,AGETTING TO KNOW THEE:

CONJUNCTION AND CONFORMITYIN AVERROES' AND MAIMOI\'1DES' PIDLOSOPHY'

j, Alfred L. IVRY·d.l New York University'h

As the Latin West knew them, Averroes (1126-98) and Maimonides(1138-1204), would not have recognized themselves. To call each one as heknew himself, we should refer to Abo al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibnRushd and Moshe ibn Maimon. This change of nomenclature is also a cul-tural shift, informing us both of each man's first name and of his father'sname. It is not insignificant that Averroes' first name was Muhammad, andthat Maimonides' was Moshe; and that both were descended from familiesof distinguished jurists, in whose footsteps they (partially) followed. In-deed, as their first names attest, both men were proud representatives oftheir cultures and their religions, or rather, of their religiously oriented cul-tures. "',Both these cultures have been called "Islamicate" for the time and place

under discussion', 12'h century Cordova and Egypt, and with some justifica-tion. Islam in the West had by then developed a diversified and thrivingculture in which religion was but one feature, and in which there was notjust the one religion. Jews and Judaism found a place within that culture,both to practice their faith, and to philosophize, to join that internationalcommunity of scholars who sought universal truth, be they pagan, Chris-tian, Jewish or Muslim'.

It is in the latter role, as an Aristotelian, that Averroes is known to theWest. Of course, we know today that he was more than that; he was a

1 This paper was originally given in the colloquium held at the University of Chicago inhonor of Joel's retirement. I offer it here in tribute and affection to him. I also wish to thankthe editors of this volume for their careful reading of the first draft of this paper, and for theirhelpful suggestions.

2 The term was coined by Marshall Hodgson in his Venture of Islam, (Chicago; Univer-sity of Chicago Press 1974), pp. 57-60, and has been widely used since. Cf., for example,Lawrence V. Berman, "The Ethical Views of Maimonides within the Context of IslamicateCivilization," in: Joel L. Kraemer (ed.), Perspectives on Maimonides, (Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press 1991), pp. 13-32.

3 Alas, this was no longer true for Jews in Al-Andalus and the Maghreb in the twelfthcentury, under Almohad rule. The growing conservatism of that regime was to affectAverroes too, towards the end of his career.

144 ALFRED L. IVRY

fierce defender of the right, within Islam, to philosophize; and a powerfulopponent of kaliim and of Avicennian metaphysics. A man of many parts,Averroes was also a medical authority and a respected jurist, the author of awork of Islamic law. As a qii<fi in Cordova, he was very much an establish-ment figure, indeed, even his Aristotelian commentaries owed their originto a caliph's request'.Maimonides is even more of an establishment figure than Averroes,

functioning officially and unofficially as the head of the Jewish communityin Egypt, and beyond, offering theological and practical guidance over avast range of issues, and defining for many the very contours of rabbinicJudaism. He too was a medical authority, and he too was a philosopher,perhaps the boldest philosopher Judaism has known'. Yet however muchhe, or Averroes, may have been led to untraditional, radical ideas in theirphilosophical investigations, they did not sever their confessional alle-giances or break with the socio-political conventions of their society. Onthe practical level, both men may be seen as staunch defenders of theirfaith, in effect as conformists.This may be seen even in Averroes' and Maimonides' attitudes towards

conjunction, the joining of the individual intellect with a supernal AgentIntellect, Aristotle's nous poiesis become, under the influence of Alexanderof Aphrodisias, an external and transcendent being. Conjunction tittisdl inArabic, devekia in Hebrew) is the last stage in a cognitive process widelyaccepted in broad principle by all medieval philosophers'. A potential or"material" intellect was believed to receive impressions from the imagina-tion (be the impressions treated as "forms" or "intentions," the Arabicma'dnis that originated ordinarily in sense perceptions. The material intel-lect, enabled by an "Agent Intellect," was recognized as able to understandthe intelligible dimension of the imaginative representations it received;which is to say that the intellect was thought able to abstract the essential,universal meaning of these particular impressions, in order to comprehend

4 For a comprehensive survey of Averroes' career and work, cf. M. Cruz Hernandez, AbU-l-Walld Ibn Rushd (Averroes): Vida, obra, pensamiento, influencia, (Cordoba: Monte dePiedad y Caja de Ahorros de Cordoba 1986). For a more abbreviated survey of Averroes'philosophical views, see Alfred Ivry, "Avetroes," in: J. Marenbon (ed.), Routledge Historyof Philosophy, Volume Ill: Medieval Philosophy, (London: Routledge 1998), pp. 49-64.

5 There is an extensive literature on Maimonides' writings. A short recent survey of hisphilosophy may be found in Alfred L. Ivry, "Moses Mairnonides," in: J.1. E. Gracia andT.R. Noone (eds.),A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, (Oxford: Blackwell Pub-lishing 2(03). pp. 445-457.

