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Web Services Security with SOAP Security Proxies Gerald Brose, PhD Technical Product Manager Xtradyne Technologies AG OMG Web Services Workshop USA 22 April 2003, Philadelphia
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Web Services Security withSOAP Security Proxies

Gerald Brose, PhD

Technical Product ManagerXtradyne Technologies AG

OMG Web Services Workshop USA22 April 2003, Philadelphia

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 2 -

Web Services Security Risks

! existing security technology does not apply well

! HTTP is not filtered by standard firewalls

! SSL does not provide end-to-end security

SOAP/HTTP SOAP/HTTP

DB

Legacy App

Web Service

! Exposure of critical resources is a risk

! integration = new access paths and data flows

! SOAP itself has no security mechanisms tomitigate risks

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 3 -

Roadmap

! Web Services Security

! Threats, Security services, Challenges

! Protocol layers

! Web Services Security Standards

! WS-Security

! XML DSig, XML Encryption

! SAML

! Web Services Security Proxies! Functionality, Deployment Scenarios

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 4 -

Security Threats

! Attacks on services

! read and record

! espionage, privacy breaches

! replay! sabotage, fraud

! modify in transit

! sabotage, fraud

! redirect or drop

! sabotage, fraud

! unauthorized access

! read, write, use

! espionage, sabotage, fraud, theft

! denial of service

! Attacks on messages

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Security Services that help

! Authentication! "where does this (part of a) message come from?"

! Authorization (access control)

! "may this message pass?"

! Confidentiality! "who can read this (part of a) message?"

!Integrity! "has this (part of a) message been tampered with?"

! Audit! "what happened?"

! Administration! "how do I manage this?"

... but SOAP has none of this !

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Web Services Security Challenges

! Loose coupling

! Web Services are message-based

! transport security sessions don't fit

! HTTP transport

! SOAP messages pass firewalls uninspected

! existing perimeter protections don't apply

! Service composition! a single message can traverse many intermediaries

! who do you trust with what?

! Document-based workflows! different parts of a message

! are processed by different processors

!may need different acces modes for different parties

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SOAP

HTTP

Intermediary

Security and Protocol Layers

HTTP

WS-Security

XML DSig ...

point-to-point point-to-point

SAML

X.509Kerberos

SenderReceiver

end-to-end

S

XML Encryption

S

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WS-Security

! OASIS-Standard

! Working Draft since 11/2002

! Message-level Security Model for SOAP

! can embed a wide variety of existing technologies

! end-to-end security with multiple trust domains

! Extensible security message header <wsse:security>

! for security information in and about messages

! Security Token format

! express claim(s) made by entities

!

text/binary, signed/unsigned, e.g. username or certificate! Integrity, Authentication, Confidentiality

! processing rules for XML Digital Signature and XML Encryption

! Common basis for future specifications

! WS-Policy, WS-Trust, WS-Privacy, ...

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! W3C-Standard! "Recommendation" since 2/2002

! XML-Syntax for digital signatures!

not just for XML content!! enveloped, enveloping, detached

XML Digital Signature

SigSig

DataData

SigSig

DataData

DataData

SigSig

! Usage in WS-Security

! detached! Integrity protection for individual parts of a

message (header and body)

!

Authentication of security tokens! Binding security tokens to messages

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the actual signature

information about thesigned object

General Form of a Digital Signature

references the

signed object

<Signature ID?><SignedInfo>

<CanonicalizationMethod/>

<SignatureMethod/>(<Reference URI? >(<Transforms>)?<DigestMethod><DigestValue>

</Reference>)+</SignedInfo>

<SignatureValue>(<KeyInfo>)?

(<Object ID?>)*

</Signature>

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XML Encryption

! W3C-Standard

! "Recommendation" since 12/2002

! XML syntax to represent encrypted data! not just encryption of XML content!

! no new algorithms

! Usage in WS-Security:! protect confidentiality of individual parts of a

message

! header (e.g., session keys)! body

! attachments

S it A ti M k L

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Security Assertion Markup Language(SAML)

! OASIS-Standard (1.0, since 5/2002)

! XML-based framework for the exchange of security information! assertions = statements by an issuer about a subject

! authentication assertion - subject is authenticated

! authorization decision assertion - subject is authorized

!

attribute assertion - subject has given attributes! SAML Protocol

! between Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) and PolicyDecision Points (PDP)

! defines request and response messages

! Usage of SAML assertions in WS-S! format for Security Tokens

!

