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Marketing Democracy:
The Political Economy of U.S. Aid for Democracy in Egypt and Morocco
Erin A. Snider
Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance
Princeton University
Texas A&M University
Working Paper: Not for Circulation or Citation
Abstract: What explains the limited impact of U.S. spending on democracy promotion in
the Middle East? The results of a cross-national study commissioned by the USAID to assess
the effectiveness of its spending on democracy in its programs worldwide found that such
aid works; the only exception, however, were programs in the Middle East. Case studies of
U.S. democracy programming in Egypt and Morocco illuminate reasons for this exception.
Most states in the region are governed by authoritarian regimes and are of strategic
importance to the United States. Why would such regimes allow external actors to
promote democracy? This paper develops a framework to explain the interaction between
the United States and such regimes calling attention to the conceptualization of
democracy promoted and the motivations for its acceptance.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades, the United States has devoted more than $4 billion
toward efforts to promote democracy worldwide. In 2005, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), the primary agency managing such assistance,
commissioned a cross-‐national quantitative study to assess the effectiveness of its
spending for democracy in its programs worldwide from 1990-‐2005. In contrast with
other efforts, the study was the first to distinguish aid for democracy from that of
general foreign assistance and concluded that spending for democracy works.
Regionally, the study’s authors found that obligations for democracy had the largest
effects on democratization in Asia and Africa and that democracy funding mattered
more “in ‘difficult contexts’ with the Middle East being the exception to this general
pattern.”1
What accounts for this exception? For most of the last decade, the United States
devoted more than $2 billion on efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East. This
amount marked a significant shift in funding levels from that of the previous decade and
reflected the Bush administration’s contention that aid for democracy was a necessary
tool to combat extremism and hence, terrorism following the attacks of September 11,
2001.2 Rhetorically and financially, support for democracy surpassed that of previous
administrations and featured prominently for the first time in the United States’
National Security Strategy. New initiatives were launched to augment pre-‐existing
democracy programs administered by agencies like the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).3
The expansion of democracy funding in the region has since been matched by
the growth of other actors such as for-‐profit and non-‐profit companies and 1 Steven E. Finkel et al., "Deepening Our Understanding of the Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Final Report," (2008). 2 Thomas O. Melia, "The Democracy Bureaucracy: The Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion," Paper prepared for the Princeton Project on National Security Working Group on Global Institutions and Foreign Policy Infrastructure (2005), 14. From 2000 to 2005, democracy assistance funding increased from $500 million to more than $2 billion. Melia notes that a significant percentage of this figure includes spending for activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. 3 In 2002, the U.S. Department of State launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a small grants program for the Middle East.
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organizations, contractors, international and local NGOs, and academic institutions
comprising what Springborg calls the ‘democratization industry’.4 Despite this
expansion, such efforts did not seem to have a demonstrable impact on the political
landscape in the region. Efforts to promote democracy substantively were often
undermined by the United States’ hesitancy to apply pressure on regimes in the region.
For skeptics of this latest effort by the U.S. to aid democracy in the Middle East, such
hesitance was proof that the old imperatives of stability and security that had framed
the United States’ relationship with the region would continue to trump this recent
push for democracy.
Understanding the limited impact of U.S. aid for democracy in the Middle East
necessitates a different research strategy than that used in USAID’s study. One of the
limitations inherent in large N studies like that executed by USAID is their inability to
relay anything instructive about the form or structure of democracy aid programs, the
context in which they were executed, and the negotiations between both donor and
recipient states in their construction.5 Evaluating the impact of democracy programs on
democracy—a contested concept in itself—has been a notoriously thorny endeavor for
both scholars and aid practitioners. Institutional and bureaucratic pressures to produce
results often involve compromises and trade-‐offs to generate numbers at the expense of
more nuanced understandings of the indirect and time-‐delayed effects of such aid.
USAID’s study assesses progress on democracy using the Freedom House Index
(FHI), an ordinal scale employed frequently by scholars as a measure of democracy.
Ordinal measures such as the FHI though mask complex changes within states receiving
aid and often relay a superficial understanding of reform trajectories.6 USAID has since
used the study’s conclusion that spending for democracy works to justify further 4 Robert Springborg, "The Democratization Industry and the Middle East" (paper presented at the Inaugural Professorial Lecture, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, May 24 2005). 5 Data used for the study was organized by dollar amount and divided by which branch of democracy aid it fell under (aid for governance, civil society, rule of law) and was solely organized by the study’s Democracy Fellow working at USAID. Details about program descriptions, grants, and recipients were not included. Author’s email correspondence with Andrew Green, USAID Democracy Fellow, Spring 2007. 6 Carl Henrik Knutsen, "Measuring Effective Democracy," International Political Science Review 31, no. 2 (2010).