6 The history and role of conjunction in the cognitive process in Classical. Hellenistic andmedieval Islamic philosophy has been recounted in a masterful way by Herbert A. Davidsonin Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, (New York: Oxford University Press1992), particularly pp. 7-42 and 315-340. A number of the major texts on the theme havebeen discussed and translated into Italian by Augosto Illuminati and others in Averroe ei'intelletto pubblico, (Rome: Manifestolibri 1996).

CONJUNCfION AND CONFORMITY IN AVERROES' AND MAlMONIDES' PHILOSOPHY 145

their true nature, This comprehension was facilitated by the AristotelianIdea of cognition as a joining of the snbject's intellect with the intelligiblesubstance of the object, so that the thought of x was considered identical tothe essence of x,The intellect of a person who accumulates true knowledge was com-

monly considered, in this view, as increasingly empowered and able tofunction on an abstract level, without the promptings and seductions of sen-sation and imagination, This is expressed often as a transition from the ma-terial intellect to an "intellect in habitu," and an "acquired" intellect Theperson whose rational faculty reached elevated levels of knowledge had ac-quired not just individual pieces of knowledge, but a comprehensive under-standing of the nature of being,At this stage, the Aristotelian noetic gave way to an ultimately Platonic

understanding of cognition, for the acquired intellect was thought to beidentical, partially if not totally, with the Agent Intellect", which representsor "embodies" the totality of forms on earth, The Agent Intellect both en-sures the continuity of earthly species and facilitates their intelligibility bythe one species, homo sapiens, that is equipped to appreciate itAccordingly, appreciation of the true nature of being was regarded as

equivalent to conjunction with the Agent Intellect It was considered thehighest achievement a person could attain, as such it was the realization oractualization of a person's essential nature; we being, by definition, rationalanimals, This fulfillment of one's nature led, it was claimed, to the highestsense of satisfaction or Itappiness a person could experience". As the AgentIntellect was understood to be part of a cosmic plan understood as divine,with God at its head, conjunction thus assumed a religious coloration,This scheme, however promising for accommodation with traditional be-

liefs, became enmeshed in controversy for two reasons principally. Firstly,there is the problem of the nature of the material intellect, whether its con-nection to the physical faculties of sensation and imagination was essentialor accidental. Should it be thought essentially related to the body, some phi-losophers - particularly Alfarabi - believed it impossible for it to conjoinwith the separate, unmixed Agent IntellectSecondly, and historically more influential, conjnnction was seen to af-

firm the nature of essential truth at the expense of the individual whoachieved it; that person loses his individuality in joining with universal be-mg. The ultimate happiness was then a negation, and not an affirmation, of

7 The "Agent Intellect," al- 'aql al-fa"iil in Arabic and inteltectus agens in Latin, is calledby Davidson and others the "Active Intellect."

8 It is thus that Moshe Narboni calls his treatise on the subject, which is heavily indebtedto Averroes' writings, a "Treatise on the Perfection of the Soul," Ma'amor bi-shelenua ha-nefesh,

146 ALFRED L. IVRY

self. This conclusion conflicted with the universal belief of the monothcis-tic faiths in personal immortality. Consequently, those like Averroes andMaimonides who affirmed conjunction, without at the same time positingan independent immortal soul in addition to an intellect, had to tread care-fully in their treatment of this theme.Maimonides is particularly circumspect in disclosing his beliefs on con-

junction and the related question of personal immortality. Accordingly, inhis rabbinic compositions and responsa there is little to lead the unsuspect-ing reader not to assume a personal immortal soul.In his Commentary on the Mishna, Maimonides' first major work, he

finds occasion to affirm what appears to be personal irmnortality primarilyin his commentary to Heleq, Chapter 10 of Sanhedrin. Those who acceptthe thirteen principles of faith that he enunciates will find their reward inthe next world, he affirms; though what that entails he knows will surprise -and disappoint - most Jews. For the overwhelming majority of his fellowJews believe in a future life of sensate pleasure, taking literally rabbinicdescriptions of that sort. They have no appreciation of metaphorical lan-guage, no uoderstanding of the logical and ontological dictates of philoso-phy. Yet on this subject, Maimonides says, the "avoidance of logical ab-surdities and the incumbancy (to accept) that which is necessary" shouldprevail.For Maimonides here, the afterlife offers a spiritual pleasure impossible

to describe. He likens it to the pleasure that the angels, stars and sphereshave, to which he says both religious law (al-shar' in Arabic, ha-torah. inHebrew) and the "metaphysicians among the philosophers" (al-ildhiyyunmin al-falasifat ha- 'elohiyyim min ha-pilosofimy? attest. This pleasure,Maimonides emphasizes, is purely intellectual, as the celestial beings haveno corporeal senses. The immortal souls, now obviously purely intellects,will have such an experience too, he asserts.This conclusion does not deter Maimonides from stipulating, - within the

eleventh principle of the faith, that principle which affirms belief in rewardand punishment - that the greatest reward is the future life, 'olam ha-bba,and the harshest punishment is spiritual annihilation, karet", God and manare presented here, however briefly, in a direct and providential relationshipthat evokes associations quite other than those conveyed by evoking intel-

9 imtirui'u 'l-mumtana'i wa-wujkbu 'l-wdjibi ; in Kafih's translation: mentat ha-nimna'otu-metzi'ia mehuyav ha-metzi'ut, in J. Kafih (ed. and trans.), Mishnah 'im perusti rabbenuMoshe ben Maimon, Seder NezikIn, (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook 1964), p. 202. This hasbeen translated elsewhere as "avoidance of logical absurdities and recognition of the exist-ence of the Necessary Existent," understanding, with some justification, al-wdjib as standingfor wiijib al-wujud.

