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A critical review and fairly comprehensive refutation of

“Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism” by

Timothy A. Stratton

GUILLAUME BIGNON

Association Axiome

December 2020.

In Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, Tim Stratton aims to defend the

Molinist view of divine providence, which seeks to reconcile God’s sovereignty and human

freedom by affirming that: 1. humans have “libertarian” free will, and 2. God is nevertheless in

providential control of everything that happens, in virtue of his having “middle-knowledge.”

The first affirmation is the thesis of “libertarianism,” according to which human free will is

incompatible with determinism and humans are making at least some free choices, from which it

follows that determinism is false. The second one is the thesis of “middle-knowledge,” according

to which God knows from all eternity what any possible human would freely do (again, in a

libertarian sense) in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place them. This

thesis was famously articulated by the Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, hence the name of the

view: “Molinism.”

As the subtitle of the book indicates, Stratton covers a lot of ground as he aims to offer “a

Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis” of the topic.

The book was published in October 2020 by Wipf & Stock publishers, and is the book adaptation

of Tim Stratton’s doctoral dissertation.

EVALUATION

Let’s go straight to the point: my assessment is extremely negative. Now, let me preface this by

saying that I am a Calvinist. So, of course, I disagree with the Molinist view defended by

Stratton in this book. But the book is peculiarly bad wholly apart from our theological

disagreement, and readers should agree with this judgment even if they think my own Calvinist

view is thoroughly wrong-headed. Stratton’s book is deeply flawed on almost all counts: some of

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the basic and fundamental definitions are botched, the historical survey is fanciful, the

philosophical arguments are confused and scattered, and even the writing style and mastery of

English are inconsistent with the expectations of a PhD dissertation. The positive endorsements

by such serious scholars as William Lane Craig and Kirk MacGregor—whose work on the topic

I deeply respect—have me wondering if we have read the same book.

Accordingly, I’m afraid this review is mostly going to be a list of what is wrong with the book,

and a very long one at that, as it must be, to substantiate adequately my claim that these serious

flaws are indeed legion. Now, not everything in the book is equally weak, and some questions

are raised here and there, that do deserve good answers, so I will cover them as well in the course

of this response, which I hope will be helpful for the thoughtful Molinist reader. But before I do,

let me begin with some measure of good will as I mention 3 positive things.

POSITIVES

A first positive point, perhaps unexpectedly, is the view defended therein. I actually like

Molinism. I think it’s false, but I have described it as the silver medal of providence models.

With its libertarianism, I think it gets free will wrong, but at least with its middle knowledge, it

rescues a much higher view of divine providence than its libertarian alternatives: simple-

foreknowledge Arminianism and open theism. If I had to abandon Calvinism, I would probably

become a Molinist. Once again, I think it’s false, but I’m always happy when someone who

rejects Calvinism like Stratton does, at least lands on Molinism.

A second point is the multi-disciplinarity I highlighted in the subtitle. I think Stratton’s attempt

to do a bit of everything in a limited space backfires as he does none of them really well, but it

does introduce the reader to all the facets of this debate, as there are indeed “biblical, historical,

theological and philosophical” issues to consider. It’s great to show the reader that all of these

disciplines have something to contribute to the debates on free will.

And finally, the bibliography contains helpful entries. Stratton has listed a good number of

relevant writings, so the reader can use the bibliography as an entry point to discover some good

authors and books on free will and divine providence.

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QUALITY OF WRITING

As a Frenchman who speaks English as a foreign language and has probably proffered his fair

share of English sentences with improper grammar or vocabulary (or both), I run the risk of

being the pot who calls the kettle black, but the weaknesses in Stratton’s writing are significant

enough (and unexpected enough at the PhD level), that I must mention them in this review and

document the problem with at least a few examples.

First, Stratton puts a “would” in the “if” clause of counterfactuals. And while we may expect a

Taylor Swift song to say “it would have been fun if you would have been the one,” we don’t

expect a scholarly monograph on Molinism to say “If the son would have never made the choice

to return to his father, then their relationship would have never been restored” (p.193) or “God

possesses perfect knowledge of how humans with libertarian freedom would choose if he would

create them” (p.239).

Secondly, philosophy professors have a running joke about the comically bad first sentence of

almost every undergrad paper. It goes like this: “For [insert long period of time] humans have

debated [insert topic].” Stratton offers his version as the book opener: “The question of the

relationship between the terms ‘determinism’ and ‘human freedom’ has occupied the thinking of

human beings for centuries” (p.1) and another one for a later paragraph where he finds it helpful

to discuss what truth is: “Truth. What is truth? People have been asking this question for centuries”

(p.9).

But beyond this merely esthetic faux pas, I’m mostly concerned with the flaws in his writing that

make it hard to understand what Stratton is even arguing. And while I’m mostly (though not

always) able to tell what he must have meant, it constantly slows down the reading to fix the

wording before evaluating the thought. Already in the very first sentence quoted above, it’s not

the relationship between the terms “determinism” and “human freedom” that is debated, but the

relationship between the things they refer to. A bit later, Stratton writes: Perhaps an illustration of this interplay of philosophy and theology can be seen in what might be

labeled a determinism of two sorts: “scientific” determinism and “theological” determinism, both

of which stand in contrast to a third variable: libertarian free will. (p.2)

What is “a determinism of two sorts”? and what does it mean to say libertarian free will is a

“variable”? Another example:

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The primary concern of this study is to critically evaluate, not only scientific determinism, but also

the issue as to how Scripture and theologians relate their understanding to the issue of human

freedom.” (p.2)

I can tell he’s talking about the relationship between determinism and human freedom, but I’m not

sure how I would even rephrase this bit: “the issue as to how Scripture and theologians relate their

understanding to the issue of …”

Another example: “[Theological determinism] has its origins, not only in certain interpretations of

select biblical passages, but also in the Bible’s implications on the behavior of Christians.” (p.2) I

cannot even guess what this is referring to. What Bible implications? What behavior of Christians?

How do these “Bible implications” differ from “interpretations of select biblical passages”? I don’t

understand that sentence. Another example: “Moreover, since these contemporary Calvinists also

affirm that they offer their objections as knowledge claims, they unintentionally join forces with

naturalists.” (p.3) Leaving aside the guilt by association with naturalists, what does it mean to say

Calvinists “affirm that they offer their objections as knowledge claims”? Isn’t every offered

objection a claim to know something, namely that the view being objected to is unjustified or

false?

Later on, he discusses the so-called sourcehood and leeway conditions for free will, offered by

libertarians: libertarian freedom sometimes refers to a categorical ability to act or think otherwise, and it always

refers to source agency without any ultimate external deterministic causes. The former is sufficient

for libertarian freedom, while the latter is necessary.

and then he adds: “With that said, one of the main aims of this study is to argue for a stronger

model description or definitional model of libertarian freedom.” (p.4) What does it mean to argue

for a “stronger model description or definitional model”? And stronger than what? Stronger than

sourcehood? Stronger than leeway? Stronger than both? The imprecision in the statement of his

own position (or is it just his definition?) makes it hard to know what he’s arguing for.

Shortly after, he writes: It is with this latter position—one seeking to affirm both freedom and determinism or divine

providence, despite the tension that would incline one to either extreme—that prompted this writer

to explore the issue as to how the two might be harmonized. (p.6)

One way to fix this incorrect sentence might be to remove the “with” if we think it’s a typo. That

now makes the “position” the subject of “prompted,” or perhaps he’s missing a noun before the

“with” to say something like “it’s a struggle with this latter position . . . that prompted this writer

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to explore…”? I don’t know. And then does he really mean to call freedom and providence two

“extremes” to avoid? I don’t think so, as he aims to affirm that both are true and biblical.

A last example: Chapter 2 examines the biblical passages in support of these two propositions. However, to

conclude, as does Turretin, that neither (1) nor (2) can be denied—and both accepted—even though

they seem irreconcilable, leads to what William Lane Craig has called an interpretative “cul de sac”

(p.6)

Here again, we can eventually guess what he really meant, but only after we trip over the “Neither

can be denied—and both accepted.”

