GSM057 JOINT 16 EOriginal: English

NATO Parl iamentary Assembly

MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EASTSPECIAL GROUP

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS

SEMINAR REPORT

FLORENCE, ITALY

26 – 28 NOVEMBER 2015

www.nato-pa.int January 2016

This Seminar Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Henrik Bliddal, Director of the Science and Technology Committee.

TABLE OF CONTENT

I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................1

II. OPENING SESSION.................................................................................................................1

III. THE IDEOLOGICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF

JIHADIST TERRORISM............................................................................................................2

IV. CONFRONTING THE REFUGEE CRISIS................................................................................3

V. TERRORIST FINANCING.........................................................................................................5

VI. EUROPE’S EVOLVING RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST: MANAGING

THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES...........................................................................................6

VII. MENA ENERGY OUTLOOK: ECONOMIC AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS............................7

VIII. CHALLENGES FACED BY WOMEN IN THE MENA REGION.................................................8

IX. LIBYA: BETWEEN STATEHOOD AND CIVIL STRIFE.............................................................9

X. IRAN AND THE EMERGING REGIONAL ORDER.................................................................10

XI. CONCLUDING SESSION.......................................................................................................11

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Two weeks after multiple terrorist attacks killed 130 people in Paris, legislators from NATO member countries and from the Mediterranean and Middle East met in Florence, Italy for the NATO PA’s annual Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM) seminar. The lawmakers discussed a range of topics of concern for the Euro-Atlantic area and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The two-day high-level seminar hosted by the Italian Parliament brought together over 250 participants including some 100 legislators from 38 countries. Topics at the centre of the debates included developing a comprehensive strategy to defeat Daesh and other jihadist terrorist movements; the management of the refugee crisis; the search for stability in Libya; Iran’s relations with the West; women and development; and recent energy sector developments. This seminar report will provide insights into these discussions among parliamentarians, government and military officials, experts, and civil society representatives.

II. OPENING SESSION

2. Dario Nardella, the Mayor of Florence, bade the delegates welcome to a city where culture and global dialogue had played a central role throughout its history. Today’s security challenges were radically different from the challenges that NATO faced during the Cold War, he told participants, as the key threat – terrorism – sought to exploit the elements and values of democracy, the Mayor underlined. The complexity of challenges could not be faced alone, they required coordination and cooperation with partners at all levels. Only weeks prior to the GSM seminar, Mayor Nardella had organised the Global Mayors Conference, where the mayors also discussed the way cities needed to deal with jihadist terrorist groups and terrorist attacks. Preserving and advancing art, culture, and identity were crucial in confronting the terrorist threat, he argued. These elements had been a major contribution of Florence to world history. “Culture is stronger than ignorance; beauty is stronger than any terrorist act,” the Mayor told the delegates in closing.

3. Gilbert Le Bris, Chairperson of the GSM, stressed that legislators from both sides of the Mediterranean Sea – and beyond – were meeting in the spirit of seriousness, facing a common enemy whose victims they mourned. He echoed French President Hollande’s statement following the Paris attacks, affirming that “we are at war”. “Daesh targeted us for who we are”, he added. “There can be no dialogue with terrorists. We must eradicate Daesh”, he told his counterparts. “The terrorists were at war with the people represented in the room because of their lifestyle and culture. We must react to this and demonstrate the strength of civilisation and the power of dialogue”, he affirmed. The meeting had several goals in his mind: to strengthen political engagement between all countries represented; to identify people that can make democratic change in the MENA region happen; and to provide a leading role in the dialogue between all sides.

4. Pietro Grasso, President of the Italian Senate, presented his view of the common challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic area and the MENA region, including institutional weakness, the fight against Daesh, terrorist financing, organised crime, migration, and tension between Turkey and Russia. All in the room shared responsibility for the failure to have come up with a coherent strategy and policies to prevent these challenges. It was, however, short-sighted to only focus on the negative aspects, he went on to say. Excellent opportunities existed for all people in the MENA region, and the Euro-Atlantic community needed to be clear-headed to build bridges – both physically and psychologically. Military tools could not suffice in the fight against Daesh and other jihadi terrorist groups, he underlined: institution and polity building was necessary; the logic of a ‘clash of civilisations’ needed to be rejected; and all legal and operational instruments to tackle transnational crime had to be in play. European states could not question the moral

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obligation of asylum, he argued. Terrorist infiltration needed to be prevented, but migrants should not automatically be equated with potential terrorists.

