0330 China Lieberthal

8/14/2019 0330 China Lieberthal

1/65

K L W J

A U.S.-CS D


2/65

John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series Number 4 March 2012

K L W J

A U.S.-CS D


3/65

Te John L. Tornton China Center at Brookings

About Brookings

Te Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct

high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative,practical recommendations or policymakers and the public. Te conclusions and

recommendations o any Brookings publication are solely those o its author, and do not

reflect the views o the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute

commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors

reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by

any donation.

Copyright 2012

1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

www.brookings.edu
http://www.brookings.edu/http://www.brookings.edu/


4/65

ADDRESS INGU.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC D I STRUST

JO HN L . TH O R N T O NCH I N A CE N T E RAT BROOKINGS

iv

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

We wish to thank the reviewers who provided impor-tant eedback that improved the quality o this volumeand others who went out o their way to contribute

their wisdom and time to this project. Te John L. TorntonChina Center, generously supported by John L. Tornton,and the Center or International and Strategic Studies at Pe-king University provided support or this publication that isvery grateully acknowledged. A special note o thanks to the

Rockeeller Foundation, which generously provided a periodo resident scholarship at its Bellagio Center in northern Ita-ly in support o this project.

Note

Te Chinese translation o this study is being published by theCenter or International and Strategic Studies o Peking Uni-versity under the title.


5/65



v

TABLEOFCONTENTS

E S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vi

I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

U S D: C S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

U S D:

U.S. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

B S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49


6/65



vi

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

The issue o mutual distrust o long-term intentionstermed here strategic distrusthas become a centralconcern in US-China relations. Vice President Xi Jin-

ping recognized this reality in giving this issue first place inhis review o key problems in U.S.-China relations duringhis major policy address in Washington, DC on February 15,2012.

Both Beijing and Washington seek to build a constructivepartnership or the long run. U.S.-China relations are, more-over, mature. Te two sides understand well each others posi-tion on all major issues and deal with each other extensively.Te highest level leaders meet relatively requently, and thereare more than sixty regular government-to-government dia-logues between agencies in the two governments each year.

Tis history and these extensive activities have not, however,produced trust regarding long-term intentions on either side,and arguably the problem o lack o such trust is becomingmore serious. Distrust is itsel corrosive, producing attitudesand actions that themselves contribute to greater distrust.Distrust itsel makes it difficult or leaders on each side to beconfident they understand the deep thinking among leaders

on the other side regarding the uture U.S.-China relationship.

Te coauthors o this paper explicate both the underlyingconcerns each leadership harbors about the other side andthe reasons or those concerns. Each coauthor has written the


7/65



vi i

narrative o his governments views without any changes madeby the other coauthor. Te coauthors have together writtenthe ollow-on analysis and recommendations. Te ocus is not

on day-to-day willingness to cooperate on various issues butrather on the actors on each side that create underlying dis-trust o the long-term intentions o the other.

Te purpose o these narratives o distrust is to enable eachleadership to better athom how the other thinksand there-ore to devise more effective ways to build strategic trust.Te coauthors hope this paper will improve the potential or

a long-term normal major power relationship between theUnited States and China, rather than an adversarial relation-ship that might otherwise develop.

UNDERSTANDINGSTRATEGICDISTRUST: THECHINESE

SIDE

Since the end o the Cold War, the PRC leadership has con-sistently demonstrated the desire to increase trust, reducetrouble, develop cooperation, and rerain rom conrontationin U.S.-China relations. Beijing realizes that China-U.S. coop-eration must be based on mutual strategic trust. Meanwhile, inBeijings view, it is U.S. policies, attitude, and misperceptionsthat cause the lack o mutual trust between the two countries.

Chinese strategic distrust o the United States is deeply rootedin history. Four sentiments reflecting recent structural changesin the international system contribute to this distrust: the eel-ing in China that since 2008 the PRC has ascended to be afirst-class global power; the assessment that the United States,despite ongoing great strength, is heading or decline; the obser-

vation that emerging powers like India, Brazil, Russia and SouthArica are increasingly challenging Western dominance and areworking more with each other and with China in doing so; andthe notion that China's development model o a strong politi-cal leadership that effectively manages social and economic a-


8/65



viii

airs provides an alternative to Western democracy and marketeconomies or other developing countries to learn rom.

In combination, these views make many Chinese politicalelites suspect that it is the United States that is on the wrongside o history. Because they believe that the ultimate goal othe U.S. in view o these actors is to maintain its global hege-mony, they conclude that America will seek to constrain oreven upset China's rise.

America's democracy promotion agenda is understood in

China as designed to sabotage the Communist Partys lead-ership. Te leadership thereore actively promotes efforts toguard against the influence o American ideology and U.S.thinking about democracy, human rights, and related issues.Tis perceived American effort to divide and weaken Chinahas been met by building increasingly powerul and sophisti-cated political and technological devices to saeguard domes-

tic stability.

U.S. arms sales to aiwan despite vastly improved cross-Straitrelationsand close-in surveillance activities off China'scoastscontribute to Beijing's deepening distrust o U.S.strategic intentions in the national security arena. Washing-tons recent rebalancing toward Asia urther contributes tothis sense o threat. American diplomatic positions spanning

North Korea, Iran, and countries in Southeast Asia are dis-comfiting and increase Chinese suspicions o U.S. intentions.

China also views the U.S. as taking advantage o the dollar as areserve currency and adopting various protectionist measuresto disadvantage the PRC economically.

Chinas criticisms o, and resistance to, some o Americas in-ternational policies and actions toward the Korean Peninsula,Iran, Syria, and elsewhere reflect the suspicion that they arebased on injustice and narrow U.S. sel-interest that will directlyor indirectly affect Chinas interests.


9/65



ix

UNDERSTANDINGSTRATEGICDISTRUST: THEU.S. SIDE

Strategic distrust o China is not the current dominant view o

national decision makers in the U.S. government, who believeit is easible and desirable to develop a basically constructivelong-term relationship with a rising China. But U.S. decisionmakers also see Chinas uture as very undetermined, andthere are related worries and debates about the most effectiveapproach to promote desired Chinese behavior. Underlyingconcerns o American leaders are as ollows:

Various sources indicate that the Chinese side thinks in termso a long-term zero-sum game, and this requires that Americaprepare to deend its interests against potential Chinese effortsto undermine them as China grows stronger. PLA aspirationsor dominance in the near seas (jinhai) potentially challengeAmerican reedom o access and action in international wa-ters where such reedom is deemed vital to meet American

commitments to riends and allies. Te context or this isthat, as Chinas strength in Asia grows, it is more importantor America to maintain the credibility o its commitments toriends and allies in the region.

Economically, the United States worries that Chinas mercan-tilist policies will harm the chances o American economic re-covery. China-based cyber thef o American trade secrets andtechnology urther sharpens these concerns.

Chinas one-party governing system also induces distrust invarious ways. Americans believe democratic political systemsnaturally understand each other better and that authoritarianpolitical systems are inherently less stable and more prone toblaming others or their domestic discontent. Authoritarian

systems are also intrinsically less transparent, which makesit more difficult to judge their sincerity and intentions. WhatAmericans view as human rights violations (especially viola-tions o civil rights) make it more difficult or the U.S. to takeactions targeted at building greater mutual trust.


10/65



x

While the U.S. welcomes a wealthier, more globally engagedChina, it no longer regards China as a developing country thatwarrants special treatment concerning global rules. Washing-

ton also looks to Beijing to take on some o the responsibilitiesor international public goods that major powers should as-sume, and it worries when Beijing declines to do so.

Given the U.S. view that Asia is the most important region inthe world or uture American interests, American leaders areespecially sensitive to Chinese actions that suggest the PRCmay be assuming a more hegemonic approach to the region.

Washington saw evidence o such actions in 2010-2012.

On the economic and trade side, America is especially sensitiveto Chinese policies that impose direct costs on the U.S. economy.Tese include intellectual property thef, keeping the value o theRMB below market levels, serious constraints on market accessin China, and Chinas 2010-2011 restrictions on exports o rareearth metals, which appeared to be strategically designed to ac-quire sensitive oreign technologiesespecially in clean energy.

