08a the Philippine-American War

7/30/2019 08a the Philippine-American War

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T H !. O BJECT 0 1' COLO N IA L D BS' ' '.

A Ph il ipp in e H ist ory LessonALFRREDO NAVARRO SALANGA

It '5 h Ul tory thatmoves us awayfr om what we are

V fe call it name sassign i t or igi nsand blame the mightTh a t made Spain rightan d Amer ic.a - b ite .

Th is is wh at it am o unt s to :we've bee n br ue n off. excisedfrom the r ind of thi ngs.

Wha t on ce Kaye us pul phas been ch ewed offand pine d - d,'y,

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Th e Phfl ip ptne -Ame r-ican War,Fr ie n dshi p and Fo rgett in gREYNALDO C. ILETO

The 189 9 Ph ilippin e-Am er ican War is not the sort of tcp te th e Filip ino pub lic likesto talk abou t. To inlagin e -Filipino s war ri ng with Americans simp ly con t radicts thedom in an t tr op es of th e Ph flippi n e-Am er - can r elatio nsh ip. In po pu lar, an d to someexten t . o ffi cia l dis co urse " 30 well , th e Ph tltppr n e-Am erf can re lati oush tp bee n a. .spec ial one , exp re ssed i n kinshJp term s lik e "compad re colon ial ism" and " li ttl eb rown br o th er ." "Moth er Am e ric a" is owed li felo ng in n er deb t , or ll tong nolo6b, byth e Fi lip in o peopl e she nu rt ur ed .Why is it so di fficu lt to speak of th e r ela rlon sh tp in term s such as invasion , re sistan ce

(so readily applied to the in Wo rld War II) , war, com bat , co lo n ialism ,exploitation, discrimi nation? Th ere ar e a numb er of explanations for lh is att itude ,b ut from a histo ria n 's pe rsp ec t ive the "probl em" p ersists m ain ly beca u se a specialre lat ton ship with Am er -ica has be come an in trin sic part of the history of th e Filipinonatio n - sta te's emergence and development. T he rec en t Phi lip p in e cen ten n ial. .ce le bra tions of th e r evolu ti on against Spa in in 189 6 an d th e b irt h of the r ep ublic in18g8 show qu i te clearly howa wa r . it h the Un it ed States simply does n O L fit int o th eh ist or ical tr aj ec to ry from coloni ali sm to inde p en den ce , tra di tion to moclerni ty. !The goals of the i/llstroda leaders of th e r89 8 revolutio n ju re app aren tly ful filled(hl'ough U.S , interven rio n . T he repressive, anti -liberal regime oft h e Sp anish fr iarsa-cs app arently replac ed by U. S. tut elage towards eventual self-rule. Good governmen twas establi shed in Taft ' s New Era. By the tim e of Gov. Fra n cis Bur to n H arr ison 'spolicy of Filip 'iuizing the bureaucra cy , anr l the passage of the Jon es Bill r o m i . ~ ieventual in dependen ce, i t looked like the go..ls of the 18g8 revolution were v.i thinreach th ro ug h pe ace ful means ra th er th an wa r.

I n th e con text o f li n cm an c.ipatory h islo ry o f th e twen tie th cen tury, a 01fcrward n. ovcme m :1'1'0.;"1 what 'vus pictur -ed as Span ish medievalism toward a mod ernnat iorr-sta tc ~ i l 1 an h t e l l U. S. co lon ial regime, is it any sur-p r- ise ,h at th eP h i l i p p " 'ar became some-.hnt of i"I non event . a gl ll l.:h in an oth erwi sesmooth pro j-ression?

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.-!Col. CorneliusGardener,Ilrstgovernor of Tayabaa

T HE OBJE CT OF COL ONIAL D llS rU

Th e Philippine -American War bro ke ou t when the U .S . Army moved to takepossession , in Febru ary 1899 , of the te rr itory it had pro cu r ed from Spain two monthsear lier. Th e Filip ino republican army fough t a defensive war for the ne%! th reeyears.If successful. th is action would have been taken as a demonstrat ion of the na t ion -

sta te' s ma tu rity. But, as we all know, it fa iled . Th e poo rlytra ined and under equipped Filipino army was rep eatedlybeaten in serpiece bat tles, so thatbylate 190 0 it had to shift toguerrilla warfare. By May 190 1, Gen . Emilio Aguinaldo andmost of the top brass of th e army eithe r had bee n c aptur edor had heeded Aguinaldo's calI to surrende r and take theoathof allegiance to the Uni ted States. By May of the CollCMing year ,

Gen . Miguel Malva r and the rest of the afD;o y comm andin sou th ern Tagalog , .110cos, and Samar had surrendered .

