Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
A Strategic Policy Framework for Advancing U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power as a National
Security Imperative
David K. Gattie, University of Georgia, College of Engineering
1. Introduction
In the ongoing battle of ideas in its electric power sector, the U.S. has reached a
familiar inflection point—it is in the throes of a debate on whether to retain civilian
nuclear power in its energy portfolio, thus as a resource for its industrial base.
Nuclear energy is a unique resource because of its unmatched energy density and
dual-purpose utility for electric power generation and nuclear weaponry. Triple-
purpose if applications in medicine are included. However, the U.S. made critical
policy decisions in the past that have carried forward and compromised America’s
capacity to advance in the civilian nuclear power space.
In 1977 the U.S. made the policy decision to “defer indefinitely the reprocessing of
spent nuclear power reactor fuel” in order to set an example for other nations to
likewise not reprocess spent fuel, with the objective being to protect the world from
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.1 This expectation didn’t transpire as France, the
U.K., Russia, Japan and India currently have nuclear fuel reprocessing capacity.2
Then, in 1993, another energy policy decision weakened the U.S. further in the
advanced nuclear power technology space when President Clinton announced3,4 the
end of nuclear power research and development, characterizing it as a program no
longer needed and effectively bringing to an end U.S. research on integral fast
reactors. With respect to both fuel reprocessing and fast reactor research, the U.S.
Senate held committee meetings in 2017 that addressed the need to look at fuel
reprocessing and fast reactor technologies as necessary advances for America’s
nuclear power future.5, 6, 7 In all, America is facing stiff international competition, not
only with respect to current light-water reactors, but also advanced reactors such as
molten salt reactors, fast reactors and small modular reactors.8 Moreover, several
1Rossin, A.D. 1999. U.S. Reprocessing and Nonproliferation Policy.
http://www.wmsym.org/archives/1999/20/20-1.pdf 2WNA, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-
cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx 3 Clinton Decision. 1993. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232 4 Gattie, DK. Nuclear power in America requires political resolve. Morning Consult, May 23, 2017.
https://morningconsult.com/opinions/nuclear-power-america-requires-political-resolve/ 5 Senate EPW Hearing, July 25, 2017.
https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=B65EC8DE-D144-4109-A469-5B5F77A16540 6 Senate Appropriations Hearing, June 21, 2017. https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-
of-the-fy2018-budget-request-for-the-us-department-of-energy 7 Senate Appropriations Hearing, September 14, 2016.
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-titled-the-future-of-nuclear-power 8 Third Way. 2017. The global race for advanced nuclear. http://www.thirdway.org/infographic/the-global-
race-for-advanced-nuclear
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
plants in the existing U.S. nuclear power fleet are facing challenges on a different
front and are struggling to compete with natural gas and renewables.9, 10
The issue of harnessing the energy of the atomic nucleus to generate electricity can
be traced to the days of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, and it was
controversial from the beginning.11,12 Some have argued that nuclear power isn’t the
right way forward or that it poses too great of a risk to the general public,13,14,15
while others argue that nuclear power isn’t necessary to meet electricity
demands.16,17,18 Yet, others contend that nuclear power is needed in order to reduce
global carbon emissions and meet climate goals.19,20,21,22,23 Currently, much of the
debate in the U.S. revolves around markets and the extent to which markets should
determine the fate of nuclear power in the U.S. energy portfolio. One argument
being that markets should be allowed to work and, thus, dictate the energy portfolio
for the U.S. electric power sector.24,25,26,27 This is in sharp contrast with efforts to
employ subsidies and zero-emission credits to keep baseload nuclear plants in
9 Proctor, D. Analysis shows U.S. nuclear plants losing $2.9 billion annually. Power Magazine, June 15,
2017. http://www.powermag.com/analysis-shows-u-s-nuclear-plants-losing-2-9-billion-annually/ 10 Polson, J. More than half of America’s nuclear reactors are losing money. Bloomberg, June 14, 2017.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-14/half-of-america-s-nuclear-power-plants-seen-as-
money-losers 11 Oppenheimer, J. Robert. "International control of atomic energy." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 4.2
(1948): 39-48. 12 Rhodes, Richard. "The Making of the Atomic Bomb, 886 pp." (1986). 13 Breyman, Steve. "Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958-1978." (2001): 141-
143. 14 Lovins, Amory B. "Energy strategy: the road not taken." Foreign Aff. 55 (1976): 65. 15 Ehrlich, Paul R. "An Ecologist's Perspective on Nuclear Power." FAS Public Interest Report 28 (1975):
3-6. 16 Lovins, A. B. (2017). Do coal and nuclear generation deserve above-market prices?. The Electricity
Journal, 30(6), 22-30. 17 Jacobson, M. Z., Delucchi, M. A., Cameron, M. A., & Frew, B. A. (2017). The United States can keep
the grid stable at low cost with 100% clean, renewable energy in all sectors despite inaccurate claims.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(26), E5021-E5023. 18 Jacobson, M. Z., Delucchi, M. A., Bauer, Z. A., Goodman, S. C., Chapman, W. E., Cameron, M. A., ... &
Erwin, J. R. (2017). 100% clean and renewable wind, water, and sunlight all-sector energy roadmaps for
139 countries of the world. Joule, 1(1), 108-121. 19 Begos, K. Experts say nuclear power needed to slow warming. Physics.Org, Nov. 3, 2013.
https://phys.org/news/2013-11-experts-nuclear-power.html 20 Kharecha, Pushker A., and James E. Hansen. "Prevented mortality and greenhouse gas emissions from
historical and projected nuclear power." Environmental science & technology 47.9 (2013): 4889-4895. 21 Vine, Doug, and Timothy Juliant. "Climate solutions: the role of nuclear power." Center for Climate and
Energy Solutions (2014). 22 Shellenberger, Michael. "The Nuclear Option: Renewables Can't Save the Planet-But Uranium Can."
