1

66Mechanism and Mechanism and

Linguistic Linguistic Creativity Creativity

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Descartes’ model for Descartes’ model for sciencescience

ExperienceExperience plays a crucial role. plays a crucial role.

MethodologyMethodology

Based on Based on modelsmodels and and mechanismsmechanisms. .

MechanismMechanism

Avoidance of any recourse to the occult or Avoidance of any recourse to the occult or mysterious (e.g.: the analogies used are mysterious (e.g.: the analogies used are clocks, fountains, …).clocks, fountains, …).

3

I should also like to be noted that in attempting to I should also like to be noted that in attempting to explain the general nature of material things explain the general nature of material things I have I have not employed any principle which was not not employed any principle which was not accepted by Aristotle and all other philosopher accepted by Aristotle and all other philosopher of every ageof every age. So this philosophy is not new, but the . So this philosophy is not new, but the oldest and most common of all. I have considered the oldest and most common of all. I have considered the shapes, motions and sizes of bodies, and examined shapes, motions and sizes of bodies, and examined the necessary results of their mutual interaction in the necessary results of their mutual interaction in accordance with the accordance with the laws of mechanicslaws of mechanics, which are , which are confirmed by reliable everyday experienceconfirmed by reliable everyday experience. . ((Principles of Philosophy 200; CSM1Principles of Philosophy 200; CSM1: 286): 286)

God: God: He is the first cause, the initial trigger.He is the first cause, the initial trigger.

Theology Theology vs.vs. Physics: Physics: Division of labour.Division of labour.

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Genetic/Evolutionary ApproachGenetic/Evolutionary Approach

To understand a phenomenon is to To understand a phenomenon is to understand how it occurred in accordance understand how it occurred in accordance with the simple and universal principles of with the simple and universal principles of Cartesian physics. Cartesian physics.

This contrasts with the theological doctrine This contrasts with the theological doctrine that God created a ready-made universe. that God created a ready-made universe.

God’s creative power is nonetheless God’s creative power is nonetheless required to set up the initial system and required to set up the initial system and triggers all their initial motions to the triggers all their initial motions to the various parts of matter.various parts of matter.

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The man/animal The man/animal distinctiondistinction

Automatic machinesAutomatic machines

The chief way to understand the bodily The chief way to understand the bodily movement is the nervous system. movement is the nervous system.

Neural activity is conceived along Neural activity is conceived along mechanical lines: nerves are pipes trough mechanical lines: nerves are pipes trough which the fast-moving vapour (the “animal which the fast-moving vapour (the “animal spirit”) moves, inflate the muscle and spirit”) moves, inflate the muscle and causes movement.causes movement.

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Bête-MachineBête-Machine

In the case of non-human animals the In the case of non-human animals the model of the machine is all we need to model of the machine is all we need to investigate and understand their observed investigate and understand their observed movement and behaviour. movement and behaviour.

The difference between humans and The difference between humans and animals rests on the presence of animals rests on the presence of consciousness/soul/mind.consciousness/soul/mind.

Animals lack the Animals lack the res cogitans res cogitans (the mind).(the mind).

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[B]y [B]y distributing the animal spirit to the muscledistributing the animal spirit to the muscle, , make the make the parts of this body moveparts of this body move in as many in as many different ways as the parts of our bodies can move different ways as the parts of our bodies can move without being guided by the will, and in a manner without being guided by the will, and in a manner which is just as appropriate to the objects of the senses which is just as appropriate to the objects of the senses and the internal passions. This will not seem as all and the internal passions. This will not seem as all strange to those who know of many kinds of strange to those who know of many kinds of automatons, or moving machines, the skill of man can automatons, or moving machines, the skill of man can construct with the use of very few parts, in comparison construct with the use of very few parts, in comparison with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the other parts that are in the arteries, veins and all the other parts that are in the body of any animal. For they will regard this body of any animal. For they will regard this body as a body as a machine which, having been made by the hands of machine which, having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably betterGod, is incomparably better ordered than any ordered than any machine that can be devised by man, and contains in machine that can be devised by man, and contains in itself movements more wonderful than those in any itself movements more wonderful than those in any such machine. (such machine. (Discourse on the Method; CSM IDiscourse on the Method; CSM I: 139): 139)