I could go on, but limited space precludes exhaustiveness, as all the examples I listed above were

taken from the first 6 pages out of 300.

DEFINITIONS

Stratton’s definitions of some of the important concepts in the free will debates are actually found

in multiple places in the book, not just in the introduction. From what I can tell, this is because

several chapters contain extended sections of material that Stratton reproduced from his blog.

Those stand-alone blog posts required introductory definitions, and once converted into book

chapters, Stratton didn’t see fit to remove their definitions as redundant or transplant them to the

beginning of the book. As a result, we are served definitions of libertarianism, determinism, and

compatibilism more than once throughout the book.

Moreover (and more problematically), they exhibit a great deal of confusion.

Compatibilism

Problems in the characterization of the compatibilist position actually begin in the foreword by

Kirk MacGregor, who seems to think that compatibilism was intended to be a distinct, mediating

view in between determinism and libertarian free will: Stratton also proves to my satisfaction that compatibilism is not a genuine third option mediating

between determinism and soft libertarianism, as Guillaume Bignon, Matthew Hart, and Paul Helm

assert, but instead collapses back to determinism. (p.xii)

This is a surprising misunderstanding of the concepts involved. Compatibilism is the view that

determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. It was never intended to be a

distinct, middle position between determinism on the one side and libertarianism on the other. And

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so of course it does not “collapse back to determinism,” as if one had to be either a determinist or

a compatibilist, and now that compatibilism has to go, we are reluctantly forced to be determinists

instead of compatibilists. We Calvinist compatibilists have affirmed determinism all along, and

maintained that it’s compatible with moral responsibility. That’s what compatibilism means. And,

of course, it’s a complete misattribution of that mistake to me: where did “Guillaume Bignon” ever

“assert” this confused view?

Stratton then misrepresents Calvinists in his introduction of the contemporary debate, saying

modern-day Calvinists assume causal determinism, and conclude that humans are not free: “[more modern Calvinists,] often basing their arguments on certain biblical passages (such as

Romans 9), presuppose that God causally determines all things and, thus, humans are not free.”

(p.3). No. First, they don’t assume it, they take it to be supported by scripture and reason; but more

fundamentally, they certainly don’t conclude nor admit that “humans are not free;” that’s the whole

point of being compatibilists: they maintain free will and moral responsibility; they only deny that

these require indeterminism.

Now, given the slight ambiguity caused by the absence of a quantifier in front of the phrase “more

modern Calvinists,” I suppose it’s technically possible for it to refer only to some “more modern

Calvinists,” who would happen to be determinists and incompatibilists. But then I would ask for

names. Where are those incompatibilist, self-identified “Calvinist” authors, who affirm

determinism and deny free will and moral responsibility? I personally can’t think of one, and I

don’t think any of the Calvinist authors he quotes in the entire book hold that view. In any case,

that doesn’t strike me as a plausible interpretation of Stratton’s words, as he opposes determinism

to human responsibility in the very framing of the debate: No debate or solution of this perceived antinomy can be intellectually argued unless one is aware of

the weight of the biblical data supporting both a view suggesting that God causally determines all

things and the data supporting the view that human beings are responsible for some things. (p.17).

Calvinist compatibilists affirm both of those things. Are they not part of the debate Stratton wants

to arbitrate? His introduction of the positions is already begging the question of incompatibilism.

Stratton does so again at the end of his biblical preliminaries as he shows that divine providence

and human free will are both biblical, and asks if the two can be coherent: Both appear to be taught in holy writ, yet they might seem to be logically incompatible. … Must

readers shrug their shoulders and retreat to mystery, or can Christians provide a logically coherent

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answer to this vital question? One matter is certain: A solution cannot occur by denying free will

(by some flavor of divine determinism), nor by denying God’s sovereignty. (p.40).

Just like that, before any argument is offered, the matter is already “certain” that determinism

cannot be affirmed, as it would be “denying free will.”

Additionally, in multiple places, Stratton fails to see that determinism is the thesis that all things

are determined by antecedent factors. It is seen for example in his repeated use of the redundant

phrase “exhaustive divine determinism.” Determinism is already exhaustive. All things are

determined on determinism. That’s what it means. But Stratton is inconsistent on this point. On

the one hand, we find him identifying his “exhaustive divine determinism” with theological

determinism simpliciter: “This, then, is the view of theological determinism or what this author

refers to as exhaustive divine determinism (EDD): all events are causally determined by God.”

(p.4) This would indicate that he correctly understands determinism is exhaustive. But at other

times he seems to assume the opposite, and we find him awkwardly avoiding to say determinism

or compatibilism are false but rather arguing against the view that they “always correspond to

reality” (p.165) or “always describe reality” (p.165) or “always explain the way things are”

(p.162), or “correspond universally to reality” (p.182). Accordingly, he says: The aim [of this chapter] is not merely to argue against the thesis of compatibilism, but to

demonstrate that this thesis does not actually correspond to reality, and thus, compatibilism does not

always explain the way things are. (p.162)

To say that a thesis “does not actually correspond to reality” is simply to say that it’s false. And if

the thesis of compatibilism is false, then it never explains the way things are.

Libertarianism

Stratton is also inconsistent in his understanding of “libertarianism.” On the one hand, he gives

correct definitions at least twice, in different chapters, saying libertarianism is the conjunction of

the thesis of incompatibilism, with the thesis that humans are sometimes free: Libertarian freedom may be defined, essentially, as the conjunction of a rejection of compatibilism

(which will be defined in chapter 12) along with the claim that humans (at least occasionally) possess

free will. (p.4)

And a similar definition is repeated on page 160. But then Stratton suggests several times that

compatibilists can agree that humans (sometimes) have libertarian freedom: “Indeed, given the

above definition of libertarianism, both compatibilists and libertarians might affirm that some form

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of libertarian freedom at least occasionally corresponds to reality.” (p.161) That’s incoherent.

Libertarianism entails incompatibilism, therefore compatibilists cannot affirm that anyone has or

ever had or ever will have “libertarian” free will. That would require incompatibilism to be true,

and hence compatibilism to be false.

Finally, Stratton invents the phrase “Biblical compatibilism” which he defines as the compatibility

of “predestination” (understood as he does in a libertarian sense) and free will: One should, however, affirm what this author refers to as “biblical compatibilism.” Biblical

compatibilism entails the thesis that God predestines all things, and humans are genuinely free and

responsible for some things. (p.186).

This invention introduces an obvious confusion with the standard term “compatibilism.” Adding

the adjective “Biblical” should only tell us that the thesis is taught or presupposed in the Bible, not

that it’s now accommodating the opposite thesis (incompatibilism) from that normally referred to

by that same word! If he ever uses this invented phrase of his in this way, it’s bound to spread

confusion. Thankfully, he never does in this book: his redefinition is immediately abandoned—it

raises the question of why he introduced it in the first place, but let’s be grateful we avoided the

additional confusion.

BIBLICAL TEXTS

Stratton turns to the Bible in a brief chapter that first surveys texts which seem to support

determinism, then those which seem to support libertarian free will, and finally those that seem to

support both. I don’t have much to say about the texts that seem to support determinism. Stratton

doesn’t really exegete them, he doesn’t engage yet—I guess to let the text speak with full force for

now, which is fine, but then I don’t have much to respond to. Let me rather comment on his texts

allegedly supporting libertarian freedom.

God tests Abraham

He first considers Gen. 22:1, and argues that when it says God tested Abraham, it presupposes that

the tester doesn’t control the outcome of the test (p.25). The problem is that this intuition about

human testers need not apply to God. Human testers aren’t also the creator and sovereign ruler of

the universe. And Stratton’s point is fully exposed to a tu quoque response as there is a similar

intuition about human testers, namely that they also don’t know the outcome of the test: the test’s

purpose is to obtain new information. Stratton quotes John Willis saying this much: “God tested

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Abraham’s faith to see if he really put God’s will above what seemed to be logical, his love for

Isaac, and the dreams of the future which God’s promises had aroused in his breast.” (p.25) If he

insists we transfer those intuitions about human testers onto God, Stratton paints himself into the

corner of having to deny God’s foreknowledge. And let every open theist say Amen.