Foreign Aff. 96 (2017): 159. 23 Climate Scientists for Nuclear. http://environmentalprogress.org/climate-scientists-for-nuclear/ 24 Lovins, A. B. (2017). Do coal and nuclear generation deserve above-market prices?. The Electricity
Journal, 30(6), 22-30. 25 Perry, M. Don’t meddle in the energy market. US News, October 11, 2017.
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2017-10-11/rick-perry-shouldnt-prop-up-
coal-and-nuclear-power-in-the-energy-markets 26 Dyson, M. Who needs baseload power: Or, let the markets work. GreenBiz, June 26, 2017.
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/who-needs-baseload-power-or-let-markets-do-their-job 27 Green, M. Let markets work for electricity grid, consumers. Breaking Energy, Nov. 3, 2017.
https://breakingenergy.com/2017/11/03/let-markets-work-for-electricity-grid-consumers/
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
operation28 or to explore mechanisms for assigning value to the reliability and
resilience attributes provided by nuclear power.29 These issues of costs, climate,
reliability and resilience are necessary in the discussion of nuclear power, but they
don’t sufficiently encompass all aspects of nuclear power in the U.S. One aspect, in
particular, is the importance of civilian nuclear power to U.S. national security, which
is the focus of this paper.
The objectives of this paper are to:
1. Provide rationale for expanding U.S. civilian nuclear power and its associated
science, engineering and technology based on U.S. national security concerns,
and
2. Present a strategic policy framework for sustaining domestic U.S. nuclear
power and expanding the U.S. civilian nuclear power footprint abroad as a
national security imperative.
Here, national security is broadly characterized as anything that constrains U.S.
options or U.S. capacity to respond to a threat (military, economic, technological,
environmental, climate, etc.). This includes, but isn’t limited to, any policy or policy
deficiency that is complicit in allowing the U.S. to fall behind other nations in a
critical field of science, engineering or technology.
2. Nuclear and National Security: A Brief Background
U.S. national security has been at the forefront of America’s geopolitical interests
since the founding of the country with one of the earliest examples being the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823.30 However, since World War II (WWII) national security is more
globally extensive and retains in its foundation concerns about nuclear energy—
concerns articulated in 1946 by Caryl P. Haskins, then Deputy Executive Officer of
the National Defense Research Committee:
We therefore cannot count on maintaining our security through a monopoly of
fundamental knowledge in the atomic field […]. Further, our monopoly of technical
information and facilities is limited and is diminishing. At present we do have a
monopoly of stockpiles of raw materials and finished atomic bombs, and we are
equipped with gigantic plants for producing these materials. Within something like
ten years, however, our monopoly in technology may have disappeared completely,
whatever the policy we now adopt with respect to international action.31 (Caryl P.
Haskins)
Haskins was clear in his concern regarding the possibility that the U.S. no longer had
a monopoly on nuclear technology. This had been demonstrated throughout the
preceding decades as scientists from across the world and from various nationalities
probed the atom for its secrets. Hailing from countries such as New Zealand (Ernest
28 State of New York Public Service Commission. CASE 15-E-0302 and CASE 16-E-0270. (pp. 5, 19, 20).
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B44C5D5B8-14C3-4F32-
8399-F5487D6D8FE8%7D 29 Dept. of Energy Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule. 2017.
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/09/f37/Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Rulemaking%20.pdf 30 Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe 31 Haskins, Caryl P. "Atomic energy and American foreign policy." Foreign Aff. 24 (1946): 591.
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
Rutherford), Denmark (Neils Bohr), England (James Chadwick), Hungary (Leo
Szilard), Italy (Enrico Fermi), Germany (Otto Hahn), Austria (Lise Meitner), and the
United States (Robert Oppenheimer), these scientists did what scientists do—
explored the unknown in order to understand the nature of things. In this case it was
the mystery of the atom and the knowledge hidden within the atomic nucleus, and
that knowledge was available to anyone or any country with the wherewithal and
commitment to explore it. The secrets of the atom could not be reserved for U.S.
interests only as scientific discovery cannot be contained by geographical boundaries
nor is it a respecter of geopolitical intentions or ideologies—good or bad.32 This was
true in 1946, it is true in 2017, and it will continue to be true in the future.
Haskins’ warning proved true as the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear
capabilities in pursuit of geopolitical dominance in Europe and Asia. This was followed
by the enactment of the Truman Doctrine33 as the foundation to U.S. foreign policy,
where America became committed to “actively offering assistance to preserve the
political integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the
best interest of the United States.”34 This was based on the geopolitical reality that
U.S. national security “depended on more than just the physical security of American
territory.”35 Eventually, on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act36 was signed into
law signifying that the U.S. had accepted its responsibility as the global leader in
what was then the new international order.
In the ensuing years, America pursued primacy in nuclear science, engineering and
technology in order to maintain a secure distance between itself and any proto-peer
nation probing the power of the atom and pursuing nuclear capabilities in order to
become a competitor with the U.S.; particularly with respect to military
capabilities.37,38 The pursuit of American primacy remains an issue of heated
debate.39,40
3. America’s Role and Responsibility in the Global Nuclear Energy Cycle
Since President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, the U.S. has been the
world leader in establishing and maintaining global standards for the nuclear fuel
32 Gattie, DK. U.S. national security and a call for American primacy in civilian nuclear power. Forbes,
Sept. 7, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/09/07/u-s-national-security-and-a-call-for-
american-primacy-in-civilian-nuclear-power/#5132b9787938. 33 Office of the Historian. The Truman Doctrine. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-
doctrine 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Office of the Historian. National Security Act. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-
security-act 37 Colucci, L. Oct. 23, 2015. National Security Doctrines and National Security Strategy Past, Present and
Future. Presentation to The Institute of World Politics.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dBcWaUMEuQ&t=2281s 38 Mearsheimer, J. Aug. 4, 2010. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia. Presented
at the 4th Annual Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security.
