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Unraveling the US Stance on Depleted Uranium Weapons William Henry Long PSCI 272W The War in Iraq, 2003 - 2011 Spring 2015
Unraveling the US Stance on Depleted Uranium Weapons
William Henry Long
PSCI 272W
The War in Iraq, 2003 - 2011
Spring 2015
While the US has repeatedly asserted its right to use depleted uranium (DU) weapons
and resisted pressure to regulate them, it has also grown increasingly hesitant to employ them.
This paper will explain why the US has adopted its current stance on DU weapons. This topic
has become controversial due to increasing allegations that DU contamination harms civilians,
primarily in the context of Iraq where the largest amount of DU contamination exists. Although
the highest usage of DU rounds occurred in the 2003 Iraq War, the weapons were also used in
significant amounts during the Gulf War and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Including the
US, the largest user of DU, 20 nations are believed to possess the weapons, making the
acceptability of using DU weapons relevant to future conflicts.
After explaining what DU weapons are and why they are militarily useful, I will present
the allegations of their harmful effects. After detailing US policy on the use of DU, I will explore
the factors affecting the country’s stance on the issue. I conclude that despite ongoing
incentives to continue the use of DU weapons, outside pressures have caused the US to curtail
the use of such weapons. A lack of alternatives as effective as DU has driven the US to resist
pressure to regulate the material, while a lack of conclusive scientific data has allowed it to
dismiss legal arguments against the weapons. At the same time, increasing pressure from
international organizations and other states, NGOs, and the media have caused the US to
hesitate to use DU rounds and to begin to seek alternatives. The combination of these factors
has caused the US to take the contradictory position of defending its right to use the weapons
in principle while avoiding their actual use. This case study demonstrates that the US places
little emphasis on precaution regarding safety regulations. It also shows that international law
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and disapproval from activists and other states can restrict the US’s actions, even when it does
not explicitly agree to abide by a particular rule.
WHAT IS DEPLETED URANIUM?
Uranium exists in several isotopes, or forms of the element that vary by mass. Uranium-
238 (U-238) is the most abundant, comprising 99.275% of natural uranium found in the Earth’s
crust (World Nuclear Association 2014). U-238 is relatively stable and minimally radioactive. U-
235, which accounts for 0.72% of natural uranium, is used for nuclear fission reactions in both
nuclear reactors and bombs (World Nuclear Association 2014). DU is created as a byproduct of
the process of enriching natural uranium to the 3-5% U-235 needed for nuclear reactors (United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2012). DU contains about .2% U-235, and is
consequently about 60% as radioactive as natural uranium (WHO 2001). For every 1,000kg of
natural uranium used to create fuel enriched to 5%, 85kg of enriched uranium and 915kg of DU
are produced, leaving the US with an immense supply of the material (United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 2012).
One of DU’s most distinctive and useful properties is its density. With a density of about
19.05g/cm3, it is about 1.7 times as dense as lead (11.35g/cm3) (Schmid and Wirz, 2001).
Consequently it has been used by civilians for radiation shielding, particularly for containing
nuclear waste and use in radiation therapy, and providing counterweights in aircraft, boats, and
satellites (Betti 2001). DU can also be hardened through a thermal treatment and alloying with
2% molybdenum or .75% titanium, rendering it as hard as tool steel (Schmid and Wirz, 2001).
For these reasons, DU has been used by the military to create armor plating in some Abrams
tanks (United States Department of the Air Force 1998). DU is integrated into layers of steel in
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Chobham armor, yielding plating that is significantly more resistant to penetration than steel
alone (Genys 2006).
DU has also been prized as a material for armor-piercing projectiles due to its
pyrophoric and self-sharpening qualities. After a DU projectile is fired, the outer coating begins
to rub off due to the friction with the air, causing the round to ignite. Most of the round stays
intact until impact, when the shedding of the outer layer accelerates (Packard 2010). Because
the material is so hard, the outer layer is shed in a pattern that maintains the taper of the
projectile, thus keeping it sharp and improving its penetration. In contrast most projectiles
“mushroom,” or expand and flatten at the point of impact, limiting penetration (Hambling
2003). The ignition of DU rounds also creates an aerosol of vaporized uranium that can cause
fuel and ammunition in targeted vehicles to explode. Unlike high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT)
rounds that rely on explosive charges encased in the shells, DU rounds avoid the potential
hazards of exploding in the barrel of a gun or leaving unexploded ordinance on the battlefield
(Packard 2010). The United States military mainly uses armor-piercing DU rounds for equipping
“Tank-Buster” A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft and M1 Abrams Tanks (Franzen 2001). DU was also
used in 25mm rounds for Bradley vehicles before the US military moved away from using DU in
medium caliber rounds in 2010 (Cullen 2010).
