UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

TAX AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

20 FRANKLIN SQUARE

NEW BRITAIN, CT

FAIR HEARING REQUEST CASE NO. 434921

STATE CASE NO. HHB-CV: 13-5015788

APPELLATE CASE NO. A.C. 36729

FEDERAL CASE NO. 3:15 CV 01521

JOAN ZANARD-KLOTH :

PLAINTIFF :

V. :

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES :

GOVERNOR MALLOY :

COMMISSIONER BREMBY :

JUDGE PRESCOTT :

APPELLATE JUDGES :

EVA TAR, FAIR HEARING OFFICER :

DEFENDANTS : February 13, 2016

MOTION OF FRAUD ON THE COURT

1) The Appellant/Plaintiff, Joan T. Kloth-Zanard, has been made aware of the

illegal acts committed in her case under Federal Rule 60(b), Fraud Upon the

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Courts. The Appellant/Plaintiff hereby petitions the court to vacate the Liens

based on the fraudulent acts of the judges and the Fair Hearing Officer

involved in her case, i.e. Judge Prescott, the 3 Appellate Judges, who’s

names appear nowhere in the courts documents to the Appellant/Plaintiff, and

including the Fair Hearing Officer, Eva Tar. The Appellant/Plaintiff makes this

statement against the defendants in their official and individual capacity

based on the following:

a) The Appellant/Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights were violated

b) Rules of Evidence violated.

c) Authentication of evidence violated.

d) Use of a 4th Party removed witness, which violates the Hearsay rule.

e) Denial of Appellant/Plaintiff’s evidence

f) False claim that the State formally entered anything into evidence when

the Fair Hearing was an INFORMAL Hearing.

g) The Fair Hearing being informal, meant that the plaintiff did not need to

follow any specific legal protocol and in fact, was told she did NOT need to

be an attorney, yet was held to a higher standard by Judge Prescott.

h) Violation of ADA rights and refusal to make any accommodations and

modifications or having been properly notified or services supplied to

assist her under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),

42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(Section 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794, Section 28 CFR § 35 & 36 from the DOJ of the

United States of America

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i) Appellant/Plaintiff Never received a fair hearing as it was closed

prematurely in violation of the plaintiffs ADA accommodations and rights.

2) Violation of the Attorney General being allowed to represent the State in this

matter, when they had been previously been contacted on July 3, 2012 and

June 22, 2012 by the Appellant/Plaintiff for assistance with this situation. No

attorney is allowed to take the case of the opposing side if they were

previously contacted by the other side and asked to represent or assist them,

especially if the initial side contacting the attorney has provided legal and

pertinent information about their side of the case. As the AG’s office was

contacted on July 3, 2012 and June 22, 2012 with a return response from

George Jepsen, and the Plaintiff specifically asks for their assistance and

explains the situation in her letter, the AG’s office by law is now barred from

appearance in the plaintiff’s cases against the state. This is a violation of

General Statutes § 1-25 and annotations and Article 6, § 2 on Supremacy

Clause and the Attorney’s Oath. (EXHIBIT F)

3) As to Statute of Limitations being time barred.

a) Appellant/Plaintiff has one year from the date of the courts decision to

respond to Fraud Upon the Courts. Federal Rule 60(b).

b) Appellant/Plaintiff appealed her case to Supreme court who did not render

a decision until September 30, 2015 and not sent until October 1, 2015.

c) Appellate court did not release their decision until May 2015.

4) Furthermore, "When a judge does not follow the law, i.e., they are

a trespasser of the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the

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judges orders are void, of no legal force or effect." The U.S. Supreme

Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,   416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687,

1974) stated that  "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner

violation of the Federal Constitution, s/he comes into conflict with the superior

authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or

representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences

of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any

immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."

[Emphasis supplied in original]. "Whenever a judge acts where he/she does

not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of

treason." U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406

(1980 ); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

Any judge or attorney who does not report a judge for treason as required by

law may themselves be guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section

2382.

5) Fraud Upon the Court is committed when the Judge or Attorney (who is NOT

the "Court") does not support or uphold the laws of the judicial machinery of

the “Court.”

6) The “Court” is an unbiased, but methodical "creature" which is governed by

the Rule of Law... that is, the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Criminal

Procedure and the Rules of Evidence, all which is overseen by Constitutional

Law.

7) The Court can only be effective, fair and "just" if it is allowed to function as the

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Laws proscribe.

8) When Judges and/or attorneys play with a revised set of rules that they

created and are therefore acting outside of law, and this constitutes Fraud

upon the Court,which immediately removes jurisdiction from that Court, and

invalidates every decision from that point on.

9) Any judge who does this is under mandatory, non-discretionary duty to recuse

himself or herself from the case. If found guilty, a judge can lose half their

pensions for life.

10)Every case which has had FRAUD involved can be re-opened at any time,

because there is no Statute of Limitations on fraud.

11)In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir.1985), the court

stated"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial

machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents,

false statements or perjury. ...It is where the court or a member is corrupted

or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed

his judicial function -- thus where the impartial functions of the court have

been directly corrupted."

12)"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court

itself, or isa fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial

machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging

cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689

(1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit

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further stated"a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a

decision at all,and never becomes final."

13)“Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court.

Further, ‘fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of

the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934); Allen

F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929)

14)This time fraud vitiates every transaction into, which it enters ...";In re Village

of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475

(1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products

Co., 338 Ill. App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v The

American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).

Under state and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed

"fraud upon the court," the orders and judgment of that court are void,are of

no legal force or effect.

15)What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"Federal law requires the

automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances.In

1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that"Disqualification is required if an

objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's

impartiality.If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to

conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be

disqualified."[Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).

16)Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is

not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality.Liljeberg v. Health

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Services Acquisition Corp.,486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) What matters

is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance; United States v.

Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a)

a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge

is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.

§455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge

but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial

process.").

17)The same Court also stated that Section 455(a)"requires a judge to recuse

himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be

questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).

18)In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that"It is

important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he/she

believes that he/she has received justice."

19)The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that"Justice

must satisfy the appearance of justice",Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,

80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct.

11, 13 (1954).A judge receiving a bribe or gaining self enrichment from an

interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of

justice."Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing;a party need not file

affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua

sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189

(7th Cir. 1989).

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20)Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no

motion asking for his disqualification.The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

further stated that"We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the

judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at

1202.

21)Judges do not have “discretion” not to disqualify themselves.By law, they are

bound by law to follow the law.Should a judge not disqualify himself as

required by law, then the judge has given another example of his

"appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge.

Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the

second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly

disqualified himself/herself.

22)None of the orders issued by any judge who has thus been disqualified by law

would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are VOID as a matter of

law, and are of no legal force or effect.

23)Should such a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the

Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution:"The right to a tribunal free from

bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process

Clause."United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996)

24)Should a judge issue any order after the judge has been so disqualified by

law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the

judge may have been engaged in theFederal Crime of "interference with

interstate commerce."

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25)If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law

as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance

of partiality" and, under the law, it would follow that he/she has disqualified

him/herself. Plaintiff is a non-represented litigant who additionally is disabled.

The Fair Hearing Officer and then the judges ignored these facts.

26)Under the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this

subjects, "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified"

under certain circumstances. Further actions made by the judge are without

jurisdiction.

27)And as The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge “wars” against the

Constitution, or if a judge acts without jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in

treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after the judge has been

automatically disqualified by law,then the judge is acting without jurisdiction,

and that indicates thatthe judge is engaging in criminal acts of treason, and

may be engaged in the extortion and the interference with interstate

commerce. Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have NO IMMUNITY for

their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate

commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

28) The court via the judge claims that there was additional evidence presented

at the fair hearing.

a) The Appellant asks what that additional evidence was because she never

saw it.

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b) The only evidence presented was a “reconstructed spreadsheet” and a

blank application form that “supposedly” was used back in 1995-1998.

c) There was NO evidence offered to support the “reconstructed”

spreadsheet.

d) The court also erred in its assumption that Caseworker Gillette could

testifying as a witness. This case worker was not a party to the case in

1995-1998 so could NOT testify to the Appellant/Plaintiff’s receipt of public

assistance as he had no first hand knowledge. Furthermore, as the state

cannot produce the Appellant/Plaintiff’s files prior to 2010, there is no

evidence to substantiate the reconstructed spreadsheet and therefore his

statements. In other words, there is no one nor way to authenticate

(Authenticity of Evidence, Rule 901) the reconstructed spreadsheet nor

the state’s claims. This Caseworker was also not the Appellant/Plaintiff’s

caseworker nor the case worker who created the “reconstructed

spreadsheet” thus his ability to be a witness to the validity is suspect as a

4th party removed.

e) As to the courts claim that the Appellant/Plaintiff’s maiden name was on

this sheet, this is not undisputed but this does not mean that the

Appellant/Plaintiff received cash assistance. On January 15, 2014, during

the Fair Hearing Appeal case in the Administration and Taxation Court,

Judge Prescott stated on page 30, Line 2-7 of the transcript, “She has a

very good claim that it was error for the fair hearing officer to admit this

document because – for two reason, as I understand them: One, is that

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it’s unreliable under all of the facts and circumstances of the case; (2)

because sh wasn’t given access to the underlying documents that this

record is based upon.” Further in the transcript, on page 41, line 23-27,

Judge Prescott is still calling into question the validity of the

‘reconstructed’ spreadsheet wen he clearly states, “And so one of my

concerns that I have, is lets say that was improperly entered into the

computer. Let’s say the amount of assistance on that date was really one

hundred and seventy-two dollars, and they hit a four.”

f) Additionally, the Appellant/Plaintiff admits to receiving Food stamps,

Medicaid, Section VIII Housing assistance, Energy Assistance and Child

Care assistance under Maximus. Therefore, the state would naturally

have her maiden name and information. Thus the Courts claim that this

means she got cash assistance has no legal precedence as the

Appellant/Plaintiff was receiving other forms of non-reimbursable

assistance and thus the state would have been able to generate her name

for this false claim.

g) Additionally, the Appellant/Plaintiff’s name on a reconstructed spreadsheet

does not mean that someone could have input the wrong client ID

number, which triggered her name to be put on the sheet. This very issue

was attested to and brought up by Judge Prescott during the

Appellant/Plaintiff’s Appeal hearing in the Administrative and Tax Court.