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/T0008.pdf 39 Brands, H. The era of American primacy is far from over. The National Interest, Aug. 24, 2016.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-era-american-primacy-far-over-17465 40 Sapolsky, H.M. Why primacy is a bad strategy for America. The National Interest, Sept. 5, 2016.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-primacy-bad-strategy-america-17578
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
cycle, with the primary objective being nonproliferation.41,42 At least one of the
institutional foundations for the U.S. role has been Section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act, which establishes the conditions and outlines the process for major nuclear
cooperation between the United States and other countries.43 In order for a country
to enter into such an agreement with the United States, that country must commit to
a set of nine nonproliferation criteria established in order to control the flow and
exchange of nuclear material supplies and fuel throughout the world.44 Historically,
the U.S. role as global leader in this critical nonproliferation agreement has been due
to its technological capabilities and high standards of excellence in the nuclear supply
chain. Nye has noted that American leadership in the global nuclear fuel chain
slowed the growth in the number of nuclear weapons states from the twenty-five
expected in the 1960s to the nine that exist today.45,46 However, of late, some
countries have penetrated other regions , particularly emerging economies, with
their own reactor designs, construction and services and, in doing so, are challenging
U.S. leadership in the nuclear field.47,48,49,50 In matters of nonproliferation, the
standards, integrity and custody of nuclear materials and fuel are paramount issues
as the U.S. provides leadership in collaborating with other nations toward global
nuclear disarmament while maintaining its long-held stewardship over the global
nuclear fuel cycle and the peaceful use of nuclear power to support economic
development objectives worldwide.
4. Trends in Nuclear Power: U.S. and Global
Nuclear power in the U.S. is facing challenging circumstances with respect to existing
plants and new plant construction. For several years now, particularly since hydraulic
fracturing unlocked abundant, inexpensive natural gas resources in the U.S., the
electric power sector is trending away from coal and toward natural gas. One benefit
of this innovation has been a decline in CO2 emissions from the electric power sector
(Figure 1). At the same time, low natural gas prices are creating issues for existing
nuclear plants, particularly in deregulated markets as markets pursue the next
marginal investment, which currently is natural gas. Consequently, several nuclear
41 IAEA. Atoms for Peace Speech by Mr. Dwight d. Eisenhower.
https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech 42 US House. https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Atomic%20Energy%20Act%20Of%201954.pdf 43National Nuclear Security Administration. 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation.
https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacef
ulcooperation 44 Atomic Energy Act of 1954. https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Atomic Energy Act Of 1954.pdf) 45 Nye, Joseph S. "Maintaining a nonproliferation regime." International Organization 35.1 (1981): 15-38. 46 Nye Jr, Joseph S. Is the American century over?. John Wiley & Sons, 2015. 47Gil, L. How China has become the world’s fastest expanding nuclear power producer. IAEA, Oct. 25,
2017. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/how-china-has-become-the-worlds-fastest-expanding-
nuclear-power-producer 48Japan Times. Russia unrivaled in nuclear power plant exports. July 27, 2017.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/07/27/commentary/world-commentary/russia-unrivaled-
nuclear-power-plant-exports/#.Wg7BxXlrzIU 49 Stratfor Worldview. Moscow’s nuclear energy advantage. Sept. 20, 2017.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/moscows-nuclear-energy-advantage 50 Gattie, DK. America is sacrificing its leadership role in nuclear energy. The Hill, Oct. 6, 2017.
http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/354269-america-is-sacrificing-its-leadership-role-in-
nuclear-energy
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
power plants are scheduled for early closure51,52,53 representing 15,285 MW of
baseload capacity and 121,640,916 MWhrs of zero-carbon emissions (Table 1).
Figure 1. U.S. power generation profile and CO2 emissions. [Data Source: U.S.
Energy Information Administration]
51Larson, A.U.S. nuclear power plant closures. Power Magazine, 2016. http://www.powermag.com/u-s-
nuclear-power-plant-closures-slideshow/. Power Magazine. 52 Plumer, B. The US keeps shutting down nuclear power plants and replacing them with coal or gas. Vox,
Nov. 3, 2016. https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2016/11/3/13499278/nuclear-retirements-
coal-gas. 53 Anderson, J. You can thank fracking for early closure of NY Nuclear Plant. Forbes, Jan. 17, 2017.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredanderson/2017/01/17/fracking-blamed-for-early-closure-of-ny-nuclear-
plant/#28a26ed3d9e8. Forbes.
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
Table 1. U.S. nuclear plants scheduled for possible closure. [Data Source for
Generation: U.S. Energy Information Administration)
In addition, new nuclear projects in Georgia and South Carolina have been
confronted by issues associated with reviving a U.S. industrial sector that, with
respect to new construction, has been dormant for thirty years. Compounding these
new construction efforts were the bankruptcy of Westinghouse and other financial
problems with Toshiba, the parent company of Westinghouse.54,55 In the case of V.C.
Summer in South Carolina, the project was canceled, leaving Plant Vogtle Units 3 & 4
in Georgia as the lone nuclear reactor construction project in the U.S.56
While the U.S. currently leads the world in the number of operable nuclear reactors,
and has since the beginning of the civilian nuclear power age, China, Russia and
India, each, are outpacing the U.S. in the total number of nuclear plants under
construction, planned or proposed. The World Nuclear Association (WNA) reports that
China has 239 reactors57 under construction, planned or proposed, of which 220 are
large reactors and that Russia has 55 reactors58 under construction, planned or
54The Economist. Westinghouse files for bankruptcy. The Economist, April 1, 2017.
