1 European Monetary System Credits: E. de Souza, P. Mathew.

1

European Monetary System

Credits:

E. de Souza, P. Mathew.

2

Contemporary Currency Regimes

• Free Float – The largest number of countries, about 48, allow market forces

to determine their currency’s value.

• Managed Float – About 25 countries combine government intervention with

market forces to set exchange rates.

• Pegged to (or horizontal band around) another currency – Such as the U.S. dollar or euro

• No national currency– Some countries do not bother printing their own, they just use

the U.S. dollar. For example, Ecuador, Panama, and El Salvador have dollarized.

3

Fixed vs. Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes

• Arguments in favor of flexible exchange rates:– Easier external adjustments.– National policy autonomy.

• Arguments against flexible exchange rates:– Exchange rate uncertainty may hamper international trade.– No safeguards to prevent crises.

• Currencies depreciate (or appreciate) to reflect the equilibrium value in flexible exchange rates

• Governments must adjust monetary or fiscal policies to return exchange rates to equilibrium value in fixed exchange rate regimes

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Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes

• Suppose the exchange rate is $1.40/£ today.

• In the next slide, we see that demand for British pounds far exceed supply at this exchange rate.

• The U.S. experiences trade deficits.

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S D Q of £

Dol

lar

pric

e pe

r £

(exc

hang

e ra

te)

$1.40

Trade deficit

Demand (D)

Supply (S)

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Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes

• Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the dollar will simply depreciate to $1.60/£, the price at which supply equals demand and the trade deficit disappears.

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Supply (S)

Demand (D)

Demand (D*)

D = S

Dollar depreciates (flexible regime)

Q of £

Dol

lar

pric

e pe

r £

(exc

hang

e ra

te)

$1.60

$1.40

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• Instead, suppose the exchange rate is “fixed” at $1.40/£, and thus the imbalance between supply and demand cannot be eliminated by a price change.

• The government would have to shift the demand curve from D to D* – In this example this corresponds to

contractionary monetary and fiscal policies.

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Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate

RegimesSupply

(S)

Demand (D)

Demand (D*)

D* = S

Contractionary policies

(fixed regime)

Q of £

Dol

lar

pric

e pe

r £

(exc

hang

e ra

te)

$1.40

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European Monetary System (EMS)

• EMS was created in 1979 by EEC countries to maintain exchange rates among their currencies within narrow bands, and jointly float against outside currencies.

• Objectives: – Establish zone of monetary stability– Coordinate exchange rates vis-à-vis non-EMS countries– Develop plan for eventual European monetary union

• Exchange rate management instruments:– European Currency Unit (ECU)

• Weighted average of participating currencies• Accounting unit of the EMS

– Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)• Procedure by which countries collectively manage exchange rates

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What Is the Euro (€)?

• The euro is the single currency of the EMU which was adopted by 11 Member States on 1 January 1999.

• These original member states were: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Finland, Austria, Portugal and the Netherlands.

• Prominent countries initially missing from Euro :– Denmark, Greece, Sweden, UK– Greece: did not meet

convergence criteria, was approved for inclusion on June 19, 2000 (effective Jan. 2001)

1 Euro is Equal to:40.3399 BEF Belgian franc1.95583 DEM German mark166.386 ESP Spanish peseta6.55957 FRF French franc.787564 IEP Irish punt1936.27 ITL Italian lira40.3399 LUF Luxembourg

franc2.20371 NLG Dutch guilder13.7603 ATS Austrian

schilling200.482 PTE Portuguese escudo5.94573 FIM Finnish markka

Euro Conversion Rates

12

Benefits and Costs of the Monetary Union

• Transaction costs reduced and FX risk eliminated

• Creates a Eurozone – goods, people and capital can move without restriction

• Compete with the U.S. – Approximately equal in terms

of population and GDP

• Price transparency and competition

Loss of national monetary and exchange rate policy independence

Country-specific asymmetric shocks can lead to extended recessions

13

The Long-Term Impact of the Euro

• If the euro proves successful, it will advance the political integration of Europe in a major way, eventually making a “United States of Europe” feasible.