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Indeed, one mayIndeed, one may compare compare the nervesthe nerves of the of the machine I am describing with machine I am describing with the pipesthe pipes in the in the works of these fountains, its muscles and works of these fountains, its muscles and tendons with the various devices and springs tendons with the various devices and springs which serve to set them in motion, which serve to set them in motion, its animal its animal spirit with the water which drives themspirit with the water which drives them, the , the heart with the source of the water, and heart with the source of the water, and the the cavities of the brain with the storage tankscavities of the brain with the storage tanks … … when a when a rational soulrational soul is present in the is present in the machine it will have its principal seat in the machine it will have its principal seat in the brain, and reside there like the fountain-brain, and reside there like the fountain-keeperkeeper who must be stationed at the tanks to who must be stationed at the tanks to which the fountain’s pipes return if he wants to which the fountain’s pipes return if he wants to produce, or prevent, or change their movements produce, or prevent, or change their movements in some way. (in some way. (Treatise on Man; CSM ITreatise on Man; CSM I: 100-1): 100-1)

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Animals and FeelingAnimals and Feeling

Contrary to the received view, there is no Contrary to the received view, there is no evidence that Descartes hold the thesis evidence that Descartes hold the thesis that animals do not suffer (i.e. do not have that animals do not suffer (i.e. do not have feelings).feelings).

An animal could be a machine with An animal could be a machine with feelings.feelings.

(See Cottingham 1978 “Descartes (See Cottingham 1978 “Descartes Treatment of Animals”)Treatment of Animals”)

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Seven ThesisSeven Thesis to be distinguished to be distinguished

1. Animal are machines1. Animal are machines2. Animals are automata2. Animals are automata3. Animals do not think3. Animals do not think4. Animals have no language4. Animals have no language5. Animals have no self-5. Animals have no self-

consciousnessconsciousness6. Animals have no consciousness6. Animals have no consciousness7. Animals are totally without 7. Animals are totally without

feelingsfeelings

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The controversial (monstrous) thesis often The controversial (monstrous) thesis often attributed to Descartes is the seventh attributed to Descartes is the seventh (animals are totally without feelings).(animals are totally without feelings).

There is no evidence in Descartes’ writing There is no evidence in Descartes’ writing that he defended it. that he defended it.

On the contrary, there is evidence that he On the contrary, there is evidence that he denies it in so far as he claims that denies it in so far as he claims that animals have fear, hope, joy.animals have fear, hope, joy.

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Linguistic creativityLinguistic creativity Why not Why not Homme-MachineHomme-Machine? ?

Humans cannot be explained in purely Humans cannot be explained in purely mechanical terms because of mechanical terms because of linguistic linguistic creativitycreativity..

The capacity to understand a language is The capacity to understand a language is species-specific.species-specific.

And language can be And language can be sensation-freesensation-free … : … : important distinction between an utterance important distinction between an utterance (language) and a cry.(language) and a cry.

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In fact, none of our external actions can show anyone In fact, none of our external actions can show anyone who examines them that our body is not just a self-who examines them that our body is not just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts, moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts, with the exception of spoken words, or other with the exception of spoken words, or other signs that have reference to particular topics signs that have reference to particular topics without expressing any passionwithout expressing any passion. … Now it seems to . … Now it seems to me that the use of words, so defined, is something me that the use of words, so defined, is something peculiar to human beingspeculiar to human beings. Montaigne and Charron . Montaigne and Charron may have said that there is a great difference may have said that there is a great difference between one human being and another than between between one human being and another than between a human being and an animal; yet there has a human being and an animal; yet there has never never been known an animal so perfect as to use sign been known an animal so perfect as to use sign to make other animals understand something to make other animals understand something which bore no relation to its passionwhich bore no relation to its passion; and there is ; and there is no human being so imperfect as not to do so, since no human being so imperfect as not to do so, since even deaf-mutes invent special signs to express their even deaf-mutes invent special signs to express their reason why animals do not speak as we do reason why animals do not speak as we do is not that is not that they lack the organs but that they have no they lack the organs but that they have no thoughtsthoughts. (. (Letter to the Marquis of New Castle, 23 Letter to the Marquis of New Castle, 23 Nov. 1946; CSMK IIINov. 1946; CSMK III: 303): 303)

