Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000 OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner. vs. PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent. VITUG, J.: On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court. In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus: "There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 1 Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus; "The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; the she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee. "These facts are undisputed.
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."1
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus;
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; the she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intevenor-appellants as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts.
"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to examination of facts on record."2
Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review oncertiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per stripes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."
Accordingly----
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." Invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, ., concur.
1 Rollo, p. 30.
2 Rollo, p. 31
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA
DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners, vs.HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the
civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other
claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her
actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.48On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter
on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-BautistaManuel C. PascualJose C. PascualSusana C. Pascual-BautistaErlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Virginia Pascual-NerNona Pascual-FernandoOctavio PascualGeranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. PascualHermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following:
Dominga M. PascualMamerta P. FugosoAbraham S. Sarmiento, IIIRegina Sarmiento-MacaibayEleuterio P. SarmientoDomiga P. San DiegoNelia P. MarquezSilvestre M. PascualEleuterio M. Pascual(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselvesillegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It
may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners, vs.HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to
take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles (OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That —
1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE
CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.
2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG. 1
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis:
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals.5 In Diaz, we have said:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. 10Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.12
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nephews and Nieces
Nieces and Surviving Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 1 which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate
of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facieproof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the otherthey are competent from reasons of necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the
fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary that an objection shallbe made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver if the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds
therefor were already apparent at the time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller — these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116775 January 22, 1998
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and LUPECINO ARNALDO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989.
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. 2 Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justa's father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers. 3 Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. 4 The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. 5 Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. 6 He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. 7
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. 8 In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa 9 but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, 10 their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. 11 Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. 12 The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. 13 They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, 14 the original owner of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioners' contention. In its decision rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the latter's death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter however died intestate and without issue. Her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code). 15
Accordingly, the court ordered:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants and the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. No cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justa's parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court ordered:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is hereby entered —
Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint in the following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.
For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the partition in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 17
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners allege:
I — THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING;
II — THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III — THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS;
IV — AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 18
After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7 hectares. Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justa's property should be as follows as private respondent contends:
A — The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to petitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.
B — As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already stated was consolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and who is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo. 19
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa's estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue only now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this Court. 20
It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, 21 petitioners admitted that private respondent is Justa's nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justa's half-sister. Apparently they are now questioning private respondent's filiation because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justa's parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her father's (Juan Arnaldo's) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition, Justa inherited her mother's (Ursula Tubil's) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares
of the 2.7 — hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justa's nearest surviving relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 — 966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree.
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa's cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. 22
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursula's daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. 23 That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors." 24
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of the petition for review must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners' extra-judicial partition of the decedent's estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate. Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties, monies and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked. 1
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter's motion for annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious and accordingly —
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as
replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doe. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the
registration or annotation thereof from the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Because of this ruling, petitioners, instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the appellate court granted petitioners' petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latter's appeal. The trial court, however, again dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to petitioners' appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural
children and the only surviving heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the beginning, the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitioner-appellants.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 4
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: engineer (mining)
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado 5
as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology, which states:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: none
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado 6
Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the case, they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos 7 stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, 8 Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court's finding of facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 9 Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case. 10
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is "deceased" is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado's first husband, the latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The
rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.12
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We quote with approval the trial court's decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
xxx xxx xxx
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund account of P100,000,00 with the People's Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B). . .
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Emphasis supplied).
As to petitioners' claim that the properties m the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better
position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. 13 In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner, vs.EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawan’s unlawful detainer suit against respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution4of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842,5 registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child6 of Dominador who died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon.7 Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title8 with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000.9
On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age, respectively,10 denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan11 and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine12 children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same.13 Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.
Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale,14 a title was issued to Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents’ ownership of the
lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents’ possession of the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997, respectively.
Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature at the back of petitioner’s birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of Lot 7226.15 They argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.16
On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the establishment of petitioner’s filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner’s action for ejectment. It added that since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff’s cause of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The decretal portion thereof, provides:
Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for their use and occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.
So ordered.18
Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal19 which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention.20 They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the property is made.
The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene.21 It, however, recalled the order granting the execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals.22
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus –
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.24 By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226.25 The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).26 A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.27
The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained –
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)28
In Baloloy v. Hular,29 respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent’s authority to file the case, the Court held that –
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.30
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as "fictitious heirs," the State will inherit her share31 and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.
The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals,32 and Sering v. Plazo,33 the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property. InCelino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago,34 the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common.35 Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta,36 the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.
In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations, to wit:
3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987 without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.
x x x x
5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of the deceased Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of the aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added)37
Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras "[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."38
Indeed, respondents’ not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are now in the twilight years of their life be granted possession of their ancestral property where their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents
and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. InSy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 39441 dated May 29, 1998 affirming with modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in an action for annulment of sale and damages.
The facts are as follows:
Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.
During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in Quezon City and in the Province of Cavite. It is the ownership of some of these properties that is in question in this case.
It appears that after the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28. Upon the reorganization of the courts in 1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of his father’s estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970 for the total amount of P47,800.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale reads as follows:
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, Filipino, married to Aurea Poblete-Nazareno, of legal age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines,
- W I T N E S S E T H -
That I am the absolute registered owner of six (6) parcels of land with the improvements thereon situated in Quezon City, Philippines, which parcels of land are herewith described and bounded as follows, to wit:
“TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 140946”
“A parcel of land (Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-47404, being a portion of Lot 3, Block D-3 described on plan Bsd-10642, G.L.R.O. Record No.) situated in the Quirino District, Quezon City. Bounded on the N., along line 1-2 by Lot 15, Block D-3 of plan Bsd - 10642; along line 2-3 by Lot 4, Block D-3 of plan Bsd-10642; along line 3-4 by Aurora Boulevard (Road Lot-1, Bsd-10642); and along line 4-1 by Lot 3-D of the
subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, being S.29 deg. 26’E., 1156.22 m. from B.L.L.M. 9, Quezon City,
thence N. 79 deg. 53’E., 12.50 m. to point 2;
thence S. 10 deg. 07’E., 40.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 79 deg. 53’W., 12.50 m. to point 4;
thence N. 10 deg. 07’W., 40.00 m. to the point
of beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED (500) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: points “1” and “4” by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. bearings true; date of the original survey, April 8-July 15, 1920 and that of the subdivision survey, March 25, 1956.”
“TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 132019”
“A parcel of land (Lot 3, Block 93 of the subdivision plan Psd-57970 being a portion of Lot 6, Pcs-4786, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917) situated in Quirino District Quezon City. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2, by Lot 1, Block 93; on the NE., along line 2-3, by Road Lot 101; on the SE., along line 3-4, by Road Lot 100; on the SW., along line 4-1, by Lot 4, Block 93; all of the subdivision plan. Beginning at point marked “1” on plan, being S. 65 deg. 40’ 3339.92 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Marikina, Rizal;
thence N. 23 deg. 28 min. E., 11.70 m. to point “2”;
thence S. 66 deg. 32 min. E., 18.00 m. to point “3”;
thence S. 23 deg. 28 min. W., 11.70 m. to point “4”;
thence N. 66 deg. 32. min. W., 18.00 m. to the point
of beginning; containing an area of TWO HUNDRED TEN SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (210.60). All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by B.L. Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; date of the original survey, Nov. 10, 1920 and Jan. 31-March 31, 1924 and that of the subdivision survey, February 1 to September 30, 1954. Date approved - March 9, 1962.”
“TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 118885”
“A parcel of land (Lot No. 10, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 11 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 9 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked “1” on the plan, being S. 7 deg. 26’W., 4269.90 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;
thence S. 25 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to point “2”;
thence S. 64 deg. 59’W., 29.99 m. to point “3”;
thence N. 25 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m to point “4”;
thence N. 64 deg. 59’E., 29.99 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.”
“TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 118886”
“A parcel of land (Lot No. 11, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 12 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the NW., by Lot No. 10 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, being S. 79 deg. 07’W., 4264.00 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;
thence S. 64 deg. 59’W., 29.99 m. to point “2”;
thence N. 25 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m. to point “3”;
thence N. 64 deg. 59’E., 29.99 m. to point “4”;
thence S. 26 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground, are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E.; date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.”
“A parcel of land (Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and LotsNos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 14, of the consolidation; and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 12, of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at the point marked “1” on plan, being S.78 deg. 48’W., 4258.20 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;
thence S. 64 deg. 58’W., 30.00 m. to point “2”;
thence N. 25 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m. to point “3”;
thence N. 64 deg. 59’E., 29.99 m. to point “4”;
thence S.25 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to point of
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.”
“A parcel of land (Lot No. 14, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 15, of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at the point marked “1” on plan, being S.78 deg. 48’W., 4258.20 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;
thence S. 25 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to point “2”;
thence S. 65 deg. 00’W., 30.00 m. to point “3”;
thence S. 65 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m. to point “4”;
thence N.64 deg. 58’E., 30.00 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.”
That for and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P43,000.00) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire satisfaction, I do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said Natividad P. Nazareno, her heirs, administrators and assigns, all my title, rights, interests and participations to the abovedescribed parcels of land with the improvements thereon, with the exception of LOT NO. 11 COVERED BY T.C.T. NO. 118886, free of any and all liens and encumbrances; and
That for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P4,800.00) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire satisfaction, I do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said Natividad P. Nazareno, her heirs, administrators and assigns, all my title, rights, interests and participations in and to Lot No. 11 covered by T.C.T. No. 118886 above-described, free of any and all liens and encumbrances, with the understanding that the title to be issued in relation hereto shall be separate and distinct from the title to be issued in connection with Lots Nos. 13 and 14, although covered by the same title.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this deed of absolute sale in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 29th day of January, 1970.[2]
By virtue of this deed, transfer certificates of title were issued to Natividad, to wit: TCT No. 162738 (Lot 3-B),[3] TCT No. 162739 (Lot 3),[4]TCT No. 162735 (Lot 10),[5] TCT No. 162736 (Lot 11),[6] and TCT No. 162737 (Lots 13 and 14), [7] all of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B which is registered under TCT No. 140946. This lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr.,[8] for which reason the latter was issued TCT No. 293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.[9]
When Romeo found out about the sale to Maximino, Jr., he and his wife Eliza locked Maximino, Jr. out of the house. On August 4, 1983, Maximino, Jr. brought an action for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On December 12, 1986, the trial court ruled in favor of Maximino, Jr. In CA-G.R. CV No. 12932, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.[10]
On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino, Sr., the present case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino, Jr. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-58.[11]Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to Natividad and that made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.
On March 1, 1990, Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza.[12] They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to Natividad, had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new title (TCT No. 277968) in his name.[13] They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza to third persons. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his title, the eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from Lot 3, and the payment of damages.
The issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. Romeo presented evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28, 1962 executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad and was represented by their mother, Aurea. By virtue of this deed, the nine lots subject of this Deed of Partition were assigned by raffle as follows:
1. Romeo - Lot 25-L (642 m2)2. Natividad - Lots 23 (312 m2) and 24 (379 m2)3. Maximino, Jr. - Lots 6 (338 m2) and 7 (338 m2)4. Pacifico - Lots 13 (360 m2) and 14 (360 m2)5. Jose - Lots 10 (360 m2) and 11 (360 m2)
Romeo received the title to Lot 25-L under his name, [14] while Maximino, Jr. received Lots 6 and 7 through a Deed of Sale dated August 16, 1966 for the amount of P9,500.00.[15] Pacifico and Jose’s shares were allegedly given to Natividad, who agreed to give Lots 10 and 11 to Jose, in the event the latter came back from abroad. Natividad’s share, on the other hand, was sold to third persons[16] because she allegedly did not like the location of the two lots. But, Romeo said, the money realized from the sale was given to Natividad.