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21719836-global-nuclear-power-industry-beset-problems-
westinghouse-files-bankruptcy 55 Hals, T. and Flitter, E. How two cutting edge U.S. nuclear projects bankrupted Westinghouse. Reuters,
May 2, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-toshiba-accounting-westinghouse-nucle/how-two-cutting-
edge-u-s-nuclear-projects-bankrupted-westinghouse-idUSKBN17Y0CQ 56 Plumer, B. U.S. nuclear comeback stalls as two reactors are abandoned. New York Times, July 31, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/climate/nuclear-power-project-canceled-in-south-carolina.html 57 WNA, China Reactors. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-
f/china-nuclear-power.aspx (As of September 2017). 58 WNA, Russia Reactors. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-
s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx (As of September 2017).
Plant
Capacity
(MW) Location
Generation
(MWhrs) Year of Generation
Crystal River 860 Florida 7,000,079 2008
Kewaunee 556 Wisconsin 4,990,254 2010
San Onofre 2,150 California 18,097,173 2011
Vermont Yankee 620 Vermont 5,060,582 2014
FitzPatrick 838 New York 7,382,237 2015
Fort Calhoun 476 Nebraska 3,425,235 2016
Clinton 1,069 Illinois 8,914,453 2016
Pilgrim 688 Massachusetts 5,414,318 2016
Quad Cities 1,871 Illinois 15,655,095 2016
Oyster Creek 625 New Jersey 4,585,091 2016
Diablo Canyon 2,240 California 18,907,578 2016
Three Mile Island 1 981 Pennsylvania 7,082,652 2016
Indian Point 2,311 New York 15,126,169 2016
Total 15,285 121,640,916
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
proposed, of which 49 are large reactors. The state-owned enterprise (SOE)
structure of the power generation sectors in China and Russia will likely advance
many of these projects to completion and bolster Chinese and Russian nuclear power
partnerships in developing regions as both countries work to broaden their respective
geopolitical spheres of influence. For example, China and Russia are involved in
planned or proposed reactors in, among other countries, Turkey,59 Jordan,60
Kazakhstan,61 Bangladesh62 and Vietnam.63 Moreover, the WNA recently published
the list of countries actively considering nuclear power programs and in it pointed out
that “State-owned nuclear companies in Russia and China have taken the lead in
offering nuclear power plants to emerging countries, usually with finance and fuel
services.”64 If current trends continue with existing U.S. plants closing and new
plants being constructed in Asia, the U.S. will eventually lag China in domestic
nuclear reactors (Figure 2) and over the long term will find itself lagging Russia and
India as well.
Figure 2. Nuclear reactors in operation, under construction, planned or proposed in
the U.S., China, Russia and India. [Data Source: World Nuclear Association]
59 WNA, Turkey. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/turkey.aspx (As of September 2017). 60 WNA, Jordan. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-
n/jordan.aspx (As of September 2017). 61 WNA, Kazakhstan. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-
n/kazakhstan.aspx (As of September 2017). 62 WNA, Balgladesh. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-
f/bangladesh.aspx (As of September 2017). 63 WNA, Vietnam. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/vietnam.aspx (As of September 2017). 64 WNA, Emerging Nuclear Countries. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-
profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx (As of September 2017).
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
5. Potential Implications of a Declining U.S. Nuclear Power Sector
While efforts by Russia and China in developing regions are commendable for
humanitarian and climate change reasons, it should be of concern to U.S.
policymakers that in doing so China and Russia are bolstering their respective
geopolitical spheres of influence through nuclear technology.65 As the U.S. has
historically been the world leader in reactor design, supplies, and manufacturing, and
has been the leading purchaser of nuclear fuel, this meant it was the dominant force
in the global nuclear cycle. However, if U.S. nuclear power plants continue to retire
or are shut down (with little or no new construction) and other countries replace the
U.S. as the dominant market force, America’s role as leader in the global nuclear
cycle will be at risk. In the event that America’s influence over the fuel cycle
diminishes, so too can its stewardship responsibility—a role that would eventually be
assumed by another country.
Clearpath’s Jay Faison has compared the support system for U.S. nuclear reactors to
that of an ecosystem linking U.S. security, the U.S. nuclear power fleet, the U.S.
Navy, international security, and U.S. economic security.66 Commander Kirk S.
Lippold, USN (Ret) recently submitted a report to the Electric Reliability Coordinating
Council entitled, “Nuclear Energy, the Production Tax Credit, and International
Security”.67 In it he echoes Faison’s nuclear ecosystem and speaks to the broader,
institutional, and system-level need for nuclear science, engineering and technology:
In order for the US to be an effective leader on nuclear issues, it must sustain a
robust and diverse ecosystem of education, research and development, scientific
innovation, and industrial capacity in the nuclear field. The domestic and
international market for technology created by the tax credit would attract new
investment in the industry; that investment would spark interest in research,
supporting laboratories, and directing students into a growing and cutting-edge field
of study. This cycle of investment and interest only functions if there is a vibrant
market for nuclear energy to drive it (Lippold).