Another advantage of DU is that it is quite inexpensive, because supply far exceeds
demand. In 2000, the US possessed 480,000 metric tons of DU (WISE Uranium Project 2008).
DU cost a mere $5 per pound in 1998, compared to $25 - $45 dollars per pound for tungsten,
the closest alternative to DU (Bradley and Blaschke 1998). Furthermore, using DU for military
purposes negates the cost of storage of the substance. Almost all DU (95%) in the US is stored
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as uranium hexafluoride, UF6, in 14-ton cylinders (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2012). The annual cost of storing, inspecting, and maintaining these cylinders was $15 million in
1998, with costs rising over time as the stockpile grows and the cylinders age (Bradley and
Blaschke 1998).
History of the Use of DU Rounds
The first documented use of DU rounds was during the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991,
when 320 tons of DU rounds were fired (Pike 2011). US aircraft later fired 3.3 tons of DU rounds
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 and 1995, and 10.2 tons of DU in Kosovo in 1999 (Pike 2011). By
far the largest amount of DU to date was fired during the Iraq War in 2003, with 1000-2000
tons of DU rounds estimated to have been used (Al-Muqdadi and Al-Ansari 2011). Over 300,000
DU rounds were fired, primarily by the US military, while UK tanks contributed to a smaller
portion of the total (Edwards 2014). Although only the US, UK, and NATO have openly
employed DU rounds, 20 countries in total are believed to possess them including China,
France, Israel, and Russia (Thompson 2006).
DOES DEPLETED URANIUM HARM CIVILIANS?
Critics of DU weapons claim that the substance is a radiological and chemical hazard
that has caused severe damage in Iraq and elsewhere, and have pushed to ban the weapons.
Over 300 contaminated sites have been reported by Iraq’s Radiation Protection Center (RPC),
concentrated in Basra Governorate in southern Iraq and Fallujah (Zwijnenburg 2014). DU
weapons have been blamed for a significant increase in the rates of cancer, congenital birth
defects, and leukemia in Iraq, among other illnesses. According to statistics provided by the
Iraqi government, the cancer rate was 40 out of 100,000 people before the Gulf War started,
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grew to 800 out of 100,000 in 1995, and increased dramatically to 1,600 out of 100,000 in 2005
(Reese 2014). Those figures are purportedly too low, because the private healthcare sector
failed to sufficiently report statistics yet accounts for about half of the healthcare in the country
(Jamail 2013). Another study found that the rate of birth defects in Al Basrah Maternity Hospital
increased from 1.37 per 1,000 births in 1995 to 23 per 1,000 in 2003 (Al-Sabbak et al. 2012).
Furthermore, a study published by the International Journal of Environmental Research and
Public Health found that the birth-sex ratio in Fallujah was 860 boys to 1,000 girls, differing
significantly from the standard 1,050 to 1,000 (Busby, Hamdan, and Ariabi 2010). The authors
concluded that the anomaly supported claims of genetic damage to the population. Although it
is clear that rates of illness and genetic damage are unusually high in Iraq, a causal link between
DU contamination and illness has yet to be proven.
Radiological Effects
The first proposed method by which DU harms humans is by emitting dangerous
radiation. Although the radioactivity of DU is often highlighted by the press, the danger posed
by this radiation has been found to be insignificant. The radiation dose rate of someone 1 meter
away from a 30mm DU round is 7nSv/hour, which is not much more than the typical dose rate
received from natural background radiation of about 100 nSv/h (WISE Uranium Project 2004).
For comparison, the dose rate from background radiation in Colorado is 300nSv/h (Conca
2013). However, critics who claim DU is dangerous due to its radiation assert that people
receive much more significant doses of radiation when the substance enters the body, either
through ingestion, inhalation, or entering a wound.
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), coordinating with the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP) and World Health Organization (WHO), addressed this
concern in a study conducted in 2010 based on soil samples at battle sites in southern Iraq. The
report considered several possible methods of radiological contamination from DU rounds,
including inhalation of contaminated soil carried by the wind, inhalation of dust inside vehicles
that were struck by DU rounds, direct contact with DU rounds, and ingestion of contaminated
soil, vegetables, and water. The authors concluded that all radiation received from DU
contamination was too small to be significant, with the possible exception of dust inhaled inside
damaged vehicles (IAEA 2010). In addition, a study concerning veterans of the Gulf War who
have pieces of DU shrapnel embedded in them due to friendly fire found that the maximum
lifetime radiation dose incurred would be .06 sieverts (Sv), which is over the limit of .05Sv for
members of the public set by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
but under the limit of 1Sv for employees at nuclear facilities (Squibb 2006). It can therefore
reasonably be concluded that all radiological effects resulting from environmental
contamination from DU, and even most forms of direct contact with DU rounds, are not
significant enough to warrant public concern.
