081117 Iraq War Progress

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The Iraq War: Progress inthe Fighting and Security

Anthony H. Cordesman

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

November 17, 2008

1800 K Street, NWSuite 400

Washington, DC 20006

Phone: 1.202.775.3270Fax: 1.202.775.3199

Web:www.csis.org/burke/reports

http://www.csis.org/burke/reports

http://www.csis.org/burke/reports



Introduction

This report is a status report. It is not intended to support a given policy,and it is not intended to assess future risks like Arab-Kurdish tensions, the

government’s handling of the Sons of Iraq, or intra-Shi’ite tensions

between the government and Sadr and the JAM. There are, however,

several points that deserve special attention.

The manning and funding comparisons of the US military effort in the

Iraq and Afghan wars show just how critical providing adequate resourceshas been to progress in the war, a point often lost in discussing concepts

and strategy. (pp. 8 to 11)

Changes in strategy and tactics have, however, had a critical impact and

here it is clear that US strategy has evolved far beyond the initial strategy

often described as the “surge.” The “Anaconda Strategy” described by

General Petraeus took advantage of Al Qa’ida’s extremism and the

alienation of Iraqi Sunnis to create a far larger movement with civil and

economic dimensions, not just military ones. (pp. 12 to 15)



Introduction - II

Ethnic and sectarian differences remain a critical problem, and

challenge to Ira’s future stability and security. The US retained enough

influence in 2007, however, to bridge over many of these divisions – inspite of slow progress and a lack of support by the Iraqi central

government in some areas.

• It is also important to note that Iraqis never supported division of the

country at a popular level, and that a steady decline took place in ethnic

and sectarian violence. As the graphs in this report show, this decline has

led to massive decline in such violence between late 2006 and September2007, and a further decline after the containment of the Sadrists and JAM

in Baghdad in the spring of 2008. (pp. 16 to 25)

The graphs showing the patterns in overall violence show a steady rise

from 2003 to late 2006, and that a major reduction in violence through

August 2007. Since that time, violence rose only during the clash between

the central government and Sadr/JAM forces in the spring of 2008, andhas continued to decline. (pp. 26 to 32)

•The extent to which the Anaconda strategy went beyond an increase in

US troop levels is clearly reflected in the data on violence and casualties

for 2006, 2007 and 2008. Advances in US intelligence,



Introduction - III

surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities during 2005-2007 laid the

groundwork for far more effective attacks on terrorist and insurgent

networks. The Sadr ceasefire enabled US and Iraqi forces to first deal withAl Qa’ida in 2007, and then deal with Sadr and the JAM in 2008 – aided

in part by carefully targeted US efforts against the most extreme elements

of the JAM in 2007. The US team in Iraq expanded the civil-military aid

and governance efforts into the field in spite of the ability to quickly

deploy more US civilian advisors, and expand aid and governance activity

at the local and provincial level. (pp. 33 to 41)

Declassified US intelligence maps show the impact on the scale of Al

Qa’ida and affiliated insurgent activity in Iraq and Baghdad from the end

of 2006 through the fall of 2008, as well as the impact of key land and air

operations, and targeting Al Qa’ida’s key cadres. Coupled to still classified

advances in IS&R, the US effectively redefined jointness incounterinsurgency warfare. (pp. 42 to 45)

Graphs showing the level of violence by type of attack also reflect these

patterns (pp. 41-44), but they also provide a warning. The overall level of

violence remains as high as at the beginning of the 2004. The war is not



Introduction - IV

“won” or “over.” Suicide bombings and other bombing attacks on the Iraqi

population have not been sharply reduced in number or intensity. What

some US commanders call an “irreducible minimum” can only beaddressed by political accommodation and the growing capabilities of the

Iraqi security forces. (pp. 46-50)

Major progress has occurred in reducing the level of violence in

Baghdad, which has been a key center of violence throughout the

insurgency. This has only been possible, however, by US division of the

city into largely Sunni, Shi’ite, and mixed areas. Reaching politicalaccommodation and creating security in the capital remain key challenges.

(pp. 51-57)

Iraqi civilian casualty patterns show the same decline as in the levels of

violence, whether calculated by Iraq, US, or NGO count. (pp. 58-61)

•The same is true of US military, allied military, and Iraqi security forces,

although the Iraqi security forces continue to take significant losses. (pp.