Romeo also testified that Lot 3-B was bought for him by his father, while Lot 3 was sold to him for P7,000.00 by his parents on July 4, 1969.[17] However, he admitted that a document was executed by his parents transferring six properties in Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13, and 14, to Natividad.
Romeo further testified that, although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that the sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale. The transfer was made in this manner in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.[18] Romeo denied stealing Lot 3 from his sister but instead claimed that the title to said lot was given to him by Natividad in 1981 after their father died.
Natividad and Maximino, Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution executed in 1962 was not really carried out. Instead, in December of 1969, their parents offered to sell to them the six lots in Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13 and 14. However, it was only Natividad who bought the six properties because she was the only one financially able to do so. Natividad said she sold Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing Corp.[19] and Lot 3-B to Maximino, Jr. for P175,000.00.[20] Natividad admitted that Romeo and the latter’s wife were occupying Lot 3-B at that time and that she did not tell the latter about the sale she had made to Maximino, Jr.
Natividad said that she had the title to Lot 3 but it somehow got lost. She could not get an original copy of the said title because the records of the Registrar of Deeds had been destroyed by fire. She claimed she was surprised to learn that Romeo was able to obtain a title to Lot 3 in his name.
Natividad insisted that she paid the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970. She alleged that their parents had sold these properties to their children instead of merely giving the same to them in order to impose on them the value of hardwork.
Natividad accused Romeo of filing this case to harass her after Romeo lost in the action for recovery of possession (Civil Case No. Q-39018) which had been brought against him by Maximino, Jr. It appears that before the case filed by Romeo could be decided, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-GR CV No. 12932 affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of Maximino, Jr.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970. Except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 162735 and 162736 as a lien in the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.
The defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed. Likewise, the third-party complaint is dismissed.
The defendants are hereby directed to pay to the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P30,000 as and for attorney’s fees. Likewise, the third-party plaintiff is directed to pay the third-party defendant’s attorney’s fees of P20,000.
All other claims by one party against the other are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, on October 14, 1992 the trial court modified its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration is hereby granted. The judgment dated August 10, 1992 is hereby amended, such that the first paragraph of its dispositive portion is correspondingly modified to read as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deeds of Sale dated January 29, 1970 and July 31, 1982.
“Except as to Lots 3, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third person, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (LOTS 10 and 11) in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated.
“The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificates of Title No. 162735 and 162736 as a lien on the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.
“LIKEWISE, THE SAID REGISTER OF DEEDS IS DIRECTED TO CANCEL TCT NO. 293701 (formerly 162705) OVER LOT 3-B AND RESTORE TCT NO. 140946 IN THE NAME OF MAXIMINO NAZARENO SR. AND AUREA POBLETE.”[22]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr. The dispositive portion of the decision dated May 29, 1998 reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision and the order in question are modified as follows:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1982 are hereby declared null and void;
2. Except as to Lots 13 and 14 ownership of which has passed on to third persons, it is hereby declared that Lots 3, 3-B, 10 and 11 shall form part of the estate of the deceased Maximino Nazareno, Sr.;
3. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to restore TCT No. 140946 (covering Lot 3-B), TCT No. 132019 (covering Lot 3), TCT No. 118885 (covering Lot 10), and TCT No. 118886 (covering Lot 11).[23]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated May 27, 1999. Hence this petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ROMEO P. NAZARENO CAN DESTROY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACCORDED TO NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS LIKE THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (EXH. 1) EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND AUREA POBLETE IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS OF THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE SAID DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (EXH. 1) IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING:
A) THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, ALL OF WHICH ARE NOTARIZED, EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING SOME OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES.
B) THE EXECUTION OF AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION WITH WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND CONFIRMATION OF SALE DATED MAY 24, 1975 (EXH. 14A) OF THE ESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE BY THE DECEASED MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND THEIR CHILDREN INVOLVING THE ONLY REMAINING ESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE THUS IMPLIEDLY ADMITTING THE VALIDITY OF PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS MADE BY SAID DECEASED SPOUSES ON THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, HALF OF WHICH WOULD HAVE BECOME A PART OF AUREA POBLETE’S ESTATE UPON HER DEMISE.
C) THE ADMISSION MADE BY MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT ON AUGUST 13, 1980
DURING HIS LIFETIME IN CIVIL CASE NO. NC-712 (EXH. 81, 81B) THAT HE HAD SOLD CERTAIN PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO THUS BELYING THE CLAIM OF ROMEO P. NAZARENO THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 IS ONE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES TO BE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.
D) THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY ROMEO P. NAZARENO HIMSELF CONTAINED IN A FINAL DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IN CA-GR CV NO. 12932 DATED AUGUST 31, 1992 AND AN ANNEX APPEARING IN HIS ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-39018 (EXH. 11-B) INVOLVING LOT 3B, ONE OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION THAT THE SAID PROPERTY IS OWNED BY PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO.
E) THE PARTIAL PROJECT OF PARTITION DATED MAY 24, 1995 WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE INTESTATE COURT IN SP. PROC. NO. NC-28 AND EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATTER COURT’S FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 9, 1991 DETERMINING WHICH WERE THE REMAINING PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND AUREA POBLETE DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES IS AN INDIVISIBLE CONTRACT? AND IF SO WHETHER OR NOT UPON THEIR DEATH, THE ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. ALONE CAN SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF SAID SALE?
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF LOT 3 UNDER THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, IS VALID CONSIDERING THAT AS PER THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DATED NOVEMBER 21, 1990. ROMEO NAZARENO ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT PAY THE CONSIDERATION STATED IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JULY 4, 1969 EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES IN HIS FAVOR (EXH. M-2).