III. THE IDEOLOGICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF JIHADIST TERRORISM

5. Andrea Manciulli, Rapporteur of the GSM, presented his report Daesh: The Challenge to Regional and International Security [226 GSM 15 E rev. 3 fin] to the members of the GSM and all other participants. The report called for a multifaceted, comprehensive response to the challenge posed by Daesh. Dedicating his report to the victims of the Paris attacks, Manciulli acknowledged the strength of Daesh’s multidimensional strategy which combines conventional war, control of territory, extensive use of media, and terrorism. “We need a quantum leap forward in our response”, Manciulli stressed, adding that military action should be complemented by a broader partnership with the countries of the Mediterranean. “Daesh exploits the contradictions within our societies”, Manciulli noted. “We need a new narrative that does not separate worlds and societies.”

6. The report dealt, in parts, with the origins of jihadist terrorism as well as the origins and evolution of Daesh. Daesh had come from ‘traditional’ jihadi terrorism and had evolved into a new form of organisation that was engaged in a hybrid asymmetrical war. A key difference to other organisations was that it was leading a conventional war to build a territorial state through ‘blitzkrieg’ tactics. It combined this war with an organisational structure that was particularly media savvy and attractive for global jihadist terrorist groups. Daesh’s ‘media war’ could not be fought with arms, but it called for a different kind of response that required cultural knowledge, he said. Furthermore, terrorism abroad was Daesh’s way to ‘project power’ and also required a multi-faceted response.

7. The emergence of Daesh had not left the world of jihadi terrorism unchanged, Mr Manciulli argued. Groups like Al Qaeda were adapting to Daesh, for example. Daesh was not merely a jihadi threat. The organisation had had its roots in the Ba’athist movement of Saddam Hussein. Many of the prominent figures came from the regime, but it also borrowed the hierarchical structure of the regime. Daesh was therefore quite impermeable to infiltration – just like Saddam’s regime. Militarily, different groups worked independently of each other, for example. Daesh was also trying to build an overarching unitary structure with welfare, justice, and education coordinated from the centre. Daesh had also entered into alliances with other groups, for example Boko Haram, and was trying to infiltrate areas with little political governance.

8. The situation in Libya was a special focus of Mr Manciulli’s report, as it might become the next hub for Daesh. Links to migrant smuggling and terrorism made it even more of an urgent problem. The report also looked at terrorism in the Euro-Atlantic area, which was perhaps the most difficult to tackle. Mr Manciulli called for a new humanism to fight radicalism. In contrast to other jihadist terrorist groups, Daesh recruits were normally very young, did not grow up in Islamicised cultures, and were media-savvy. Indeed, socio-economic estrangement was not the only reason for radicalisation, he pointed out. Daesh was targeting the contradictions in modern societies. In closing, Mr Manciulli called for “our friends on the other side of the Mediterranean” to help face this generational problem.

9. Marco Minniti, Italy’s Undersecretary of State in charge of National Security, told the audience that the world had come to a “watershed in history” after the Paris attacks: Daesh had perpetrated a military attack for military reasons and according to military logic in the heart of Europe. No longer were they attacks of individuals; no longer was Daesh merely a terrorist organisation with limited attack capabilities. Instead, Daesh had tried to take over control of a European capital for a limited time. Conventional and asymmetrical activities were now intertwined in Daesh. A great worry for Mr Minniti was the co-ordination of attacks abroad through

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Daesh’ headquarters in Syria and Iraq. The conventional and asymmetrical wars were linked through the foreign fighters. Several thousands of them from over 100 countries had left their home to fight for Daesh. They could go back home and become terrorists in their own countries, making Daesh a worldwide threat, Mr Minniti underlined.10. Daesh was impossible to contain, but had to be defeated, Mr Minitti argued. He proposed a strategy based on four pillars: prevention, especially through improved intelligence and intelligence sharing; rupturing Daesh’ financial streams; a military campaign; and diplomacy by concerned international actors.

11. In Syria, the threat was not only Daesh. Democratic transition was the key, and the Vienna talks were key to this. Mr Minniti also rejected the link between refugees and terrorism, calling it a fundamental mistake. After all, the refugees were running away from terror. Europe could not back down on the Schengen zone and free movement. These were fundamental for Europe. However, Europe’s external frontiers needed to be more closely monitored.

12. After the presentations of Mr Manciulli and Mr Minniti, a lively discussion ensued among seminar participants. Addressing a question on the importance of intelligence sharing in confronting Daesh, Mr Manciulli pointed out that there had been recent successes in intelligence cooperation, noting Italian operations with Tunisia and the Balkans. He argued that intelligence cooperation always reflected general relations on the international scene. However, recent events meant that more needed to be done. Open-mindedness and generosity in intelligence sharing needed to be developed. Preventive intelligence work needed to come to the forefront as well, he argued.