Resisting God

Stratton then mentions texts saying that humans resist God, or refuse God: Prov. 1:23-26 where

God says “I have called you and you refused to listen,” Matt. 23:37 in which Jesus pleads with

men and we’re told they go against his will, and Matt. 22:3 with the wedding guests refusing the

invitation. Stratton says it implies they could have come: “People were genuinely invited to join

the kingdom of heaven—implying that they could accept God’s invitation—yet these individuals

would not come on their own volition or free will” (p.25-26). This claim that humans “could” have

done otherwise is also pressed by Stratton with 1 Cor. 10:13 which says God will not tempt the

Corinthians beyond their ability, but will leave a way of escape, that they may be able to endure

the temptation (p.27). The problem with those claims is that the “ability” to do otherwise can be—

and has been—analyzed in two different ways: one that entails indeterminism, and one that

doesn’t. The kind of ability that Stratton needs to establish is one whereby the person could have

done otherwise while holding in place everything about the person (inside and out) at the moment

of choice. That’s a “categorical” ability to do otherwise. But compatibilists have long insisted there

is a sense of ability that is necessary for moral responsibility and perfectly compatible with

determinism: it’s a “conditional” sense of ability, the ability to do otherwise if we had wanted, or

if we had tried, or something along those lines. This is the view of the so-called “Classical

Compatibilists.” Incompatibilists are welcome to push back against this conditional analysis—and

I do address some of their objections in my article “The Distasteful Conditional Analysis”1—but

Stratton doesn’t even mention the distinction, and just leaves us with the equivocal claim that we

“can” do otherwise. That doesn’t quite establish libertarianism. This problem will reappear later

in Stratton’s book, so we will return to it.

1 Philosophia Christi Volume 18, Issue 2, 2016.

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Freedom from the law and self-control

Stratton then references Gal. 5:13 where Paul says Christians are “called to live in freedom.” This

is plainly not describing the freedom of the will, but the freedom from moral obligation on certain

matters: we are freed from the law. It is demonstrably irrelevant here.

Stratton then adds we are called to exercise “self-control” in 2 Tim. 1:7, Prov. 16:32, and 2 Pet.

1:5, 7 (p.28). That again is irrelevant to whether we are determined. We may well control ourselves

even if God providentially controls us as he controls all things. Stratton needs to show that both

cannot be true. And even if we grant that a human cannot be both self-controlled and controlled

by another human, we will then need to hear why God can’t be dis-analogous to humans in that

respect. That’s a tall order.

Stratton then says we are condemned for our actions in Rev. 20:12, and says it entails freedom. He

presses the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) explicitly, which claims that we cannot be

morally responsible if we “cannot” do otherwise. And once again, it features the equivocation on

“cannot”: Judgment for the unbelievers, then, is based on deeds done, and thus on both personal responsibility

and freedom of action because a person cannot be judged for what he cannot avoid doing, especially

if it was causally determined by someone or something other than the defendant. (p.28).

This is the same question-begging I pointed out above, camouflaged by the equivocation on the

“ability to do otherwise” which may be analyzed as categorical or conditional.

Stratton mentions that God issues commands, and we’re said to “have a choice” to obey in Deut.

30:10-20. Well of course, we make choices, we even make free choices, all of this is affirmed by

compatibilists. None of this supports indeterminism.

Saving a rich man

Stratton then turns to Jesus’s saying that it’s easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle

than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. Here Stratton simply quotes Roger Olson’s

critique: Roger Olson’s comments on [these words] are forceful: “What sense does this verse make in light

of irresistible grace? Is Jesus saying it is harder for God to save a rich man than a poor one? How

could that be? If everyone, without exception, only gets into the kingdom of God by God’s work

alone without any required cooperation on his or her part, then Jesus’s saying makes no sense at

all.” (p.29)

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Olson doesn’t really tell us what allegedly makes no sense about its being harder for God to save

a rich man. No one is saying it is actually “hard” for an omnipotent God, but it’s perfectly

meaningful to say it’s harder simply to denote that there is more work to do on the person’s heart:

there’s a hurdle to overcome on the way to repentance, and so God must give more grace than if

the person were not rich (all else being equal). Stratton’s comments don’t help; he first says “Olson

reflects his Arminian position.” I don’t understand what that means. And then “If God gives grace

to all and sovereignly chooses to create a world in which everyone is extended free choice, then

there is no basis for merit.” (p.29) How does “there is no basis for merit” follow from “God gives

grace to all and sovereignly chooses to create a world in which everyone is extended free choice”?

And how would the truth of that conditional support libertarian freedom? I’m lost, and I don’t

think it’s my fault.

Willing to save everyone

Stratton then puts forward the texts affirming that God wants all men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:3-4),

that he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked (Ezekiel 18:23), and that he doesn’t wish that

any would perish (2 Pet. 3:9). There are several Calvinist responses available. Let me just state

briefly for now that I favor the view that the libertarian pressing these texts into service is

equivocating on the “will” of God, as God may have some desire or will to do a thing, and yet

have overriding reasons not to do it. We will revisit that question when Stratton presses these texts

as a stand-alone argument later (the contention he calls “The omni argument”).

Determining Judas?

Finally, the section on texts that seem to support both determinism and free will has more of the

same, there’s not much I need to comment on, except one very strange affirmation in his section

on “Jesus and Judas,” where Stratton seems to grant that Jesus teaches determinism! I realize it

would be incoherent for him as a Molinist, but I don’t see other plausible interpretations of

Stratton’s words, here. He quotes Jesus in Luke 22:21-22: “But behold, the hand of him who

betrays me is with me on the table. For the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to

that man by whom he is betrayed.” And then he says that Jesus declared Judas’s act “has been

determined,” and “This is a very clear example which shows that determinism—rightly

understood—need not mean that the sinner can blame God for being judged.” (p.38) Well yes,

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compatibilists are fully on board with that point. But I don’t think he as a Molinist wants to affirm

determinism, unless what he means by determinism “rightly understood” is “indeterminism.”

HISTORICAL SURVEY

The ensuing 150 pages, which amount to half of the book, are dedicated to surveying some

important Christian thinkers of the past on the question of free will and providence. One of

Stratton’s goals here is to show that famous authors who are usually channeled by Calvinists (like

Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Luther and others) actually all affirm libertarian freedom! Let’s see

how he does that.

Augustine

Stratton correctly notes that the early writings of Augustine on free will sound libertarian, but that

Augustine later moved rather explicitly toward determinist views in his interactions with Pelagius.

Stratton notes Augustine’s affirmations that: “The wills of men are so much in the power of God,

that he can turn them whithersoever it pleases him,” “God does whatsoever he wills in the hearts

of even wicked men,” and that “God operates on men’s hearts to incline their wills withersoever

he pleases.” (p.57) These are best interpreted as determinist/compatibilist views. Here again from

Augustine quoted by Stratton: it [scripture] shows us that not only men’s good wills, which God Himself converts from bad ones,

and, when converted by Him, directs to good actions and to eternal life, but also those which follow

the world are so entirely at the disposal of God, that He turns them wherever He wills, and whenever

He wills, to bestow kindness on some, and to heap punishment on others, as He Himself judges right

by a counsel most secret to Himself, indeed, but beyond all doubt most righteous. (p.57)

Still, Stratton tries to keep Augustine a libertarian when it comes to non-salvation issues:

“Although Augustine became more ‘Calvinistic’ in his later years, he never appears to have

rejected a limited libertarian freedom in issues unrelated to soteriological issues” (p.59). I don’t

see that distinction in the universal declaration quoted above. Augustine sure sounds like a

determinist, and it’s no surprise that Calvin quotes him constantly, or that modern-day Calvinists

are often said to hold the “Augustinian” view.

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Pelagius

Stratton then discusses the view of Pelagius, who was famously condemned as a heretic, plausibly

for denying original sin and the necessity of grace, among other teachings. Stratton lists a number

of Pelagius’s views, but I fail to understand which of these statements Stratton accepts and which

ones he rejects when saying that “Pelagianism” must be rejected. Among others propositions,

Stratton counts the following as Pelagian: “for Pelagius free will meant the ability to do what was

right and good. This must be seen and understood as his reaction to Augustine’s determinism.”