62-69)

•Iraqi perceptions of the “surge” present reporting problems because

polling data are dated and do not reflect the level of progress achieved





Introduction - VI

security in that province. (pp. 88-91), when these charts are compared to

the other data in this report.

• Like public opinion polling on the impact of the “surge,” the polling datalag current developments. They do, however, clear reflect the tensions

between Iraqi belief that the invasion was not justified, a history of

popular support for attacks on US and allied forces and a broad desire for

the US and allied forces to leave -- and understanding that a rushed US

and allied departure could undo the gains made to date. (pp. 92-99)

• Major progress has occurred in increasing the size and capability of Iraqiforces, and in Iraq’s taking over the funding of such efforts. This progress

is still, however, highly dependent on continued US and allied advisory

efforts and support. (pp. 101-123)





Afghanistan Iraq

Territory (Sq Km 647,500 437,072

Population 31,889,923 27,499,638

GNP ($USB) 35 100

Oil Export Revenues - 2007($USB)

0 41

Per Captia Income (US$) 1,000 3,600

Literacy Rate (%) 74.1 28.1 74.1

Median Age 17.6 20

% 0-14 years 44.6 39.4

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

35,000,000

Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007

Iraq vs. Afghanistan



US Force Levels in Iraq vs.

Afghanistan

10

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Iraq BA 0 50 56.4 83.4 98.1 129.6 145.4 *53.4

Afghan BA 20 14 12.4 17.2 17.9 34.9 30.2 *12.5

FY01-

02FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08

FY09

Bridge





Strategy Strategy

•No new Bush strategy since December 2006

• Anaconda strategy slide provided by by General Petraeus in

April 2008 testimony to Congress.

• Broad picture of potential long term US force cuts, and shift

of US role to strategic overwatch, presented in September

2007, but with little details.

• No clear long term timelines: Force cuts beyond one brigade

remain “conditions based.”

• Both the Iraqi MoD and head of MNSTC-I said in February

2008 that Iraqi forces would not be ready to assume full

counterinsurgency role before 2012.

• Announced development and aid strategy do not yet reflect

US cuts in aid and massive increases in Iraqi oil export

revenues.



Full Spectrum Operations

Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008


http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/081117-iraq-war-progress 14/14314Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008





Counterinsurgency Guidance










Changes in Doctrine




Changes in Leadership Development






Ch i L L d



Changes in Lessons Learned


Ch i K l d M



Changes in Knowledge Management


A i B i d T “R d



Active Brigade Team: “Road to

Deployment










Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal

Challenges

30

Sectarian Challenges Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi’a. 1% Other

Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3%

Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara

9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch

2%, Other 4%

Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%,

Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided

Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily

urbanized.



31

Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions



Three sources: CIA World Factbook, unsourced;

“Iraq: a Country Study,” Federal Research Division, Library of

Congress, 1988, unsourced (“knowledgeable observers”);

Average ABC News polls „07-„08, N=6,652 via 1,386 points.

CIA WFB LoC ABC

Shiites 60-65% 60-65% 49%

Sunni Arabs 12-22* 13 33

Kurds 15-20 NA 15

Non Muslims 3 NA 3

*Extrapolated

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Directorof Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

Real World Ethno-Sectarian Population

Parameters?

I i N S ht Di i i E D i



33

Iraqis Never Sought Division Even During

Worst Part of Fighting

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2007. Pg. 1







Movement of Iraqi Refugees



Copright Anthony H.

Cordesman, all rights reserved 37

Movement of Iraqi Refugees

•Some 2.7million

displacedwithin Iraq

•1.2 millionbefore

February 2007

•1.5 millionsince

•300,000 in

first threemonths of

2008

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly

Report, April 30, 2008, p.













Iraqi Civilian Deaths Per Day from Vehicle

Bombs, Gunfire & Executions: 2003-2007

Source: Iraqi Body Count, as of June 24, 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007Vehicle Bombs 1.4 5 9.6 16 21

Gunfire/Executions 15 18 26 58 39



Rise in Terrorism in Iraq: 2005-

2007Attacks Targeting Non-Combatants

Adapted from US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism. April 30, 2008, and www.nctc.gov

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

Terror attacks Attacks causing at least one

death, inury, or kidnapping

People killed, injured, or

kidnapped

2005 3,469 2837 20731

2006 6628 6026 38863

2007 6212 5574 44008

http://www.nctc.gov/








The Military Course and Impact of

the Surge





The “Surge” - II

47

Synergy and Serendipity Al Qa’ida extremism alienates many Sunnis and tribes

Tribal uprising in Anbar is transformed into sons of Iraq

Sadr declares and keeps ceasefire.