Th e proc ess of tu rni ng the wa r in to a noneven t beganimmediately afte r the o fficial end of the war on 4July 190 2; .I n the ear liest textbooks wr itt en fo r the newly op enedpublic high schools, the revolut ion of 1896 -98 and thePh il ippine-Americ an War were clearl y d tffere nda red.Ame rican educato rs en cou raged Filipinos to remember1896 -189 8 as the time when Filip inos, inspired by theilustrodos. r ose again st the ir feuda lis t ic colon ial ruler. Spain .Th e 1898 repu blic was represen ted as th e high point ofFilip in o developm ent . It was also disparaged , however . aslacking i n ma tu r ity. The U .S . takeover wa s d eemedin evitable because the revolut ion, to paraphrase J ame sLer oy, was led no t by genuine revolutio na rie s but by localbo sses or caciques; furth ermore, U.S. observe rs like d toemphasize, the governmen t and citizen s alike hadviews about what ind ependen ce reaUy mean t. T h e mos tgla rin g evi d en c e o f lack WD-S no less than th e repu bli can

goverom ern's resistan ce to U .S. occupation - the war itself. As tex tbook wr ite rBar rows pu t it , the war (or rather, i nsu rr ect ion ) was a g-re at m isu nden tand ing . IfAgwme ldc and his gen er als had bee n mature o r intelligent eno ugh to un derstand UH;intentions of the United States (wh ich was to help the Filipino s comple te rbeu- revolun on und er the ir tu telage), [heywould not have pu t up a res istance.s

J11 short, the gen erauo n s of Fil tp rooswho learn ed their Ph ilipp inc h isto ry inAme r- Ican co lon ial schools did no t see the W3l as the U.S. suppression of theircherished revol utio nary and nationalist dreams. Instead it was mo re of a misguided.even stupi d , rej ect ion of a gift of fur the r en ligh ten me n t. T h e fact th at man yFilipi no officer -s who h ad fough t agains t theAmericans carne to hol d pub lic officeu nde r co loni al rul e, on ly reinforced the view tha t the war of was a wasteof effort, an even t tha t wns best forgo tt en .

On the Amc ri c.ln si d l', the myth g-encrall)' pc rsists that th ere W:lS merely a"Speni sh-Ame ri cowcr" in J89 8 whic h almost magically lande r! the Ph ilipp in es onUncle Sara's Ia? af t er some treaty in Paris


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!!j,Lt , C,,1. Norbert aMayo wit h HillHspis ilmm ng mga

5iJ tungsrx!ng Upa {Lu gue ofVete rans of UpaCityl. 19 59

T HE OB J ECT O P CO LO lf l AL DE !I U

I do not knc.... tha t the Ame r-ican a worse than other soldiers , but surely it wasbad ffiough ,and a month's.:ampa;gningagainst theN'g:'S SO--calkd h verydemoralrzing,and bad fe r- di scipltne. To tflt lIi>itorotlorl f l - , spells as an aphOl-ism, h as perh apsdone

harm than the saying that Nobidian il agoodIndian,mept a dtQdone ,5G ar den er c laimed tha t one ' o f the regimen ts in the

Schwan expeditio n , all raw recru its , had set a bad examp lefor h is men ; " th ey loo te d everythi ng an d destroyed for thefu n of it. Every chur ch and some graveyards were thor ou ghlygon e through ." Th ese ar e the so r t of details th at r emi ndus o f th e real war that gripped th e town s o f scu tb er nLuzon-> sim ilar to the experiences of the j apanese occup at ionwh ich , in cont r ast, are well remem ber ed ,

In th e sections tha t follow, I ad dr ess fu r t h er issuesabo ut the fo rgetting of th e war by focusin g o n two of th etowns in it iall y occupied by Colon el G ardene r 's r egim en t :

-T iaong and Can delaria . Wh ethe r the his tor ical detailsabou t th ese towns an d th eir leade rs can be regurded as"r epresen ta tive" or not is besi de th e poin t . T h e myths ofth e "splen d id littl e. war" can be challen ged effectively on lyby resurre cling local events an d :knowledges that have b eenmarginal ized o r fo rgo tten .7AMIGO WARFARETh e years 19 0 0 - 19 0 2 cons titute a lacuna in o ur knowledgeof the war , In n atio nalis t th e focu s is onthe fat e of th e rep ub li can government and army. By tbe t. ndof r899, nHn}' of the republic's weolthy and edu cated sup

porters had defected to the America ns , and its most cap ab le m ili tary com man der ,An to n io Luna , had bee n assassinated by Filipino soldters allegedly u nder orders (romGenera l Aguimudo. Textbook h isto ries gen erall)" t race th e gradu al r et reat of Agum aldoto the north until he is cap tu red in ea rly 19 01 and takes the oat h of allegiance to theUn ite d States In Ap ril.