• It is likely that the U.S. dollar will lose its place as the dominant world currency.

• The euro and the U.S. dollar will be the two major currencies.

14

Bretton Woods Regime(fixed exchange rates)

• Stable exchange rates, but adjustable– US dollar fixed in terms of gold ($35 an ounce)– fixed parity for other currencies in terms of dollar– band around dollar parity: plus or minus 1.0 %– adjustment of parities after consultation with the

IMF• adjustments discouraged, allowed in case of

serious balance of payments disequilibria, postponed by IMF loans

– Central Banks of member countries hold reserves in gold or dollars

– and have right to sell dollars for gold to Federal Reserve

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Bretton Woods Regime(fixed exchange rates)

• Consequences– dollar becomes the international currency

(international dollar standard or gold exchange standard)

– dollar takes on role of reserve currency (interest bearing)

– Central Banks must intervene in foreign exchange markets to stabilise the exchange rate of their currencies by buying and selling dollars

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Problems of B-W regime• Problem 1: Nth Currency Problem

– two currencies means one exchange rate• (N currencies mean N-1 independent exchange rates)

– both countries cannot independently fix the exchange rate.

– EITHER both co-operate (symmetric solution) – OR one follows a policy of “benign neglect”

(asymmetric solution). Role played by the USA

• Problem 2: Realignments– definition: changing the exchange value of a

currency.– rendered difficult by the rules of the regime– postponed as much as possible. – Result:

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Problems of B-W regime• Problem 3: Speculative attacks

– Exchange rate value loses credible– Massive sales (normally) or purchases of the

currency.

• Breakdown of Bretton-Woods regime– Inflation rises in the United States of America

• accelerates because of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies (Vietnam war)

– Two effects• Purchasing power value of US$ falls• Other countries “import” American inflation.

– Markets start selling dollars in large quantities– Movement started by request of the Banque de

France (de Gaulle) to USA to convert its dollar holdings into gold (“exorbitant privilege”).

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Problems of B-W regime

• Breakdown of Bretton-Woods regime (cont’d)– August 15th 1971. Nixon closes “gold window”– December 1971. Smithsonian Agreement: general

realignment and increase of band to plus or minus 2.25% March 1973: free floating

– Strong fluctuations of European currencies against the dollar – and, therefore, even stronger fluctuations between the European currencies

– In this context, the European Monetary System (EMS) is born.

– 1976: Jamaica Agreements (official end to Bretton-Woods period)

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How EMS addressed Bretton-Woods Regime Problems

• Asymmetry– introduction of ECU

• a basket of currencies of all Member States• each currency in the basket assigned a

weight–the weight could change over time

• replaced European Unit of Account

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The ECUA basket of all EC currencies

Belgian franc = Belgian (3.301) and Luxembourg (0.13) franc

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• Asymmetry (cont’d)– introduction of an Exchange Rate

Mechanism• participation in ERM not obligatory• each participating currency assigned a (bilateral)

central parity with respect to each of the other participating currencies (defines a parity grid )

• maximum variation of 2.25% on either side of central parity allowed

– Italy granted exception of 6% on either side.

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• Asymmetry (cont’d)– obligatory and unlimited intervention at the

margin• suppose 1 DEM equalled 20 BEF (central

parity)• market exchange rate could vary between

19.55 and 20.45 BEF• if market rate reached either bound, both the

Belgian National Bank and the German Bundesbank had to intervene in the market

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• Asymmetry (cont’d)– obligatory and unlimited intervention at the

margin (cont’d)• if the exchange rate rose to 20.45 (appreciation of

mark and depreciation of franc)• the Bundesbank and the Belgian National Bank

would have to sell marks and buy francs• German Bundesbank at an advantage because it

could print as many marks as it needed• Belgian National Bank at a disadvantage because it

had a limited stock of marks to sell.• Why oblige both to intervene?

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• Asymmetry (cont’d)– obligatory and unlimited intervention at

the margin (cont’d)• because as a result of the intervention, the

German money supply increased and the Belgian money supply decreased

• German interest rates fell and Belgian interest rates rose, stabilising the exchange rate

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How ERM addressed Bretton-Woods Regime Problems

• Realignment– At the request of one or several countries participating

in the ERM, a consultation occurred involving the Ministers of Finance and the Governors of the Central Banks of all the participating countries.