(p.62) Isn’t that exactly Stratton’s view that when a sinner freely sins, his free will means he had

“the ability to do what was right and good” instead? In “opposition to Augustine’s determinism”?

And if Stratton responds that an unregenerate man can only sin but is still free to choose between

different sins, then he’s not out of the Pelagian woods yet, because if the principle of alternate

possibilities is true at all, it plausibly applies to all levels of granularity for action. There is no

reason to claim blameworthiness for specific sin X requires the categorical ability to not commit

specific sin X, if one denies that blameworthiness “for sinning” in general requires the categorical

ability not to sin. Stratton correctly notes that “Pelagius said it was possible for some people to

live without sin.” (p.62). Again, that’s a consequence of the categorical PAP: if moral

responsibility requires the categorical ability to do otherwise, (or “ought implies can”), and if we

are responsible for failing to live without sinning, then it follows that we can live without sinning.

That point is repeatedly made by Luther, affirmed by Edwards, and defended anew in my own

book Excusing Sinners and Blaming God.2 Stratton should really tell us how he avoids the Pelagian

view on this, not just tell us that Pelagianism should be rejected.

Aquinas

Stratton devotes a long section to Thomas Aquinas, and finds him to affirm libertarianism. I don’t

need to arbitrate this. Tom Flint and Paul Helm count Aquinas as a determinist/compatibilist, and

Eleonore Stump takes him to be libertarian. My own reading of Aquinas makes me side with

Stratton and Stump on this, I find that Aquinas does say a number of things that fit best with

libertarianism.

2 Guillaume Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2018), onwards of page 133. Also see the discussion of “levels of granularity for action” on pages 110 to 119.

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Erasmus and Luther

Stratton then turns to the dispute on free will between Erasmus and Luther. He finds Erasmus is

obviously on the libertarian side, and lists some of his reasons. Yes. There is no dispute here. It’s

Stratton’s case for how Luther is also a libertarian that is most unexpected. Luther is quoted as

explicitly arguing in favor of determinism, not just for providential control of salvation, but for

everything which God “foreknows,” which is, of course, everything: Luther forthrightly announces his position, based on the premise that what God “foreknows” is not

“contingent,” (that is, shaped or determined by man’s decision or circumstances) but “necessarily”

will happen: “It is, then, fundamentally necessary and wholesome for Christians to know that God

foreknows nothing contingently, but that He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to His

own immutable, eternal and infallible will. This bombshell knocks ‘free-will’ flat, and utterly

shatters it.” (p.108-109)

How does Stratton rescue Luther’s alleged libertarianism in response to this? He doesn’t. He just

separately notes that Luther is ok with the use of the term “free will” for non-soteriological matters

(or “matters below”), because we’re not enslaved to one side when making mundane decisions, in

the way Luther sees us enslaved to sin when making decisions in response to divine

commandments. But from the mere defense of “freedom” by Luther in mundane matters, it

obviously doesn’t follow that he means it as libertarian freedom, especially when Luther is quoted

right above defending an argument from foreknowledge which applies to every single free choice.

Stratton makes the leap from “freedom” to “libertarian freedom,” just like that: Luther clearly believes that there is human freedom in many decisions and actions a person is

engaged in this world (‘in the realm of things below him’). This might be termed what philosophers

call ‘soft libertarian freedom’ or ‘limited libertarian freedom,’ that is, limited to things other than

soteriological matters. (p.110-111).

Leaving aside the couple of English mistakes that here again make it sound a bit off—the first

sentence is missing the “in” from “engage in,” and the second should read either “might be termed”

or “might be what philosophers call,” but not “might be termed what philosophers call”—the

fundamental non sequitur should be clear: we cannot jump from “freedom” to “libertarian

freedom.” The same mistake is then made with Melanchthon: he affirms we have the “liberty of

will” to make regular decisions, and Stratton counts him as a libertarian: “The Reformed,

systematic theologian clearly affirms limited libertarian freedom” (p.111). No.

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Calvin

Stratton continues and repeats the mistake with John Calvin. The French Reformer says Adam had

“free choice of good and evil,” and Stratton unwarrantedly inserts libertarianism into his

paraphrase: “Adam and Eve had libertarian freedom to choose either the good or evil.” (p.115).

No. Once again, the mere mention of free choice isn’t an affirmation of libertarianism, or Stratton

should count me as a libertarian too.

And Calvin draws the same sort of distinction as Luther, between “heavenly things” and “earthly

things,” but Calvin isn’t affirming libertarian free will in this distinction any more than Luther did.

Stratton himself quotes Calvin as going against that very interpretation: In those actions, which in themselves are neither good nor bad, and concern the corporeal rather

than the spiritual life, the liberty which man possesses, although we have above touched upon it

(supra, Chap. 2 sect. 13-17), has not yet been explained. Some have conceded a free choice to man

in such action . . . [However] I contend that whenever God is pleased to make way for his

providence, he even in external matters so turns and bends the wills of men, that whatever the

freedom of their choice may be, it is still subject to the disposal of God. That your mind depends

more on the agency of God than the freedom of your own choice, daily experience teaches.

Calvin’s view sure sounds like Calvinism.

Stratton’s treatment of Calvin to make him out to be a libertarian is most tortured when Calvin

says that men sin of necessity and that it’s compatible with their sinning voluntarily. Stratton

responds as follows: It is hard for this writer not to conclude that by what he says he is evading the issue. One can readily

agree that Adam freely chose—without compulsion—to disobey God. But how is it that a person

does something “voluntarily” if the “will is deprived of liberty?”? Does not “necessity” refer to what

a person must do because of his nature? (p.119)

So, Stratton brings his own incompatibilist conviction to the table and accordingly doesn’t

understand how Calvin can affirm human choices are both “necessary” and “voluntary.” But how

Calvin can do so is trivial: Calvin is simply not an incompatibilist! Stratton faults him for this

belief as if Calvin were engaging in circular reasoning: “Is not Calvin, then, assuming his

conclusion, that is, that despite saying that people sin by necessity, they nevertheless have

freedom?” (p.119) Leaving aside the accusation of circular reasoning—no, Calvin isn’t begging

any question because he’s not here offering an argument for compatibilism, he’s merely voicing

his view—the main point remains, that Calvin’s view is very much what Stratton himself says it

is: “people sin by necessity,” and, yes, “they nevertheless have freedom.” Calvin does assume the

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two are true (and hence compatible). Stratton disagrees. That’s fine. They can work it out with

arguments. But Stratton can’t here assume his incompatibilism, force it onto Calvin’s defense of

human freedom, apply redacting tape on Calvin’s affirmation of necessity in that very sentence,

and conclude that since Calvin affirms voluntariness he must be denying necessity and be a

libertarian! I’m not sure why Stratton would want Calvin in his team, but that’s not the way to

draft him.