T he p r oblem with p resent ing a h istory of the war at the r eg ional a nd lor al levelis tha t , in contrast to the Aguinaldo narr at ive, no th in g much seems to have happen edin te rm s of con ven nona l war fare. Fe r almost two yean after th e U .S , i nvasion oftheir reg ion, the gue rr illa colu mns of Lt. C ob. No rb cr to Mayo an d Lad islaoMas o.ngca, dom in ated th e h in te rlan d of Tl ac ng an d Ca ndelaria . For a year thetownsp eopl e lived a lenrlffla.Q : SO you pr",ferred to gain Independence by concealing yourselves every timeyou saw anAmerican and rc getyour living from the poor peo ple of the barr ios?Cadiz : BuouSl!!llt Ii tull'nan/(olon,,/ a n g ~ c ' ! J ] toldw tohat!l' putitnu and tohId, ourstlue.l;tna! !hiJ tro lld not last la 1C and lI'I! trol.l lrl bt givtnOtd ind p l l dell.6

In such ci rcu msta nces, m uch could easily be fo rgo tte n about th e war , b ecause th eusu al bat tl e st o r ies j u st wen: n ot the r e to m em or-ial ize,What seems to be b rou ght ou t in th e local hist o ry o f T iaon g and Cand elaria is

the Filipino exper ie nce o f dealingwith a superior force th ro ugh varfou s m echan isms ,like feign ing defeat , playi ng dead , sh iftin g ide n ti ties , allowi ng on esel f to be nd withthe wind like th e bam boo (to .use a cliche qu ite common abo u t Fil ipi n os) ,Townsp eople stradd led both r egim t! s, coloni al an d n ati on alist , with rela tive ease.The p rob lem for th e U .S. post comman ders in so - called pacified towns was n ot tha tth er e was muc.h da ng er of Am erican soldiers be ing h armed by th ose p esky gu errillaban d s which could no t shoo t strai gh t. hu t tha t the Ame r icans cou ld no t be cer ta inth at th e fr ien dly, coop erat ive presidente. or lo cal mayor , they wer e dealing with in th edaytim e, was no t th e cha irman of the town's r evolu ti on ary com mit te e at n igh t. T h iswas no t wh at the U .S . o r exp ected . Th e enemy had to be visib le andstabl e, an obj ect of conf ron tat ion tha t could be de stroyed . yes. bu t possib ly alsotu rn ed in to will in g subj ects an d even fr iends. After all . th e o ffi cial ideology of theU .S, fakeover of the i slan ds was "ben evolen t assim tlati orr'l-ccon qu est con str ued es amo ral imp era t ive to adop t an d civil iz e the "O rphan s o f the Pectfic."?

"Amigo warfa re " was what the Am ericans der isively cal led the Filipi n o sty le o fr esistan ce. Th e Filipin os were fr ien ds d ur ing th e day or whe n con fr ont ed , b u t atn igh t or wh en no on e was looking, they were guerrillas. When th e caval ryapp ro ach ed , most of th e en emy disappe ared, or th ei .r un iforms were shed for p easan tgear. Even more fru st radng W (;S when th ey donne d uni forms . I n Frustr ation ."srig. Ge n . J. Frankl in Bell , who took over the paci ficati o n o f Sou the rn 1a galog inNovember 19 0 ]; wrote- "In order to confuse th eir id en tity and the reby able them'mo re sa fely to cond uct thei r sku lkin g ope rat ions . they have adop ted th e u n ifo r m ofou r A rm.y an d n ut .ive tr oop s with out (I) ly p lain , std ki n g, an d u n ifor m m ar k ofdi stin ctio n of their cwn , in violat io n of section 63 . "$ Am er ica n p atro ls Incur-redseveral m ishaps as a resu lt of mistake n ide nt ity.

m o re ..b ou t th e dyn am ics o f am igo warf ar e . th e ab ili t)' to "hi l tid e n titie s i n ch an gin g con texts , sho uld. en ligh t en us ab ou t the whol e iss u e ofcolh ,bo r


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T a ll O BJECT OP C OW N I AL D IlSIR.B

Manuel Tin lo , an d perh aps a dozen o thers , the majo ri ty of leaders in th e war haveyet to be prope rly r esear eh ed .s O ne obvious reason fo r their neglect is the very factthat th ey fought the Amer icans , "ou r" sent imen tal alli es in Worl d War II . Ano th erreason is th at bo th Filipino and Ame rican sch olar ship h as tend ed to be crit ical of thei1ustrado prin cipa l (ru r al gen try) or cacique or igin s of most of th ese mil itary lead er s.Wha t is generally forgou en is that th e U .S. Army itself, in ju stifying harsh measur esin 190 0 -1902 , deployed th e notion th at th e ordinary gu err illa soldiers an d th eirfamilies needed to b e em ancipated fro m th eir despot ic imd feudal leade rs.