– These decided whether and to what extent a realignment should take place.

– Consequently, realignments were carried out rapidly and with the agreement of the participating countries.

– The consultation often limited the extent of the realignment out of fear of loss in competitiveness.

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How ERM addressed Bretton-Woods Regime Problems

• Speculative Attacks– obligatory and unlimited interventions by the

two Central Banks whose currencies were involved

– markets would then know that between them the Central Banks would not run out a currency

– this would reduce the probability of a speculative attack

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Functioning of ERM of EMS• Four phases in the functioning of the ERM

– March 1979 to March 1983• Participating countries going there own way

policy-wise. 7 realignments.

– April 1983 to January 1987• Participating countries beginning to recognise

the constraints on policy imposed by the ERM. 4 realignments.

– February 1987 to September 1992• The “hard” EMS. 1 “technical” realignment (Italy).

– October 1992 to end 1998• the period following the “breakdown” of the EMS

and preceding monetary union

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Functioning of ERM of EMS• Four phases in the functioning of the ERM

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Functioning of ERM of EMS

Inflation

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

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1950-1972 1973-1978 1979-1985 1986-1991 1992-1998

France

Germany

Italy

Netherlands

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Functioning of ERM of EMS• Why did the ERM “break down” in Sep. 1992?

– Remote causes• the system had become too rigid

– markets convinced no more realignments before monetary union (Delors effect)

• loss of competitiveness of certain countries• large capital flows into high interest rate

countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal)– is this compatible with interest rate parity?– risk premium.

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– Remote causes (cont’d)• the system had become asymmetric and

dependent on Germany– the Bundesbank set the interest rate for

Germany– the other ERM countries tied their

currencies to the German mark– the other ERM countries adapted their

interest rate to Germany’s» In the ERM, Germany played the role

that the USA played under Bretton-Woods

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– Proximate causes:• capital flows (liberalisation of capital flows in

1990)

• the Bundesbank hikes up its interest rate after re-unification

• Maastricht Treaty vote in Denmark and in France

• Solution: either floating exchange rates or move to monetary union

» Britain chose floating

» as did Italy and Spain temporarily

– fluctuation margins increased to 15% on both sides of central parity

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Transition to a Monetary Union• The Delors Report• The Maastricht Treaty

– The 3 stages– Stage Two: preparing for monetary union

• establishment of the European Monetary Institute

• countries shall endeavour to avoid excessive fiscal deficits

• the criteria for membership

– Stage Three: monetary union

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Cost – Benefit Analysis

Costs• Loss of exchange rate as

adjustment mechanism• Loss of monetary policy

independence• (Partial) loss of fiscal

independence• Conversion costs

∑ costs > ∑ benefits ?

Benefits• Elimination of exchange rate risk• More price transparency• Price stability• More trade• Lower interest rates• International role of the currency• Stronger position in international

policy negotiations

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Monetary Policy Strategy

• The “two pillar” framework for the assessment of the risks to price stability– an “economic analysis” pillar (short term)

• assessment of current economic developments and associated short to medium-term risks to price stability. Includes an analysis of shocks hitting the euro area economy and projections of key macroeconomic variables

– a “monetary analysis” pillar (medium term)• developments in a wide range of monetary

indicators including M3, its components and counterparts, notably credit, and various measures of excess liquidity.

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• The “two pillar” framework for the assessment of the risks to price stability– a “monetary analysis” pillar

• a “reference value” for the rate of growth of the monetary aggregate, M3, is calculated on the basis of the quantity theory of money:

– rate of growth of money stock

= inflation rate + trend growth rate of output – rate of change in velocity of circulation of money

= (below 2 %) + (2 % to 2.5 %) – (-0.5 % to –1 %)

= (more or less) 4.5 %

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3

4

5

6

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9

Jan-

99

May

-99

Sep

-99

Jan-

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May

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Sep

-00

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May

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-01

Jan-

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Sep

-03

Jan-

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Rate of growth of M3 (“reference value: 4.5%)

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Monetary Policy Instruments

• a. Standing facilities

– marginal lending facility (ceiling)• no bank will borrow for more

– deposit facility (floor)• no bank will lend for less

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Monetary Policy Instruments (cont’d)

• b. Open market operations

– buying and selling government bonds to “counterparties” (financial institutions with whom the ESCB deals directly)

– open market operations allow the Central Bank to steer the interest rate within the bounds.