Arminius

The next chapter is on Jacob Arminius. Stratton highlights Arminius’s disagreements with

Calvinism. I’m not sure what the takeaway of the chapter should be. Of course, Arminius is not a

Calvinist, he’s an Arminian. I guess that’s Stratton’s main point here, though the concluding

sentence of the chapter makes an additional claim about misrepresentations of Arminius: “What

he [Arminius] did write, however, is clear enough to dispel for the careful researcher that he did

not teach what many have accused him of believing.” (p.137) I don’t know which

misrepresentations of Arminius are in view here, perhaps accusations that he was some sort of

Pelagian? If such accusations are treated and refuted in the chapter, I missed them. But we can

proceed, I think it’s clear Arminius is an Arminian: not a Calvinist, and not a Pelagian.3

The Synod of Dort

Stratton also seeks to find some libertarianism in the Canons of Dort, that traditional bastion of

Calvinist theology. He does so in the same way once again: they affirm that there’s a certain light

in all men, which still explains why they’re able to do right some time, and Stratton tells us it must

mean libertarian free will. The gap between what the Canons say and Stratton’s interpretation is

once again massive. He quotes the Canons as follows: There is, to be sure, a certain light of nature remaining in man after the fall, by virtue of which he

retains some notions about God, natural things, and the difference between what is moral and

immoral, and demonstrates a certain eagerness for virtue and for good outward behavior (p.145-

146)

And Stratton comments: “This is a very important statement because it implies that people can

make some decisions freely for matters other than evil—and thus have (at least) limited libertarian

3 Roger Olson does a pretty good job at showing this much, in Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006).

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GUILLAUME BIGNON

freedom—though this freedom never can lead to salvation.” (p.145) The leap is not only

unjustified, it’s also inconsistent with Stratton’s later claim that Dort leaves libertarian free will as

an “open question.” (p.160)

Libertarianism: all or nothing

Let me now make a point that applies to all the figures listed above as allegedly affirming “some”

libertarian freedom in things that don’t pertain to salvation, while being determined in the things

that pertain to salvation. Stratton had put it like this: if one does not possess the libertarian freedom to resist or not to resist the Holy Spirit’s grace, it

does not logically entail that no one ever possesses the libertarian ability to choose among a range

of options each of which is compatible with one’s nature regarding matters that are not related to

soteriological issues. (p.146)

The problem is that the only way to hold this view coherently is to deny that those determined

actions that pertain to salvation are morally responsible. That’s because if any of our mundane

choices are made with libertarian free will, then it means libertarianism is true, which means

incompatibilism is true, and hence any given action cannot be both directly free and determined.

So, on that view, if humans are determined “to resist or not to resist the Holy Spirit’s grace,” then

they cannot be responsible for it. And while a Christian may feel it’s fine to remove all

praiseworthiness for a sinner’s choice to repent and believe, they shouldn’t accept the other side

of that same coin which is that a sinner’s choice to reject the Gospel cannot be blameworthy. I

don’t think any of the historical figures surveyed in the book would be on board with that. Of

course, Stratton may declare that all these historical figures are guilty of affirming just that

incoherence, but interpretative charity says we probably should not.

The cost of historical eisegesis

The historical section ends with a chapter on Jonathan Edwards, whom Stratton thankfully does

not find to affirm libertarianism. Let’s see the “cup-half-full” and note that although Edwards is

the only one in that situation, at least there is one that Stratton couldn’t recast as a libertarian. He

concludes: “each of [the theologians surveyed]—except for Edwards—seems to occasionally

affirm some level of libertarian freedom limited to some things, some of the time.” (p.158) And

again, “all of the theologians surveyed in the previous chapters (apart from Edwards) could easily

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agree on this definition of libertarianism and affirm that humans possess it.” (p.161) No. They

could not, and they did not.

In the end, upon seeing its flaws, we may be tempted to skip this long historical section, or dismiss

it as neither helping nor hurting Stratton’s case—since it matters more to us whether a view is true

than whether it was affirmed by Christians of the past—but all this historical eisegesis does have

a real cost for Stratton's biblical claims as well. Because if Stratton is able to declare that libertarian

free will is even in (late) Augustine, Luther, and Calvin—who not only don't affirm it but so

strongly seem to deny it in the very texts quoted by Stratton—then we can't be too impressed when

Stratton likewise declares he finds libertarian free will in the Bible. And his misguided

philosophical exegesis of these authors leads us ironically to a point of happy agreement I have

with Stratton: we both maintain that to hold the Bible’s view on whether humans have libertarian

free will, one must side with Calvin, Luther, Melanchthon, and the Synod of Dort!

PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL

The next chapter aims to offer philosophical arguments supporting libertarianism. It actually opens

again with definitions of libertarian free will and compatibilism because this section is coming

from a stand-alone post from Stratton’s blog.4 I already addressed the confusions found in

Stratton’s definitions, so let me not revisit them here, and let’s turn to Stratton’s case for

libertarianism. The first argument he mentions is Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.

Stratton introduces it like this: One strong argument against exhaustive determinism, as argued by Edwards and Bignon, is the

“Consequence Argument” (CA) set forth in Peter Van Inwagen’s seminal book An Essay on Free

Will. (p.163)

The awkward English phrasing unfortunately makes it sound like Jonathan Edwards and I are

proponents of the Consequence Argument, but the “argued” in Stratton’s aside on the two of us

refers to “determinism,” not to “argument.” I’m not sure why Stratton needs to drag Edwards and

me into this sentence to repeat we defend determinism in the middle of introducing the

Consequence Argument, nor why he goes for the odd list of just the two of us—though I of course

4 “Excusing Sinners, Blaming God, Compatibilism, & the Consequence Argument” https://freethinkingministries.com/excusing-sinners-blaming-god-compatibilism-the-consequence-argument/

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enjoy the flattering juxtaposition of one of the greatest American philosophers and little old French

me.

He quotes van Inwagen’s brief statement of the Consequence Argument: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the

remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what

the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our own acts) are not

up to us. (p.165)

Stratton then rephrases it to target theistic determinism more explicitly, and offers a couple of

paragraphs to explain its premises. The main problem with this section on the Consequence

Argument (and the reason why I’m not getting into much detail here) is that Stratton simply doesn’t

defend it against any of the responses on offer in the literature: the so-called “no-past objection”

by Joseph Campbell,5 accusations of begging the question such as those discussed by Fischer and

Pendergraft,6 or the argument’s reliance on the incompatibilist principle of alternate possibilities

(PAP), none of this is mentioned. This complete abandonment of the battlefield is hard for me to

understand (and I’m French!). We’re in a chapter on arguments for libertarian freedom. The

Consequence Argument is famously one of them. Does Stratton not care to bring it home? If so,

he needs to engage with at least some of its discussion in the literature. Instead, he only mentions

my response that van Inwagen begs the question by defining free will in a way that assumes

libertarianism, to which Stratton replies by insisting that he thinks the PAP is true and properly

basic. That’s not doing much to discharge the incompatibilist’s burden of proof. He quotes Jerry

Walls: We believe that libertarian free will is intrinsic to the very notion of moral responsibility. That is, a

person cannot be held morally responsible for an act unless he or she was free to perform that act

and free to refrain from it. This is a basic moral intuition, and we do not believe there are any relevant

moral convictions more basic than this one that could serve as premises to prove it. (p.164).

If Walls is right that the incompatibilist PAP cannot be supported by arguments with more basic

premises, what does that do to Stratton’s chapter that aims to offer philosophical arguments for

libertarian free will understood as the categorical ability to choose between several options?

5 Joseph Keim Campbell, “Free Will and the Necessity of the Past” Analysis 67.2 (2007) 105–11. 6 John Martin Fischer and Garrett Pendergraft, “Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?” Philosophical Studies 166.3 (2013) 575–95.

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“Striking” and “candid” admission of standard definitions

From then on, Stratton’s comments get really scattered. He leaves the Consequence Argument

completely behind, doesn’t interact with any of my further responses to it, and instead says that

“strikingly,” I make a “candid” admission that is “quite significant,” when I say that…libertarian

free will is incompatible with determinism! This is just embarrassing. The incompatibility of

libertarian free will and determinism is completely definitional. How “striking” is it that I,

Guillaume Bignon, affirm standard definitions? I should also note that Stratton quotes me out of

context in a way that changes the subject of my sentence, and thereby distorts its meaning a bit: I

had said that the Consequence Argument establishes what I “happily concede, namely that

libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism, but falls short of refuting compatibilism.”

Stratton’s truncation of the subject makes me say that libertarian free will falls short of refuting

compatibilism (which is trivially true, as “libertarian free will” is not an argument), whereas it’s

the Consequence Argument that I said falls short of refuting compatibilism.