And as there is no documentation nor witnesses to this time period, there

is no way to prove that this is not the case.

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h) The court has also committed an error when it states that the

Appellant/Plaintiff never denied receipt of public assistance and that she

never objected to the spreadsheet.

i) In fact, Appellant/Plaintiff submitted numerous letters and

correspondence (Exhibit A) stating she did not owe the amount of

money DSS was stating but further stated that she got Food Stamps.

Medicaid, Housing Assistance and Energy Assistance and Child Care

Assistance via Maximus

ii) All of these resources that Appellant/Plaintiff states she received are

NOT reimbursable, i.e. do not have to be repaid, under the Welfare

Reform Act of 1994/1995.

iii) These letters were not only mailed in as part of her statement request

for a fair hearing, but were also submitted as evidence when the Fair

Hearing Officer prematurely closing the case but instead allowing the

Appellant/Plaintiff to submit her evidence via Caseworker Gillette. As

well, the State’s own attorney General submitted the very same letters

as evidence.

iv) Additionally, as the Fair Hearing was prematurely terminated before

the Appellant/Plaintiff could present her case and in direct violation of

her ADA rights, the court is assuming that the Appellant/Plaintiff would

not have stated her objections to the spreadsheet and more during her

fair hearing testimony had she not been cut off repeatedly by the

hearing officer.

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v) The hearing officer’s continuous denial of the Appellant/Plaintiff’s rights

to an “informal meeting” as described in the State of CT Policies is

specifically for a client to explain their case and why they disagree

without the aid of an attorney and without having to have legal

knowledge of how the law works, was further an obstruction to the

Appellant/Plaintiffs rights.

vi) The Appellant/Plaintiff was not given the ability to present her case

during the fair hearing and instead tormented and had her disabilities

of extreme PTSD, stress and anxiety triggered by the hearing officer,

when she tried to properly present her case.

i) To reiterate, the court also committed an error when it claimed that the

Appellant/Plaintiff did not object to the submission of the “reconstructed

spreadsheet during the fair hearing. It was objected to both on February

7, 2012, and March 17. 2012 (Exhibit A).

j) Furthermore, while it seems that this “reconstructed spreadsheet was

entered informally as evidence, the hearing officer, Ms. Tar, refused to

allow the Appellant/Plaintiff to speak, thus how could the Appellant/Plaintiff

possibly object during the hearing?

k) The Appellant/Plaintiff was never allowed to present her case so that she

could even get to the point of stating that she does not feel the figures are

accurate or as the courts would say, that she “objects”.

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l) In fact, during every attempt to submit her story that would have lead to

her eventually objection to the spreadsheet, the Appellant/Plaintiff was cut

off and never allowed to complete her testimony.

m) However, within all of her submitted paperwork, letters and motions,

submitted prior and after the premature ending of the hearing,

Appellant/Plaintiff clearly states repeatedly that she “contests” or

disagrees or does not accept the figures on the SOFA (Statement of

Financial Aid – Reconstructed Spreadsheet) produced by DSS.

n) And while the Plaintiff/Appellant does not use the same legal jargon or

format as she is NOT an attorney, and according to the Fair Hearing rules

and procedures and definition does NOT have to be an attorney nor know

the law and it’s procedures, she was held to a hirer set of standards than

all others both in violation of her Fundamental Rights and ADA rights un

Title II, 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the DOJ’s 28 CFR rules. But as

this was an INFORMAL MEETING to allow non-attorneys to disagree with

the agencies decisions, it would also follow that as a pro-se, she would not

use the same legal jargon in a “INFORMAL MEETING”. See various

attached Exhibits A (Letter Dated February 7, 2012 on the top of page 2,

Letter Dated March 17, 2012, Appellant/Plaintiff’s Prepared Statement for

the Fair Hearing called Kloth vs. DSS line item 17 & 18, Formal Complaint

filed November 20, 2014 lines 9-12)

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o) By the end of the prematurely closed hearing, Ms. Tar gave the

Appellant/Plaintiff permission to submit her evidence to Caseworker

Gillette to copy and send over to the Hearing Officer.

p) Caseworker Gillette was handed all of the files and information that the

Appellant/Plaintiff came to the fair hearing with, for him to copy and

submit, as it was cost prohibitive for the Appellant/Plaintiff to submit due to

her financial devastation.

q) Contained in all of this paperwork submitted to Caseworker Gillette were

all the letters, the statutes, laws, the Appellant/Plaintiff’s opening

statement of notes and everything that the Appellant/Plaintiff had amassed

to prove her case. This includes all the documents and proof that the

Appellate Courts are now claiming were never produced or stated. Thus

the Appellant/Plaintiff trusted Caseworker Gillette to do as he had

promised and make sure to reproduce all of her records and send them to

Hearing Officer Tar.

r) The Appellate Court and Judge Prescott of the Administrative and

Taxation Court are thus indirectly stating that Caseworker Gillette did NOT

send the entire packet to Hearing Officer Tar and thus violated his

Fiduciary Responsibilities.

s) If Caseworker Gillette did NOT copy and submit the entire file, this is an

additional Tort action that the Appellant/Plaintiff can now hold against the

Agency for Misrepresentation of their Fiduciary Responsibilities et.al. This

Tort has already been submitted and was part of the original claim.

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t) Appellant/Plaintiff had a reasonable belief and trust that Caseworker

Gillette would comply with the Hearing Officers orders to copy the

Appellant/Plaintiff’s file in it’s entirety and submit it. Therefore, there was a

fiduciary responsibility that the Appellant/Plaintiff believed she was being

legally protected by.

u) Additionally, as there is no production of paperwork with the

Appellant/Plaintiff’s signature, there is no evidence to object to in the files.

The Appellant/Plaintiff however, repeatedly addressed in letters and

motions, that she clearly “contested” the validity of the SOFA and of

getting $22,000 plus in assistance. (Exhibit A See attached Letters dated

February 7, 2012 and March 17, 2012, Kloth vs. DSS case notes for fair

hearing, Brief dated November 20, 2012 on item 12, Motion for

Reconsideration Dated January 16, 2013, Motion To Appeal dated,

January 16, 2013, including the Brief of November 2012.)

v) As to the courts claim that the Appellant/Plaintiff did not follow the rules of

evidence during her Fair Hearing, as the Appellant/Plaintiff is a pro-se who

is legally disabled, and not a formal lawyer, the plaintiff points to the

following policies and procedures related to Fair Hearings.

i) The fair hearing trial is NOT a formal court of law, but an “INFORMAL

MEETING” where evidence or papers are submitted in a informal

format, as a pro-se, the Appellant/Plaintiff would not know or

understand to object to them and was told that the fair hearing was an

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informal meeting and she did NOT need to be or have an attorney.

She was just to present her side of the story.

ii) A fair hearing is designed to be an “Informal meeting” because most

people filing for one are coming as pro-se and are not expected to

know the law and how to adjudicate a case.

iii) The point of it being informal is to allow a pro-se to present their case

without having to be an attorney and know all of the laws and rules, or

in other words, have to know that she needed to formally object to the

introduction of paperwork. (See quotation from the state of CT website:

http://www.ct.gov/dss/cwp/view.asp?a=2349&q=304648)

iv) In addition, the Assistant AG, even admitted in court that Fair Hearings

are very Informal, or as he put it, ‘Not done that way when it comes to

admitting evidence.’ (See Transcript) Therefore by the AAG’s own

admission, there was no need for the Appellant/Plaintiff to use the

words, “object”, as it was not a formal court trial presentation of

evidence nor was she expected to know that she had to object or

contest any of the state’s evidence.

v) Furthermore, in a fair hearing in 2009 and other fair hearing attended

by the Appellant/Plaintiff, she has never had to object to any

documents entered and won her case against DSS. This shows a

precedence that pro-se victims or litigants are not expected to know

the appropriate legal jargon or rules of evidence and to be expected to

use them in a Fair Hearing.

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vi) Furthermore, this shows a discrimination against the Appellant/Plaintiff

and retaliation for blowing the whistle on the Department of Social

Services for falsely placing a lien upon her and her property.

29) As to the courts claim that the Appellant/Plaintiff’s original files would not

have bore any evidence of what actually transpired in 1995-1998, the

Appellant/Plaintiff respectfully disagrees. In fact, they would clearly show that

the Appellant/Plaintiff did NOT receive the amount of money claimed by DSS

and that her assistance from the state was specific to Medicaid, Food

Stamps, Housing Assistance, Energy and Child Care via Maximus. All these

programs do NOT require reimbursement.

30) Furthermore, the original files would have shown that the Appellant/Plaintiff

was in fact a victim of Domestic Violence and had other rights that protected

her from further persecution.

31) The court has erred also on its conclusion that the “reconstructed

spreadsheet” is valid, just because the state and Caseworker Gillette, who

was not a party to the Appellant/Plaintiff’s original Welfare case, says it is

good.

a) With no evidence to justify the figures, there is no way, as the judge

clearly pointed out at the trial, to know if someone accidently hit a 4

instead of a one. See Authenticity of Evidence, Rules of Evidence and

Due Process and Right of Redress.

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b) Furthermore, there is no way to know if someone accidently put in the

wrong client ID and it came up with the Appellant/Plaintiff’s name instead

of another person.

c) As there is no witness from that time period who worked with the

Appellant/Plaintiff, there is no way to question anyone on the validity of the

information contained in the spreadsheet.

d) As the Appellant/Plaintiff did contest and disagreed to the spreadsheet in

her letters and in the evidence that she gave to Caseworker Gillette to

copy for the Hearing Officer Tar, the court has erred on it’s belief that the

Appellant/Plaintiff never objected, when in fact, the Appellant/Plaintiff

objected numerous times using the word “Contested” in place of

“objected” in all of her correspondences.

e) As to the Fair Hearing procedure according to the State of Connecticut’s

Department of Social Services own admission and description, it is that of

an INFORMAL MEETING where a client can present why they disagree

with the department’s actions. This means it is NOT a formal procedure

and thus a pro-se would not be expected to know the rules of evidence to

use the exact word, “OBJECT”. The use of the word CONTEST clearly

shows that the Appellant/Plaintiff did indeed object. (Exhibit B taken from

the state’s own website.)