13. Some participants posited that the Islamic world was witness to Sunni-Shia split that amounted to a civil war, but others criticised this assertion. For one, the catch-all description of “Sunnis against Shia” was not accurate, they argued. Furthermore, important intra-Sunni tensions existed. Mr Manciulli said that the current confrontation with Daesh was a cultural battle, but it was not between the “West” and Islam, but between tolerance and intolerance.

14. The question of how to prevent radicalisation and to execute de-radicalisation programmes was in the spotlight during the discussion as well. Mr Manciulli noted the different approaches in European countries to this challenge. European countries and countries in the MENA region needed to learn from each other in this respect, and a diversity of tools needed to be in place to be successful. Mr Manciulli pointed out that Arab societies were equally challenged by radical jihadist ideologies. In short, the Euro-Atlantic area and the MENA region needed to address it – individually and in cooperation. National interests needed to be put aside to do so.

15. At the end of the first session, Andrea Manciulli’s GSM report [226 GSM 15 E rev. 3 fin] was adopted.

IV. CONFRONTING THE REFUGEE CRISIS

16. Dr Joost Hiltermann, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at the International Crisis Group, opened this session by reminding the audience that the people in the MENA region suffered on a daily basis. He underscored several points he wanted the delegates to understand before diving into the details:

- A refugee crisis existed in the MENA region with its origin in armed conflicts.- Europe was and had been contributing to the crisis by acts of omission and commission.- Refugees were mostly coming from active conflict areas, not from areas firmly under

control of any group.

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- Conflicts such as the ones taking place in the MENA region had self-perpetuating features and crises tended to get worse if nothing was done.

- Refugees needed to be kept as closely as possible to the places they were fleeing from – not only because of the backlash in countries they were fleeing to, but also because they would be more inclined to rebuild their country early on after the conflicts had ended.

- Long-term solutions included help to mediate conflicts, increasing funds for refugee programs, and avoiding further harm, for example by banning arms sales to the region.

17. Dr Hiltermann recounted the evolution of the civil war in Syria, with its more than 250,000 dead, one million wounded, 2.1 million homes destroyed, 4 million refugees, and 8 million internally displaced people (IDPs). Programs for refugees and IDPs were severely underfunded, and of the funds promised, only a third of the money had been disbursed.

18. Dr Hiltermann further explained what he meant by self-perpetuating effects of such conflicts: - Radicalisation and brutality tended to get entrenched and rise on all sides over time.- A war economy would develop, with people, fuel, and arms smuggling creating vested

interests.- Conflicts would metastasise, drawing in states and non-state actors and creating a

regional conflict.

19. For a long time, Euro-Atlantic states thought the conflicts in the MENA region would stay away from their territories, which partially explains the failure to fund refugee programs. They had also supported proxies with their own agendas and pursued an overly securitised and military approach, he argued. A lack of political strategy and weapon sales into the region made matters worse. Dr Hiltermann called on participants to fully support the Vienna process, fund refugee programs, and ban arms sales. He also called upon the European Union to stem the problem at its source.

20. Dr Ferruccio Pastore, Director of the FIERI [International and European Forum for Migration Research], noted that the perception that the refugee crisis was becoming a problem for Europe as a whole did not develop across Europe at the same time: for Italy, it started in 2013, for Greece in 2014, and the EU only took first action in 2015. The EU was at a political and strategic impasse: it was quite clear that the “Dublin regime” was dead, but the EU had not come up with a coherent new regime that could replace it. EU leaders were now forced to make fundamental decisions during a time where events changed on a daily basis, for example with the introduction of border controls that happened like a “game of dominoes”. The EU relocation scheme for refugees had been adopted on paper, which was a major breakthrough and contained the embryo of a European solution, he said. However, implementation had barely started. At the current pace, the agreed number of refugees would not conclude this century. Dr Pastore welcomed the strengthening of the common external borders by improving FRONTEX.

21. The core of the political challenge rested in the fact that there was a significant external dimension to the problem. This required a comprehensive approach, which in turn was normally only triggered by ‘shocking’ events. This political hurdle reflected the general and fundamental challenge of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). He did see positive developments, however, in the dialogue with Turkey. However, the EU had little leverage in the conflicts in Libya and Syria. In closing, Dr Pastore argued that the EU could no longer muddle through. In order to regain relevance, the EU needed more integrated sovereignty, leading to a future joint border guard, which included search and rescue. However, this required political leadership and institutional reforms.