But why does he think the “admission” is significant? He first says: It means that Calvinists—such as Edwards and Bignon—who affirm that the doctrine of EDD

[Exhaustive Divine Determinism] always describes reality—are far more extreme on the issue than

Luther and Calvin seemed to be. (p.165)

Again, with the odd list of “Edwards and Bignon,” we are now accused of being extremists. In

response, perhaps I just need to expand his horizons of Christian proponents of compatibilism and

determinism, to dispel the notion that I and Edwards are some sorts of lonely radicals at the extreme

end of the theological spectrum: count me in with Paul Helm, Greg Welty, James Anderson, Paul

Manata, Daniel Hill, James Gibson, Steven Cowan, Michael Preciado, Paul Rezkalla, David

Haines, Daniel Johnson, David Alexander, Heath White, Jay Bruce, Christopher Green, Taylor

Cyr, Tom Schreiner, D.A. Carson, Ed Komoszewski, Rob Bowman, Dan Wallace, John Feinberg,

Bruce Ware, John Piper, Chris Date, Pascal Denault, Scott Christensen, et al. It’s not “Bignon and

Edwards” under a tree.

And then Stratton says that as a result of my admission, all he needs is to offer one sound argument

against determinism: if the libertarian offers one sound argument for libertarian free will or the

claim that God doesn’t causally determine everything about humanity, then “he is justified in

claiming that determinism and, consequently, compatibilism (as historically understood) do not

always correspond to reality.” (p.165)

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How is that astonishing? If the libertarian offers one sound argument for libertarianism, then

determinism and compatibilism are false. Of course, that’s how arguments work. But the same is

also obviously true for the opposing view: if compatibilists offer a single sound argument for

compatibilism, then libertarianism is false. None of this is remarkable, and none of this is the result

of my “admission.”

THE FREE-THINKING ARGUMENT

Stratton then turns to what seems to be his most important argument against determinism, the one

he calls “the free-thinking argument.” It’s a claim that determinism undermines the rationality of

our knowledge claims. Stratton introduces it by first declaring me to be in bed with Sam Harris: Harris (a naturalist) and Bignon (a theological determinist) both seem to agree that things external

to humanity govern and control everything about humanity . . . Naturalists and divine determinists

are indeed odd bedfellows; nevertheless, they offer a united front proclaiming that libertarian

freedom is an illusion. (p.166-167).

Nonsense. We agree on something. We’re not offering a “united front.” And that thing we happen

to agree on, is not that libertarian free will is an illusion; it’s that libertarianism is false. I reject the

claim that libertarian freedom is an “illusion” as if it somehow appeared to us we had libertarian

free will though we in fact don’t. I deny that it appears to us one way or the other. And of course,

the guilt by association is a two-way street:

Stratton and Harris “both seem to agree” that God doesn’t determine humans to sin.

Stratton and Harris “both seem to agree” that determinism is incompatible with free will.

Stratton and Harris “both seem to agree” that the sky is blue.

Now what? Is Stratton in bed with the new atheist?

Imprecision on the scope

As we now consider Stratton’s claim that determinism would prevent humans from making

reasonable knowledge claims, we first want to know what kind of knowledge he’s talking about.

Is he arguing that determinism undermines the rationality of every knowledge claim, or only some

subset of them? I do think he intends to restrict the scope of his argument to something like

“knowledge obtained by drawing inferences to the best explanation,” but his own words on the

matter are very inconsistent. Since he repeats ad nauseam the conditionals claiming something

like “if determinism is true then it excludes reasonable knowledge claims,” we have a large sample

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of his own words to assess which scope he wants for the argument, and it varies greatly. In several

places, I found some apparent restrictions like these: If one cannot freely think and infer the best explanation (among a range of alternative options each

compatible with one’s nature), then there can be no justification that that specific belief really is the

best explanation. (p.168, emphasis mine).

[T]he person who denies [that we make libertarian free choices] ultimately must reject rationality

and the knowledge (justified, true belief) gained via the process of rational inference and

deliberation.” (p.169, emphasis mine)

Causal determinism is incompatible with rational inference or reason-based knowledge. (p.173,

emphasis mine)

But in what seems to be a majority of cases he simply makes unrestricted claims of universal

exclusion of knowledge: It appears to be true that one may argue that human beliefs can be rationally affirmed only if humans

possess libertarian freedom (p.167, emphasis mine)

If determinism is true, then atheists—or anyone else for that matter—cannot possess justification

for their beliefs. (p.168, emphasis mine)

If libertarian freedom is not possessed by humans, then humans cannot rationally affirm knowledge

claims. (p.174, emphasis mine)

if an agent is not the source and originator of his own thoughts (and something external to the person

is causally determining the person’s thoughts), or if he does not ever possess the ability to think

otherwise regarding anything, then he is merely left assuming his or her determined thoughts are

good—let alone true! (p.179, emphasis mine)

On the up side, I don’t think this lack of precision in the formulation matters a whole lot, since I

don’t think the claim is any more convincing when it’s modestly restricted to beliefs obtained by

inference to the best explanation, than it is when applied wholesale to all of our beliefs. So, let’s

see how Stratton argues the point.

The contested premise

Stratton formulates the same basic “free-thinking” argument several times, with syllogisms

featuring sometimes as many as 8 steps, but we can skip all the details, because in each case the

one premise that Calvinist determinists will reject is trivial to identify: it’s always the conditional

that says something like “if determinism, then no knowledge.”

It’s the premise called (A3) on page 167: “If humans do not possess libertarian freedom, then

humans do not possess the ability to rationally infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims”

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It’s the one called (C3) on page 171: “If libertarian free thinking does not exist, then the process

of rationality is illusory”

It’s the one called (D1) on page 174: “If libertarian freedom is not possessed by humans, then

humans cannot rationally affirm knowledge claims”

And it’s all the other “if / then” statements I quoted just above when documenting the imprecision

on the argument’s scope. So, what justification does Stratton provide in support of that disputed

conditional? To answer that question properly, I must now break with the order of the book,

because Stratton’s supporting claims are scattered all over the chapter, and they are repeated

throughout, without much of an attempt to sort them out logically. Accordingly, I have to reorder

that material myself, to group related claims, and properly address each contention in turn.

From what I can tell, Stratton makes 7 identifiable claims. He says: 1. that deliberation requires

free will and it’s obvious we have libertarian free will when we choose between options, 2. that

using rationality to refute his argument would be self-defeating as it would tacitly support the

argument, 3. that determinism removes our ability to “think otherwise,” or our access to alternate

possible beliefs, 4. that on determinism, our beliefs are not “up to us,” or are “outside of our

control,” or are “forced” on us, 5. that God on determinism is relevantly analogous to a mad

scientist controlling us and choosing our beliefs for us (which would exclude knowledge), 6. that

on determinism, our cognitive faculties are not aimed at truth, and 7. that the truth of “indirect

doxastic voluntarism” (the thesis that we are sufficiently in control of some of our beliefs to be

judged for them) requires our having libertarian free will. As we will see, it’s a mixed bag: some

of these are deeply confused, and some of them raise pretty good questions. Let’s tackle them all

in order.

Deliberation requires free will and it’s obvious we have libertarian free will as we consider options

Here Stratton offers another 5-step syllogism that boils down to saying rationality requires

deliberation, and deliberation requires libertarian free will. But of course, compatibilists refuse

that second claim, and Stratton gives us precious little in support of it. He gives us a definition of

“deliberation” from the Webster dictionary, that is entirely acceptable by the compatibilist, and

perfectly compatible with determinism: “To weigh in the mind; to consider and examine the

reasons for and against a measure; to estimate the weight of force of arguments, or the probable

consequences of a measure, in order to a choice or decision; to pause and consider.” (p.170).

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He then says: “The question, then, that The Deliberation and Liberation Argument raises is this:

‘Is it possible to truly deliberate without libertarian freedom?’” to which the Calvinist responds

“yes, it is,” and asks for an argument to the contrary. Stratton simply repeats a different version of

the same premise: “It would seem, then, that libertarian freedom is necessary if one genuinely is

to possess the ability to evaluate his thoughts/beliefs and to deliberate in the truest sense.” (p.170)

And that’s it. Stratton doesn’t tell us anything else about deliberation.

He does say that deliberating and evaluating options require “free will,” but he still presupposes

that free will is incompatible with determinism, as evidenced by a handful of false dilemmas: he

says “the evaluative thoughts a person may feel are governing his deliberations are actually caused

and determined by things (or persons) external to him.” Calvinists affirm both horns are true.

