IN THE MATTER OF A PUBLIC INQUIRY

UNDER THE INQUIRIES ACT 2005

AND THE INQUIRY RULES 2006

THE GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

WITNESS STATEMENT OF

PHILIP BOOTH

I, PHILIP BOOTH state as follows:

Introduction

1. I make this statement in response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry's Rule 9 letter to me

dated 12 July 2019. This statement also voluntarily responds to questions posed to me

by the Metropolitan Police.

2. I make reference to a number of contemporaneous documents throughout this

statement, which are appended as exhibits. Where I make reference to such

documents, I use the following reference "PB/[ ]".

My background

3. I graduated with a Business degree in Managerial and Administrative Studies from

Aston University in 2001. I am a member of the Association for Project

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Management. Having checked my training records, I can confirm that I have

completed the following training during my career:

(a) Association for Project Management APMP qualification (IPMA Level D)

(b) PRINCE 2

(c) Various management and project management training courses including:

Microsoft project, insights management training, Contract procurement,

consulting skills, financial management, Biophilia and Wellness training.

(d) Attendance at industry related conferences and seminars including: London

real estate forum, Association for retirement communities, Cluttons charity

estates forum.

4. I joined Appleyards Limited (which was subsequently purchased by Artelia Projects

UK Limited) ("AUK") in January 2005. I left AUK in April2016. Whilst working for

AUK both my salary and national insurance were paid by AUK.

5. Between August 2001 and January 2005, I worked as a Project Manager for Glen

Care, working on projects relating to mental health hospitals. Since May 2016 to date,

I have been a Partner at Cluttons, in the Project Management Consultancy Division.

6. When I joined AUK my internal job title was Assistant Project Manager and at the

time of the Grenfell Tower Refurbishment project (the "Project") I had been

promoted to a Senior Project Manager. I ultimately was promoted to a Project

Director within AUK.

7. At the time of the Project, in terms of my position within AUK, I reported to Bill

Phelps at AUK, who was the Head of Projects. When Bill Phelps left AUK at the end

of2015, Ian Bailey became my line manager.

8. In relation to the Project itself, I reported to Simon Cash, who was the Project

Director.

9. Prior to the Project I had worked on a number of school refurbishment projects. Some

ofthose projects involved curtain walling and cladding, in relation to low rise school

buildings, i.e. 1 to 3 floors.

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10. Prior to the Project, I had fulfilled the role of Employer's Agent on a range of

projects. Whilst at Glen Care I was involved in around 4-5 design and build projects

of new hospitals in the healthcare sector. At AUK I worked on construction related

projects as Employer's Agent in the education, commercial and heritage building

sectors. The capital value of these projects varied from £1 million to £15 million.

My role on the Project

11. I understood that AUK had three roles on the Project: (i) Employer's Agent ("EA");

(ii) Quantity Surveyor ("QS") and (iii) CDM-Coordinator ("CDM-C"). I am aware

that AUK first became involved in the Project in 2012 and that its formal appointment

documents were signed in July 2014.

12. My role on the Project started around April 2013 when I was brought in to assist my

colleague, Robert Powell, who was the EA on the Project at the time. In July 2013,

Robert Powellleft AUK and I assumed the role of EA.

13. In my role as EA I reported in to Simon Cash, who, as Project Director, was the senior

person responsible for the Project on behalf of AUK. Simon Cash had overall

responsibility for service delivery and management of the AUK team on the Project. I

also worked alongside Chweechen Lim, the QS, and Keith Bushell, the CDM-C. In

my role as EA, I was initially assisted by Peter Blythe, and later by Nick Valente who

were both Assistant EAs. It is common that an EA will be assisted by an Assistant

EA, dependent upon the scale and complexity of a project.

14. I worked in the same AUK office as Chweechen Lim. We talked regularly. Our

interactions were via internal discussions, meetings, calls, emails and meetings with

the client. I would have discussed costs issues with Chweechen.

15. My interaction with Keith Bushell was primarily at the beginning of the construction

works on the Project. Our interactions were about how the refurbishment works

would be carried out on site in a safe and managed way. I spoke to Keith Bushellless

frequently than I spoke to Chweechen Lim; perhaps weekly or every other week. Our

interactions were via internal discussions, meetings, calls and emails.

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16. I understood the Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation ("TMO")

to be AUK's client. Generally on the Project, my main point of contact at the TMO

was Claire Williams. During the tender process on the Project, which I discuss in

more detail below, I interacted with Jenny Jackson, a procurement specialist at the

TMO. I also had interactions with David Gibson, Paul Dunkerton and Peter Maddison

at the TMO, examples of which I discuss later in this statement.

17. In addition, I interacted with Bruce Sounes at Studio E (the Architect on the Project),

Matt Smith at Max Fordham (the TMO's M&E consultant on the Project) and Simon

Lawrence and Simon O'Connor at Rydon (the building contractor appointed on the

Project).

18. My interactions with these parties m relation to the Project were cordial and

professional. In terms of co-operation, co-ordination and communication between

myself and the other parties on the Project, we typically communicated by email and

telephone and regular project meetings were arranged. I attach as Schedule A to this

statement a table detailing the principal minuted meetings on the Project that I

attended.

19. I do not recall having any direct dealings with the Royal Borough of Chelsea &

Kensington ("RBKC"), other than having some interaction with John Alien ofRBKC

Building Control regarding the building control fees for the Project

(see PB/1 [ ]). I also do not recall having any direct dealings with Harley

Curtain Wall I Harley Facades.

20. I do not recall any direct interaction with EXOVA Warringtonfire. I was aware of

them and I understand they were appointed to provide advice to the TMO on fire

strategy, as I received some emails and documents regarding their involvement for my

information.

21. As to the RBKC Planning Authority, I was involved in some issues relating to the

planning application for the Project and I refer to some examples of my involvement

in those issues and contact with the Planning Authority later in this statement. The

technical issues relating to planning were being dealt with by Studio E and the TMO's

planning consultant, IBI Taylor Young, and I was kept informed of their progress in

this regard. Obtaining planning permission for the Project was a fundamental issue in

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terms of whether or not the Project could proceed and therefore was one, as EA, that I

needed to monitor.

22. Around mid-June 2015 I was assigned to another project which required a full time

commitment from me. The EA role was taken over by Neil Reed, who I understand

continued in that role until handover and practical completion of the Project. I left

AUK in April2016.

The role of an EA generally

23. The EA role is a defined contractual role under a JCT Design and Build contract,

usually accompanied by the RlCS Employer's Agent Services schedule which will set

out the specific duties of the EA. The RlCS is the Royal Institute of Chartered

Surveyors and it is a regulatory body that oversees the surveying profession. The

specific EA duties that are selected in an RlCS Employer's Agent Services schedule

will vary from project to project and will be dependent on the client's specific

requirements.

24. The exact scope of the EA role will depend on which boxes are ticked in the RlCS

standard form appointment, but the role does not involve signing off or approving any

designs or materials. I enclose a copy of the RlCS Employer's Agent Services

schedule contained in AUK's appointment, which shows which EA services AUK

were appointed to carry out on the Project (PB/2 [ ] and

PB/3 [ ]).

25. An EA's role is administrative in nature. AUK were appointed under the RlCS

standard form appointment and, as the EA for AUK, I was there to administer the

contract, manage the costs and report against them, and support the client through the

processes and systems of the Project. At all times, however, the client was the entity

which had to take all necessary decisions relating to the Project. AUK did not have

any decision making role.

26. Generally, an EA will be involved in issuing client instructions, variations and

payments throughout a project. An EA also usually supports a client by setting up the

building contract, administering it and monitoring the building contractor's progress

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in relation to it and checking whether the building contractor has finished the works

under the building contract.

27. In terms of monitoring how a project is progressing, an EA often takes account of the

RIBA Outline Plan of Work, which sets out the process of managing and

administering building contracts into a number of key work stages. At the time of the

Project, the RIBA Outline Plan ofWork 2007 was applicable (PB/4 [ ]). It

divided a project into Stages A-L. The RIBA Outline Plan of Work 2007 provides a

useful framework for an EA to determine what stage a project is at and, as set out in

the document itself, what the key activities on the project should be.

28. The EA role is different to the Project Manager role and there is a separate RICS

Project Manager Services schedule for that role. During the Project I was sometimes

mistakenly referred to as the Project Manager in minutes and other documents, and it

was also included in my email signature. The reference to Project Manager referred

to my internal job title at AUK and not my role on the Project, which was EA.

29. I am not aware of any statutory responsibilities held by an EA at the time of the

Project nor am I aware of any statutory responsibilities on an EA being introduced

subsequently.

30. An EA does not check materials proposed by designers. There will normally be a

specification in the contract setting out what material must be used or whether

equivalent materials can be used. Where 'equivalent' wording is used, the contractor

can suggest what it would like to use. The architect or the client needs to say whether

that alternative material is acceptable or not. An EA also does not check compliance

with Building Regulations. The responsibility for obtaining the certificate from

Building Control confirming compliance with Building Regulations is on the

contractor, and an EA will expect to see that certificate confirming such compliance at

the end ofthe Project.

My introduction to the Project

31. I was first introduced to the Project in April 2013. I recall being introduced to it by

Simon Cash, who gave me a briefing as to the status of the Project and its current

issues. Robert Powell, who was the EA at that time, was leaving AUK and therefore

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the plan was for me to take over the EA role on the Project from him. There was,

however, an overlap period during which both Robert and I were working on the

Project, which served as a handover period.

32. My recollection is that the Project was borne out of the fact that RBKC had an

ongoing project relating to the school and leisure centre that were next to the

Grenfell Tower and that it also wanted to refurbish Grenfell Tower to provide the

residents with new kitchens and bathrooms, additional flats in the lower levels,

upgrades to the boxing club, nursery and playground and, more generally, improve

the aesthetics of Grenfell Tower.

33. I recall that at this time there was a significant difference between AUK's cost

estimate for the Project and that being proposed by Leadbitter, who was the potential

building contractor to be appointed on the Project. Whilst it is not unusual to have

differences in cost estimates, particularly this early on in a project, the difference

here was significant. I recall that there had been some discussion as to whether the

main contractor should be re-procured, but initially the TMO decided to continue

with Leadbitter with a value engineering exercise to be undertaken to identify cost

savings. This was confirmed by Peter Maddison of the TMO during a Project

Review meeting on 26 April2013 (PB/5 [ ] and PB/6 [ ]).

34. On 30 April 2013, Robert Powell emailed Paul Dunkerton at the TMO as a follow

up to the Project Review meeting on 26 April 2013 to inform him that AUK was

starting to pull together an action plan. In this email he mentioned that payment of

outstanding consultants' fees was a first step (PB/7 [ ]). Robert Powell

sent a further email to Paul Dunkerton at the TMO and David Hale at AUK

regarding the plan to address outstanding consultants' fees (PB/8 [ ]). On

3 May 2013, David Hale of AUK sent an email to Paul Dunkerton at the TMO

giving him details of outstanding invoices of Studio E, Max Fordham and IBI Taylor

Young (PB/9 [ ], PB/10 [ ], PB/11 [ ] and

PB/12 [ ]).

35. The TMO halted its planning application for the Project whilst steps were taken to

pull together an action plan and to rethink the scope of the design and possible VE

options (PB/13 [ ]). As I had some capacity at the time, I assisted Robert

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Powell of AUK on some tasks on the Project, including the preparation of an

adjusted near term action plan (PB/14 [ ], PB/15 [ ] and

PB/16 [ ]). The plan went up to mid-September 2013 and was sent to

the TMO on 2 May 2013, along with an initial draft for a revised project brief which

had been prepared by Robert Powell (PB/14 [ ] and

PB/16 [ ]). The brief set out the original scope of the Project, the

proposed revisions to the scheme and potential value engineering items that had

been proposed by the proposed contractor (this being Leadbitter at the time).

36. The first meeting I attended on the Project was a VE and Project Review Meeting

which took place on 9 May 2013 (the minutes incorrectly record the date as 8 May

2013) (PB/17 [ ], PB/18 [ ] and PB/19 [ ]). Prior

to the meeting, on 8 May 2013, I prepared a document setting out the financial and

other implications of adding and removing various aspects of work to the Project. I

asked Chweechen Lim and Simon Cash for their input on the high level costs of

some of those additions and omissions, so as to guide the TMO as to what to add and

omit to the Project to make it more affordable (PB/20 [ ] and

PB/21 [ ]). The proposals were set out in a 'Brief Additions and

Omissions' table and also contained some VE items which had previously been

proposed by Leadbitter and had already been costed. One of these items included

changing Aluminium Cladding and Schuco curtain wall and windows to Insulated

Render and standard Aluminium frame windows, which produced a saving of

around £610,000. Chweechen provided me with some estimated costs on the same

day in relation to heating proposals, alternative access to the walkway level and

options for kitchen, bathroom, door entry upgrade and communal decorations.

(PB/22 [ ] and PB/23 [ ]).

37. With regard to outstanding fees on the Project, on 10 May 2013, Paul Dunkerton

asked me to check his draft fee report, which set out details of fees agreed and paid

to date and outstanding fees. I responded the same day with comments on his draft

(PB/24 [ ] and PB/25 [ ]).