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expenditures for its democracy and governance programs. The study’s findings for its
programs in the Middle East, however, relay the importance of further work to capture
the dynamics and processes that may offer more instructive insights into questions of
aid impact to generate more useful recommendations for aiding democracy.
This paper suggests a different way of thinking about democracy aid beyond the
constructs of measures such as the FHI and underscores the importance of looking at
the context in which aid programs are implemented as well as the motivations and
imperatives of both donors and recipient states. The study’s authors and one of the
foremost scholars of democracy aid emphasize the value of qualitative case studies in
capturing the complexity of aid projects on the ground as “the only way to gain an
understanding of political events and effects and that many of the most important
results of democracy programs are psychological, moral, subjective, indirect, and time-‐
delayed.”7
As such, this paper develops a framework to explain the limited impact of such
aid through case studies of past efforts in Egypt and Morocco, two of the highest
recipients of such aid in the region. Egypt and Morocco are appropriate states in which
to examine U.S. democracy assistance. Both states have received more than ten years of
such assistance through USAID.8 Having a longer record of assistance is critical for
assessing potential patterns and trends in how aid has been formulated, distributed,
and received in various sectors over time and in different political and economic
contexts. Beyond similarities in assistance records, both states represent different
types of authoritarian regimes with Egypt until 2011 classified as a one-‐party dominant
state and Morocco as a constitutional monarchy. Both states also vary in their level of
dependence on the United States, and by extension, their strategic importance. Egypt is
the second highest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, receiving an average of $2 billion
7 Finkel et al., "Deepening Our Understanding of the Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Final Report."; Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 340-‐41. 8 The scope for this study is limited to U.S. democracy assistance funding administered through USAID, which executes the majority of such aid. Other actors include the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, and the National Endowment for Democracy, which receives money from the U.S. Congress.
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annually in military and economic aid since 1979.9 This amount reflects the United
States’ view of Egypt as a vital partner in maintaining regional stability by sustaining
peace with Israel and acting as a regional arbiter. Morocco is also seen by the United
States as an important regional ally in counterterrorism efforts and trade, though less
than Egypt. Morocco’s assistance from the United States reflects this, averaging $40
million since 1979.10 Variability on both regime type and strategic importance may
suggest an explanation for differences in the execution and construction of programs in
both states and offer insight for other states in the region. The analysis that follows
draws on archival work, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, extensive
fieldwork in both countries as well as in Washington, D.C. and over 90 interviews in
Arabic and English with activists, diplomats, development practitioners and
contractors, U.S. Embassy and USAID staff.
Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State
Though the study’s authors offer no explanation for the limited effect of U.S.
democracy aid on democratization in the Middle East, two observations about the
orientation of states in the region provide a useful starting point. Most states in the
region have been governed by an authoritarian regime and the United States views the
region as vital for its national security interests. Democracy assistance programs
fundamentally aim to challenge the structure of power within a recipient state.11 Given
this, why would an authoritarian regime allow an external actor like the United States to
promote democracy? Logically, one would expect such regimes to protest or refuse
efforts by an external actor to promote reforms that aim to realign power within the
state. At the same time, one would also expect caution to govern a donor state’s
democracy strategy in areas it regards as strategically important where concerns about
stability would be paramount.
9 Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," ed. Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 2007). 10 Author’s calculation drawn from USAID’s U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants database. Available online: www.gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov 11 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve.
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That authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have allowed democracy aid
programs implies that some benefit is derived in exchange for such programs to
operate. This suggests that a regime’s level of dependency on a donor may shape the
extent to which that regime can challenge the structure and substance of democracy
programs. Recipient regimes may feel obliged to allow democracy programs if they rely
on a donor for economic or military support. They may also permit democracy
programs if their acceptance might enhance their ability to extract aid or concessions
from another donor. An authoritarian regime’s decision to allow such programs signals
its intent to reform. Even if its commitment to reform is suspect, a regime could
leverage this signal to enhance its credibility internationally in the hope of attracting
further assistance and investment.