Heavy Metal Toxicity
While DU may not pose a serious radiological threat, it is known to have significant
chemical toxicity. According to meta-analysis from 2010, high dose exposure to DU causes
renal failure, as the kidneys are the primary target of the substance at this level of exposure
(Briner 2010). As no one who comes into contact with the substance through combat or the
environment receives this high a dose, the more important concern is the effects of chronic low
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level exposure. There have been studies with animals suggesting that this type of exposure can
cause brain, kidney, bone, and developmental problems as well as an increased risk of cancer,
but there have not been sufficient studies with humans with environmental exposure as found
in Iraq (Briner 2010). The IAEA determined that, despite the lack of significant radiation, levels
of DU in the soil and water in southern Iraq were large enough to pose a threat from chemical
toxicity (IAEA 2010). Other studies have found problems with the nervous system, liver, and
heart, while genetic mutations have been found during in vitro experiments (Reese 2014).
Although scientists have yet to determine whether the rising rates of illness in Iraq are caused
by DU contamination rather than other factors, enough evidence exists to suggest that the
repeated low-level exposure to DU in Iraq constitutes a valid cause for concern.
EXPLAINING US POLICY REGARDING DU WEAPONS
While the US military has recognized that DU can be chemically toxic with enough
exposure and taken some precautions, it has downplayed its effects and maintained ineffective
cleanup protocols. The US Department of Veterans Affairs (USDVA) runs a DU follow-up program for
any veterans concerned about exposure to DU (USDVA 2014). The US government has also conducted a
long-term study on a group of veterans of the Gulf War who were wounded by DU rounds, reporting no
ill effects (Squibb 2006). However it should be noted that this study, which is often referenced to allay
fears of DU, has serious flaws. Although the report and subsequent public statements announced that
no cancers were found among the participants, one veteran had Hodgkin’s lymphoma and another had
a bone tumor (Fahey 2008). When asked to explain the discrepancy, Dr. McDiarmid who worked on the
study attributed the omission to the word limit of the report (Fahey 2008). The study also included a
mere 33 participants, which is too low a number to obtain accurate statistics of cancer and other
illnesses. It also excluded veterans exposed to DU who did report health problems, including two
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soldiers who reported children with birth defects and two men who developed serious kidney problems
during the war (Fahey 2008).
According to the Department of the Army’s Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling,
Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain
Depleted Uranium as well as its Handling Procedures for Equipment Contaminated with
Depleted Uranium or Radioactive Commodities, all accidents involving DU are to be approached
as potential radiation hazards, following the army’s typical radiation protocols (1996, 2002).
Considering that the radiation levels of DU are negligible, approaching it primarily as a
radioactive threat during clean up is unnecessary and ineffective. While this may simply seem
overly cautious, the manuals lack instructions to clean up DU as a potential chemical toxin,
which is its main danger. This is in spite of the fact that the 2002 manual states that “the
radiation from DU is only slightly stronger than the ionizing radiation normally coming from the
soil and from the air… Heavy metal poisoning is the main health concern with DU” (Department
of the Army). Areas affected by DU incidents “are to be decontaminated to background levels”
of radiation (Department of the Army 1996). Considering DU barely emits more than
background radiation, decontamination outside of vehicles is likely to be considered
unnecessary in the field. This leaves open the possibility of chemical contamination of soil,
water, and air at the site.
Asserting the Right to Use DU
Despite a recent hesitancy to employ them, the US has repeatedly asserted its right to
use DU weapons. The US has vetoed every UN resolution concerning DU, although they have
been cautionary rather than regulatory, maintaining that there is no proof of their harm. In an
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explanation of the vote on the UN resolution on DU from 2012, a representative of the US, UK,
and France said that “given the lack of tangible evidence to the contrary we do not recognize
the presupposed potential risk to health and the environment and therefore do not support UN
resolutions that presuppose Depleted Uranium is harmful” (Pollard 2012). In 2011 the US
maintained the possibility of using DU rounds when it deployed A-10 aircraft to Libya. Although
DU rounds had not been used, a US Air Force spokeswoman said she refused “to speculate on
what may or may not be used in the future.” (ICBUW 2011). In October of 2014, the US announced
that it was deploying twelve A-10 Thunderbolt IIs armed with DU rounds for the fight against
ISIL (Swanson 2014). Master Sgt Hubble of the 122nd Fighter Wing told the press that “should
the need to explode something arise – for example a tank – they will be used” (Swanson 2014).