10 ibid., p. 204.11 ibid., p. 216.

CONJUNCTION AND CONFORMffY IN AVERROES' AND MAIMONIDES' PHILOSOPHY 147

lectual cognition and The "Necessary Existent."This personalizing of God is the dominant tone of Maimonides' Mishneh

Torah too, as evinced, for example, in his section on the Laws of Repent-ance, Hi/khat Teshuvah, in the Book of Knowledge, Sefer ha-Madda'":Maimonides expands upon the theme of the world to come in chapters

eight and nine of this section, life in 'olam ha-bba being the "good reservedfor the righteous," ha-tovan ha-tzefunah la-tzaddiqim; or more precisely,for the souls of the righteous, nafshot ha-tzaddiqim'", Significantly, the soulis then identified with the intellect, and it is this entity that experiences areward greater than any other, and an ultimate beneficence: ha-sakhar she-'eyn sakhar le-ma'alali mimmenii ve-ha-tovah she- 'eyn ahareha tovah":Maimonides in this manner mingles traditional religious concepts with

nontraditional ones, leaving the reader with possibly confusedfeelings.Maimonides has, however, made his philosophical notion of God and Hisrelation to the world explicit earlier, in the very first section of This Book ofKnowledge, Sefer ha-Madda', the section dealing with Laws concerning"Fundamental Principles of the Torah," Yesodei he-Torah. There,Mairnonides portrays God as endowing all objects on earth with their formsthrough the intermediary of a certain "tenth angel," also known as "ishim,"which term clearly represents the philosophers' Agent Intellect". Man'sform, his soul, is then identified more precisely, once perfected, as his intel-lect, and it is this immaterial faculty of the soul that survives bodily corrup-tion and death. "It knows and apprehends the separate intelligibles; itknows the Creator of the universe; and it endures forever. "16Maimonides broaches the theme of the perdurance, or eternal nature of

the soul, in Part One, chapter 74 of The Guide of the Perplexed in a verybrief but more revealing way than he attempted in his earlier, rabbinicallyoriented writing. As part of a polemic against kalam arguments for the crea-tion of the world in time and in opposition to the notion of an infinitenumber of souls, Maimonides states that all surviving intellects are "one innumber," that is, they are all the same!'. He attributes this view principallyto Ibn Bajja, an Andalusian near contemporary whose views on astronomyhe found helpful also. However, Maimonides adds that statements on these

12 Moses Hyamson (ed. and trans.), Mishneh Torah, The Book of Knowledge, "The Lawsof Repentance," 3:5-14,4:6; (Jerusalem:Boys Town Jerusalem Publishers 1962), pp. 84b-8Sb.86b.

13 ibid., 8.1,2; Hyamson, 90a.14 ibid., 8.3; Hyamson,90b15 ibid., "The Fundamental Laws of the Torah," 4:6; Hyamson, 39a.16 ibid., 4:9. My translation of ha-tzurah. ha-zot yoda'at u-masseget ha-de'ot ha-perudot

min ha-gelamim ve-yoda'at bore ha-kol ve- 'omedet le- 'olam u-Ie- 'olemei 'olamtm.17 Shlomo Pines (trans.). The Guide of the Perplexed, (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press 1963), p. 221; Salomon Munk (ed.), Dakilat al-Ha 'irin, with additions by Issachar Joel,(Jerusalem: Y. Yunovitz 1930), p. 155:10.

148 ALFRED L. IVRY

matters, that is, concerning the survival of the soul or intellect, are abstruse,or "obscure," ghawdmid.Here as elsewhere, Samuel ibn Tibbon translates ghamid as 'amoq, which

conveys to us, and probably to him as well, both profundity as well as diffi-culty; certainly Maimonides uses the term frequently in both senses. In thepresent instance, Maimonides probably is alluding to a certain inconsist-ency among the philosophers on the nature of the survival of the soul or in-tellect; and he is referring as well to the lack of a consensus on this issue.The one point on which there is agreement, Maimonides says, apparentlyincluding himself, is that there is just the one intellect that survives, whichis tantamount to saying that there is no individual immortality.Maimonides barely discusses this issue elsewhere in the Guide or else-

where, though it is mentioned in passing in Guide 1:70 (Pines, p. 173).Rather, he often gives a contrary impression, through references to the"permanent duration" of the soul, or to life in the "world to come." He isnot, however, prepared in the Guide to engage in a thorough investigationof the soul, its nature, relation to the body and the possibility of separatingfrom it. Instead, he makes passing reference to the various stages of intel-lection in different places of the Guide, as Alexander Altmann has shown'",