38. Following the VE and Project Review Meeting a number of updates were made to

the Brief Additions and Omissions table. This was sent to Paul Dunkerton of the

TMO on 14 May 2013 to assist with an upcoming Board Meeting he had

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(PB/17 [ ]). The updated table noted that a saving of £40,000 could be

made by reducing the high level cladding from 4m to 2m on the roof of the building

and removing the crown. The table also noted that changing the cladding from

Aluminium cladding and Shuco curtain wall to insulated render would result in a

saving of £325,000, but was "highly unlikely to be acceptable to planners"

(PB/19 [ ]). On the same day I also sent a draft version of the Project

Brief to Paul Dunkerton which incorporated the updated table for his approval

(PB/26 [ ] and PB/27 [ ]). The proposed omissions set out

in the table amounted to a total saving of around £1,717,000.

39. Alongside the Brief Additions and Omissions table, I sent Paul Dunkerton my mark­

up of a summary report on costs which had been prepared by the TMO. The main

changes I made to this report were to update the costs to take account of the

decisions made in the VE and Project Review Meeting (PB/28 [ ] and

PB/29 [ ]).

40. Although there was a lot of discussion on VE and time spent considering VE

options, VE is common in many projects.

41. During the 9 May 2013 VE and Project Review Meeting there was also a discussion

on the arrangements for the appointment of consultants and contractors. I felt that

the appointments needed further consideration and on 10 May 2013 I emailed Paul

Dunkerton of the TMO to inform him that AUK were proposing to prepare a

procurement paper for the TMO's consideration and approval. I wanted to ensure

that everyone's role, how the contracts and appointments worked and what the TMO

were committing to was clear going forward (PB/24 ] and

PB/25 [ ]).

42. Following the VE and Project Review Meeting, on 10 May 2013, Andrew McQuatt

of Max Fordham emailed me their views on possible M&E VE options

(PB/30 [ ], PB/31 [ ], PB/32 [ ] and

PB/33 [ ]). I shared these with Leadbitter, which in turn provided its

proposed M&E subcontractor's comments (PB34/ [ ] and

PB/35 [ ]). I then obtained Max Fordham's views on these comments.

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43. Around this time the reconciliation of outstanding fees payable to the project

consultants, including Studio E, was an issue that still needed addressing. On 21

May 2013 a meeting took place between the TMO and AUK. I was not present at

this meeting, but Robert Powell sent me a summary of what was discussed

afterwards (PB/36 [ ]). He summarised:

"Interesting meeting this am !

Basically- Peter Maddison has been over-ruled by Laura Johnson ....

She wants to keep the works for the boxing club and nursery and doesn't want

to progress the kitchens & bathrooms at this stage necessarily .....

Also PM not keen on progressing with leadbitter ....

Our report kicking this all off was based upon the objective of preserving

programme- This now not so important. Value for money is .....

Accordingly we are likely to re procure scheme via OJEU ! .. . "

44. On 24 May 2013, Robert Powell sent Peter Maddison and Paul Dunkerton at the

TMO a recommendation regarding payment of Studio E's outstanding fees

(PB/37 [ ] and PB/38 [ ]). AUK assisted the TMO in

addressing the issue of outstanding consultants fees by considering the validity of

the fees claimed and then drafting professional fee reconciliation letters for the TMO

to send to Studio E, Max Fordham and IBI Taylor Young (see PB/39 [ ],

PB/40 [ ], PB/41 [ ], PB/42 [ ] and

PB/43 [ ]).

The decision to re-procure the Project

45. Although I had limited direct interaction with Leadbitter my impression of them as a

contractor was that they were not open or transparent about how they had built up

their figures in their costs estimate for the Project. I was also aware that Leadbitter

were already engaged on the Kensington Academy and Leisure Centre project

("KALC"), having been appointed via the IESE framework, which was running

alongside the Grenfell Project and adjoined Grenfell Tower. "IESE" is the

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Improvement and Efficiency South East framework for public sector construction

projects, which contains a group of pre-approved building contractors, from which a

client can select.

46. On KALC Lead bitter had submitted a number of requests for extensions of time and

additional costs. I also got the impression that Leadbitter did not seem to have the

appetite for the Project. The Project involved the refurbishment of a fully occupied

high rise building; it was very different in nature from KALC as that involved a new

build.

47. Despite these concerns I had not expected the TMO to decide to re-procure the main

contractor. A month earlier, on 23 April 2013, Robert Powell of AUK had issued a

Status Report to the TMO advising them that whilst there were issues with

Leadbitter, there was less risk in sticking with Leadbitter than going out to tender.

The Report advised that the focus should be on preserving the programme

(PB/44 [ ] and PB/45 [ ]).

48. In projects there are three drivers; price, quality and time. This is known as the

'golden triangle'. The drivers are fairly independent of each other but the strategy

taken and how key decisions are made will depend on what the client considers to be

the most important. For example, if cost is the driver the product must still function

and meet the base line quality standards, but a lesser quality may be chosen in order

to get the lower price.

49. Initially, on this Project, I understood that 'time' (or programme) was the key driver

for the TMO. My understanding was that the TMO wanted work on the Project to

take place alongside work on KALC so that it could benefit from economies of

scale. I also recall that there was some concern amongst residents that Grenfell

Tower would not in fact be refurbished, and the TMO was keen to dispel those

concerns by commencing the works as soon as possible.

50. I agreed with the conclusion reached in the Status Report Robert Powell had

prepared. As programme was the driver and a contractor was already on board, it

made sense to stick with Leadbitter and avoid the delay involved in going down a

long procurement route. However, following the meeting on 21 May 2013, the

TMO's decision to change the driver from programme to demonstrating value for

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money meant that the recommendation in the Status Report to preserve the

programme was no longer tenable. The shift from programme to value for money

(or 'price') was a significant change in the TMO's order of priority. To demonstrate

that the best price had been achieved, the TMO would need to go out to open

competitive tender. This had to be reflected in the Status Report and as a result

AUK changed its recommendation to reflect the new driver.

51. On 23 May 2013, I sent an email to Paul Dunkerton and Peter Maddison at the TMO

attaching a revised version of the TMO's summary report on costs (see

PB/46 [ ] and PB/47 [ ]). This report estimated the total

construction costs, including preliminaries and a contingency allowance, at

£9,364,000. The overall Project cost (excluding VAT) was estimated at £10,594,000.

The summary report also included comments on the disadvantages of the current

scheme, potential savings from value engineering options and some new scheme

options. On 28 May 2013, David Gibson at the TMO confirmed the revisions to this

summary report on costs reflected the discussions he had had with Robert Powell at

their meeting on 21 May 2013 (see PB/48 [ ]).

52. An addendum to the Status Report was also issued by AUK to the TMO on 24 May

2013. In the covering email sent by Robert Powell to Peter Maddison of the TMO

(PB/49 [ ] and PB/50 [ ]) he stated:

"This should now give you the comfort you are looking for to proceed to

looking to re-procure the construction against our earlier recommendation

(which was based on now obsolete information)."

53. The addendum to the Status Report included the following clarificatory wording on

the TMO's key priorities for the Project:

"The original report made some recommendations based upon knowledge of

the project and our understanding of the TMO 's priorities at that time.

In the intervening period and following a meeting the TMO held with Laura

Johnson of Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea in week commencing 13

May 2013, the TMO have clarified their position relating to a number of

contributory factors to the scheme:

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• Value for Money is to be regarded as the key driver for the project;

• Whilst the inclusion of a Decent Homes provision (works to kitchens &

bathrooms) was to be considered this work is no longer critical as it

could be accommodated under a separate project at a later date;

• RBKCI TMO wish to retain works to the boxing club and the nursery as

originally brieftd;

• RBKCI TMO support the omission of some of the works to commercial

space to the garages and 'finger blocks';

• RBKCI TMO remain to be convinced that the existing arrangements

with Leadbitter can produce value for money and believe entering in to

a new, competitive procurement process will give best value to the

scheme. This process is likely to entail an OJEU procurement exercise;

and

• [AUK] to review possibility of utilising alternate framework

procurement."

54. The addendum recommended that the TMO:

"Review options to replace the contractor with the target of improving value

for money- Framework I OJEU option to be considered".

The re-procurement phase

55. On 3 June 2013 I circulated an updated Project Brief to the TMO for their review

and approval, which had been amended to reflect the new project driver

(PB/51 [ ], PB/52 [ ], PB/53 [ ] and

PB/54 [ ]). I also told the TMO that I wanted to discuss the order of

priority of the proposed additions (which had previously been discussed in the VE

and Project Review meeting on 9 May 2013) as they were not all affordable

(PB/51 [ ]).

56. On 6 June 2013 I attended a Project Review meeting between AUK and the TMO

which took place at AUK's offices (PB/55 [ ], PB/56 [ ] and

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PB/57 [ ] ) . At item 1.1 of the meeting minutes it was noted that, subject

to inserting overall project costs, the TMO approved the Project Brief. During the

meeting the TMO also requested that AUK review the previous addendum to the

Status Report to include greater detail on programme and costs to demonstrate that

tendering the contract would deliver greater value for money. This was recorded at

item 2.1 ofthe meeting minutes.

57. I was tasked with updating both the Project Brief and the Status Report. I asked

Chweechen Lim to update the costs report to include the full project costs and sent

her a number of documents to assist, including a document on proposed cladding

materials prepared by Studio E which listed zinc and aluminium as options

(PB/58 [ ], PB/59 [ ], PB/60 [ ],

PB/61 [ ], PB/62 [ ], PB/63 [ ] and

PB/64 [ ] ). In the meantime I worked on revising the addendum to the

Status Report to take on board the comments raised by the TMO in the 6 June

meeting. The updated version was sent to the TMO on 19 June 2013 with the

following revised wording (PB/65 [ ], PB/66 [ ] and

PB/67 [ ]):

"Given that the amended project brief gives primacy to value for money for

the project we recommend that the TMO re-procures the Principal Contractor

through an OJEU compliant, open Market tender.

Furthermore, by submitting to a restricted tender list in connection with a

framework procurement solution, this could exclude Leadbitter from the

opportunity to fairly bid for the work. It is our opinion, that to do this would

expose the TMO to the risk that Leadbitter might seek to challenge the re­

procurement process with attendant effect on time and cost to the project.

An OJEU compliant re-tendering exercise would, in our opinion, provide the

TMO with the best opportunity to secure proven competitive market rates for

the construction whilst maintaining the opportunity for Leadbitter to bid

competitively for the work, negating the risk of a challenge to the process".

58. During the 6 June Project Review meeting the TMO also requested that Studio E

attend a Residents Meeting on 17 June 2013 to advise on design developments. I

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was requested to attend on behalf of AUK (PB/56 [ ]). The purpose of

the Residents Meeting was to enable the TMO to explain the current status of the

Project and what had happened during the previous six months to residents of the

Grenfell Tower. It was my understanding that the TMO had requested that Studio E

and I attend so that they could assure residents that the relevant parties had been

engaged and the work was going to be carried out. In advance of this Residents

Meeting, I sent an email to Peter Maddison at the TMO on 13 June 2013 with some

possible questions that might be raised at that meeting and possible answers to those

questions (PB/68 [ ]).

59. On 11 June 2013 I sent the TMO a draft revised programme showing the two

procurement routes for the main contractor; OJEU and the LHC Framework

(PB/69 [ ] and PB/70 [ ]). I explained to the TMO, that

although the OJEU process would take a month longer than the LHC Framework, it

was a more open procurement option and would still be open to Leadbitter, thereby

reducing the risk of Leadbitter raising a complaint or claim against the TMO

(PB/69 [ ] and PB/70 [ ]). The revised addendum to the

Status Report, which had been issued on 19 June 2013, also set out AUK's

recommendation that the TMO re-procure the Principal Contractor though an OJEU

compliant, open market tender (PB/65 [ ], PB/66 [ ] and

PB/67 [ ]).

60. On 25 June 2013 I chased the TMO for a decision on the procurement process

(PB/71 [ ], PB72 [ ] and PB/73 [ ]). 1 sent

further chasers on 2 July and 10 July 2013 explaining that we would not be able to

finalise the professional team appointments, implement the OJEU procurement

process or develop and agree the Pre-Qualification Questionnaire ("PQQ") until we

had formal confirmation of the TMO's decision. I explained that if the OJEU notice

was not issued by 22 July 2013, this would delay the proposed start on site date of

February 2014 (PB/74 [ ], PB/75 [ ], PB/76 [ ],

PB/77 [ ] and PB/78 [ ]).

61. At this stage, the fees for AUK, Studio E and Max Fordham's involvement in the

Project were under consideration. As part of my role as EA, I advised the TMO on

the fee proposals made by Studio E and Max Fordham.

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62. On 3 July 2013, Bruce Sounes at Studio E sent Peter Maddison at the TMO a fee

proposal for Studio E's work through to completion (PB/79 [ ] and

PB/80 [ 1).

63. On 4 July 2013, I emailed Max Fordham informing them that it was proposed that

they would remain appointed to the TMO post tender and not novated like Studio E.