No rberto Mayo, one cf T iecog'e colonels. would be 8. good candidate for dism issalon th e basis o f socia l ori gins. If one were loo kin g for a read y label ro affiJl: to h im,th en "me stizo" i t mu st be - hut not Chi nese, n or Spani sh, n or even a comb inat io nof both . H is great -grandfather was an Ir ishm an in the Bri tish exp editiona ry forcethat inva de d t he Ph ilippines in 1762. H e ma r ri ed a Chi nese mest iza from Ltpa andsettled down the re , rnaki.n g his For tune in the coffee indu stry.

Mayo is als o d escribed as "q uit eaccomp lished for a Filip ino " and con irufrucci6n,ab le to speak and write in bo th Tagalog and Spanis h . A four th -yea r en rolmentrecor d at the Un iver sity of San to Tomas reveals th at h e s tu di ed Spanish , Lat in ,geometry, trigonometry , and even a b it of Eng lish . ' o He was once spo tted in thehills of T iao ng clu tchi ng h is "little red book"- a copy of Rizal' s sediuous novel, Nolime tange re.II No doubt Mayo was an ilU5tmdo o r mo re accurat ely, a r ural ilustradQ .

. Th e uustraoos of the Phil ipp ine -Amer-ican War period have been punished in historyowing to the. "cap itulation" in 1899 of many wealthy, high ly edu cated , and mest izolegislators and officials of th e republic.12 Th e names Pedro Patern o , FelipeBuen camino , an d Manue l Argcelles coun t am ong th em. Bu t thi smestizo named Mayo rep resented another variety. Atta ch ed to the Banah awBattalion , he saw act ion in. many par ts of the Southern Tagalog region and was serio us lywou nded in lat e 1899 (u fuc t ,..hi ch becam e well known ) . [3 After a pe ri od ofre cup erati on , h e was back in action in 1900 , rising qui ckly th r ough the ranks , Mayoacted as a lnllying point f 0 1" sold iers an d officers b eing abando n ed in the suxrenderethat took place in 190 0 and ' 9 1. He wisely based h ims elf in the bar rios of T iaongwhere his b rothe r s maintai n ed the family r icelands. By 1901, h is b ro th er Mart in , aschoo lteacher . and h is sisters Micae la. and Amanda , were living in the relative secur ityof the pcbador! . Micaela was then Cdring for a little boy, a fu tu re vesuge o f the war ,th e feisty an ticol onial poli tician Claro MayoRecto. te

Th e other colone l of 'Tiacng, Ladislao Masaogcay. equally begs forgetting on th egro unds th ill he was a local boss. He h ailed Iroan an old fami ly of Tiamg end bore a yerymdw sur name. He owned some land, was a for mer headman, and became grJbunadvml/oin 189 '< , all of which mark h im 0 ',l E. as a p rincixll. But he neither spoke no r wrote inSpanish , so an ilus(rado h e W :L S . C ! ~ . In [act , all o fh is Cw l"cspom :enc C! wns handled by "-secretary. All of the se qualitiesseem to mark him 0\1,t as a a r : ; a local chi ef.

But letuslake a closer look. Caciques were not ncc C!. ca.rilyrapacious bosses or mani pul ativepatlon s. Th e pro blem in the existing literatur e' on the s\\tj ect is {hat Vie h:>rdly eve r-hearthese chiefs speak. The an ti -Marcoe lncrarur e on. "gu; s. end geld" h&. effaced thevarieties of caciques tha t existed and the con texts in which the}'o peraced. ts

M rr:;angeay may have been ignorant of Spanish, but h e was a proficient Tagalogspeaker and so wasable to re ese 1) is men and keep tiP their morale. He was t he origina l

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"fihbusrer" in the town. earning a reputation by squabbling with a Span ish Iieutenan t ofthe Guardia Civil in r89 1and jo inin g the revolution early.16A commissioner fr om t hecapital. in confi rming his election as revolutionary mayor i n 1898 , wrote that

was "the initiator of the revolution in this town, whos e moral a nd m aterialsacr ifices offered up to th e Mother land are most cert ain ly wort hy of th is humblerecomm endation : he is and has always been a separatist through his political acts."17From mid-190 0 thro ugh early190 !< , Mesangcay built up his column byattracting staue redsold iers who refused to su rre nd er with thei r officers.I8 They all stoodsomewhat in awe,if nor in fear , of this "man of p rowess" they called "My Colonel" or "Ca pi tan lslac."WA- AND :F ll.IENDSHIP IN PACI FIED T OWNST he fact tha t j us t about all of the town cen ters or poblaciolU in the Plultpp tn es wereunder U.S. civil or military co n tr ol by mid-1900 h as facilitated th e war 's for gett ing .For un like the simi lar situa tion in 194-2, when thej apanese army r uled the poblacions,only to be booted out two to th re e years later , U.S. contr ol was no t followed by a"liberation " ph ase th at woul d have n ecessit ated a recovery ofwar rnem or ies. Instead ,U.S. pacificati on and education pr ograms after 1902 man aged to transform resistan cein th e "bocndocks'