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Monetary Policy Instruments (cont’d)

• c. Minimum Reserves– banks have to deposit at the ESCB a

certain percentage of the deposits they themselves receive from clients. Which means that liquidity is withdrawn from the system. But also affects the profitability of banks who are paying interest on these deposits to clients but cannot lend them to others.

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4. Exchange Rate Policy• Who is responsible ?

– It is the responsibility of the Council, in virtue of Article (EC) 111 and by way of derogation from Article (EC) 300, acting on a recommendation of the Commission or the ECB.

– It must act unanimously if it concerns (i) “conclud[ing] formal agreements on an exchange rate system for the ECU in relation to non-Community currencies”;

– by a qualified majority if it concerns (ii) “adopt[ing], adjust[ing] or abandon[ing] the central rates of the ECU within the exchange rate system”, or (iii) “in the absence of an exchange rate system in relation to one or more non-Community currencies Y formulat[ing] general orientations for exchange-rate policy”.

– The ECB must be always be consulted “in an endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with the objective of price stability” in the first two cases, and “without prejudice to the primary objective of the ECB to maintain price stability” in the third case.

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Exchange Rate Policy• Fixed Exchange rate policy vis-à-vis Pre-ins

(ERM 2)– participation is voluntary– hub and spoke: the Euro is the hub.– unlimited intervention by both parties, UNLESS

danger to price stability– actual participants: Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania

and Slovenia

• Exchange rate policy vis-à-vis the Rest of the World– floating exchange rates– external representation of the Euro-area countries

(see further)

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External representation of the Euro-Area countries“The President of the ECB (replacing the national central bank governors from the euro area) and the President of the EuroGroup will take part in the meetings of G7 Finance Ministers when the world economic situation, multilateral surveillance and exchange rate issues are being discussed. The Commission will be involved to the extent required to enable it to perform the role assigned to it by the Treaty, and it will attend the meetings in connection with specific issues, to be determined by the Ministers.”

Furthermore, the ECB has been granted observer status at the International Monetary Fund where only the governments are represented. The Economic and Monetary Union will be represented by the president of the Euro-area countries assisted by a representative of the Commission.

44

The Stability and Growth Pact

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Stability and Growth Pact• Origins of the Pact (to caricature a bit)

– French considered ESCB statutes a necessary evil to bring Germany into a monetary union

– France wanted a strong countervailing power

– Germany refused a monetary union without some economic convergence

– Germany wanted rules to maintain fiscal discipline once monetary union achieved

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The Macroeconomic Role of Fiscal PolicyThe Stabilisation Role• Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers (no gov’t action

required).– A rise in output increases tax revenues and

decreases government expenditures. This dampens the increase in output.

– A fall in output lowers tax revenues and raises government expenditures. This increases output.

• Discretionary Fiscal Policy.– Policy changes in gov’t. expenditures and/or

revenues.

• Cyclically Adjusted Budget Deficits (CAB).– Actual budget deficits minus the automatic changes.

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Why Fiscal Rules?• Historical Background

– In the 1980s, there was a large accumulation of government debt in most OECD countries, which was unprecedented in peacetime.

– As a consequence, fiscal sustainability became the main fiscal policy issue, and major reforms of the fiscal policy framework were undertaken in nearly all OECD countries.

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)

• Legal Basis– Article 99 of the EC Treaty - multilateral

surveillance• through monitoring of economic policies and the

publication of Broad Economic Policy Guidelines

– Article 103 of the EC Treaty – “no bail out” clause

– Article 104 of the EC Treaty - Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)

• procedures for establishing existence of, and taking effective action against, excessive deficits and debt levels.