I asked Max Fordham to provide its proposed fee to the end of the Project

(PB/81 [ ], PB/82 [ ], PB/83 [ ],

PB/84 [

PB/87 [

], PB/85 [

], PB/88 [

], PB/86 [

] and PB/89 [

],

]). Duncan

Campbell replied on 9 July 2013 with details ofMax Fordham's proposed fees.

64. On 10 July 2013, I emailed David Gibson at the TMO with details of AUK's

additional work and fees for the period April to September 2013, which were set out

in a letter from Robert Powell of AUK to the TMO dated 28 June 2013. I also asked

him to confirm in writing the TMO's decision to proceed with OJEU procurement of

the main contractor, so that I could proceed to prepare the necessary documents

(PB/77 [ ] and PB/78 [ ]).

65. On 12 July 2013, the TMO issued their formal instruction to AUK to proceed with

the OJEU procurement of the main contractor (PB/90 [ ] and

PB/91 [ ]). The TMO also informed Leadbitter of their decision to re­

procure. I understand that Leadbitter did not raise any objections at this time and

instead offered any assistance the TMO might need (PB/92 [ ] and

PB/93 [ ]).

66. On 16 July 2013, David Gibson at the TMO confirmed AUK's fee proposal for the

period April to September 2013 that was set out in Robert Powell's letter dated 28

June 2013 (PB/94 [ l and PB/95 [ 1). He noted that this

proposal covered AUK's services up to 16 September 2013, after which there would

be a separate fee arrangement for AUK's fees going forward.

67. On 17 July 2013, David Gibson at the TMO forwarded me an email that Peter

Maddison had sent to Cllr Feilding-Mellen at RBKC on 16 July 2013, which

attached a document produced by Studio E setting out a number of different options

for cladding (PB96 [ ], PB/97 [ ] and PB/98 [ ]).

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These included both zinc and aluminium options. I am not a designer and therefore I

was not technically qualified to comment upon those options and did not do so. It is

not an EA's role to do so.

68. On 19 July 2013, I sent David Gibson and Paul Dunkerton at the TMO an update on

professional fees and overall project budget (PB/81 [ ],

PB/82 [ ], PB/83 [ ], PB/84 [ ],

], PB/87 [ ], PB/85 [

PB/88 [

], PB/86 [

] and PB/89 [ ]). I noted that I was considering the

fee offers recently provided by Max Fordham and Studio E.

69. On 8 August 2013, Chweechen Lim of AUK sent David Gibson, Peter Maddison

and Sasha Kulidzan at the TMO an updated cost plan based on drawings issued in

July 2013, entitled 'Stage D Cost Plan rev A' (PB/99 [ ] and

PB/100 [ ]). The cost plan provided AUK's estimated costs for the main

elements of the proposed works on the Project at that time, based on the latest

available drawings. Chweechen Lim as QS prepared it. As EA, whilst I would be

aware of Chweechen working on updated costs estimates at appropriate stages in the

Project I was not involved in the calculations that underpinned the figures in such

estimates, as that was the QS' role.

Tender Documentation

70. The PQQ is a document setting out a series of questions for potential contractors to

answer regarding their commercial, technical and financial competencies. It is used

to help public sector buyers assess potential suppliers of services or contractors

where certain levels of technical ability are required.

71. I prepared an initial draft of the PQQ which I discussed in a meeting with Jenny

Jackson and David Gibson of the TMO. Following that meeting, on 16 August

2013, I circulated the PQQ and a PQQ Evaluation Report to the TMO for review and

comment (PB/101 [ ], PB/102 [ ], PB/103 [ ],

PB/104 [ ], PB/105 [ ] and PB/106 [ ]). The

PQQ Evaluation Report set out the criteria against which the contractors would be

assessed and the relevant weighting given. The evaluation criteria included

assessing engagement and effective communication with residents, which had the

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highest weighting at 20% (PB/103 [ ]). Other assessment criteria

included programme management, detailed design and liaison with planning

authorities and experience of working on high rise buildings.

72. Jenny Jackson, a procurement expert at the TMO, took the lead role in reviewing the

PQQ and Evaluation Report. Although AUK had responsibility for administering

the tender process, the process itself was strategically led by the TMO, and in

particular by Jenny Jackson. As the TMO's procurement advisor, Jenny Jackson

heavily influenced how the tender process was carried out.

73. On 19 August 2013 Jenny Jackson sent AUK a mark-up of the re-procurement

documents. She provided a number of comments on the Tender Report and

amended the sconng and weighting system for the PQQ questions

], PB/108 [ ], PB/109 [ ] and (PB/107 [

PB/110 [ ]). I responded to Jenny Jackson on the same day. I let her

know that I had accepted her changes to the documents and that my intention was to

issue the OJEU the following day.

74. The weightings agreed with the TMO for the evaluation criteria were as set out

below:

Evaluation area Weighting%

Experience of working with clients and third parties to secure 15

grants and contributions for environmental improvements

Engage and communicate effectively with residents 20

Programme management 10

Effective supply chain management 10

Detailed design and liaison with planning authority 10

Experience of working on high rise buildings 10

Introduction of innovation -particularly energy conservation 10

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Working next to a live construction site 5

Community engagement 5

Environmental waste management 5

Total 100

75. The Grenfell Tower OJEU notice was published on 20 August 2013. The OJEU

notice itself had been drafted with legal input from an external law firm, Trowers

and Hamlins LLP, and was approved by David Gibson of the TMO

], PB/112 [ ], PB/113 [ 1 and (PB/111 [

PB/114 [ ]). The notice had a PQQ return date of 20 September 2013,

by which date completed PQQs had to be submitted. The PQQ should also have

been finalised by this date. However, despite chasing from AUK, it was not signed

off by the TMO until 27 August 2013. In the period that followed a total of 22

PQQs were issued to interested contractors.

76. On 10 September 2013, I attended an M&E design review meeting with the TMO,

Max Fordham and Studio E. Following this meeting, on 13 September 2013, I

circulated a mark-up of the M&E design review paper that had been presented by

Matt Smith of Max Fordham at that meeting, in order to highlight action items for

respective parties (PB/115 [

PB/117 [ ], PB/118 [

], PB/116 [

] and PB/119 [ ]).

],

77. On 17 September 2013 I sent the TMO a PQQ Evaluation marking spread sheet that

would be used to mark the returned PQQs (PB/120 [ ],

PB/121 [ ] and PB/122 [ ]). The PQQ was made up of 12

sections, and sections 1 to 10.1 were all pass/fail questions. I explained to the TM 0

that AUK would mark these questions on the basis that if the contractor did not pass

any of the questions, then the TMO and AUK would not need to spend time marking

the subsequent questions. The remaining sections of the PQQ were subjective

questions, to be marked by AUK and the TMO separately, with the scores then being

reviewed and moderated into a single combined score for each contractor. The

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subjective questions focused on the delivery of the Project and asked for examples

of experience in areas such as working effectively with the supply chain, managing

liaison with the planning authority and dealing with challenges on high rise

properties (PB/122 [ ]).

78. On 18 September 2013, Simon Cash sent David Gibson at the TMO a copy of

AUK's fee proposal for the remainder of the Project (PB/123 [ ] and

PB/124 [ ]). Ultimately, a revised version of this proposal dated 27

February 2014, which was sent by Simon Cash at AUK to Jenny Jackson at the

TMO, was included as part of AUK's appointment executed by the TMO

(PB/3 [ ]).

79. On 20 September 2013 Jenny Jackson reviewed the PQQ Evaluation marking sheet

and confirmed that she had no revisions to it (PB/125 ],

PB/126 [ ] and PB/127 [ ]).

80. By the 20 September 2013 deadline 5 PQQs were returned. These came from

Durkan, Keepmoat, Mulalley, Rydon and Wates. There was some concern from

Jenny Jackson that several contractors might drop out, leaving too limited

competition. She asked that AUK assess how to proceed once the PQQ responses

had been evaluated (PB/128 [ ]).

81. As I have explained above, the PQQs were made up of pass/fail questions, which

AUK marked, and subjective questions which were scored by each of AUK and the

TMO in order to calculate an average. On 25 September 2013 we sent the TMO the

PQQ Evaluation sheet setting out our

(PB/129 [ ] and PB/130 [

scores for the PQQ responses

]). We did not find any major

problems with any of the PQQs, but we highlighted a few things that we wanted to

discuss with the TMO. The main question was whether the example projects

Durkan had included matched the required criteria (PB/129 [ ]). I also

let the TMO know that, whilst the number of responses was disappointing, the

quality of the returns we had received looked sufficient to deliver the Project

(PB/129 [ ]).

82. On 20 September 2013 I sent the TMO a table of contents showing AUK's initial

thoughts on how the Tender Document for the Project might be structured

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ART00008527 _0020 ART00008527/20

(PB/131 [ ], PB/132 [ ] and PB/133 [ ]). These

were for discussion at a meeting between AUK and the TMO the following week to

discuss the tender process. I also sent the TMO a flow diagram of the tender process

moving forward and noted that the next milestone was the review of the PQQ

responses (PB/131 [ ], PB/132 [ ] and

PB/133 [ ]).

The Tender Review process

83. On 25 September 2013 a meeting took place at the TMO's offices to review the

tender process. Simon Cash, Peter Blythe and I attended from AUK, whilst David

Gibson, Jenny Jackson and Claire Williams attended from the TMO. During the

meeting we discussed the eligibility of the PQQs received, and in particular whether

the examples provided by Durkan in its PQQ met the minimum requirements. It was

decided that the PQQs did show the desired range of skills and therefore none should

be disqualified (see items 1.2 and 1.3 of PB/134 [ ] and

PB/135 [ ]). A number of other items relating to the tender process were

discussed, and I note some of these below:

(a) The TMO and AUK were to score the PQQs separately, with the

overall score being the average;

(b) The TMO decided that they wanted 2 or 3 residents to be involved in

the scoring process. Claire Williams was responsible for organising

this;

(c) Both parties were to use the sconng document provided by Jenny

Jackson as a way of keeping notes. Any discrepancies between the

scores would be discussed at the next tender meeting;

(d) It was agreed that the scoring of the tenders was to be 40% cost and

60% quality, with 5% of the quality score being based on the

interview; and

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ART00008527 _0021 ART00008527/21

(e) The bidders' conference was scheduled for 4 December 2013 (later

changed to 5 December 2013) at the TMO's offices with an optional

site visit for contractors in the afternoon.

84. During the meeting on 25 September it was also agreed and noted that the contract

would be a JCT Design and Build (D&B) contract.

Design Development

85. During the re-procurement process the design continued to be developed. A Design

Review meeting took place on 24 September 2013 at which a review of the Stage D

M&E Design was carried out (PB/136 [ ] and PB/137 [ ]).

During the meeting it was also noted that the project cost was over budget by

£376,000, at a total of £10,299,000.

86. On 27 September 2013, Bruce Sounes of Studio E emailed AUK, the TMO and Max

Fordham summarising a meeting they had with Harley Curtain Wall, a cladding

supplier. Bruce Sounes' email described Harley Curtain Wall as being "specialists

in this type of project" and noted that (PB/138 [ ]):

"1. Their "back of a fag-packet" budget, based on the areas is "around £3m ",

of which would include~ £250kfor the mast climbers and zinc rainscreen

cassettes. This equates to 18% over our Stage D budget of £2. 3m

(assuming access costs fall under Preliminaries).

2. Their recurring experience is that budgets force clients to adopt the

cheapest cladding option: Aluminium Composite Material (ACM), face­

fixed. We have offered to forward a more detailed take-off so they can

provide a more accurate budget. A Zinc Composite Panel is also

available which is cheaper to install than a cassette . ... "

Bruce Sounes also said that Studio E had approached Paneltec who were preparing

budget costs (PB/138 [ ]).

87. Max Fordham also continued to develop its Stage D Report. I provided some

handwritten comments on their Stage D Report on 30 September 2013, which

mainly related to clarifications to be made via surveys and to ensure that was what

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ART00008527 _0022 ART00008527/22

being proposed was allowed for in the cost plan. I also commented that Building

Control confirmation was to be sought for the extension of the smoke ventilation

system and a decision was required on whether the Tower gas supply should be

metered (PB/139 [ ] and PB/140 [ ]).

88. Max Fordham updated and circulated their Stage D Report on 9 October 2013,

incorporating the comments I had made and incorporating further comments

received from the TMO (PB/141 [ ] and PB/142 [ ]).

During a Design Team Meeting on 22 October 2013, it was confirmed that Max

Fordham's Stage D Report was approved (PB/143 [ ],

PB/144 [ ], PB/145 [ ], PB/146 [ ],

PB/147 [

PB/150 [

PQQ Evaluation

], PB/148 [

] and PB/151 [

], PB/149 [ ] ' ]).

89. On 9 October 2013 Jenny Jackson of the TMO sent me the results of the evaluation

undertaken by the TMO of the subjective PQQ questions (PB/152 [

and PB/153 [ ]). Question 10.3 of the PQQ, which related to

communication and coordination with residents during the works, was evaluated in a

meeting attended by two residents of Grenfell Tower, and David Gibson, Jenny

Jackson and Claire Williams ofthe TMO. The remaining questions were evaluated

by Jenny Jackson and Claire Williams (PB/152 [ ] and

PB/153 [ ]). Peter Blythe and I marked the subjective questions on

behalf of AUK. The scores were added together and an average computed.