Again, he says: determinists (if correct) would not have come to their conclusion about determinism based on their

intelligence or by choosing to examine the evidence to infer the best explanation. Rather, their very

conclusion about determinism would simply be determined by external factors (p.169, emphasis

mine)

But we say both are true. And finally, the same false dilemma between determinism and

deliberation is found in Stratton’s quote of William Lane Craig: if one comes to believe that determinism is true, one has to believe that the reason he has come to

believe it is simply that he was determined to do so. One has not in fact been able to weigh the

arguments pro and con and freely make up one’s mind on that basis. (p.169)

Once again, Calvinists affirm both horns, so we would need an argument to support the claim that

it has to be either one or the other. Instead, Stratton tells us it’s obvious: “it seems intuitively

obvious that humans possess libertarian freedom and make real choices after deliberating among

a range of genuinely available options (at least occasionally)” (p.169). And with his belief that we

obviously experience libertarian free will, he says that the alternative is to see this experience of

making choices as an “illusion,” a view which I was fascinated to learn is held by Guillaume

Bignon: Determinism implies that a human being’s thoughts and beliefs are causally determined by external

factors. It is easy to see, then, why some determinists (like Harris and Bignon) claim that human

choices are illusory. (p.168-169)

At the risk of repeating myself, no, libertarian free will is not an illusion: we don’t have it, and we

don’t appear to have it. And free will simpliciter is not an illusion either: we appear to have it, and

we do have it. I just say it’s compatible with determinism.

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Allow me to pause at this point, to note that when I look at the references to my name so far in this

book, it's really a sight to behold: multiple flagrant misattributions of views I don't hold, a truncated

quote that changes the meaning of my sentence, guilt by association with Sam Harris, and a claim

that my affirmation of basic definitions is a “striking admission.” That’s quite the record.

Let’s proceed.

It’s self-refuting to rationally argue against the argument

Stratton says that using rationality to refute his argument would be self-defeating as it would tacitly

support the argument. The argument’s third premise, which he named (A3), was claiming: “if

humans do not possess libertarian freedom, then humans do not possess the ability to rationally

infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims.” And to defend it, Stratton claims: one must appeal to rationality and assume he has knowledge and/or some degree of justification

about why the third premise is faulty. Consequently, the act of objecting to (A3) appears to

inadvertently presuppose the truth of (A3). (p.168)

No, it presupposes a denial of the consequent, not an affirmation of the conditional. It doesn’t

presuppose the truth of (A3), it presupposes the truth of (A4), which said: “Humans do possess the

ability to rationally infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims.” Stratton can’t keep track of

what his own premises are saying here. And that confusion between (A3) and (A4) is what makes

interaction with Stratton on this topic rather unpleasant, because as soon as he hears you argue, he

claims his argument is vindicated. That’s just silly. It vindicates the undisputed claim that we are

rational (A4), not the disputed conditional that if determinism is true, rationality is excluded (A3).

Alternate possibilities

Stratton says that in order to be justified in our thoughts and beliefs, we must have access to

alternate thoughts and beliefs. This access to alternate possibilities is requested by Stratton

throughout the chapter, with many different formulations. He says that if a person “could not have

chosen better thoughts and beliefs,” then “he is simply left assuming that his determined thoughts

and beliefs are good or the best, as well as whether or not they are true.” (p.174) He says we need

to have the “ability to reject incoherent thinking in favor of coherent thinking” (p.175), and that

one must be able to “think otherwise,” because “If one does not possess any ability to think

otherwise (at least some of the time), then he has no choice but to affirm that a current thought

cannot be otherwise—even if it should be otherwise.” (p.178)

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Again, “if something outside of human control causally determines you to affirm a false belief,

then it would be impossible for you to infer or affirm a better belief—let alone the truth!” (p.167-

168). And again, if a person “could not have chosen better thoughts and beliefs, then he is simply

left assuming that his determined thoughts and beliefs are good (and that his beliefs are true)”

(p.168). Stratton also quotes J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig: “If one is to have justified

beliefs . . . then one must be free to obey or to disobey epistemic rules. Otherwise, one could not

be held responsible for his intellectual behavior” and Stratton comments: “The phrase ‘to obey or

disobey’ implies the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and a range of options available

from which one may choose when it comes to thinking, rationality, and ‘intellectual behavior’”

(p.177).

One last version of the claim: “if [an agent] does not ever possess the ability to think otherwise

regarding anything, then he is merely left assuming his or her determined thoughts are good—let

alone true!” (p.179).

In short, the claim is repeated all over the chapter: one must have the ability to think otherwise.

The problem is that we still haven’t moved beyond the equivocation between “categorical” and

“conditional” senses of the ability to do otherwise. As I mentioned above when dealing with 1 Cor.

10:13 and Stratton’s claim that we “can do otherwise” when facing temptation, there is a

“conditional” analysis of the ability to do otherwise, which has long been offered by the so-called

“classical compatibilists” and is compatible with determinism. That conditional ability, I agree, is

necessary to deliberate freely: if you couldn’t choose option B even if you wanted to, then you’re

not free to choose between options A and B (whether A and B are actions, or simple belief

affirmations). That is compatible with determinism. What Stratton would need to do is to support

the claim that a categorical ability to think otherwise is necessary; that the ability in question must

be interpreted modally as the existence of a possible world which shares a strictly identical past up

until the moment of choice, and contains a different choice. Stratton doesn’t do any of that. Instead,

he jumps from “ability to do otherwise” to “libertarian freedom” just like that: Another rhetorical question on possessing the ability to believe otherwise: “Does a person possess

the ability to reject irrational thoughts and beliefs in favor of rational thoughts and beliefs”? … If a

person answers “yes” to the above question, then he simultaneously, tacitly affirms libertarian

freedom and affirms his ability to choose between options consistent and compatible with his

nature.” (p.175).

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To which I reply: non sequitur. Stratton says it’s a properly basic belief that “at least some humans

do possess the ability to make these evaluative and rational judgments” (p.175). Yes. And from it,

one doesn’t just get libertarianism without an argument.

Finally, I should mention here a possible worry for Stratton’s own position, that doesn’t arise in

his book: it concerns God’s beliefs. If they necessarily correspond to reality (as they must since

God is essentially omniscient), then Stratton cannot analyze God’s ability to think otherwise in

categorical/modal terms, or he would have possible worlds wherein God holds false beliefs (where

the truth is P, but God exercised his categorical ability to freely believe not-P), which is absurd.

Instead, we need to analyze God’s ability to think otherwise in conditional terms, exactly as I

suggest we do for human knowledge: God could—and we could—believe otherwise, if something

were different, namely (at least in the case of God) if the truth to be believed had been different.

This problem mirrors exactly Jonathan Edwards’s argument against the PAP, which pointed out

that if moral responsibility requires the categorical ability to do otherwise, then God cannot be

praiseworthy for acting righteously, as he isn’t able not to act righteously: there is no possible

world in which God acts unrighteously. I articulate and defend Edwards’s argument in my book

Excusing Sinners and Blaming God as well. As to God “believing otherwise,” I suppose a defender

of Stratton’s view may respond that God never “deliberates,” or never “draws inferences to the

best explanation,” and that the categorical ability to think otherwise is only necessary for drawing

inferences. This is where precision on the scope of Stratton’s claim about knowledge may come

to matter, a precision which I documented above is unfortunately lacking.

Beliefs “outside of our control” or “not up to us” or “forced”

In a few instances, Stratton uses the phrase “outside of our control” to refer to things that humans

are determined to do (or to believe). And he says: “if all things are outside of human control, then

this includes exactly what every human thinks of and about and exactly how each human thinks

of and about it.” (p.168, emphasis mine). He also quotes William Lane Craig using that exact

phrase: When you come to realize that your decision to believe in determinism was itself determined and

that even your present realization of that fact right now is likewise determined, a sort of vertigo sets

in, for everything that you think, even this very thought itself, is outside your control. (p.169)

The problem here is quite similar to that with the “ability to do otherwise.” The control that is

necessary for free will can be—and has been—analyzed in ways that are compatible with

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determinism, as well as in ways that are not. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s book

Responsibility and Control did just that, and distinguished between “regulative” control, and

“guidance” control, the latter of which is compatible with determinism. Fischer and Ravizza’s

model, and in particular their call for “reasons-responsiveness” capture relevant desiderata for free

actions while not requiring “regulative” control, and hence remaining compatible with

determinism. Michael Preciado’s recent book A Reformed View of Freedom highlights the

usefulness of guidance control for Reformed theology.7 Stratton doesn’t give evidence that he’s

familiar with these distinctions on “control.” If he is, why not engage with them, and try to take us

beyond the mere equivocation on the phrase “out of our control”?