Kurds wait on Article 140

What Went Wrong Central government did not reach out to Sunnis, “Sons of

Iraq”. Police generally fell short, did not perform.

Negligible progress in rule of law

Extremely slow progress in political accommodation.

US civilian role and aid impact fell far short of goal.

Iraqi government spending on development, services, and

security.

Did not reduce impact of British defeat in the south, growing

intra- Shi’ite tensions.

Growing Iranian role and influence

Did not affect Arab-Kurdish-Turkish tensions.

Little progress in strengthening ties to other neighbors.



US Troop Levels: March 2003 to



US Troop Levels: March 2003 to

May 2008

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO-08-837June 23, 2008, p. 19

Al Qa'ida in Iraq December, 2006



50

Q q ,



51

OEF Close Air Support Sorties



Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Totals

2004 1 3 7 1 3 24 16 9 13 4 1 4 0

2005 1 1 1 23 7 10 16 20 9 19 23 46 0

2006 5 23 42 63 59 141 216 242 329 240 201 209 0

2007 178 163 310 202 179 288 368 670 181 98 289 0 0

0

100

200

300

400

500

600700

800

Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007

OEF Close Air Support Sorties

With Munitions Dropped, 2004-2007(Excluding 20mm and 20mm rounds and unguided rockets)



Copyright Anthony H.Cordesman, all rights reserved 53



Copyright Anthony H.Cordesman, all rights reserved 54



55

Al Qa'ida in Iraq March, 2008



56

Source for slides18 and 19: MNF-I,

April 9, 2008



Patterns in Violence As Result of

the Surge and Campaign Against

Sadr

Al Qa'ida in Iraq Winter 2006 vs. Fall



58

2008


Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity: Winter



2007 vs. Fall 2008


The Battle of Sadr City: March-April 2008




Security Incidents: Jan 2004-Oct 2008



Security Incidents: Jan 2004-Oct 2008




Indirect Fire Attacks: 2004-2008



Indirect Fire Attacks: 2004 2008


IED Explosions: 2004-2008



p


IED INCIDENT TRENDS



IED INCIDENT TRENDS

65Source: Bill McMichael, Pentagon Correspondent, Times News Service, Military Times News Group, http://www.militarytimes.com/

Caches Found and Cleared: 2004-2008

http://www.militarytimes.com/

http://www.militarytimes.com/



Caches Found and Cleared: 2004 2008


Weapons and Explosive Cache Finds: 25

M h 7 A t 2008



March-7 August 2008




Trends in Baghdad:

US and Iraqi Views

US Joint Security Stations and Outposts inBaghdad: July 2007



Baghdad: July 2007

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO-08-837June 23, 2008, p. 20

Ethno-Sectarian Attacks: May 2006-Oct 2008




Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence



in 2007-2008(Trend in Total Incidents per Month by Type)

Source: Iraqi Official

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

Katyusha 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 9 16 23 15 32 21 0

Suicide Bomb 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 1 3 2 Assasination 0 21 13 13 23 15 16 0 0 9 12 16 21 16 15 22 31 25

Bicycle Bomb 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Car Bomb 26 23 19 38 35 20 35 15 24 20 15 16 6 13 13 13 13 11

Mortar 87 74 43 83 90 190 138 89 76 54 48 46 82 62 228 216 98 63

IED 55 65 33 82 63 133 96 84 63 78 73 71 103 77 131 118 107 96

0

50

100150

200

250

300

350

400

450





in 2007-2008(Monthly Distribution of Incidents by Type)


Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total

IED 55 65 33 82 63 133 96 84 63 78 73 71 103 77 131 118 107 96 0

Mortar 87 74 43 83 90 190 138 89 76 54 48 46 82 62 228 216 98 63 0

Car Bomb 26 23 19 38 35 20 35 15 24 20 15 16 6 13 13 13 13 11 0

Bicycle Bomb 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Assasination 0 21 13 13 23 15 16 0 0 9 12 16 21 16 15 22 31 25 0

Suicide Bomb 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 1 3 2 0

Katyusha 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 9 16 23 15 32 21 0 0

0

50

100

150

200

250

Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in



2007-2008(Trend in Total Casualties per Month by Type)


Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunBody Found 395 365 324 411 726 548 596 421 324 174 165 126 123 116 135 117 123 103