90. The PQQ scores were discussed during a Tender Review Process meeting on 14

October 2013, which I attended alongside my colleagues Simon Cash and Peter

Blythe. Jenny Jackson attended on behalf of the TMO (PB/154 [ ],

PB/155 [ ], PB156 [ ], PB/157 [ ],

PB/158 [ ] and PB/159 [ ]) . During the meeting it was noted

that AUK's scores were slightly higher than the TMO' s, but none of the marks for

the questions were too far apart and no further action needed to be taken. The

minutes also noted that AUK was to send letters containing feedback and invitations

to tender on behalf of the TMO to the five contractors (PB/158 [ ]).

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ART00008527 _0023 ART00008527/23

Letters were sent to each of the contractors letting them know that they had been

invited to tender at the beginning ofNovember 2013.

91. The draft tender documents which I had previously circulated were also discussed.

It was agreed that some of the weightings needed to be amended and approved by

the TMO. It was also agreed that the evaluation of the Tender Price would include a

score for both the proposed fee for gaining funding and the potential works that may

be added. The initial idea was to score 80% for works, 15% for options and 5% for

funding. At item 3.11 ofthe minutes it was noted that the design team needed to be

commissioned to perform a technical audit to check whether the tenders met the

specification (PB/158 [ ]). Finally, it was noted that the TMO were still

pushing for 1 November 2013 for the design coordination and I was asked to find

out when Studio E planned to carry out their design review.

92. I had previously emailed Studio E on 11 October 2013 regarding the design review

and had set out the documents that were needed from them for the re-procurement

(PB/160 [

(PB/161 [

]) . I chased Studio E for this information on 17 October 2013

] and PB/162 [ ]). On 22 October 2013 I attended

a Design Team Meeting alongside Chweechen Lim and Peter Blythe of AUK, and

representatives from the TMO, Max Fordham, Studio E and Curtins. At the meeting

it was noted that Max F ordham and Curtins would have their tender packages ready

by 1 November 2013, but that Studio E were not on track to meet the deadline as

they required time to coordinate the design. It was agreed that Studio E would have

their tender package completed in advance of the tender review meeting between

AUK and the TMO on 12 November 2013. At this time there were a number of

tender documents and drawings that were still outstanding and I expressed concern

during the meeting that the agreed tender document delivery date would not be met

(PB/163 [ ], PB/164 [ ] and PB/165 [ ]). Both

Curtins and Max Fordham sent their tender documents by the 1 November deadline

(PB/166 [ ], PB/167 [ ], PB/168 [ ] ' PB/169 [ ], PB/170 [ ], PB/171 [ ] ' PB/172 [ ], PB/173 [ ], PB/174 [ ] ' PB/175 [ ], PB/176 [ ], PB/177 [ ] ' PB/178 [ ], PB/179 [ ], PB/180 [ ] '

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ART00008527 _0024 ART00008527/24

PB/181 [ ], PB/182 [ ], PB/183 [ ] ' PB/184 [ ], PB/185 [ ], PB/186 [ ] ' PB/187 [ ], PB/188 [ ], PB/189 [ ] ' PB/190 [ ], PB/191 [ ], PB/192 [ ] ' PB/193 [ ], PB/194 [ ], PB/195 [ ] ' PB/196 [ ], PB/197 [ ], PB/198 [ ] ' PB/199 [ ], PB/200 [ ], PB/201 [ ] ' PB/202 [ ], PB/203 [ ], PB/204 [ ] ' PB/205 [ ], PB/206 [ ], PB/207 [ ] ' PB/208 [ ], PB/209 [ ], PB/210 [ ] ' PB/211 [ ], PB/212 [ ] and PB/213 [ ]). On 1

November 2013, Curtins sent to me and Bruce Sounes at Studio E, amongst other

documents, a document entitled "Structural Performance Specification For the

Design, Supply and Application Of Overcladding Systems to Grenftll Tower"

(PB/214 [ ], PB/215 [ ], PB/216 [ ] ' PB/217 [ ], PB/218 [ ] and PB/219 [ ]). As noted

on its cover page, this document was prepared for Studio E. I would not have

reviewed this document in detail nor would I have been able to comment on its

technical contents. On 3 November 2013, I received a link from Studio E to its

preliminary tender issue documents (PB/220 [ ]).

93. There were also some concerns regarding the proposed plan to go out to tender on

18 November 2013. On 11 November 2013 Andrew Snelling of ADS Associates

Ltd emailed AUK regarding the proposed tender date (PB/221 [ ]).

Andrew Snelling was providing construction cost consultancy services on the M&E

element of the design. He raised a number ofM&E items that were still outstanding:

" ... 2. No planning approval

3. Not all surveys have been completed as advised by the design team.

6. Fire strategy has not been signed off by Building Control/ Fire Officer

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8. Architects drawings and room data sheets were not complete and

highlighted data sheets would not be available at tender.

9. The architect and m&e consultant has not carried out a final co-ordination

review.

12. Technical details of existing plant are not provided within the MF spec. "

94. A further tender review process meeting took place between AUK and the TMO on

12 November 2013 which I attended. At the meeting it was decided that the 18

November date to put the works out to tender was unrealistic. It was agreed that the

deadline should be pushed two to three weeks back, but that the bidders' conference

should still take place on 5 December 2013 (PB/222 ] and

PB/223 [ ]).

95. To maintain the momentum I circulated a checklist to the TMO, Curtins, Max

Fordham and Studio E on 20 November 2013 identifying outstanding actions and

who needed to review what in relation to the tender process (PB/224 [

and PB/225 [ ]). The checklist noted that Studio E and Max Fordham

were to confirm that the fire strategy drawings had all been provided, and Max

Fordham was to report on the smoke extraction system. Also outstanding was the

TMO's review of asbestos survey reports to check if any additional surveys were

required (PB/225 [ ]). On 28 November 2018 I also sent Studio E, Max

Fordham and Curtins the TMO's comments on the tender documentation and asked

them to make the changes relevant to their discipline (PB/226 [ ] and

PB/227 [ ]). After those changes were made the tender documents were

finally agreed and on 29 November 2013 I issued the invitations to tender to the five

shortlisted contractors (PB/228 [ ] , PB/229 [ J and

PB/230 [ ]).

96. On 5 December 2013 all five contractors attended a site visit followed by a bidders'

conference. The conference was chaired by Jenny Jackson. A brief introduction to

the teams working on the Project was provided and Claire Williams gave a

background to the Project, explaining that works were needed to the heating system,

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ART00008527 _0026 ART00008527/26

exterior cladding and smoke/fire system. The design team also talked through the

TMO's key requirements from a technical standards perspective

(PB/231 [ ]).

97. A tender period of 9 weeks was allowed, with tenders to be returned to AUK by

noon on 31 January 2014. (The tender deadline was subsequently extended to 14

February 2014 following two requests for extension of time (see Tender Query Log

6 issued on 13 January 2014 (PB/232 [ ] and PB/233 [ ]),

and Tender Query Log 8 issued on 17 January 2014 (PB/234 [ ] and

PB/235 [ ]))).

98. Following the issue ofthe tender documents on 29 November 2013, the contractors

raised a number of tender queries. Peter Blythe of AUK coordinated the

clarifications to those queries by issuing Tender Query Logs. At the end of the

tender period, a total of 69 tender queries had been raised by the contractors on

issues relating to ventilation, cladding, crown alternative, doors and works needed to

the lift lobbies.

99. On 20 December 2013 I received a letter from Wates stating that they would not be

submitting a tender for the Project due to winning work elsewhere and being unable

to resource the work. I passed this on to the TMO on the same day and suggested

that we call the remaining shortlisted contractors to see how they were getting on

with completing their tenders (PB/236 [ ] and PB/237 [ ]).

Peter Blythe took the lead in contacting the remaining contractors. On 7 January

2014 he sent an email to the TMO, copying me in, summarising that all the

contractors were "keen for the work" but the feedback from Rydon and Keepmoat

was that they were feeling the time pressure (PB/238 [ ]) . Peter

explained that both contractors said that they had been struggling to get M&E prices

from their supply chains but noted that neither of them had formally requested an

extension of the tender period.

100. Whilst waiting for the tender returns other areas of the Project continued to progress,

including discussions on the cladding and cost. On 7 November 2013 Studio E

forwarded an email exchange between them and Harley Curtain Wall to AUK and

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ART00008527 _0027 ART00008527/27

the TMO (PB/239 [ ]). The email exchange related to Harley's costs for

ACM. Harley's email to Studio E stated that:

" .. .from a Harley selfish point of view, our preference would be to use ACM

It's tried & tested (on many Harley projects), and we are confident in the cost

base. That said, we are of course an envelope contractor, and would be happy

to clad the build in the material of choice".

101. The email exchange shows that Bruce Sounes of Studio E replied to Harley

(PB/239 [ ]) stating:

" ... We share your concerns about the reliability of the proposed panel source

but we set out to do zinc, and budget permitting it will be a fantastic result.

We 're challenged to achieve a "natural" non-coated cladding look. "

102. Chweechen Lim replied to Studio E on 11 November 2013 and referred to the

previous negotiations that had taken place with Leadbitter (PB/239 [ ]) :

"After our previous negotiation with Leadbitter, the total cost for external

fac;ade (aluminium cladding that look similar to Zinc effict) allowed in the

Cost Plan is £2.3M

The quote below indicated a budget cost of £3.25M which is beyond the

budget.

I will include ACM cladding in the Contract Sum Analysis and ask the

contractors to provide optional cost for Zinc Cladding. "

103. Possible VE options also continued to be explored. On 18 December 2013, Peter

Blythe emailed Claire Williams at the TMO, Bruce Sounes at Studio E and Matt

Smith at Max F ordham asking for their thoughts on VE (PB/240 [ ]) .

Bruce Sounes replied to Peter on 6 January 2014 with some thoughts and stated it

was "premature to start chopping the scheme" (PB/241 [ ]). I do not

understand why Bruce Sounes thought Peter Blythe's email of 18 December 2013

was suggesting "chopping the scheme" as Peter had not suggested that in his email. I

replied the next day stating:

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"We were not after an extensive thought or time process just any ideas that

have come to mind during the preparation of the tender documentations. You

are right this will be far easier to do once we have the tender returns and can

see the quantum of savings that may be required.

Peter Maddison simply asked us (after the bidders conference) for some ideas

where costs could be reduced if the tenders come in, as suspected, over

budget. A simple list like Maxfordham and Claire have provided would be

helpfol. We will add reducing the specification of fittings and fixtures to the

list."

Peter Blythe then followed up the same day with an updated spreadsheet of VE

options as at that date.

104. On 10 January 2014, planning permission for the works to Grenfell Tower was

granted. Marc Watterson of IBI Taylor Young, the planning consultant, forwarded

the decision notice to Claire Williams of the TMO on 13 January 2014, copying me

and Bruce Sounes of Studio E to the email (PB/242 [ ],

PB/243 [ ] and PB/244 [ ]). The permission was conditional

on, amongst other things, providing detailed drawings or samples of materials, as

appropriate, on the materials to be used on the external faces of the building,

windows and doors before any works to these areas could begin

(PB/243 [ ]).

105. On 10 January 2014, Claire Williams asked AUK to put forward a proposal for a

client design advisor ("CDA") role (PB/245 [ ]). A detailed proposal

was prepared noting that Richmal Hardinge would assume the role of CDA if

AUK's proposal was accepted. The proposal set out the scope of services AUK

would be prepared to offer as CDA, AUK's previous experience of the role and a fee

proposal (PB/246 [ ]).

106. There was also a particular focus on finalising consultant's appointments at this time

as both Studio E and Curtins were to be novated to the contractor post-tender. On 7

January 2014 I chased Curtins, the structural engineers on the Project, for their final

contract of appointment (PB/247 [ ], PB/248 [ ] and

PB/249 [ ]). I had previously sent Curtins my comments on their

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contract on 23 October 2013 and I had asked them to send an electronic mark-up in

return (PB/247 [ ]). This was still outstanding. I continued to chase

Curtins and, on 6 February 2014, Curtins sent a draft of the contract to Claire

Williams of the TMO. There were a number of placeholders in the documents on

which I provided input (PB/250 [ ] ).

107. On 15 January 2014 I received an email from Claire Williams ofthe TMO, copying

in my colleagues Peter Blythe and Simon Cash. Claire Williams' email explained

that she had received a call from Keepmoat who had informed her they were

declining to tender on the basis that the level of risk was an obstacle for them and

their sub-contractors (PB/251 [ ]). As was noted in the Final Tender

Report (which I discuss further below), the risk that Keepmoat was concerned about

was a high probability that they would not be able to achieve a tender adjudication

with sufficient confidence to address time limitation issues from their specialist

supply chain members. This left three contractors in the running; Durkan, Mulalley

and Rydon.

