03 a Critique of Skinner's Views on the Explanatory Inadequacy of Cognitive Theories

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A Critique of Skinner's Views on the Explanatory Inadequacy of Cognitive TheoriesAuthor(s): Michael G. WessellsSource: Behaviorism, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall, 1981), pp. 153-170Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758983 .Accessed: 21/10/2011 14:42

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2/19

A

CRITIQUE

OF

SKINNER'S

VIEWS

ON

THE

EXPLANATORY

INADEQUACY

OF

COGNITIVE

THEORIES

Michael

G.

Wessells1

Vassar

College

Over

several

decades,

B.

F.

Skinner

(1953, 1957,

1964,

1968, 1969,

1974,

1977a)

has

sharply

criticized

mentalistic

theories,

including

the

cognitive

theo

ries that

now

pervade experimental psychology.

When

one as

influential

as

Skin

ner

condemns

cognitive

theories,

it is all too

easy

for radical behaviorists to

reject

cognitive

theory

and research

without

a

fair

hearing.

This

is

unfortunate

because behavioral

and

cognitive

analyses

are

complementary (Catania,

1973;

Segal,

1977).

As discussed

below,

cognitive

analyses

can

specify

the

biological

bases of behavior and

the

private

events that influence

behavior. Behavioristic

analyses,

on

the other

hand,

can

identify

the

environmental

antecedents of

public

and

private

events. It is

unlikely

that

the entire

behavioral

story

can

be

told

fully

either

from

the

inside,

as

many

cognitivists

have

attempted

to

do,

or

from

the

outside,

as

many

behaviorists

have

attempted

to

do. Joint

inquiry

among

behaviorists

and

cognitivists

could lead

to

a

more

complete

understand

ing

of

both

the

environmental

and the

private

determinants

of behavior.

This

paper

is

written

in

the

spirit

of

fostering

cooperation

among

behaviorists

and

cognitivists.

Skinner's

criticisms

of

cognitive

psychology

may

be

divided into

two

propo

sitions

which

will be

examined

in

separate

papers.

First,

cognitive

theories

lack

explanatory

power.

Second,

cognitive

theories obstruct

the search for

the

causes

of

behavior.

The

aim

of

this

paper

is

to

critically

evaluate

the

first

proposition

and

to

argue

that

Skinner

has

not

identified

principled

limitations

on

the

ex

planatory

power

of

cognitive

theory.

It

is

important

to note what

is

at stake

here.

If all

cognitive explanations

were

logically

flawed, cognitive

theories

and

the

research

they

guide

would

be

unworthy

of

the

serious

attention

of

radical

behaviorists,

and

attempts

to

bridge

behavioral

and

cognitive

analyses

would

be

ill-advised.

This

paper

also

examines

some

of

the weaknesses

of Skinner's

pro

gram

for

explaining

behavior,

particularly

behavior

that

is influenced

by

biologi

cal factors.

The

aim

is

not to

disparage

the radical

behaviorist

outlook,

to

which

the author

is

highly sympathetic,

but

to

disarm

ineffective

criticisms

that detract

from

the

radical

behaviorist

position.

After

all,

if

behaviorism

is

to

advance,

it

must be

criticized

by

behaviorists

(Sidman,

1976).

The

plan

of

this

paper

is to

evaluate

separately

each of

Skinner's

three

main

proposals regarding

the

inadequacy

of

cognitive

explanations.

These

proposals

may

be

summarized

as

follows.

First,

cognitive

explanations

are

incomplete

in

H

am

grateful

to

John

Donahoe,

J.

D.

Keehn,

Jan

Krueger,

Steve

Sadowsky,

and

an

anonymous

re

viewer

for

their

helpful

comments

on

an

earlier

version

of

this

paper.

Requests

for

reprints

should

be

sent

to

Michael

G.

Wessells,

Department

of

Psychology,

Vassar

College,

Poughkeepsie,

New

York 12601.

153


3/19

Michael

G.

Wessells

that

they

fail

to

specify

the

environmental antecedents

of

inner events.

Second,

cognitive

explanations

are

fictional

because

they

are

circular and because

the

putative

inner

processes

are

not

causes

of

behavior

but

are

either

mediational

or

epiphenomenal.

Third,

cognitive

explanations

are

unnecessary

since

they

add

nothing to an exhaustive analysis of the functional relations between the envi

ronment

and behavior.

These

proposals

are

difficult

to

evaluate

for

several

reasons.

For

one

thing,

Skinner's

position

is

dynamic,

even

ambivalent

(Dennett,

1978),

and

he

some

times modifies the

strength

of

or

the

grounds

on

which he

makes

a

particular

statement

(cf.

Scriven,

1956).

Further,

Skinner's

objections

intertwine extensive

ly,

so an

evaluation

of his

critique

requires

an

analysis

of

his

overall

approach.

Although

this

paper

concerns

his

criticisms of

experimental cognitive

psychol

ogy,

particularly

theories of information

processing,

it

will

be

necessary

in

some

instances

to

examine his

broader, and,

in

general,

older views

on

mentalism

and

on cognitive theories from the nonexperimental areas of psychology. The analy

sis

of Skinner's

older

views

may

seem

unfair

because

cognitive

theories have

.changed

rapidly

in recent

years.

But

the

older

ideas discussed

below

have

occur

red

repeatedly

and have

appeared

in

works

that Skinner

published

after

the

mid-1960s,

following

the

rise of

theories of

information

processing.