While Faison and Lippold speak of the U.S. nuclear ecosystem, there is also the
larger global nuclear ecosystem of which the U.S. is the key member. This global
nuclear ecosystem won’t disassemble simply because U.S. electricity markets cannot
sustain nuclear power nor will it dissolve if, by policy, the U.S. mandates a retreat
from the deployment of civilian nuclear power altogether—a retreat that, among the
world’s leading industrial, economic and military powers, would constitute a
unilateral U.S. exit from civilian nuclear power. To the contrary, the global nuclear
ecosystem will remain. However, a U.S. absence from it would constitute an
unprecedented risk since the U.S. will not be positioned at the top of the supply
chain, and thus will not necessarily have the influence it has held since the discovery
of nuclear energy and the peaceful use of civilian nuclear power via the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act. Moreover, if America abandons civilian nuclear power altogether, it will
65 Williams, D. China invites Rosatom to build nuclear power plant. Power Engineering International, Aug.
8, 2017. http://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/2017/08/china-invites-rosatom-to-build-nuclear-
power-plant.html 66 Faison, J. Nuclear, the ecosystem. Clearpath, December 1, 2016. https://clearpath.org/jays-take/nuclear-
the-ecosystem 67 Lippold, K. Nuclear Energy, the Production Tax Credit, and International Security. July 31, 2017.
http://www.electricreliability.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Energy%2C%20The%20Production%20Ta
x%20Credit%2C%20and%20International%20Security.pdf
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
very likely result in an exodus of expertise from the U.S. as scientists and engineers
pursue opportunities where nuclear power is advancing and the expertise is in
demand (e.g., China, Russia, India)68.
In a 2013 report, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) raise
several critical points regarding the traditional role of the U.S. in the global nuclear
cycle and how that role is diminishing due to decreased U.S. nuclear power activity
compared with competing nations.69 The following excerpt highlights the rationale for
why U.S. energy policy, as pertains to nuclear power, must be globally circumspect:
Today, much of the world’s nuclear manufacturing and supply capability still relies on
designs and technologies developed in the United States. But the firms involved are
largely foreign-owned. Even in the market for conventional light-water reactors,
where the United States led the world for decades, all but one of the U.S.-based
designers and manufacturers have been acquired by non-U.S.-based competitors.
The countries that are currently strengthening their nuclear capabilities and global
market position (i.e., France, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, with China close
behind) have different reasons for pursuing nuclear technology—some are primarily
concerned about energy security or about preserving domestic fossil fuel resources,
while others may be motivated by a mix of nationalistic and geopolitical
considerations. But in all cases they see nuclear technology as offering long-term
benefits that justify a significant near-term sovereign investment, even faced with
the prospect that world natural gas prices may fall if the unconventional gas
production technologies in use in the United States are successfully applied in other
parts of the world. The most aggressive of these new national nuclear programs is
underway in China (CSIS).
More recently, a key finding of a major study by the Energy Futures Initiative, whose
President and CEO is former Secretary of Energy, Ernest Moniz, highlights that “a
robust nuclear energy enterprise is a key enabler of the Nation’s nonproliferation
goals, and that it supports the fleet modernization plans of the U.S. Navy, as well as
the global strategic stability and deterrence value of nuclear.”70 The CNA Military
Advisory Board has also reported on the national security implications of advanced
nuclear technologies.71
68 Gattie, DK. U.S. national security and a call for American primacy in civilian nuclear power. Forbes,
Sept. 7, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/09/07/u-s-national-security-and-a-call-for-
american-primacy-in-civilian-nuclear-power/#5132b9787938. 69 CSIS. Restoring U.S. Leadership in Nuclear Energy: A National Security Imperative. June 14, 2013.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/restoring-us-leadership-nuclear-energy 70 Energy Futures Initiative. The U.S. Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler. August
2017.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ec123cb3db2bd94e057628/t/59947949f43b55af66b0684b/1502902
604749/EFI+nuclear+paper+17+Aug+2017.pdf 71 CNA Military Advisory Board. Advanced Energy and U.S. National Security. June 2017.
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2017-U-015512.pdf
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
6. Nuclear Power in America: Leadership or Isolationism?
In 1947, Henry Stimson, Secretary of War during WWII, wrote an article entitled
“The Challenge to Americans”72 in which he articulated the realities of the world that
America had become a part of, and in which America had assumed a global
leadership role. A few excerpts from Stimson’s article are relevant to the U.S. today,
particularly with respect to America’s disposition toward nuclear power:
We are having our first experience of constant, full-scale activity in world politics.
Other nations have lived for years as principals in the give-and-take of diplomacy.
Until now we have been, except in wartime, on the fringe. It is no wonder that, when
suddenly placed in the center of alarms and excursions of international affairs, we
are abnormally sensitive (Stimson, p. 5).
It is not surprising, then, that many of us are confused and unhappy about our
foreign relations, and that some are tempted to seek refuge from their confusion
either in retreat to isolationism or in suggested solutions whose simplicity is only
matched by their folly. In the main, our difficulties arise from unwillingness to face
reality (Stimson, p. 5).
First, and most important, Americans must now understand that the United States
has become, for better or worse, a wholly committed member of the world
community. This has not happened by conscious choice; but it is a plain fact, and our
only choice is whether or not to face it (Stimson, p. 6).
It is the first condition of effective foreign policy that this nation put away forever
any thought that America can again be an island to herself. No private program and
no public policy, in any sector of our national life, can now escape from the
compelling fact that if it is not framed with reference to the world, it is framed with
perfect futility (Stimson, p. 6).
As a corollary to this first great principle, it follows that we shall be wholly wrong if
we attempt to set a maximum or margin to our activity as members of the world.
The only question we can safely ask today is whether in any of our actions on the
world stage we are doing enough. In American policy toward the world there is no
place for grudging or limited participation, and any attempt to cut our losses by
setting bounds to our policy can only turn us backward onto the deadly road toward
self-defeating isolation (Stimson, p. 6).
It is altogether fitting and proper, of course, that we should not waste our substance
in activity without result. It is also evident that we cannot do everything we would
like to do. But it would be shriveling timidity for America to refuse to play to the full
her present necessary part in the world. And the certain penalty for such timidity
would be failure (Stimson, p. 7).