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But though I regard it as established that we But though I regard it as established that we cannot prove there is any thought in animals, I cannot prove there is any thought in animals, I do not think it can be proved that there is none, do not think it can be proved that there is none, since the human mind does not reach into their since the human mind does not reach into their hearts. But then I investigate what is most hearts. But then I investigate what is most probable in this matter, probable in this matter, I see no argument for I see no argument for animals having thoughts except this one: animals having thoughts except this one: since they have eyes, ears, tongues and since they have eyes, ears, tongues and other sense-organs like ours, it seems likely other sense-organs like ours, it seems likely that they have sensation like us; and since that they have sensation like us; and since thought is included in our mode of thought is included in our mode of sensation, similar thought seems to be sensation, similar thought seems to be attributable to themattributable to them. …. …

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But in my opinion the main reason for holding that But in my opinion the main reason for holding that animals lack thought is the following. Within a single animals lack thought is the following. Within a single species some of them are more perfect than others, as species some of them are more perfect than others, as humans are too. This can be seen in horses and dogs, humans are too. This can be seen in horses and dogs, some of which learn what they are taught much better some of which learn what they are taught much better than others; and all animals easily communicate to us, than others; and all animals easily communicate to us, by voice or bodily movement, their natural impulses of by voice or bodily movement, their natural impulses of anger, fear, hunger, and so on. Yet in spite of all these anger, fear, hunger, and so on. Yet in spite of all these facts, it has never been observed that any brute facts, it has never been observed that any brute animal has attained the perfection of using real animal has attained the perfection of using real speech, that is to say, of indicating by word or speech, that is to say, of indicating by word or sign sign something relating to thought alone and not to something relating to thought alone and not to natural impulsenatural impulse. Such speech is the only certain sign . Such speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden on a body. All human beings use it, of thought hidden on a body. All human beings use it, however stupid and insane they may be, even though however stupid and insane they may be, even though they may have no tongue and organ of voice; but no they may have no tongue and organ of voice; but no animal do. Consequently this can be taken as a real animal do. Consequently this can be taken as a real specific difference between human and animals. specific difference between human and animals. ((Letter to More, 5 Feb. 1649; CSMK IIILetter to More, 5 Feb. 1649; CSMK III: 365-6): 365-6)

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Linguistic competence is stimulus-freeLinguistic competence is stimulus-free

This is one of the lessons of Cartesian This is one of the lessons of Cartesian linguistics. linguistics.

Humans Humans vs.vs. Animals: Linguistic Creativity Animals: Linguistic Creativity

Human beings (unlike animals) can think and Human beings (unlike animals) can think and express their thought in language because express their thought in language because humans are endowed with a “humans are endowed with a “rational soulrational soul”. ”.

But the But the soulsoul is is immaterialimmaterial; it is not ; it is not something which derives from the something which derives from the structure/function of our brain. It is implanted structure/function of our brain. It is implanted in each human being by God.in each human being by God.

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[W]e can also know the difference between man and [W]e can also know the difference between man and beast. For it is quite remarkable that there are beast. For it is quite remarkable that there are no no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen—that they are incapable of even madmen—that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an arranging various words together and forming an utterance from them in order to make their utterance from them in order to make their thoughts understoodthoughts understood; whereas there is no other ; whereas there is no other animal, however perfect and well-endowed it may be, animal, however perfect and well-endowed it may be, that can do the like. This does not happen because that can do the like. This does not happen because they lack the necessary organs, for we see that they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet they cannot speak as we doand yet they cannot speak as we do: that is, : that is, they they cannot show that they are thinking what they are cannot show that they are thinking what they are sayingsaying. On the other hand, men born deaf and dumb, . On the other hand, men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech-organs as much as the and thus deprived of speech-organs as much as the beasts or even more so, normally invent their own sign beasts or even more so, normally invent their own sign to make themselves understood by those who, being to make themselves understood by those who, being regularly in their company, have the time to learn regularly in their company, have the time to learn their language.their language.