Binding to WS-Security in progress("SAML Token binding")

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Standards in Concert

<SOAP:Body wsu:Id="x">

SOAP:Header

<wsse:Security>

</wsse:Security>

AssertionAssertion

SignatureSignature

SOAP:Env

</SOAP:Body >

WS-S

XML DSig

SAML

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How to deploy WS-Security?

! Secure endpoints: AppServer + client software

! Drawbacks

! integration may involve modifying software

! management of multiple hosts and pieces of software

! possible vendor-dependencies

! Secure gateways: Web Services Security Proxies

! Advantages:

! transparent integration into existing systems! separates application and security functionality

! simpler, centralized administration! only the proxies need to be configured and managed

! platform and vendor independency, interoperability

! offloads processing (cryptography, etc.)

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 15 -

Web Services Security Proxies

! Transparent Proxy for Web Services! messages are sent to the proxy, inspected

there, and forwarded! Application-level Gateway

! security in the application layer

! proxy understands SOAP/HTTP and WS-Security

! content inspection

! Deployed at both sender and receiver

! outgoing SOAP messages are extended withWS-Security information

! supports B2B through federated trust!

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 16 -

Web Services Security Proxies

SOAP

WS-SecurityProxy

TrustBoundary

HTTP

WS-SecurityProxy

HTTP

(opt.)(opt.) WS-Security

HTTP(S)

...

IntermediariesTrust

Boundary

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 17 -

receiver side

! Authentication (SAML orbasic mechanism)

! Authorization! Integrity

! Verification and Signing

!

Content Filtering! XML Schema checking

! Confidentiality

! Audit

Security Services in the Proxy

sender side

! Authentication

! Insertion of WS-S headers

! Authorization (outgoing)

! Integrity

! Verification and Signing

!Content Filtering! XML Schema checking

! Confidentiality

! Audit

WS-SecuritySAML

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 18 -

Deployment Scenarios

Web Services used to integrateapplications and services with

! trading partner! branch offices

WS-Security Proxy! Federated Trust eliminates duplication of policy and user information

Federated Extranet

Deployment of new W eb Services! Application services for broad range of 

users! UDDI registered servicesWS-Security Proxy! allows broad service access! provides authentication and authorization

services

Internet

Web Services used internally for! cross department service use! application integrationWS-Security Proxy! controls access to Web-Service resources

from different departments!

Secure inter-application communication

Intranet

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 19 -

SOAPEnabling

Platform

SOAP

SOAP

OriginalSOAP Message

Internet Scenario

Client application

Legacy

application

SOAP

SOAP

WS-SecuritySAML

WS-SecuritySAML

Protected/VerifiedSOAP Message

DMZ

Web Service

SecurityProxy

Internet

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Federated Extranet Scenario

SOAP

WS-SecuritySAML

ProtectedSOAP Message

SecurityProxy

DMZ

SOAPEnablingPlatform

SOAPClient application

Legacyapplication

SOAP

SOAP

WS-SecuritySAML

WS-SecuritySAML

Protected/VerifiedSOAP Message

DMZ

Web Service

SecurityProxy

Internet

OriginalSOAP Message

WS D i B d C t ll

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Copyright © 2003 XTRADYNE Technologies AG- 21 -

WS-Domain Boundary Controller

Architecture of Xtradyne's WS-Securityproduct (WS-DBC):

Policy

DB

 AdminConsole

IIOP/SSL

(LDAP)PolicyServer

IIOP/SSL

WS-DBC

SOAPSOAP

Web Service

S

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Summary

! Web Services need! suitable message-based security models

! standards for interoperability

! Emerging security standards have strong industrysupport

! consortiae, vendors, products

! WS-Security Proxies as security solution

! platform-neutral standards support

! comprehensive security functionality forWeb Services at the application layer

! transparent integration without software modifications(„pluggable“)

!ideal support for B2B scenarios


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