32)As to the issue of being a victim of Domestic violence, the Appellant/Plaintiff

did site a state statute or in this case law and act. It falls under the Family

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Violence Act and copies of this act were submitted as evidence to Hearing

Officer Tar and thus were part of the record. (Exhibit C)

a) Had Hearing Officer Tar allowed the Appellant/Plaintiff to present her

case, this was one of the main things that she tried to present as to how

she even ended up getting any assistance from the State of CT.

33)As to the papers for the statute of limitations, this was part of the documents

that were submitted to Caseworker Gillette to copy and send to Hearing

Officer Tar and was part of presentation that she was not allowed to give.

(Exhibit D)

34)From February until the trial, the Appellant/Plaintiff was repeatedly denied

representation or at least an advocate or accommodation as required by law.

(Exhibits E)

a) Appellant/Plaintiff is disabled and indigent.

b) Appellant/Plaintiff repeatedly requested an attorney, accommodations or

an advocate. First, she tried state wide legal services who refused to

assist her in any format, despite state laws that this was discriminatory.

Appellant/Plaintiff was told by an anonymous source that Governor Malloy

blocked all indigents who were being gone after by the State or it’s

agencies with liens on their property from obtaining any legal aid.

c) She also contacted the ACLU.

d) And lastly, she contacted the ADA based on her disabilities, and in

particular her extreme PTSD, stress and anxiety, which she explained

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repeatedly, would prevent her from presenting her case properly during

the fair hearing without her getting emotionally upset.

e) By Federal and State statutes for Americans with Disabilities Act, this is a

violation of her civil rights to deny her this access. To save money, the

Appellant/Plaintiff requests that the court utilize their own copy of the

Transcript to verify that the Hearing Officer was well aware that the

Appellant/Plaintiff’s disabilities were taking a toll on her and affecting her

ability to participate in the hearing by referring to the following pages of the

transcript.

i) On page 12 of the transcript, the Appellant/Plaintiff clearly states at the

top to bear with her because this is extremely emotional for her.

ii) On page 13 of the Hearing Transcript is it quite obvious that the

Appellant/Plaintiff does NOT understand how to present evidence, how

to object to evidence, or how to present a case at all.

iii) On page 19 of the hearing transcript, line 4 & 5, the hearing officer

states, that she realizes the Appellant/Plaintiff is getting even more

upset and worked up. Clearly indicating that the hearing officer

realizes that the Appellant/Plaintiff’s disabilities are preventing her from

presenting her case properly.

iv) Then on page 20, line 16 & 17, the hearing officer again tells the

Appellant/Plaintiff that she is getting too upset and needs to calm

down.

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v) Then on page 22 to the top of page 23, starting at line 10 on page 22,

it is very clear that the Appellant/Plaintiff’s anxiety and the stress of

trying to present this case are overwhelming. The hearing officer, in

fact, refuses to allow her to continue.

vi) This clearly shows that the Appellant/Plaintiff was unable to properly

represent her case due to her disabilities.

vii) This clearly shows that the Appellant/Plaintiff should have been given

an attorney per the ADA laws and lack of financial means to afford an

attorney or at least been afforded more leniency by the Hearing Officer

rather than cut her off entirely.

viii) Had the state and agencies abided by the ADA law and

(1) Indigence laws, the Appellant/Plaintiff’s stress and anxiety would

not have been an issue.

ix) According to the Federal and State statutes for Americans with

Disabilities Act, this is a violation of her civil rights to deny her access

or make accommodations for her disability.

x) Had the Appellant/Plaintiff been provided with proper representation, a

formal objection during the fair hearing would have been properly

entered.

35)Attorney General and their offices has committed fraud upon the courts as

they were not legally permitted to make an appearance in this case as the

plaintiff had contacted them with their story and requesting assistance prior to

the filing of this case. (Exhibit F – Letter of July 12, 2012)

22

Wherefore, the Appellant/Plaintiff respectfully requests the courts remove the

lien upon her and her property due to serious frauds upon the courts by the

Appellees/Defendants per the Federal Laws. In addition, as the

Appellant/Plaintiff chances of a fair new trial in the State of Connecticut are

severely hampered and contaminated, the plaintiff reserves requests an out of

state impartial panel or jury to review her case that has NO ties to the State of CT

or it’s players. In addition, no matter how unartfully pleaded, the Plaintiff has

preserved her right to transfer to another jurisdiction or appeal up to the United

States Supreme Court. She also reserves the right to amend and correct any

defects. She has also used the statute in the federal practice book that allows the

practice book rules to be removed if it violates her substantive rights. And more

importantly, due to all the government misconduct, it creates a situation where by

the plaintiff cannot follow the rules.

Date: 02-13-2016

__________________________________Joan T. Kloth-Zanard, Pro-Se320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488203-770-0318

23

CERTIFICATION OF SENDING

Pursuant to P.B. § 62-7, 66-2 & 66-3 and all other state and federal rules and laws, this is

to certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent via email on this 13th day of February

2016 to the Defendant/Appellee’s attorney as follows:

Gary Williams, #403967

Assistant Attorney General

55 Elm Street/Post Office Box 120

Hartford, CT 06106/06141

860-808-5318 work

860-808-5587 fax

______________________________

Joan T. Kloth

Plaintiff, Pro-Se

320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488

24

Exhibit A

25

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488

203-267-7801 home

February 7, 2012

Dee Stygar

DSS?

Hartford, CT

RE: Request for Account to which social Security TANF was paid to

Dear Ms. Stygar:

To follow up with my recent phone message and conversation, my attorney and I

are requesting information as to the account or accounts that all of the payments

were sent to for each and every one of the payments stated in the SOFA. In

other words, for every payment made to me between February 1995 to October

1998, I need to know where and how the payment was sent, i.e. whether by

check to a mailing address or put on an EBT card and what they were for, i.e.

TANF or Daycare expenses.

Also, I am officially filing an appeal on the SOFA, which the state claims that I

owe. I came to this state in January 1995, with a Section 8 housing Voucher,

26

because I had gotten into Sacred Heart to get my degree Physical Therapy so I

could get off the system and be self-sufficient. My landlord, a probate attorney

firm at the time, agreed to sign my lease but once I moved in, the landlord was

refusing to sign the section 8 lease. I had already registered for my classes and

was ready to start school when this happened. The school recommended I put

my education off to September 1995, so I could secure a roof over our heads. At

the time, no one told us that do to the new Welfare To Work Reforms, that unless

I was enrolled and attending school by July 1995, I could no longer go to school.

In September, when I went to go back to school, Social Services informed that I

could no longer go. I explained the situation but no one would help me out. I did

not know how to fight this back then but tried to fight anyway. I was never told I

could appeal this decision either or that I could go to my state legislators and

congressman for help. Because of this, I ended up forced on the system for the

past 17 years, unable to ever get off. Had I attended school as I had planned

when I moved here on January 15, 1995, we would NOT be having this

conversation today and I would have been gainfully employed as a Physical

Therapist.

In addition, after this incident with me being denied the education I moved to CT

to get, I was put into two training programs for free or that were paid for by WIA.

Both of which, resulted in no employment and us still be stuck on the system.

And now I am being told that I have to pay back the daycare for these bumbles

for training that never resulted in work.

27

For these reasons, I am contesting and appealing the SOFA amounts based on

the fact that the state was the cause of this horrible situation that forced us for

the past 17 years to be stuck in one way or another on the system, when they

failed to assist me to continue my education for school before Welfare Reform hit

and thus denying me that chance to get off of the system. Then to add insult to

injury, the state added to this problem by providing me training that resulted not

only in no work, but further debt to the state for daycare expenses and money to

survive.

My Social Security Number is xxx-xx-6477

Please email all information to the address below.

My email address is Putzangel@aol.com

Thanks in advance.

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

28

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488

203-267-7801 home

Client ID: …8791

March 17, 2012

Office of Administrative Hearings and Appeals

Connecticut Department of Social Services

25 Sigourney Street, 12th Floor

Hartford, CT 06106-5033

RE: Appeal of Lien on Home and attachment to any monetary awards

Dear Hearings and Appeals Administration:

To follow up is my request for a Fair Hearing based on your recent letter of

March 13, 2012, stating you have placed a lien on my home. Not only does this

letter not detail how much this lien is for or what it stems from, but I believe it

should be voided. This letter is I write today, is the similar to the letter I sent on

February 7, 2012 to Dee Stygar at Social Services stating that it was my official

request for contesting the money Social Services claims I owe them. Ms. Stygar

never responded to my request except for placing a lien on my home. So now

for the history of this situation and my reasons for contesting it.

29

I came to this state in January 1995, with a Section 8 housing Voucher. I

had been homeless for 9 months with a brand new infant after her father tried to

strangle me when I was 5 months pregnant. I came here because I had gotten

into College to get my degree in Physical Therapy so I could get off the system

and be self-sufficient. My landlord, a probate attorney firm at the time, agreed to

sign my section 8 lease but once I moved in, the landlord was refusing to sign it.

I had already registered for my classes and was ready to start school when this

happened. The school recommended I put my education off to September 1995,

so I could secure a roof over our heads. At the time, no one told us that do to the

new Welfare To Work Reforms, that unless I was enrolled and attending school

by July 1995, I could no longer go to school. In September, when I went to go

back to school, Social Services informed that I could no longer go. I explained

the situation with the housing and being previously enrolled but no one would

help me out. I did not know how to fight this back then but tried to fight anyway.

I was never told I could appeal this decision either or that I could go to my state

legislators and congressman for help. Because of this, I ended up forced on the

system for the past 18 years, unable to ever get off. Had I attended school as I

had planned when I moved here on January 15, 1995, we would NOT be having

this conversation today and I would have been gainfully employed as a Physical

Therapist.

