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1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute www.worldbank.org/wbi/ governance Global Issues Seminar Series, March 1 st , 2006 "If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it." -- Lord Kelvin
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Page 1: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

1

Governance and Corruption Worldwide:

Empirical Evidence and Lessons for PolicyDaniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institutewww.worldbank.org/wbi/governance

Global Issues Seminar Series,

March 1st, 2006

"If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it." -- Lord Kelvin

Page 2: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Challenging Convention – key tenets

1. Governance and Corruption are Unmeasurable

2. Some evidence: Governance has improved globally?

3. Good Governance: outcome of development and

growth? – & emerging economies are corrupt…?

4. The trouble is with Public Sector & Officials in LDCs

5. Cultural & Historical Determinism of Corruption

6. Fighting corruption by ‘Fighting Corruption’

(Laws, Codes, Campaigns, Agencies & More

Regulations)

Page 3: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Tenet # 7: Challenging the previous ‘popular notions’

1. Data Matters -- on Governance & Institutions: while ‘sensitive’, & margins of error (not uniquely) – data can be gathered, analyzed, and used judiciously

2. Expanding Beyond the Washington Consensus-- Adding to the Macro and the Structural’/Sectoral: Institutions, Governance and Corruption Matters

3. On Average: stagnation on Governance, and level is low -- Has it become a binding constraint nowadays?

4. Significant variance: some countries show that it is feasible to improve governance in the short term

5. Interventions that have not worked – vs. what may work better in the future? – Transparency, Meritocracy and Deregulation matters – within collective action with private sector, legislative and judiciary

Page 4: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Six Dimensions of Governance

• The process by which those in authority are selected and replaced – VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY – POLITICAL STABILITY & ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE/TERRORISM

• The capacity of government to formulate and implement policies– GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS– REGULATORY QUALITY

• The respect of citizens and state for institutions that govern interactions among them – RULE OF LAW – CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

Governance as the set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised -- specifically:

Page 5: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Voice & Accountability, 2004 (Selected Countries)

-2.5

0

2.5M

YA

NM

AR

KO

RE

A,

NO

RT

H

ER

ITR

EA

TU

RK

ME

NIS

TA

N

SU

DA

N

UZ

BE

KIS

TA

N

SY

RIA

SO

MA

LIA

BE

LA

RU

S

ZIM

BA

BW

E

PA

KIS

TA

N

EG

YP

T

RU

SS

IA

VE

NE

ZU

EL

A

MA

DA

GA

SC

AR

IND

IA

GH

AN

A

AR

GE

NT

INA

KO

RE

A,

SO

UT

H

SO

UT

H A

FR

ICA

GR

EE

CE

MA

UR

ITIU

S

UR

UG

UA

Y

CH

ILE

ES

TO

NIA

PO

LA

ND

HU

NG

AR

Y

GE

RM

AN

Y

NE

TH

ER

LA

ND

S

FIN

LA

ND

NO

RW

AY

DE

NM

AR

KPoor Governance

Governance Level

Margins of Error

Good Governance

Source for data: : 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.

Page 6: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Control of Corruption: one Aggregate Indicator (selected countries from 204 worldwide, for illustration, based on 2004 research

data)

-2.5

0

2.5E

QU

AT

OR

IAL

GU

INE

A

KO

RE

A, N

OR

TH

TU

RK

ME

NIS

TA

N

UZ

BE

KIS

TA

N

TA

JIK

IST

AN

BA

NG

LA

DE

SH

VE

NE

ZU

EL

A

ZA

MB

IA

RU

SS

IA

KO

RE

A, S

OU

TH

MA

UR

ITIU

S

SO

UT

H A

FR

ICA

GR

EE

CE

ITA

LY

BO

TS

WA

NA

SL

OV

EN

IA

CH

ILE

FR

AN

CE

SP

AIN

UN

ITE

D K

ING

DO

M

NE

TH

ER

LA

ND

S

NO

RW

AY

NE

W Z

EA

LA

ND

FIN

LA

NDPoor

Governance

Governance Level

Margins of ErrorGood

Governance

Source for data: : 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.

Page 7: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Government Effectiveness, 2004: World Map

Source for data: : 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.

Page 8: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Judiciary Independence (EOS survey results 1998-2004)

1

4

7

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Inde

pend

enci

a de

la J

udic

atur

a

OECD

East Asian NICs

Latin America

NON OECD

High Independence

No Independence

Page 9: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Are all Countries Stagnating in Governance?

• The world on average has not improved

• But large or small variation across countries?