ISF Dead 28 36 33 25 32 35 69 22 23 41 26 29 31 28 42 64 59 24

ISF Wounded 55 45 69 100 88 95 119 40 31 58 54 84 77 72 121 141 94 81

Dead Civilian 255 256 198 495 344 190 300 235 219 143 98 104 153 197 322 531 233 178

Wounded Civilian 206 512 403 110 999 530 893 507 437 461 287 329 311 453 941 152 938 468

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in



2007-2008(Monthly Distribution of Casualties by Type)


Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total

Wounded Civilian 206 512 403 110 999 530 893 507 437 461 287 329 311 453 941 152 938 468 0

Dead Civilian 255 256 198 495 344 190 300 235 219 143 98 104 153 197 322 531 233 178 0

ISF Wounded 55 45 69 100 88 95 119 40 31 58 54 84 77 72 121 141 94 81 0

ISF Dead 28 36 33 25 32 35 69 22 23 41 26 29 31 28 42 64 59 24 0

Body Found 395 365 324 411 726 548 596 421 324 174 165 126 123 116 135 117 123 103 0

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600



Violent Civilian Deaths: Jan 2006-Oct 2008




Iraqi Body Count: Iraqi Civilians Killed During



the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat

Source: Iraq Body Count: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/enforced-security June 24, 2007

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar

Deaths 1,42 1443 1,76 1,58 2,09 2,42 3,12 2,74 2,39 2,92 2,96 2,65 2,79 2,46 2,56 2,41 2,73 2,08 2,53 2,32 1,22 1,18 986 856 767 962 1534

-200

300

800

1,300

1,800

2,300

2,800

3,300

Icasualties: Iraqi ISF & Civilians Killed During

th “S ” d Aft d b M th f C b t

http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/enforced-security6












the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat

Source: Icasualties, http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Ap

ISF 189 158 191 201 150 132 217 233 150 224 123 123 91 150 215 300 198 197 232 76 96 114 89 72 69 110 161 113

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

ISF



US & Coalition Casualty Patterns

US Kill d d W d d i C b t



US Killed and Wounded in Combat

in Various Wars

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical AnalysisDivision, as of April 8, 2008

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

700000

800000

900000

1000000

Revolutionary1812 Mexican CivilSpan.-Amer.WWI WWII Korea VietnamLebanon Gulf Somalia Afghan IraqWounded in Action 6188 4504 4152 281,88 1662 204002 671846 102284 303644 467 1937 30004

Killed in Action 4435 2260 1733 140414 2446 53402 291557 36574 58209 256 382 29 294 3310

Non-combat Deaths 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Civil War is Union only; Confederate dead were 74,524 battle and 59,297 other;

wounded unknon.

T t l US Kill d d W d d i I



Total US Killed and Wounded in Iraq:

2003-May 3, 2008

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical analysisDivision, as of May 5, 2008

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

Total Deaths KIA Non-Hostile WIA Returned WIA Not Returned19 Mar-30 Apr 03 139 109 30 116 429

1 May 03-3 May 08 4,076 3,323 753 16,451 12,915

Dod Civilians 11 8 3 0 0

Totals 0 0 0 0 0

US Kill d d W d d i C b t i I b



US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Iraq by

Cause: March 2003-April 5, 2008

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical AnalysisDivision, as of April 8, 2008

Drowning Burns/SmokeArtllery/Mortar/RocketExplosive DeviceGrenade Gunshot NBC AgentsOther Weaponery RPG Air/Veh. CrashFall, Cut, Other MedicalUnknown

Killed in Action 15 17 190 2076 655 40 110 7 155

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Killed in ActionTotal of 3,267hostile deaths,

738 Non-hostiledeaths, and

29, 676wounded =

33,681 Total



83Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg. 23

Monthly US Casualties – Operation Iraqi



y p q

Freedom: March 2003-April 2008

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

M a r

M a y

J u l

S e p

N o v

J a n

M a r

M a y

J u l

S e p

N o v

J a n

M a r

M a y

J u l

S e p

N o v

J a n

M a r

M a y

J u l

S e p

N o v

J a n

M a r

M a y

J u l

S e p

N o v

J a n

M a r

M a y

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Wounded

Killed in Action

Non-Combat Deaths

Note: Accidents includes “other deaths; Killed in Action includes “died of wounds”. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

Total US and Allied Killed During the



Total US and Allied Killed During the

“Surge” and Afterwards

Source: Icasualties: Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, accessed,May 4, 2008

