1 Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use: Analytical Approach and Draft Updated Results Dr. David F. Von...

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Estimated DPRK Military Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use: Analytical Energy Use: Analytical

Approach and Draft Approach and Draft Updated ResultsUpdated Results

Dr. David F. Von HippelDr. David F. Von HippelNautilus Institute Senior AssociateNautilus Institute Senior Associate

Prepared for the “DPRK Energy Expert Study DPRK Energy Expert Study Group MeetingGroup Meeting”, Stanford University, California

June 26 - 27, 2006

DPRK Energy Expert Study DPRK Energy Expert Study GroupGroup 2

D. Von Hippel 6/2006

ESTIMATE OF DPRK MILITARY ESTIMATE OF DPRK MILITARY SECTOR ENERGY USE: OUTLINE SECTOR ENERGY USE: OUTLINE

OF PRESENTATIONOF PRESENTATION Approach to Nautilus DPRK Military Energy Use

Analysis Key Assumptions for DPRK Military Energy

Use: 1990/1996/2000 and 2005 Overview of Draft Results by Subsector and

Fuel Key differences from previous results

Future Energy Paths, Military Sector “What if” Analysis: DPRK Fuel Sufficiency

During Combat

DPRK Energy Expert Study DPRK Energy Expert Study GroupGroup


DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: OVERALL APPROACHOVERALL APPROACH

Overall Approach for Military Energy Use Estimate number of fuel-using vessels,

vehicles, aircraft, armaments from non-classified sources

Estimate hours of use for classes of equipment

Use characteristics of equipment to estimate fuel use for equipment population in each year



DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONSKEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS

Number of vessels, aircraft, armaments assumed in use for the DPRK military in 2000 and 2005 similar to 1996, 1990 levels Except additions of some naval vessels pre-2000 Ground forces in 2005 assumed ~950,000 troops

Ground forces activity in 2000/2005 13-20% lower than estimated 1990 levels Due to shortage of fuel, parts

Aircraft flight hours per year 50-60% of estimated 1990 levels by 2000/2005




Naval force activity at 75% of estimated 1990 levels for 1996 through 2005 for vessels in routine use

Military manufacturing assumed the same in 2000/2005 as in 1996 (80% of estimated 1990 levels)




COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS

GROUND FORCES

Trucks and

General Use

Vehicles

Tanks, Amph. Veh.,

Armored Veh., Other Arms

Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 1990: 1000 100Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 1996: 870 80Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2000: 870 80Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2005: 870 80Fraction of Stock Unuseable: 20%




COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS--AIRCRAFT USE

Mission Hours Per Year: 1990 1996 2000 2005Fighters/Bombers (Note 13 ) 24 18 13 13Transport Aircraft 50 42 34 34Helicopters 32 24 19 19Ave. airspeed--Fract. of Maximum 80% 80% 80% 80%

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS--NAVAL ENERGY USE

Active Hours Per Year in: 1990 1996 2000 2005Amphibious 50 50 50 50Submarines 100 100 100 100Other Vessels 800 600 600 600Ave. power use--Fract. of Max. 50% 50% 50% 50%




Coal and Oil use in buildings and for other (non-vehicle/vessel/aircraft) use similar to 1990

Electricity use falls to 50% of 1990 levels in 1996, 2000, rising slightly again by 2005

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS, MILITARY MANUFACTURING

Lifetime of Ground Forces Equipment (yrs): 20Lifetime of Small Armaments (yrs): 10Lifetime of Naval Vessels (yrs): 30Fract. of Weight of Equip. as Iron & Steel 90%




Military Sector Assumptions (continued)COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS--NAVAL ENERGY USE

Active Hours Per Year in: 1990 1996 2000Amphibious 50 50 50Submarines 100 100 100Other Vessels 800 600 700Ave. power use--Fract. of Max. 50% 50% 50%

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS, MILITARY MANUFACTURING

Lifetime of Ground Forces Equipment (yrs): 20Lifetime of Small Armaments (yrs): 10Lifetime of Naval Vessels (yrs): 30Fract. of Weight of Equip. as Iron & Steel 90%



SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMANDDPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND

As of 2000, Military accounted for ~8% of total DPRK energy demand, but ~37% of oil products demand (~27% if KEDO oil used for electricity production was included)

Estimated Military fraction of DPRK gasoline and diesel use is much higher (more than 50%)—most in dual-use vehicles

DPRK Military Energy Use by Fuel, 2005

Gasoline10.4%

Electricity9.6%

Diesel10.1%

Aviation Gas0.4%

Heavy Oil0.1%

Kero/Jet1.7%

Coal67.7%




- 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000

Terajoules (TJ)

Trucks and other Transport

Armaments

Air Force

Naval Forces

Military Manufacturing

Buildings and Other

DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 2005

CoalPetr. Prod.Electricity




DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by Vehicle/Equipment Type: 2005

Tanks/Heavy Arms1%

2 1/2 Ton Trucks38%

Service Veh./Navy2%

Other Vessels13%

Patrol Craft30%

Service Veh/Air Force

3%

Transport/Helic.2%

Fighters/Bombers9%

Other Trucks/Utility2%



MILITARY FUEL USE UNDER MILITARY FUEL USE UNDER DIFFERENT FUTURE “PATHS”DIFFERENT FUTURE “PATHS”

In ~Sept. 2002, discussions of Military downsizing in DPRK

Projected reduction in military energy use, activity in Redevelopment case versus “Recent Trends” case

Military Energy Use, Redevelopment Case

0

10

20

30

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50

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70

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

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2018

2020

2022

2024

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2028

2030

Mill

ion

GJ BuildingsOther

Milit. Manufact.Naval ForcesAir ForceArmamentsTrucksOth Trans

Military Energy Use, Recent Trends Case

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

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2020

2022

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Mill

ion

GJ BuildingsOther

Milit. Manufact.Naval ForcesAir ForceArmamentsTrucksOth Trans



Based on our estimates of fuel use during routine exercises, fuel use by the DPRK military for 30 days of full-time combat would be about 130,000 tonnes Assumes 50% of ground force equipment inoperable

by the end of 30 days Ground forces are moving (engines of vehicles and

armaments running) about half the time Aircraft cease operations in 24 hours 90% of naval forces cease operation in 5 days

ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBATSUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT



At 2000 fuel import/production rates, would take 3 months to restock military fuels, or ~1.5 months if refineries operate at 100% capacity (and if all supplies diverted to military)

Even at equipment levels present after 30 days, 180% of import/production would be needed to sustain combat (90% if refineries operate at full capacity)

Assumes fuel supply lines are not disrupted, therefore an estimate of maximum capability

ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBATSUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT



THANK YOU!THANK YOU!

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