– Protocol on EDP annexed to the Treaty• definition of reference values for excessive government

budget deficit and debt; and other details.

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)• Relevant texts

– Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [the “preventive arm”]

• aims, through regular surveillance, at preventing budget deficits going above the 3% reference value. Requires the submission of stability and convergence programmes.

• imposes a medium-term objective of a government budget close to balance or in surplus

– measured in cyclically adjusted terms (see Code of Conduct)

– Council Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the EDP [the “dissuasive arm”]

• in the event of the 3% reference value being breached, requires Member States to take immediate corrective action, and, if necessary, allows for the imposition of sanctions. Council can provide an “early warning” of an eventual deficit.

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SFP)

• Relevant texts (cont’d)– Council Regulation 3605/93 on the application

of the Protocol on the EDP (updated: 475/2000, 351/2002)

• provides precise statistical content to the concepts of government budget deficits and debt

– European Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact (Amsterdam, 17 June 1997)

• a political commitment by all parties involved in the SGP to a proper implementation of the budget surveillance process.

52

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)

• Relevant texts (cont’d)– Declaration by ECOFIN Council reaffirming

commitment to SGP (1 May 1998)

– Code of Conduct on content and format of stability and convergence programmes

• laid down by Monetary Committee (12 October1998) and revised by Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) (2001), which replaced the Monetary Committee.

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Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)• Art. 104.1 Member States shall avoid

excessive deficits– exception: UK (shall endeavour to avoid

excessive deficits)

• Art. 104.2 specifies the meaning of excessive deficits. An excessive deficit exists if– the ratio of the planned or actual

government deficit to GDP exceeds a reference value

– the ratio of government debt to GDP exceeds a reference value

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Stability and Growth Pact• The reference values are specified in a

protocol to the Treaty– 3% for the ratio of the planned or actual

government deficit to GDP at market prices – 60% for the ratio of government debt to

GDP at market prices.

• The concepts are defined statistically in Regulation 3605/93 (revised by regulations 475/2000 and 351/2002)

55

Stability and Growth Pact• Art. 104.3 to 6 concern the procedure for

identifying situations of excessive deficit• Art. 104.7 to 11 concern the procedure for

ensuring the correction of excessive deficits– Art 104.7 and 8 apply to all EU Member States– Art 104.9 to 11 apply only to Euro-area Member

States

• Art 104.12 concerns the abrogation of the EDP when the Member State is deemed to have corrected its excessive deficit.

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Stability and Growth PactCouncil Regulation 1466/97

– also known as the “preventive arm”– Euro-area MS must submit a pluri-annual

“stability programme” updated annually– the other MS must submit a pluri-annual

“convergence programme” updated annually

– the contents are identical– the programme should lay down how the MS

plan to respect the norms laid down in the excessive deficit procedure

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Stability and Growth Pact

• The programme must– include the medium-term objective for a

budgetary position which is close to balance or in surplus

– indicate the adjustment path towards this objective.

• The Council will decide whether to approve the stability programme or to invite the member state to adjust it.

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• The Council will also monitor its implementation and may issue recommendations in this context.

• The Council may issue an “early warning” to a Member State before an excessive deficit occurs.

• Article 104.2 of the Treaty allows the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product to exceed the reference value only if this situation is exceptional and temporary

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• Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 defines what is to be understood by “exceptional and temporary”.

• In particular, it states that an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn will be considered exceptional only if there is an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%.

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• A smaller decline can only be considered exceptional by the Council, – on the initiative of the Member State

concerned, – when there is supporting evidence on the

abruptness of the downturn or on the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends. • Annual falls of less than 0.75% will not

be considered as severe

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Stability and Growth Pact• The procedure laid down in Article 104 of the EC

Treaty to be followed for establishing an excessive deficit is further specified in Regulation (EC) 1467/97 which lays down– that decisions are taken by (a majority of two thirds of the

votes of) the Council, excluding (the votes of) the representative of the Member State concerned, and acting on a recommendation from the Commission.