Non-cooperation
The US has withheld the coordinates of most DU rounds fired during the Iraq war,
limiting the effectiveness of researchers investigating the effects of the substance on the
environment and civilians. Without these coordinates, international observers have been
unable to accurately map all of the locations and concentrations of contamination, and
therefore have been hindered in comparing the concentrations of contamination with rates of
illnesses. The lack of coordinates has also impaired cleanup efforts, which are estimated to cost
$100,000-150,000 per site with a total of $30-45 million (Edwards 2013). The Iraqi government
bears the responsibility for cleaning up sites of DU contamination, with little help from coalition
forces. The US and UK have not released any information about cleanup efforts undertaken by
them (Zwijnenburg 2014). Although DU contamination is currently spreading via the military
scrap metal trade, destroyed vehicles (which the US military identifies as more serious hazards
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due to the high concentration of DU) and scrap metal collection sites are not being properly
monitored or managed (Edwards 2013). According to Zwijnenburg’s report, “DU destroyed
tanks and other military wreckage [are] being left in city centres, towns and villages, with local
people stripping them for valuable parts and children using them as playgrounds” (2014, 7). The
report also estimates that the Iraqi government lacks a coherent plan and is unable to properly
fund or devote much attention to the issue, especially as the conflict with ISIL continues. The US
has not announced any plans to aid cleanup efforts in the future.
A Step Back
In March 2015 a public relations officer from the Pentagon announced to the press that
“U.S. and Coalition aircraft have not been and will not be using DU munitions in Iraq or Syria
during Operation Inherent Resolve” (Trevithick 2015). Another official at the Pentagon said that
“A-10 aircraft [in the region] are not equipped with PGU-14 armor piercing incendiary
ammunition,” which is the specific name of the DU rounds used by that aircraft (Trevithick
2015). While this is by no means a binding declaration, it does indicate a significant softening of
US policy on DU weapons. The US had already begun to take steps in this direction in 2010,
when it announced plans to phase out medium caliber DU rounds used by Bradley vehicles and
A-10 aircraft, although the timescale was open ended and large caliber rounds were retained
(Cullen 2010). In 2011 the US chose not to load A-10s deployed in Libya with DU rounds,
although it did not rule out their future use (ICBUW 2011). This recent hesitancy to employ DU
rounds can be attributed to several possible causes including legal arguments and increasing
pressure from international organizations and activists.
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Overall the US has downplayed the issue of DU weapons, maintaining that the health
risks are minimal while refusing to cooperate with research efforts that may show otherwise.
The US has insisted that it has the right to use the weapons, and has not developed cleanup
procedures designed specifically to contain potentially toxic DU contamination. The US has also
not helped Iraq with its cleanup efforts, likely because spending millions of dollars on cleanup
would be tantamount to admitting that DU contamination presents a problem. Over the past
few years however, the US has quietly been phasing out the use of DU weapons.
A Lack of Alternatives
The primary factor driving the American objection to following a precautionary
approach to DU weapons has been the lack of effective alternatives. The main substance which
has been considered as a potential alternative to DU rounds is tungsten, which is another heavy
metal that has been used in armor-piercing rounds. Tungsten is denser than DU and still
penetrates armor relatively effectively. However, it lacks the pyrophoric and self sharpening
properties of DU, which makes it both less effective than DU at piercing armor and safer for the
environment and civilians because there is no dust created by the rounds which could cause
contamination (Rowlatt 2014). Although reports vary dramatically, the UK government
estimated that DU rounds were 15% more effective at penetration than tungsten rounds while
the US military reported an average of a 52% increase in penetration (Cullen 2012). However,
Cullen argues that improvements to the barrel of the gun, weight and shape of the round, etc.
could more than compensate for any loss of penetration caused by switching to tungsten, and
that tungsten alloys have a stronger potential for improvement as a material than DU (2012). A
key disadvantage of tungsten is that over 80% of the world’s supply is controlled by China,
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which has recently been restricting exports of the material and driven prices up (Rowlatt 2014).