After this incident with me being denied the education I moved to CT to

get, I was put into two training programs sponsored by the state to help me

obtain employment. Both of which, resulted in no employment and us still being

30

stuck on the system. When this failed, I tried to work in construction but had to

quite due to physical problems. During this time, I was forced to take TANF and

put my child into daycare. Now I am being told that I have to pay back the

daycare and TANF for these bumbles for training that never resulted in work and

for daycare during the training and for the temporary work I did get as per

ordered by Welfare Reform. In other words, it was the federal changes of

Welfare Reform, i.e. Welfare to Work that caused the need for daycare, and a

charge to my account that I should not have needed. In addition, had Maximus

been available during this time, I would NOT have a daycare bill at all as all

daycare would have been provided at a reduced rate via Maximus.

Unable to get a stable job and loosing my eyesight, in 1999 I went back to

school at my expense to finish my BS in health and psychology so I could go on

for a dual masters in Marriage and Family Therapy as well as Professional

Counseling. I graduated in 2002 with a BS and immediately January 2003

started school full-time for my masters. By 2005, it was apparent that I was not

going to get my masters do to breach of contract and religious discrimination by

my graduate school. Of the 60 credits I need, I have 57.23 for a degree I can

never get and that has left me $62,000 in student loan debt. In 2006, I began a

lawsuit against my graduate school, which continues today.

At about this time in 2006, I pissed someone in Social Services off

because I kept reporting problems such as security breaches and problems with

obtaining proper medical care. At about this time, unannounced to me, DSS

begin an investigation claiming I am frauding them. The worker, Connie Onofrio

31

spent 2.5 years investigating me and going after me for fraud only to have the

case thrown out because she was double dipping my husband’s income and did

not follow DSS policy on self-employed home-businesses. She was furious and

has been ever since, as this would have been a big kudos for her with the

department. I do not know if this lien is her doing or not but it is a bit suspicious.

Now let’s add to this that I am legally disabled for physical and mental

issues. In 2010, I became officially disabled with degenerative joint disease and

extreme anxiety and stress. But despite this I continue to voluntarily work 24/7

online with victims of psychological abuse. I cannot get paid because I do NOT

have a degree. I cannot get a job because I am over-qualified or under-qualified.

And with my physical handicaps, it eliminates most of the jobs that are presently

out there. In fact, I have been working with BRS on and off since 2005 and they

have been unable to obtain me any employment.

It is also curious as to why now DSS would be putting a lien on our home,

when we are NOT selling it. It is worth nothing and we would then have no

where to live. But in the far future, if we did sell it, any money from the sale of

the house or from a monetary award, are desperately needed for me to survive

into my old age. At present, I only get $730 a month, which does NOT even pay

my bills now. To take any more money from me that would be required to keep

me from going homeless, starving, as well as living on the streets, would be a

grave injustice to my family and I.

Not to mention that my house is upside down in the market as well as

already has two liens on it, one for a roof and one for a heating system that had

32

to be paid by outside state agencies or my town as we could not afford these

repairs. Any left monies from a sale go to them first, and then would need to go

to moving and obtaining a new roof over our head that is stable. If Social

Services continues down this road, we would have no choice but to foreclose on

this house thus no one would see anything and, it would just add more insult to

injury for our economy and our situation.

Add to this that the house is also under a loan modification. In November

2013 our loan modification ends and if we are still living here, we will need to do

a new loan or modified loan on this house. With liens on the house, it becomes

very difficult to get one let alone getting them in a timely manner, or getting them

at all. So by putting a lien on our house, DSS is forcing us further into a

homeless situation and financial devastation. The point of social services is to

help us not hurt us but that does not seem to be their intention with this recent

harassment and abuse of me.

Also, on February 7, 2012 when I wrote to Dee Stygar, I requested a

breakdown of the monies as to who and what they were paid to and the total

amount to each, i.e. cash assistance vs. childcare. To this date, I have never

received it nor an acknowledgment of my letter, despite contacting Ms. Stygar a

second time about the letter and this matter. The only thing I got from Ms. Stygar

was this lien on my house.

I believe this lien is illegal as it would need to go through a court of law to

be enacted and cannot just be added without a court order allowing DSS to do

so. Much like when you win a judgment in court and the defendant does not pay.

33

Here there is and was NO court action and thus no right to put a lien on my

house. As far as I can tell from the statute, it says nothing about putting a lien on

the house, only that if I get a monetary win such as the lottery or a lawsuit that is

NOT discriminatory based, then I must pay back to the state first. But since

these damages owed are due to the state and federal governments negligence,

and are over 15 years old at least, this should not even be happening. There

should be a statute of limitations.

Let’s add to this, that the laws DSS is using to decide the fate of my life,

my house, my belongings, my gains were created after any monetary awards

had been given to me. I do NOT recall any such paperwork stating that I would

be responsible to pay this back if I had a monetary win or sold my house.

Therefore, I and here right now, I am requesting copies of said papers that I

signed during the years of 1995-1998 with DSS for cash assistance and daycare

that have my signatures on them and showing that I was bound by some law to

pay them back. If DSS cannot provide them, then this means I am grandfathered

in and the new laws cannot apply to me. From what I can see, these laws came

into affect between 1998 and 2005. I have NOT taken any monetary assistance

since August 1998 at which time I believe it was for daycare only. But starting in

July 1997, DSS began to get reimbursement from the father of my daughter via

child support, which paid for some of the monies after that date and thus the

monies owed are from prior to July 1997 before these laws were enacted, thus

grandfathering us in.

34

In addition, had welfare reform not demanded I find a job instead of going

to school, I would NOT have needed the TANF or daycare services as my

student loans would have paid for all of that and thus I would NOT be owing any

money to DSS. As well, the school had a daycare facility right on their property.

Because I was NOT allowed to get my education as a physical therapist, I lost

this opportunity to go to school so that I could get off of the system. Instead, I

was forced further onto the system and apparently, further into debt with the

state. This seems to be an indebt-ness that one can never get out of. This is

paramount to entrapment as I was forced into a position of being constantly

owing because I could not get my education so I could get off of the system.

Instead I was shoved on further in need of the states services. In fact, this is

quite apparent in that I have been suck on the system for medical assistance for

18 years and in the last two years, for food stamps, despite trying everything

possible to get off, including going back to school for my BS and then Masters in

Marriage and Family Therapy.

For these reasons, I am contesting this lien and all demands for the state

to be paid back, because I am legally disabled, poverty stricken and based on

the fact that the state and federal government via Welfare Reform in 1995, was

the cause of this horrible situation that forced us for the past 18 years to be stuck

in one way or another on the system, when they failed to allow me to continue

my education. This situation by the Federal and State agencies denied me the

chance to get off of the system. Then to add insult to injury, the state added to

this problem by providing me training that resulted not only in no work, but further

35

debt to the state for daycare expenses and money to survive. There is NO

reason that I should be paying back any daycare or TANF some 15 years later.

There should be a statute of limitations on all of this, especially since I have NOT

needed financial assistance or daycare since 1998. And with the enactment of

these pay-back laws after my receiving of this assistance, I should be

grandfathered out of paying them back.

My Social Security Number is xxx-xx-6477

Please email all information to Putzangel@aol.com and send a hard copy to the

address at the top of the page.

Regards,

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

36

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488

203-267-7801 home

Client: ….8791

Request: 439521

Motion for Reconsideration

This is a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the Appellant’s case for

client no. ….8791, Request No. 439521.

Here are the relevant facts for reconsideration:

1) Appellant is legally disabled with degenerative joint disease and extreme

stress and anxiety but was denied her rights under the ADA Act of 1990.

2) The state still has the burden of proof to prove that Appellant signed any

paperwork in the years between 1995-1998 that DSS claims she owes

them money for. DSS has been unable to provide any paperwork prior to

2010.

3) All Paperwork signed by the appellant to this day, does NOT state that if

she received TANF, that she must pay it back via liens on her personal

property.

4) An agency, or organization cannot claim hidden additional policies and

rules from outside sources that are not made readily available to the

claimant.

37

5) DSS tried to claim that the additional polices were out on the Internet for

appellant to access. In the 1990’s there was no such thing as the internet

as we know it today. In fact, Internet use was not even an asset that one

could access to obtain information from the state as the state was still

using a DOS system.

6) By consumer and federal law, an organization, business or corporation

cannot claim laws, rules or other policies that are NOT part of the contract

that the recipient is signing for. They cannot be posted somewhere else

that the claimant must obtain access for in order to read. In 1995-1998,

there was no internet access to obtain copies of additional polices or rules

that DSS was not informing the claimant of.

7) All additional polices, rules, and procedures must be printed in clear font

that is large enough to read and in the contract section of the application

where the claimant is to sign. They cannot be posted somewhere else

and still be considered part of the contract.

8) According to DSS, the contracts that are used today are the same ones

that were used in the 1990’s. If this is the case, nowhere on this present

contract does it state that if the appellant received TANF that she has to

pay it back. It only states if she got SAGA. Appellant never got SAGA.

9) By consumer and federal law, an organization, business or corporation

cannot claim laws, rules or other policies to be posted only on the internet,

as this does NOT constitute providing the information at the time of the

contract signing or that the signer of the documents has access to them

38

via the internet or that they have been even told about them. A signature

is required to confirm that the claimant has been told specifically about

these additional policies for the state to reclaim money. And since, the

state cannot produce any files prior to 2010, the burden of proof is on the

state that they apprised the appellant that such policies were in place or

that she signed acknowledging that she was told about these policies.

10)By consumer and federal law, an organization, business or corporation

cannot claim laws, rules or other policies that are in such small print that

they cannot be read without special reading glasses. Appellant has visual

handicaps and was going blind during the time that she supposedly was

receiving cash assistance.

11)By consumer and federal law, an organization, business or corporation

cannot claim laws, rules or other policies that are not handed to the

recipient of the services for them to sign off that they agree to them, which

further adds to point No. 1, that DSS cannot provide proof the claimants

signature that she had been told about this lien process.

12) DSS has been unable to produce files back any further back than 2010.

Cash assistance is only being claimed owed for the years of 1995-1998.

13)It is further stipulated that the Appellant would not have needed the

supposed cash assistance if DSS had NOT denied her legal right to

continue her education that she moved to CT to finish in 1995. Appellant

moved here with her 11-month old daughter after being homeless for 9

months right after a serious domestic violence altercation. Appellant was

39

covered for this continued education under the Family Violence Act and

Laws.