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This shows not merely that the beasts have less This shows not merely that the beasts have less reason than men, but that they have no reason at all. reason than men, but that they have no reason at all. For For it patently requires very little reason to be it patently requires very little reason to be able to speak; and since as much inequality can able to speak; and since as much inequality can be observed among the animals of a given be observed among the animals of a given species as among human beings, and some species as among human beings, and some animals are more easily trained than others, it animals are more easily trained than others, it would be incredible that a superior specimen of would be incredible that a superior specimen of the monkey or parrot species should not be the monkey or parrot species should not be able to speak as well as the stupidest child—or able to speak as well as the stupidest child—or at least as well as a child with a defective brainat least as well as a child with a defective brain—if their soul were not completely different in —if their soul were not completely different in nature from oursnature from ours. And we must not confuse speech . And we must not confuse speech with the natural movement which express passions with the natural movement which express passions and which can be imitated by machines as well as by and which can be imitated by machines as well as by animals. (animals. (Discourse of the Method; CSM 1Discourse of the Method; CSM 1: 140-1): 140-1)

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SyntaxSyntax For Descartes, like the Stoics, For Descartes, like the Stoics, syntactic syntactic

arrangementarrangement is the is the sine qua nonsine qua non of of linguistic capacity as it is manifested in linguistic capacity as it is manifested in humans. (cf. Chomsky’s UG)humans. (cf. Chomsky’s UG)

Is loquitur qui suo loco quodque verbum sciens Is loquitur qui suo loco quodque verbum sciens point et is tum prolucutus, cum in animo quod point et is tum prolucutus, cum in animo quod habuit extulit loquendohabuit extulit loquendo

[the one who is capable of speaking places each [the one who is capable of speaking places each word on its place and expresses a proposition word on its place and expresses a proposition when in talking one expresses what one has in when in talking one expresses what one has in one’s soul] (Varron [Roman philosopher], one’s soul] (Varron [Roman philosopher], De De Lingua Latina VI 56Lingua Latina VI 56) )

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Turing TestTuring Test

It should help to distinguish a thinking It should help to distinguish a thinking mechanism from a non thinking one. mechanism from a non thinking one.

Turing (1950) asked the question whether Turing (1950) asked the question whether machines can think. machines can think.

““The Turing Test” is often used to refer to The Turing Test” is often used to refer to some kinds of behavioral tests for the some kinds of behavioral tests for the presence of mind, or thought, or intelligence presence of mind, or thought, or intelligence in allegedly minded entities.in allegedly minded entities.

E.g. a box with a computer inside E.g. a box with a computer inside vsvs. a box . a box with a person inside having to reply to some with a person inside having to reply to some questions posed by an experimenter outside questions posed by an experimenter outside the box. the box.

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Descartes anticipated the Turing TestDescartes anticipated the Turing Test..

No machine can compose and understand No machine can compose and understand sentences the way we do.sentences the way we do.

Chinese roomChinese room (Searle) (Searle)

In two rooms a Chinese and a non-Chinese In two rooms a Chinese and a non-Chinese speaker answering questions coming from speaker answering questions coming from outside the room. The non-Chinese is outside the room. The non-Chinese is capable, following instructions on where to capable, following instructions on where to go and what to take when such sign comes go and what to take when such sign comes in, to give out the right papers/answers (she in, to give out the right papers/answers (she passes the Turing Test). Yet, she doesn’t passes the Turing Test). Yet, she doesn’t understand Chinese. understand Chinese.

Linguistic competence doesn’t resume to Linguistic competence doesn’t resume to mere syntactic manipulation.mere syntactic manipulation.

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Zombies?Zombies? From Descartes’ method of doubt it follows From Descartes’ method of doubt it follows

that he comes to know only himself and that he comes to know only himself and God.God.

It is true that, since my decision to doubt It is true that, since my decision to doubt everything, it is so far everything, it is so far only myself and God only myself and God whose existence I have been able to know whose existence I have been able to know with certaintywith certainty. (. (Fourth Meditation; CSM IIFourth Meditation; CSM II: 39): 39)

Thus how do we come to know that others Thus how do we come to know that others are not zombies? are not zombies?