108. On 30 January 2014, Studio E issued a NBS Specification document which included,

at section H92, specifications for the cladding system (PB/252 [ ] ,

PB/253 [ ] , PB/254 [ ] , PB/255 [ ] ,

PB/256 [ ], PB/257 [ l and PB/258 [ ]). I believe

I received a copy of this document for information as part of my EA role in the

tender process. I would have looked at it but I would not have reviewed it in any

detail. In section H92, under the heading "INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED

WITH TENDER", it stated:

"In addition to the cladding specified [sic} in the below clauses 120 & 123 submit

comparative [sic] supply and install costs per m2 of the whole cladding system for

the following alternative materials:

Reynobond- Duragloss 5000:

o Metallic std & non-std (Satin gloss)

o Chameleon

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o Anodised Look (Satin gloss)

Alucobond:

o Spectra, Sakura 917.

Zinc:

o QUARTZ ZINC composite polymer panel by VM Zinc

Note: Face fastened solutions permitted."

109. During the tender period Chweechen Lim, AUK's QS, also worked on preparing the

pre-tender cost estimate for the works. I was copied into some of these emails. On

13 February 2014 Chweechen Lim sent an email to Claire Williams explaining that

she had the updated the costs, and the total construction cost was estimated to be

£10,045,000 (PB/259 [ 1 and PB/260 [ ]). Chweechen noted

in her email that the estimated cost was over the client's budget of £8.5m and she

provided some suggestions for VE, some of which had already been included in the

tender.

Review of the tender returns

110. The tender returns from Durkan, Mulalley and Rydon were all received by the

extended tender deadline of 14 February 2014 and were formally opened by the

TMO. A process of reviewing, checking and evaluating each of the tender returns

then followed. As I was going to be out of the office during the week the tenders

would be marked, I arranged a handover meeting with Peter Blythe so that he could

progress the evaluation and analysis of the tenders m my absence

(PB/261 [ ]).

111. On 17 February 2014 I was copied into an email from Peter Blythe to Studio E, Max

Fordham, Curtins and the TMO summarising the tender returns received from the

contractors (PB/262 [ ]). Peter Blythe's email explained that Mulalley

had priced the works at £10,426,414, Durkan at £9,940,928 and Rydon at

£9,249,294, but noted that the prices were likely to be adjusted as the returns were

reviewed and assessed.

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112. On 19 February 2014, Chweechen Lim sent Claire Williams and Jenny Jackson

AUK's initial review of the tender returns for their consideration

(PB/263 [ ]). Chweechen also sent this information to Studio E, Max

Fordham and Curtins on the same day so they could provide their comments

(PB/264 [ ], PB/265 [ ] and PB/266 [ ]).

Chweechen noted that Mulalley had failed to provide a detailed cost breakdown

(although this was provided a few days later on 24 February 2014

(PB/267 [ ] and PB/268 [ ])) and that their programme was

longer than that specified. Chweechen explained that, strictly speaking, this meant

Mulalley's tender was non-compliant and could be discounted. Chweechen's email

also noted that Mulalley had not offered any savings in relation to an alternative

design proposal. The alternative design proposal involved costing the savings that

could be realised from the use of Aluminium cladding to the fa9ade of the Tower.

Both Rydon and Durkan had offered savings of £243,067 and £169,727 respectively

for the alternative design proposal (PB/263 [ ]).

113. Following receipt of Chweechen's email, both Studio E and Max Fordham provided

comments on Rydon's tender submission from a technical perspective on 19 and 20

February 2014 (PB/269 [ ], PB/270 [ ] and

PB/271 [ ]). Bruce Sounes of Studio E commented in his email that he

was "concentrating on Rydon as the others are so far behind"

(PB/269 [ ]). I understood this to mean that Bruce Sounes had

concentrated his efforts on assessing the Rydon tender submission because it was the

lowest price and believed it was significantly stronger than Durkan and Mullaley's

tender submissions.

114. Jenny Jackson of the TMO also responded on 19 February 2014, expressing her

concern that, by asking Mulalley for their cost breakdown, Mulalley might be given

the impression that their tender was compliant. Jenny Jackson said that a decision

needed to be made about how to treat their tender (PB/263 [ ]). AUK

carried out a further review of the tender assessment criteria and preliminaries, and

on 25 February 2014 Simon Cash of AUK sent the TMO a letter regarding the

evaluation of the tenders (PB/272 [ ] and PB/273 [ ]). The

letter explained that the TMO should continue to include Mulalley in the tender

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evaluation process on the basis that the tender submission could still be assessed and

scored fairly and properly in accordance with the assessment criteria in the tender

submissions. On 26 February 2014 Jenny Jackson and Peter Maddison said that they

agreed with the decision to proceed with the evaluation of Mulalley's tender

(PB/274 [ ]).

115. Whilst the position regarding Mulalley's tender was being considered, Chweechen

Lim had prepared a first draft of an Initial Tender Report. Chweechen circulated the

report internally to Simon Cash, Peter Blythe and me for further comment on 25

February 2014 (PB/275 [ ] and PB/276 [ ]). At this stage the

Report did not contain any recommendations and was simply an analysis of the

tender returns received. The Report noted that Rydon had priced the preliminaries

"very competitively and below average" but that a comparison revealed a "broadly

consistent pricing at a sustainable level" between each of the tenders.

116. In order to complete the 'Quality Section' of the Tender Report I emailed Claire

Williams on 27 February 2014 asking her to send the TMO's scores on each of the

contractor's responses, along with any notes or explanation as to how the TMO

reached that score (PB/277 [ ]). The Quality Section was worth 60%,

with 55% of that score attributable to the tender responses and the remaining 5% to

the interviews with the contractors (PB/277 [ ]). Claire Williams agreed

to send the TMO's raw scores and we also agreed to arrange a meeting between the

TMO and AUK in order to discuss any large divergences in the marking

(PB/278 [ ]). The meeting was arranged for the following week.

117. Around 28 February 2014 the draft tender report was issued to the TMO. The draft

report concluded that Rydon had submitted the "most competitive tender price and

the highest quality making it the most economically advantageous tender". The

report also noted that as the interviews were weighted at 5%, regardless of the

interview scores, Rydon would still have the most advantageous tender

(PB/279 [ ]).

118. On 2 March 2014, Jenny Jackson of the TMO emailed Simon Cash, Peter Blythe and

me asking how to bridge the gap between the £9,249,294 tender submitted by Rydon

and the TMO's budget of £8.5m stating (PB/280 [ ]):

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"Please can we discuss how we intend to bridge the gap between the

£9,249,294 tender submitted and the £8.5m client budget?

I think the way forward is to enter into the contract for £9,249, 294 and then

embark on the VE post award (so the award is on the basis of [sic} the

published evaluation criteria). There will need to be some "informal"

discussion with the preferred contractor prior to award so there is an

understanding of the approach. "

119. The following day, on 3 March 2014, Simon Cash replied to Jenny Jackson

(PB/281 [ ]) stating:

"I agree with you in terms of placing the contract at the submitted tender

value and an offline discussion with the preferred contractor. Particularly to

set out the intent once a contract has been entered into. There is absolutely

nothing to say that once in contract the KCTMO cannot look for ways of

making savings and as part of the informal discussion, the intention can be

made clear and although not binding, the contractor's agreement sought to

work with KCTMO to achieve the required savings. Some savings have

already been identified and the contractor may well put forward others for

consideration during the discussions that can be investigated prior to entering

into contract. "

120. On 4 March 2014, Jenny Jackson sent back a mark up of the tender report AUK had

previously sent to her (PB/282 [ ] and PB/283 [ ]). Jenny

Jackson asked that more detail be included on the individual scores for each

contractor, including an analysis of the contractor's overall quality performance and

any concerns (PB/283 [ ]) .

121. The tender interviews with the contractors were scheduled to take place on 7 March

2014, with the first hour being an introductory session to present on the history of

the scheme to date, the OJEU process, the tender quality questions and the interview

process (PB/284 [ ] and PB/285 [ ]). I was asked to present

the section on the tender quality questions and review. On 6 March 2014, the day

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before the interviews, I received an email from Claire Williams regarding the review

of the tender questions I was presenting (PB/286 [ ]).

122. The interviews with each of the contractors took place as scheduled on 7 March

2014. I was on the interview panel, along with the TMO. Prior to the interviews,

Jenny Jackson had prepared a note, which included a list of the questions that could

be asked during the interviews, based on a scenario (PB/287 [ ]). The

questions in the list were the only questions that could be asked during the

interviews. I recall that Jenny Jackson wanted to avoid shortlisted contractors

hearing different things in interviews, which could be said to benefit one contractor

over another, and she wanted to take steps to avoid this.

123. Following the interviews with each of the contractors, the tender report was updated

to include the interview feedback. I circulated a further draft of the report to the

TMO on 11 March 2014 (PB/288 [ ] and PB/289 [ ]). On

17 March 2014 I issued a final Tender Report to the TMO (Final Tender Report Rev

A) (PB/290 [ ] and PB/291 [ ]). The Report recorded that

Rydon had scored the highest, followed by Durkan and then Mullalley. The

recommendation in the Report stated:

"Rydon have submitted the most competitive tender price and the highest

quality making it the most economically advantageous tender. It is worth

noting that Rydon received the highest marks in all aspects of the tender

evaluation.

It is therefore recommended that:

• Approval is given to commence the formal standstill period in

accordance with the EU Regulations and, subject to the conclusion of

this standstill period, the contract is awarded to Rydon Limited and a

Notice is placed in the Official Journal of the European Union to this

effect."

124. On 18 March 2014 my colleague Peter Blythe sent Durkan and Mulalley letters

informing them that they had not been successful in their tender for the Project. The

letters informed them of the 10 day standstill period, and set out their scores and

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detailed feedback on each question. (PB/292 [ ], PB/293 [ ],

PB/294 [ ] and PB/295 [ ]). On the same day Rydon was

informed that its tender had been successful and it had been selected as the preferred

bidder for the Project, subject to the agreement of the site boundary and formal

approval from the TMO Board and RBKC (PB/296 [ J and

PB/297 [ ] ). The issue of the decision letters also marked the beginning

ofthe 10 day standstill period before Rydon could be formally awarded the contract.

The standstill period ran from 18 March 2014 to midnight on 28 March 2014.

125. My impression of the TMO during the tender process was that they were fully

informed and wanted to be engaged at every stage. I recall that we would have long

meetings where the TMO would check that what was being tendered was fully

understood, agreed and signed off. The process, including the scoring, was thorough

and was marked by AUK and the TMO independently. Both AUK and the TMO

concluded that the contract should be awarded to Rydon.

Pre-Construction Agreement ("PCA")

126. On 25 March 2014 Claire Williams sent a draft PCA to Peter Blythe and me, asking

for our comments (PB/298 [ ] and PB/299 [ ]). The PCA

was to be entered into by the TMO and Rydon. I replied to Claire Williams on 27

March 2014 with some recommendations, but explained that these were made purely

from a "project manager" perspective as I did not have a legal background

(PB/300 [ ]). My reference to "project manager" was to my job within

AUK and not AUK's contractual role on the Project, which, as I mention above, was

EA. I suggested that the appendix to the PCA might include the following

additional activities: value engineering, working with the planning consultant to

discharge planning conditions, and supporting smoke extract design development

and agreement with Building Control. I also suggested adding a long stop date for

the completion of all activities. Claire Williams replied on the same day

acknowledging my feedback and suggested that the points I had raised should be

discussed further during an introductory meeting that had been scheduled for 1 April

2014.

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127. Over the course of the next two months there were continued negotiations over the

PCA. A number of amendments were made to the Agreement, with it passing back

and forth between AUK, Rydon and the TMO. On 21 May 2014 final revisions

were made to the Agreement and Claire Williams of the TMO confirmed that she

was happy with the changes (PB/301 [ ]). On 22 May 2014 Rydon

signed the PCA (PB/302 [ ] and PB/303 [ ]).

The decision on the cladding material

128. A Contractor Introduction Meeting took place on 1 April 2014 at which

representatives from the TMO, AUK and Rydon were present. Peter Blythe and I

attended from AUK. During the meeting the respective roles of each party were

made clear and it was noted that AUK, represented by myself, would perform the

role of EA on the Project (PB/304 [ ], PB/305 [ J,

PB/306 [ ] and PB/307 [ ]). The reference to me as Project

Manager and Peter Blythe as Assistant Project Manager at the beginning of the

minutes represented our internal AUK job designations, rather than our roles on the

Project.

129. The focus of the meeting was on the proposed savings that had been referred to in

the tender submission. At item 2.1 of the minutes a potential saving of up to

£376,175 was noted, which could be realised through changes to the cladding

material and method of fixing (PB/305 [ ]). However it was noted that

any such changes would need to be approved by the planners. Further savings of

£35,004 and £60,074 in relation to the crown and window louvres respectively were

also identified. The minutes further noted that the TMO board had approved an

overall budget of £9.7m, which included all professional and planning fees. The

PCA was also discussed and Rydon confirmed that they were happy with it. The

PCA was to be capped at a value of £350,000 as approved by the TMO board. It

was also confirmed that both Studio E and Curtins had been novated to Rydon.

Novation of designers to a building contractor is standard in the context of a D&B

contract. In terms of communication channels, if an EA needs to raise an issue with

the designers, once they are novated, the EA should do so via the building

contractor. Other than this, I do not believe the novation of the designers to the

building contractor significantly impacts on the role of an EA.