14)Had Appellant been allowed to go to school as was her right under the

Family Violence Act and laws, she would have had student loans, grants

and funding to pay for any cash assistance she needed.

15)The denial of the appellants right to her education in 1995, caused serious

harm and damages to the appellant.

16)Under the family violence laws, the claimant is NOT held to the same set

of standards as they have been forced onto the system by a domestic

violence issue.

17)Under the Family Violence Act, Appellant would have been allowed to

continue her education, whether she was enrolled in school by July 1995

or not. It just so happens that Appellant was enrolled in January 1995 but

then denied her education by DSS.

18)In 1995, DSS was fully aware that Claimant was victim of domestic

violence, as they demanded the name and contact information of the

biological father. DSS threatened the claimant could not get assistance if

she did not divulge this information. Claimant was forced under duress to

disclose her attacker and his whereabouts so that he could now track her

to CT.

19)Claimant provided all this evidence to the hearing officer who completely

ignored her evidence and refused to allow her to present her case.

40

20)Hearing Officer for this case discriminated against the Appellant who is

clearly disabled with stress and anxiety when before the hearing was even

put on record, she began screaming at the appellant. This action caused

the appellant to be over-wrought with fear, stress and anxiety making it

difficult for the Appellant to present her case.

21)Even when Appellant tried to stay calm and read from her paperwork, the

Hearing Officer refused to listen to her evidence and repeatedly shut the

appellant down.

22)Hearing officer refused to allow appellant to present her case and closed

the hearing with prejudice against the appellant.

Wherefore, Appellant respectfully asks for a Reconsideration of this case and for

the Hearing officer to be brought up on charges of discrimination against the

disabled.

Date: January 16, 2013

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

Pro-se

41

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488

203-267-7801 home

Kloth-Zanard : Client: ….8791

Vs. :

Department of Social Services :

& State of CT : Request:

439521

MOTION FOR APPEAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES (DSS)

FAIR HEARING AND DISMISSAL OF ALL CHARGES

This is a motion for Appeal of the dismissal of the Appellant’s case, client no.

….8791, Request No. 439521 with the Department of Social Services pertaining

to a Lien upon the Appellant’s property.

Here are the relevant facts for appeal:

23) Appellant is legally disabled with degenerative joint disease and extreme

stress and anxiety but was denied her rights under the ADA Act of 1990

when she requested legal assistance.

a. Title 42 – The Public Health and Welfare- Chapter 26 – Equal

Opportunity For Individuals with Disabilities.

42

24) Appellant came to this state homeless with an 11-month-old child and

as a victim of Domestic Violence. Appellant had been accepted into

College to obtain her degree as a Physical Therapist so she could be

self-sufficient. The Appellee denied her this right under the Family

Violence Act that affords DV Victims to not be held to the same set of

standards pertaining to education as another claimant on Welfare

under the Welfare Reform Act.

a. 104th Congress (1995-1996)H.R.3734.ENR, 7(iii) waive, pursuant

to a determination of good cause, other program requirements such

as time limits (for so long as necessary) for individuals receiving

assistance, residency requirements, child support cooperation

requirements, and family cap provisions, in cases where

compliance with such requirements would make it more difficult for

individuals receiving assistance under this part to escape domestic

violence or unfairly penalize such individuals who are or have been

victimized by such violence, or individuals who are at risk of further

domestic violence.

25) Further as to the Appellant’s education, the Appellee lied to the Appellant

when they told her to put her education off until September 1995, when

the Appellant had a housing crisis. The Appellee having just spent the

better part of the past year being educated on the New Welfare Reform

Act, knew that the Appellant had to be enrolled in school by July 1995.

43

26) Appellant asserts that she does NOT owe $22,000 in Cash Assistance

that she supposedly received between 1995-1998.

a. Appellant is unable to prove how much she actually owes as

Appellee has deliberately destroyed all the files pertaining to the

years in question.

i. As the Appellee is claiming no statute of limitations, it is

therefore their responsibility to maintain all of the records

pertaining to their claim. The fact that they deliberately

destroyed all of the evidence upon which the Appellant

relied, is a violation of due process and intentional spoliation

of evidence.

1. Under federal and state law, the intentional spoliation

of evidence is grounds for dismissal

ii. This makes the burden of proof that the Appellant actually

owes this amount of money based on signed contracts and

DOS documents that are subject to human error a matter of

serious issue.

iii. Furthermore, it is highly suspect that the Appellant would

owe this much money when all files were transposed

manually by a social worker from a DOS file to the present

computer system.

iv. In addition, the amount of money $22,000 plus the child

support that was paid and removed from the total figure of

44

$28,310 over a supposed period of 39 months, amounts to

$725 a month in cash, which comes out to $4.22 an hour.

Minimum wage in 1995 through October 1996 was only

$4.25. It is highly suspect that the state would have given

any claimant under the new Welfare Reform act, almost

minimum wage.

v. In addition, Welfare Reform act only allowed for a person to

receive cash assistance for only 18 months, thus making 39

months a violation of the Welfare Reform Act by the

Appellee or a gross overstatement of the time the Appellant

was receiving state cash assistance.

vi. Further proof that the figures are probably inaccurate is in

the case of a 70 year old woman whom was on the system

as a single adult in 1960 and DSS claims that she owes

$37,000.

1. How can a single adult owe more than two people on

the system 35 years later, when the cost of living

dramatically increased in that time frame?

2. This shows that chances are pretty good that DSS’s

files are inaccurate and inappropriate. But since they

have deliberately destroyed them, making

examination of how the Appellee came to these

figures impossible.

45

REMAINDER OF THIS DOCUMENT IS ALREADY PART OF COURT

RECORDS.

46

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard Client ID: …….8791

Respondent, Pro Se CCSES Number:

320 North George’s Hill Road Request Number 429521

Southbury, Connecticut 06488

Phone:

IN THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, REGULATIONS

AND ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

IN AND FOR THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In Re the Matter of: |

|

JOAN T. KLOTH-ZANARD, |

|

vs. |

|

WATERBURY DEPARTMENT OF |

SOCIAL SERVICES |

_______________________________________|

COMES NOW Complainant Joan T. Kloth-Zanard with this her

Presentation to the Waterbury Department of Social Services Regional Office

relating to the unlawful placement of a LIEN on Complainant’s real estate and

would respectfully show the Department the following:

47

1. Complainant came to the State of Connecticut as an abused spouse

who was a victim of domestic violence and disabled individual in 1994.

A copy of the Final Restraining Order of the Superior Court, Chancery

Division, Family Part Bergen County, State of New Jersey is attached

as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference for all purposes as

if fully set forth verbatim.

2. As a victim of abuse while pregnant, complainant ended up homeless

right after her daughter was born and moved to Connecticut under CT

PA-99 and 97 of the Domestic Violence Laws to complete her

education so she could become self-sufficient. At that time, she was

required as a victim of domestic violence, to apply for various types of

state aid. The Department of Social Services denied her access to

education in 1995.

3. It is Complainant’s position that the denial of her educational

opportunities in 1995 extended her needs for cash assistance from the

State.

4. In 1996, the Department unlawfully placed a lien on a housing

discrimination lawsuit for any and all past, present and future cash

assistance received. As a victim of domestic violence when

Complainant received state assistance no such lien was required by

law, b), Connecticut Statute 17b.93 c exempts such liens in

discrimination cases such as Complainant’s, and c), the Department

notified Complainant in 1996 that the lien was unwarranted, but left the

48

lien against Complainant in place without notifying Complainant or her

pro bono. This error by the Department caused Complainant additional

problems and damages by, in effect, blackballing her on all

employment background checks, thus preventing her from obtaining

gainful employment.

5. In 1997, Connecticut’s Department of Children and Families

erroneously listed Complainant on the State’s Abuse and Neglect

Registry, despite the fact that her case had been dismissed with

prejudice and closed, even though the resolution of the case was duly

noted in the Department’s records. Further, the Department never

notified Complainant of the listing or any disposition of the case so that

Complainant did not discover the error to allow her to begin correcting

it until June of 2012. This error also tainted Complainant’s job search

efforts and prevented her from becoming gainfully employed for more

than a decade or to be precise, 17 years.

6. State law and regulations only mandate repayment of State cash

assistance for State Administered General Assistance. Complainant

has never received State Administered General Assistance.

7. Complainant did receive funds under the State’s Temporary

Assistance for Needy Families program. Complainant understands,

however, that Temporary Assistance for Needy Families funds are not

covered by the State’s lien regulations.

49

8. Complainant also notes that under the Family Violence Laws, victims

of abuse, especially if while pregnant, are NOT held to the same set of

standards as other welfare recipients.

9. The Department of Social Services is unable to produce any papers

with Complainant’s signature stating that she agreed to pay back any

money prior to 2010. Copies of e-mails from Thomas Gaudette and

Carolyn P. McCarthy demonstrate that the Department has been

unable to produce any documentary evidence of any evidence of

Complainant’s indebtedness are attached as Exhibit B and

incorporated by reference for all purposes as if fully set forth verbatim.

Complainant asserts that the Department’s failure to provide original

documents relating to Complainant’s indebtedness fails to meet any

reasonable standard of credible, admissible evidence of any debt owed

to the State of Connecticut.

10.Complainant asserts that she has never signed any document calling

for repayment of moneys to the State, that she has never received

State Administered General Assistance, and that the only assistance

she has received has been Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,

which does not require any repayment to the State.

11.All computer records produced by the Department relating to the

claimed indebtedness of Complainant are NOT from 1995-1998 as the

system was then a DOS system and not reliable enough to retain

information and track validity of it.

50

12.The Department has not produced any credible or admissible evidence

whatsoever that Complainant owes the State of Connecticut any

money whatsoever from assistance received from the State.

Complainant asserts that the purported charts the Department has

produced are based on unreliable and questionable computer files

created years after the claimed indebtedness was supposedly

incurred. Further, there is no assurance of any sort that the purported

charts are accurate in any manner.

13.Complainant believes that the State is violating various State and

Federal statutes of limitations on debt in general and recovery of

statutory aid in general.