How might dependence on a donor then shape the form and substance of
democracy programs? One would expect a recipient regime’s ability to challenge
programs to be a function of their dependence on the donor. Regimes that depend
highly on a donor would offer less resistance to aid programs. Those that are both
highly dependent on a donor and seen as strategically important, however, may tolerate
democracy programs but would have significant leverage in shaping such programs. A
regime’s strategic importance to the donor thus insulates it from punishment and
affords more room in which to negotiate with the donor. In turn, donors concerned
with preserving stability with strategically important states may adopt more limited
forms of democracy assistance to limit the potential for uncertainty, upheaval, and the
rise of new and potentially less cooperative political actors. Even if not considered
ideal, though, limited forms of democracy aid could be seen by the donor as a foothold
in which to build on efforts in the future in the hope that more conducive conditions for
liberalization might later exist.
These dynamics suggest incentive structures that might shape interactions
between a donor state and an authoritarian regime in negotiating democracy aid
programs and bring attention to the primacy of form in aid construction. In the
broadest sense, democracy assistance programs are those that aim to foster and
encourage democracy within a state. Citing the work of DeZeeuw and Kumar, Lappin
defines such aid specifically as “the non-‐profit transfer of funds, expertise, and material
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to foster democratic groups, initiatives, and institutions that are already working
towards a democratic society.”12 This expansive definition relays the multiple forms
that such aid can take, with resources directed to local government, human rights
groups, political parties, and groups comprising civil society among others. Burnell
classifies such forms of aid into supply and demand components of aid efforts. For
example, aid toward the supply side of governance includes efforts to reform
constitutions, legal frameworks, and enhance government organization, while those on
the demand side focus on assistance to ‘pressure group networks’. 13
The combination of any of these elements should reflect, as the democracy
assistance literature relays, the state of development and the distribution of power
within a recipient state. Ideally, the form of democracy aid chosen by the donor would
reflect both the development of the recipient state and the opportunities available in
which to maximize the potential for any one component to effect change. In
authoritarian states, the options available to donors are limited. For donors, the allure
of privileging economic reform as a part of a democracy strategy in an authoritarian
state is twofold: Economic growth has been cited extensively as one of the variables
most likely to enhance the prospects for democracy and ensure its sustainability.14
Further, in restrictive states where the parameters and opportunities for donors would
be more constrained, strategies that emphasize economic growth may pose less of a
threat to regimes already engaged in economic reform efforts, thus offering a potential
platform from which to expand their efforts into more political areas of support.
12 Richard Lappin, "What We Talk About When We Talk About Democracy Assistance: The Problem of Definition in Post-‐Conflict Approaches to Democratisation," Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 4, no. 1 (2010): 187. 13 Peter Burnell, "Democracy Assistance: Origins and Organizations," in Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, ed. Peter Burnell (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 57. 14 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Edward N. Muller, "Economic Determinants of Democracy," American Sociological Review 60, no. 6 (1995); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959); Ross Burkhart and Michael Lewis-‐Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (1994).
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Privileging economic growth as part of a democracy strategy in an authoritarian
state though presumes that regimes in such states are committed to distributing any
gains from such reform and are invested in the mechanisms by which growth might
enhance democratization. The literatures on the durability of authoritarianism in the
Middle East and the linkages between fiscal crises and democratization though
underscore the limitations of assumptions linking economic reform with a diminution
of state power.15 Fiscal crises, for example, served as motivation for many authoritarian
regimes to embrace some component of economic liberalization. The notion that
economic reforms would generate political reforms, however, underestimates the
imagination and pragmatism of authoritarian regimes.
Because the strength of the authoritarian state is rooted not only in its monopoly
of force, but its control over the economy, it will minimize reforms that might
undermine its influence in the economy.16 Economic crisis and reform have often not
resulted in the state’s retreat but rather, as Ayubi reminds us, its redeployment.17 States
as varied as China, Egypt, and Syria have demonstrated the ability of regimes to control
the pace of reform, implementing measures gradually while reinforcing their power
through patronage networks and elites within the state.18 As their experiences indicate,
privatization and other tenets of economic reform do not imply the loss of state control
and power necessarily. In controlling the process of reform and reformulating its rules, 15 Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Giacomo Luciani, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State, and Democratization," in Democracy without Democrats?, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I.B. Taurus, 2001); Iliya F. Harik and Denis Joseph Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State (London: I.B. Taurus, 1995); Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis," American Political Science Review 89(1995); Eva Bellin, "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor and Democratization in Late-‐Developing Countries," World Politics 52(2000); Ellen Lust-‐Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 16 Luciani, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State, and Democratization," 134. Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (London: MacMillan, 2000), 34. 17 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, 329. 18 Mary Gallagher, "Reform and Openness: Why China's Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy," World Politics 54(2002); Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, "Cuba: The Changing Scenarios of Governability," Boundary 29, no. 3 (2002): 55-‐75; Charles Tripp, "State, Elites, and the 'Management of Change'," in The State and Global Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East, ed. Hassan Hakimian and Ziba Moshaver (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 223.