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TX J: O . J:lCT a li CO LON lA L DuIl l . l!.

the in flue nce he had to induce the people o f the Pueblo to act again st th eAme rteans ."Il lWhat even tu ally ma de Can tos imp ortan t in his own r ight was h is gro-wing in f luenc e

(or at least hi s pe rc eived in flu en ce) over th e commandi n g officer of th e local gar rison .Worki ng with C ap ta in Moore could n ot h ave be en fo r th is Am eri can . 8.$ clearlyd isdainfu l o f the ordinary 100 or hombre. As he on ce explained to a visito r . thlSt black n\ggt rsl!!Ouldhaw to tah lhIirhatsaffu.,nt ll h, pasmJ. H e wo uld ~ - i a over to anyo ne who faile d to doso . pull off h is hal and throw it to the ground . cursing in Spanish. 11Us rul e of salutingo.fficers applied a4 0 to th e ft rinripolts. who d etested it because " it remi nded the m somu ch of th e 1l l"l"Ogan ce o f th e Sp


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THE OBJ&CT O P C OL O )( U L DU n E

T h is was "a poli cy o f p erm itting no ne u t rality"- m ea nin g to say one h ad to befor or agai nst , no t j us t in words bu t in d eed . l realkedthnt il iJV)u lddo nogood !o try so!ol(eIhE inhabita nts to be ourfn ends (BeIO.3 2 Th e alte rn ative was to forc e th e in habitan ts tost op aid ing th e re sis tan ce in ord er to save th em selves f ro m destructio n. In or der toapp ly p re ssu re on th em , th ey would be her ded in to "p rot ected zo nes ."

Iu fi rst glance i t app ear ed t o be a volun tary th ing. Asfriendship ~ n o t be m ated to order0/ foret, 1deemed il be rtnot tocompel !hepeople to enter zones.. . but mere!J to ofe r them the opporlunig(lndpermit themtockcideJor themstlves whether thq lL'Ould be fritnds 33 Coul d they pract ice"f r ee ch oice" an d st ill save the ir ski ns? Bell assume d that tho se wh o didn 't come inwere eithe r gu e r rilla suppo rt e rs who would be t reated acco rd ingly, o r we re beingfor ced agains t th eir will to stay outsid e th e towns. An. omino us discou rse was develop ingin U .S . Armycir cles as to why man y of th e roo rema in ed ou ts id e t he Am er ican towns.Bell e lCplai ns : "A r e ign of te r ro r long existed in the mou n ta ins of Lebec , wher e

(bandi t) ch iefs have h eld some of th e p eop le u n de r do m ina tion as complete asever existed in the days of feud a li sm . " So the U.S. Ar my was to "hu nt these int imidatedpeople and brin g them with their families in to p ro tected zo nes ."34 Th eywe re t o libe rat eth e mass es an d pro tect th em fr om the ir oppre ssive cacique s.

What we n o ti ce in Bell ' s spe ech is how a d iscourse o f em an cipat ion emergesalongside a d iscou rse of n ative dup licity, despot ism , an d backward ness. O ne neededth e oth er in th e con text of the imp erial war . Bu t th e fo rme r is rem em ber ed as thepreCU'sor of me colonial hallmarks of "tu telage" and "developmen t," wh ile itscomp lemen to f or ien tali sm an d r acism are p oin ted ly for gotten .

\lfe also n ot ice a p lay on the n oti on of frien dsh ip. Am.igo wa rfare was an attempt tocome to te rms with the new to deflect its massive powerby being friends andnegotiat ing with its represen tat ives in the town cent er s, wh ile commitmen tto the revolu tionary p rojec t . Bell , in a poin ted re fere nce to amigo warfare , pro no unced.fri en dshi p to m ean l l . s u to U .S. ru le. O ne am not fo rce Filip ino s to befri en ds, he sn}s, bu t th ose ....ho do no t submi t will be rreared -is ene mies and destroyed .Since the Pldlippine -Amer tcan rclntto nship is tod ay in ter-ms o f"f rie nd,.,hip ,"it is ha rdly sur pr ising that its d isl'ipl in ;' l"} or igins are best for go tt..n.

Th e establishm en t of "t rue" [ricnclsh ip re qu ir ed th e 'de lin eation of firm bou n claxicsbetwee n the Am e rican " insid e"- th e 10 W ' 1 cerue rs-c an d th e "o u ts ide " which wouldbe tu rn ed in to a n o - m


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T HE O B] &CT OF COLON IA L DU I Il J:

American com ma nde r . Brig . Gen . Ja cob Smi th , th at h e ordered a "kill -and- bu rr, "opera tion to purush the peop le at large- me n, women, and chil d re n -for the ircr ime. Th is was, o r could be , anot her re fere nt for the term mU$$om.

