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Introduction 1 Noise pollution and industrial pollution are well-known phenomena. The more technical term for such pollution is ‘externalities’. In both instances, the producer of the pollution creates a social cost that is borne by others. Unwilling recipients, such as residents on a noisy airport flight- path or downstream recipients of water pollution, bear the cost. For some types of pollution, such as greenhouse gases dispersed in the atmosphere, society as a whole bears the cost of the emissions. That crime can also be examined as a form of pollution is the subject of this chapter. It is proposed that various agents, whether manufacturers of frequ ently sto len produ cts, or owne rs and manag ers of premi ses that are crime prone because of poor design or policies, can produce costly criminal opportunities for which other parts of society bear the cost. In furthering the study of ‘crime as pollution’ (Roman and Farrell 2002), this chapter discusses the nature and definition of externalities, and seeks a preliminary mapping of how the notion of pollution applies to different types of crime. Crime reduction that utilized rewards and market-based incentives as proposed herein would be adopting a radically different philosophy to ‘traditional’ punitive approaches to crime control and crim- inal justice. The chapter also undertakes a preliminary examination of control instruments that have been developed in environmental economics. A range of instruments have been proposed for climate control, and these are examined for possible lessons for crime reduction. With regard to the implementation of crime-reduction efforts based around an understanding of crime as pollution, the possibility of an Enhanced Crime Doctrine is considered. It is adapted from the existing Enhanced Injury Doctrine applied to the motor vehicle industry whereby, since it is highly predictable that many traffic crashes will occur, vehicle manufacturers are accountable for safety standards to reduce any addi- tional (enhanced) injury. Since aggregate levels of crime can be predicted with reasonable accuracy for many crime types, it is argued that it should legally behove crime polluters to recognize this and adopt anti-crime 8 Crime as pollution: proposal for market-based incentives to reduce crime externalities Graham Farrell and John Roman