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May

Other 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 2

UK 2 6 1 3 3 1 12 3 7 8 4 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 0

US 106 70 112 83 81 81 104 126 101 78 84 65 38 37 23 40 29 52 52 19

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140 Total from 3/2003-endto 3/2008=

4066 US, 176 UK, 135

Other,

and 4,377 Total

Monthly US Casualties – “Surge” and

Aft d J 2007 M 2008



Afterwards: January 2007- May 2008

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May2007 2008

Wounded 647 519 618 653 658 753 616 565 361 297 203 212 234 215 328 330 195

Killed in Action 78 70 71 96 120 93 66 55 42 29 28 14 34 25 36 42 15

Non-CombatDeaths

5 11 10 8 6 8 12 29 23 9 8 9 6 4 3 10 4

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000Wounded

Killed in Action

Non-Combat Deaths

Note: Accidents includes “other deaths; Killed in Action includes “died of wounds”. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center



Perceptions of the Surge:

US and Iraqi

I t f T S



88

70%68%

70%

65% 67%

53%49%

43% 44%42%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Security where

forces sent

Security in

other areas

Political

dialogue

Ability of

Iraqi gov't

Economic

development

August Now

Impact of Troop Surge ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

% saying it's worse

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK P OLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director

of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.



After the “Surge”



g

91

Reducing the Uncertainties of a “Long War”

Sunni- Shi’a and Arab-Kurd political

accommodation. Sons of Iraq

Sadr vs. ISCI

Stable autonomy for Kurds.

Open list and air elections at national,

provincial, and local level.Creation of Effective governance and services at

at national, provincial, and local level.

Resolving petroleum and national budget

issues. Move from aid and government subsidies to

sustained development and employment.

Neighbors: Iran, Syria, Turkey, Gulf

US and Iraqi domestic politics

Legislative Progress Towards Political



Accommodation: 2007-2008


Potential Risks and “Storm Clouds”




Patterns of Violence by ProvincePatterns of Violence by Province



Patterns of Violence by Province Patterns of Violence by Province

and Transfer of Responsibilityand Transfer of Responsibility• Violence varies sharply by province.

•Violence by province diminished from mid-2007 to April 2008, butMaliki offensive in Basra and fighting with Sadr that began in March2008 has since radically increased the level of violence and areasimpacted.

• Polling data date back to February 2008.

• Reporting on transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces haveconsistently bordered on the absurd. Transfers have been cosmeticand Iraqi forces are not ready for the mission.

• Iraqi government cannot provide effective governance or presencein many areas supposedly under its control.

Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq forSelected Provinces, August 2005 through



95

Early May 2008

Note: Each data point representsthe average number of dailyattacks for the specified period of

time, as reported in DOD’squarterly reports to Congress.

GAO analysis of DOD’s quarterly reports to

Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in

Iraq, January 2006 through February 2008; and

data provided by MNF-I for March 2008 throughMay 2008

Source: GAO. “SECURING,

STABILIZING, AND REBUILDINGIRAQ: Progress Report: Some

Gains Made, Updated StrategyNeeded” June, 2008. Pg. 13



96

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” March 2007, Pg. 15



97

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June 2007, Pg. 20



98

QuickTime™ and a

decompressor are needed to see this picture.

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2008. Pg. 21



99Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2008. Pg. 27

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2007



100Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September June 2007. Pg. 26

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2007



101Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September 2007. Pg. 23

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October 2007



102Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” December 2007. Pg. 19

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: January 2008



103Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” MJarch, 2008. Pg. 26

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2008




Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2008



105Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg. 29

Saw Local Violence During Past 6 Months:



Car bombs/suicide attacks 27% Baghdad 61%

Snipers/crossfire 24% Mosul 58%

Sectarian fighting 22% Diyala 58%

Unnecessary violence

by U.S. forces 28% Anbar 54%

by militia 18% Basra 60%

Forced separation 14% Baghdad 28%

Basra 29%

Saw oca V o e ce u g ast 6 o t s:

August 2007-February 2008ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK Poll



Transferring Provincial Control - I



107

Petraeus briefing Slides, April 2008

Source: Petraeus Briefing Slides, April 9, 2008




Transferring Provincial Control - II



109

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg. 32

Transfer of Forward Operating Bases to Iraqis



110

Date FOBs # Transferred %Transferred

October 2006 110 52 47.3%

June 2007 122 61 50.0%

September 2007 125 61 48.8%

November 2007 125 61 48.8%

January 2008 125 63 50.4%

Source: DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,November 2006, June 2007, September 2007,

December 2007, and March 2008.Note: DoD did not report on FOBs in March 2007.