Although

contemporary cognitive

theories

will

be discussed in

order

to

show the

timeli

ness

of

the

issues,

most

of

the

statements

regarding

the nature

of

cognitive

analy

ses

could

have been

made

in

reference to

prominent

theories

from

the

1960s

and

the

early

1970s.

Moreover,

many

of the

theories

discussed

in

this

paper

and in its

sequel

had

appeared

well

before

1977,

the

year

in

which

Skinner

published

his

most recent critique of cognitive psychology. Keeing these points inmind, Skin

ner's

main

proposals

regarding

the

explanatory

inadequacy

of

cognitive

theory

are

now

examined.

INCOMPLETENESS

The

proposal

that

cognitive

theories

are

incomplete

is

illustrated

in

the fol

lowing

passages

concerning

mental

way

stations, thirst,

and

feelings,

respectively.

.

.

.

We

may

object,

first,

to

the

predilection

for

unfinished causal

se

quences. ... An action is not explained by attributing it to expectations

until

the

expectations

have

in

turn

been

accounted

for.

.

. .

(Skinner,

1969,

p.

240)

...

In

each

case

we

have

a

causal

chain

consisting

of

three

links:

(1)

an

operation

performed

on

the

organism

from

without

?

for

example,

water

deprivation;

(2)

an

inner

condition

-

for

example,

physiological

or

psychic

thirst;

and

(3)

a

kind of

behavior

-

for

example,

drinking.

.

. .

The

most

objectionable

practice

is to

follow

the

causal

sequence

back

only

as

far

as

the

hypothetical

second link.

.

. .

...

We

cannot

account

for the

behavior

of

any

system

while

staying

wholly inside it; eventually we must turn to forces operating upon the

organism

from

without.

(Skinner,

1953,

pp.

34-35)

154


4/19


5/19

Michael

G.

Wessells

computer

programs

To

be

sure,

a

cognitive

theory

does

not

explain

the

occurrence

of

a

particular

response

by specifying

the

environmental

antecedents

of

the

response.

Yet

an

explanatory

cognitive

account

does accommodate

the

effects

of

the

environ

ment. In a complete cognitive account, the effects of exposure to particular

stimuli

would be

deducible

from

a

set

of

universal

principles

that

specify

the

internal

mechanisms

that allow

the

environment

to

influence

behavior.

Using

the

familiar

computer

metaphor,

a

cognitive

explanation

would

specify

the

princi

ples

governing

the hardware

of

the

human

information

processing

system.

In

turn,

these

principles

constrain

the

kinds

of

programs

the

system

can

use,

the

kinds

of functions

the

system

can

perform

and

the

mechanisms

whereby

the

environment influences

the

system.

Because such

an

account must

accommodate

the

functional relations

between environment

and

behavior,

it is

not

incomplete

in

the

sense

Skinner

contends.

Indeed,

if this

type

of

explanation

is

incomplete,

then behavioristic accounts must also be incomplete, for the functional relations

determined

by

behaviorists

are

a

subset of the data that

a

cognitive explanation

must

eventually

accommodate.

Because

Skinner

has not

demonstrated

that

cog

nitive

explanations

are

logically incapable

of

accounting

for the effects

of

the

environment,

his

criticism

is

uncompelling.

One

might

argue

that

a

cognitive

explanation

is

incomplete

because it

does

not

indicate

which

aspects

of

the

phylogenetic

environment

determined

the

uni

versal

processing

mechanisms

of

the

organism

and,

indirectly,

the

effects

of

the

ontogenetic

environment. But this criticism

applies

to

all

analyses

of

behavior,

Skinner's

included.

As

will

be

argued

in

detail

later,

it

may

be

neither

necessary

nor practical to demand that a theory identify the phylogenetic antecedents of

behavior.

The

conclusion

that

cognitive explanations

are

not

necessarily

incomplete

does

not

imply

that current

cognitive

theories

are

explanatorily

adequate.

In

fact,

contemporary

cognitive

theories

are

descriptive,

not

explanatory

(for

dis

cussions

of

descriptive

and

explanatory cognitive

theories,

see

Honig,

1978;

Pylyshyn,

1973).

Extant

theories have

not

identified

universal

properties

or

mechanisms that

underlie

and

constrain

learning. Rather,

current

theories

postu

late constucts

and

processes

?

for

example,

the

depth

and

the

elaborateness

of

processing

(Craik

and

Tulving, 1975),

reconstructive

retrieval

processes

(Spiro,

1980), and schemata (Thorndyke, 1977)

-

that serve to order observations, to

identify

possible

mechanisms

underlying

behavior and to

generate

predictions.

These

descriptive

theories

are

incomplete,

as

both

cognitivists

and

behaviorists

would

agree.

Yet

these

theories

constitute

a

transitional

step

along

the

arduous

path

toward

explanation.

Viewed

in

this

manner,

these

theories

are

invulnerable

to

the

criticism

of

incompleteness. They

become

vulnerable

only

if

they

are

mistakenly

regarded

as

explanatory.

Nothing

inherent in

the

cognitive

approach

necessitates

such

an

error.

Of

course,

this

rejection

of Skinner's

incompleteness

criticism

does

not

entail

the

acceptance

of the

strategies

that

many

cognitivists

use

in

constructing

an

explanatory

theory.