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130. On 1 April 2014, following the Contractor Introduction Meeting, I sent an email to

Marc Watterson of IBI Taylor Young, the TMO's planning consultants. My email

related to the savings that could be realised from the proposed face fixed Aluminium

cladding system, the proposed removal of the crown to the top of the building and

the proposed removal of the louvre panel for the windows which had been discussed

during the previous day's meeting (PB/308 [ ]). I asked Marc Watterson

for his opinion on the requirements for planning permission and discharge of

conditions in relation to each of these.

131. Marc Watterson replied to my email on 6 April 2014 recommending that a meeting

with the RBKC local planning authority ("the LP A") would be required to finalise

decisions on the above (PB/308 [ ]) . In his email he provided some

initial thoughts on each of the proposals commenting that a 'face fixed' system

might cause problems if the fixings were visible. He also said that the LPA would

be unlikely to agree to taking the crown out of the scheme, and that the window

louvres had previously caused concerns as the LPA wanted to be convinced their

quality was good enough (PB/308 [ ]).

132. Marc Watterson also provided his feedback at a Pre-Contract Meeting which took

place on 9 April 2014 between the TMO, AUK, Studio E and Rydon. During the

meeting Marc W atterson is noted as having stated that there had, in the past, been a

struggle "to find an aluminium product to meet the specification previously because

of concerns regarding the physical appearance (colour and finish) and the

longevity" (PB/309 [ ]).

133. A meeting with the LPA was arranged for 8 May 2014 in order to discuss materials

and potential alterations to the planning application. Prior to the meeting, on 6 May

2014, Rydon circulated a list of possible agenda points and goals

(PB/310 [ ]). One of the items listed on the agenda was:

"Proposal of material change to the fac;ade. From Zinc to Aluminium

composite (A CM). Put forward our case that ACM is not an inferior product

to Zinc".

I recall that at this time the entire discussion between Studio E, IBI Taylor Young

and the LPA surrounding the cladding related to its appearance and whether ACM

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looked of a cheaper or lesser quality than zinc. As the material chosen would

change the appearance of the building fascia, the LPA were concerned that ACM

might aesthetically be inferior to zinc.

134. Peter Blythe and I attended the meeting with the RBKC planners, Sarah Scannell

and Edward George, on 8 May on behalf of AUK (PB/311 [ ] and

PB/312 [ ]). Representatives from the TMO, Studio E, IBI Taylor

Young and Rydon were also present at this meeting. Studio E and Rydon were there

to address technical matters relating to planning and the cladding.

135. Peter Blythe of AUK circulated minutes of this meeting on 15 May 2014

(PB/313 [ ]), which updated a previous draft with comments from Claire

Williams at the TMO. Peter also had an exchange of emails with Bruce Sounes at

Studio E, in which Bruce Sounes gave some details regarding the difference in

service life between zinc and ACM (Aluminium Composite Material). My

recollection is that the RBKC planners were concerned that ACM would not retain

its appearance as long as zinc. As noted in the minutes of the meeting

(PB/312 [ ]), during the meeting it was noted that a flat panel ACM was

proposed as the cladding material. At item 1.2 of the minutes it was noted that the

confirmed life span for this product was similar to that of the product previously

suggested. Item 1.4 of the minutes noted that the RBKC planners had been

presented with a number of different colour options for the ACM and their

preference was for a "slight texture and glossy panel". Item 1.8 of the minutes

noted that Sarah Scannell, one of the RBKC planners, was to visit sites during the

week commencing 12 May 2014 where similar cladding systems had been installed.

The minutes also noted that there would be no changes to the proposed height of the

crown (PB/312 [ ]).

136. On 17 July 2014 Chweechen Lim forwarded an email to Peter Blythe and me on

cladding costs (PB/314 [ ]). The email provided a breakdown of

cladding cost options which showed the savings that could be realised for fully

cassette fixed cladding, fully face fixed cladding and a hybrid version involving

cassette fixed columns and face fixed panels. These costs were sent to me for

information only but I understand that they had been requested by Claire Williams

as she was presenting these costs to Councillor Feilding-Mellen and the LPA.

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137. On 31 July 2014 I was copied into an email from Peter Blythe to Rydon confirming

that the TMO had made a decision regarding the cladding, and had decided to

proceed with cassette fixing throughout and a champagne colour

(PB/315 [ ]). The TMO's decision followed feedback that it had

received from Sarah Scannell, a Senior Planner at RBKC LP A, on 23 July 2014 as

follows (PB/315 [ ]):

" ... Officers are reviewing these proposal in the knowledge that Grenfell

Tower is highly visible from many points across the borough, and given its

height, will be difficult to maintain and that the process of re-cladding is an

expensive one. Officers are seeking a high quality finish to the building not

only for reasons of design and visual amenity, but also to ensure that the

material have sufficient longevity.

In line with previous advice, the .fixings as currently proposed are not

acceptable. The onsite sample demonstrates that when the panels are attached

in this way they are visible. Attaching the panels through rivets effects the

smooth surface of the panels and are likely to weather badly, like the panels

we saw in Chalk Farm, at the lower and upper levels. The only way we can be

convinced that the quality of these panels is acceptable is if they are completed

with concealed fixings, or cassettes.

Officers are also not convinced that the Natural Aluminium Brushed colour of

the panels will represent a high quality finish when placed across the whole

building. We are far more comfortable with the Champagne Metallic panel

within the sample board. While we understand that it is similar to the existing

concrete colour, we believe it will give warmth to the building and high quality

finish than the aluminium colour would not. We understand that this has

implications for the project, so before pushing you towards this change we

request a full image of the building clad in the Champagne Metallic. "

Preparation for the start of the Construction Phase

138. On 29 May 2014 I was copied into an email from Keith Bushell, AUK's CDM-C on

this Project, to Claire Williams (PB/316 [ ]). The email from Keith

notified Claire Williams that the Construction Phase Health and Safety Plan issued

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by Rydon was in accordance with the Construction (Design and Management)

Regulations 2007, and that the TMO could now instruct Rydon that it could

commence work on site (PB/316 [

Rydon on 30 May 2014 (PB/317 [

]). The TMO sent confirmation to

]) as follows:

"We have had confirmation from our CDMC (Artelia) that your construction

phase H&S plan is sufficiently developed, project specific and adequate.

Therefore KCTMO is content that you can commence the works at Grenfell

Tower, commence your site set up and other activities, in accordance with the

pre-construction agreement. "

139. At this time I was dealing with numerous queries from Claire Williams, and would

often be copied into emails outside the scope of my role and experience. I also had

a number of other projects that I was working on alongside the Project. I felt that the

Project was becoming increasingly demanding on my time. As a result I sent an

email to my colleagues, Peter Blythe and Chweechen Lim, asking for their support

in helping me to get ahead in managing the Project (PB/318 [ ]). I was

also aware that AUK were bidding for more work with the TMO and would

naturally look at the level of service provided on the Project. I therefore wanted to

ensure that they were happy with the service AUK were providing. Both

Chweechen and Peter replied on the same day giving me their full support

(PB/318 [ ]). Chweechen also prepared a detailed list of next steps

needed to prepare the contract documents and a list of outstanding actions that

needed to be completed by Rydon (PB/318 [ ]). A Pre-Start Meeting

was arranged for 13 June 2014 and a detailed agenda was circulated to the TMO,

AUK and Rydon on 9 June (PB/319 [ ] and PB/320 [ ]).

140. The Pre-Start Meeting took place at AUK's offices on 13 June 2014 and was

attended by AUK, the TMO and Rydon. At the start of the meeting the roles and

responsibilities of each party working

(PB/321 [ ] and PB/322 [

on the Project were noted

]). Item 2.2 of the minutes noted

that: "It is proposed to enter into the contract at the tendered sum but the exact

scope of works is to be agreed depending on the VE exercise". At item 2.9 it was

confirmed that the original contract sum was £9,249,294. Cladding was also

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discussed during the meeting and item 3 .1 of the minutes noted that: "RYD received

positive comments from the planners after seeing the Kilburn example, however they

wanted to see a bronze finish". Item 3.3 of the minutes noted "It was assumed that

the material will not be signed off prior to entering into the contract. Therefore,

cassette fixed aluminium will be assumed which has a saving of £293,368 from the

original design".

141. Following the Pre-Start Meeting it was agreed that Chweechen Lim would send the

TMO a high level summary of the contract sum for Grenfell Tower following the

tender and the subsequent VE work. Chweechen sent her summary to Claire

Williams of the TMO on 17 June 2014 (PB/323 [ ]). The high level

summary noted that the adjusted tender figure was £8,683,172, which included a

saving of £293,368 for cassette fix aluminium cladding. After reviewing the costs,

Claire Williams asked Chweechen and me to see whether there was any value in

looking at alternative window manufacturers (PB/324 [ ]). Claire

Williams noted that Durkan had offered "substantial" savings in this respect in its

tender. On 18 June 2014 Chweechen forwarded Claire Williams' query to Rydon,

asking for their views on the windows savings. Rydon responded commenting that

whilst there were cheaper mechanisms than tilt and turn windows, tilt and turn was

generally considered to be a safer option (PB/325 [ ]).

142. A further financial review of the Project costs took place during a financial session

on 27 June 2014 between the TMO and AUK (PB/326 [ J and

PB/327 [ ]). Following the meeting I circulated a list of actions arising

from the meeting which needed to be completed to Claire Williams, and to my

colleagues Peter Blythe and Chweechen Lim (PB/326 [ ] and

PB/327 [ ]). The majority of the actions listed were for AUK to progress

and involved liaising with Rydon to identify the amount of cost savings from

reducing or changing certain works.

143. On 11 July 2014, Peter Blythe sent the TMO AUK's draft Pre-Contract Report, the

draft JCT Design and Build ("D&B") contract and the contract sum analysis

summary for comment (PB/328 [ ], PB/329 [ ],

PB/330 [ ] and PB/331 [ ]). D&B contracts push risk onto

the contractor, and take risk from the client. D&B contracts also result in greater

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cost certainty. The Pre-Contract Report set out the budget and cost information for

the works prior to the TMO entering into a contract with Rydon. In particular the

Report set out the cost savings that had been identified that would allow the original

tender sum of £9,249,294 to be reduced to the total contract sum of £8,563,117

(PB/329 [ ]).

144. The TMO provided their comments on these documents. On 15 July 2014, further

updated versions of the draft D&B contract and contract sum analysis summary were

circulated by Chweechen Lim (PB/332 [ ], PB/333 [ ] and

PB/334 [ ]). In her email to the TMO, Chweechen explained that AUK

were advising the TMO to enter into a contract with Rydon based on a 66 week

construction programme. Chweechen explained that, although Rydon's original

tender contained a 62 week programme, a 4 week extension of time to the

programme was appropriate due to a series of delays to the works commencing.

This included a delay in the contract award to Rydon and Rydon not having full

possession of the areas it should have had (PB/332 [ ]).

145. On 15 July 2014 Peter Blythe also sent the TMO the updated Pre-Contract Report

(PB335/ [ ] and PB/336 [ ]). There were no significant

changes between the draft the TMO had previously seen on 11 July 2014 and the

updated version, however some of the figures had been finalised and more costs

information had been added regarding the cladding options (PB/336 [ ]).

This resulted in a total contract sum figure of£8,556,133. The Report recommended

that the TMO enter into a contract with Rydon at this proposed contract value.

146. On 18 July 2014 Peter Blythe chased Claire Williams of the TMO for approval of

the contract documents, reminding Claire Williams that AUK would need one week

to get the documents in place once the TMO had given the go ahead

(PB/337 [ ]). Following further revisions to the JCT D&B contract from

both the TMO and Rydon, the contract was issued on 22 August 2014

(PB/338 [ ] and PB/339 [ ]).

Client Design Advisor ("CDA") role

147. As at July 2014 the TMO had not appointed a CDA despite asking AUK to forward

a proposal for the CDA role in January 2014. This became a problem in relation to

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valuations, which AUK was responsible for as QS. Prior to making a

recommendation for payment AUK had to be satisfied that progress had been made

in relation to drawings and that they were in accordance with the Employer's

Requirements (PB/340 [ ], PB/341 [ ] and

PB/342 [ ]). Without seeing any of the drawings Studio E had produced,

it was difficult to value the work they had done and to pay the relevant fee to Rydon.

I therefore asked Rydon to send an up to date record of drawings and designs to

AUK so that we could check that the fee Studio E were claiming was justified. As

AUK had no design role, my intention was to pass the drawings on to Claire

Williams for formal approval (PB/343 [ ]) .

148. The issue of appointment of a CDA was discussed at the Progress Meeting on 15

July 2014 (PB/344 [ ] and PB/345 [ ]). On 29 August 2014,

Peter Blythe and I received an email from Claire Williams of the TMO explaining

that the TMO were going to see whether they could manage the role within the TMO

as they were "very familiar with the specifications for social housing"

(PB/346 [ ]). Claire Williams also said that most of the design concerns

were over the new build areas such as the flats, nursery and boxing club, as other

elements such as the cladding and M&E were designed and under guarantee

(PB/346 [ ]). It was my impression that the TMO considered they were

better placed to take on the role as they were informed about residents' needs and

the internal specifications for the flats.