The Touring Test should help. And The Touring Test should help. And Descartes anticipated it.Descartes anticipated it.

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There are There are two waystwo ways to distinguish between to distinguish between real human beings and merely automata:real human beings and merely automata:

I made special efforts to show that if any such I made special efforts to show that if any such machines had the organs and outward shape of a machines had the organs and outward shape of a monkey or of some other animal that lacks reason, monkey or of some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing that they did we should have no means of knowing that they did not possess entirely the same nature as these not possess entirely the same nature as these animals; whereas if any such machines bore a animals; whereas if any such machines bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as closely as possible for all practical purposes, we as closely as possible for all practical purposes, we should still have should still have two very certain means of two very certain means of recognizing that they were not real menrecognizing that they were not real men. .

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First testFirst test..

The first is that The first is that they could never use words or put they could never use words or put together signs as we do in order to declare our together signs as we do in order to declare our thought to othersthought to others. For we can certainly conceive of . For we can certainly conceive of a machine that it utters words corresponding to a machine that it utters words corresponding to bodily actions causing a change in its organs (e.g. if bodily actions causing a change in its organs (e.g. if you touch it in one spot it asks what you want of it, if you touch it in one spot it asks what you want of it, if you touch in another it cries out that you are hurting you touch in another it cries out that you are hurting it, and so on). But it is it, and so on). But it is not conceivable that such a not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements machine should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men can dopresence, as the dullest of men can do..

A machine doesn’t pass Turing Test.A machine doesn’t pass Turing Test.

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Second testSecond test..

Secondly, even though such machines might do some Secondly, even though such machines might do some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others, which would they would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they were acting not through reveal that they were acting not through understanding but only from the disposition of their understanding but only from the disposition of their organs. For whereas organs. For whereas reason is a universal reason is a universal instrument which can be used in all kind of instrument which can be used in all kind of situations, these organs need some particular situations, these organs need some particular disposition for each particular actiondisposition for each particular action; hence it is ; hence it is for all practical purposes for all practical purposes impossible for a machine impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to make it act in to have enough different organs to make it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us actour reason makes us act. (. (Discourse of the Method; Discourse of the Method; CSM 1CSM 1: 139-40): 139-40)

A machine lacks linguistic creativityA machine lacks linguistic creativity..

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Cartesian LinguisticsCartesian Linguistics

Linguistic CreativityLinguistic Creativity

Humans must be capable of linguistic Humans must be capable of linguistic creativity from a very early age, independently creativity from a very early age, independently of education, culture, etc. (see of education, culture, etc. (see poverty of the poverty of the stimulus argumentstimulus argument). ).

As such linguistic creativity must be As such linguistic creativity must be innateinnate. .

Descartes, like Leibniz, recognized the Descartes, like Leibniz, recognized the existence of innate ideas, while Chomsky existence of innate ideas, while Chomsky postulates UG.postulates UG.

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Port-RoyalPort-Royal Grammar and Logic Grammar and Logic

[T]he ideas of being and thought [T]he ideas of being and thought in no way originate in no way originate in the senses. Instead, the soul has the faculty to in the senses. Instead, the soul has the faculty to form them from itselfform them from itself, although often it is prompted , although often it is prompted to do so by something striking the senses, just as a to do so by something striking the senses, just as a painter can be brought to produce a canvas by the painter can be brought to produce a canvas by the money promised him, without our thereby being able to money promised him, without our thereby being able to say that the money was the origin of the painting. say that the money was the origin of the painting. (Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 29)(Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 29)

It is thus It is thus false that all our ideas originate in the false that all our ideas originate in the sensessenses. On the contrary, one can say that . On the contrary, one can say that no idea in no idea in the mind originates in the senses, although the mind originates in the senses, although motions in the brain, which is all the senses can motions in the brain, which is all the senses can bring about, may provide the occasion for the soul bring about, may provide the occasion for the soul to form various ideas that might not have been to form various ideas that might not have been formed without this occasionformed without this occasion. (Arnauld & Nicole . (Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 30)1662: 30)

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Central Point of Cartesian LinguisticsCentral Point of Cartesian Linguistics

The general features of grammatical structure The general features of grammatical structure are common to all languages (are universal) and are common to all languages (are universal) and reflect certain fundamental properties of the reflect certain fundamental properties of the mind. mind.