These

strategies

and

the

problems

associated with them will be discussed in the second paper.

If

cognitive

theories

are

not

inherently

incomplete, why

do

they

appear

to

be

incomplete

from

the

radical

behaviorist

outlook?

Primary

among

the

many

possible

reasons

are

the

following. First,

many

of

the

cognitive

accounts

pro

posed

by

laypeople

(and

by

misguided

psychologists)

are

incurably

vague

and

in

156


6/19


7/19


8/19

A

Critique

Of

Skinner's

View

Of

The

Explanatory Inadequacy

Of

Cognitive

Theories

(Skinner,

1974,

p.

17;

italics

added)

Here Skinner

asserts

that

some

private

events,

particularly

those

upon

which

we

can

introspect,

are

collateral

products

of

conditioning

histories

and do not

con

trol behavior.

For

example,

in

memorizing

a

set

of

objects,

one

might

construct

an

image of the objects and consciously inspect the image. The introspected

image

might

appear

to influence

one's

recall

of

the

objects.

From

Skinner's

perspective,

however,

the

introspected

image

is

a

product

of

a

history

of

rein

forcement of

op?rant seeing

responses

(Skinner,

1953,

pp.

270-275; 1974,

pp.

82-86).

Further,

the

introspected

events

are

not

causal,

for

the

physiological

processes

involved

in

the

shaping

and the maintenance

of behavior

by

contin

gencies

of

reinforcement

are

beyond

the

scope

of

introspection

(Skinner,

1974,

pp.

216ff.;

1977a,

pp.

9-10).

For

the sake of

clarity,

Skinner's views

concerning circularity,

the

non

causal status

of

private

events,

and

epiphenomenalism

will

be

examined

sepa

rately.

Circularity

The

proposal

that

cognitive

theories

are

logically

circular is

cogent

in

many

instances.

Indeed, cognitivists

have

recognized

the

circularity

of influential

theories such

as

the

levels-of-processing

analysis

of

memory

(Baddeley,

1978;

Eysenck,

1978;

Postman,

1975).

The

problem

of

circularity

has

hampered

at

tempts

to

define

the

units

and the

capacity

of

short-term

memory

(Glanzer

and

Razel,

1974;

Simon,

1974),

to

distinguish empirically

between short-term

mem

ory

and

long-term

memory

(Waugh

and

Norman,

1965),

and to

determine

the ef

fects of

semantic

structure

upon

the retrieval of

information

from

semantic

memory

(Smith,

1978),

among

others.

In

pointing

out

this

problem,

Skinnerhas

performed

an

important

service.

But

logical

circularity

is

no

more a

necessary

problem

of

cognitive

theories

than of b?havioral theories. For example, constructs such as feature detectors

(see

Eimas

and

Miller,

1978)

and

prototypes

(see Posner,

1969;

Rosch,

1977)

have

been defined

independently

of

the data

they

were

intended

to

explain.

As

physiological

inquiry

advances,

the

ability

to

define

inner

processes

independent

ly

of

the behavior

to be

explained

will

undoubtedly improve.

Further,

cognitiv

ists

can

avoid

the

problem

of

circularity

by anchoring

constructs

to

logically

independent

operations

(Garner,

Hake and

Eriksen,

1956).

Skinner's

criticism also

overlooks

the

point

that

logically

circular

theories

can

contribute

to

scientific

inquiry,

particularly

in

the

initial

stages

of

research

(Audi,

1976).

Specifically,

they

help

to

organize

observations

and

to

make

test

able

predictions

that

guide

research.

Indeed,

the

concepts

of reinforcement

and

the

op?rant organized

and

guided

useful

research

before

attempts

were

made

(for example,Meehl, 1950; Schick, 1971) to define theconcepts independently

of

the

phenomena

they

had

been

intended

to

explain.

Along

similar

lines,

Skinner's

treatise

on

verbal

behavior,

an

insightful

interpretation

that

many,

the

author

included,

believe

will

guide

useful

research,

proposed

many

circular

ac

counts.

Consider

the

following

statements

concerning

descriptive

autoclitics,

verbal

responses

that

are

controlled

by

other

covert

or

overt

verbal

responses

and

that

modify

the

reaction

of

the

listener.

The

speaker

may

acquire

verbal

behavior

descriptive

of

his

own

be

havior.

. .

.

The

behavior

so

described

may

be

verbal:

the

speaker

may

159


9/19

Michael

G.

Wessells

talk about

himself

talking.

He

may

describe

the

responses

he

has

made,

is

making,

or

will

make.

For

example,

he

may

say

/

said

"Heads"

or

/

now

say

"Heads"

or

/

will

say

"Heads.

"

. . .

The

events

available

to

him

as

stimuli

consist

of the

products

of

his

own

behavior

as

speaker.

He

may

hear himself or react to private stimuli associated with vocal behavior,

possibly

of

a

covert

or

even

incipient

form.

. .

.

Such

stimulation

may

also

assume

control

of

the verbal

op?rant

called the

tact.

(Skinner, 1957,

pp.

313-314)

Here the

private

stimuli,

particularly

those

associated

with the

covert

responses,

are

inferred

directly

from

the

responses

to be

accounted for. This

type

of

ac

count,

indisputably

circular,

occurs

frequently

throughout

Verbal

Behavior.