14.Complainant is still legally disabled, recognized as such in the State’s

records, with disabilities that meet the definitions of the Americans with

Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 and entitled therefore to its

protections and accommodations from the State based on her

disabilities.

15.Further, as a victim of abuse, Complainant’s position is that she is not

held to the same standard under Connecticut law and the Family

Violence Laws, and is not required to make reimbursements to the

State. At the time Complainant applied for State assistance, none of

the documents she signed, and none of the documents transmitted to

her, notified her for any requirement to repay any of the State

assistance for which she applied or that she eventually received. All of

51

the 1995 documents filed with the Department is the same paperwork

being used for Department claims presently. The paperwork in

question makes no reference to any requirement to reimburse the

State for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families via liens, only

State Administered General Assistance, that Complainant never

applied for or received.

16.Documents Complainant signed from 1995-1998 apparently no longer

exist in the State’s files. The Department have failed and refused to

produce either the original “wet ink” copies or true and correct copies

of the originals. Further, by law, Complainant is not required to retain

such records for more than seven (7) years. Complainant has

requested the required information/evidence on no less than five (5)

occasions and, over a period of six (6) months the Department was

unable to locate and/or produce any records relating to Complainant

prior to 2010. During the two (2) years for which records have been

produced, Complainant did not receive any cash assistance

whatsoever. It is Complainant’s position that the Department has the

burden of proof for the claims being made against Complainant’s real

estate, and the Department has clearly failed to meet its burden.

17. In seventeen years of dealing with the Department for her original

determination and various requests for “redetermination,”

Redetermination papers state that ONLY State Administered General

Assistance recipients must repay cash assistance through liens.

52

Complainant has never received State Administered General

Assistance as this is only for people with health problems and she did

NOT have health problems back in 1995-1998. However, the

redetermination papers which Complainant signed give no notice of

any requirement to repay Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

cash assistance via lien or otherwise.

18. Finally, Complainant cannot identify a single legal precedent in

Connecticut or the Federal system that supports the Department’s

action of placing a lien on Complainant’s real estate.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Complainant respectfully

requests the hearing commissioner to Order the Department to correct all of

Complainant’s records and to require the Department to remove any and all liens

on Complainant’s real estate, to lawfully, properly and expeditiously file all

necessary documents with any appropriate government entity or organization,

and thereafter to formally and officially notify Complainant that the process has

been properly and successfully completed.

November 20, 2012 Respectfully submitted,

______________________________

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

Respondent, Pro Se

320 North George’s Hill Road

53

Southbury, Connecticut 06488

54

EXHIBIT B

55

THE HEARING:

Taken from State of CT Website:

http://www.ct.gov/dss/cwp/view.asp?a=2349&q=304648

Hearings are usually held by video conference

If your hearing involves Child Support, Childcare or a Nursing Home Discharge,

not all of the following information may apply to you.

The hearing process gives you a chance to explain why you disagree with the

Department’s action. It is an informal meeting, presided over by a hearing officer,

in which someone from the Department, usually your eligibility worker, will

explain the Department’s action. You will be able to present your side of the

situation and provide any documents that you think might help your argument.

You may also bring witnesses who can testify for you.

56

EXHIBIT C

57

ADDENDUM B TAKEN FROM:

Location: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE;

October 2, 2009 2009-R-0349

SUMMARY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE LAWS

By: Sandra Norman-Eady, Chief Attorney

You asked for a summary of Connecticut's family violence laws, including all

major changes by year.

SUMMARY

Since 1977, Connecticut has had laws designed to protect spouses from

domestic abuse. Initially, the law sought to provide this protection by authorizing

courts to grant protective orders. In 1986, Connecticut enacted a comprehensive

family violence act. Among other things, the law defines family violence, gives

police officers and courts directions on handling family violence cases, and

requires the Judicial Department to maintain family violence intervention units in

each of its geographical areas.

Domestic violence laws have been amended almost every year since 1986. The

58

amendments are both civil and criminal in nature and cover aspects of family

violence ranging from the definition of a family or household member to the

creation of an address protection program.

CONNECTICUT'S FAMILY VIOLENCE LAWS

Family Violence Defined

Connecticut law defines “family violence” as an incident between family or

household members that either causes physical injury or creates fear that

physical injury is about to occur. Verbal abuse or argument is not considered

family violence unless there is present danger and the likelihood that physical

violence will occur. The discipline of minor children by parents or guardians is not

considered family violence unless

An Act Concerning Welfare Reform and The Expenditures Of The

Department of Social Services (PA 97-2, June 18 Special Session)

The act exempts Temporary Family Assistance applicants and recipients who are

victims of family violence from job training, work placement assistance,

subsidized and unsubsidized employment, and child support enforcement

requirements. It defines a domestic violence victim as someone who has been

battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by (1) physical acts that resulted in, or

threatened to result in, physical injury; (2) sexual abuse; (3) sexual activity

involving a child in the home; (4) being forced to participate in sexual acts; (5)

mental abuse; or (6) neglect or medical care deprivation.

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60

EXHIBIT D

61

THIS STATUTE WAS THE EXACT STATUTE SUBMITTED TO THE FAIR

HEARING OFFICER AND OFFERED AS EVIDENCE IN THE PAPERWORK TO

BE COPIED AND SUBMITTED TO THE HEARING OFFICER BY

CASEWORKER GILLETTE. FOR BREVITY, APPELLANT ONLY INCLUDES

PORTIONS TO HELP WITH PAPER REDUCTION ACT AS THIS IS AN 11

PAGE DOCUMENT

CHAPTER 926*

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

      Secs. 52-573 and 52-574. Limitation on contracts under seal. Actions on

agreements to sell real estate. Sections 52-573 and 52-574 are

repealed.      (1949 Rev., S. 8313; 1949, S. 3232d; 1959, P.A. 574, S. 7;

February, 1965, P.A. 401, S. 2; 1971, P.A. 18, S. 2.)

(Return to

Chapter Table of Contents)

(Return to

List of Chapters)

(Return to

List of Titles)

      Sec. 52-575. Entry upon land to be made within fifteen years. (a) No

person shall make entry into any lands or tenements but within fifteen years next

after his right or title to the same first descends or accrues or within fifteen years

next after such person or persons have been ousted from possession of such

land or tenements; and every person, not entering as aforesaid, and his heirs,

shall be utterly disabled to make such entry afterwards; and no such entry shall

be sufficient, unless within such fifteen-year period, any person or persons

62

claiming ownership of such lands and tenements and the right of entry and

possession thereof against any person or persons who are in actual possession

of such lands or tenements, gives notice in writing to the person or persons in

possession of the land or tenements of the intention of the person giving the

notice to dispute the right of possession of the person or persons to whom such

notice is given and to prevent the other party or parties from acquiring such right,

and the notice being served and recorded as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-

40 shall be deemed an interruption of the use and possession and shall prevent

the acquiring of a right thereto by the continuance of the use and possession for

any length of time thereafter, provided an action is commenced thereupon within

one year next after the recording of such notice. The limitation herein prescribed

shall not begin to run against the right of entry of any owner of a remainder or

reversionary interest in real estate, which is in the adverse possession of

another, until the expiration of the particular estate preceding such remainder or

reversionary estate.      (b) If any person who has such right or title of entry into

any lands or tenements is, at the time of the first descending or accruing of such

right or title, a minor, non compos mentis or imprisoned, he and his heirs may,

notwithstanding the expiration of such fifteen years, make such entry and serve

and record such notice at any time within five years next after full age, coming of

sound mind or release from prison, or his heirs shall, within five years after his

death, make such entry and serve and record such notice, and take benefit of the

same.      (1949 Rev., S. 8314; P.A. 96-249, S. 13, 14.)      History: P.A. 96-249

divided section into Subsecs. and in Subsec. (a) added provision re interruption

63

of possession, effective June 6, 1996.      See Secs. 47-26, 47-27 re title by

adverse possession by or against railroad and railway companies and formerly

canal companies.      

      Sec. 52-575a. Action to enforce recorded private restrictions or

notations on maps. No action or any other type of court proceeding shall be

brought to enforce a private restriction recorded in the land records of the

municipality in which the property is located or a notation on a filed map

pertaining to the use of privately owned land, the type of structures that may be

erected thereon or the location of same unless such action or proceeding shall

be commenced within three years of the time that the person seeking to enforce

such restriction had actual or constructive knowledge of such violation. This

section shall be deemed not to apply to any private restriction or notation

pertaining to (a) any public utility easement; (b) any right-of-way; (c) any park or

open space land; (d) any private driveway, roadway or street, or (e) any sewer

line or water line.      (1972, P.A. 283; P.A. 73-93; P.A. 90-169.)      History: P.A.

73-93 substituted "the party seeking to enforce such restriction" for "such party"

for clarity; P.A. 90-169 replaced "a recorded private restriction" with "a private

restriction recorded in the land records of the municipality in which the property is

located".      Cited. 214 C. 464.

(Return to

Chapter Table of Contents)

(Return to

List of Chapters)

(Return to

List of Titles)

      Sec. 52-576. Actions for account or on simple or implied contracts. (a)

64

No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract

in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues,

except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.      (b) Any person legally

incapable of bringing any such action at the accruing of the right of action may

sue at any time within three years after becoming legally capable of bringing the

action.      (c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to actions upon

judgments of any court of the United States or of any court of any state within the

United States, or to any cause of action governed by article 2 of title

42a.      (1949 Rev., S. 8315; 1959, P.A. 574, S. 8; 1971, P.A. 18, S. 1; P.A. 82-

160, S. 246.)      History: 1959 act deleted exception for nonnegotiable

promissory notes and added provision re article 2 of title 42a; 1971 act referred

to any "contract in writing" rather than to "any contract in writing not under seal";

P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.      See Sec.