Before these restrictions, the price of tungsten was already over five times that of DU (Bradley
and Blaschke 1998). Ultimately tungsten could be at best an imperfect substitute for DU,
because although it has less potential for spreading contamination via dust, studies have shown
it also has toxic and carcinogenic effects. Imbedded shrapnel has been shown to cause tumors,
and tungsten rounds have been shown to be quite soluble and able to contaminate
groundwater (Hambling 2009). As a result, the Undersecretary of Defense advised weapons
researchers in 2007 to consider alternatives to tungsten.
There are currently no other clear alternative materials for effective armor piercing
rounds. Steel, the original material used for armor piercing rounds, is not toxic or carcinogenic
but achieves much less penetration than DU or tungsten (Santonen, Stockmann-Juvalla, and
Zitting 2010). DU and tungsten rounds are classified as kinetic energy penetrators, or rounds
which pierce armor through their velocity and shape. HEAT shells, which contain an explosive
charge surrounded by copper, can also breach tank armor but some types of armor have been
designed to explode the charge before it reaches the core layer of armor (Ankerstjerne 2014).
Sadarm (Seek and Destroy Armour) is a smart weapon that is fired like a normal artillery shell,
but deploys a parachute, scans the terrain, and fires a projectile of liquid metal at the most
valuable target’s weakest point (Hambling 2000). However the material used in the projectile is
tantalum, a toxic heavy metal with little previous scientific study, which offers no improvement
to the risk of contamination compared to DU. It is clear that switching from DU rounds would
require a great deal of research into alternative materials and weapon designs, and likely
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changes to the US military’s tactics. It is therefore not surprising that the US has resisted calls to
abandon, even if temporarily, DU rounds.
Weak Legal Arguments
One reason that the US has been able to maintain its right to use DU weapons is that it
has thus far been able to dismiss the validity of legal arguments against DU rounds (but not
their possible acceptance by other countries or groups). Although no treaty currently exists
banning or regulating DU weapons, opponents argue that DU is already illegal under existing
laws of armed conflict. Arguments claiming DU weapons should fall under bans on chemical and
nuclear weapons fall flat, as radiological and chemically toxic effects are not the primary
purpose of the weapons but are secondary to their primary use as projectiles (McDonald 2008).
Similarly, they are not restricted as incendiary weapons, because the Geneva Conventions
excludes rounds designed as projectiles with additional incendiary effects (McDonald 2008).
The most popular legal arguments used against DU weapons, laid out by groups such as
the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW), center on the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks, the prohibition of unnecessary suffering, the principle of proportionality,
and the principle of precaution (ICBUW 2010). According to Article 51 of the 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, indiscriminate attacks include “those which employ a
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
protocol” and thus harm civilians (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 2015). They
also include “attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (ICRC 2015).
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To assess how the use of DU rounds could constitute an indiscriminate attack, the radius
of DU dust from an impact should be considered. Upon striking a hard target such as a tank,
approximately 20 percent of a DU round is aerosolized, and a typical burst of fire from an A-10
aircraft can create 300g to 960g of aerosol (Fahey 2008). About 90 percent of DU dust falls
within 50 meters of the impact point, and later spreads to about 100m (Fahey 2008). This poses
a significant exposure risk for people within close proximity at the time of impact. As previously
mentioned, burning vehicles struck with DU pose the most serious risk of exposure, followed by
physical contact with metal fragments that can lead to hand-to-mouth ingestion. There is a
potential but unconfirmed risk of groundwater contamination which could increase over time
as intact rounds dissolve (WHO 2001). Although there is a risk of exposure for civilians,
particularly when DU rounds are used near urban areas, the current uncertainty about the
health effects in real conditions makes it impossible to prove that the use of DU rounds
constitutes an indiscriminate attack. This argument has therefore has had a limited influence on
US policy making. If significant effects are proven in the future however, this argument may
lead to future treaties banning DU weapons. The US acknowledged some risk of indiscriminate
effects from DU several years ago and advised caution, but later disregarded the advice. While
concluding that DU rounds were legal, a 1975 memo from the US Air Force’s Office of the Judge
Advocate General advised that DU weapons should only be used against hard targets like
armored vehicles (Edwards 2014). The memo also stated that “Use of this munition solely
against personnel is prohibited if alternative weapons are available” for reasons “related to the
prohibitions against unnecessary suffering and poison” and noted that the incendiary effects of
the rounds could be hazardous in urban areas (Edwards 2014). It concluded that “Precautions
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to avoid or minimize such risks shall be taken in the use of this weapon or alternate available
weapons should be used” (Edwards 2014). According to Zwijnenburg’s report however, the US
military fired at least 1,500 rounds directly at troops during the Iraq War (2014). While the US
acknowledges some legal basis for caution regarding potential indiscriminate effects of DU, it
has not taken steps to formally ban or restrict the use of DU rounds.