The

point

is

not

that Skinner's

analysis

of

verbal behavior

is

hopelessly

circular

(it

is

not)

but

that

circularity

per

se

does

not

rob

an

account of its

value.

Circularity

is

a

grave

problem

when it

is

inherent

in

an

account,

as

it is in

many

mentalistic

accounts

proposed

by

laypeople,

and

when it

brings

inquiry

to

an

end. But

as

indicated

above,

cognitive

theories

are

not

inherently

circular.

Equally

important,

circular

cognitive

theories have not

ended

inquiry

but have

stimulated research aimed

at

defining

independently

constructs

such

as

the

level

of

processing

(for

example,

Craik and

Tulving,

1975; Eysenck

and

Eysenck,

1979).

These

considerations weaken

Skinner's criticism

substantially.

Noncausal

Status

of

Inner

Events

Skinner's second

argumeht,

that

inner

processes

are

not

causes

of behavior

and that the ultimate causes of behavior are in the environment, leads to a logi

cal

regress

(Audi,

1976).

For

example,

the

effects

of

the

ontogenetic

environment

at

a

particular

moment

depend

in

part

on

the

effects

of

previous

exposures

to

the

environment,

as

witnessed

in

the

phenomena

of

blocking

and

selective

atten

tion

(Mackintosh, 1974). How,

then,

can

the

effects

of

the

ontogenetic

environ

ment

that

occur

at

one

particular

moment be

singled

out

as

causal?

Skinner's

attempted

resolution

of

this

problem

is

characteristically

prag

matic.

...

It

is

true

that

we

could

trace

human

behavior

not

only

to

the

physical

conditions

which

shape

and

maintain

it but

also

to

the

causes

of

those conditions and the causes of those

causes,

almost ad

infinitum,

but

there

is

no

point

in

going

back

beyond

the

point

at

which

effective

action

can

be

taken.

That

point

is

not

to be

found

in

the

psyche,

and the

explanatory

force

of

mental

life has

steadily

declined

as

the

promise

of

the

environment

has

come

to

be

more

clearly

understood.

(Skinner,

1974,

p.

210;

italics

added)

. . .

the

real

causes

lay

in

the

environment,

because if

we

want to

do

anything

about

genocide,

it

is to

the

environment

we

must turn.

. .

.

(Skinner

and

Blanshard,

1967,

p.

331)

On this

view, explanation and the ability to control behavior are intimately re

lated.

Skinner

regards

the

environment

as

the

cause

of

behavior because

it

is

the

environment

that is

directly

accessible

and

that

can

be

used to

predict

and

con

trol

behavior.

For

Skinner,

explanation

is the

handmaiden

of

pragmatism.

This

approach

is

troublesome because the

ability

to

control

behavior

is

neither

necessary

nor

sufficient

for

the

achievement

of

an

explanatory

account.

160


10/19

A

Critique

Of

Skinner's

View

Of

The

Explanatory

Inadequacy

Of

Cognitive

Theories

Many

theories

in

astronomy

have

explanatory

power

even

though

they

have not

enhanced

our

ability

to

control

cosmic

events

(Martin,

1978).

Further,

environ

mental

events

that

are

useful

in

predicting

and

controlling

behavior

may

not

be

causal or explanatory in any intelligible sense. For example, medical physicians

often

prescribe

placebo

pills,

the

ingestion

of which

alleviates the

patients'

symptoms.

In these

cases,

the

ingestion

of the

placebo

clearly

controls

behavior.

But

it

seems

odd

to

argue

that the

ingestion

of the

pill

therefore

caused

or

ex

plained

the

patients'

behavior.

For the

ingestion

of

the

placebo

may

have been

a

sufficient but

not

a

necessary

condition for

the

modification

of

behavior. Behav

ioral

control,

then,

can

be achieved

in

the

absence

of

explanation

and

vice

versa.

Environmental

factors

cannot be ascribed

a

privileged

explanatory

status

simply

because

they

are

accessible

and useful in

controlling

behavior.

Another

problem

is

that

pragmatism

is

a

fickle criterion

by

which

to

judge

theories. Contemporary cognitive theories have already advanced the teaching of

reasoning

(Collins, 1977),

the

measurement

of

intelligence

(Sternberg,

1977)

and

the

improvement

of

memorial

skills

(Atkinson,

1975;

Morris,

1977).

Conceiv

ably,

cognitive

theories

might

eventually identify

methods

for

controlling

behav

ior

that

surpass

those

generated

by

behavioral

theories.

If that

were

to

occur,

would

one,

following

Skinner's

approach,

conclude that

cognitive

theories

pro

vide

better

explanations

than

behavioral

theories

provide?

The

absurdity

of such

a

conclusion

indicates that

it

is

unjustifiable

to

ele

vate,

as

Skinner

has

done,

pragmatic

and

methodological

concerns

to

the status

of

explanatory

prerequisites.

An

explanatory

theory

may

advance

one's

ability

to control a phenomenon, but the ability to control the phenomenon is not the

sine

qua

non

of

the

explanatory

power

of

the

theory.

The

explanatory

adequacy

of

a

theory

should

be decided

by

the

extent to

which the

theory

agrees

with

existing

observations,

exhibits

generality

and internal

consistency,

makes

novel,

non

trivial

predictions,

converges

with

other

theories,

achieves

parsimony,

and

so

on.