Thus, it seems fairly clear that Maimonides follows Alexander ofAphrodisias or Ibn Bajja, in Guide 1:70, in considering the material or hylicintellect, to be "merely a faculty consisting in preparedness," quwatu '1-isti'dad [aqat, i.e., a disposition to receive intelligible notions", It is lessclear exactly where Maimonides located this disposition within the body,and whether he regarded it as the product of natural generation or an ema-nation of the Agent Intellect?". He does, however, distinguish between thispotential intellect, which he also calls soul and which he considers contem-poraneous with the generation of the body, and the "soul" that "has be-come actual" and after death is separate from matter. This, in traditionalphilosophical terms, ought to be the acquired intellect. As separate, it is"one thing only," Maimonides boldly acknowledges".Maimonides explicitly distinguishes between a potential, hylic intellect,

and an actualized, now called "acquired," intellect, in Guide 1:7222• Whilethe material intellect is identified with the corporeal contingencies of practi-cal intellect, the acquired intellect is seen as in a relation to man parallel to

18 "Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics," in A. Altmann,Von dermiuelaiterlichen zur modernen Aufkldrung, (Tiibingen: Mohr 1987), pp. 60-9 L

19 Pines, p. 174; Munk/Joel, 119:2820 Altmann, "Maimonides on the Intellect," p. 69, takes issue with the corporeal locations

Shem Tab and Narboni gave to the material intellect.21 Cf. the rabbinic support for this unorthodox view that Maimonides educes from

B.T. Hagigah 12b (Pines, p. 173).22 Pines, pp. 190, 193. _~lr,.;.m,.:

CONJUNCTION AND CONFORMITY IN AVERROES' AND MAIMOJ\WES' PHn...oSOPHY 149

that in which God relates to the world: truly separate, and influencing itthrough emanation.Here Maimonides has conflated the acquired and Agent Intellect, for it is

the latter that is universally recognized as endowed with emanative powersthat facilitate cognition. Maimonides' Muslim predecessors - al-Farabi,Avicenna, and Ibn Bajja - had already made this equation, the acquired in-tellect understood by them as capable of possessing a maximal degree ofuniversal truth. As such, it had the Agent Intellect as the direct object of itscognition, which, for Ibn Bajja at least, brought full conjunction with it23•Maimonides is more prepared to present the acquired intellect as separate

from and outside the body than he is to consider it as subsisting somehowin the body. He thus has a physically implicated material intellect on theone hand, and a completely separate acquired intellect on the other. Howone gets from one to the other is not addressed, presumably intellectionproceeds through the usual channels, viz., the intellects in habitu and inactu. The leap from the acquired to the Agent Intellect is also not detailed,its implications perhaps better left unsaid.Maimonides has, however, laid out in great detail the classic understand-

ing of what constitutes intellection, the essential aspect of the process ofcognition. In Guide 1:68 he spells it out, apropos of what is "generally ad-mitted" of God, viz., that "He is the intellect as well as the intellectuallycognizing subject and the intellectually cognized object, - innahu '1-'aqlwa-'1-'aqil wa-' I-ma 'qui (ha-sekhel ha-maskil ve-ha-muskali- and thatthose three notions form in Him, may He be exalted, one single notion inwhich there is no multiplicity, "24

However unique and unknowable Maimonides usually insists God is,qua intellect He emerges as a paradigm for everyoue who cognizes a truenotion, the major difference being that the object of God's thought is con-tinually within Him from the start, being Himself. As for other intellects,Maimonides says, "it is clear that whenever intelJect (any intellect -AI) ex-ists in actu, it is identical with the intellectually cognized thing (fa-inna '1-'aql huwa 'l-shay' al-ma'qulr. And it has become clear that the act of everyintellect, which act consists in its being intellectually cognizing, is identicalwith the essence of that intellect. Conseqnently the intellect, the intellectu-ally cognizing subject, and the intellectually cognized object are always oneand the same thing in the case of everything that is cognized in actu. "25

This statement seems as clear as can be that the intellect in itself whenoperational is identical with its activity and its object, the intelligible form.

Z3 Cf. the summary of Ibn Bajja's position in Davidson, op. cit., pp. 145,322.24 Pines, p. 163; Munk, 112:14. As Maimonides says there, he had already stated this

definition of God in his Mishneh Torah, and cf. Yesodei he-Torah, I.25 Guide 1:68, Pines, p. 164; Munk, 113:18.

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Everyone who thinks truly thus participates in something presumably exter-nal to him, but which is actually and essentially part of him. The trulythinking person has expanded his or her horizons, and has become part ofthe greater and eternal world of universal being",Mairnonides does not speak of any additional faculty in the soul or out-

side it, as a second psychic conscience, which controls or supervises thisidentification of the intellect with its intelligible objects. The person whoseeks the felicity that comes with knowledge of God and the ultimate truthsmust zealously defer to his or her intellect, and not allow the other facultiesof the soul, the nutritive, sensory, imaginative and appetitive faculties, tosubvert it. Due to the frailty of the human condition, its needs and lusts, thisis an extremely difficult task, and accounts for the rarity of a sustained con-junction.