Recent developments have increased suspicions among rel-evant American agencies. Te U.S. military sees the PLA ap-parently prioritizing development o weapons systems par-ticularly targeted at American platorms, and it worries aboutlack o transparency in Chinas military plans and doctrines.

Te scope and persistence o China-based cyber attacksagainst U.S. government, military, and private sector targetshas alarmed American officials in charge o cyber efforts andraised very serious concerns about Chinese norms and inten-tions. And U.S. intelligence officials see increased evidence ozero-sum thinking in Beijing regarding the U.S. and also in-creased Chinese espionage efforts in the United States.

ANALYSIS

Drawing rom the above, there are three undamental sourceso growing strategic distrust between the United States and


11/65


JO HN L . TH O R N T O NCH I N A CEN T ER AT BROOKINGS

xi

China: different political traditions, value systems and cul-tures; insufficient comprehension and appreciation of eachothers policymaking processes and relations between the gov-

ernment and other entities; and a perception of a narrowinggap in power between the United States and China. Te firsthighlights structural and deep-rooted elements in the UnitedStates and China that are not likely subject to major change. Itis more realistic for Washington and Beijing to address insteadthe second and third sources of strategic distrust by improvingtheir understanding of each others domestic situations andworking together more effectively in international endeavors

both bilaterally and with other players. In so doing, readersshould be mindful that strategic distrust appears to be morethe accepted wisdom in Beijing than in Washington, possiblyreflecting Chinas memories of the 100 years of humiliationand the recognition of its disadvantageous power position vis--vis the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONSFORBUILDINGSTRATEGICTRUST

Te following recommendations are intended to be illustra-tive of the types of new initiativesthat can address the issue ofstrategic distrust. Tey are not meant to be read as a specificaction program, as even the coauthors do not agree on the de-tails of every one. Te purpose in presenting these ideas is to

spark creative thinking on both sides.

In economics and trade:create the conditions to encourageChinese investment in real assets in the United States; com-plete the current U.S. review of its technology export restric-tions before the 2012 election; and on the Chinese side, makethe detailed workings of the Chinese political system moretransparent to key American officials and analysts so that the

latter can develop more realistic expectations of China. TeU.S. and China should also, as soon as is feasible, begin nego-tiations toward completing a bilateral investment treaty.


12/65



xi i

In military affairs: hold a sustained, deep dialogue to dis-cuss what array o military deployments and normal opera-tions will permit China to deend its core security interests

and at the same time allow America to continue to meet ullyits obligations to riends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region.Such talks, undertaken by top leaders with active military par-ticipation on both sides, may produce related outcomes suchas: agreement on mutual restraint in deployment o especiallydestabilizing new capabilities; better understanding o long-term possibilities on the Korean peninsula; improved mutualunderstanding regarding the overall security situation sur-

rounding the aiwan Strait; some agreements on modalitiesto reduce tensions in the maritime space just beyond Chinasterritorial waters; and potential steps to lessen the security di-lemmas that currently bedevil Chinese and American nuclearmodernization and space activities.

In the cyber realm:discuss potential norms, rules, and accept-

able practices with a view to developing deeper understandingo how each government is organized to handle issues in thissphere, and adopting common vocabulary and principles.

In multilateral dialogues:hold two ongoing trilateral (mini-lateral) dialogues (China-Japan-U.S. and U.S.-China-India)to address issues o mutual concern in each triad. Such trilat-erals may reduce the chances o developing a strategic cleavage

that puts the U.S. on one side, China on the other, and othercountries in the region in a position o having to choose sides.

KEYCONCLUSIONS

Te above recommendations reflect a belie that strategic dis-trust is very difficult but not impossible to address meaning-

ully. Tey seek, thereore, to suggest a variety o specific ini-tiatives that may erode the bases or deep distrust over long-term intentions and acilitate greater mutual understandingand cooperation.


13/65



xiii

Te stakes in this endeavor are exceptionally high. Te Unit-ed States and China will remain the two most consequentialcountries in the world over the coming decades. Te nature o

their relationship will have a proound impact on the citizenso both countries, on the Asia-Pacific region, and indeed onthe world. Strategic distrust will inevitably impose very highcosts on all concerned i it continues to grow at its currentrapid pace.

Words matter, and thereore many o these recommenda-tions ocus on new dialogues. I such dialogues and related

actions do not prove effective, then both leaderships shouldvery careully consider how to manage U.S.-China relationsso as to maximize cooperation and minimize the tensions andconflict, despite each sides deep distrust o the long-term in-tentions o the other.


14/65



1

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. and China have a wide-ranging, deep and rela-tively mature relationship. Te presidents o both coun-tries have repeatedly indicated the value o developing

a cooperative relationship or the uture. Both sides have apragmatic awareness o the issues on which they disagree,and both appreciate the importance o not permitting thosespecific disagreements to prevent cooperation on major is-sues where cooperation can be mutually beneficial. In addi-

tion, the leaders and top working-level officials on both sideshave gained substantial experience in dealing with each oth-er and, in many cases, have come to know each other airlywell.1

Te above are promising dimensions o U.S.-China relationsand should bode well or the uture. Tere is no more impor-tant bilateral relationship, and thus its uture direction is oenormous importance to each country, the region, and theworld. For regional and global issues such as nonproliera-tion and climate change, active U.S.-China cooperation or atleast parallel actions makes issues more manageable; havingthe U.S. and China work at cross purposes makes those issuesmore difficult, or even impossible, to manage.

1As o January 2012, Presidents Hu Jintao and Barack Obama have met ace-to-aceten times and have in addition spoken requently on the phone. Tere are over sixtyormal annual dialogues between Chinese and U.S. government officials.


15/65



2

Despite both sides tacit agreement on the above, there aregrounds or deep concern about the uture. As o early 2012the U.S. has withdrawn its orces rom Iraq and is on sched-

ule to draw down its involvement in the Aghan conflict, andWashington is rebalancing its policy in the direction o Asiaand the Pacific. Tis shif reflects President Obamas basic per-spective, as Americas sel-described first Pacific president,that because Asia is the most important region o the worldor the uture o the United States, it is vitally important thatAmerica maintain and enhance its leadership role there. InNovember 2011 the Obama Administration publically com-

mitted to devote the necessary resources to sustain this leader-ship role in Asia, even as its domestic fiscal challenges threatensubstantial cuts in the overall deense budget and make und-ing o major overseas commitments potentially more contro-versial at home.2

China is expanding its roles in the Asia-Pacific region. Since

2000, virtually every Asian country, as well as Australia, hasshifed rom having the U.S. as its largest trade partner to hav-ing China as its largest trade partner. Most o these countrieshave also invested directly in Chinas economy. In short, al-most every Asian country now builds continued participationin Chinas economic growth into its own strategy or utureprosperity. Although Chinas economic and political interestsare increasingly reaching around the world, its geoeconomic

and geopolitical center o gravity remains in Asia, or what theleaders o China reer to as its periphery.In addition, Chinas military capabilities are improving sub-stantially as a result o double-digit annual growth in its de-ense expenditures nearly every year since the mid-1990s. Asignificant portion o that growth has been in orce projection

capabilities, especially in the navy and also in the air and mis-sile orces. Te Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is still many

2Kenneth Lieberthal, Te American Pivot to Asia,FP.com(December 21, 2011):http://www.oreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_pivot_to_asia .
http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_7/FP.comhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_7/FP.comhttp://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?llr=mm9rv4bab&et=1108991997962&s=467&e=001rfBQpggV8RqO7be2n2UVTg6bfI15HU19ij7V6nUl4U7Fq9PAP0YtgVEe3l3b1_j3cRyUIduWuc56VJJT0jRCoT1GM77_txngg7M2LI2ljrF3fIoElCquYDEDy7t5a8gPhOOCeRpSCs9LmY1aP2VSzU2MLOTYe7uwTJt0aMfB6es7x4SRtIEisjXtwcm30j2ohttp://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?llr=mm9rv4bab&et=1108991997962&s=467&e=001rfBQpggV8RqO7be2n2UVTg6bfI15HU19ij7V6nUl4U7Fq9PAP0YtgVEe3l3b1_j3cRyUIduWuc56VJJT0jRCoT1GM77_txngg7M2LI2ljrF3fIoElCquYDEDy7t5a8gPhOOCeRpSCs9LmY1aP2VSzU2MLOTYe7uwTJt0aMfB6es7x4SRtIEisjXtwcm30j2ohttp://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?llr=mm9rv4bab&et=1108991997962&s=467&e=001rfBQpggV8RqO7be2n2UVTg6bfI15HU19ij7V6nUl4U7Fq9PAP0YtgVEe3l3b1_j3cRyUIduWuc56VJJT0jRCoT1GM77_txngg7M2LI2ljrF3fIoElCquYDEDy7t5a8gPhOOCeRpSCs9LmY1aP2VSzU2MLOTYe7uwTJt0aMfB6es7x4SRtIEisjXtwcm30j2ohttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_7/FP.com


16/65



3

years away rom being a global military power, but its capabili-ties in the Asia-Pacific region have expanded markedly overthe past fifeen years.