Likewise, competing accounts are offered for what counts as “up to us.” There are compatibilist

and incompatibilist ways to unpack “up-to-us-ness.” And if free will is compatible with

determinism, then it’s perfectly sensible to describe a free (though determined) action as being “up

to us,” even if it doesn’t satisfy the libertarian’s expectations for a sourcehood condition. So, when

Stratton says that on determinism a human’s thoughts are “not up to that which one refers to as the

‘I’ but to things other than the self” (p.173), the compatibilist will object and request a reason to

unpack “up-to-us-ness” in this incompatibilist way. Instead, the way he sees things, what we do is

“up to God” on one level, and also “up to us” on another level, which preserves free will and moral

responsibility (as well as knowledge). Facing this compatibilist story of what counts as the proper

“source” of one’s action, Stratton’s repetition of the conditional “if an agent is not the source and

originator of his own thoughts (and something external to the person is causally determining the

person’s thoughts), … then he is merely left assuming his or her determined thoughts are good—

let alone true!” (p.179) remains question-begging, as it’s unsupported by premises the Calvinist

would accept.

Finally, in a number of places, Stratton uses the language of “forcing” to describe God’s

determination of all things: “If a person’s thoughts and beliefs are forced upon him, and he could

not have chosen better thoughts and beliefs, then he is simply left assuming that his determined

thoughts and beliefs are good (and that his beliefs are true).” (p.168) He then asks a rhetorical

question: “When there is disagreement amongst individuals, does this imply that God is forcing

(causing) some/many people to believe false propositions?” (172). I don’t know what Stratton

7 Michael Patrick Preciado, A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology (Eugene, OR: Piwkick Publications, 2019).

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means by the juxtaposition “forcing (causing),” because the two are not equivalent, and “forcing”

has connotations of coercion that don’t follow from determinism. But yes, determinism does mean

that all things, including people’s false beliefs, are determined ultimately by God in his providence.

And the Calvinist thinks that God has morally sufficient reasons for determining that, just as he

has morally sufficient reasons for all the evil that happens in this world. It’s Stratton’s job to tell

us—with premises we accept, not just rhetorical questions—why that’s necessarily false. If

“forced” is intended to simply denote determinism, then the claim that it undermines rationality is

question-begging. But if it’s intended to refer to something stronger, like coercion, then Stratton’s

claim isn’t just question-begging, it also stands refuted, because coercion features the use of

physical force or threats, which makes it demonstrably disanalogous to the normal compatibilist

case wherein God determines our choices but uses neither force nor threats.

Mad scientist

Stratton offers a mad scientist manipulation case to argue that we couldn’t know anything if we

were under that scientist’s control, and that the same problem applies if God determines us: Suppose a mad scientist exhaustively controls (causally determines) all of Smith’s thoughts and

beliefs all the time … [and] consider this rhetorical question: “How could Smith (not the mad

scientist) rationally affirm the current beliefs in his head as good, bad, better, the best, true or

probably true without begging the question?” (p.173).

The problem is that Stratton doesn’t tell us how the scientist does that. Does the scientist’s

contraption make our beliefs non-reason-responsive? If he just shoves beliefs in our brains with

electrodes regardless of the evidence coming our way, then of course that makes our cognitive

faculties unreliable and removes warrant for our beliefs, but then that makes it relevantly

disanalogous to the normal compatibilist case where God determines our beliefs in ways that leave

our cognitive faculties reasons-responsive. And conversely, if whatever the scientist does isn’t

breaking the connection between our beliefs and the reasons and evidence coming our way, then

why think it’s impeding on the reliability of our cognitive faculties to detect the truth? All Stratton

says is that our beliefs would not be “up to us,” but “up to the mad scientist” (p.173). I already

pointed out that “up-to-us-ness” need not be exclusive in that way, which makes this disjunction a

false dilemma at least when it comes to God.

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Aiming at truth

Alvin Plantinga famously argued that our true beliefs amount to knowledge only if they are

produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, in an environment that is friendly to them,

and according to a design plan aimed at truth. Additionally, Plantinga argued that if naturalism

and evolution are true, then our cognitive faculties are designed by chance and natural selection to

aim at “survival,” not particularly at “truth,” which would give us a reason to think they’re not

reliable to produce a preponderance of true beliefs. That, in turn, would be a defeater for all the

beliefs they produce, including our beliefs in naturalism and evolution, therefore making the pair

of beliefs self-refuting. He called this the “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.” Stratton

attempts to retool Plantinga’s argument to aim it not just at the naturalist, but also at the Calvinist

determinist: However, these problems are also burdensome for the Calvinist who—aligning himself with the

naturalist—affirms that all things are exhaustively, causally determined, though, not by the forces

of nature, but by God. (p.172)

Plantinga’s claim was that if naturalistic determinism is true, then our cognitive faculties are not

aimed at truth. Stratton seems to endorse Plantinga’s claim against naturalistic determinism, and

additionally claims that if theological determinism is true, then our thoughts are not aimed at truth

either, because they’re always aimed at God’s greatest desires instead; God determines us to hold

some true beliefs, and some false beliefs, all according to God’s plan: Alternatively, if God is exhaustively running the show via causal determinism, then the thoughts

and beliefs of humanity are not necessarily aimed at truth either. Rather, the thoughts and beliefs of

humanity are always perfectly aimed at the will of God—and God causally determines the majority

of humanity to possess and affirm false theological beliefs. Hence, if EDD [Exhaustive Divine

Determinism] is true, then human theological beliefs are not reliable (p.173).

This confuses general design and meticulous providential purposes. The sense of “aim” relevant

to Plantinga’s argument is one that refers to the general design of our cognitive faculties. And the

general design of our cognitive faculties—how God has wired the minds of humans in general—

can perfectly be said to be “aimed at truth” on theological determinism, even as we also say that

God, in his meticulous providence, has specific purposes behind his decree of just when our

cognitive faculties will in fact function properly or not. Therefore, determinism isn’t a reason to

think our faculties aren’t aimed at truth in the relevant sense. That conclusion is only given to you

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by naturalistic determinism (which means Plantinga’s argument against naturalism actually

works), but it doesn’t undermine Calvinism and its theological determinism at all.

Stratton’s misunderstanding of what it means for our cognitive faculties to be “aiming” at

something in the sense relevant to Plantinga’s argument, is most apparent in Stratton’s claim that

on naturalistic determinism, human thoughts are not aimed at anything: “Ultimately, if naturalistic

determinism is true, the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not intentionally ‘aimed’ at anything

since physics and chemistry are running the show.” (p.173) This shows that he doesn’t understand

the “aim” in question. We don’t need an intentional designer to say that on naturalism human

brains are “aimed” at survival. Natural selection can shape a mechanism whose “general design”

is aiming at survival. That’s precisely what Plantinga affirms of our cognitive faculties on

naturalism and evolution. And it is that same idea of “general design” to aim at truth, which theists

affirm is true of our cognitive faculties, and I insist is perfectly compatible with theological

determinism.

Stratton adds that on determinism our beliefs are determined by external factors that are not

rational: their [the determinists’] very conclusion about determinism would simply be determined by external

factors (perhaps chemistry and physics) that are not aimed at truth and have nothing to do with

rationality, the process of acquiring reason-based knowledge, or critical thinking and logic. (p.169)

Yes, chemistry and physics aren’t rational. But on theological determinism, they’re ultimately

determined by God who is most definitely rational. Stratton later does add “God” to the list of

candidates for what determines our thoughts, but somehow insists we’re determined by a “non-

rational” process: their [the d