Maimonides knows of only a handful of persons who attained this ex-alted status: the patriarchs, Moses, Aaron and Miriam. However, on a moreintermittent level, philosophers and prophets - who are a unique kind ofphilosophers - may be included in this group. Much of the theory of proph-ecy, with the preeminent presence of the emanative Agent Intellect, is anaccommodation to the psychology of conjunction.The Agent Intellect does not play favorites, however; it facilitates every

person's intellectual activity. It is, for Maimonides as for most of the phi-losophers who preceded him, the formal, efficient and final cause of ourintellects, a "divine" or eternal immaterial substance that indifferently im-bues the world with an intelligibility that stems from it. This is achievedthrough an ongoing, essentially impersonal emanative process that Maimo-

26 My position takes Maimonides' statement at its word, and assumes he believes that thecognitive process described affords an accurate or "true" representation of objective reality.Admittedly, Maimonides does believe certain metaphysical topics defy full comprehension,notably knowledge of God's essence. Shlomo Pines has developed the thesis that Maimo-nides has an agnostic position regarding metaphysical knowledge, and considers his talk of anafterlife "theological philosophy," i.e., religiously motivated theology, not philosophicallyrigorous. Cf "The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to al-Farabi, ibn Bajja, andMaimonides," in: Isidore Twersky (ed.) Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature,vel. 1, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1979), pp. 89-100. Josef Stem has takenthis thesis further, claiming that Maimonides considers the articulation in words of the "innerspeech" of thought to distort the truth known to the intellect. Accordingly, none of Maimo-nides' metaphysical claims to knowledge were intended to be taken literally. Cf. now Stem,"Maimonides on Language and the Science of Language," in: R. S. Cohen and H. Levine(eds.), Maimonides and the Sciences, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 20(0),pp. 173-226.

Pines' article prompted two strong responses, from Alexander Altmann, "Maimonides onthe Intellect..." (see note 18 above), pp. 60-129; and Herbert Davidson, "Maimonides onMetaphysical Knowledge", in: A. Hyman (ed.), Maimonidean Studies vol. 3 (1992-93), pp.49~103. A partial response to Stem's thesis can be found also in A. Ivry, "The Logical andScientific Premises of Maimonides' Thought," in: A. L. Ivry, E.R. Wolfson, and A. Arkush(eds.), Perspectives on Jewish thought and Mysticism, (Amsterdam: Harwood AcademicPublishers 1998), pp. 63-97.

CONJUNcrION AND CONFORMIIY IN AVERROES' AND MAIMONIDES' PffiLOSOPHY 151

nides accepts without demurral, a process at work with prophets and phi-losophers alike, as well as with everyone who acquires the slightest trueknowledge.Thus, each and every true cognition is in itself an act of conjunction with

the Agent Intellect, through one of it, surrogate constituents". The AgentIntellect in itself is the totality of such surrogate forms on earth, but it ispresent in each. As one proceeds to an ever-greater understanding of theworld, one comprehends more and more of the Agent Intellect, realizing theunity underlying the variety and multiplicity of its parts. At every stepalong the way, however, the knower is in touch with the source of thisknowledge, and assumes more and more of its identity. It is this that givesone the sense of elation and satisfaction that is the philosopher's reward(and solace).I emphasize the quotidian sense of conjunction because much of the phi-

losophical literature on this theme, Maimonides' writings included, treatsconjunction as though it occurs rarely, and towards the end of one's life.Frequently, moreover, conjunction was formally reserved, as a technicalterm, to that stage of perfected knowledge in which the Agent Intellect it-self, as a separate self-contained intelligible substance, became the object ofthe acquired intellect's thonght. This is clearly what Maimonides means to-wards the end of the Guide, by having his ideal person thinking only ofGod, and as a consequence being protected from all evil". Snch a personhas realized his or her essential being, in conjunction with the Agent Intel-lect, and as snch is not affected by the afflictions to which flesh is heir.Maimonides thus plays down the effect of a limited level of cognition, in

terms of achieving immortality, and this despite his knowledge that theAgent Intellect is involved in every act of the rational faculty. For Mai-monides had said in the very first chapter of the Guide (Pines, p. 23), thatconjunction with the Agent Intellect (there called "divine intellect") is anessential, defining property of man's "image," that of a rational being.Still, he would have us believe that it is only with complete perfection thatone may be vouchsafed passage to the next world.But who is this one? Maimonides does not admit, in the Guide, to a per-

sonal "soul" other than the intellect that survives the death of the body. The"permanently enduring" intellect, on the other hand, is such because it isone with the Agent Intellect. All along, it has been conjoining with it,though in an interrupted way. At death, with the body not there to distractit, the intellect is free to remain with the object of its thought, which it hascome to be.

27 Pace Professor Altmann's interpretation of the role of the Agent Intellect in facilitatingcognition, a role that he feels does not entail conjunction. See "Maimonides on the Intellect,"p.84.