Not surprisingly, these various shifs are raising questionsthroughout Asia about respective U.S. and Chinese roles.Such questions inevitably increase the potential or suspicionsabout U.S. and Chinese motives and intentions.

Domestically, both the U.S. and China are conronting theneed in the coming ew years to change basic dimensions o

the distinctive growth model each has pursued or decades.In the U.S. the major issue is how to deal with a fiscal deficitthat threatens to spin out o control within a decade i seriousmeasures are not taken on both the expenditure and revenuesides o the equation. In China, the 12thFive Year Plan articu-lates a new development model because the resource, environ-mental, social, and international costs o the model pursued in

recent decades3

have become too great.

Prospects or the uture thus must take into account expec-tations about how successul the U.S. and China respectivelywill be in effecting the economic transition that each nowconronts. At present, many commentators and politicians oneach side attribute their own countrys economic deficienciesto actions by the other side and propose various penalties in

response. Tereore, to the extent that reorms in the two de-velopment models all short, the bilateral relationship is morelikely to deteriorate. Tis introduces additional uncertaintysurrounding each sides uture posture and capabilities.

A urther complication is the rapidly growing importance ocybersecurity issues in the U.S.-China security relationship.

Recent years have witnessed the dramatic transormation oeconomic, military, and social activities in a way that makes

3Tis ormer model places particular stress on high levels o exports, savings, andinvestment.


17/65



4

the digital world increasingly critical to all three. Te digitalworld is inherently transnational and has characteristics thatmake many o the normal approaches to building mutual con-

fidence on security issues useless. In a very short period otime, activities in cyber space have deepened suspicions inboth Beijing and Washington about the intentions and capa-bilities o the other side. It will inevitably take years to developthe mutual understanding o concepts, approaches, substan-tive developments, and principles necessary to reduce uncer-tainty and suspicion in this new cyber realm.4

In a major policy address in Washington on February 15,2012, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping placed the need toenhance mutual trust at the top o the list o challenges that thetwo sides must address more successully.5He was right to givethe issue such priority.

Tis papers coauthors have spent many years deeply engaged

in U.S.-China relations, and they eel that mutual understand-ing is critical to achieving the outcomes that are in the inter-ests o each country. But they also worry that at a time o arreaching change, each side is increasingly uncertain about theother sides real perceptions and long-term intentions in thisrelationship. Does the other side seek and expect to develop anormal, pragmatic major power relationship, where the twocountries cooperate where they can and seek to limit disagree-

ments where their interests differ? Or does the other side seeits success as necessitating concerted actions to constrict andreduce its opponents long-term capabilities and influence?Will the top leadership o the other side be willing and able tospend enough political capital to overcome domestic obstaclesto establishing a more cooperative relationship?

4Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer, Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,() (Brookings, February 2012).

5Renmin wang, February 16, 2012: http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/17132096.html.
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/17132096.htmlhttp://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/17132096.htmlhttp://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/17132096.htmlhttp://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/17132096.html


18/65



5

Tis paper terms distrust o ultimate intentions in the bilateralrelationship strategic distrust. Here, strategic means expec-tations about the nature o the bilateral relationship over the

long run; it is not a synonym or military. Strategic distrustthereore means a perception that the other side will seek toachieve its key long term goals at concerted cost to your ownsides core prospects and interests. Te major concern is thatit appears as o 2012 that strategic distrust is growing on bothsides and that this perception can, i it esters, create a sel-ulfilling prophecy o overall mutual antagonism.

Te coauthors o this paper believe that each side can bettermanage the issue o strategic distrust i its leaders have con-fidence that they have an accurate picture o the way the oth-er leadership thinks on the issues that produce this distrust.Tat kind o picture is not easy or either side to obtain. First,various individual leaders do not ully agree on their longrun expectations o U.S.-China relations. Second, the leaders

are changingChinas top leadership will witness large-scaleturnover in the all o 2012 and spring o 2013, and the UnitedStates is holding its presidential election in November 2012.Even i President Obama is reelected, it is likely that a num-ber o individuals holding key relevant official positions in thisadministration will change. Tird, it is always very difficult tobe certain about what top level leaders really think, as versuswhat they must say and do to meet immediate needs.

Despite these serious difficulties, this paper seeks to explaincandidly the perceptions each side has o the others motiva-tions, the concerns each leadership consequently has as it looksto the long-term uture, and the implications o this analysisor uture efforts to reduce strategic distrust in U.S.-China re-lations. In so doing, it is not ocused solely on the very top

two or three officials in each country. Rather, it tries to portrayunderlying perspectives broadly (but not uniormly) shared inthe upper reaches o each leadership. It then provides sugges-tions on the types o initiatives that might in the uture help toreduce strategic distrust in U.S.-China relations.


19/65



6

Te major purpose o this paper is thus to improve the abilityo each side to appreciate the thinking o the other.6Withoutthis kind o awareness, it is more difficult or either side to

devise policies that might reduce or at least effectively managestrategic distrust to mutual benefit. Indeed, without such un-derstanding, it can be very difficult to anticipate how the otherside will interpret decisions being madeeven those intendedto advance the relationship.

Neither coauthor currently holds an official government posi-tion. Each has contributed to this essay his best understanding

o the situation in his own country with the intention o mak-ing this essay as useul as possible to pertinent leaders on bothsides. Given the goals o this paper, neither author has soughtto influence or edit the views expressed by the other in the twocore sections o the paper, Understanding Strategic Distrust:Te Chinese Side (by Wang Jisi) and Understanding Strate-gic Distrust: Te U.S. Side (by Kenneth Lieberthal). All other

sections o the paper are jointly authored.

Tis paper portrays mainly the underlying perspectives o abroad stratum o national decision makersnot o the gen-eral publicabout the long run in U.S.-China relations. Itpurposely ocuses especially on what doubts each has aboutthe prospects and why those doubts exist. Tese undamentaldoubts are perectly compatible with sincere and meaningul

efforts to make the current relationship constructive and tobuild bridges between the two countries. But over time suchdoubts can tilt the relationship toward mutual hostility i notaddressed effectively. It is precisely to avoid this undesirableoutcome that the authors have written this paper.

6In the American idiom, this means or each sides decision makers to be betterable to put themselves in the shoes o the other side in order to understand realmotivations and perceptions; in the Chinese language, this is reerred to as huanweisikao().


20/65



7

UNDERSTANDINGSTRATEGICDISTRUST:

THECHINESESIDE

Astable, cooperative relationship with the United Statesis in the best interest o China in its road to modern-ization. Since the end o the Cold War, the PRC lead-

ership has consistently demonstrated the desire to increasetrust, reduce trouble, develop cooperation, and rerain romconrontation in U.S.-China relations. Beijing has assuredWashington, especially in the last ew years when it has seenmore worries in America about China strategic intentions,

that China does not seek to challenge or supplant the role othe U.S. in the world, and that China-U.S. cooperation mustbe based on mutual strategic trust. Te Chinese leadershiphas also taken measures to manage domestic media and pub-lic opinion to reduce excessive nationalist sentiment directedat the U.S. Meanwhile, in Beijings view, it is U.S. policies, at-titude, and misperceptions that cause the lack o mutual trustbetween the two countries.