22. During the discussion, Dr Hiltermann pointed out that it was a common misperception that most refugees came from areas firmly controlled by one side. Ninety percent of the refugees

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come from areas not under Daesh’ control, but rather from those areas where they were suffering from aerial bombardment and barrel bombs. He also pointed out that there was a remarkable degree of consensus among many people living in the areas controlled by Daesh and that the latter were protecting them from the Syrian regime and the advances of Iran. This feeling of threat was not going to go away any time soon, he argued.

23. Arguing against the position that Daesh was sending refugees to Europe to undermine it, Dr Pastore told delegates that daesh hated the refugees for abandoning their homes. If Europe could overcome the refugee challenges, this could be a strategic win for Europe, as Daesh had everything to gain if they could make Europe hate the refugees.

24. Dr Hiltermann argued that, once the Libyan factions had come to a political agreement, he could see a role for NATO in contributing to a better security environment in Libya. He did not think that a no-fly zone or a safe zone in Syria was a viable idea. A no-fly zone would constitute an act of war against the Syrian regime and escalate the conflict. Matters had complicated through the Russian intervention. He did not believe that a safe zone could actually be safe. A political solution needed to be a transition process that all external sides can agree to, and at some stage, Bashar Assad needed to go. If this could be achieved, the international community would be in a better position to fight Daesh. However, he also underlined that as long as the Assad regime existed, the ‘moderate’ rebels would radicalise too.

25. Dr Pastore pointed out that, for many years, experts had been talking about the possibility that terrorists would take the refugee route. After the Paris attacks, the evidence found in the case should not be dismissed. However, he urged caution and calm and wanted to see analyses sharpened. After all, perhaps Daesh wanted the EU to question its refugee policies. Dr Pastore was equally sceptical about no-fly zones, safe zones, and so-called ‘humanitarian channels’.

26. Laura Boldrini, President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, also addressed the participants of the seminar on the refugee crisis. She remembered the many refugees who died in their countries and fleeing them. “A year ago, it would have been unthinkable that hundreds of thousand refugees would walk all the way to central Europe,” President Boldrini underlined. The refugee crisis needed to be addressed first and foremost by political means; all military actions needed to be guided by political long-term strategy. She urged to clamp down on the human trafficking and oil smuggling routes from Syria, help moderate forces such as the Kurds, combat marginalisation of migrants and refugees in Europe, defend human rights, ensure that emergency measures did not limit citizen rights indefinitely, and combat climate change as a fundamental reason for migration pressures.

V. TERRORIST FINANCING

27. Tom Keatinge, Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), talked to participants on the role of finance in identifying Western foreign terrorist fighters, focusing in particular on the way the public and the private sector can work together. “Without partnership, we will fail, and we are achieving less than we could,” Mr Keatinge argued. Financial institutions had been at the forefront of the global counter terrorism architecture since the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, they had been involved primarily in post-event tracing of financial activities. Mr Keatinge argued that they could play a larger role in terrorism prevention by identifying Western foreign fighters. First, those who travelled were normally young and left a significant money trail. Second, getting to areas controlled by jihadist terrorist groups involved a lot of cash transactions, and foreign fighters thus left a clear ATM money trail. Third, they were relatively unconcerned with operational security at present. A step change in working together with financial institutions was required in his view – away from transactional and events-driven co-operation. Financial institutions wanted to

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contribute, but the components empowering them to do so were absent often. Of course, policy-makers needed to establish clear rules on privacy when monitoring potential foreign fighters, he said. In conclusion, Mr Keatinge called financial institutions a force multiplier in addressing this challenge.

28. Angelino Alfano, Italy’s Minister of Interior, told the delegates that, when addressing the challenge of Daesh, one should recall the four freedoms that US President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlined – freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. The fight against Daesh was an unprecedented war, as Daesh was not simply a terrorist organisation, but one with high ambitions, financial funds, troops, and the wish to become a state. They wanted to go back to the boundaries of the old caliphate; not even Osama bin Laden called himself ‘caliph’, Minister Alfano pointed out. He sketched a number of remedies against Daesh which needed to be employed simultaneously. Military tools needed to be employed to fight back against Daesh. Intelligence and policing needed to target any infiltration of Europe. Legal rules and regulations and cultural instruments needed to be part of the tool box as well. He noted that addressing the challenges in Libya was crucial and so was the increasing external border control of the EU. The international community was dealing with a jihadist terrorist organisation that was now a global threat.