The next argument, suffering from the same flaw as before, is that DU rounds cause
unnecessary suffering. Critics claim that DU rounds cause serious illnesses that harm people
long after combat, but because this has not been proved, claims of unnecessary suffering are
unsupported. Furthermore, the US military can argue that the use of DU rounds is necessary
because there are no alternatives as tactically effective (Shah 2004). Claims that DU rounds are
disproportionate can also not be proven while the health effects on civilians cannot be verified,
let alone quantified for comparison with the military benefits. While these arguments are often
brought up by the media, they are unpersuasive and lack enough weight to affect US policy on
DU.
The Strongest Legal Argument Against DU Weapons
The strongest case that can be made against DU weapons is that the use of these arms
violates the precautionary principle. This principle calls for states to refrain from using weapons
when there is reason to believe they may harm civilians or the environment, even when
scientific evidence is inconclusive. The reasoning behind it is that it is far more costly to repair
damage from weapons after harmful effects are proved than it is to delay using the weapons
until they are proven to be safe. The process of obtaining scientific certainty is too slow to
create timely laws and policies to effectively safeguard the environment and civilians (Shah
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2004). Consequently the burden of proof is placed on states which possess the weapons in
question.
The precautionary principle has a disputed status in international law. Article 57 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that commanders should “take all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding . . .
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects”
(ICRC 2015). Article 58 directs that “the Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent
feasible [emphasis added] . . . take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian
population . . . against the dangers resulting from military operations” (ICRC 2015). Opponents
of DU argue that refraining from using DU rounds constitutes a feasible precaution to protect
civilians because the benefit of protecting civilians from possible harm outweighs the cost of
using less effective rounds against armored targets. However, this section of the Additional
Protocol I is open to interpretation. While it does imply that militaries should be prepared to
accept some decreases in tactical effectives in order to protect civilians, it does not address
uncertainty about these adverse effects on civilians. The precautionary principle was first
explicitly supported by international law in the United Nations World Charter for Nature, which
states that “where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not
proceed” (UN 1982). It has been included in other environmental treaties since then, such as
the Montreal Protocol and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
The precautionary principle has a few variants including strong and weak precaution,
and principle and approach. The strong precautionary principle “requires risk creators to
research and justify the risks they impose on society” and “suggests that some precautionary
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regulation should be a default response to serious risks under conditions of scientific
uncertainty” (Sachs 2011, 1285, 1295). Strong precaution only applies when there is some
credible evidence suggesting harm, and that the risks are serious rather than trivial. According
to this principle, DU weapons should undoubtedly be regulated because there are allegations of
harm and supporting studies as well as significant potential for harm. In contrast, the weak
precautionary principle allows regulation in the face of uncertainty but does not require it
(Sachs 2011). The importance of the precautionary principle in US law has declined since the
1990s (Ashford 2006). The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and the 1996 amendment
to the Regulatory Flexibility Act require agencies to justify any costs imposed by major health,
safety, and environmental regulations and to default to the cheapest forms of regulation
(Ashford 2006). Because the burden of proof has shifted to regulatory agencies to show that
the benefits of regulations outweigh their cost, regulations in the US based on the
precautionary principle have become increasingly rare.
There is also a distinction between the precautionary principle and precautionary
approach. The precautionary approach was first laid out in the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development which states:
in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall be not used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. (UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992).
Some key points here that distinguish the approach from the principle is that according to the
approach states are only urged to mitigate risks when doing so is financially feasible and there
are plausible alternatives to the action in question. States are therefore not as strictly bound to
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regulate risky actions under the approach. The term “principle” is distinct in that a “principle of
law” is a source of law. For this reason the US has opposed the use of the term “precautionary
principle” when negotiating international treaties (Recuerda 2008). While numerous
international treaties have invoked the precautionary principle and the EU has gone so far as to
consider it a source of law, its status as customary international law is disputed (Recuerda
2008). If not all states, particularly the US, accept the precautionary principle why does it
matter? There is a precedent set by several international treaties that incorporate the principle,
so it is plausible that given the serious allegations against DU other states will create a
precautionary treaty regulating the weapons, even without ratification by the US, which will be
a binding part of international law.