Chinese distrust o the United States has persisted ever sincethe ounding o the Peoples Republic o China (PRC) in 1949.In the 1950s and the 1960s, the PRC viewed the U.S. as themost erocious imperial power and the gravest political andmilitary threat. When the Soviet Union became Chinas arch-enemy in the late 1960s, the U.S. threat diminished but did

not disappear, particularly in political and ideological terms.Troughout the years since China embarked upon reorm andopening in 1978, Chinese distrust o the U.S. has maniesteditsel in many and varying dimensions, ranging rom ears oAmerican intererence in Chinas internal politics to suspicions


21/65



8

o American attempts to prevent China rom becoming a greatglobal power.

In short, Chinas strategic distrust o the United States is deep-ly rooted, and in recent years it seems to have deepened. Tedistrust is reflected not only in some official pronouncements,but also, and most strikingly, in the news media, the inter-net and blogosphere, and the educational system. Te officialthinking and the popular sentiments reinorce and interactwith each other.

STRUCTURALCHANGESINTHEINTERNATIONALSYSTEM

Since 1949, Chinas changing assessments o the internationalstrategic structure have caused many readjustments o Bei-jings oreign policy thinking, especially its perceptions o theUnited States. Afer the iananmen political storm and seachanges in the Soviet bloc in 1989, Deng Xiaoping called or

a cautious, non-conrontational approach toward the UnitedStates, which is widely known in China as the posture o tao-

guangyanghui, or keeping a low profile. o a large measure,this approach was premised on the actand the assessmentthat Chinas power and international status were ar weakerthan those o America, and that the global balance at that mo-ment tilted toward Western political systems, values, and capi-

talism. Dengs ideas and policies regarding the United Stateswere ollowed or two decades by the two successive leader-ships headed by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Since 2008, several developments have reshaped Chinas viewso the international structure and global trends, and thereoreo its attitude toward the United States. First, many Chineseofficials believe that their nation has ascended to be a first-

class power in the world and should be treated as such. Chinahas successully weathered not only the 1997-98 Asian finan-cial crisis but also the 2008-09 global financial crisis; the lat-ter, in Chinese eyes, was caused by deep deficiencies in the


22/65



9

U.S. economy and politics. China has surpassed Japan as theworlds second largest economy and seems to be the numbertwo in world politics, as well. Chinese leaders took great pride

in hosting the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the ShanghaiExpo in 2010, along with some other major events that werealso unprecedentedly grandiose. Chinas outer space projectsand advanced weaponry have also contributed to Beijings selconfidence. Chinese leaders do not credit these successes tothe United States or to the U.S.-led world order.

Second, the United States is seen in China generally as a de-

clining power over the long run. Americas financial disorder,alarming deficit and unemployment rate, slow economic re-covery, and domestic political polarization are viewed as but aew indications that the United States is headed or decline. obe sure, Chinas top leadership has been sober-minded enoughto observe the resilience o U.S. power and not to have reachedthe conclusion that Americas superpower status is seriously

challenged as o now.

In act, Chinas leaders realize that a downturn in the U.S. econo-my would definitely jeopardize Chinas economic development,including its exports and the value o its savings in U.S. treasurybonds. Yet, Beijing still sees the lack o confidence and compe-tence o the United States on the global stage and a quite chaoticpicture in U.S. national politics. Te power gap between China

and the U.S. has narrowed considerably. In 2003 when Americalaunched the Iraq War, its GDP was 8 times as large as Chinas,but today it is less than 3 times larger. It is now a question ohow many years, rather than how many decades, beore Chinareplaces the United States as the largest economy in the world.

Tird, rom the perspective o Chinas leaders, the shifing

power balance between China and the United States is part oan emerging new structure in todays world. While the West-ern world at large is aced with economic setbacks, emerg-ing powers like India, Brazil, Russia, and South Arica joinChina in challenging Western dominance. Tese countries are


23/65



10

reerred to collectively as the BRICS and BASIC, with theirleaders meeting regularly.7 Teir coordination o economicand oreign policies serves as a counterweight to Western pre-

dominance. Te G20 is replacing the G8 as a more effectiveand probably more viable international mechanism. Te IMF,the World Bank, and other international organizations andregimes now have to take the aspirations and interests o theemerging powers more seriously.

Fourth, it is a popular notion among Chinese political elites,including some national leaders, that Chinas development

model provides an alternative to Western democracy and ex-periences or other developing countries to learn rom, whilemany developing countries that have introduced Western val-ues and political systems are experiencing disorder and chaos.Te China Model, or Beijing Consensus, eatures an all-pow-erul political leadership that effectively manages social andeconomic affairs, in sharp contrast to some countries where

color revolutions typically have led to national disunity andWestern inringement on their sovereign rights.

Obviously, the above Chinese observations are not readilyshared in America. Many o Chinas political elites, thereore,suspect that it is the United States, rather than China, that ison the wrong side o history. In the past when they respect-ed America or its affluence and prowess, it was somewhat

credible; now this nation is no longer that awesome, nor is ittrustworthy, and its example to the world and admonitions toChina should thereore be much discounted.It is strongly believed in China that the ultimate goal o theUnited States in world affairs is to maintain its hegemony and

7BRICS arises out o the inclusion o South Aricainto the BRICgroup in 2010.As o 2012, its five members are Brazil,Russia, India, China and South Arica. Atthe Copenhagen climate summitin November 2009, the grouping o our largedeveloping countries Brazil, South Arica,Indiaand China, known as BASIC,worked together to define a common position on emission reductions. Tis groupsubstantially overlaps with BRICS.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIChttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conferencehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developing_countrieshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developing_countrieshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conferencehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIChttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africa


24/65



11

dominance and, as a result, Washington will attempt to preventthe emerging powers, in particular China, rom achieving theirgoals and enhancing their stature. According to typical Chinese

understanding o world history, American politicians are truebelievers o the law o the jungle, and their promotion o de-mocracy and human rights are in reality policy tools to achievegoals o power politics. Tis cynicism is so widespread that noone would openly affirm that the Americans truly believe in whatthey say about human rights concerns. Te rise o China, withits sheer size and very different political system, value system,culture, and race, must be regarded in the United States as the

major challenge to its superpower status. Americas internationalbehavior is increasingly understood against this broad backdrop.

POLITICALANDVALUESYSTEMS

Since the very early days o the PRC, it has been a constantand strong belie that the U.S. has sinister designs to sabotage

the Communist leadership and turn China into its vassal state.Such alleged designs are reerred to as Americas strategy opeaceul evolution against socialism. U.S. sympathies toward,and support or, anti-Communist demonstrations in EasternEurope beore the collapse o the Soviet bloc, the color revo-lutions in the ormer Soviet states, and the Arab Spring in2011, and support or democratic reorms in Myanmar are all

maniestations o U.S. schemes to this effect.

Te Communist Party o China (CPC) has long guardedagainst the influence o American ideology, as its advocacy osuch ideas as civil rights, political and religious reedom, andWestern democracy is unacceptable to the governing ideol-ogy o China. Chinese officials and mainstream commentatorscategorically reject the idea that China should conduct politi-

cal reorm that might lead to Western-type democracy. WuBangguo, chairman o the Standing Committee o the Nation-al Peoples Congress, stated in May 2011 that, on the basiso Chinas conditions, we have made a solemn declaration that


25/65



12

we will not employ a system o multiple parties holding officein rotation; diversiy our guiding thought; separate executive,legislative and judicial powers; use a bicameral or ederal sys-

tem; or carry out privatization.

Leading Chinese observers continue to view U.S. policy to-ward China as aimed to Westernize and divide the country.Tey vehemently denounce American sympathy and supportor the Dalai Lama, whom they regard as a political figure try-ing to separate ibet rom the rest o China. Teir distrust oAmerican intentions deepened afer the violent riot in Lhasa

in March 2008, which was seen as resulting rom the long-standing American encouragement o the ibetan separat-ists living abroad. Te horrible violence in Urumqi in July2009 exacerbated Chinese indignation against American e-orts, as it was reported by the Chinese media that the Ui-ghur political activist Rebiya Kadeer had staged the killings,and that she and her separatist organization were unded and

backed by the U.S. government. It is widely believed in theChinese leadership that the Americans orchestrated awardingthe Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo in October 2010. Liu hadbeen sentenced to 11 years or inciting subversion againstthe Chinese government. It is a notable act that all the exist-ing political orces arrayed against the Communist Party oChina, including the Falun Gong, have established their basesin, and are seen as being backed by, the United States.