29. During the question and answer session, Mr Keatinge discussed the role oil played in Daesh’ finances. Oil revenues made up between 33% and 40% of its financial income. While the international community had been very slow in targeting Daesh’ oil infrastructure, the international coalition was now doing so aggressively. Eight million consumers resided in Daesh territory, but the Assad regime and local and regional players were also buying the oil, using long-established smuggling routes. He called it unlikely that some of it would end up on the international market. He also argued that finance was transnational just as much as terrorism. However, counter-terrorism was often ‘siloed’ in national efforts. He also pointed out that non-governmental organisations and remittance companies were very vulnerable to be used by terrorist organisations, but that the international community needed to strike a balance: if they were burdened with massive regulations, organisations would withdraw from aid work and the people would suffer.

30. Mr Keatinge argued that states needed to get serious about identifying and disrupting the financial flows of Daesh and should sanction those countries that did too little. Minister Alfano underlined that the fight against Daesh was not a religious war. In Italy, the Muslim community had shown a very strong reaction against Daesh, for example. While it was very difficult to share intelligence among states, it remained the only solution to thwart terrorist attacks. In intelligence collection, the right balance needed to be struck on privacy of data. He also refused to give up the Schengen zone, but he noted that it needed to be amended. External border controls with more stringent checks and the sharing of airline passenger data were key in this respect.

VI. EUROPE’S EVOLVING RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST: MANAGING THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

31. To begin her address to the seminar participants, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, underlined how important the links and relations between EU and NATO were in today’s security environment. She had a good relationship with the NATO Secretary General and was working closely on coordinating NATO and EU policies. NATO and the EU were different in nature and had different members, she noted, but over the two first years of her time in office she and the NATO Secretary General had increased the cooperation significantly.

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32. Discussing the way forward in Syria, Ms Mogherini was satisfied that all relevant actors were present at the Vienna talks, which was a result of the enormity of the humanitarian crisis and the Iran nuclear agreement. Significant differences existed between the parties at the table, which in part reflected the differences inside Syria. However, she argued that if the Vienna process could produce a deal, it would translate into effects on the ground. Key issues were the timetable for transition, the reform of the constitution, elections, a ceasefire across Syria, and the continued fight against all terrorist groups – with the designation of terrorist groups being another sticking point. On the military side, the EU was not as such involved. Still, the EU had agreed a common framework at the EU level in 2014, welcoming all national contributions; and after the Paris attacks, France had invoked article 42.7 of the Lisbon treaty – the so-called mutual defence clause. 33. Ms Mogherini also touched upon the Middle East peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The EU continued to lead the international efforts in the Middle East Quartet, seeking to inject some movement into the process. She was convinced that at this point in time, if the peace process stalled even further, it could be the first chapter of a dangerous story because it could produce a powerful narrative for Daesh and other jihadist terrorist groups.

34. The High Representative also argued that the next stop for Daesh could easily be Libya. The country was in a very dangerous situation. The EU was working with the new UN special envoy to get a signature on the proposed political compromise. If the warring factions could not produce such a national compromise, there would be consequences, she warned. The country could fall apart. The political process in Libya had to be connected to the fight against Daesh in her mind. The EU had a package to support Libya ready to go if the political conditions were right, she noted.

35. During the debate, the High Representative underlined that Europe could not defer to the United States for its security. Europe needed to assume its fair share of the burden. Powerful countries needed partners, she said. The United States, Europe (including Russia), and the MENA region needed to invest in building partnerships. There would be hard times, but all could find pragmatic common ground. On Libya, she pointed out that she would be prepared to organise conferences on the country. Indeed, she was working with the UN Special Representative on this. She admitted that the EU was not ready to face the refugee crisis. Some countries had argued from the beginning that it was a European problem, but it took catastrophic events for all to realise this. She was looking forward to a serious political decision on how to manage refugees and migrants. “We should not forget that the refugee crisis is first and foremost a crisis of the refugees themselves and of the Middle East”, Mogherini told the parliamentarians. She also clarified the process for the invocation of article 42.7 and the follow-up processes. She saw it as a very good sign for EU solidarity. France was now discussing with the member states about possible contributions. Ms Mogherini had been asked to facilitate these talks. Commenting on recent tensions between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian plane which Turkey stated had both violated its airspace and ignored repeated warnings, Mogherini called for de-escalation and urged all governments to refocus on the real target : Daesh.