17b-122 re reimbursement of town by pauper

      Sec. 52-577. Action founded upon a tort. No action founded upon a tort

shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission

complained of.      (1949 Rev., S. 8316.)      See Sec. 52-555 re actions for

injuries resulting in death.      See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to

person or property caused by negligence, misconduct or malpractice

      Sec. 52-577a. Limitation of action based on product liability claim. (a)

No product liability claim, as defined in section 52-572m, shall be brought but

within three years from the date when the injury, death or property damage is first

65

sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been

discovered, except that, subject to the provisions of subsections (c), (d) and (e)

of this section, no such action may be brought against any party nor may any

party be impleaded pursuant to subsection (b) of this section later than ten years

from the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the

product.      (b) In any such action, a product seller may implead any third party

who is or may be liable for all or part of the claimant's claim, if such third party

defendant is served with the third party complaint within one year from the date

the cause of action brought under subsection (a) of this section is returned to

court.      (c) The ten-year limitation provided for in subsection (a) of this section

shall not apply to any product liability claim brought by a claimant who is not

entitled to compensation under chapter 568, provided the claimant can prove that

the harm occurred during the useful safe life of the product. In determining

whether a product's useful safe life has expired, the trier of fact may consider

among other factors: (1) The effect on the product of wear and tear or

deterioration from natural causes; (2) the effect of climatic and other local

conditions in which the product was used; (3) the policy of the user and similar

users as to repairs, renewals and replacements; (4) representations, instructions

and warnings made by the product seller about the useful safe life of the product;

and (5) any modification or alteration of the product by a user or third

party.      (d) The ten-year limitation provided for in subsection (a) of this section

shall be extended pursuant to the terms of any express written warranty that the

product can be used for a period longer than ten years, and shall not preclude

66

any action against a product seller who intentionally misrepresents a product or

fraudulently conceals information about it, provided the misrepresentation or

fraudulent concealment was the proximate cause of harm of the claimant.      (e)

The ten-year limitation provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall not

apply to any product liability claim, whenever brought, involving injury, death or

property damage caused by contact with or exposure to asbestos, except that (1)

no such action for personal injury or death may be brought by the claimant later

than sixty years from the date that the claimant last had contact with or exposure

to asbestos, and (2) no such action for damage to property may be brought by

the claimant later than thirty years from the date of last contact with or exposure

to asbestos.      (f) The definitions contained in section 52-572m shall apply to

this section.      (g) The provisions of this section shall apply to all product liability

claims brought on or after October 1, 1979.      (P.A. 76-293, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-604,

S. 36, 84; P.A. 79-483, S. 3; 79-631, S. 107, 111; P.A. 82-160, S. 247; P.A. 87-

537, S. 12, 13; P.A. 90-191, S. 1; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 40, 70; P.A. 05-

288, S. 180.)      

      Sec. 52-577b. Limitation of action for damages caused by contact with

or exposure to phenoxy herbicides. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections

52-577 and 52-577a, an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by

contact with or exposure to phenoxy herbicides while serving as a member of the

armed forces of the United States in Indo-China from January 1, 1962, through

March 29, 1973, may be commenced within two years from the date of discovery

of such injury, or within two years from the date when, through the exercise of

67

reasonable diligence, the cause of such injury should have been discovered,

whichever is later.      (P.A. 83-15, S. 1, 2.)      See chapter 506, part IV (Sec. 27-

140aa et seq.) for Vietnam Herbicides Information Commission.      Cited. 205 C.

219. Cited. 214 C. 464.

68

EXHIBIT E

69

70

71

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard Client ID: ….8791

320 North George’s Hill Road CCSES Number:

Southbury, CT 06488 Request No. 439521

203-770-0318 cell

203-267-7802 fax

NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR CONTINUATION

Issue: Notice of Lien

Program: Public Assistance

Detail:

To follow is my request for continuation of 30-60 days based on the ADA

Rules and discovery while an ADA specialist assists me in putting this

case together. Please acknowledge receipt of this fax ASAP by either

calling or faxing an acknowledgement.

Regards,

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

72

REQUEST FOR ADAAA ACCOMMODATIONS

Joan Kloth is disabled under the definitions of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Amendments Act of 2008, and therefore entitled to accommodations from this

entity under Federal law.

The ADA was enacted in 1990 to provide a clear and comprehensive national

mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §

1210l(b)(1). The ADA was subsequently amended by the ADAAA which became

effective on January 1, 2009 and was thereafter published in the United States

Code to clarify and extend Congress’s intentions with regard to disabled persons’

participation in all aspects of American society. (P.L. 110-325). The law’s

purpose was to ensure that disabled individuals are given to equal access

to employment, public services, public accommodations and

telecommunications. Title II, prohibits any public entity from discriminating

against “qualified persons” with disabilities in the course of the public

service, program or activity. §§12131-12134.

The ADAAA defines the term “public entity” to include state and local

governments, as well as their agencies and instrumentalities. § 12131 (1). An

individual is a qualified person with a disability if they, “with or without reasonable

modifications to rules, policies or practices, the removal of . . . communication

barriers meet the essential eligibility requirements for services provided by the

public entity. § 12131(2). (citing Tennessee v. Lane, U.S. 541 US 509, 517

(2004). Title II incorporates by reference the enforcement provisions of §505 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794a, which authorizes private citizens

73

to bring suit for money damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12133; Id. at 517.

Once a disabled litigant has provided sufficient information to a covered entity to

document his or her qualified disability, that entity is required to provide

reasonable modifications to its rules, policies or practices in order to allow that

litigant to have access to the essential services provided by the court. See 42

U.S.C. 12131(2). According to the law, accommodations are NOT business

as usual within the existing rules, but reasonable modifications to those

rules to insure meaningful participation by the disabled person.

Congress’s intention was equally clear relating to the prerogatives of disabled

individuals rights to accept [or reject] tendered accommodations. The 42 U.S.C.

12201(d), statement, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require an

individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service,

opportunity, or benefit which such individual chooses not to accept that

violates this protective provision,” puts common local court procedure in

direct contention with Federal law.

Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, known as the Supremacy

Clause, establishes the U.S. Constitution, U.S. treaties, and Federal statutes as

“the supreme law of the land.” The text decrees these to be the highest form of

law in the U.S. legal system, and mandates that all state judges must follow

Federal law when a conflict arises between Federal law and either the state

constitution or state law of any state. (Within the Clause, the word “shall” is

used, which makes it a necessity, a compulsion.) The Supremacy Clause applies

if the “Federal government is acting in pursuit of its constitutionally authorized

74

powers, as noted by the phrase “in pursuance thereof” in the actual text of the

Supremacy Clause itself. With regard to the ADAAA and its precursor statutes,

all are recognized as “civil rights statutes” and all have been challenged before

the United States Supreme Court and have been found to be constitutional and

lawful. In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) the Supreme Court held

that when Federal interest in an area of law is sufficiently dominant, Federal

law must be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same

subject; and a state law is not to be declared a help when state law goes

farther than Congress has seen fit to go. [emphasis added]

More recently, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ found in Barker v.

Riverside County Office of Education, 584 F.3d 821, 22 A.D. Cases 835 (9th Cir.

2009) that “the language employed in the anti-retaliation provisions of Title

II1 does not evince a congressional intent to limit standing to individuals

with disabilities” is specifically instructive. The use of the phrase “any

individual” and the absence of any language limiting standing to those with

disabilities indicates Congress’ intent to grant standing under Title II “as

broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” See Innovative

Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d at 47 (citing Trafficante v.

Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209(1972)). What the panel did mean is

that Clause (a) of §35.134 protects “any individual” who “has opposed any

act or practice made unlawful by this part.” 28 C.F.R. §35.134 [emphasis

1 In fact, the anti-retaliation section, §12203, is actually found in Title IV of the statute, which lists miscellaneous provisions that apply to the statute generally and to other applicable laws.

75

added].

. In Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc. v. the Eighth Judicial District Court of the

State of Nevada, In and For, No. 57461 (Nev. 08/09/2012), the Nevada Supreme

Court made clear that the laws of the State of Nevada are preempted by the

Federal statute.

The Jensen Court explained that “whether state law claims are preempted by

federal law is a question of law that we review de novo, without deference to the

findings of the district court.” Nanopierce Tech. v. Depository Trust, 123 Nev.

362, 370, 168 P.3d 73, 79 (2007). The Nevada Supreme Court found that

preemption doctrine emanates from the Supremacy Clause of the United

States Constitution, pursuant to which state law must yield when it frustrates or

conflicts with Federal law. Id. The doctrine is comprised of two broad branches:

express and implied preemption. Id. Express preemption occurs, as its name

suggests, when Congress “explicitly states that intent in a statute's language.” Id.

at 371, 168 P.3d at 79. Implied preemption arises, in contrast, “[w]hen Congress

does not include statutory language expressly preempting state law.” Id.

Implied preemption contains two sub-branches: field and conflict preemption.

Id. Field preemption applies “when congressional enactments so thoroughly

occupy a legislative field, or touch a field in which the Federal interest is so

dominant, that Congress effectively leaves no room for states to regulate conduct

in that field.” Id. Conflict preemption, or obstacle preemption, as it is oftentimes

called, occurs when “Federal law actually conflicts with any state law.” Id. at 371,

168 P.3d at 80. The Jensen court explained that conflict preemption analysis

76

examines the federal statute as a whole to determine whether a party's

compliance with both Federal and state requirements is impossible or whether, in

light of the Federal statute's purpose and intended effects, state law poses an

obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's objectives. Id. at 371-72, 168 P.3d

at 80.

The Jensen court found that “Although states have the ‘police powers to

prohibit discrimination on specified grounds,’” Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp.,

432 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2005), historically states have, at best, played a

junior role in this area. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985)

(explaining that Congress enacted provisions prohibiting discrimination

against disabled persons precisely because such persons had otherwise

been neglected). Thus, because the petition did not involve a legislative

landscape traditionally occupied by the states, the presumption against

preemption did not apply with particular force to the issues in Jensen. See

Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 n.3 (noting that the force given to the presumption

against preemption is guided by “the historic presence of state law”). With these

overarching principles in mind, the court considered the purpose and intended

effects of the ADA.

It found that “the issue of preemption under the ADA is an issue of

nationwide magnitude in need of clarification in the courts of this state.”

[emphasis added] [¶ 26] The Nevada Supreme Court stated specifically in

Jensen that “The preemption doctrine emanates from the Supremacy

Clause of the United States Constitution, pursuant to which state law must

77

yield when it frustrates or conflicts with Federal law. [emphasis added] Id.