28 Guide IJJ:51, Pines, pp. 624 ff.

152 ALFRED L. IVRY

Maimonides' doctrine of conjunction thus effectively denies personalimmortality, reason enough for him to be reticent on the issue. Averroes, onthe other hand, is practically verbose on the theme of conjunction. He wrotea little more than three treatises on the human intellect and the possibility ofits conjunction with the Agent Intellect. One of the treatises is good sized",two of the three treatises are rather short", and a fourth is just about onepage long",

These treatises are in addition to the remarks Averroes makes on the ra-tional faculty in his three (!) commentaries on Aristotle's De anima. Theviews he expresses in the commentaries on this faculty are themselves farfrom uniform, as has been noted", particularly as concerns the initial stageof the intellect in a person, the material, or hylic intellect. The first of thetwo short treatises recognizes the singular importance of determining thenature of this first stage of the intellect, but does not articulate a clear posi-tion regarding it33. Averroes is interested primarily in asserting the essentialseparation of a person's intellect from his body, so as to allow for conjunc-tion with the Agent Intellect. This meeting and merging of minds is re-garded as a final stage in the development of one's intellect, the full realiza-tion of its potentiality. The resulting immortality is not emphasized,generally.

The commentaries themselves stress different aspects of conjunction.The one view which is dominant, however, is that conjunction is not onlywith the Agent Intellect, but is of the Agent Intellect; that is, the perfected

29 This is "The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction" which is extant only in the lem-mata of the Commentary written by Moshe Narboni. Cf. Kalman Bland (ed. and trans.), TheEpistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Com-mentary of Moses Narboni, (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary 1982).

30 Cf. J. Hercz, Drei Abhandlungen iiber die Conjunction des Separaten Intellects mit dentMenschen, von Averroes (Vater und Sohn), (Berlin: H. G. Hermann 1869). The first two trea-tises, those written by Averroes himself, form the basis of two Latin translations, theTractatus de animae beatitudine and Epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cumhomine. These Latin treatises were included in the Renaissance editions of Averrocs' com-mentaries on Aristotle; cf. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Connneniarius, (Venice 1573, re-print, Frankfort aIM 1962), vol. ix. They have been translated into Italian by AugustoIlluminati, Completa Beatitudo: l'intelleuo felice in tre opuscoli averroisti. (Ancona: L'orec-chic di van Gogh 2000), pp. 121M43.The relation of the De animae beatltudine to the Hebrewtexts has been studied by Herbert A. Davidson, "Averrois Tractatus de Animae Beatitudine."in Ruth Link-Salinger et. at, (eds.), A Straight Path, (Washington, D.C. :Catholic Universityof America Press 1988), pp. 57-73; and by Marc Geoffroy and Carlos Steel, La Beatitude deL'Ame, (Paris: J. Vrin 2001), pp. 9-81. Geoffroy and Steel have compared the Hebrew trea-tises to a reconstructed Latin text, offering both in French translation, pp. 199-245.

31 This is listed as an appendix in Narboni's commentary (above, n. 29), pp. 151-2 He-brew, p. III in Bland's translation.

32 Cf. Davidson, On Intellect, pp. 258-298.33 The first of the shorter treatises leans towards Alexander's view of the material intellect

as a mere disposition, without endorsing his view of this disposition as generated and henceconuptible. Cf. Davidson, p. 274-275.

CONJUNCTION AND CONFORMITY IN AVERROES' AND MAIMONIDES' PHILOSOPHY 153

intellect thinks only of universal truths, which are the subject matter of theAgent Intellect. This state of perfection, Averroes says in the Short Com-mentary or Epitome, has not yet been achieved by mankind in general,though it is within its capacity" •. Perfection of this sort is thought generallyto entail complete knowledge of all possible truths, a state indeed divine.In the Short Commentary, as in the Long Commentary as well, Averroes

does acknowledge (once in each commentary) a lesser degree of perfection,but one that qualifies as well for the appellation of "conjunction.":" This isa state of partial knowledge, one in which the conjunction with the AgentIntellect is not all consuming, but which is real nevertheless. This state ispossible, since each and every act of cognition involves the Agent Intellect,the intellect that is for Averroes (as for Maimonides) the efficient, formaland final cause of each act of cognition.Be the degree of conjunction what it is, these commentaries barely speak

of the felicity that it is supposed to bring, or of the presumed immortality.The Middle Commentary mentions neither partial conjunction, felicity orimmortality, its discussion of conjunction seemingly restricted to the me-chanics of intellection. Personal immortality is all but explicitly ruled out inboth the Middle and Long Commentaries, which take Aristotle's remark inDe an. 430a23 to mean that the Agent Intellect severs its relation with usupon our death, being immortal only when alone with itself".This does not mean that Averroes believes the material intellect in us is

itself mortal, since then conjunction with an eternal being conId never suc-ceed at all, the two intellects having then incompatible natures. No, in thisview of Averroes' it is the intellect that we have acquired in onr lifetime,that which distinguishes us and presnmably grants us happiness, whichdoes not endure after our death. The conjunction that we achieved in ourlifetime ceases, thongh the truths realized then by us do not change theirstatus. They endure in the Agent Intellect, and will continue to be realizedby other individuals. "Our" material intellect, on the other hand, returns, asit were, to its essential subject, be it the Agent Intellect, as the Middle Com-