Balangiga was n ot an isolated inciden t. O th er par ts of th e Philippi nes cou ld becalled a "howling wild er ne ss"fo in I go r an d I90 2 bu t th ese h ave been obscur ed by th emyth of "a splen di d lit tle war ." From lat e Dec emb er thr ou gh early Apri l, doz ens ofsearch - end - destroy op er ation s were mo unted thro ughout th e ju r isd ictio n ofGe n era l Bell 's Th ird Separa te Brigade . For example, in one oper ation alon e lastingtwelve days, Lt. H . Richmond and h is Fir st Cav


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T H E O Bj :r;CT O f C OLO NIAL DU IIl.R

au th o r ity . Th e th r u st o f Bou gh to n 's o fficial inve stiga t io n is n ot une xpected . but h isfi n di ng s are n cne th eless val uable for th ei r de rails abou t what th e Cand elartan swen tth rough i n the p ro tect ed zon es .

Th e purp os e of in te rr oga t ion s in th e pr ot ected zon es was n ot j ust to ide nt ifY"eli tes" an d "too" so tha t th e peu c n - c l ieo t o r "feuda l" rela tio ns b etwee n th em migh tb e b ro ken. It was also to exp lo it family ties, to ta ke spo use! and ki n as ho st age inor de r to for ce su rr ender s. C regorto Man iho was co nfin ed when it was di scoveredtha t he was the br o the r of so ldie r Eu !ogi o , of Mayo 's comm and , C apt.Policor n io de Luna's wife hear d that th e T iao ng au tho rit ies were arr esti ng the fam ili eso f imll rTectos, sh e escap ed an d wen t back to th e cou n trysid e , leaving her daugh ters inth e pob/acum. In Sa n ta Rosa , th ey cap tu red the wife o f C o l. Nic ola s Go nz ale s,Ma l:a r' s second in comman d. Kn owing th l t m any gu er r il la fami lies had sough llefuge i n th e Loboo mou nta in s, th e U.S. caval ry fe r ret ed ou t a to ta l of 495 WOmenand children in a sweep of th e in March , T hey were herded int o the p rotectedzones , some 10 be used as h ostages.+6

Of the hundre d or so women co nfined in C an de laria (an d m ore in Tiaong ) , 50m ehad bee n charged with aiding o r com municating with the i l l S U O th ers were the reas ho stage wh ile some male mem be r o f the fam ily wen t in search of guns wh ich he hadconfe ss ed abou t, "Wh en Caye tano Um alt , wh ose fathe r was a sold ier , was r eleased inorder to go ou t to secu re a gun , h e left his wife an d his mothe r in th e

Obviously , the women were vulnerable at differen t levels, A ccordin g to y e s tCapt ain Boughton , a r u mo r ci rculate d that " if a sco u t presented h im se lf at a h ousean d a woma n o f hi s cho ice d id no t accede to hi s wishe s, the h u sban d , fa the r , or malem em ber o f th e fam ily would be imp r - son ed , dep o r ted , or sh ot ,"

Lau ra 1.. , whose husban d was in th e Malagi pri so n calli!' , claimed that "she had beenviolated by Scout Clement against her will by means of threa ts and in tim idahorn."Bough ton im ervie, ed C lemen t who admut ed tha t "he h


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THE OBJECT OF COLONIAL DESIRE

Masangcay was soon abandoned even by hi s sa le l ieutenant. He cont i nu ed tc:h id e o ut i n t he forest, liv ing under t h e c ar e of some reootucioiuuioswho h ad b e endisarmed by their officers bu t ha d no t surrender ed. H e finally presented himse lf tothe commanding officer of Tiaong on 26 April . I hadonjy one gun andone revolver, becausethe restwere taken aw:ry from me Iry ny soldiers. (Masangcay) 50

Norberta Mayo had surrendered in Lipa a week e a rl ie r . H i s r e vo l ut ion a rycolumn hadbeendoingwell, he said, until "the Am erican troopsbegan to reconcentratethepeople an d ... at t h e s ame t imepursuing us constantly." Our troops became disorganizedand demoralized. At the time I surrendered on account of this demoralization I scarcejy had thirtf guns leftwith me. (Mayo)51

Bernardo Marques, wh o had su rr end e red i n T i aong on r6 April , explained tohis American in terrogator why those who had sworn to resist "until they hadaccomplished their independence" eventually gave up as well: "They surrenderedf o r v a ri ou s t hi ng s ; sorne because t he y wer e; t i red of staying in the field; somethrough fear an d because theylos thope ; because some o f t h emhad been in ju red orlost t he i r health through life in the field; an d som,; because their families obligedthem to surrender. I do no t know rno re , "52