5. WHETHER OR NOT AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF ROMEO P. NAZARENO, TCT NO. 277968 (EXH. M) SHOULD BE CANCELLED AND DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND A NEW ONE ISSUED IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO PURSUANT TO THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN
THE LATTER’S FAVOR ON JANUARY 29, 1970 BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES.[24]
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. Petitioners argue that the lone testimony of Romeo is insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to a notarized document.
To begin with, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when these coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[25] The lone testimony of a witness, if credible, is sufficient. In this case, the testimony of Romeo that no consideration was ever paid for the sale of the six lots to Natividad was found to be credible both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals and it has not been successfully rebutted by petitioners. We, therefore, have no reason to overturn the findings by the two courts giving credence to his testimony.
The fact that the deed of sale was notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. As held in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:[26]
Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.
Second. Petitioners make capital of the fact that in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which was declared final by this Court in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of Appeals upheld the right of Maximino, Jr. to recover possession of Lot 3-B. In that case, the Court of Appeals held:
As shown in the preceding disquisition, Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property in dispute by purchase in 1970. She was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When her parents died, her mother Aurea Poblete-Nazareno in 1970 and her father Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. in 1980, Natividad P. Nazareno had long been the exclusive owner of the property in question. There was no way therefore that the aforesaid property could belong to the estate of the spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete. The mere fact that Romeo P. Nazareno included the same property in an inventory of the properties of the deceased Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. will not adversely affect the ownership of the said realty. Appellant Romeo P. Nazareno’s suspicion that his parents had entrusted all their assets under the care and in the name of Natividad P. Nazareno, their eldest living sister who was still single, to be divided upon their demise to all the compulsory heirs, has not progressed beyond mere speculation. His barefaced
allegation on the point not only is without any corroboration but is even belied by documentary evidence. The deed of absolute sale (Exhibit “B”), being a public document (Rule 132, Secs. 19 and 23, Revised Rules on Evidence), is entitled to great weight; to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant (Yturralde vs. Aganon, 28 SCRA 407; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308). Defendants-appellants’ own conduct disproves their claim of co-ownership over the property in question. Being themselves the owner of a ten-unit apartment building along Stanford St., Cubao Quezon City, defendants-appellants, in a letter of demand to vacate addressed to their tenants (Exhibits “P”, “P-1” and “P-2”) in said apartment, admitted that the house and lot located at No. 979 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City where they were residing did not belong to them. Also, when they applied for a permit to repair the subject property in 1977, they stated that the property belonged to and was registered in the name of Natividad P. Nazareno. Among the documents submitted to support their application for a building permit was a copy of TCT No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Natividad Nazareno (Exhibit “O” and submarkings; tsn March 15, 1985, pp. 4-5).[27]
To be sure, that case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties in the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-party complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, this third-party complaint concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own.[28] Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.
Furthermore, Natividad’s title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other words, the title to the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. If the first case resolved anything, it was the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B alone.
Third. Petitioners allege that, as shown by several deeds of sale executed by Maximino, Sr. and Aurea during their lifetime, the intention to dispose of their real properties is clear. Consequently, they argue that the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 should also be deemed valid.
This is a non-sequitur. The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino, Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the Deed of Sale made on January 29, 1970 is valid.
Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale. The question, however, is whether these sales were made for a consideration. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Indeed, it was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals that Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the Deed of Sale.
All these convince the Court that Natividad had no means to pay for all the lots she purportedly purchased from her parents. What is more, Romeo’s admission that he did not pay for the transfer to him of lots 3 and 25-L despite the considerations stated in the deed of sale is a declaration against interest and must ring with resounding truth. The question is, why should Natividad be treated any differently, i.e., with consideration for the sale to her, when she is admittedly the closest to her parents and the one staying with them and managing their affairs? It just seems without reason. Anyway, the Court is convinced that the questioned Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970 (Exh. “A” or “1”) is simulated for lack of consideration, and therefore ineffective and void.[29]
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals said:
Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 void and of no effect. In the case of Suntay vs. Court of Appeals (251 SCRA 430 [1995]), the Supreme Court held that badges of simulation make a deed of sale null and void since parties thereto enter into a transaction to which they did not intend to be legally bound.
It appears that it was the practice in the Nazareno family to make simulated transfers of ownership of real properties to their children in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Per the testimony of Romeo, he acquired Lot 25-L from his parents through a fictitious or simulated sale wherein no consideration was paid by him.He even truthfully admitted that the sale of Lot 3 to him on 04 July 1969 (Deed of Absolute Sale, Records, Vol. II, p. 453) likewise had no consideration. This document was signed by the spouses Max, Sr. and Aurea as vendors while defendant-appellant Natividad signed as witness.[30]
Fourth. Petitioners argue further:
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970 is an indivisible contract founded on an indivisible obligation. As such, it being indivisible, it can not be annulled by only one of them. And since this suit was filed only by the estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. without including the estate of Aurea Poblete, the present suit must fail. The
estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. can not cause its annulment while its validity is sustained by the estate of Aurea Poblete.[31]
An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever may be the nature of the thing which is the object thereof.The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not to the object thereof. [32] In the present case, the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to Natividad. The obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts, otherwise the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are therefore mistaken in basing the indivisibility of a contract on the number of obligors.
In any case, if petitioners’ only point is that the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone cannot contest the validity of the Deed of Sale because the estate of Aurea has not yet been settled, the argument would nonetheless be without merit. The validity of the contract can be questioned by anyone affected by it. [33] A void contract is inexistent from the beginning. Hence, even if the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone contests the validity of the sale, the outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at all.
Fifth. As to the third-party complaint concerning Lot 3, we find that this has been passed upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As Romeo admitted, no consideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of Sale. Therefore, the sale was void for having been simulated.Natividad never acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being without consideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her name.
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only “female and the only unmarried member of the family.”[34] She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states:
There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.
There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. on April 20, 1979[35] will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. The rule is settled that “every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.”[36]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Buena, J., no part.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ,petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct orders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively passing upon title to the properties subject of such deeds? Is a compromise agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner?