A second principle, and one which requires emphasis as a necessary complement to
any policy of full participation, is that we are forced to act in the world as it is, and
not in the world as we wish it were, or as we would like it to become. It is a world in
which we are only one of many peoples and in which our basic principles of life are
not shared by all our neighbors. It has been one of the more dangerous aspects of
our internationalism in past years that too often it was accompanied by the curious
72 Stimson, Henry L. "The challenge to Americans." Foreign Aff. 26 (1947): 5.
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
assumption that the world overnight become good and clean and peaceful
everywhere if only America would lead the way. The most elementary experience of
human affairs should show us all how naïve and dangerous a view that is. (Stimson,
p. 7-8)
Stimson’s counsel is both prescient and germane with respect to America’s role and
responsibilities in the global nuclear energy space. Will America lead or will America
retreat?
A direct comparison of the prospects for nuclear power in the U.S. and China
illustrates opposite trajectories for the world’s largest economic powers (Figure 3).
The graphs are a projection of future nuclear power generation and capacity under
the scenario that China carries through with its plans for new nuclear construction
and that U.S. nuclear reactors currently in operation are retired after a 60-year life
with no new nuclear construction to replace the retired capacity. This results in a loss
of over 9,521 TWhrs of zero-carbon generation, which is equivalent to about 2.3
years of total annual generation for the entire U.S. Whether the U.S. can backfill this
loss and meet its electricity needs and climate objectives with distributed demand-
side management, renewables and energy efficiency, as some have proposed, can
only be modeled or left to conjecture73, 74 as there is no precedent for doing so at
such a scale. Therefore this loss in baseload, zero-carbon nuclear power generation
is characterized here as an internal threat to the U.S. as the loss of baseload power
will have energy security and grid reliability implications. Moreover, offsetting the
loss of this level of zero-carbon electricity poses concerns about mitigating climate
change, which in and of itself is classified as a national security threat75,76.
However, what doesn’t need to be left to models and conjecture is that this loss in
nuclear capacity is equivalent to an absence of nuclear construction projects,
meaning nuclear science and engineering are not being practiced and applied in the
U.S. This atrophy in the U.S. nuclear sector will result in a steady loss of institutional
knowledge in research and development of advanced nuclear science, engineering
and technology since there will be no demand for such sciences and engineering in
the U.S. Under this scenario, other countries advance and the U.S. declines. In fact,
the decline is such that the U.S. will find itself isolated from competing powers in
nuclear science, engineering and technology, which represents a world that hasn’t
existed since the advent of nuclear power.77 Perhaps even more concerning, it would
create conditions for a potential shift in the current international order, which was
created in large part due to U.S. influence over the past seventy years—a shift with
outcomes that can only be left to conjecture. Therefore, a diminished U.S. presence
in civilian nuclear power wouldn’t represent global leadership. Rather, it would create
a geopolitical vacuum that will be occupied by countries such as China and Russia
73 Lovins, A. B. (2017). Do coal and nuclear generation deserve above-market prices?. The Electricity
Journal, 30(6), 22-30. 74 Jacobson, M. Z., & Delucchi, M. A. (2011). Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar
power, Part I: Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of infrastructure, and materials. Energy
policy, 39(3), 1154-1169. 75 Pumphrey, Carolyn. Global climate change: National security implications. ARMY WAR COLL
STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2008. 76 Fetzek, S., C.E. Werrell, and F. Femia, Eds. 2016. Military expert panel report: Sea level rise and the
U.S. military’s mission. The Center of Climate and Security. 77 Gattie, DK and Jones, S. An America without nuclear power. Forbes, April 24, 2017.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/04/24/an-america-without-nuclear-power/#72246ccd50d2
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
that will leverage civilian nuclear power technologies and services to enhance
relationships with emerging economies. For the U.S. to abandon nuclear power,
domestically and abroad, would constitute an unprecedented form of U.S.
isolationism—isolation from a world moving forward in nuclear power as the U.S.
retreats.
Figure 3. Trajectory of nuclear generation and nuclear capacity in the U.S. and
China through 2056. (Data sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration and
World Nuclear Association)
As such, the U.S. should set its energy policy, as pertains to nuclear power,
according to “the world as it is, and not in the world as we wish it were, or as we
would like it to become”78. Meaning, the U.S. should remain engaged and active in
nuclear science, engineering and technology. This calls for a comprehensive and
strategic energy policy that not only sustains existing U.S. civilian nuclear capacity,
but also expands nuclear power deployment in the U.S., advances nuclear research
and development, and facilitates deployment of U.S. civilian nuclear power
technology and services abroad.
7. Strategic Policy Framework for Advancing U.S. Nuclear Power
The U.S. nuclear power industry is working against at least two headwinds—one
domestic and one global. Domestically, inexpensive natural gas is contributing to the
early closure of nuclear power plants (Table 1), which is particularly problematic in
deregulated markets. Globally, the U.S. nuclear power industry is competing with
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those from China and Russia, putting
U.S. industry at a competitive disadvantage against entities backed by state
78 Stimson, Henry L. "The challenge to Americans." Foreign Aff. 26 (1947): 5.
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
treasuries. Combined, this underscores the need for a comprehensive U.S. energy
policy strategy that is domestic and global in scope and sustains nuclear power as an
energy, climate and national security imperative.
7.1. Discussion of policy framework
The energy policy framework proposed here (Figure 4) is comprised of domestic and
global domains interlinked to meet nine overall policy objectives (Table 2). The
domestic domain is organized to facilitate a more comprehensive cooperative
federalism involving federal, state and industry entities, specifically around the
national security imperative of nuclear power. The global domain is organized by way
of diplomatic international negotiations around the issues of economic development
and climate change with nuclear power as a key technology for addressing both.