There was something about the way the war ended, a t l e as t in the area I havestudied, tha t encouraged the forgetting of the experience. Much of the SouthernTagalog provinces was a wasteland by March of 1902. Th e ric e stocks that could no tbe brought in to th e protected zo nes (fortified hamlets) were destroyed by t h e U .S .Cavalry. Gr.anaries an d houseswere razed by the hundreds; on e does no t need t o g obeyond official U .S. A rmy r ep o rt s to r econstr-uct the carnage. Furthermore, inApril , at abou t t h e t ime Gene r al Mal va r surrendered , cholera h ad s p re ad f r omManila to th e provinces, facilitated by t he movements ofD.S. troops. An epid emic,coupled wi th a subsistence crisis, was about all that th e populace of Batangas,Tayabas,and Laguna could bear . Th e U.S. garr i sons soon began receiving emotionalletters f rom barr io heads pleading for assistanc e. 53

, 'What i n te rest s me here is the way t h at t h eU .S . Armywas able to turn a situationof utter destruction an d suffering, fo r whi ch i t was largely responsible. into aredempt ive s i tua t ion . Wi th the des t ruc t ion of c rop s , t h e loss of f a rm animal s a ndimplements, an d the overall breakdown o f agriculture, the Southern Tagalogregio nbecame d ep e n d e n t , for eight years at least, on th e importat ion of f ood. On ly thecolonial r-ej-ime , of course, was capable ofimport ing food stocks, the commissar-iesin the U.S. posts becoming the local distribution centers.

In such a si tuation of uuer dependenc e on t h e occupation forces for such ba sicnecessities as rice an d medic ine, i t i sHot difficult to imagine how "resistance" couldbe forgot ten, and thegenerosi ty , thekindness , of the U.S. commissar ies remembered.Th e U.S . Army played t he r o le of benefactor extremely 'well. Sentiments of utang nQro60 tIl en carne into playas lives wcre actual ly saved t h rough in terac t ion with theAmericans. When the populationwas on its knees, the use of force was lifted. Therewefe no mass executions, no lo n g - t e rm imprisonment , just a rigorous disciplirringas be fitted a people under tutelage.

To undursrund the deeper nnphcauons of" surrender" in the towns ofTiaong an dCandelaria, therefore, we have to look beyondthe officers an d soldierswho laid downtheir w e a p o n ~ in April Ig02.We should note the '!'rives an d relatives of th e hundreds of

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IUTO

detainees who approached American off icers, day or night , to seek their release; th etownsfolkwho l i ne d up at t h eU .S . commissar ies to receive their allocation of food.Ultimate surrender took the f orm o f a rather quickforgett ing. In the meeting whereseventy women of Candelaria were t o ld t o file formal charges of violation againstnat ive; scouts as well as their American officers, n o o ne cam e; Forward. As CaptainBoughton repor t s, "Some of t hebe t t e r class, when askedwhy it was tha t no complaintwas made against anyindividual scout, replied i t was probably du e t o t h e fact thatthe war beingover, thepeople -eere disposed to letthe dead past bury its dead. "54

What does it mean to bury t he pas t? At on e level , i t could mean t h at t h ewomenwished to erase a tragic an d shameful event from publicm emory. Bu t since this erasures e ems to have been contingent upon "the wa r being over," it seems also to reflectthe acc eptance of a new era by t he people of Candelar ia . Senora de Gala's eloquentspeech, th e provos t marsha l l' s invit a t ion t o f il e complaints, th e "collaborator"InspectorH errera'sbehind-the-scenes work to get the investigationgoing, all indicatethe extent to which communication ha d been established with th e; invading army.Forge t ting the "dead pa st " c an be taken to mean t h at the ravages of wa r h ad n otdiminished th c Cendelardan's ability to come to terms with another set of impositionsf rom an outside power- to es tabl ish r elationships of hierarchy and indebtednesswiththe Americans an d thus, ultimately. to domesticatethem.55 On e final explanationwe might thus cons i de r f o r t h e f o rg e tt in g o f t h e wa r i s - tha t the townspeople ofSouthern Tagalog could no t be burdened by history as they commenced still anotherperiod of accommodat ion to colonial ru le. Perhaps, with more research, we migh teven find th e no ti o no f "amigo warfare" usefu l in un d erstanding this new period i nPhilippine history.

NOTES:

Philippine" Ateneo de M m - d ~ 'lini",r,it)' Press, J9SS), epilogue.7.. See Peynaldo C. Ileto, Knu,ungilmcriCQ'S C o ! o ~ , A Htmd,.,d )'o."ji'om Ih, Phil'N"'" 11{1 (The Burns

CJni,' ~ c t u r e , . 1997). O C C ~ , , ? : " . d Papers S ~ : ' i ~ n t t r fOl' Philippine Studies University ofHawai'ial Manoa, 1999, c h " p t L


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TH E OBJECT OF COLONIALDESIRE

3 best accountthus far of the Schwan expedition and of the various,tages of the war in southernTagalog, is Glenn A. May, Botti_ fO>" Balanga> (New Haven , Conrr.. Yale University, I991).