Transfer of Forward Operating Bases to Iraqis

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 105

I i i f US R l i II i i f US R l i I



Iraqi views of US Role in Iraq Iraqi views of US Role in Iraq

• Trend has been more favorable, since victories in 2007 but…

• Iraqi public opinion data date back to February 2008. Events sincethat time may have increase Sunni tolerance and support of USforces and reduced it for Shi’ites.

• Data on Iraqi perceptions show clear conflict between nationalism,desire for US to leave,and understanding US presence stillnecessary.

• Sharp polarization of Iraqi opinion along sectarian and ethniclines.

































Iraqi Force DevelopmentIraqi Force Development -- IIII



Iraqi Force Development Iraqi Force Development II II

• Data on police progress disguise reality that most police are nowcontrolled at local and governorate level, many “trained and equipped” men

are no longer in service, and embeds have not been provided or effective.

• Corruption and incompetence in MoD and MoI remain major problems.

Prime minister’s office continues to provide ineffective guidance andmanagement.

• The future role of the tribal militias and “Sons of Iraq” remains uncertain in

spite of slow Iraqi government efforts to deal with issue.

•No clear plans for transferring funding responsibilities from US aid to Iraqigovernment budget, but progress is taking place.

2000

Attack Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations



300

400

500

600

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

1 J u n 0 7

2 9 J u n 0 7

2 7 J u l 0 7

2 4 A u g 0 7

2 1 S e p 0 7

1 9 O c t 0 7

1 6 N o v 0 7

1 4 D e c 0 7

1 1 J a n 0 8

8 F e b 0 8

7 M a r 0 8

4 A p r 0 8

2 M a y 0 8

3 0 M a y 0 8

2 7 J u n 0 8

2 5 J u l 0 8

Attack Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations

IEDs and Mines (includes Explosions and Found and Cleared)

Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks

Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

1 5 A u g 0 8

~592K



Comparative Cost of Aid to

Afghan and Iraqi Forces



Source: CBO, 2008

g q($US Current Billions)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Afghan 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 1Iraq 0 0 0 0 5 6 3 6 2

Total 0 0 0 0 5 7 5 13 3

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Afghan

Iraq

Total



125Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

How US Iraqi Security ForcesAid Funds Have Been Spent



126

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April

30, 2008, p. 51.

Iraqi Security Budget by Year



Iraqi Security Budget by Year

Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

Iraqi Security Expenditures vs Budget



Iraqi Security Expenditures vs. Budget

Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008



Number of Iraqi Security Forces:March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008



130

Notes: a: The term “operational” refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term “trained and equipped” refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from theState Department’s March 9, 2005 and January 31, 2007 Iraq Weekly Status Report and Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi Security ForcesUpdate, January 26, 2007. b: The term “trained” refers to Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Counterterrorism Bureau forces. Numbers are from April30, 2008 Iraq Weekly Status Report. c: Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces. d: Army numbers include support forces. e:Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers. f: The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway patrolforces. g: Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers. h: Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities ProtectionService personnel working in 27 ministries. i: Numbers reflect total Iraqi security forces trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due tocasualties, absence without leave, and normal separation.

Source: GAO. “SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed” June, 2008.Pg. 24

Total Size of Iraqi Security Forces

(Number of Personnel) Aug 07-Jul 08



0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL

Border Enforcement

National Police

Iraqi Police Services

Special Operations

Navy

Air Force

Support Forces

Army

Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008





Growth of Iraqi Security Forces

(Assigned Personnel) August 2007-July 31, 2008



0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

Aug-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08

Border Enforcement

National Police

Iraqi Police Service s

Special Operations

Navy

Air Force

Support Forces

Army

Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

Projected Growth of Iraqi Forces



135Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008



Iraqi Ground



137

a. Data is derived from the MoD HumanResource Information ManagementSystem (HRIMS), whichtracks MoD manpower and payroll data.

b. The table represents TOTALFIELDED GROUND FORCES (154,598 – ALMOST ALL ASSIGNED TOIGFC) and what is PLANNED or ingeneration, etc., with regard to ground

forces (9,430).

Source: Department of Defense.“Measuring Security and Stability

in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg.

47

Iraqi GroundForces

PersonnelBy Division:

July2008











142Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008



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081117 Iraq War Progress

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