The Jensen court explained that “the doctrine is comprised of two broad

branches: express and implied preemption.” Id. Express preemption occurs,

as its name suggests, when Congress “explicitly states that intent in a

statute’s language.” Id. at 371, 168 P.3d at 79.

More recently, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ found in Barker v.

Riverside County Office of Education, 584 F.3d 821, 22 A.D. Cases 835 (9th Cir.

2009) that “the language employed in the anti-retaliation provisions of Title II2

does not evince a congressional intent to limit standing to individuals with

disabilities” is specifically instructive. Instead, the use of the phrase “any

individual” and the absence of any language limiting standing to those with

disabilities indicates Congress’ intent to grant standing under Title II “as broadly

as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution” is dispositive regarding the

courtroom participation of ADAAA advocates. See Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v.

City of White Plains, 117 F.3d at 47 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.,

Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209(1972)). In essence, the Ninth Circuit court found that

Section 504 and Title II do not mean “any individual with a bar card.” Nor do they

mean “any individual a judge chooses to allow.” What the panel did mean is that

Clause (a) of §35.134 protects “any individual” who “has opposed any act

or practice made unlawful by this part.” 28 C.F.R. §35.134 [emphasis added].

In Olmstead v. L. C., 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 549, 9 A.D. Cases 705 (U.S.

2 In fact, the anti-retaliation section, §12203, is actually found in Title IV of the statute, which lists miscellaneous provisions that apply to the statute generally and to other applicable laws.

78

1999) the Supreme Court of the United States found that state courts fall under

the purview of the ADA statute, and that states can be liable for money damages

for violation of ADA mandates. Many courts across the country have recognized

that the application of Title II to the courts of this country requires that an ADA

litigant’s confidentiality be protected and allow for ex parte communications as it

relates only to the ADA accommodations requests of the litigants. The Superior

Court of California, County of Alameda, provides on its website the ADAAA policy

and procedure, which provides for a streamlined process for applicants to

request and obtain accommodations. See

http://vvvvw.alameda.courts.ca.gov/courts/ada/index.shtml. Further, New

Hampshire courts permit an applicant to make ex parte communications with the

court, so long as such communications deal only with the accommodation(s)

request and do not deal with the subject matter or the merits of the proceeding

before the court. Id. By way of further example, the ADAAA policy and procedure

for the Fourth District of Idaho, provides that “confidentiality” applies to the

identity of the applicant in all oral and written communications, including all files

and documents submitted by an applicant as part of the application process for

accommodations in court proceedings. (See http://www2.state.id.lls/fourthjudicial)

Washington State’s, Clark County courts website specifically states that medical

and health information related to accommodations will be sealed automatically

by the court. (See http://wvvw.co.clark.wa.us/courts/). The Georgia Commission

on Access and Fairness in the Courts, specifically states that a well-drafted

accommodation procedure should maintain the confidentiality of medical

79

information (step 3). (See http:/hvww.georgiacourts.gov).

“Title II’s enforcement provision incorporates by reference § 505 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, as added, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, which

authorizes private citizens to bring suits for money damages.” [emphasis

added] 42 U.S.C. §12133. The Act specifically provides that “A state shall not

be immune under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United

States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for

a violation of this chapter.” [emphasis added] 42 U.S.C. §12202

Thus, the Supreme Court concluded in Lane, “that Title II, as it applies to the

class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,

constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” [¶ 54] Therefore, the Defendants in

the instant action are exposed for their clear, intentional and arbitrary

deprivations of both Appellants’ rights under the ADAAA and related statutes,

rules and regulations, Due Process, Equal Protection, and 42 U.S.C. 1983.

§12203 of the ADAAA3 is clear and unequivocal with regard to individuals

3 Sec. 12203. Prohibition against retaliation and coercion(a) Retaliation. No person shall discriminate against any individual because

such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation. It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.

(c) Remedies and procedures. The remedies and procedures available under §§ 12117, 12133, and 12188 of this title shall be available to aggrieved persons for violations of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, with respect to subchapter I,

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seeking their rights under the statute and those assisting them in obtaining their

rights.

More important for the purposes of the requested accommodations, the Supreme

Court concluded in Lane, “that Title II, as it applies to the class of cases

implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid

exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” [¶ 54] The Supreme Court recognized that “Congress

understood in shaping the ADA, would sometimes require not blindfolded

equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but

accommodation.” [emphasis added] [¶ 65]

Finally, the statute makes clear that the relevant subchapter provides to any

person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in

violation of the subchapter or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such

person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of § 12183 of the

statute has clear rights of redress through suit in state or Federal court.

Moreover, the section states specifically that “Nothing in this section shall require

a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual

notice that a person or organization covered by this subchapter does not intend

to comply with its provisions.”

Because of her disability, Joan Kloth is financially incapable of employing an

attorney to represent her before the Commission and, because she must

proceed pro se, requires additional time to research and prepare her

subchapter II and subchapter III of this chapter, respectively. (emphasis added throughout) 42 U.S.C. § 12203.

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presentation to the Commission.

THEREFORE, Joan Kloth is specifically asking for accommodations under the

Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 to include an immediate

continuance of thirty (30) to sixty (60) days of her currently scheduled hearing

before the

Commission and for such other and further accommodations to which she may

show herself to be entitled under the Americans with Disabilities Act

Amendments Act of 2008 and related Federal and state disability discrimination

laws, rules and regulations.

Dated: September 18, 2012

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Certification Pursuant to Sec. 62-7

A copy of the foregoing preliminary statement of issues was emailed via

the courts electronic system, this _____ day of April, 2014 to Gary Williams,

Assistant Attorney General, attorney for the defendant-appellee, 55 Elm Street

Hartford CT 06106, 860-808-5318 work, 860-808-5587 fax,

Gary.Williams@ct.gov

________________________________

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

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EXHIBIT F

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Joan T. Kloth-Zanard320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488203-267-7801 landline

203-770-0318 cellJune 22, 2012

Attorney General55 Elm StreetHartford CT 06106

RE: DSS and DCF

Dear Attorney General:I am contacting you as recommended by the dozens of different agencies and people I have spoken to over the past 2 weeks. I need help because they all believe that I have been falsely categorized by the DSS and DCF causing 18 years of inability to obtain employment. Between DSS’s falsely putting a lien in 1996 on a lawsuit that did not exist and then DCF falsely registering me on the CT Child Abuse and Neglect Registry, I have been prevented me from being properly and gainfully employed.

DSS lien actions have caused me to look like I cannot pay my bills and am irresponsible to prospective employers. And DCF apparently falsely put me on their State Registry of Abuse and Neglect offenders back in 1997 even though they admit that they closed the case and withdraw the neglect petition on 11/18/1997 and then again on 2/24/1998, it was deemed that the case was closed and the petitions withdrawn. Yet, they put me on the registry and never removed my name.

I have tried to get legal assistance from everywhere, including statewide legal services. SWLS claims that they cannot assist me with the DSS issue as they have a right to place a lien against me. I am legally disabled and live on $730 a month. I do NOT have funds to afford an attorney. And no attorneys, so far, will take my DSS case. I have not tried to bring my DCF case to SWLS because it may require suing DCF for damages as they falsely and prematurely put my name on the CT Registry for Child abuse and neglect and never removed it despite admitting in their own records that the charges were withdrawn and the case closed against me.

I, unfortunately, did not realize that this was what was going on until the events began to unfold this year and I was discussing them with my two counselors, psychiatrist and two former DSS and DCF workers. They all told me that someone in the state agency has targeted me.

Please I cannot keep living like this and being attacked.

Regards,Joani

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Joan T. Kloth-Zanard320 North George’s Hill Road

Southbury, CT 06488203-267-7801 home203-770-0318 cell

July 3, 2012

Attorney General55 Elm StreetHartford CT 06106

RE: DCF and DSS

Dear Attorney General:I am beside myself with what I have now found out. For 16 years I thought there was something wrong with me that no one liked me because I could not get a job. Now, I found out that it was not me but DSS and DCF that defamed and slandered me filing false claims that showed up whenever an employer did a general search about me.

To follow is the information on the two state agencies that just destroyed my life, DSS and DCF.

This all began in 1995, when DSS refused to allow me to finish my degree in Physical Therapy that I had been going to school for since 1990 or so. Had I been allowed to go to school, I had student loans to pay for my cash needs and child care and would never had needed anything more than food stamps, medical and housing assistance for the 18 months of schooling I needed to do back then to complete my degree. Instead, I was forced onto the entire welfare system, as I had no way to self-support my daughter and I, including having to apply for cash assistance and child care assistance. I knew that if I won the lottery or a huge monetary lawsuit for specific damages, that DSS could get a return on cash assistance. But not once during this time was I ever told that if I became self-sufficient that DSS could place a lien against any of my property to re-coop the cash assistance. Had I known this I would never have taken the assistance and just suffered.

Then in 1997, DCF falsely accused me of neglecting my daughter. Though the case was thrown out and the neglect charges withdrawn, DCF still put my husband and I on the Child Abuse and Neglect Registry without our knowledge. They also never changed out records to reflect that this was unsubstantiated. I only found this out a month ago, when I was turned down for a volunteer job and they told me why. I have had this corrected for me but they are taking their sweet time correcting it for my husband. But either way, the damage has been done.

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For 16 years I have struggled with being unemployable to the point that I am now legally disabled. I have lost at bare minimum $500,000 in income over these past 16 years. And now DSS, has put a lien on my home for $22,000 for cash assistance in an amount that I never received, nor would have needed if they had just let me go to school in 1995 to complete my degree.

I cannot afford an attorney to sue DCF or DSS for their slander and defamation of me all these years. I tried Statewide Legal Services but they refuse to help stating that DSS and DCF can do whatever they please basically. I have called around to every agency and attorney I can find to get help with this, but either they cannot help or they will not take the case pro-bono. But both of these issues made me look bad to any reasonable prospective employer. What DCF and DSS did to me deliberately made it impossible for me to ever be gainfully employed in the state of CT.

Please this should NOT have happened., but I cannot handle the magnitude of this case alone. I need your help to right this wrong and bring back my reputation as a good citizen who was blackballed by these two agencies.

Regards,

Joan T. Kloth-Zanard

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