China has built increasingly powerul and sophisticated insti-tutions, especially counterintelligence and cybersecurity orc-es, to saeguard domestic political stability. Tere is a strongconviction that the CIA and a lot o seemingly-aboveboardAmerican NGOs and companies are in act gathering sensitivedata rom China with hostile intent. In early 2010, Googles

open criticism o Chinas alleged official intererence in itswork in China triggered a fierce response rom Beijing. It wasdeeply suspected in Chinas political circles that the U.S. gov-ernment was backing Google in inflaming anti-governmentsentiment among Chinas netizens.


26/65



13

American involvement in the color revolutions in CentralAsian states and some other ormer Soviet states, as well asthe American attitude toward the Arab Spring in 2011, have

urther solidified the notion that the United States wouldsabotage the rule o the CPC i it saw similar developmentsand opportunities in China. Given the increased emphasis inChina today on internal political stability, the resulting strate-gic distrust o U.S. intentions is deepening.

NATIONALSECURITYISSUES

Some high-ranking Chinese officials have openly stated thatthe United States is Chinas greatest national security threat.Tis perception is especially widely shared in Chinas deenseand security establishments and in the Communist Partysideological organizations.

Several recent developments have contributed to Chinas

deepening distrust o U.S. strategic intentions in the nationalsecurity arena. First, despite the remarkable improvement orelations between Beijing and aipei since the KM returnedto power in May 2008, the United States has continued to pro-vide aiwan with advanced weapons aimed at deterring theMainland. Tis is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes andhas added to the suspicion that Washington will disregard

Chinese interests and sentiment as long as Chinas power po-sition is secondary to Americas.

Second, while the Obama administration has reassured theChinese leadership that it has no intention o containing Chi-na, the U.S. Navy and Air Force have intensified their close-insurveillance activities against China. At times, U.S. spy planesand ships are so close to Chinese borders that the PLA is seri-

ously alarmed at operational levels. Te Chinese military lead-ership views these activities as deliberately provocative, as noother countries in todays world, not even Russia, are undersuch daily American military pressure.


27/65



14

Tird, Washington has strengthened security ties with a num-ber o Chinas neighbors, including most recently India andVietnam, two states that once ought border wars and still

have territorial disputes with China. Intensified U.S. militaryexercises joined by its allies have caused more Chinese appre-hensions. Chinese officials have paid special attention to theObama administrations statements o a new pivot o Ameri-cas strategic ocus to Asia, made during the APEC meetings inHawaii and the East Asia Summit in Indonesia in November2011. In Beijings interpretation, many o Washingtons latestactions in Asia, including the decisions to deploy on rota-

tion U.S. marines in Darwin, Australia, encourage Myanmar(Burma) to loosen domestic political control, and strengthenmilitary ties with the Philippines, are largely directed at con-straining China. Americas meddling in the South China Seaterritorial disputes by asserting reedom o navigation con-cerns there is particularly disturbing to Beijing.

ECONOMICISSUES

In recent years, there have been accumulated Chinese misgiv-ings that the U.S. is using China-U.S. economic rictions as ascapegoat or American economic ailures. U.S. trade protec-tionism is widely viewed in China as a sign o American lossesin international competition. In Chinese eyes, Americas trade

deficit with China is largely caused by its export controls re-sulting rom political prejudices against China. Meanwhile, theUnited States is seen as setting up numerous political obstaclesor Chinese companies to invest in America and merge with oracquire American companies. American pressures on China torevalue its currency are generally viewed as a high-handed, un-reasonable way to serve the interests o the United States at theexpense o Chinas economy and o Chinese laborers.

Since the beginning o the global financial crisis, Chinas hugeholdings o U.S. treasury bonds have become a more contro-versial domestic political issue. Due to the devaluation o U.S.


28/65



15

dollar, the fluctuations o the U.S. financial markets, and theAugust 2011 debt ceiling battle, there are increased doubtsabout the necessity and wisdom o keeping so large a portion

o Chinese savings in the United States. Kidnapping, cheat-ing, stealing, plundering, and irresponsible are but a ewo the words the Chinese are using to express their mistrusto U.S. debt instruments. o be sure, Chinas economic andpolitical leaders continue to see ew alternatives to purchas-ing American debt instruments. But Beijings domestic politi-cal circumstances make this a very difficult issue or any whowant to deend the decisions to hold or increase those finan-

cial assets.

With a weakened U.S. dollar in the global financial markets,Beijing has had more doubts about the sustainability o the U.S.dollar as the global reserve currency and eels some urgencyto internationalize the Renminbi. At the same time, Chinaalso suspects that the United States will create obstacles to the

RMBs becoming an international currency. Many believe thatU.S. global hegemony is sustained essentially by the dominanceo the U.S. dollar, and see the United States as having in the pastsought to constrain the rise o the Euro. Te Obama admin-istrations recent plans to finalize and eventually expand therans-Pacific Partnership (PP) is viewed in Beijing as an e-ort to compete with Chinas growing economic ties with otherAsian economies and limit the circulation o the RMB.

ENERGYANDCLIMATECHANGE

Te George W. Bush administration was regarded by manyChinese officials as representing the interests o oil oligar-chies, and the Iraq War and U.S. policy toward the Middle Eastwere seen as driven by the desire to control global oil supplies.

While these Chinese suspicions continue today, the Obama ad-ministrations designated projects to develop clean energy areseen as similarly sel-interested. o a great number o Chineseeconomists and opinion leaders, the whole discourse o climate


29/65



16

change is a Western conspiracy, which is designed first o all toprevent China and other developing countries rom catchingup. Tey believe that by creating the impression that climate

change is caused by human activities and that reducing carbonemission provides the solution, the Westerners seek to be ableto make profits by selling their low-carbon technologies andconstraining the rise o economies like Chinas that still mustvastly expand production and inrastructure development tomeet the needs o a society that is still transitioning out o pov-erty and towards a predominantly middle class society.

Chinese leaders, many o whom have technical and scientificbackgrounds, may be more impressed with the mainstreamscientific findings about climate change and may not believe insuch conspiracy theories. China is truly interested in strength-ening cooperation with America and Europe in developingclean energy. However, there is a political risk to echoingWestern calls or a green economy with too much enthusiasm,

as Chinas high speed economic growth has to depend on os-sil uels or many decades to come.

DIPLOMACY

Te perceived changing power balance between China andthe United States has prompted many Chinese to expect, and

aspire to, a more can-do PRC oreign policy, and the Chi-nese leadership clearly recognizes these sentiments. I Beijingin the past was somewhat tolerant toward U.S. arms sales toaiwan and military surveillance around Chinas borders, itshould now have enough courage and resolve to punish theAmericans or such deeds. So ar Beijing has been prudent inresponse to the Obama administrations pivot to Asia rheto-ric and related diplomatic and military moves, but how much

longer it should remain so is debated in China.

Chinas criticisms o, and resistance to, some o Americas in-ternational policies and actions toward the Korean Peninsula,


30/65



17

Iran, Syria, and elsewhere reflect the suspicion that they arebased on injustice and narrow U.S. sel-interest that will di-rectly or indirectly affect Chinas interests.

Beijing remains officially committed to the denuclearizationo the Korean Peninsula and would be deeply disturbed by anynew move North Korea might take toward nuclear weapon-ry or prolieration. However, some Chinese leaders hold theview that it is the United States, rather than North Korea, thatshould be held more responsible or tensions on the KoreanPeninsula. Afer all, over 60 years ago China ought the Kore-

an War, siding with North Korea against the United States andSouth Korea to keep American troops away rom an area bor-dering Chinas northeast provinces. oday, it is still in Chinasbest interest to help North Korea maintain its domestic stabil-ity. Given the present security threat posed to China by theUnited States in East Asia, a riendly relationship with Pyong-yang is o vital importance. It is a widely held view in Beijing

that the United States would like to see regime change inPyongyang and that American pressures on the North Koreangovernment are aimed at undermining or overthrowing it atChinas expense.