The Port Royal grammar/logic, for instance, is The Port Royal grammar/logic, for instance, is not the study of a particular languagenot the study of a particular language but but the study of the way our mind organizes the study of the way our mind organizes our thought/ideasour thought/ideas. .

It is the study of our reasoning and the latter is It is the study of our reasoning and the latter is independent of a particular language: it is independent of a particular language: it is universal.universal.

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This art does not consist in finding the means to This art does not consist in finding the means to perform these operations, since nature alone perform these operations, since nature alone furnishes them in giving us reason, but in furnishes them in giving us reason, but in reflecting on what nature makes us do. (Arnauld reflecting on what nature makes us do. (Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 23)& Nicole 1662: 23)

[R]easoning is not a collection of names [R]easoning is not a collection of names according to a convention depending according to a convention depending entirely on human fancy, but a solid and entirely on human fancy, but a solid and practical judgement about the nature of practical judgement about the nature of things by considering ideas in the mind that things by considering ideas in the mind that people chose to mark by certain namespeople chose to mark by certain names. . (Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 28)(Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 28)

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ChomskyChomsky (1965. Aspects of the Theory of (1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax)Syntax)

Chomsky develops a theory based on Chomsky develops a theory based on these (Cartesian) assumptions. these (Cartesian) assumptions.

A sentence like:A sentence like:

(1) The little cat is on the mat(1) The little cat is on the mat

is represented as:is represented as:

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SS

NP VPNP VP

Det AP N V P NPDet AP N V P NP

Det N Det N

The little cat is on the matThe little cat is on the mat

SS = Sentence; = Sentence; NPNP = Noun Phrase; = Noun Phrase; VPVP = = Verb Phrase; Verb Phrase; DetDet = Determiner; = Determiner; APAP = = Adjectival Phrase; Adjectival Phrase; NN = Noun; = Noun; VV = Verb; = Verb; PP = Preposition.= Preposition.

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It is often assumed that such structure is It is often assumed that such structure is the the mental representationmental representation of the of the sentence. sentence.

What does it represent? What does it represent?

‘‘To represent’ is a two terms relation. It To represent’ is a two terms relation. It must represent something to someone. must represent something to someone.

This seems to suggest that the one This seems to suggest that the one entertaining this representation is entertaining this representation is consciously awareconsciously aware of it or that one can of it or that one can attain it by some introspective exercise. attain it by some introspective exercise.

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Ray Jackendoff Ray Jackendoff (2002. (2002. Foundations of Foundations of LanguageLanguage. OUP). OUP)

To avoid these problems (linked to the To avoid these problems (linked to the problem of intentionality) Jackendoff problem of intentionality) Jackendoff proposes an intentional-free terminology.proposes an intentional-free terminology.

Instead of representation, one can talk Instead of representation, one can talk about about cognitivecognitive structurestructure, instead of , instead of symbol of symbol of cognitivecognitive entityentity, and so on., and so on.

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The study of human language capacity divides The study of human language capacity divides into:into:

Theory of competenceTheory of competence the functional characterization of the “data the functional characterization of the “data structures” stored and assembled in the structures” stored and assembled in the functional-mind in the course of language use.functional-mind in the course of language use.

Theory of performanceTheory of performancethe functional characterization of the use of the functional characterization of the use of these data structures in the course of these data structures in the course of language perception and production.language perception and production.

Theory of neural instantiationTheory of neural instantiationhow the data structures and the processes how the data structures and the processes that store and assemble them are realized in that store and assemble them are realized in the brain.the brain.

