other
Canadian provinces.
Table 1: Substate Party Positions on the National Question in
Quebec
QUEBEC PARTIES (SUBSTATE)
PQ
PLQ
CAQ
QS
Contagion effect
Owner
Less contagion
Contagion
Contagion
(1) Constitutional issue
Stable: Independence
Ambiguous: Balance between status quo/more powers
Stable: Clear contagion, want more autonomy
Stable: Clear contagion, want more autonomy
(2) Identity
Cosmopol-itanism
Owner: Intercultural, distinct model, anti-m/c,
charter of secularism
Resistance to contagion, contest PQ: support m/c, oppose
charter
Agreement with PQ: Contagion effect to and from PQ, support
charter
Resistance to contagion, contest PQ: support m/c, oppose
charter
Language
Owner: protect French language
(valence)
Contagion (valence)
Contagion (valence)
Contagion (valence)
(3) Regional Interests
Supra-
national
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Social
Owner: Pro-Qc social model (left-wing)
Oppose Qc social model (right-wing)
Oppose Qc social model (right-wing)
Pro-Qc social model (left-wing)
Economic
Valence
Owner: Qc economic model
Oppose Qc economic model, contest PLQ ownership
Valence
Multi-level dimension
Opposition to Canadian policies
Support Canadian policies
Opposition to Canadian policies
Opposition to Canadian policies (except m/c)
Table 2: Statewide Party Positions on the National Question in
Quebec
QUEBEC PARTIES (STATEWIDE)
BQ
LPC
CPC
NDP
Contagion effect
Owner
Less contagion
Less contagion
Contagion
(1) Constitutional issue
Stable: Independence
Stable: Status quo, against more autonomy
Stable: Status quo, against more autonomy
Stable: Status quo, open to more autonomy
(2) Identity
Cosmopol-itanism
Owner: Intercultural, distinct model, anti-m/c
Resistance to contagion, contest BQ: support m/c
Resistance to contagion, contest BQ: support m/c
Resistance to contagion, contest BQ: support m/c
Language
Owner: protect French language
(valence)
Contagion (valence)
Contagion (valence)
Contagion (valence)
(3) Regional Interests
Supra-
national
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Generally pro-NAFTA (valence)
Social
Owner: Pro-Qc social model
Valence (but nuanced view)
Valence (but nuanced view)
Pro-Qc social model
Economic
Valence
Valence (but nuanced view)
Valence (but nuanced view)
Valence
Multi-level dimension
Opposition to Canadian policies
Support Canadian policies
Support Canadian policies
Support Canadian policies
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