VII. MENA ENERGY OUTLOOK: ECONOMIC AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS

36. Dr Bassam Fattouh, Director of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, talked to the delegates about the geopolitics and energy markets in the Middle East and the changing nature of risks. He noted that the oil prices had fallen sharply despite a deteriorating global geopolitical backdrop, raising the question whether the ‘geopolitical risk premium’ was being properly priced into the oil price. He explained that political instability or conflict did not always cause large supply disruption, citing the example of today’s Iraq. Naturally, plenty of current counter-examples existed, for example Libya, Yemen, and Syria. However, political instability or conflict affected long-term productive capacity of the energy sector. What the energy market was seeing today

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was that the nature of geopolitical risk affecting oil market was changing. He also questioned the link between high energy prices and political stability. A period of sustained high energy prices did not bring more stability to the MENA region or improve Russia’s relations with the West. However, he also asked if energy prices had been lower, would the MENA region have been more or less stable? All of this showed the complexity of the interactions between geopolitics and oil markets, Dr Fattouh argued.

37. Dr Fattouh gave the representatives a snapshot of the current energy situation in the MENA region, after the region had seen a series of events deeply affecting its political landscape since early 2011. First, many MENA state institutions had fragmented and had been eclipsed: governments could no longer protect borders, control territory, and extract resources; armies, judicial systems, and parliaments were fraying; and the legitimacy of transitional governments were in question. Second, the region had seen the rise of the non-state actors. Third, as the power of central government weakened, new local powers would emerge and had already emerged in some places. These local powers could not be side-lined, which added new complexity for foreign players’ relationship with governments and local players.

38. Dr Fattouh noted that energy assets were being targeted in many of the regions civil conflicts. This had led to the paralysis of the energy industry in some countries: In Yemen, although a small producer, oil production had ceased; Syria’s oil production had almost ceased; in Libya, oil production recovered to the pre-2011 level but had once again fallen as the civil war had intensified; and in the South Sudan, the civil war was affecting output potential, with the production almost half its peak. Such disruptions tended to persist for long periods due to constraints outside the reach of the energy industry. Dr Fattouh outlined the long term implications on the investment environment: first, risk perceptions raised the cost of energy finance; second, political instability and policy uncertainty weighed on investment decisions and delayed bid rounds and new regulations; third, it led to the inability to implement large infrastructure projects in some countries; and fourth, it produced weak institutions and bureaucratic delays.

39. Dr Fattouh also took a step back and looked at the global energy picture. In particular, he looked at the US shale oil and gas revolution, which led to three implications in his mind: first, lower US interest in the MENA region; second, a potential erosion of MENA governments revenue bases, which could in turn cause political unrest; and third, a diversion of trade flows, namely to Asia, and more competitive markets.

40. Dr Pasquale Salzano, Executive Vice-President of Government Affairs Department at ENI, gave an overview of MENA energy markets from his company’s perspective. He argued that the oil sector could be a factor for political stability. For example, ENI discovered a very large gas field in Egypt’s deep off-shore, which could be a stabilising factor for Egypt if the right political choices were made. One of the old paradigms of energy markets was slowly eroding. Normally, producing countries exported to consumer countries, but this orthodoxy is not as solid as it used to be. Egypt, for example, went from being a producing country to a large importer, in large part to its policy of subsidies, which inflated its domestic consumption. An energy company was not suited for politics, but it could be a responsible actor through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs.

41. Addressing the oil and gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Dr Salzano argued that the new resources could lead to domestic energy security, but also to EU energy security through the diversification of supply routes. Domestic markets were not large enough to keep the gas for domestic purposes; export to Europe or other places thus needed to be encouraged. ENI hoped to see the Eastern Mediterranean Sea become an energy hub, but a critical mass was necessary.

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42. During the discussion period, Dr Fattouh pointed out that it was not all doom and gloom on the MENA energy markets, but he did stress the point that the longer the current unsettled situation persisted, the more long-term capacities would suffer. When asked about Daesh’ oil production, he told the participants that he had no numbers, but the production was quite small. Furthermore, oil sold by Daesh on the local market garnered extremely low prices, due to the risks involved. The amount smuggled out of Daesh-held territory was also very small. Delegates also discussed other countries’ energy production with the presenters, for example Algeria, Iran, and Russia.

VIII. CHALLENGES FACED BY WOMEN IN THE MENA REGION

43. Dr Moushira Khattab, former Ambassador of Egypt to the Czech and Slovak Republics and South Africa and a former Egyptian Minister of Family and Population, addressed the issue of the struggle for women's rights in the MENA region. After the uprisings in the so-called Arab Spring, many countries in the region experienced a power vacuum, and in virtually all those cases ultra-conservative groups were the only ones who managed to consolidate their power and assume leadership. This had come at the expense of gains previously made by women’s rights movements through decades of hard work and dedicated activism, Dr Khattab told the audience. The ultra-conservative groups were “anti-women to the core”, she went on to say.