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the resulting private sector can become a mirror of the regime itself, dependent on the
state for protection or with the state able for example to become a ‘majority
shareholder in a private company’.19
Privileging economic reform as a part of a democracy strategy in an
authoritarian state may be the only avenue available to donors. The process of
economic reform and adjustment in such states though can often have undemocratic
outcomes—a point under examined by scholars of democracy assistance. Kurtz’s
research on neoliberalism and democratization in Chile relays that point finding that
rather than serving as a mechanism to weaken state dominance, economic reforms
“produced intense social atomization, peasant quiescence, and a reconstruction of rural
conservative dominance.”20 Privatization and other components of neoliberal reforms
adopted served to enhance the dominance of the agrarian upper class in Chile, with the
effect of diminishing rural democratic contestation.21 The implication of such an
approach is that donor credibility and legitimacy could be jeopardized if those
marginalized by a regime perceive such efforts to reinforce the state or associate the
reform process with hardships that may occur as a result. The assumption that
economic reform will eventually serve as a catalyst for political reforms in the future
also presumes that the beneficiaries of such reforms will act as stewards of democracy
and have an interest in extending political reforms to the rest of the population.
The discussions above help elucidate the motivations of both authoritarian
states and donors in accepting and giving democracy assistance. They also illustrate the
potential for such assistance to become irrelevant for its intended purpose or to
strengthen rather than challenge the structure of power in a recipient state.
Dependency on a donor may commit an authoritarian regime to accept some form of
democracy assistance. In the process of negotiating this aid, policies and strategies
taken by donors like the United States could encourage several different pathways
through which such regimes are able to manipulate and dilute the substance of
19 See Owen in The State and Global Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East. Hakimian and Moshaver, eds. Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001. 20 Marcus J. Kurtz, "Free Markets and Democratic Consolidation in Chile: The National Politics of Rural Transformation," Politics & Society 27, no. 2 (1999): 277. 21 Ibid.
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democracy programs. Our attention now turns to how these processes interacted in
strategy in Egypt and Morocco.
Case Study: Egypt
When USAID’s democracy program began in Egypt in the early 1990s, the state
faced enormous economic and social challenges. After years of declining growth and
the postponement of necessary economic reforms, Egypt experienced a fiscal crisis in
1991. The crisis marked nearly two decades of sporadic experiments in economic and
political liberalization first launched by President Sadat. In the wake of the 1967 and
1973 wars with Israel and the economic crises that ensued, Sadat introduced a policy in
1974 to open the economy to foreign investment, marking a shift from the socialist
economic policies of his predecessor, President Nassar. This opening—infitah—of the
economy and the resulting policy of privatization (khashkasah), was intended to
encourage foreign investment, though it was not, as Rutherford notes, Sadat’s intention
to completely restructure the economy.22 The basic purpose of the infitah policy was
“to initiate a new development strategy based on export-‐oriented policies, a more
important role for the private sector, foreign investment, and market forces.”23
The spirit behind infitah created the expectation that political reforms would
follow those in the economic sphere. Political reforms that soon followed such as the
establishment of a multi-‐party system, though, were motivated by the need to manage
and minimize opposition resulting from the embrace of a new economic orthodoxy and
foreign policy.24 The shift from a socialist economy to one based on the market
threatened the regime’s stability by potentially dislocating its social base of support and
a system of patronage and cooptation already established under Nasser. Concern for
preserving this dynamic—and implementing the bare minimum economic reforms
22 Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak : Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 135. 23 Said El-‐Naggar, "Prospects and Problems of Privatization," in The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, ed. Ibrahim M. Oweiss (Washington: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990), 54. 24 Bahgat Korany, "Restricted Democratization from Above: Egypt," in Political Liberalisation and Democracy in the Arab World, Volume 2: Comparing Experiences, ed. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 47.