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[T]o speak of a [T]o speak of a language [e.g. English] in language [e.g. English] in linguistic is a bit like speaking of a species in linguistic is a bit like speaking of a species in biologybiology: one acknowledges that members of a : one acknowledges that members of a species are not genetically identical; and cases species are not genetically identical; and cases sometimes arise where what is apparently one sometimes arise where what is apparently one species shade off imperceptibly over geographical species shade off imperceptibly over geographical range into another. Does that mean there are no range into another. Does that mean there are no species? Some biologists think so. But as long as species? Some biologists think so. But as long as we regard the term as a convenient first-we regard the term as a convenient first-approximation, there seem no arm in it. (Jackendoff approximation, there seem no arm in it. (Jackendoff 2002: 35-6)2002: 35-6)

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The Mechanistic Conception The Mechanistic Conception and Language Creativityand Language Creativity

Mechanistic ExplanationMechanistic Explanation

For Descartes it falls short to explain For Descartes it falls short to explain linguistic creativity. linguistic creativity.

E.g.: It cannot explain how we build E.g.: It cannot explain how we build sentences.sentences.

It can explain animal (and human) bodily It can explain animal (and human) bodily behaviours/ movements and functions, but it behaviours/ movements and functions, but it cannot explain human’s mastery of language.cannot explain human’s mastery of language.

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Language is what differentiates humans Language is what differentiates humans from animals. from animals.

Hence Cartesian dualism, for the capacity Hence Cartesian dualism, for the capacity of using language transcends the of using language transcends the mechanic movements of the body.mechanic movements of the body.

Automata/robots could never arrange Automata/robots could never arrange words in order to transmit new thoughts: words in order to transmit new thoughts: they lack language creativity. They can they lack language creativity. They can never understand new sentences either.never understand new sentences either.

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Linguistic creativity is species specific: Linguistic creativity is species specific: stimulus freestimulus free

Dualism Dualism quaqua Mechanistic Necessity Mechanistic Necessity

The impossibility of a mechanistic explanation The impossibility of a mechanistic explanation of language creativity leads Descartes to of language creativity leads Descartes to postulate a (species specific) entity, the mind postulate a (species specific) entity, the mind (a thinking substance/(a thinking substance/res cogitansres cogitans) playing the ) playing the role of the creativity principle, while the role of the creativity principle, while the mechanical principle account for body mechanical principle account for body movements and function.movements and function.

With the With the abandon of contact mechanicsabandon of contact mechanics (from Newton on) the motivation for thinking (from Newton on) the motivation for thinking of the mind and mental operations as separate of the mind and mental operations as separate from the body and its function also disappears.from the body and its function also disappears.

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The problem of other The problem of other mindsminds

Other BeingsOther Beings

It is only the capacity to innovate It is only the capacity to innovate (linguistic creativity) which constitutes (linguistic creativity) which constitutes evidence of the minds and the evidence evidence of the minds and the evidence that others have minds.that others have minds.

To show that other beings are not To show that other beings are not automata (zombies) suffices to show that automata (zombies) suffices to show that they are capable of linguistic creativity.they are capable of linguistic creativity.

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RomanticismRomanticism

Humboldt (1836) characterizes language as Humboldt (1836) characterizes language as energyenergy. .

As such it is an As such it is an activity rather than a activity rather than a productproduct. Language . Language quaqua activity must make activity must make potentially infinite uses of finite means (like potentially infinite uses of finite means (like the Cartesian the stress is on linguistic the Cartesian the stress is on linguistic productivity). productivity).

To do so language must rest on a To do so language must rest on a generativegenerative principleprinciple which is mostly fixed and which which is mostly fixed and which provides the scope of linguistic production. provides the scope of linguistic production.

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Substantial QuestionSubstantial Question

It concerns the way we characterize this It concerns the way we characterize this generative principle, i.e. how do we generative principle, i.e. how do we construe this generative grammar construe this generative grammar (Humboldt did not raise it).(Humboldt did not raise it).

Linguistics (within a rationalist Linguistics (within a rationalist framework) will address this question.framework) will address this question.

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Main Points of Cartesian Main Points of Cartesian LinguisticsLinguistics

CreativityCreativity

In its normal use language is independent In its normal use language is independent from external stimuli and/or internal states from external stimuli and/or internal states and it is not restricted to practical and it is not restricted to practical communicative functions.communicative functions.

Language is the mirror of mindLanguage is the mirror of mind

As such it helps the Cartesians (dualists) to As such it helps the Cartesians (dualists) to explain the existence of other minds, i.e. explain the existence of other minds, i.e. that others are not complex robots, animals that others are not complex robots, animals or zombies.or zombies.