Beijings policy toward Iran is also acing a dilemma. On theone hand, China supports the principle o nonprolierationtogether with the United States and its European allies. On

the other hand, the Chinese are concerned that Washingtonshigh-handed position toward eheran is driven more by anAmerican desire to change the political structure o Iran andthe geopolitical picture in the Middle East than by its declaredgoal o keeping the Iranians rom obtaining nuclear weapons.China is not ready to support more U.S. sanctions against Iranby cutting off its own trade relations with eheran.

Although the turbulence in the Arab world since early 2011 isnot viewed in Beijing as necessarily stirred up by, and benefi-cial to, the U.S., the Chinese government was perturbed by theorceul intervention o the Western world in Libya in 2011.


31/65



18

Further advance o U.S. schemes in the region, now being un-olded in Syria, would be seen as detrimental to regional sta-bility at the expense o China. Tereore, China joined Russia

and some other countries in opposing international efforts todelegitimize the current Syrian government and support theopposition orces in that country.

Americas counter-terrorism efforts around the world areviewed in Beijing as a means to expand U.S. spheres o interestin the Middle East, Central Asia, and elsewhere. At the begin-ning o the 21stcentury, especially afer September 11, 2001,

when Washington became preoccupied with counter-terror-ism and the wars in Iraq and Aghanistan, China oresaw a20-year long strategic opportunity in oreign affairs, duringwhich it could ocus on domestic tasks centered on economicgrowth. However, since the Obama administrations decisionto pull American troops out o Iraq and Aghanistan, there hasarisen a stronger Chinese suspicion that the United States will

move its strategic spearhead away rom the Greater MiddleEast and redirect it at China as its greatest security threat. Terecent pronouncements about Americas pivot to Asia tendto reinorce this suspicion.

Te Chinese have taken note o a series o American diplo-matic moves seemingly directed at China. Tese includeWashingtons involving itsel in Chinas territorial disputes

with a ew Southeast Asian countries, notably Vietnam andthe Philippines, over the South China Sea. Although the U.S.official position on this issue remains neutral, it looks obvi-ous to the Chinese that the Americans would like to drive awedge between China and ASEAN and keep the issue alive.U.S. calls or reedom o navigation in the South China Sea areclearly working against Chinas territorial claims. Other un-

riendly U.S. diplomatic moves include the strengthening oU.S.-India ties. When India is reerred to by Americans as thelargest democratic country in the world, the connotation orChina is obvious.


32/65



19

China sees many American activities in the world as viola-tion o the principle o nonintererence in other countriesdomestic affairs. Chinas policies toward a number o develop-

ing countries, such as Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, arein sharp contrast with American positions. American criti-cisms o Chinese diplomatic practices in these countries areperceived as depriving China o gaining access to the naturalresources there and thereore as part o the global Americaneffort to complicate and constrain Chinas rise.


33/65



20

Strategic distrust o China is not the current dominantview o national decision makers in the U.S. govern-ment. Teir consensus view rather sees the prospect or

both Beijing and Washington to adopt policies that lead tothe type o long-term relationship that one expects to charac-terize ties between two basically cooperative major powers.Te desired U.S.-China relationship as o the 2020s wouldinclude efforts to reduce conflicts where possible, to cooper-

ate or at least work in broadly parallel ashion to provide re-gional and global public goods such as maritime security andlower greenhouse gas emissions, and to maximize mutualbilateral benefits. Tis does not portend a lack o rictionseach country will have interests that will clash with the other,and their very different cultures, systems, and modern histo-ries will mean that differing viewpoints on many issues areinevitable. But under these conditions both sides will seekwin-win outcomes where possible and try to minimize thedamage where this is not possible.

Te current U.S. attitude is thus one that believes it is easibleand desirable to develop a basically constructive relationshipover the long-term with a rising China. In this view, Chinasrise can bring many positive developments. But it is critical

that a strong and prosperous China itsel becomes a respon-sible major power that respects agreements and internationalrules, sees room or both countries to play major roles in thevital Asian region, and encourages U.S.-China cooperation onmajor global issues. Te type o China envisaged by current

UNDERSTANDINGSTRATEGICDISTRUST:

THEU.S. SIDE


34/65



21

predominant American official thinking is one that will have asignificant impact regionally and globally but will not target itsincreasing capabilities specifically to diminish and disadvan-

tage the United States.

But U.S. decision makers also see Chinas uture as very unde-termined. Te above attitude is based on a relatively optimisticset o assumptions that they recognize could prove incorrectin practice. One object o U.S. policy is thus to make this rela-tively optimistic set o outcomes more likely, but there is alsoclear recognition that it is necessary to be able to cope with the

possibility that things may move in a different direction.

Tus, despite the current undamentally positive U.S. objec-tive, there are worries about a variety o developments onthe Chinese side and also debates about the most effectiveapproach the United States can take to promote desired Chi-nese behavior. Te worries are not at this point great enough

to cause national policy makers to decide that U.S.-China re-lations are inevitably going to be zero sum in nature (whereevery gain or one side is a loss or the other). Te underlyingconcernsand the reasons or themare as ollows.

STRUCTURALCHANGESINTHEINTERNATIONALSYSTEM

American leadersas distinct rom various American schol-ars and punditstend not to think in terms o grand theorieso hegemonic power transition, the clash o civilizations, orother overarching structural explanations o global politics.Tey ocus on more concrete issues, even as they think interms o global principles and approaches to dealing with ma-jor issues. Tis approach tends to downplay notions o the in-evitability o outcomes and to allow a greater role or astute di-

plomacy and or chance. But within this context, the act thatChinas global impact and ranking has been increasing rapidlyin recent years and that the U.S. is experiencing serious di-ficulties domestically is itsel producing particular sensitivities


35/65


JO H N L. TH O RN T O N CH I N A CE N T E R AT BROOKINGS

22

uncertainty. Tis has our basic components with regard toAmerican leaders level o strategic trust o Beijing:

American leaders see ample evidence that China seesitsel as Number wo and assumes that the U.S., asNumber One, will perorce try to hold back Chinasrise. Tis attitude pervades the Chinese media and isalso clearly evident in many other sources o inor-mation rom China. Tis view causes top Americansto worry both that China seeks to displace the U.S.as Number 1 and views U.S.-China relations in un-

damentally zero-sum terms. o the extent that Chinahas and will continue to hold these views, some o-ficials argue that it is only prudent or the U.S. to as-sume that China sees its interests in terms o weak-ening the U.S., and that the U.S. should interpret andreact to Chinas actions in this light.

Chinas military is investing heavily in developing orceprojection capabilities in the Western Pacific, with alikely view toward enhancing its global reach in com-ing decades. Recent PLA acquisitions (such as an anti-carrier missile, stealth fighter, and aircraf carrier) in-evitably threaten to constrict U.S. military flexibility inthe Western Pacific, which the United States views asa vital region or its uture. Tere is currently too little

interaction between the U.S. military and the PLA toprovide credible assurance that these developments arenot potentially adverse to U.S. interests in maintainingits alliances and protecting its broader diplomatic andcommercial interests in the region. Some PLA writingsthat assert broad aspirations to limit what other mili-taries can do in the near seas (jinhai) enhance these

concerns. American military planners interpret theseChinese aspirations and acquisition o specific capa-bilities as designed ultimately to deny U.S. orces ac-cess to and an ability to operate reely in the maritimearea beyond Chinas territorial waters. But such access


36/65



23

and operational reedom is deemed vital or the secu-rity o the United States and o its riends and allies.Te result is contingency planning and acquisitions

programs on the U.S. side to assure that China can-not successully enorce a strategy o anti-access andarea denial that would keep American orces ar romChinese borders in a time o conflict.

Americans, including U.S. leaders, have been shockedby the international financial crisis and are deeplyconcerned about the dysunctions in their own po-

litical system as they seek to put the country back ontrack. In this context, there is greater sensitivity toother countries potentially trying to take advantageo these U.S. difficulties to reduce Americas chanceso bouncing back. Many Chinese actions, especiallyin the economic and trade realms, are being seen atleast partly as having this objective. As explained in

more detail below, this is especially true in cyber thefo U.S. intellectual property, mercantilist policies seenas directed at undermining U.S. manuacturing com-petitiveness in key industries, and currency policythat constrains U.S. exports to the growing Chinesedomestic market.