– the deadlines that are to be observed– the rules for monitoring and assessment of the corrective

actions taken– and the eventual application of sanctions if corrective action

is not taken or deemed unsatisfactory• sanctions are applied only to Euro-area members• in the event of persistent excessive deficits

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Stability and Growth Pact• Sanctions

– in the first year of sanctions, the MS concerned must pay a non-interest bearing deposit equal to• fixed component: 0.2% of GDP, plus• variable component: 10% of difference

between deficit and the 3% reference value• a ceiling of 0.5% of GDP is set.

– in subsequent years only the variable component is paid

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The Stability and Growth Pact in Action

• The SGP entered into force with the start of monetary union– 1 July 1998 for Regulation 1466– 1 January 1999 for Regulation 1467

• In the lead up to monetary union:– there was a great effort made towards “fiscal consolidation”– in order to qualify for membership in the monetary union

• Since the start of monetary union– there has been a steady relaxation in the effort– so that now we appear to be back in 1991 re: fiscal

consolidation

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• Portugal– 30 January 2002: Commission proposes that an “early

warning” be issued to Portugal (and Germany) under Regulation 1467/97.

– 12 February 2002: Council decides not to do so: Portugal profits from heavy pressure exerted by Germany.

– 16 October 2002: Commission issues an opinion that an excessive government deficit exists in Portugal. [Art. 104 (5)]

– 5 November 2002: Council declares that an excessive deficit exists in Portugal and recommends action. [Art. 104 (6) and (7)]

– Portugal acts to remove the excessive deficit

– Excessive deficit procedure against Portugal was abrogated this spring (2004)

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The Stability and Growth Pact in Action• Germany

– 30 January 2002: Commission proposes that an “early warning” be issued to Germany (and Portugal)

– 12 February 2002: Council decides not to do so under heavy pressure from Germany (pre-election period).

– 8 January 2003: Commission issues an opinion that an excessive government deficit exists in Germany [Art. 104 (5)]

– 21 January 2003: Council decides that an excessive deficit exists in Germany and recommends action [Art. 104 (6) and (7)]

– 18 November 2003: Commission issues an opinion that Germany has not acted on the recommendation and proposes legally binding measures [Art. 104 (8) and (9)]

– 25 November 2003: Commission recommendations do not obtain the required qualified majority. Council proceeds further (see below) and adopts a set of conclusions put forward by the Italian Presidency.

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• France– 21 January 2003: France receives an “early warning” from

the Council– 7 May 2003: Commission issues an opinion that an

excessive government deficit exists in France [Art. 104 (5)]– 3 June 2003: Council decides that an excessive deficit exists

in France and recommends action [Art. 104 (6) and (7)]– 21 October 2003: Commission issues an opinion that France

has not acted on the recommendation and proposes legally binding measures. [Art 104 (8) and (9)]

– 25 November 2003: Commission recommendations do not obtain the required qualified majority. Council proceeds further (see below) and adopts a set of conclusions put forward by the Italian Presidency.

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• Three elements in the Council proceedings on 25 Nov. 2003:• 1. It did not accept the Commission’s Recommendations under

Article 104 (8) and 104 (9): no qualified majority in favour.• 2. It used the voting procedure of Article 104 (9) to vote in a

new set of conclusions.• 3. These conclusions were in the nature of a new

recommendation.

• The Commission sued the Council before the ECJ which concluded (in substance) on 13 July 2004 that:– The lack of a qualified majority effectively held the “excessive

deficit procedure” in abeyance till the Commissin proposed a new recommendation

– The Council acted illegally in proposing a new recommendation (a prerogative of the Commission)

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Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact

Relevant texts• “Strengthening Economic Governance and Clarifying the

Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, Communication of the Commission of 3 September 2004, COM(2004)581 final.

• “Improving the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, Council report agreed by the ECOFIN Ministers at their extraordinary meeting of 20 March, and endorsed by the European Council of 22/23 March 2005.

• Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, (presented by the Commission), COM(2005) 154 final, Brussels, 20.4.2005

• Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (presented by the Commission), COM(2005) 155 final, Brussels, 20.4.2005.

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1 European Monetary System Credits: E. de Souza, P. Mathew.

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