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required—explains the erratic trajectory that economic and political reforms took
thereafter. In the 1980s, political reforms and liberties such as the expansion of press
freedoms, the emergence of thousands of NGOs, and the release of political prisoners
were extended in what Brownlee calls ‘democracy in doses’—actions intended to ease
the state’s economic burden and minimize the impact of economic adjustment.25
The expansion of the private sector under infitah over the 1970s and 80s also
gave rise to a new class of businessmen whose benefits depended on compliance with
the state for access to support and protection. The concerns and interests of the elite
created by this process of change thus revolved around preserving such access rather
than advocating for its extension through democratization.26 Economic reform became
a project carefully executed and controlled by the state. Instead of serving as a catalyst
for political liberalization, the state used the process of economic reform to strengthen
itself through cooptation, creating disincentives for reform beneficiaries to question the
system sustaining the regime. Beyond the beneficiaries of privatization, Owen remarks,
“most sections of the Egyptian bourgeoisie … share an interest in the slow-‐paced
economic reform as well as in preserving a system in which the workers and peasants
are virtually disenfranchised and unrepresented at the political level.”27
These developments relay the state’s imperative for undertaking reform and
provide insight into how support for the regime was managed and maintained. By the
early 1990s, fiscal crisis seemed to threaten the sustainability of the status quo. Relief
came through a $25 billion debt relief package from the United States in return for
Egypt’s support during the Gulf War and a structural adjustment program with the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 28 During this time, the state also
faced increased violence from Islamist groups, which would persist throughout much of 25 Jason Brownlee, "The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt," in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, ed. Larry Diamond, Daniel Brumberg, and Mark Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 49. 26 Nadia Ramsis Farah, Egypt's Political Economy: Power Relations in Development (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2009), 81. 27 Roger Owen, "Socioeconomic Change and Political Mobilization: The Case of Egypt," in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 193. 28 Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 140.
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the decade. Against this backdrop, USAID first began to develop plans for a democracy
program in Egypt. In Washington, D.C., Gerald Hyman, one of the principal architects of
USAID’s democracy and governance program felt that there were serious stakes to
democracy in Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt, and Indonesia in the early 1990s because of their
importance regionally. Egypt, he recalls, was one of the early cases in which the Agency
tried to determine how to approach democracy on a global basis and develop programs
reflecting the political context of the recipient aid country.29
The decision to launch a program in Egypt followed USAID’s efforts to capitalize
on political developments in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s by establishing a formal
democracy center within the Agency. As no paradigm existed then for the organization
and construction of democracy programs, Hyman devised four areas in which USAID
would focus its efforts: elections and political participation; civil society; the rule of law;
and governance. These four areas served as starting points for the Agency’s programs
and were chosen to reflect the academic literatures on democratization and economic
development.30 An Agency policy paper issued in 1990 announcing the launch of a
‘Democracy Initiative’ provides insight into the Agency’s early conceptions of
democracy, laying out a broad framework for its promotion. While acknowledging
inconclusive debates about the relationship between economic development and
democracy, the paper emphasizes that “democratic institutions and a strong democratic
political culture can be highly supportive of efforts to address development problems
and establish the basis for sustained economic growth.”31
The policy paper emphasizes that Agency efforts to promote democracy should
be seen as best achieved over time and through holistic integration with its existing
assistance programs. For example, the Agency emphasizes the importance of input
from field staff in program development along with USAID staff in regional bureaus to
ensure that local needs and the circumstances within a host country are reflected in
29 Gerald Hyman, former director of the Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID. Interview, Washington, D.C. July 7, 2008. 30 Ibid 31 Directorate for U.S. Agency for International Development, "USAID Policy: Democracy and Governance," ed. United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.1991).
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programs.32 Additionally, the paper underscores the importance of considering
different paths and approaches in promoting democracy. While acknowledging that
American institutions can protect human rights and support good governance, other
paths may be suitable, emphasizing, “the Democracy Initiative does not seek to impose
the American model on developing countries.”33
Efforts undertaken already by the Agency’s regional bureaus to incorporate
democracy within its programs are addressed and provide early insight into
discrepancies among bureaus on the subject of democracy. For example, the policy
paper states that its Asia, Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean bureaus include
specific allocations for human rights and democratic development within its budgets.
With regard to the Europe and Near East bureau, however, the paper indicates that its
“special characteristics” and “special authorizations and earmarks may limit the scope
for developing approaches in these two regions.”34
In the case of Egypt, concerns about stability and whether the Egyptian
government would move on any type of reform dominated discussions within USAID.