These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for review on certiorari before us assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 which annulled the decision3 of the trial court 4 and which declared the compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial court's approval. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed, the instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision as well as the subsequent orders of the respondent court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 14, 1992 is made PERMANENT. The compromise agreement dated October 30, 1969 as modified by the memorandum of agreement of April 13, 1970 is DECLARED valid and binding upon herein parties. And Special Proceedings No. 44-M and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED. 5
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967, [herein private respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility (Annex "B", Petition).
On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as administratrix of the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an
inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of her late mother (Annex "C", Petition).
Before the administration proceedings Special in Proceedings No. 44-M could formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, [herein private respondent] Rosalia's father, died on October 21, 1968.
On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration (Special Proceedings No. 1022) over the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by (herein private respondent) Rosalia. 6
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement (Annex "D", Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court], and took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate estate.
On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require administratrix, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement (Annex "E", Petition).
Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein petitioners] entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise agreement (Annex "F". Petition)
On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed, thru counsel, a motion to require [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement (Annex "G", Petition). They likewise filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement (Annex "H", Ibid), in which they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.
On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to withdraw his appearance and the two motions he flied, Annex "G" and "H" (Annex "I", Petition).
On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof, which prompted [herein private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31, 1980 (Annex "K", Petition).
On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion to change administratrix (Annex "L", Petition) to which [herein private respondent] Rosalia filed an opposition (Annex "M", Ibid).
The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position papers, which they did (Annexes "N" and "O", Petition). On September 14, 1989, former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered his re-appearance as counsel for (herein petitioners).
On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial court], this time presided by Judge Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated its decision on June 26, 1991, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by declaring and ordering:
1. That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 44-M consists of all her paraphernal properties and one-half (1/2) of the conjugal properties which must be divided equally between Rosalia Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;
2. That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 consists of all his capital properties, one-half (1/2) from the conjugal partnership of gains and one-half (1/2) of the intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-M;
3. That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez shall be inherited by his only legitimate daughter, Rosalia V. Sanchez de Lugod while the other one-half (1/2) shall be inherited and be divided equally by, between and among the six (6) illegitimate children, namely: Patricia Alburo, Maria Ramuso Sanchez, Rolando Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly T. Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez;
4. That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in favor of Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967 are all declared simulated and fictitious and must be subject to collation and partition among all heirs;
5. That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod is hereby ordered to prepare a project of partition of the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 and distribute and deliver to all heirs their corresponding shares. If she fails to do so within the said thirty (30) days, then a Board of Commissioners is hereby constituted, who are all entitled to honorarium and per diems and other necessary expenses chargeable to the estate to be paid by Administratrix Rosalia S. Lugod, appointing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Gingoog City as members thereof, with the task to prepare the project of partition and deliver to all heirs their respective shares within ninety (90) days from the finality of said decision;
6. That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, Administratrix Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod is hereby ordered to submit two (2) separate certified true and correct accounting, one for the income of all the properties of the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under
Special Proceedings No. 44-M, and another for the properties of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 duly both signed by her and both verified by a Certified Public Accountant and distribute and deliver to her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters in equal shares, one-half (1/2) of the net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez from October 21, 1968 up to the finality of this decision;
7. For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give cash advances to the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez during their minority and hour of need from the net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which adversely prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of college education, (the trial court) hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod to pay her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages, and also the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees;
8. Upon release of this decision and during its pendency, should appeal be made, the Register of Deeds and Assessors of the Provinces and Cities where the properties of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca are located, are all ordered to register and annotate in the title and/or tax declarations, the dispositive portion of this decision for the protection of all heirs and all those who may be concerned.
SO ORDERED.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 17, 1991 (Annex "P", Petition) on August 6, 1991.
On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and opposition to [herein private respondent] Rosalia's motion for reconsideration (Annex "Q", Petition).
On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex "S", Petition) declaring, among other things, that the decision at issue had become final and executory.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration of said Omnibus Order (Annex "T", Petition). Said [herein private respondent] was allowed to file a memorandum in support of her motion (Annex "V", Petition).
On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner Rosalia's motion for reconsideration (Annex "W", Petition). 7
Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and contended:
I
The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.
II
The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which was impossible.
III
The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional rights of [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod when [the trial court] decided to annul the deed of sale between the said [herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without affording them their day in court.
IV
[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any evidence thereon.
V
[The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod's right to appeal. 8
For clarity's sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromise agreement 9 of the parties:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by their mutual desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations between and among themselves, for mutual valuable considerations and in the spirit of good will and fair play, and, for the purpose of this Compromise Agreement, agree to the following:
1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21, 1968 was legally married to Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, who predeceased her on September 29, 1967, out of whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Oppositor herein, was born, thus making her the sole and only surviving legitimate heir of her deceased parents;
2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children, Intervenors-Oppositors and Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;
(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on March 17, 1926 at Cebu City, Philippines, to Emilia Alburo;
(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of wedlock on May 9, 1937 at Gingoog, Misamis Oriental, now, Gingoog City, to Alberta Ramoso;
(3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May 19, 1947,
(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February 16, 1949,
(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950, and
(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all born out of wedlock to Laureta Tampus in Gingoog City, Philippines.
3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties, to wit:
I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ
NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot No. 1041 C-2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 1033, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040, 1042 & 1043; South by Lot No. 1080, 1088, 1087 & 1084; East by Lot Nos. 1089, 1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos. 954, 1038, 1057 & 1056, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183, 672) sq. ms. more or less.
P21,690.00
II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No. 2745, C-7 located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 2744, 2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No. 2741, containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14,700) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,900.00
(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No. 3271 C-7 located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by Panyangan River & F. Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P11,580.00
(3) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad. Lot No. 2319, Case 2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 1061; South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No. 1044; and West by Lot No. 1041, containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (3,225) sq. ms. more or less.
(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No. 3272, C-7 Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan River; South by Panyangan River; and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Damian Querubin.