Increasing International Pressure: UN Involvement
The most important reason that the US has grown hesitant to employ DU weapons is
that international pressure to do so has been mounting. While the US has dismissed its own
precautionary advice regarding DU, other states have embraced the precautionary principle
and pushed for international regulations. DU weapons were first addressed by the UN in 1996,
in a resolution titled International peace and security as an essential condition for the
enjoyment of human rights, above all the right to life. The resolution stated that the
commission:
Urges all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the production and the spread of weapons of mass destruction or with indiscriminate effect, in particular nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological weaponry and weaponry containing depleted uranium. (UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 1996/16).
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The report also called for the collection of information concerning the use of these weapons by
governments and research on their effects. The commission was “Convinced that the
production, sale and use of such weapons are incompatible with international human rights and
humanitarian law” due to their effects on civilians and the environment (Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 1996/16). Yeung Sik Yuen’s 2002
follow-up report also found DU weapons to be toxic and argued they were illegal due to their
effects despite the absence of specific regulations concerning them at that time.
In 2007 the UN passed a resolution placing DU weapons on the agenda and requesting
reports from states and international organizations. Argentina and Jamaica advocated for a
moratorium and Qatar called for a ban, while most other reports advocated caution and more
research (UN General Assembly 2007). DU weapons stayed repeatedly on the UN’s agenda after
that resolution, with further calls for more information but no regulations or obligations. A
2010 resolution added that the General Assembly:
Invites Member States that have used armaments containing depleted uranium in armed conflicts to provide the relevant authorities of affected States, upon request, with information, as detailed as possible, about the location of the areas of use and the amounts used, with the objective of facilitating the assessment of such areas. (General Assembly 2011).
This provision lacked any teeth, as was demonstrated when the US refused to reveal the
coordinates of DU rounds fired in Iraq after receiving requests from UNEP and the Iraqi
government. Only a portion of these coordinates were indirectly released in 2014 when the
Dutch Ministry of Defense, which had received the information due to worries about Dutch
troops stationed in Iraq, released the information to the Dutch group PAX for a report (Edwards
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2014). There were UN resolutions passed in 2012 and 2014 to similar effect, again recognizing
that research has been inconclusive on possible harm to the environment and civilians. The
2012 resolution passed by a vote of 155 for, 4 against, and 27 abstentions. The United States,
the United Kingdom, France, and Israel opposed the resolution, while most abstentions came
from members of the EU (ICBUW 2012). The US, UK, and France objected on the grounds of a
lack of evidence, but the vast majority in the general assembly supported the cautionary
resolution (Pollard 2012).
Setting Expectations: Other Countries Support a Ban
The first country to ban the use of DU weapons was Belgium, which voted in 2007 on a
law banning the weapons that came into effect in 2009 (ICBUW 2009). In May 2008, building
upon previous resolutions, the European Parliament (EU Parliament) passed a resolution calling
for a moratorium on the use of DU among member states. The resolution stated that the
parliament:
Urges Member States, within the framework of future operations, not to use depleted uranium weapons in European Security and Defence Policy operations and not to deploy military and civilian personnel in regions where no guarantee can be given to the effect that depleted uranium has not been, or will not be, used . . .[and] Strongly reiterates its call on all Member States and NATO countries to impose a moratorium on the use of depleted uranium weapons and to redouble efforts towards a global ban, as well as systematically to halt production and procurement of this type of weaponry; (EU Parliament 2008).
This was the first significant resolution passed by an international body that explicitly called for nations,
including the US as a member of NATO, to ban DU weapons. A resolution passed in 2014 on the
situation in Iraq expanded on previous resolutions by adding a call for members to support
decontamination efforts in Iraq (EU Parliament 2014).
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In September 2009, the Latin American Parliament passed a resolution calling for a
moratorium on DU weapons (ICBUW 2009). The resolution was widely supported, although DU
contamination had only occurred at testing sites in Puerto Rico and Panama (ICBUW 2009).
Costa Rica later became the second nation to enact a ban on June 9, 2011 (Marujo, 2011).