44. Assessing the status of women in the MENA region had never been an easy task, Dr Khattab said, and wide disparities existed between countries. Achievements over the last decades were neither linear nor consistent. The gender gap was still flagrantly high, especially in political participation and economic empowerment. Very serious violations of women’s rights and atrocities remained unreported and unaccounted for. Many women lost some of their rights in the last five years. In the refugee crisis, the women and children were increasingly bearing the brunt. Dr Khattab called for the development of a sustainable culture that recognised women as equal citizens. Culture and education played a large role in this.

45. A new and shocking development for Dr Khattab was the emerging phenomenon of women terrorists. Around 200 women and girls between the ages of 18 and 25 had joined Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Most of these women came from European countries. The reasons for this were not yet entirely clear, and they needed to be studied carefully, Dr Khattab argued. The radical jihadists understood the power of women very well. For one, they actively recruited them – not only as fighters –, and they also sought to silence those who challenged their ideology and spoke out for equality. Nevertheless, many women were brave enough to confront the extremists.

46. During the question and answer period, Dr Khattab discussed situations in particular MENA countries, but also focused on cross-cutting issues, such as the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, women’s role in peace processes, the targeting of women during conflicts, the diminishing role of women in the MENA public sphere, maternity and paternity leave rights, genital mutilation, the social stigmas of rape, and the forced marriage of minors.

IX. LIBYA: BETWEEN STATEHOOD AND CIVIL STRIFE

47. Paolo Gentiloni, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, presented an Italian perspective on the Libyan crisis. Minister Gentiloni underlined that Europe faced two major challenges that needed to be addressed separately, although they sometimes risked being merged: terrorism and migrant flows. He argued that in overcoming these two challenges, the international coalition to fight Daesh needed to be broadened and consolidated. He underlined that Russia needed to be a partner in this, as he viewed its help in counter-terrorism as extremely important. In this respect, he hoped that the downing of the Russian SU-24 by Turkey, after it had

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violated Turkish air space, would not jeopardise a diplomatic solution of the Syrian conflict. In the weeks prior to the meeting, the international community had opened a window of opportunity for Syria with the Vienna talks which needed to be fully utilised, he argued.

48. Next to the Syrian conflict, the political situation in Libya was extremely important in addressing the twin challenge of migration and terrorism. Italy wanted to see a united Libya that was stable, solid, and not penetrated by terrorists. Italy would give all its support to the new government, as soon as a political compromise was found. Time was of the essence because there was a risk of Daesh expansion in Libya. The area around Benghazi especially could fall further into the hands of Daesh and other jihadist terrorist groups. Countering this risk depended on the Libyans themselves. Important internal resistance against political compromise existed. This division was not in the interest of the country or the people of Libya, the Minister argued. Italy and the EU had immediate support ready in areas such as the economy, institutional reform, and the security sector. Success in Libya would have a big impact on the migrant crisis. On the positive side for Libya was the fact that the country had huge resources to rebuild the country and that the form of Islam practised in Libya was, generally, not in dispute.

49. General Claudio Graziano, Italy’s Chief of Defence Staff, argued that the military could only play a limited role in any solution to the problems in Libya – or Syria for that matter. A comprehensive strategy with clear guidelines for the military needed to be elaborated in order to create the appropriate synergies. Libya was a country of strategic interest to Italy, both in terms of economic and social terms. The intervention in Libya in 2011 had unfortunately not been very coordinated General Graziano said. Today, Libya needed to be built up on a Libya- and Libyans-first basis. The Italian military and other European militaries were supporting the training and preparation of the Libyan armed forces. He also gave the seminar participants an overview over the EU’s European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) mission’s phase 2. The EU naval operation against human smugglers would now be able to board, search, seize, and divert vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking on the high seas, in line with international law.

X. IRAN AND THE EMERGING REGIONAL ORDER

50. Louis Racine, Officer at the General Direction for International Relations and Strategy in the Department of North Africa and Middle East in the French Ministry of Defence, laid out his own personal thoughts on whether Iran’s regional policy was evolving after the Vienna nuclear agreement. The fact was that Iran’s position had never been as strong as it was now, but could it pave the way for Iran to become a constructive regional power, he asked. Proponents who favored such an interpretation would, inter alia, point to the facts that an economic opportunity would present itself after sanctions were lifted, Iran could help combat Daesh, and the balance of power was becoming more diverse in the Middle East. However, increasing tension in the power structure existed in Iran and, in general, there was a lack of will and capability to overcome an antagonistic attitude towards the international community. This could prevent Iran from making strategic choices, Mr Racine argued.