Moreover, as nuclear energy is a dual-purpose resource that is being leveraged for
geopolitical purposes by competing powers such as China and Russia, this policy
recommends that U.S. primacy in the full cycle of civilian nuclear power be
established as an objective of U.S. national security strategy with the intention being
for the U.S to remain committed to maintaining its traditional role and responsibility
in the global nuclear supply chain.
Figure 4. Strategic policy framework for advancing U.S. civilian nuclear power as a
national security imperative
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
Table 2. Objectives of strategic policy framework.
Objectives of Strategic Energy Policy Framework (Figure 4)
Policy Actions
Policy Objectives
Nuclear Power as a National Security Objective
Establish U.S. primacy in the full cycle of civilian
nuclear power as a national security imperative [Overarching]
1. Establish nuclear power as a strategic issue of U.S. national security
2. Revitalize growth and development of U.S. civilian nuclear power industry along
with research and development in advanced nuclear science, engineering and technology—(e.g., small modular reactors, molten salt reactors, fast breeder reactors, fuel fabrication, fuel reprocessing, and spent fuel storage)
Diplomatic Negotiations
U.S. Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce, in collaboration with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, negotiate favorable investment
conditions for U.S. industry to engage with emerging
regions in the deployment of civilian nuclear power
[Links 1, 2, 3 & 4 in Figure 4]
3. Allow U.S. nuclear power industry to compete with SOEs from countries using
nuclear power as a geopolitical tool 4. Deploy U.S. civilian nuclear power abroad to provide developing economies with
reliable, low-carbon nuclear-generated electricity in support of economic goals 5. Establish a U.S. geopolitical presence in countries where competing nations with
competing interests are establishing their respective geopolitical spheres of
influence 6. Maintain and enhance U.S. influence, leadership and stewardship in the global
nuclear fuel and supply chain
Financial Feedback Direct a portion of returns from international
investment to support U.S. nuclear R & D [Links 5 & 6 in Figure 4]
7. Provide a self-sustaining revenue stream to establish and support strategic U.S.
industry, government and academic partnerships in research and development of advanced nuclear science, engineering and technology
Policy Feedback Incorporate global trends in climate and carbon
emissions into U.S. energy policy [Link 7 in Figure 4]
8. Account for global geopolitical realities in U.S. energy policy as pertains to nuclear power and national security
9. Account for U.S. impact on global carbon reductions via deployment of U.S. nuclear power technology in emerging regions
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
7.1.1. Diplomatic Negotiations
U.S. Departments of Energy, State and Commerce, in collaboration with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, will coordinate diplomatic efforts to cultivate opportunities
for U.S. industry to engage with emerging regions in the development of their
electric power sectors (Links 1-4, Figure 4). These diplomatic efforts include
negotiating investment conditions that afford the U.S. nuclear industry fair terms on
which to compete with state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) from other countries and
extend U.S. engagement with these regions in the peaceful deployment of nuclear
technology as per Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.79, 80 This will provide
emerging regions with advanced zero-emission power generation technology that is
highly reliable and has a lifespan of 60-plus years. As these regions work towards
developing their economies and keeping carbon emissions low, nuclear power will
afford them a solid baseload of power on which to diversify their portfolio through
the incorporation of higher levels of renewable energy over time. Moreover, this will
bolster U.S. geopolitical presence in these regions and enhance U.S. influence and
stewardship over the global nuclear fuel and supply chain, therefore enhancing
national security.
7.1.2. Financial feedback to U.S. nuclear research and development
A challenge in the U.S. nuclear sector has been the high capital costs of large nuclear
projects. This, combined with the long period of dormancy since the last major
nuclear construction in the U.S. and the federal government’s cancellation of nuclear
research in 1993, has made it difficult to get traction in new nuclear development,
particularly for advanced technologies such as molten salt, small modular and fast
reactors. It will be incumbent upon any energy policy committed to maintaining and
advancing nuclear power to include a funding structure for sustaining the U.S.
nuclear enterprise long-term with minimal financial impact on U.S. taxpayers.
This proposed policy will provide not only substantive economic benefits for emerging
regions but also financial profits for the U.S. nuclear sector engaged with these
regions. However, this engagement isn’t limited to plant construction alone. It will
include ongoing training in operation, maintenance, spent fuel management, safety,
trade, security and proliferation issues, among other areas. This will create
opportunities for educational and cross-cultural collaboration between the U.S. and
emerging nations—collaborations that can serve as platforms for extending U.S.
research and innovation and for establishing goodwill in regions where U.S.
geopolitical influence is of strategic importance.
Since these economic benefits and financial profits are due in part to the diplomatic
efforts of U.S. agencies to create investment opportunities abroad, a portion of these
profits will be earmarked to support additional research and development
collaborations involving federal agencies, U.S. states, research universities and
79 National Nuclear Security Administration. 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation.
https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacef
ulcooperation 80 U.S. Atomic Energy Act. 1954.
https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Atomic%20Energy%20Act%20Of%201954.pdf
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
industry (Links 5 & 6, Figure 4). The intention here, once the policy has been
established and matured, is to create a self-sustaining revenue stream to support
and expand nuclear research and development in the U.S. as it pursues primacy in
the nuclear space.
7.1.3. Global feedback to U.S. energy policy
The U.S. is at a different stage in its economic development compared with that of
China, India, and emerging economies such as Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia and
Cambodia. Therefore, the U.S. has more options and greater latitude in setting its
energy policy. Meaning, while the U.S. can reduce fossil fuel consumption,
incorporate more renewable energy resources and increase energy efficiency
following decades of industrial development using reliable, high density energy
resources, emerging economies are in different stages of economic development and
therefore aren’t at a comparable economic stage that will accommodate a reduction
in fossil fuel consumption or an increase in efficiency. These countries need more
energy, not less, and aren’t in a position to experiment with technologies that
haven’t been tested and proven at large economic scales. While the U.S. has an
established, mature industrial economy on which to steadily integrate renewable
energy, there is no precedent for establishing an industrial economy on an energy
foundation that is predominantly renewable energy resources. As such, with respect
to energy consumption, energy efficiency and the incorporation of renewables, the
U.S. isn’t in a position to simply lead by example alone, because a successful energy
policy in the U.S. doesn’t necessarily translate to a successful, or practical, energy
policy for developing regions.