The control of

behavior

is

relevant

to

the

task

of

explaining

behavior

only

insofar

as

the

predictions

of

the

theory

are

assessed

through

attempts

to

control

behavior.

But

the

kinds of

predictions

one

aims

to

make need

not

be

dictated

by

the

pragmatic

desire

to

change

behavior for

the better.

Ironically,

the

attempt

to

use

the

ability

to

control

behavior

as

the

criterion

for deciding what is explanatory works against Skinner's environmentalist

approach

in

some

instances.

According

to

a

strict

interpretation

of

Skinner's

position,

genes

lack

causal

status since

they

are

inner structures and

are

products

of the

phylogenetic

environment

(Skinner,

1953,

p.

26;

1969,

p.

87;

1974,

pp. 33-45).

But

the

phylogenetic

environment

is

largely

inaccessible

and,

apart

from

the

time-consuming

method of

selective

breeding,

it cannot be

used

to

con

trol

behavior.

In

contrast,

genetic

structure

is

relatively

discoverable

and

acces

sible,

and

the

ability

to

control characteristics

by

manipulating

genetic

structure

is

advancing

rapidly.

Using

the criterion

of

control,

genes

seem

to have

a

stronger

claim

to

causal

status

than the

phylogenetic

environment

has.

On

Skinner's

own

grounds, then, the argument that it is the phylogenetic environment, not the

genes,

that

causes

behavior

must

be

rejected.

With

regard

to

discovering

the

bio

logical

determinants

of

behavior,

the

strategy

of

environmentalizing

the

causes

of

behavior

(Schnaitter,

1978)

may

not

pay.

One

might

object

that

Skinner

would

probably

be

willing

to attribute

causal

161


11/19

Michael

G.

Wessells

status

to

genes

so

long

as

particular

genetic

antecedents

of

behavior

had

become

isolable

and

manipulable

via

physiological procedures

(see

Skinner,

1972,

p.

422;

1974,

p. 215).

But

here

again,

methodological

considerations

are

dictating

what

counts

as an

explanation;

the

positions

of

the

horse

and the

cart

have been

re

versed. Also note that in the history of biology, genetic explanations became

useful

well before

genes

had

been

defined

and

made

manipulable

on a

physio

logical

level

(Carlson,

1966; Dunn,

1965).

One

may

agree

with Skinner that

ex

planatory

concepts

must,

in

principle,

refer

to

physical

events.

But it

does

not

follow

that

a

concept

lacks

explanatory

power

unless

its

physical

referents have

been

identified.

Like

investigators

in the

biological

and

the

physical

sciences,

psychologists

may

use

explanatory

concepts

even

when

the

physical

referents

of

the

concepts

are

unknown.

It

is

worth

mentioning

here

why

many

cognitivists

do not

view

physiological

analysis

as

their chief

method.5

As

pointed

out

earlier, cognitivists

hold

that

the

functional properties of information processors can be specified on a conceptual

level.

Many

of

the

most

complex

aspects

of

the

operation

of

a

system

can

be

an

alyzed

most

naturally

at

a

molar,

nonphysiological

level

(Fodor, 1981).

More

over,

attempts

to

explain

and

to control

inner

processes

need

not

await

the

de

velopment

of

a

highly

advanced

physiological technology

that

could be used

to

identify

the

physical

bases

of inner

processes.

This

approach

has

a

pragmatic

ring

to

it,

and it

is

consistent with

Skinner's

(1938)

view that

explanatory

(func

tional)

relations

can

be discerned

even

though

the

physiological

bases

of

these

relations

are

unknown.

In

conclusion,

Skinner'.s

argument

that

only

the

environment

causes

behav

ior fails because it entails the enslavement of explanation to pragmatic and

methodological

concerns.

A

more

reasonable

position

for radical behaviorists

is

that

both

environmental and inner

events

are causes

of

behavior

(see

Schnaitter,

1978).

Cognitive

accounts

may

seem

to

depart

from

this

view since

they explain

behavior

in

terms

of

universal

inner

processes.

Recall,

however,

that

a

cognitive

explanation

must

accommodate

the

functional

relations

between

the

environ

ment

and behavior that

are

formed

in

the

lifetime of the

organism.

In

this

sense,

cognitive

explanations

do not

ignore

environmental

causes.

Further,

cognitive

explanations

do

not

attribute

causal

status

to all

inner

events,

and

the

door

leading

to

epiphenomenalism

is thus

kept

open.

Epiphenomenalism

Skinner

(1974,

p.

17; 1977a,

pp.

9-10)

has

stated

that

what

we

introspect

upon

are

collateral

products,

not

causes

of

behavior,

and

that the

physiological

processes

that

mediate the

control

of

behavior

by

the

environment

are

beyond

the

reach

of

introspection.

He

also

asserts

that

cognitive

psychologists

say

they

know

cognitive

processes

through

introspection.

Cognitive psychologists

have

two

answers

to

the

charge

that

the

men

tal

apparatus

is

a

metaphor

or

construct.

One

is

that

cognitive

processes

are

known through introspection. Do not all thinking persons know that

they

think?

.

.

.

No

one

doubts

that

behavior

involves internal

processes;

the

question

is

how

well

they

can

be

known

through

introspection.

.

.

.

^Of

course, many

cognitive

psychologists

are

searching

for

the

pysiological

bases

of

cognitive

processes.

See Posner

(1978)

and

Thatcher

and John

(1977).