149. I was reassured by the fact that the TMO had already seen AUK's proposals for the

CDA work before they made their decision to keep the role in-house. The TMO

must therefore have understood the scope of the role, their responsibilities on design

sign-off and believed that they could deliver. I sent an internal email to AUK on the

same day informing them of the TMO's decision (PB/347 [ ]). Simon

Cash of AUK replied stating:

"I would like to think that with Rydon 's approach so far, it should not be an

onerous task. However, It is very important that we do not find ourselves

being dragged into dealing with any issues relating to compliance or design

advice without it being acknowledge as additional work."

(PB/347 [ ])

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150. I understood the reference in Simon's email to the role not being "an onerous task"

as relating to the fact that only a limited number of changes would need to be

approved by a CDA. This was because Rydon were building according to approved

drawings, and therefore it was unlikely that many changes would be made.

151. In his email Simon Cash also emphasised that AUK should not be drawn into design

matters. This was an ongoing issue throughout the Project. Claire Williams often

tried to refer design related questions to AUK, despite the fact that AUK had no

design role. This continued even after the TMO turned down AUK's offer of the

CDA role. I refer to some examples of this below.

Construction Phase

152. As the Project moved through the construction phase there was a real focus on

making progress. I set out below details of my role and involvement as an EA in the

administration of the building contract in the construction phase.

153. Regular progress meetings were scheduled between the TMO, AUK and Rydon. I

would have attended most of these meetings and often checked and signed off on the

meeting minutes, which were prepared by AUK. Rydon also started preparing

regular site progress reports, which it circulated to AUK and the TMO ahead of each

progress meeting.

154. Rydon's Site Progress Report No. 1 was issued to AUK on 14 July 2014

(PB/348 [ ] and PB/349 [ ]). As this was the first report it

was fairly short. It noted that demolition and removal works had commenced, and

that a mock up of the proposed cladding system was ready for viewing by the

Planning Officers. AUK provided some general feedback to Rydon on the reports,

suggesting that it include the percentage of tasks complete against the percentage

that they should be complete, a list of items to be completed in the coming period,

and a list of key risks (PB/350 [ ]). These were all incorporated in

Rydon's later reports.

155. The first Progress Meeting took place on 15 July 2014 and was attended by AUK,

the TMO and Rydon (PB/345 [ ]). During the meeting cladding was

discussed and item 1.6 of the minutes noted that the LPA would be viewing the

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colours and fixing detail of the cladding mock up on 17 July 2014. It was further

noted that initial feedback on the cladding was that the vertical sections needed

design work. At item 1.6 of the minutes a post meeting note recorded that:

"Post-meeting note: the initial feedback from the planners is that they would

probably prefer the champagne to be brushed aluminium and they were not

that keen on the face fix".

Design development was also discussed and item 3 .1 of the minutes noted that

Claire Williams needed to appoint a Client Design Advisor. (At this time the TMO

had not yet turned down AUK's offer of the CDA role). Item 3.3 noted that " ... the

TMO (or their adviser when appointed) needs to sign off all design".

156. Progress Meeting No. 2 took place on 19 August 2014, ahead of which AUK's draft

high level risk register was circulated to the TMO and Rydon

(PB/351 [ ], PB/352 [ ], PB/353 [ ],

PB/354 [

PB/357 [

], PB/355 [

], PB/358 [

], PB/356 [

] and PB/359 [

] ' ]). At this

time the highest risk items were the risk of delay due to not entering into the

contract, potential additional costs if Bouygues did not complete all the external

works they had agreed to on the site boundary and HSE concerns of a lack of

coordination with the KALC team. These were all items that AUK were continuing

to monitor.

157. During the Progress Meeting on 19 August 2014 Rydon reported that they were

slightly behind programme but that "none of the slips will cause a delay"

(PB/360 [ ], PB/361 [ ], PB/362 [ ] and

PB/363 [ ]). In relation to design development, it was noted that design

meetings were underway and scheduled for every two weeks. Item 5.2 of the

minutes noted that H&S site visits would take place every three weeks, with Rydon

to share the site report with AUK's CDM-C.

158. On 20 August 2014 Rydon suggested that the fire alarm panel for the finger blocks

might need to be moved and this raised a query of whether the change should be

priced as a variation and instructed. Peter Blythe wrote to Rydon on 22 August 2014

citing from the Tender Query Log to confirm that the panel did need to be moved

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and explaining that an addition/omission exercise could be conducted

(PB/364 [ ]). As the query related to the pricing of instructions AUK

were able to provide some input.

159. I attended Progress Meeting No. 3 on 16 September 2014. During the meeting it

was noted that the AOVs were not working and Claire Williams was to keep the fire

brigade up to date in this respect. Item 6.1 on Building Control also recorded that

building control officers from the "local body" had been appointed with the hope

that this might get a faster response. Finally, it was noted that Rydon were behind

schedule but that this was not expected to affect the deadline for the Project

(PB/365 [ ] and PB/366 [ ]).

160. On 18 September 2014 I received an email from Claire Williams informing me that

the RBKC executive director was not happy with the champagne colour for the

cladding and had not signed off the report as he preferred the "greyer" colour.

Claire Williams asked Simon Lawrence of Rydon, who was copied to this email,

whether it would be useful for Bruce Sounes of Studio E to intervene and assist the

LPA (PB/367 [ ]). The following day, Claire Williams sent an email

exchange to me involving the LPA and IBI Taylor Young. It was agreed that the

"Smoke Silver Metallic" sample should be considered as an alternative to be

presented to the Planners (PB/368 [ ]).

161. On 19 September 2014 Claire Williams sent me an email explaining that a fire risk

assessment from CS Stokes noted that the lightning conductor was not continuous in

some places and to check what was m Rydon's contract for this

(PB/369 [ ]) . As EA, it was within my scope to answer questions of this

nature. I replied to Claire Williams on 24 September 2014 informing her that it was

within the Employer's Requirements for Rydon to repair the lightning protection. I

also let Claire Williams know that Rydon were required to install a new fire alarm to

new areas and to replace smoke extraction system components that were non

functioning or non serviceable, and this was now necessary due to faults with the

fire alarm panel (PB/370 [ ]). I emailed Rydon on the same day

regarding each of these issues asking whether it would carry out the repairs

(PB/371 [ ]). (It was eventually decided that Rydon's maintenance team

would review both items).

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162. On 25 September 2014 Claire Williams emailed me asking for my views in relation

to Rydon's contract and the fire strategy for the Grenfell site during the various

stages ofthe Project (PB/372 [ ]). Claire Williams was of the view that

Rydon was responsible for the fire strategy as it had possession of the site and the

CD M-C was responsible for reviewing this as part of the construction phase plan.

After speaking to Keith Bushell, AUK's CDM-C on this Project, I confirmed to

Claire Williams that Keith had reviewed and approved the construction phase plan

but this was a live and changing document. As regards the fire strategy for the site, I

had to remind Claire Williams that Rydon were not responsible for all systems to the

building because Grenfell was an occupied building. I explained that

(PB/373 [ ] and PB/374 [ ]):

"Rydon are responsible for their construction site and the safety of all those in

their construction site. However Grenftll is an occupied building so they will

never be folly responsible for all systems to the building. They follow and

work with the existing client fire strategy which is residents stay in flats which

has been risk assessed by the client (TMO). "

163. In early October 2014 Peter Blythe left AUK and his role was taken over by Nick

Valente. Nick Valente assisted me by taking the lead in issuing Employer's Agent

Instructions ("EAis") to Rydon. He also took the lead in liaising with Keith

Bushell, AUK's CDM-C on issues relating to CDM and the H&S file which were

raised by Claire Williams.

164. On 16 October 2014 I received an email from Simon Lawrence ofRydon expressing

concern over the fact that Claire Williams was continuing to propose changes to the

design (PB/375 [ ]). He stated:

"My only concern is that the designs she has concerns about are the tender

drawings which were obviously issued to us by the KCTMO. Admittedly we

are the designers but I won't be expecting us to make changes to flat layouts,

etc. off of our own back, we would assume that they were correctly designed

at tender. She also mentioned that designs needing to comply with KCTMO

design guide. I'll haven't checked the tender does yet but don't believe this

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has been issued to us, but I could be wrong. So plenty to iron out before we

get to far and changes become costly for no reason. "

165. Simon Lawrence also provided, as an example, an email from Claire Williams where

she expressed concern regarding the size of the windows being larger than the

existing windows (PB/376 [ ]). Simon Lawrence stated that whilst

Claire Williams' concerns might be valid, they related to tender designs the TMO

had issued to Rydon. I responded on the same day advising that he politely advise

Claire Williams that the windows were as per the tender stage

(PB/376 [ ]).

166. During Progress Meeting No. 4 on 21 October 2014, which I attended along with

Nick Valente and Chweechen Lim, it was noted that the AOVs were still not

working (PB/377 [ ], PB/378 [ ] and PB/379 [ ]).

Problems with the fire alarms were also discussed and item 5.3 of the minutes noted

that:

"Car! Stokes has been to site to look at the fire system.

SL [Simon Lawrence] said that RYD should have the fire system back up and

running by Christmas [. .. ]

CW [Claire Williams] will be speaking to Janice Wray from estate services to

consider fire panel review procedure [. .. ]

The fire brigade are aware that the fire alarm system does not work. "

167. On 27 October 2014 I was notified by David Gibson of the TMO that boilers at

Grenfell Tower had had to be turned off due to the detection of carbon monoxide.

David Gibson stated that the problem seemed to link to works Rydon had carried out

to the vents in the basement (PB/380 [ ], PB/381 [ ],

PB/382 [ ] and PB/383 [ ]). The problem left residents

without heating and hot water for 48 hours and as a result David Gibson stated that

"We need clarity on the sign off process for method statements and work etc ... "

(PB/384 [ ]). He asked that AUK lead on this. A few hours later, David

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Gibson followed up with an email to Simon Cash, to which I was copied, stating

(PB/384 [ ]):

" ... Peter Maddison has been in touch ...

He is requesting that you lead on a review of arrangements. We need clarity

between Rydon, Artelia (including your Cdmc responsibilities) and Max

Fordham on how designs and method statements are agreed and signed [off]

before works commence ... "

168. It was odd that the TMO were asking these questions of AUK given that firstly,

these were design questions, secondly, the TMO had declined AUK's offer of a

CDA role and thirdly, AUK did not have any role in design sign-offs. Simon Cash

commented that (PB/385 [ ]):

"We offired the TMO Client Designer Adviser services and they declined,

saying that they would do this role themselves. So, I do not see that we have a

role in any sign-offi. "

169. I spoke to David Gibs on on 31 October 2014 and followed up by email on 4

November in which I re-iterated that Rydon, as Principal Contractor, was solely

responsible for ensuring the works on site were carried out in a safe manner

(PB/386 [ ]). I explained that:

"Rydon will review and approve their subcontractors method statements and

risk assessments for each element of work. They are the most qualified to

determine what is and what isn't the safest way to construct the works and so

this responsibility sits appropriately with them. Rydon, as with all main

contractors, to ensure they are compliant with H&S rules, regulations and

practices have an independent inspector review the H&S on site regularly.

This is happening and until this event they had not identified any issues. "

170. Keith Bushell, AUK's CDM-C, also responded to David Gibson, outlining the CDM

principle regarding method statements. He explained that the Principal Contractor

has responsibility for all H&S aspects on site and for managing risk assessments and

method statements obtained from its subcontractors (PB/387 [ ]).

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171. On 6 November 20 14 I emailed Chweechen Lim regarding a query that had arisen in

a meeting the previous day on what the contractor's requirements were for

maintenance and defects of systems they were working on (PB/388 [ ]).

Chweechen confirmed my understanding that all new systems had a 12 month defect

period from the date of completion. She also explained that where there are only

some alterations being made to an existing system, the defects liability period only

covered the altered part of the system and not the entire system (i.e. only those parts

that have been changed) (PB/388 [ ]).

172. Despite the fact that the TMO knew that AUK had no design role, the TMO still

tried to involve AUK in design related matters. On 12 November 2014 Claire

Williams ofthe TMO emailed Nick Valente and me noting that she was waiting for

Rydon to verify that the proposed windows would meet Building Regulations and

asked AUK to advise whether there was any issue of a flame retardance requirement

in relation to the cladding (PB/389 [ ]). Claire made reference to a

previous fire that had occurred at a building called Lakanal House. I replied to Claire

the same day stating (PB/389 [ ]):

"I would be very surprised if there is any issue with building regulations with

the windows. So I hope that you are not holding up getting approval from

Peter and David while you wait for Rydon to confirm.

I had a quick review of the NBS spec in the tender does for cladding and it

does specifY the cladding must comply with the following standards, one of

which I would anticipate requires flame retardance. However as client I

suggest you seek clarification from Rydon:

Compliance standard: The Centre for Window and Cladding Technology

(CWCT)

'Standard for systemised building envelopes'.

Comply with the recommendations ofGRCA publications

'Specification for the manufacture, curing and testing of GRC products' and

'Guide to fixings for glass fibre reinforced concrete cladding'.

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Structural andfire requirements:

Generally: As section B50.

Modifications: None.