• New method: for each country, we can identify

whether there are significant changes over time

• It is found that changes can take place in the

short-term: in 6-to-8 years, some deteriorations

as well as some significant improvements as well

Page 10: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

19

Changes in Rule of Law, 1996-2004

-2

0

2Z

IMB

AB

WE

IVO

RY

CO

AS

T

SW

AZ

ILA

ND

VE

NE

ZU

EL

A

MO

LD

OV

A

C. A

FR

. R

EP

.

ET

HIO

PIA

CU

BA

EG

YP

T

GE

RM

AN

Y

U.K

.

NIG

ER

IA

UG

AN

DA

JO

RD

AN

RO

MA

NIA

SL

OV

AK

RE

P.

SE

RB

IA

SL

OV

EN

IA

MO

ZA

MB

IQU

E

MA

LT

A

ES

TO

NIA

CR

OA

TIA

LIT

HU

AN

IA

Changes were calculated on the basis of the differences in country estimates from 1996 and 2004. Classification for major deteriorations and improvements were based on 75% confidence interval. Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.

Major Deterioration

(selected countries)

Major Improvement

(selected countries)

Insignificant Change

Page 11: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Governance Indicators: Zimbabwe, 1996/2004

Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.

Page 12: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

21

Croatia 2004 vs.1996

Page 13: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

23

Governance Indicators: Chile, 1996/2004

Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 ; Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.

Page 14: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Governance Matters: The 300% ‘Dividend’

1. Large Development Dividend of Good Governance: a one-standard-deviation improvement in governance raise incomes per capita in a country by about 300% in long-run

2. But is such a decline in corruption unrealistically large?: NO -- One S.D. is the difference from: Eq. Guinea Iran or Uganda Mauritius Portugal Finland or New Zealand

3. The impact is from governance to incomes, and not viceversa -- higher incomes alone will not do

4. Urgency of interventions to improve governance

Page 15: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

25

-1

0

1

Low Voice Middle Voice High Voice

Voice and Accountability

Con

trol

of C

orru

ptio

n

Good

Voice and Accountability vs. Control of Corruption

Source for Control of Corruption: : 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/).

Page 16: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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The ‘Mezzo’ Level of Governance Measurement

• Based on cross-country surveys, mainly of enterprises – (such as the EOS of WEF, BEEPS/WBES of WB, etc.)

• Thousands of firms interviewed on a range of issues; focus on governance, specialized questions

• More detailed unbundling of governance and corruption phenomena than aggregate indicators

• Relatively broad country coverage, but less than aggregate governance indicators

• Measuring what is taking place De Facto matters: it uncovers stark realities masked in De Jure indicators

• Addresses empirically: ‘It takes two to “tango”’

Page 17: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

27

Some Key Constraints to Business, by Region, Responses from the Firm in EOS 2005

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

OECD East Asia NICs East Asiadeveloping

Middle East &North Africa

Latin America

Foreign Currency Bureaucracy Corruption

Tax Regulations Inflation

% firms reporting constraint among top 3:

Source: EOS 2005. The question posed to the firm was: Select among the above 14 constraints the five most problematic factors for doing business in your country.

Page 18: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Figure 1: Better Governance is Associated with Higher Country’s Competitiveness

ZWE

VNM

VEN

URY

USA

GBRARE

UKR

UGA

TUR

TUN

TTO

THA

TZA

TJ K

TWNCHE

SWE

LKA

ESP

ZAF

SVN

SVK

SGP

YUG

RUS

ROM

QAT P RT

P OL

P HL

P ER

P RY

P AN

P AK

NOR

NGA

NIC

NZLNLD

NAM

MOZ

MAR

MNG

MDA

MEXMUS

MLT

MLI

MYS

MWI MDG

MKD

LUX

LTULVA

KGZ

KWT

KOR

KEN

KAZ

J OR

J P N

J AM

ITA

ISR IRL

IDN

IND

ISL

HUN

HKG

HND

GUY

GTM

GRC

GHA

DEU

GEOGMB

FRA

FIN

ETH

SLVEGY

ECUTMP

DOM

DNK

CZECYP

HRV CRICOL

CHN

CHL

TCD

CAN

CMRKHM

BGRBRA

BWA

BIHBOL

BEN

BEL

BGD

BHR

AZE

AUT

AUS

ARGDZA

ALB

2

4

6

-2 -1 0 1 2 3Control of Corruption

Glo

bal

Co

mp

etit

iven

ess

Ind

ex

Low

Low High

High

r = 0.90

Sources: GCI is from GCR2005/6 by WEF, Control of Corruption from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, ‘Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’.