162


12/19

A

Critique

Of

Skinner's View

Of

The

Explanatory

Inadequacy

Of

Cognitive

Theories

(Skinner,

1977a,

pp.

9-10)

This

passage

reveals

a

serious

misunderstanding

of

contemporary

cognitive

psychology.

Most

cognitivists

now

believe that

many

inner,

causal

processes

cannot be introspected upon. Indeed, Neisser expressed this view in 1967 in his

discussion of visual

images:

. . .

My

own

view,

as

the

reader

has

already discovered,

is

that both

memory

images

and

percepts

are

constructed

anew on

every

occasion

when

they

are

experienced.

.

.

.

When

an

image

is

constructed,

the

opera

tions of

synthesis

use

the

information,

which

otherwise is

carried

silently,

unconsciously,

in

ways

which

(by definition)

we can

hardly

"visualize."

(Neisser,

1967,

p. 170)

Similarly,

Kosslyn

(1978),

who

has

used

introspective

evidence

extensively

in

his research, writes

To

some,

the

study

of

imagery

seems

simple.

All

one

needs

to

do

is

to

introspect.

This is

equivalent

to

saying

that

in

order

to

study

visual

perception,

all

one

needs

to

do is look.

Clearly,

much

processing

goes

on

before

we

become

conscious

of

an

object,

either when

we are

perceiving

it

or

imaging

it. An

understanding

of

either

phenomenon

entails

uncover

ing

the

mechanisms

responsible

for

representing

and

processing

the rele

vant

information.

. . .

(Kosslyn, 1978,

p.

217)

Past

generations

of

cognitive

psychologists

may

have based

explanatory

accounts

primarily upon introspective knowledge. But most contemporary cognitivists

believe that

introspection

cannot

possibly

reveal the universal

processing

mech

anisms that would constitute

an

explanatory

account.

Further,

many

cognitivists

believe

that

what

is known

through

introspection

is

epiphenomenal

and

is

unrevealing

of

inner

pausai

processes (Anderson

and

Bower,

.1973;

Anderson,

1976,

1978; Kieras,

1978;

Pylyshyn,

1973,

1978;

Simon,

1972).

Consider,

for

example,

these

passages

from

an

influential

paper

written

by

Pylyshyn.

.

.

.

Just

because

we know that

we

use

certain

mnemonic

strategies,

or

that

we

say

certain

things

to

ourselves,

or

that

we

"see"

certain

ob

jects

in our "mind's

eye"

or "hear" ourselves

rehearsing

a series of num

bers,

etc.,

we

cannot

assume

that

the

contents

of

such

subjective

knowl

edge

can

be

identified

with

the kind

of

information-processing

proce

dures

which

will

go

into

an

explanatory

theory.

(Pylyshyn,

1973,

p.

3)

. . .

The

role

of

experienced

images

(i.e.,

appearances)

in

thinking

is

by

no

means

clear

since

even

if

we

make

the

assumption

that

the

con

tents

of

our

experiences

reveal

theoretically

useful

psychological

proc

esses,

it still

remains

true

that

very

little

(if

any)

of

the

thinking

is

car

ried

by

such

processes.

(Pylyshyn,

1973,

p.

6)

Overall, cognitivists in experimental psychology simply do

not

believe

that

cognitive

processes

are

known

through

introspection.

For

the most

part, they

use

introspective

reports

as

data

to

be

explained,

and

they

agree

with

Skinner

(1974,

p.

16)

that

introspective

reports

may

be useful

even

though

they

do

not

reveal the

causes

of

behavior

(Kosslyn

and

Pomerantz,

1977). Thus,

the

prevalent

cognitivistic

position

on

introspective knowledge

agrees remarkably

well

with

163


13/19

Michael

G.

Wessells

that of

Skinner.

It is unfortunate

that

behaviorists

and

cognitivists

are

quick

to

point

out

their

differences

and

to

overlook

their

convergences.

Although

the

epiphenomenalist

position

may

be

valid,

Skinner

maintains

the

position

on

contestable

grounds.

Skinner's chief

supporting

argument

is

that the

construction of our nervous system does not allow us to introspect upon the

physiological

events

that

mediate

the effects of

the

environment

on

behavior

(Skinner,

1974,

p.

216;

1977a,

p.

10).

But it

is

conceivable

that

one

could

intro

spect upon

causal

factors without

introspecting

upon

physiological

events.

As

sume,

for

example,

that

at

a

particular

time,

there

occurs

in

the

brain

of

person

P

a

set

of

neural

events

N

and that

P

introspectively

observes

a

visual

image

(I)

of

a

set

of

objects.

Also

assume

that

P

recalls

the

names

of

the

objects

if

and

only

if

N

and

I

are

occurring.

Presumably,

Skinner's

position

would

be

that the neural

events

(N)

cause

both

the

image

and

the recall

of

the

objects,

so

the

image

is

epiphenomenal

and

does

not

reveal the

causes

(N)

of the

recall of the

objects.

Another possibility, however, is that the image consists of the set of neural

events

N

in

much the

same

way

that

an

overt

response

such

as

the

lifting

of

an

arm

consists

of

a

set

of

neural

and

muscular

events.

On

this

view,

I

can

be

con

strued

as

the

cause

of

the

recall of the

objects

even

though

I

reveals

nothing

about

N.

This

hypothetical

example

is

not

intended

as

an

endorsement

of

the

central-state

identity

thesis.