Design: Complete the design in accordance with the designated code

of practice to satisfY specified performance criteria."

173. I did not know the answer to Claire Williams' question so in my email I referred her

to the NBS Specifications as a reminder of what had gone out to tender, and I

included a direct quote from the Spec. I also explained that the TMO should seek

further clarification from Rydon (PB/389 [ ]). In my email to Claire, I

wanted, as far as I could to be helpful and deliver a good service. However, I was

careful to make it clear that she should approach Rydon on her question. I do not

recall any other occasions where any party raised the fire at Lakanal House or sought

any assurances as to the fire performance or fire specification of the cladding system

being installed in the Project.

174. I note that, the same day, Claire Williams emailed Simon Lawrence at Rydon,

copying me in, asking for clarification on the fire retardance of the cladding and

setting out the quote from the specifications that I set out in my email to her

(PB/390 [ ]).

175. On 12 November 2014 I chased Simon Lawrence of Rydon regarding a design

change tracker that had been discussed at a previous client design meeting on 22

October 2014 (PB/391 [ ]). The purpose of the tracker was to manage

the process in relation to design changes and approvals, and to act as an audit trail of

changes made and why. Rydon had originally produced a draft of the tracker on 24

October 2014 (PB/392 [ ] and PB/393 [ ]) which I had

provided comments on (PB/394 [ ]), but since then I had not heard back

and I was concerned that deadlines might be missed. I explained that although

Rydon were responsible for managing the design development process and seeking

approval for alterations to tender designs and comments on construction drawings, I

wanted to make sure that appropriate and fair time was given to Max Fordham and

the TMO to review and comment on drawings. I raised that the TMO had to make

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some difficult, quick decisions concerning windows and metering, and I wanted to

ensure that was avoided in future. The tracker was important in this respect

(PB/395 [ ]).

176. Asbestos containing materials had been found in some flats and I asked Rydon for

reassurance that appropriate steps were in place to manage the process of drilling

through those asbestos materials. On 17 November 2014 Simon Lawrence ofRydon

emailed me setting out the steps that Rydon would be taking to limit their interaction

with asbestos containing materials. He also explained that Rydon's sub-contractor's

risk and method statements for this work would be forwarded to AUK's CD M-C for

comment (PB/396 ], PB/397 [ ] and

PB/398 [ ]).

177. Progress Meeting No. 5 took place on 18 November 2014 (PB/399 [

PB/400 [ ], PB/401 [ ], PB/402 [

J, ] and

PB/403 [ ]). The minutes recorded that Rydon's latest Progress Report

showed they were six weeks behind schedule and that sub-contractors progress has

been slower than anticipated. During the meeting it was also noted that a design

change tracker had been prepared and this was to be updated following the meeting.

The AOV and fire alarm panel were also discussed, with Rydon and the TMO

leading on these items. Item 9.5 of the minutes recorded a lengthy discussion on

windows, which had still not been ordered at this time. The failure to order the

windows meant that the works fell into delay. Rydon had previously advised that

the windows needed to be ordered by 7 November 2014 to maintain their

programme. On 26 November 2014 I emailed the TMO explaining that they had

two options. The first was to wait until the application had been approved and then

order the windows. The disadvantage with this approach was that it would likely

result in a delay of 8-10 weeks to the programme, and likely incur delay costs of in

excess of£ 100,000. The alternative option was to order the windows without formal

approval from the LP A. The risk then was the application was not successful and

the TMO would be liable for any abortive works and orders associated with ordering

the windows (PB/404 [ ]).

178. On 2 December 2014 Claire Williams queried making further changes following a

review of the electrical drawings. I advised Claire that whilst we could instruct

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these changes, I would warn against too many changes due to the cost implications

and the fact that the budget did not have a large contingency to cope with changes

(PB/405 [ ]).

179. On 2 December 2014, following a query from Claire Williams on the abortive costs

of ordering windows, I advised her that the cost of windows was approximately

£1,280,000 but some of this might not be incurred depending on how much of the

order had been manufactured (PB/406 [ ]).

180. On 4 December 2014 I received an email from Claire Williams in which she

expressed that she still had some confusion on the design approval process. She

explained that her assumption was that Max Fordham reviewed the drawings first

and then the TMO would get the final version to comment on, but this was not what

Rydon were doing (PB/407 [ ]). I recall that following this email I

produced a flow chart to clarify the arrangements for signing off on design changes,

which I circulated on 5 December 2014 (PB/408 [ ] and

PB/409 [ ]). I believe that the reason for confusion was that there was

more change than would normally be expected on a D&B project that was designed

up to the level the Project had been at tender. My aim was that the chart I had

prepared would control the process better (PB/408 [ ] and

PB/409 [ ]). During Progress Meeting No. 6 on 11 December 2014 it

was agreed that the design approval process set out in the chart would be followed

by the team (PB/410 [ ] and PB/411 [ ]).

181. On 5 December 2014 I was copied into an email from Rydon regarding the smoke

extraction system at Grenfell Tower and an explanation of how it operated

(PB/412 [ ]). Following the email Claire Williams told me that she

would talk to the TMO's internal people so that she could reassure herself that

everyone knew how the existing system worked. Claire also asked me to confirm

that the new smoke extraction system as designed would meet the required standards

(PB/413 [ ]). I replied to Claire Williams on 8 December 2014

explaining that building control approval was required for the fire safety and smoke

extract system, which Rydon had already been discussing with building control

(PB/414 [ ]). I also noted that:

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"It is recognised that the existing system will not meet 'new build' standards

but they are aiming to provide the best possible design within the existing

building constraints. "

182. Following my email Claire Williams said that she was concerned that the system

designed at tender may not meet the standard as the concierge was no longer on site,

and she did not want to leave residents vulnerable or the TMO open to any risk

(PB/414 [ ]). I could not answer Claire's question from a technical point

of view, but I let her know that my understanding was that the smoke detection

system was designed and tendered assuming that a concierge would be in

attendance. As this was no longer the case, I had understood that she was going to

check with her team what arrangements the TMO needed to put in place. I also

explained that from previous discussions with her, I had understood that Claire

Williams wanted the alarm to be forwarded to a 24 hour manned arrangement

(PB/415 [ ]). Max Fordham also later followed up on 5 January 2015

with an email stating that the ERs were clear about what should be allowed by the

contractor, and this was that a central control panel needed to be provided with a

dial-up connection to the local fire brigade or approved monitoring centre

(PB/415 [ ]).

183. On 8 December 2014 Claire Williams gave the go ahead to order the windows and I

issued an instruction to Rydon requesting that they book the window manufacture

(PB/416 [ ]). The windows were expected on site around the week

commencing 23 February. At this time Rydon were already at a 9 week delay and

they informed me that the contract completion date would be affected. Rydon duly

issued a delay notice (PB/417 [ ], PB/418 [ ] and

PB/419 [ ]). On 2 January 2015 the LPA approved the non-material

amendment to change window sizes to be as existing (PB/420 [ ] and

PB/421 [ ]).

184. On 12 December 2014 I sent the TMO Rydon's programme showing a 9 week delay

due to the window order and the notice of delay (PB/422 [ ],

PB/423 [ l and PB/424 [ ]). The notice stated that the

"Client change to window design and installation works" had caused delay to the

delivery and installation of the windows as per the programme. I explained to the

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TMO that AUK would be working with Rydon to report on the cost implication of

the delay and change to the programme, which we aimed to send to the TMO in

early January. I received a reply to my email from Claire Williams of the TMO on

the same day. She was not happy with the wording "client change" in Rydon's

notice of delay and suggested that this should be called a "project team change".

She considered that some of the change was attributable to Rydon not passing on all

information about what impact the design arrangement of the windows would have

(PB/425 [ ]). Claire Williams was also keen that there should be some

cost benefit to the TMO from the lesser works that were now needed as Rydon

would no longer need to cut into the concrete to enlarge the existing window

opening. She asked that AUK take this up with the TMO. I told Claire Williams

that I understood all of this but she needed to be aware that the change to the

windows and cost was significant (PB/426 [ ]).

185. On 24 December 2014 Claire Williams emailed Matt Smith of Max Fordham and

myself explaining that a consultation for Grenfell Residents was held on 22

December 2014 so that they could see the new Heat Interface Unit ("HIU") layout,

which had moved from a cupboard in the kitchen into the hallways of flats

(PB/427 [ ]). Following that meeting there was some resident resistance

to the location of the HIU s and Claire Williams asked whether those residents might

be offered the original proposal. On 5 January 2015 I replied to Claire. My advice

was that, whilst this could be offered, it should be seen as last resort as there may be

buildability and timing complications (PB/427 [ ]). Rydon also agreed

because locating the HIU in the kitchen cupboard would make access near

impossible for maintenance works but said it would be possible to accommodate the

change if absolutely necessary for a small number of flats (PB/428 [ ]).

186. Around December 2014 Tony Batty of Silcock Dawson, the M&E Clerk of Works,

and Jon White of John Rowan and Partners, the general building Clerk of Works,

started conducting site visits to Grenfell Tower. Regular joint Site Reports were

circulated, although I did not always get these immediately as I was often missed

from the distribution list or my email address was entered incorrectly. Claire

Williams often had to forward the reports to me.

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187. On 15 December 2014 Claire Williams forwarded COW Site Report No. 1, and

flagged that boiler installation was 4 weeks behind but there was nothing on M&E in

Rydon's Progress Reports (PB/429 [ ] and PB/430 [ ]).

Claire Williams also had to forward Site Report No. 2 which noted further delays to

the programme (PB/431 [ ] and PB/432 [ ]), including the

AOV system running 9 weeks behind programme and communal heating works

running 22 weeks behind.

188. I arranged a catch up meeting with Rydon on 16 January 2015 to carry out a detailed

review of the programme and to discuss the delay caused by the windows and the

delays reported on other elements of the work. I also wanted to discuss current

progress in light of the COW reports (PB/433 [ ], PB/434 [ ],

PB/435 [ ], PB/436 [ ], PB/437 [ ] and

PB/438 [ ]). The meeting with Rydon was positive and it was clear that

Rydon had carried out significant work and given consideration to the programme.

They had prepared a revised programme which included greater detail and

information, but I did express my disappointment in the current delay to the

programme. Rydon's new programme reported a 7 week extension of time to the

completion date to 23 October 2015 and they considered that this revised

programme was "more accurate, considered and deliverable". I fed all of this back

to Claire Williams (PB/439 [ ]). Following the meeting with Rydon we

agreed a lengthy list of actions that needed to be completed to ensure progress

continued to move forward (PB/440 [ ]).

189. I attended Progress Meeting No. 7, which took place on 20 January 2015

(PB/441 [ ] and PB/442 [ ]). Amongst other issues, Rydon's

delay was discussed and Simon Lawrence of Rydon presented a draft revised

programme, the final version of which he intended to submit that week. It was also

noted that Rydon had submitted a detailed design of the AOV system to Building

Control.

190. On 23 January 2015 I received Rydon's revised programme reflecting the new

completion date of 23 October 2015 (PB/443 [ ] and

PB/444 [ ]). In their email, Rydon said that the delay caused by the

windows was in fact more than 7 weeks, but they had tried to reduce the delay by

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altering the sequence of works. I sent the revised programme to Claire Williams of

the TMO on 26 January 2015 (PB/445 [ ]). I told Claire Williams that I

proposed to issue the extension to 23 October 2015 as requested, but costs and

preliminaries responsibility for the 7 week period would continue to be negotiated.

191. On 29 January 2015 I emailed Simon Lawrence of Rydon asking when we could

expect to receive their application for additional costs arising from the delay to the

works (PB/446 [ ]). I noted that some ofthe cost would likely fall on

Rydon, and some of it on the TMO. Simon Lawrence replied on the same day

stating that the critical path of the Project was based around the delivery and

installation of the windows - which had been delayed due to the client's choice

(PB/446 [ ]). He also stated "!fit were not for the windows we would

still be able to complete all works by the original contract end date".

192. The delay to the programme and the extended contract completion date had a knock

on effect on costs elsewhere. For example Max Fordham submitted a proposal for

future additional costs for conducting site visits and meetings and additional project

time, which amounted to just above £10,000. I considered their claim to be

reasonable and informed Claire Williams ofthis (PB/447 [ ]).

193. I attended Progress Meeting No. 8 on 13 February 2015 (PB/448 [ ] and

PB/449 [ ]). Again, amongst other issues, Rydon's progress against

programme was discussed.

194. The COWs site visits and snagging was well underway at this time, but I understood

from email exchanges that there were some issues regarding a lack of coordination

with Rydon which made this difficult. To clear the air and agree a way forward, the

COWs and Rydon met on 3 March 2015. I was forwarded a summary of their

meeting by Claire Williams for information (PB/450 [ ]). The summary

noted that Rydon would give 2-3 days notice to the COWs prior to covering up any

areas, and that the COW would be gradually increasing their on-site visits.

195. On 9 March 2015 Claire Williams was sent an email from residents of the Grenfell

Tower requesting that the TMO and Rydon do not enter their properties to carry out

works as they were concerned about the lack of consultation from the TMO/Rydon

and the intention to place HIUs in the hallways (PB/451 [ ]). The email

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ART00008527 _0058 ART00008527/58

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