34 Cf S. Gomez Nogales (ed.), Epitome De Anima, (Madrid: Consejo Superior deInvestigaciones Cientificas, Instinuo Miguel Asin: Institute Hispano Arabe de Cultura 1985),p.93; in his Spanish translation, La Psicologia de Averroes, (Madrid: Universidad Nacionalde Educaci6n a Distancia 1987), p. 184. See too Alfred L. Ivry, "Averroes' Short Commen-tary on Aristotle's De anima," Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, VIII(t997), p. 540.

35 Cf. Ivry, "Avcrroes' Short Commentary," p. 534; F. Stuart Crawford (ed.), AverroisCordubensis: Commentarium. Magnum ill "Aristoteles De Anima Libras, (Cambridge, MA.:Mediaeval Academy of America 1953), p. 500.

36 Crawford, Cornmentarium Magnum, pp. 408, 409; Alfred 1... Ivry (ed. and trans.),Averroes: Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De anima, (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young Uni-versity Press 2002), p. 117.

154 ALFRED L. IVRY

mentary has it, or a universal material intellect, as the Long Commentaryasserts".Perhaps with this in mind, the commentaries find little reason to speak of

the felicity and immortality which conjunction is often thought to provide.The benefits of learning are relatively short-lived, though not to be spurnedtherefore. Intellectual perfection lets us look into eternity, but does notgrant us permanent entry. We can take comfort in the thought, however,that we have been part of an eternal order of being, and will always be so.

lt may be reflections such as these that drew Averroes to write repeatedlyabout the possibility of conjunction, in the independent treatises to whichwe have referred. In comparing these compositions on conjunction, weagain observe a certain reticence to expand upon the purpose of the phe-nomenon.Conjunction is, after all, a two-way street, with the subject and object

becoming one as they unite. As such, there is little point to insist upon whois conjoining with whom, except for the perspective in which the issue isengaged". Viewing conjunction from the Agent Intellect downwardspresents the topic as a metaphysical issue concerned mostly with the ques-tion of the causal nature of the separate intellects of the heavens, to whichthe Agent Intellect belongs.Viewing conjunction from the material intellect upwards, on the other

hand, presents the topic as one having psychological and existential signifi-cance. "Psychological" in two senses of the word, pertaining both to thepsyche or soul of the individual, and to the rational faculty of that soul;while the claim of "existential" significance assumes a transforming effectupon the intellect of the person experiencing it. For, as we have said, theresult of conjunction for an individual is the ultimate happiness, or "felic-ity," hatzlaha, beatitudine, the Arabic sa'dda) which one may experiencein this world, the intellect knowing and thus uniting with eternal and henceimmortal truths, thereby becoming somehow part of them.

It is therefore significant that, just as in the commentaries, Averroes pre-fers to discuss conjunction in less dramatic terms, approaching it essenriallywithin a metaphysical perspective. Certainly for him, no existential truthcan have any meaning without a supporting metaphysical theory anchoredin physical data. The scientific manner in which he discusses conjunction inthese treatises could lead one to believe he did not appreciate its existentialdimension, but that would be to underestimate him. He concludes the

37 cr. Alfred L. Ivry, "Averroes' Three Commentaries on De Anima," in: Gerhard En-dress and Jan A. Aertsen (eds.), Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition, (Leiden: Brill1999), pp. 209-212.

38 Cf. Averroes' attempts at distinguishing the effect of conjunction upon the Agent Intel-lect and the stages of the human intellect involved in it, in the Epistle on the Possibility ofConjunction, Sections 5-9 (English, pp. 40-52; Hebrew, pp. 34-55).

CONJUNCTION AND CONFORMITY IN AVERROES' AND MATh10NIDES' PHlLOSOPHY 155

smallest of his essays on this topic by affirming apprehension of the AgentIntellect as man's ultimate felicity, "(the attainment of) an eternal lifewhich undergoes neither change nor corruption.t"?This statement of unchanging felicity needs to be modified, however, in

light of Averroes' more ample remarks in his commentaries, as well as inthe treatise on The Possibility of Conjunction. In that work he again linksconjunction to felicity, the achievement of the former entailing the latter".Felicity is not. however, an unending state of being. Averroes recognizes,since conjunction itself is fmite in endurance, for the individual whoachieves it. Even within one's lifetime, Averroes points out in this treatise,the very act of conjunction with the Agent Intellect leads to the displace-ment of the individual, acquired intellect".Though intermittent and transient in an individual, conjunction and the

attendant felicity are always present somewhere on earth. There is a neces-sity for at least some individuals to experience conjunction with the agentintellect, for otherwise Divine providence, which, Averroes says, peoplecall nature ([haJ-hashga~ah ha-elohit ve-hi she-yikre'iim ha-teva'Y; wouldhave done something in vairr",For Averroes, conjunction elevates the individual intellect to a state in