51. The Iran nuclear deal was a major success for Iran, but despite the many benefits gained, differing interpretations existed inside the leadership, with one side saying that Iran conducted skilful diplomacy to get a breakthrough and another one saying that it was a victory through exhaustion.

52. Regionally, Iran found itself in a complicated architecture of powers. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a major factor in terms of what role Iran could and would play in the Middle East in the future. It remained to be seen how the Russian return to the region would affect it. Mr Racine argued there was an increasing co-dependence between Iran and Russia. On

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Syria, Iran’s positions had not changed but had become even more hard-line. Taking part in talks did not mean that they wanted to play a constructive role, Mr Racine pointed out.

53. For the Iranian regime, internal and external survival was key. After 1979, they tried to export the revolution; today, they engaged in a “forward defence of the revolution” through spheres of influence. Analysts should employ a non-monolithic view of regime where modernisers and supporters of the status quo fought behind the scenes. Iran had changed at the societal level, but not at the elite level. Iran’s foreign policy was not likely to change in the short and medium term. In conclusion, Mr Racine argued for maintaining dialogue with Iran, implement the deal, and test its intentions.

54. During the discussions, Mr Racine faced questions on whether Iran was willing and able to abide by the nuclear agreement. He argued that it was in their interest to comply, but he could not exclude that Iran would test the borders of the agreement to see what they could get away with. On Iran’s partners going forward, he told delegates that the Russia-Iran relationship had historically been fraught with tension; it was a very pragmatic relationship at this point in time. Iran was looking east for economic development to countries like China, South Korea, and India. However, Iran was not merely looking for partners who could provide quantity and money, but for partners who could build up expertise. The EU thus had certain leverage over Iran, as the country prized better relations with the EU very highly. He cautioned, however, that Ayatollah Khamenei did not endorse closer cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic area at this point, in particular with the United States. Furthermore, the support of non-state actors like Hezbollah made it very hard for Western countries to cooperate closer.

XI. CONCLUDING SESSION

55. Vice Admiral Michael T. Franken, Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) at US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Stuttgart, presented his view on combatting jihadist terrorist groups, which was one line of effort for AFRICOM. Vice Admiral Franken told participants that a burgeoning number of Daesh members were coming into Libya. This was not a new phenomenon, but an offshoot of Daesh’ general strategy. In Africa, the deadliest jihadist terrorist groups remained Boko Haram. Still, in Mali, Al Qaeda had perpetrated a deadly attack on a hotel merely days after the Paris attacks, illustrating that Al Qaeda still had operational capability and was engaged in an organisational struggle with Daesh.

56. The Vice Admiral argued that Daesh was very good at recruiting new fighters. Alienation in their home country was a key factor for recruitment. However, Daesh and other terrorist organisations needed failing/failed states to operate, areas with on-going civil wars or where the government had no control. These groups could not operate in free and stable societies. The international community could not work against these groups without working with locals. Thus, support of law enforcement, economic development, good governance, border controls, and anti-corruption and anti-organised crime efforts were some of the lines of effort for the international community. The fight against jihadist terrorist groups would be a long-term campaign that required patience, flexibility, and creativity, Vice Admiral Franken concluded.

57. During the discussion with Vice Admiral Franken, he asserted that the United States had reasonably good intelligence on Daesh in Libya. He conceded mistakes had been made; the difficulty now lays in the question of how to fix those mistakes.

58. Roberta Pinotti, Italy’s Minister of Defence, argued that the international community needed to think more profoundly about today’s security challenges. Emergencies needed to be managed, but they could not be the only issue the international community should tackle. Italy was highly committed to the fight against Daesh, but the military could only be one tool in the

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overall strategy. With regards to the security challenges in the MENA region, she argued that, while there had been a great opening at the beginning of the Arab Spring, now most countries looked more at the risks that had emerged as a result. She took the members on a ‘tour d’horizon’ of the current security challenges. The Minister argued that the West needed to tread very cautiously in the MENA region, given the West’s history in the region. She highlighted the role of social media in producing a counter-narrative against radical jihadists. Furthermore, she stressed the need to co-operate more on intelligence, as prevention and investigation of terrorism was of the essence. She concluded by saying that Daesh could be defeated as an organisation, but once removed, it did not mean the end of international terrorism.

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