Opinion within USAID’s new Center of Democracy and Governance in Washington was
divided about what elements of reform to push and conflicting objectives about the
appropriate path to pursue. While some in the office acknowledged the need for
political reforms in Egypt, they also felt that issues of stability and security were
paramount as well. Others, however, advocated applying more pressure on the
government in implementing reforms.35
That Egypt was ambivalent about adopting reform, specifically that for
democracy was not unexpected. Indeed, tensions first encountered at the outset of
USAID’s democracy program were a continuation of those that have existed since the
beginning of USAID’s general foreign assistance program in Egypt. In many respects
USAID’s possibilities for success were constrained by the nature of the frequently cited
32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., 17. 34 Ibid., 15. 35 Gerald Hyman, former director of the Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID. Interview, Washington, D.C. July 7, 2008.
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‘special relationship’ between the United States and Egypt. States that receive
democracy assistance funding from USAID typically receive funds from the Agency’s
development assistance funds. In Egypt, however, democracy aid funding has been
drawn from Economic Support Funds (ESF).
These funds were established under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
reflecting the U.S. Congress’ contention that “under special economic, political, or
security conditions, the national interest of the United States may require support for
countries in amounts which could not be justified solely [for development purposes]”.36
ESF funded programs are implemented with guidance from the U.S. Department of State
and are used to support several objectives many of which reflect the contention that
support for a market economy is necessary for the development of and transition to
democracy.
Both Egypt and Israel are the largest recipients of ESF Funding. Following the
peace treaty between the two countries in 1979, the United States gave both significant
assistance packages in recognition of diplomatic relations between the two. Since 1979,
Israel has received an average of $3 billion annually in aid from the U.S., with Egypt
receiving nearly $2 billion. The terms of the assistance between the two, however, vary.
Israel’s aid consists of direct cash transfers to the government while Egypt’s aid must be
directed toward specific programs agreed upon by both the United States and the
Egyptian government.
Variance in this arrangement has long been a source of tension between the
United States and Egypt. A former director of the USAID Mission in Egypt notes that
“the bulk of the ESF was supposed to go for projects built by U.S. contractors; a smaller
amount was for a commodity import program, to provide Egypt with essential imports
from U.S. suppliers; and a much smaller amount for a cash transfer, to give the
Egyptians a little cold cash and AID a small level to try to move the government in the
reform direction. The Egyptians greatly resented the arrangement: the flow of funds
36 "U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide," ed. United States Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.2005), 6.
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was slow, and highly controlled as to how the funds could be used and [which] they saw
accruing to U.S. firms.”37
Of USAID’s four areas of democracy assistance, much of the aid distributed to
Egypt fell under the areas of civil society and the rule of law for the first half of the
1990s. In the latter part of the decade, programs were expanded to include assistance
for governance and media programs. Projects initiated in the early 1990s were not
completely now, but followed similar efforts begun in the early 1980s under the general
umbrella of development assistance. Further, they were framed in terms of their benefit
to the economy. An Egyptian project manager working at USAID’s Institutional
Development and Support Office, which was the precursor to the current Democracy
and Governance Office, recalls that debates among staff members revolved then around
market freedoms and privatization.38 At that time, he notes, when both USAID and the
World Bank were pushing privatization, no one questioned the logic of this approach
nor did they consider that improper management might be the problem or that
worker’s rights were not incorporated into a democracy strategy. Indeed, as one
Egyptian employee currently with USAID’s Democracy and Governance in Cairo noted,
“when you read the project papers for democracy at this time, they were all geared
towards improving the investment and economic climate in Egypt.”39
Former USAID staff working in Cairo felt that framing civil society,
parliamentary reform programs and other areas of democracy programs in terms of
economic benefits reflected the United States’ support for the Government of Egypt’s
economic reform program.40 Attempts to fund programs without explicit links to the
economy met with resistance from officials from the Egyptian government. Such
programs were never rejected or ended outright but negotiated to the point that
USAID’s original objectives were diluted. The end results were programs seen as
impotent from the perspective of USAID but often ones that ended up fulfilling an
37 Marshall D. Brown. Director of USAID Egypt, 1987. U.S. Foreign Assistance Oral History Program, 1996. 6. 38 Tamer El Meehy, former project manager, Office of Institutional Development and Support, USAID Cairo, Interview with the author, July 14, 2009. 39 Egyptian staff member, USAID Cairo. Anonymous interview with the author. May 6, 2007. 40 Former USAID staff member. Anonymous interview with the author. May 30, 2007.
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imperative of the Egyptian government. For example, USAID’s first attempt to fund a
civil society project in 1993 took nearly two years to negotiate with the government. In
that period, USAID staff in Cairo worked to gather input from Egyptian and
international NGOs on possible components of a new program with the idea of having
stakeholders design a project together.