Since global carbon reduction will likely remain a key policy objective for decades to
come, for the U.S. and the world, carbon reduction strategies should be as
comprehensive and strategic as possible and have a global scope when feasible. For
example, EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) focuses on reducing carbon emissions from
the U.S. electric power sector as an example to the world that the U.S. is committed
to taking action on climate change81. While the CPP is being challenged on the
grounds that it is inconsistent with the Clean Air Act and with the principles of
cooperative federalism82, the CPP also represents a U.S.-centric energy policy
approach to an issue that is global in scope83. In fact, U.S. carbon emissions for 2016
were at 1994 levels whereas emissions for the rest of the world continue to increase
(Figure 5).
81 US EPA. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants.
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants_.html 82 US EPA. EPA takes another step to advance President Trump’s America First energy strategy, Proposes
Repeal of “Clean Power Plan”. Oct. 10, 2017. https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-
advance-president-trumps-america-first-strategy-proposes-repeal 83 Gattie. DK. The US can do better than the Clean Power Plan. The Hill, Oct. 13, 2017.
http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/355306-the-us-can-do-better-than-the-clean-power-plan
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
Figure 5. CO2 emissions for U.S., China, India and the rest of the world.
Gattie (2017) has proposed that U.S. efforts to reduce global carbon emissions would
have a greater impact if those efforts strategically included deployment of low- and
zero-carbon technologies, particularly nuclear power, in emerging economies where
fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions are expected to increase.84 The policy
framework proposed here embodies this proposition by accounting for global carbon
emissions avoided or reduced via deployment of U.S. nuclear technology in emerging
regions (Link 7, Figure 4). The objective is for this feedback to inform U.S. energy
policy and provide a realistic global scope for carbon management that isn’t
constrained to U.S. industry within U.S. borders where carbon emissions are already
declining. The point being that U.S. industry, particularly the U.S. nuclear industry,
can have a greater impact on mitigating carbon emissions through engagement
beyond U.S. borders rather than limiting its efforts to trying to set an example that
other countries cannot necessarily follow due to their different economic stations. To
reiterate, the objective here is to provide global leadership through engagement, not
by example alone.
With respect to energy policy, the inclusion of this global feedback closes the loop on
an overall policy framework that will inherently require a more innovative approach
to cooperative federalism between federal and state authorities in close collaboration
with the U.S. nuclear power industry. In effect, it will provide U.S. industry with the
freedom and latitude to be innovative on a larger scale and to have a greater impact
on global carbon emissions than it can when confined to U.S. borders. Moreover, it
will simultaneously create economic benefits for the U.S. economy and U.S. research
institutions as well as create collaborative opportunities with developing economies.
84 Gattie, David K. "Incorporating stability and resilience in energy policy for the US power sector:
Recommendations for the Trump administration." The Electricity Journal 30.1 (2017): 47-54.
Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]
8. Conclusion
While the debate will continue as to the role of nuclear power in the U.S. energy
portfolio and how that role should be determined, the argument presented in this
paper is that the national security implications of nuclear science, engineering and
technology, and nuclear energy itself, are inexorable geopolitical realities of today’s
global society. As such, not only should nuclear power be central to U.S. energy
policy, U.S. primacy in the full cycle of civilian nuclear power should be established
as an objective of U.S. national security strategy. However, national security is a
non-monetized benefit of civilian nuclear power, therefore the role and ultimate fate
of nuclear power must be a strategic policy decision and not simply a market
outcome since markets alone cannot detect these non-monetized benefits.
The policy framework presented here leverages U.S. industrial innovation in the
nuclear power sector along with strategic U.S. diplomacy in an effort to align U.S.
energy policy with the global reality that nuclear technology is being deployed and
leveraged as a geopolitical tool by competing nations. While nations such as China
and Russia are regularly referenced in this paper with respect to their nuclear
ambitions, the national security threat isn’t limited to China and Russia expanding
their civilian nuclear capacity or that they’re developing advanced nuclear
technologies. The threat is that the U.S. is lagging these competing powers in the
single most energy dense dual-purpose energy resource on Earth and, in the
process, creating the risk of America becoming marginalized in the stewardship of
the global nuclear cycle. Therefore, with respect to nuclear science, engineering and
technology, the institutional knowledge gap between the U.S. and some nations is
widening.
Moreover, U.S. engagement in emerging economies by way of nuclear power has
much to offer in the way of reliable, low-carbon electricity for economic
development. But, perhaps more importantly, it establishes a U.S. geopolitical
presence in these regions while sustaining U.S. influence and stewardship in the
global nuclear fuel cycle and supply chain.
In the end, the issue remains: How does the U.S. maintain energy security and
reliability within its power grid, reduce the threat of global climate change, counter
the national security risks of rising global powers seeking to assume America’s
leadership role in nuclear science, engineering and technology, and ultimately
conclude in a world free of nuclear weapons? The scope of this question is global, but
will require domestic U.S. policy decisions based on prudence, wisdom, sound
judgement and foresight grounded in the realities of the world as it is and the
geopolitics that govern the world as it is. As such, this is a geopolitically complex
policy issue, not just an energy issue and not just a market issue. Therefore, the
U.S. response should be globally comprehensive and strategic and not left to U.S.
market forces alone—the national security implications simply are too great.