{.. e n ~ r ' s confidential letter to P i n g r ~ dat ed 2, February 1900, ;5published in Melvin Holli, ed.,"A Viewof theAmerican Campaign against 'Filipino Insurgm ts' , 1900," Philipp;n, Studi,s17, rJanuary J969.5. Ibid. , 100.

6. Cadiz,Junn. Test imony. Lucena, 3June 1902, Uni,,,d States NationalArchive, (USNA) RecordGroup (RG) 94 Adjutant Gene,al's Office (AGO) { 'lISO?

/. Vicente Rafael, ",rhite Love, Survdllance and Nationalist Resi"tance in the U.S. Coloniz,'ltionof Philippines," in Amy Kaplan and DonaldPease, Cultum ofUni!,dSlates Imperialism (Durham,N. C.:Duke University, 1993), r85.

8. Bell. J. F. (Brig. Gen ., C ommmdin g3 r d S e p a r a t B r i g a d Report, Ba\angas, December190Q, Washington, ~ r n m e n t PrintingOffice 1903, wi U ~ N A RG!H AG04I5839.

9 Recent examplcs a re Resil Mojares. The War against th, Am en'cons, R t s i s t ~ n c " Q"d ColIGborQtion in Ceo".]899-1906 (Quezon City. Philippine.,: Ateneo Manila University ~ s s ; 1999), OrlinoA. Ochosa,The Tinio Brigade, ).nh'-Americon Resfltan,e 'I) the !locos Pro,inces, 1899-1901 (Quezon Cily, Phil ippines: New Day,1989). A good ovcrvicw of the War is O. D. Corpuz, Th. Roots of tile Filipino NGtfGn, vol. II ~ z o n City,

P h i l i p p i n AkJahi Foundation, 1989), chapters'\!O-\!l.IO. L;bro de MGtriwlo Estudios General" de SegLmdo Ense;lan(a, 18go- r8gI , A r c h i v of U n i v ~ r s i t y of

SanlO Tomas (AUST).rr Concepcion He rr e ra vda Umali, Fmgm,nto,d,mi]uwntud, ms.. Ig77,Tomo II, 18.I\!. The cla"ic study of this i, TeodoTo A. Agon.cillo, Maiolo," Tnt Crf,i, ofth" R'iJUblfc (Qu ezon City:

U n i v ~ r s i t y of Ihe Philippines Press, Ig60),13 T he BGtaU6n BQndww was organized byMiguel Malvar shortly after the s u c c ~ , " f u l n a t i o n ~ l i 5 t siege

of the Spanish stronghold ofTayabas, capital of the province bythat nam e, in August18g8. Th cof the s i e g had brought t o g ~ t h ~ v o l u t i o n a r i ~ , from different towns in the region, includingTiaong. Appointed c o m m a n d of the Battalion was E u s t ~ c i o 1.faloles, MalvQr', broth er-in-IQw and apharmaci,t by profession.

I1.. The infornoation on Mayo isscattered th:'oughout theUS a r e h i v ~ l material. The most ,if"nificantod o c u m ~ ! l t is his testimony a l l . u c 9 ll,lav IgO\! USKA R"94AGO' " ' 600 I R' , , . 'J. " , . . , I : S C ~ ~ S O cnatoConstantino, The . ~ r f d i o g oj 0 Filipino ( Q u ~ z o n City. P h i l i p p i n :\!oj"ya Books, Ig8g), 3.

J5 Guns, goons u nd g ol d a re t h r e s ai d t o obstruct the demouQtic process in thePhilippines. ther:1eof c a c i q : l dominati""i, persuasively developedi Beneclic tAncbrson, "CaciqueD. lllocracyin Phili p p i n 0 rigim aT ,I D r ~ a , r . s , " ir,VicenteL. R a f a ed., lJi;ccepanrHi"I';ri", 7""l5localEm')', Oil F i l ~ b i " o Cultum (l'hilad dphia, Pa., Temple Ul1iversityPress, 1995) , 3 - 50.

16. Ei"odcal Daw Papers, Tiaong, Quezonprovince , 1952 -53, Kational Archives, ivIanila.17 E s p c d i e n t inst,",.l ic1o elcccion de COl"go, publico> l o c ~ l el puebio de Ti"Ollg, (iendo

comi,ionado de e l e c c i o n Dun Felix A l - g u Augt'st r89S. P l l i l i p p i n ~ Revolutionary P , ' p (PRJ')nOLS.

18. \,fasangcay, Ladtslao. Ttstimor:; (T;1galog original). 2 ~ - ' 2 3 MeT 1902, RC94 A G O ' 1 ~ u 6 0 7 .19Thc: T i l g ~ l o g word b',ndd . (mount',in) was b,'ough t back t(1 lh . Unilfd Str,te.'bv i ' e : u r n L ~ v .

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08a the Philippine-American War

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