One of the holdups to discussions between Americans and Egyptians lay in
defining the terms of ‘civil society’ and ‘participation’ underlying the project, which
varied significantly between the two.41 The USAID project officer assigned to the
project recalls that his counterparts in the Ministry of Interior were not interested in
changes proposed by USAID and came up with their own program. The officer was
excused from negotiations with the Egyptians and replaced by another USAID colleague
who had the backing of the Interior Minister and President Mubarak. Rather than incite
tension with the government, USAID compromised and abandoned some of its aims to
maintain some semblance of a project. In the words of the excused officer, “I think the
mission people did what they felt they needed in order to continue negotiating with the
government…this is Egypt and the program is going to be there no matter what. It is
not a matter of ‘if’ you get the money, it is a matter of when.” 42
This dynamic characterized programs for the rest of the decade regardless of
which form of democracy aid was pursued. Under the area of rule of law, for example, a
project called the ‘Administration of Justice Project’ (AOJS) was officially launched in
1994, but its actual implementation began years later. Rule of law projects were in the
words of an Egyptian USAID employee, ‘the flavor of the 1990s’ in terms of Agency
preference.43 A former staff member with AMIDEAST, the organization contracted to
carry out the project recalls, “that it took ten years for Egypt and the U.S. government to
agree on a statement of work says a lot about the reality of much it took for the
governments to be on the same page.”44 As with other projects, AOJS framed its
41 Frank Pavich. Supervisorial Special Projects Office, Office of International Development Support. Interview. U.S. Foreign Assistance Oral History Program. Georgetown University, 1998. 42 Ibid. 43 Egyptian USAID employee. Office of Democracy and Governance. USAID Cairo. Anonymous interview with the author. May 12, 2007. 44 Former AMIDEAST staff member. Interview with the author. May 31, 2007.
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expected benefits to democracy in Egypt in economic terms. For example, USAID states
that “an improved court administration and an informed judiciary are essential
elements without which democracy will falter and economic growth will be thwarted.
Further, USAID notes that “as Egypt enters a period of economic re-‐structuring and
privatization, there is pressing need for an efficient, predictable, and timely
administration of justice.”45
The assessment process USAID relied on in determining the suitability of the
AOJS project for its democracy program in Egypt relays the Agency’s narrow view of
which elements within Egyptian society it saw as beneficial for democracy. Interviews
conducted for the assessment were conducted with members representing the private
sector.46 Discussions during these interviews, which were undertaken with the
Chamber of Commerce and the Cairo Businessmen’s Association, “all indicate a strong
interest and support from the private sector for judicial reform in procedures and
regulations that adversely affect growth of private enterprise…their comments are a
positive indication of political commitment to reform.”47
At the end of the decade, USAID resurrected the idea of funding a more robust
civil society program in Egypt with an explicit shift in funding for such aid under
democracy activities. In 1997, USAID listed as one of its strategic objectives a desire to
increase civil society participation and promote an improved environment for
democracy.48 An advisory board was established informally to gather opinions on the
type of activity the Agency would fund. In 1998, USAID issued a competitive Request
for Applications (RFA) to establish and manage an NGO Service Center designed
increase civil society participation “by building strong organizations capable of voicing
45 USAID, "Administration of Justice Support Project Identification Project," ed. United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.1994). 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 ———, "USAID/Egypt Results Review and Resource Request (R4)," ed. United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.1997).