P2,370.00
(5) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 & 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P61,680.00
(6) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457, Cad. Lot No. 3273, C-7 Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East by Panyangan River; and West by Lot No. 3270, containing an area of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (34,300) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.
P3,880.00
(7) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000, Cad. Lot No. 2806, Case 7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded
on the North by Agayayan River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo Ramoso; and West by Restituto Baol, containing an area of SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (6,676) sq. ms. more or less.
P380.00
(8) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924, Cad. Lot No. 1206 C-1 located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and bounded on the NW., by Lot No. 1209; SW., by Lot No. 1207; Eastby National Highway; and West by Lot No. 1207; containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (4,513) sq. ms. more or less.
P740.00
(9) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925, Cad. Lot No. 5554, located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486; East by Lot No. 5555; and West by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms. more or less.
P320.00
(10) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926, Cad. Lot No. 5555 C-7 located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South by Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488, 3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot No. 3496; and West by Lot No. 5554, containing an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (77,776) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,350.00
(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot No. 61-C-1 located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot 64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St; East by Lot Nos. 63, and 62; West by Road-Lot 614-Guno St., containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FORTY TWO (1,042) sq. ms. more or less.
P9,320.00
(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5, Block 2, located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 4, block 2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot No. 6, block 2, West by Subdivision Road, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. ms. more or less.
P12,240.00
(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No. 7-A-16-0 located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 7-A-16-0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No. 7-A-18-Road; West by Lot No. 8, PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs. Restituto Baol, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,050.00
(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7, located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-Steep Bank; East by NW, by Lot No. 5158, Villafranca, containing an area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (96,200) sq. ms. more or less.
P3,370.00
III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)
NATURE AND DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL
1. Fifty (50) shares of stockRural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.at P100.00 per share P5,000.00
2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stockwith San Miguel Corporation 400.00
4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated properties in the following manner, to wit:
(a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso
shares, considering not only their respective areas but also the improvements existing thereon, to wit:
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 and 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. and assessed in the sum of P61,680.00.
(b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties, both real and personal, enumerated above with the exception of the following:
(1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel Corporation, indicated in San Miguel Corporation Stock Certificate No. 30217, which two shares she is ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo;
(2) The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block 2 together with the improvements thereon and identified as parcel No. II-12, lot covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798 identified as Parcel No. II-13 in the above enumerated, and Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7 together with the improvements thereon, which is identified as parcel No. II-14 of the above-enumeration of properties, which said Rosalia S. Lugod is likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso shares;
5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and severally in form of advances after October 21, 1968 the aggregate sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P8,533.94) and NINETY-FOUR CENTAVOS;
6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the indebtedness of the deceased Juan G. Sanchez and his deceased wife Maria Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the sum of P43,064.99;
7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their respective shares as may be determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and shall likewise be responsible for the expenses of survey and segregation of their respective shares;
8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez hereby waive, relinquish and
renounce, jointly and individually, in a manner that is absolute and irrevocable, all their rights and interests, share and participation which they have or might have in all the properties, both real and personal, known or unknown and/or which may not be listed herein, or in excess of the areas listed or mentioned herein, and/or which might have been, at one time or another, owned by, registered or placed in the name of either of the spouses Juan C. Sanchez or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both, and which either one or both might have sold, ceded, transferred, or donated to any person or persons or entity and which parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify together with all the improvements thereon, as well as all the produce and proceeds thereof, and particularly of the properties, real and personal listed herein, as well as demandable obligations due to the deceased spouses Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of the aforementioned spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, in favor of oppositor Rosalia S. Lugod;
9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorney's fees shall be borne respectively by the parties hereto;
10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor children, namely: Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, hereby declare that she has no right, interest, share and participation whatsoever in the estate left by Juan C. Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, or both, and that she likewise waives, renounces, and relinquishes whatever rigid, share, participation or interest therein which she has or might have in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod;
11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each other any whatever claims or actions, arising from, connected with, and as a result of Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Rosalia S. Lugod, warranting that the parcel of land ceded to the other parties herein contains 48 hectares and 36 ares.
12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the payment to Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of the sum of P51,598.93 representing the indebtedness of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez and the advances made to Rolando Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and Myna all surnamed Sanchez, mentioned in paragraphs 5 hereto agree to have letters of administration issued in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any bond.
That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment of the parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and intervenors immediately after the signing of this agreement and that the latter also mutually agree among themselves to have the said lot subdivided and partitioned immediately in accordance with the proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and intervenor and that in the meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet
effected, the administrations of said parcel of land shall be vested jointly with Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of petitioners and Maria Ramoso, one of the intervenors who shall see to it that each petitioner and intervenor is given one sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds of all agricultural harvest made thereon.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise agreement be approved.
Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGODIntervenor-Oppositor Oppositor
(Sgd.)ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYESR-101-Navarro Bldg.(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St.REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro CityGingoong City
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZPetitioner Petitioner
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZPetitioner Petitioner
(Sgd.)LAURETA TAMPUSFor herself and as GuardianAd-Litem of the minorsFlorida Mierly, Alfredo, andMyrna, all surnamed Sanchez
ASSISTED BY:
TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.Counsel for PetitionersCagayan de Oro City
The Clerk of CourtCourt of First InstanceBranch III, Medina, Mis. Or.
Greetings:
Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the Honorable Court today, Oct. 30, 1969.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ
The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the parties entered into with the assistance of their counsel, amended the above compromise. (It will be reproduced later in our discussion of the second issue raised by the petitioners.)
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution 10 dated September 4, 1992, initially dismissed private respondents' petition. Acting, however, on a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated September 14, 1992 and September 25, 1992, respectively, 11 Respondent Court thereafter reinstated private respondents' petition in a resolution 12 dated October 14, 1992.
In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition, setting aside the trial court's decision and declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding.
Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
In this appeal, petitioners invite the Court's attention to the following issues:
I
The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 considering that the special civil action of certiorari may not be availed of as a substitute for an appeal and that, in any event, the grounds invoked in the petition are merely
alleged errors of judgment which can no longer be done in view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had long become final and executory.
II
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in annulling the decision of the lower court for the reason that a compromise agreement or partition as the court construed the same to be, executed by the parties on October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.
III
The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of facts of the lower court that the alleged conveyances of real properties made by the spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca just before their death in favor of their daughter and grandchildren, private respondents herein, are tainted with fraud or made in contemplation of death, hence, collationable.
IV
In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower court's declaration of fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of annulment.
V
The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the intestate proceedings even as the lower court had not made a final and enforceable distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan C. Sanchez.
VI
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly erred in not at least directing respondent Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight (8) hectares due petitioners under the compromise agreement and memorandum of agreement, and in not further directing her to include in the inventory properties
conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower court to be part of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez. 13
The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are hereby consolidated into three main issues specifically dealing with the following subjects: (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy before the Court of Appeals, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of the properties sold.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Propriety of CertiorariBefore the Court of Appeals
Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal within the reglementary period, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing private respondent's recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They contend that private respondents' invocation of certiorari was "procedurally defective." 14 They further argue that private respondents, in their petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the trial court which, being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were not correctable by certiorari. 15 This Court disagrees.
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: "(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30, 1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 231985); (3) for certain special consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al. 16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L029039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)." 16 Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction, 17 as in the present case.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 18 After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are convinced that all these requirements were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. 19 It is hornbook doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar." 20 In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale anddetermined with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof . In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.21
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in disregard of the parties' compromise agreement. 22 Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement "was nor approved by the court," 23 is tantamount to "an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law. " 24
The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial court's decision but also the latter's jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not merely errors of judgment. 25 Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is well-settled that "(a)n act done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected bycertiorari." 26
Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent appellate court is apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia here under Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court. But the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to [prevent] a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient (Echauz vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381). Here, considering that the respondent court has disregarded the compromise agreement which has long been executed as early as October, 1969 and declared null and void the deeds of sale with finality, which, as a probate court, it has no jurisdiction to do, We deem ordinary appeal is inadequate. Considering further the [trial court's] granting of [herein petitioners') motion for execution of the assailed decision, 27 [herein private respondent] Rosalia's resort to the instant petition [for review on certiorari] is all the more warranted under the circumstances. 28
We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be challenged through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. At the very least, this case is a clear exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the trial court's decision and resolutions were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. "A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void; ' . . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.' " 29
Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties
covered by said agreement. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all miners represented only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus. 30
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. 31 Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, 32 where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037),even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361). (Emphasis found in the original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, 33 followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. 34 To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. 35
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases. 36Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise."
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. 37
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. 38 We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case.
In any event, petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial court. This new question or matter was manifestly beyond the pale of the issues or questions submitted and threshed out before the lower court which are reproduced below, viz.:
I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to their grandchildren collationable?
II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to their legitimate daughter also collationable?
III The first and second issues being resolved, how much then is the rightful share of the four (4) recognized illegitimate children? 39
Furthermore, the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17, 1990 filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court 40 readily reveals that they never questioned the validity of the compromise. In their comment before the Court of Appeals, 41 petitioners based their objection to sad compromise agreement on the solitary "reason that it was tainted with fraud and deception," zeroing specifically on the alleged fraud committed by private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod. 42 The issue of minority was first raised only in petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' Decision; 43 thus, it "is as if it was never duly raised in that court at all." 44 Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process. 45 We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize the well-settled rule that "(a)n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 46
The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in No. 8 of the aforequoted compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a relinquishment by petitioners of "a right to properties which were not known." 47They argue that such waiver is contrary to law, public policy, morals or good custom. The Court disagrees. The assailed waiver pertained to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent's estate which were not included in the inventory of the estate's properties. It also covered their right to other properties originally belonging to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been transferred to other persons. In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm and ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid because, contrary to petitioners' protestation, the parties waived a known and existing interest — their hereditary right which was already vested in them by reason of the death of their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent." Hence, there is no legal obstacle to an heir's waiver of his/her hereditary share "even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate." 48 At any rate, such waiver is consistent with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for the settlement of civil disputes. 49
Finally, petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod's alleged fraudulent acts, specifically her concealment of some of the decedent's properties, attended the actual execution of the compromise agreement.50 This argument is debunked by the absence of any substantial and convincing evidence on record showing fraud on her part. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of fraud or deception by alleging, inter alia, that the parcel of land given to them never conformed to the stated area, i.e., forty-eight (48) hectares, as stated in the compromise agreement. We find this argument unconvincing and unmeritorious. [Herein petitioners'] averment of fraud on the part of [herein private respondent] Rosalia becomes untenable when We consider the memorandum of agreement they later executed with [herein private respondent] Rosalia wherein said compromise agreement was modified by correcting the actual area given to [herein petitioners] from forty-
eight (48) hectares to thirty-six (36) hectares only. If the actual area allotted to them did not conform to the 48 hectare area stated in the compromise agreement, then why did they agree to the memorandum of agreement whereby their share in the estate of their father was even reduced to just 36 hectares? Where is fraud or deception there? Considering that [herein petitioners] were ably represented by their lawyers in executing these documents and who presumably had explained to them the import and consequences thereof, it is hard to believe their charge that they were defrauded and deceived by [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners], when actually surveyed, happened to be different in area to the stated area of 48 hectares in the compromise agreement, this circumstance is not enough proof of fraud or deception on [herein private respondent] Rosalia's part. Note that Tax Declaration No. 06453 plainly discloses that the land transferred to [herein petitioners] pursuant to the compromise agreement contained an area of 48 hectares (Annex "A", Supplemental Reply). And when [herein petitioners] discovered that the land allotted to them actually contained only 24 hectares, a conference between the parties took place which led to the execution and signing of the memorandum of agreement wherein [herein petitioners'] distributive share was even reduced to 36 hectares. In the absence of convincing and clear evidence to the contrary, the allegation of fraud and deception cannot be successfully imputed to [herein private respondent] Rosalia who must be presumed to have acted in good faith. 51
The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties on April 13, 1970 and referred to above reads:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby agree:
1. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30, 1969 so as to include the following:
a. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners and intervenors, all illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Sanchez, forty-eight (48) hectares, thirty-six (36) ares as embodied in
the aforementioned compromise agreement to thirty-six (36) hectares only, thus enabling each of them to get six (6) hectares each.
b. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel of land which is now covered by O.C.T. No. 146 (Patent No. 30012) and the adjoining areas thereof designated as Lot A and Lot C as reflected on the sketch plan attached to the record of this case prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario E. Zalles pursuant to the Court's commission of March 10, 1970 provided, however, that if the said 36-hectare area could not be found after adding thereto the areas of said lots A and C, then the additional area shall be taken from what is designated as Lot B, likewise also reflected in the said sketch plan attached to the records;
c. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Sanchez (petitioners and intervenors) shall be effective among themselves in such a manner to be agreed upon by them, each undertaking to assume redemption of whatever plants found in their respective shares which need redemption from the tenants thereof as well as the continuity of the tenancy agreements now existing and covering the said shares or areas.
d. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said petitioners and intervenors prorata.
e. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary administration of the area designated as Lot 5 of the Valles Sketch Plan pending final survey of the said 36-hectare area.
Cagayan de Oro City, April 13, 1970.
(Sgd.)LAURETA TAMPOSFor herself and as Guardianad-litem of Rolando, Mierly,
Alfredo and Myrna, allsurnamed Sanchez
Assisted by:
(Sgd.)TEOGENES VELEZ, Jr.Counsel for Petitioners
(Sgd.)ROSALIA S. LUGODAdministratrix
Assisted by:
(Sgd.)PABLO S. REYESCounsel for Administratrix(Sgd.)MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZIntervenor 52
Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement; they even amended it when they realized some errors in the original. Such correction emphasizes the voluntariness of said deed.
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their compromise. 53 This Court has consistently ruled that "a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits." 54 By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine years after its execution, when they filed with the trial court their Motion to Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated October 26, 1979. 55 In hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that petitioners filed said motion for the sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their compromise agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their view was unwise and unfair. While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of petitioners, we can only stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or disregard the legal effects of said compromise which, by its very nature as a perfected contract, is binding on the parties. Moreover, courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision different therefrom. 56 It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was
doing" 57 and "a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact, (McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488) because courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments." 58 Volenti non fit injuria.
Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in deeming Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 "CLOSED and TERMINATED," arguing that there was as yet no order of distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. They add that they had not received their full share thereto. 59 We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate may be made when the "debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any," had been paid. This order for the distribution of the estate's residue must contain the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the trial court's conclusion, 60 reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93 was shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia, who also absorbed or charged against her share the advances of Rolando T. Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil Code on collation. 61Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is the law between them, already contains the names and shares of the heirs to the residual estate, which shares had also been delivered. On this point, we agree with the following discussion of the Court of Appeals:
But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its appreciation of the facts of this case are the uncontroverted facts that (herein petitioners) have been in possession and ownership of their respective distributive shares as early as October 30, 1969 and they have received other properties in addition to their distributive shares in consideration of the compromise agreement which they now assail. Proofs thereof are Tax Declarations No. 20984, 20985, 20986, 20987, 20988, 20989 and 20990 (Annexes "B" to "H", Supplemental Reply) in the respective names of (herein petitioners), all for the year 1972. (Herein petitioners) also retained a house and lot, a residential lot and a parcel of agricultural land (Annexes "I", "J" and "K", Ibid.) all of which were not considered in the compromise agreement between the parties. Moreover, in the compromise agreement per se,it is undoubtedly stated therein that cash advances in the aggregate sum of P8,533.94 were received by (herein petitioners) after October 21, 1968 (Compromise Agreement, par. 5) 62
All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate proceedings which, consequently, should be deemed closed and terminated. In view of the above discussion, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.
Third Issue: Fraud and Collation
Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod to deliver to them the deficiency as allegedly provided under the compromise agreement. They further contend that said court erred in not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged deficiency in the inventory for purposes of collating the properties subject of the questioned deeds of sale. 63 We see no such error. In the trial court, there was only one hearing conducted, and it was held only for the reception of the evidence of Rosalia S. Lugod to install her as administratrix of the estate of Maria Villafranca. There was no other evidence, whether testimonial or otherwise, "received, formally offered to, and subsequently admitted by the probate court below"; nor was there "a trial on the merits of the parries' conflicting claims." 64 In fact, the petitioners "moved for the deferment of the compromise agreement on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of properties — NOT because of any deficiency in the land conveyed to them under the agreements." 65 Hence, there is no hard evidence on record to back up petitioners' claims.
In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia's willingness to reimburse any deficiency actually proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the geodetic engineer who prepared the certification and the sketch of the lot in question, and who could have provided evidence for the petitioners, "to bring records of his relocation survey." 66 However, Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did not comply with the court's subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum. Neither did he furnish the required relocation survey. 67 No wonder, even after a thorough scrutiny of the records, this Court cannot find any evidence to support petitioners' allegations of fraud against Private Respondent Rosalia.
Similarly, petitioners' allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale are bereft of substance, in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal presumption of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public documents, has not been overcome. 68 On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations. We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime. 69 Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are not collationable because, essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.
In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares provided in the compromise, concealment of properties and fraud in the deeds of sale are factual in nature which, as a rule, are not reviewable by this Court in petitions under Rule 45. 70 Petitioners have failed to convince us that this case constitutes an exception to such rule. All in all, we find that the Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the issues raised by them. Indeed, they have not persuaded us that said Court committed any reversible error to warrant a grant of their petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