While the US is not obligated to follow resolutions like the EU Parliament’s call for NATO states
to impose a moratorium on DU, the fact that a growing number of states are denouncing or
banning DU indicates that a treaty regulating or banning the weapons is possible in the near
future. Similar to previous resolutions, the UN may pass a resolution over the US’s objection
that regulates or bans DU. If this were to happen, the US would not want to explicitly violate
such a treaty because it wants to protect the authority of international law and avoid ill-will
from other countries. Violating a treaty on DU could strain current alliances with European
states which support precautionary measures, creating an unnecessary obstacle to cooperation
in future conflicts. Because of this growing possibility of an international ban, the US has
become more hesitant to employ DU rounds and has started searching for alternatives. The
US’s reluctance to use DU mirrors its approach to other controversial weapons in the face of
international pressure. The US Department of Defense announced that flamethrowers (which
were prominently used from World War I to the Vietnam War) would no longer be used by the
US military in 1978, two years before the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons banned
incendiary weapons (Huard 2014). Although the US is also one of the few countries to still
assert its right to use cluster bombs, which 112 countries have banned under a 2008
international treaty, it has refrained from using them since 2009 (Biron 2014). The US’s
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restraint regarding these controversial weapons can be attributed to a desire to avoid
international criticism and litigation.
Bad Press: NGOs and the Media
In addition to pressure from other states and international organizations, the US faces
increasing pressure from NGOs and the media to ban DU. This pressure affects the US in four
ways: it limits investment in DU, supports research by groups more willing to report negative
findings, lobbies governments and international organizations to ban the weapons, and
increases the attention paid to the issue by the public. The International Coalition to Ban
Uranium Weapons is the largest group of opponents to DU, representing about 160 smaller
organizations (ICBUW 2015). A notable member of ICBUW is the Campaign Against Depleted
Uranium (CADU), a UK based organization, that started a campaign in 2007 for individual
supporters to choose not to do business with banks that invest in depleted uranium weapons.
While the campaign did succeed in getting the UK Co-operative Bank and KBC in Belgium to
stop investing in DU manufacturers and Barclays PLC to limit investment in DU, it likely had a
small overall impact on the production of DU rounds as most other large banks did not alter
their investments (ICBUW 2009). The ICBUW also lobbies governments via petitions signed by
the group’s supporters and by advising policy makers in the UN, EU Parliament etc. (ICBUW
2015). NGOs have also supported research into the issue, of which the most notable example is
the report “Laid to Waste” by the Dutch group PAX examining the contamination in Iraq. While
creating the report, PAX successfully lobbied the Dutch government for the coordinates of
many DU rounds fired by the US, over the US’s objection (Edwards 2014). Reports like “Laid to
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Waste” portray the DU contamination in Iraq in a negative light and have increased support for
a ban and given fuel to the media.
An increasingly important yet indirect source of pressure on the US is the media.
Inflammatory headlines such as “U.S. Depleted Uranium as Malicious as Syrian Chemical
Weapons” and “Fallujah babies: Under a new kind of siege; Doctors and residents blame US
weapons for catastrophic levels of birth defects in Fallujah's newborns” along with grisly images
of deformed children have spread in recent years (Considine 2013, Jamail 2012). While many of
these articles are exaggerated and sensationalistic, they do increase how much attention the
public pays to the issue. By doing so, bad press may shift public opinion against the use of DU
weapons. American officials generally wish to avoid violating public opinion, and would thus be
less likely to support the use of DU weapons if public opinion clearly disapproved of doing so.
However, the use of DU weapons is not a very salient issue to most of the public, and no
authoritative polls are currently available regarding public opinion on the matter. It is therefore
impossible to quantitatively measure how pressure from the media affects US policy on DU, but
would be worth investigating in a future report if the issue gains more widespread attention.
Conclusion
Due to a combination of conflicting factors, the United States has adopted a
contradictory stance on DU in that it fights for its right to use DU weapons but refrains from
using them. There is currently no material as effective as DU for kinetic energy penetrators,
causing the US military to be wary of a ban on DU. The lack of conclusive evidence of a causal
link between the use of DU rounds and illness in Iraq allows the US to dismiss legal arguments
against the weapons. At the same time, DU weapons have received bad press and spurred
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growing efforts for a moratorium by international groups. As with the US’s restraint regarding
other controversial weapons like cluster bombs, the US’s reluctance to use DU rounds reflects
its desire to protect itself from disapproval and charges of violating international law.
If an international ban is enacted, the United States will most likely comply. Whether or
not there is a ban and whether or not later studies conclude that DU rounds caused significant
harm in Iraq, the issue of DU weapons will provide an important case study affecting support of
the precautionary principle and evaluations of controversial new weapons in the future. This
case shows that the US gives little weight to the precautionary principle with regard to safety
regulations, which sometimes puts it at odds with other states and activists. This issue also
illustrates that attitudes in the press and emerging norms abroad can influence US policy, even
when it has an incentive to do otherwise. International law and the repercussions of violating it,
even when the US has not endorsed a particular law, can constrain the US’s actions.
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