Rather,

the

point

is that

physicalism

does

not

re

quire

the

view

that

introspective

knowledge

is

necessarily

limited because

of

the

inability

to

introspect

upon

physiological

events

on

a

molecular

level.

Whether

introspected

events

are

epiphenomenal

is

an

empirical

issue that

cannot

be

decided

by argument

or

by

apodictic

decree.6

Even

if

future

research

supported the epiphenomenalist position, the cognitive outlook would not there

by

be

undermined.

NONNECESSITY

Skinner's

third criticism of

cognitive

explanations

is

that

they

are unneces

sary.

.

.

.

The

behavior

generated

by

a

given

set

of

contingencies

can

be

ac

counted

for without

appealing

to

hypothetical

inner

states

or

processes.

If

a

conspicuous

stimulus

does

not

have

an

effect,

it is

not

because

the

organism

has not attended to it or because some central

gatekeeper

has

screened it

out,

but

because the

stimulus

plays

no

important

role

in

the

prevailing

contingencies.

The

other

cognitive

processes

invoked

to

salvage

an

input-output

formula

can

be

disposed

of

in the

same

way.

(Skinner,

1969,

p. 8)

. . .

There

is

a

familiar

experiment

on

color

generalization

in

which

a

pigeon

pecks

at

a

disk

of,

say,

green

light,

the behavior

being

reinforced

on

a

variable

interval

schedule.

When

a

stable

rate

of

responding develops,

6Currently,

extreme

versions

of the

epiphenomenalist

position

are

being challenged

in

research

con

cerning imagery (Kosslyn

and

Pomerantz,

1977;

Shepard,

1978).

According

to

one

seminal model

(Kosslyn,

1980), images

are

constructed

from

abstract

conceptual

knowledge

that is in

a

propositional,

nonintrospect

ible format.

But

an

image,

once

constructed,

can

be

used in

further

processing.

For

example,

the

image

can

be

scanned

or

rotated,

and

global

parts

of

the

image

can

be

compared.

On this

view,

an

introspectable,

con

structed

product

of

nonconscious

processing

may

be

functional,

not

epiphenomenal.

Needless

to

say,

the

evaluation

of

this

view

requires

much

more

research.

164


14/19


15/19

Michael

G.

Wessells

strictly

behavioral

analyses.

One

of

these

gaps

concerns

biological

influences

on

learning

(Seligman,

1970;

Shettleworth, 1972;

Staddon and

Simmelhag,

1971).

Skinner

(1966,

1969, 1974,

1975,

1977b)

often

accounts

for

biological

influ

ences

by attributing

a

particular

instance

of

stimulus control to

the effects of the

phylogenetic environment. But these attributions, though provocative, tend to

be

piecemeal

listings,

not

systematic

accounts.

Nowhere does

he

provide

an or

ganized

account of

the

phylogenetic

contingencies

that,

for

example,

shaped

organisms

in

ways

such

that their behavior

is

modified

by

some

contingencies

of reinforcement but

not

by

others.

Equally

important,

it

is

unlikely

that

he will

provide

such

an

account.

For

one

thing,

the

phylogenetic

environment

is

mostly

inaccessible,

so

it

is

extremely

difficult

to

identify

the

environmental factors

that

shaped

behavior

in

ancestral

environments. And

because

the

ontogenetic

envi

ronment is

of

greatest

practical

value

in

controlling

behavior,

Skinner

has

focused

his research

almost

entirely

on

the

ontogenetic

determinants

of behavior.

In the absence of systematic investigations of and accounts of the effects of bio

logical

factors

on

learning,

theories of

stimulus

control

are

incomplete.

In

accounting

for the

effects of

biological

factors, cognitive

theories

may

be

quite

useful.

As discussed

previously, cognitive

explanations

include formalized

statements

or

representations

concerning

the

universal,

biologically

based

prop

erties

of

the

organism.

These

statements,

provided

that

they

accommodate

the

interactions between

biological

and

ontogenetic

factors that

occur

during

devel

opment,

could

be

used

to

predict

the

constraints

on

the

stimuli that will control

the

behavior

of

organisms.

Of

course,

one

could

argue

that

cognitive

explana

tions,

even

if

attainable,

are

not

necessary

for

accounting

for the effects of

bio

logical factors. Skinner (1953, p. 54; 1969, p. 173) believes thatphysiological

analyses

will

eventually

fill in

the

gaps

in

our

understanding

of the effects of

the

phylogenetic

environment.

But

this

argument

cuts

both

ways.

If

cognitive

theo

ries

can

account

for observations

that

can

also

be

accounted

for

via

behavioral

and

physiological

analyses,

then the

latter

two

could be viewed

as

unnecessary.

In

reality,

our

present

knowledge

is too

limited

to

allow

definite statements

about

the

necessity

or

the

nonnecessity

of

particular

approaches.

The

deeper

problem

facing

Skinner's criticism is that

an

account

that is

logically

unnecessary

is

not

therefore

unimportant

or

invalid. For

example,

even

if

the

laws

of

chemistry

were

reducible

to the

laws of

physics,

it

would

not

fol

low that the laws of chemistry lack explanatory power and practical utility.

Moreover,

a

physiologist

could

argue

that

behavioristic

accounts

are

unnecessary

because

functional

relations

between

the

environment

and

behavior

can

be

explained

on a

physiological

level.