which the individuality of that intellect is lost. During a person's lifetime,that individual may rejoice in the conjunction with the Agent Intellect ofwhat may be considered with some justice as one's personal intellect. How-ever, there is no similar sensation after death, when the acquired intellectdisappears, lacking its own substantial independence. The Agent Intellectshould then be seen as assuming a new relation with another person's mate-rial intellect, or simply as maintaining its relationship with the species withwhich it is linked. The immortality of which Averroes speaks is thus one ofuniversal truth and being, with which we participate in only the most self-effacing way, as part of our species' order.This is part of the unorthodox teaching that Averroes does not want the

unsophisticated reader to absorb, so he ends his treatises with assurances ofDivine providence and general agreement with traditional religious be-liefs'". Particularly striking is Averroes' comment that it is "impossible" Iefshar, for God not to allow some human beings, those who have become

3\1 My translation, and cf. Bland, p. 112. The Hebrew on p. 152 has ha-hatzlahah ha-oharonah la-adam ve-ha-hayyim ha-nitzhiyyim asher 16yassigem shiniii ve-16hefsed.

40 ibid., pp. 40 English, 108 Hebrew.41 ibid., p. 50 English, 50 Hebrew. Avcrroes puts it that the hylic intellect emerges as the

acquired intellect disappears in conjunction. Cf Alfred L.lvry, "Averroes on Intellection andConjunction," Journal of the American Oriental Society 86.2 (1966), p. 83.

42 Hercz, Drei Abhandlungen, pp- 8, 38.43 Cf. the concluding paragraph of both treatises, ibid., pp. 10, 14 (Hebrew), 47, 56 (Ger-

man); in the French translation of Geoffroy and Steel, pp. 222 and 236.

156 ALFRED L IVRY

perfected in their knowledge of the theoretical sciences, to view "His radi-ance, sovereignty and the majesty of His countenance," zivo va-hadaro ve-hod panav":In this manner, Averroes articulates a traditional attitude, and, like

Maimonides, may be seen as qualifying his radical position. Both men wishto conform to popular opinion, or to appear to so conform, even when ex-pressing unorthodox views. I fear they would have disapproved of my re-marks.

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44 Hercz, p. 13 (Hebrew). and cf. p. 53 (German).

"TWO GENTLEMEN OJ<"CORDOVA:AVERROES AND MAIMONIDES

ON THE TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE OF GOD"

Barry S. KOGANHebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion

Cincinnati, Ohio

Our title invites us to consider or recousider, as the case may be, two ofthe most illustrious figures and accomplished thinkers of 12"'century Anda-lusia. While neither AbU al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd(Averroes) nor Miisa ibn Maimun (Maimonides) lived out his entire life inthe remarkable city of Cordova, each one went on to distinguish himselfelsewhere in the same or similar areas of endeavor with a keen awarenessof his ties to the intellectual heritage of Southern Spain. We know that eachwas decisively influenced in his life by the policies of the Almohad regime,the former as a favored (and later disfavored) court intellectual and the lat-ter as a persecuted outsider and exile. Each would eventually become aleading jurist within his own religious community and author importantworks of jurisprudence, although Maimonides' influence has arguably beenthe more long lasting and significant than that of his counterpart. Eachwould distinguish himself as a practicing physician of great repute as welland, beyond this, as a prolific writer on both the theory and practice ofmedicine. Each would produce enormously learned works in philosophyand contribute especially to clarifying the proper relation between philoso-phy and religion. Indeed, these works would become classics during theirlifetimes and remain so to this day. Finally, each of these thinkers is re-membered and honored now, centuries later, as an exemplary teacher, in-deed, one who still has much to tell us about the highest things, especially"divine things" and the knottiest problems associated with them, despitechanges of outlook and conviction of every conceivable kind.

The purpose of this discussion is to explore the views of Averroes andMaimonides on the question of how we ought to understand and teach

• I am pleased to be able to dedicate this study to Prof. Joel L. Kraemer, a truly outstand-mg scholar and gentleman of Chicago and its great university, from whose profound learning,exemplary scholarship, and personal kindness 1 have benefited in many ways. May his lightand his like increase. [ would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Profs. Kraemer,Ralph Lerner, Alfred Ivry, Josef Stern, and Gad Freudenthal for their helpful questions, com-ments, and suggestions on portions of this paper delivered at academic conferences and toProf. Tzvi Langennann for his extraordinary patience and kindness.

ADAPTATIONSAND INNOVATIONS

Studies on the Interaction between Jewishand Islamic Thought and Literature

from the Early Middle Agesto the Late Twentieth Century,

Dedicated to Professor Joel L. Kraemer

EDITED BY

Y. Tzvi Langermann and Josef Stern

Collection de laRevue des Etudes juivesdlrigee parSimon C. Mimouni et Gerard Nahon

PeetersParis-Louvain-Dudley, MA2007