As Chinas economic and military capabilities grow,

countries throughout Asia are inevitably making ad-justments in their oreign policies. Chinese words andactions that encourage others in Asia to have less con-fidence in the uture o the U.S. in the region are causeor serious concern.

In short, the very act that China has been rising rapidly at a

time that the U.S. has experienced major difficulties has cre-ated a set o sensitivities to Chinese views, actions, and statedaspirations that in various ways contributes to American stra-tegic distrust o China.


37/65



24

POLITICALANDVALUESYSTEMS

U.S. leaders believe that democracies are inherently more

trustworthy than are authoritarian systems. Tis stems in partrom an analytical conclusion that authoritarian systems natu-rally worry more about their own domestic stability and arethereore more willing to bolster nationalism and create in-ternational crises in order to secure stability at home. Tis inturn makes expressions o strong nationalism and indicationso national level concern about domestic stability in China

worrisome indicators o potential anti-American efforts keyedto (or stemming rom) domestic pressures. Tis is particularlythe case when China, as is ofen the case in domestic propa-ganda, blames the United States or its own domestic discon-tents and social instability.

Authoritarian political systems are also viewed as inherentlyless trustworthy because they are less transparent. Te Chi-

nese system takes particular care to conceal its core politicalprocessessuch as selection o top leaders and civil-militaryinteractionsrom outside view. American leaders do not,thereore, understand how well coordinated with the civilian/diplomatic side are such things as PLAN actions in the SouthChina Sea or the first test flight o a stealth fighter. Te latter,or example, occurred just as Secretary Gates arrived in Bei-

jing in January 2011 to reestablish high level U.S.-China mili-tary dialogue and was regarded by many on the U.S. side as adirect insult to the U.S. Secretary o Deense. More broadly, insuccession politics, it is very difficult or outsiders to under-stand what pronouncements and actions are shaped more byinternal political considerations than by external intentions.Tis lack o transparency enhances uncertainties about Chi-nas strategic intentions toward the U.S.

oo little understanding o how the Chinese political sys-tem actually unctions also leads easily to Americans view-ing Chinese decision making as strategic, coordinated, and


38/65



25

disciplined. Disparate conflicting outcomes produced by therelatively uncoordinated initiatives o different ministries,enterprises, and localities are thereore ofen seen as part o

a seamless web o Politburo Standing Committee policy de-signed to conuse and deceive American policy makers. Fail-ure to implement commitments to the American side (e.g., onprotection o intellectual property rights or on rules concern-ing government procurement) tend to be seen as indicationso insincerity, when in many cases they may in act result romthe inherent limitations on the central authorities capacityto rigorously implement a policy throughout the country. In

short, American leaders ofen do not understand the Chinesedomestic political system well enough to determine with con-fidence which outcomes reflect strategic decisions by Chinasnational leaders and which instead reflect inherent dynamicso the political system that are beyond the control (and some-times against the wishes) o those leaders. Tey also tend toquestion the explanations o their Chinese counterparts when

they assert domestic incapacity as a reason or ailing to meetcommitments, viewing these explanations as sel-serving anddisingenuous.

Te U.S. also has long believed that democratic political sys-tems are inherently more legitimate domestically and there-ore inherently more stable and that officials in democraticsystems have a much better understanding o the nature o

politics in the U.S. itsel. It is elt that officials in democraciesare, thereore, less likely to misjudge what is marginal andwhat is central in U.S. politics and thereore are less likelyto impute hostile intent to the U.S. when marginal players sayoutrageous things. Tis, in turn, makes it less likely that hos-tilities will arise between the U.S. and other democracies.

Given undamental American values, what are seen as humanrights violations (especially, violations o civil rights) in Chinaand other countries make it politically very difficult or the U.S.government to undertake actions with such countries that aimfirst o all to build mutual trust. Americans tend to be deeply


39/65



26

suspicious o countries that trample on the civil rights o theirown citizens. For historical reasons, the act that China is gov-erned by a communist party in a one-party system inherently

creates misgivings among many Americans, including highlevel officials, and makes it still harder to establish ull mutualtrust. Tis actor is more subtle than in the past but still is anelement in the trust equation.

DIPLOMACY

As noted above, the undamental U.S. attitude toward Chinasrise is that a wealthier China that plays a larger role in the worldis welcome on the condition that China seeks to be a relativelyconstructive player in regional and global issues. In somewhatmore detail, U.S. leaders recognize that China is such a signifi-cant player in the regional and global economies that Americacannot significantly constrain Chinas growth and should notregard doing so as desirable, in any case. Indeed, they eel on

balance that there are considerable advantages to America inhaving a wealthier, more globally engaged China.

At the same time, the U.S. on balance no longer regards Chinaas a developing country, especially given the PRCs overallGDP and extraordinary oreign exchange reserves. Ameri-can leaders thereore look to have China both reinorce global

norms and regimes regarding such issues as nuclear proliera-tion and increasingly assume the burdens that major pow-ers must bear to provide various types o public goods in theglobal and regional systems. Tey worry about Chinas likelyuture behavior as they see Beijing do too little to take up thesebroader responsibilities at present.

For a variety o reasons, despite Chinas repeated assurances

that it does not seek to push America out o Asia, Americanleaders remain deeply concerned that China seeks to dominatethe region at significant cost to U.S. influence and intereststhere. Many aspects o Chinas regional diplomacy during 2010


40/65



27

reinorced these underlying concerns. For example, China ob-jected vocierously to proposed U.S.-ROK naval exercises inthe Yellow Sea in response to a North Korean provocation on

the basis that a U.S. aircraf carrier in international waters inthe Yellow Sea implicitly threatened Chinas security. And For-eign Minister Yang Jiechi berated Secretary o State Clintonor interering in affairs that should not concern the U.S. at theASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi where the Secre-tary made comments about South China Sea issues. Becausethe United States regards Asia as the most important region inthe world or long-term U.S. interests, there is special sensitiv-

ity to the potential long-term significance o Chinese actionsin Asia that suggest that the PRC is either assuming a morehegemonic posture toward the region or specifically seekingto constrain the American presence and activities there.

ECONOMICSANDTRADE

Te combination o Chinas rapid annual economic growththroughout the global economic and financial crises and theperception that Chinese policy is becoming increasingly mer-cantilist has created concerns that China seeks to sustain itsrapid growth at direct cost to the United States. Within thisnarrative, some concrete issues especially engender suspicionabout the motives o Chinas leaders:

Intellectual property thef. Despite relatively highquality laws and regulations and Chinas joining themajor pertinent international conventions, the ongo-ing massive thef o U.S. intellectual property createsthe impression that this thef is an integral part o thePRCs national development and deense strategies.Tis suspicion has grown as cyber attacks rom China

in recent years have resulted in the loss o extraordi-nary amounts o private sector proprietary data, inaddition to sensitive military inormation such as theengineering data or the new F-35 fighter aircraf. It


41/65



28

is urther increased by Chinas policies that effectivelyrequire transer o technology to gain access to theChinese market, especially in new green technologies.

In many cases, American leaders have seen that tech-nology sharing agreements required as a condition oentering the Chinese market have led to technologythef and the use o that technology (combined withvarious Chinese subsidies and other support or theirfirms) to drive the American firms out o business.

Currency policy. Chinas control over the value o the

RMB, keeping it below market-determined levels, isviewed as a wide-ranging subsidy or Chinese exportsto the U.S. and a tax on U.S. exports to China. Espe-cially in the wake o the global financial crisis whenthe U.S. is highly ocused on creating jobs in its manu-acturing and export sectors, this currency policy ata minimum is seen as demonstrating indifference to

U.S. vital interests.

Constraints on FDI. Although China complains aboutAmerican restrictions on the export o certain tech-nologies to China, Beijing periodically publishes ahighly consequential list o sectors where oreigninvestment is either prohibited or limited. Tis goesar beyond issues o national security and amounts to

protectionism that directly harms American econom-ic interests. Te act that many o these restrictionsaffect sectors where U.S. firms are highly competitivesuch as financial servicesincreases the concernthat China is prepared to grow its economy at direct,unair cost to the American side.