Page 19: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

29

2

3

4

5

6

7

Yaounde Douala Bogota Medellin Vilnius Kaunas Madrid Barcelona

Fre

quen

cy o

f B

ribe

ryVariance in Governance across cities within same country:

Bribery in Procurement as an illustration

Source: author calculations based on EOS firm survey, WEF2003, 271 cities. Question: In your industry, how commonly firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with awarding of public contracts? (7: very common…. 1: never occur)

High Bribery

Low

SpainColombia LithuaniaCameroon

Page 20: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

30

Local Services:Local Services:Access to Water, City Governance and GlobalizationAccess to Water, City Governance and Globalization

(Non OECD Sample)(Non OECD Sample)

20%

100%

Acc

ess

to W

ater

(%

)

Poor Governance Good Governance

Control of Corruption

Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption

Bribery in Utility State Capture

Local City

Global City

Sources: EOS 2003, UN 1998, KK 2002 & KLM 2004

Page 21: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

31

The ‘Micro’ Level – In-depth in-country diagnostics for action programs

Key Features of Governance Diagnostic Tools

• Multi-pronged surveys of: households, firms and public officials [‘triangulation’]

• Experiential questions (vs. ‘opinions’/generic)

• Local Institution Implements, w/WB Collaboration

• Recognizing Multidimensionality of Governance

• Focus on Service Delivery

• Input for Action and Change: Action Programs

Page 22: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

32

Misgoverned vs. well Governed Agencies in-Country (as ranked by public officials, 2000 diagnostic)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Professional Oranizations

The Church

Army

NGOs

Ombudsman

The President of the Republic

Petroecuador

Police

Customs

Transit Council

Congress

The Transit Commission of Guayas

% reporting that the agency is very corrupt

Page 23: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

33

Citizen Voice Helps Control Bribery Citizen Voice Helps Control Bribery (Bolivia Diagnostics)(Bolivia Diagnostics)

Based on 90 national, departmental, and municipal agencies covered in the Bolivia Public Officials Survey.

10

20

30

40

50

Low Moderate_Low Moderate_High High

Voice / External Accountability

Bri

ber

y

Simple Average Association Control Causal Link Margin of Error

Page 24: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

35

Policy Implications 1. Measuring governance is important 2. Measuring Governance is feasible 3. Governance Matters: large “development dividend”• strong causal impact of governance on incomes, but

little evidence that higher incomes raise governance4. The world on average is ‘stagnant’ – but some

countries have improved significantly5. Need to refocus efforts to improve governance • frank questioning of what doesn’t work: -- Anti-Corruption campaigns-- Drafting more laws, codes, and Conventions-- Create additional ethics and A-C agencies-- ‘Blame’ History, Culture or Legal Origins-- ‘Blame’ Reform, Privatization, Globalization

Page 25: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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What Appears to Work…

1. ‘Data Power’ + Transparency Strategy & Reforms

2. Voice and Accountability – incl. Freedom of the Press

3. Subnational Level Reforms and Focus (cities, villages..)

4. Deregulation/ Integrate to world economy & markets

5. Focus on Incentives and on Prevention

6. Meritocratic Civil Service & Oversight Institutions

7. Budgetary/Public Expenditure Reforms

8. Political Finance Reform

9. Role of Corporate/Banking Sectors & Multinationals

10. Judicial Reform

Page 26: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Governance Has Improved in Some Groups:e.g. “Pull Effect” of EU Accession

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Rul

e of

Law

EUAccessed

ex-SovietUnion (noaccess)

Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/. EU EE Accessed Countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

High

Low

Page 27: 1 Governance and Corruption Worldwide: Empirical Evidence and Lessons for Policy Daniel Kaufmann, The World Bank Institute .

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Bibliographical References1. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2005. "Governance Matters IV:

Governance Indicators for 1996-2004." http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Synthesis_GovMatters_IV.pdf (synthesis), and, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Synthesis_GovMatters_IV.pdf (full paper)

2. Kaufmann, D. and A. Kraay. 2003. "Governance and Growth: Causality Which Way?" http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/growthgov_synth.pdf.

3. Kaufmann, D. 2003. "Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy." http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/rethink_gov_stanford.pdf.

4. Kaufmann, D. 2004. "Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World."

http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Kaufmann_GCR_101904_B.pdf.5. Bellver, A. and D. Kaufmann (2005). "Transparenting Transparency: Initial

Empirics and Policy Applications". http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/TransparencyIMF.html

Governance Indicators User Interface: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.


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