Yet this

does

not

imply

that behavioristic

accounts

are

unimportant

or

invalid. The

laws of

behavior

are

laws

regardless

of

the

availability

of

knowledge

about

underlying

physiological

processes

(Skinner,

1938,

pp.

418ff.).

And the

behavioral laws have

obvious

practical

value

(see

Catania

and

Brigham,

1978).

Similarly, cognitive analyses

may

be

important

even

if

they

are

logically

unnecessary.

For

one

thing, they

may

provide

system

atic

accounts

of

the

effects

of

biological

factors

on

behavior.

Further,

they

are

advantageous in analyzing behavior that has arisen through a complex and un

known

history.

This

point

will

receive additional

attention in the

sequel

to this

paper.

In

conclusion,

cognitive

accounts

are

not

added

theoretical

baggage

that

is

invented

whenever

the

environmental

antecedents of

behavior

are

inconspicuous.

166


16/19

A

Critique

Of

Skinner's

View

Of

The

Explanatory

Inadequacy

Of

Cognitive

Theories

Even

if

an

individual's

history

of

environmental-behavioral

relations

were

known

completely, cognitivists

would view

the

explanatory

task

as

incomplete.

They

would ask

what

were

the

biological properties

that

permitted

the

environment

to

have the observed effects on behavior. In light of Skinner's primary goal of con

trolling behavior,

it is

understandable

that he

sees

no

reason

to

look

beyond

the

environmental determinants

of

behavior. But in

light

of

cognitivists'

goal

of

explaining

behavior and

the

environmental

influences

thereon,

it

is

understand

able

that

they

look

beyond

the

environmental

determinants

of

behavior.

Wheth

er

cognitivists

will

achieve

an

explanatory

theory

cannot

now

be

determined,

and it

is too

early

to

depict cognitive

accounts

as

unnecessary

diversions from

the

path

toward

explanation.

CONCLUSION

Skinner's

criticism

concerning

explanatory

incompleteness

and

fictionality

apply

to

some

descriptive

cognitive

theories.

Yet

many

descriptive

theories

are

invulnerable

to

Skinner's

proposals

regarding

circularity,

epiphenomenalism

and

the

noncausal

status

of

inner events.

Further,

explanatory

cognitive

theories

elude

the

incompleteness

and the

fictionality

criticisms

entirely.

The

criticism

regarding

nonnecessity

may

apply

to

cognitive

explanations,

though

this

has

never

been

demonstrated,

but

this

criticism

overlooks-the

potential

usefulness

of

cognitive

accounts.

Thus

none

of

Skinner's

objections

identify

principled

limita

tions

on

cognitive explanations.

This

conclusion

does

not

imply

approbation

of

extant

cognitive theories,

nor

does it

negate

Skinner's

poignant criticisms

con

cerning

the

perils

of

cognitive

theorizing,

the

topic

of

the

second

paper.

This

conclusion

does

imply,

however,

that

it

is

premature

to

depict

cognitive

ac

counts

as

inherently

flawed

and

unworthy

of the

serious, dispassionate

attention

of

radical

behaviorists.

The

paper

is

intended to

be

propadeutic

to

cooperative

research

and

con

structive

dialogue

among

radical

behaviorists

and

cognitivists.

Achieving

the

latter aims

requires

an

exposition

of the

differences

between

the

behavioral

and

cognitive

approaches.

One of the chief

points

made

above is

that the two

approaches diverge sharply

in

their

metatheoretical

aims

and

their

conceptions

about explanation. The chief aims of radical behaviorism

are

to predict and con

trol

behavior.

Skinner maintains

that

the

greatest

degree

of

behavioral

control

is

accomplished

by

manipulating

environmental

variables,

so

he

looks

to

the

environment for

an

explanation

of

behavior.

In

this

approach,

pragmatism

and

explanatory

conception

are

thoroughly

interwoven.

In

contrast,

the

principal

aim of

cognitive psychology

is

to

explain

behavior

by

specifying

on a

concep

tual level

the

universal,

internal

structures

and

processes

through

which

the

en

vironment

exerts

its

effects.

Some

unfortunate

misunderstandings

have

probably

arisen

from

the

failure

to

discern

and

to

analyze

these

differences

in

goals

and

in

conceptions

about

explanation.

From the

behaviorist outlook, cognitive explanations appear fic

tional

in

that

they

do

not

refer

ultimately

to the

environment.

From

the

cogni

tive

outlook,

behavioral

explanations

appear

incomplete

and

misguided

because

they

describe

but fail

to

explain

the effects

of the

environment.

In

order

to

achieve

extensive

cooperation

between behaviorists

and

cognitivists,

these

differ

167


17/19

Michael G.

Wessells

enees

in

conceptions

of

explanation

will

have

to

be

reconciled.

Even

in

the absence

of

a

reconciliation, however,

the

present

research of

behaviorists

and

cognitivists

may

be viewed

as

complementary

(Catania,

1973;

Segal,

1977).

In

particular,

cognitive

research

may

specify important

private

events and biological properties that influence behavior, and behavioristic re

search

may

specify

the environmental

determinants

of

private

events

and

of

the

relations between

private

events and

overt

behavior.

In

view

of the substantial

gains

that

might

follow

from

collaborative

research,

it

seems

worthwhile

to

try

to

bridge

the

explanatory

chasm that

now

exists.

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