Rare earth metals. Chinas imposition o significant re-strictions on the export o rare earth metals once Chi-na had become the source or over 90% o the globalsupply o these substances created particular concernsabout the PRCs strategic approach to trade. Te rare


42/65



29

earth metals are crucial or many military and civil-ian products, especially in the electronics and cleanenergy areas. Although China explained its restric-

tions primarily on environmental grounds, it createda situation whereby in 2011 firms could gain access tosufficient quantities o these metals only i they movedtheir production acilities to China itsel, in the pro-cess putting their technologies at increased risk othef. Regardless o Chinas real intentions, this issuewas handled in a way that greatly increased concernsover how Beijing will act as it becomes able to dictate

outcomes in a broader array o sectors and issues.

All o the above increase the concern among American lead-ers that, despite many pronouncements to the contrary, Chinamay view the uture with the U.S. in zero-sum terms. Negativeconclusions about Chinas intentions based on these econom-ic and trade concerns may be elt somewhat more strongly

among the top American political leaders than among thoseofficials solely engaged in the economic side o the U.S.-Chinarelationship.

INSTITUTIONALIZEDDISTRUST

Strategic distrust has been partially institutionalized in the

U.S. system (as it has in the Chinese system). Each individualagency is in act very large and diverse, and it is inaccurate toattribute a single view to any particular major agency. Never-theless, there are perspectives that are held by important o-ficials concerning issues that are particularly germane to theirown agencies. Te ollowing highlights some o these.

MILITARYTe U.S. military, like any military, is assigned to assume theworst case and then on that basis to build the capability andplans to protect the country and its vital interests. China now


43/65



30

has one o the most powerul militaries in the world, and itis increasing the capabilities o its military more rapidly thanis any other country. Te U.S. perception is that the PLA is

apparently giving top priority to developing capabilities de-signed specifically to target American military platormssuch as aircraf carriers and satellitesand the PLA is, by in-ternational standards, not transparent as to its capabilities andas to what new capabilities and doctrines it will adopt to copewith the key strategic threats its aces in the coming years.

rust is engendered when a nations long-term plans are un-

derstood and its actions roughly correspond to those plans.In Chinas case its military plans in key areas have not beenmade clear. Te militarys White Papers, or example, haveno regional sections that outline what Chinas interests are inthe various areas o the world. Meanwhile, the PLA is build-ing worldwide space-based intelligence, communications, andnavigation systems, as well as aircraf carriers and amphibious

landing craf.

Given the specific targeting o major American platormsand the lack o transparency about its weapons programs,the American military is periodically unpleasantly surprisedat new PLA acquisitions. Tis enhances distrust o PLAs ulti-mate intentions and plans. Within the U.S. military, this dis-trust is especially strong in the navy, air orce, cyberspace, and

intelligence arms.

Some specific developments have particularly sharpened U.S.military suspicions about China. For example, in the 2001 EP-3and in other military incidents, the Chinese side has reused toengage seriously on the real acts o the case, instead insistingrigidly on a fictitious rendering o what actually occurred and

then at some point engaging in serious discussions to reach asolution. In the words o one American official, Tis practicecauses distrusti China is not going to be influenced by theacts o the case, then it is hard to establish a basis or mutualunderstanding, cooperation and compromise.


44/65


45/65



32

Te FBI, which plays a significant role in both counterespio-nage and domestic cybersecurity, has become very alarmed atChina-based operations directed at U.S. domestic targets. Te

number o espionage cases aimed at stealing American tech-nology in the U.S. corporate sector has increased substantiallyin recent years. While this may reflect in part a more effectiveeffort at finding cases o espionage, there is a consensus thatthe level o effort directed rom China has gone up consid-erably. On the cybersecurity side, the FBI is swamped withcases o cyber intrusions rom China-based servers that aim atsensitive American targets and that use very sophisticated and

persistent methods o penetration and extraction o inorma-tion. Very requently, the inormation targeted is deemed to beo unique interest to Chinese authorities (rather than to hack-ers, criminal organizations, or other governments).

In sum, critical agencies in the U.S. government have man-dates and experience that provide them with a basis or con-

cluding that the United States should not be confident thatChina seeks constructive cooperation with the U.S. as its long-term strategic objective. In the post-9/11 world, these agenciesare playing a somewhat more prominent role in U.S. policymaking, and this builds strategic distrust more centrally intothe policy mix on the U.S. side.

CONGRESSTe United States Congress is not included among the topAmerican leaders discussed to this point, but congress plays asignificant role in various aspects o U.S. oreign policy. Tat isespecially true on trade issues. Congress also has control overgovernment budget appropriations and as such is able to makeits concerns elt in the Executive branch in various ways.

Tere are 535 members o the U.S. Congress, and they repre-sent a very diverse set o constituencies. Many have ormedtheir views about China based on some personal experience


46/65


47/65



34

ANALYSIS

The purpose o the above overviews is not to provide adetailed snapshot o current views o individual topleaders on each side. Rather, the above aims to capture

key relevant views o the top political elite in each capital inthe hope that this candid explication will prove to be o valueor the decision makers o each country insoar as they seekto build a constructive relationship with the other.

As the above narratives highlight, despite extensive experiencewith each other across a wide range o issues, there is substan-tial and growing underlying strategic distrust in U.S.-Chinarelations. Te reasons or that distrust differ. On the Chineseside these doubts stem more rom Beijings application o les-sons rom past history, while on the U.S. side the doubts tendmore to derive rom Washingtons uncertainties as to how amore powerul China will use its growing capabilities. In eachcase, differences in political systems and values significantlyexacerbate both the inherent distrust o the other sides mo-tives and the inability to understand ully what shapes theother sides attitudes and actions.

Given Chinas modern history and its still-evolving domesticsystem, Beijing has deep concerns not only about Americas

strategic posture toward the PRC but also about Washingtonsultimate intentions toward Chinas domestic political stabil-ity and economic growth. By contrast Washington, despite itscurrent domestic difficulties, harbors no concerns about thecontinued viability o the American political system, and it


48/65



35

tends to view its uture prospects primarily as a unction ohow effectively America deals with its own domestic prob-lems. It is more concerned about Chinas impact on the inter-

national system and how that might affect Americas ability topromote its longstanding principles and interests.

Tere are, in sum, three undamental sources o the growingstrategic distrust between the United States and China.

Te first is the different political traditions, value systems, andcultures o the two bodies politic since the ounding o the

PRC in 1949. On the U.S. side, Chinas undemocratic politicswith human rights violations and opaqueness makes its gov-ernment less trustworthy, despite the improvement in Chinaseconomic and social lie in the post-1978 reorm years. TeChinese leadership regards this U.S. attitude as consistentlyhostile in that it is designed to undermine Beijings own au-thority and legitimacy. It is thereore hard or Beijing to be-

lieve that the Americans are sincere in stating that they wantto see a strong and prosperous China.

Tis source o strategic distrust has been urther deepened bycertain institutions and groupings in each country. For under-standable reasons, a large portion o the two countries nation-al security and deense establishments, as well as their intelli-gence communities, work on the premise that the U.S.-China

relationship is unriendly, and their work in turn may nurturemutual suspicions. o many individuals in these organizations,strategic distrust o the other country is obviously justified. Inaddition, American media ofen report unflattering narrativesabout China and U.S.-China relations. Teir counterparts inChina in recent years have ound sensational negative storiesand commentaries about the United States very appealing to

their domestic audiences. Put together, these institutions andgroupings help to create a political correctness in each countrythat makes taking effective measures to develop mutual trustmore difficult.


49/65



36

A second broad source o mutual strategic distrust is insu-ficient comprehension and appreciation o each others policy-making processes and relations between the government and

other entities. Each side tends to perceive the other sides ac-tions as more strategically motivated, more careully designed,and more internally coordinated than is actually the case. Forexample, the economic a

Date post:	04-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	lhg900
View:	220 times
Download:	0 times

0330 China Lieberthal

Documents