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citizen concerns, increase the frequency with which they voice them, and to secure
recognition of civil society as a legitimate voice in decision-‐making.”49
A contractor working on the project at the time recalled that as the first explicit
democracy project for civil society, anxiety existed about the Egyptian government’s
response to its establishment.50 Any initial trepidation the Egyptian government had at
the outset of the project dissipated. A steering committee comprising representatives
from USAID and the Egyptian government with the purpose of giving policy advice and
guidance to the project was dissolved a month after its first meeting by Amina El
Guindy, the Minister of Social Affairs, seeing no need for its continuance.51 The
prospects for reform and space for civil society seemed ripe. As USAID began reviewing
applications for the project, civil society activists were already engaged in a dialogue
with the Egyptian government to change Law 32, which governed civic associations and
was seen as outdated and inappropriate. 52
For the first time, the Egyptian government sought the opinions of activists and
NGO leaders in the construction of a new law, a process viewed by many with optimism
in reversing years of government suspicion toward civil society. USAID’s project was
delayed for two years and its objectives diluted in response to developments with the
NGO law. Despite consultations with civil society members and the illusion of
government concessions to civil society, the government replaced Law 32 with the
more restrictive Law 153, which banned registration to NGOs “whose activities involve
political or trade union-‐like activities which are exclusively restricted to political parties
49 Request for Applications (RFA) No. USAID/Egypt RFA 263-‐99-‐008. Internal document provided to the author. 1. 50 Robert Latowsky. Director of Infonex, Cairo. Interview with the author. April 25, 2007. 51 Ibid. 52 Law 32 was first enacted in 1964. “The Role of NGOs in Egypt”. Internal document, USAID Cairo. According to Agati, none of the suggestions given by NGO representatives to the Ministry of Social Affairs were incorporated prior to its presentation to the Parliament and its provisions enhanced the state’s control over the work of NGOs by restricting their access to foreign funding and giving wider discretion to grant or deny registration to organizations. For more, see Mohamed Agati, "Undermining Standards of Good Governance: Egypt's NGO Law and Its Impact on the Transparency and Accountability of CSOs," International Journal of Not for Profit Law 8, no. 2 (2007).and Mariz Tadros, "Long Way to Go," Al-Ahram Weekly, 18-‐24 December 2003.
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or unions.”53 The contracting director for USAID’s project recalls that the U.S.
Ambassador was using the project as leverage to try and get a better NGO law; in the
process, modifications were made diluting the scope of the project’s activities. For
example, while the program initially aimed to “increase citizen’s participation in
decision-‐making” it was eventually altered to the less aggressive sounding “supporting
NGOs and development.”54 Activities that may have enhanced political participation
were removed and those that filled a development function useful to the government
were retained. In the end, according to the director, “USAID decided not to be an extra
political liability so they watered [the program] down to what the Ministry would
accept. We were told to keep the initial vision, but to be more low profile in supporting
it.”55
Continuity and the Illusion of Change: Democracy Aid After 2002
With the Bush administration’s focus on democracy in the Middle East after
2002, funding levels for democracy aid in Egypt increased from annual levels of $22
million for much of the 1990s to nearly $75 million by 2005.56 With the expansion of
funds, also came a more aggressive approach towards democracy promotion. As the
most populous state in the Arab world and one regarded for its cultural importance and
leadership role in the region, the administration made Egypt the focus of its efforts in
the region. Initially, actions from Washington suggested an intention to more
consistently and forcefully pressure the regime than it had in the past.57 Extra funding
for democracy aid came through the Middle East Partnership Initiative, a small grants
initiative administered by the State Department through the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.
53 Ibid. 54 Patrick Crump, Director, Save the Children. Interview with the author. Cairo. May 8, 2007. 55 Ibid. 56 Michele Dunne, "Evaluating Egyptian Reform," in Democracy and the Rule of Law Project (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 57 In 2002, for example, Bush criticized the Mubarak regime for its prosecution of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a professor and human rights activist sentenced to prison on what were regarded as trumped up charges of embezzlement, tarnishing Egypt’s image abroad, and receiving funds without government authorization. Bush’s criticism was followed by a refusal to extend additional foreign assistance to Egypt beyond that already allocated in a move that Human Rights Watch called, “the most significant step the United States has ever taken to defend human rights in the Arab world.” Peter Slevin, "Bush, in Shift on Egypt, Links Aid to Rights," The Washington Post, August 15 2002.
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Prior to 2004, no mechanism was in place to ensure that the Egyptian
government used U.S. funds for democracy assistance.58 An amendment sponsored by
U.S. Senator Brownback in that year, however, gave USAID’s Mission in Cairo full
oversight of funds allocated for democracy removing the power of the Egyptian
government to determine how such funds would be spent.59 Democracy programs
administered through a bilateral agreement with the Government of Egypt (GOE) were
designed in close collaboration between both governments.60 In many cases, a GOE
representative would serve on panels to select the contractor implementing USAID’s
democracy projects.
As a result of the Brownback amendment, USAID added a direct grants program
to its democracy program enabling organizations to approach USAID for assistance.
USAID only informed the GOE after grants were issues to local and international civil
society organizations. Though the grant program was intended to deliver aid without
Egyptian government interference, an audit conducted by the Office of the Inspector
General for USAID documented several instances in which program objectives were
compromised by the government. For example: “one grantee endured a six month delay
in beginning activities because the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSA) did not approve
the project’s activities with other civil society organizations … [and] the Egyptian
government cancelled a grantee’s training event without providing any reasons for the
decision. The grantee had planned training events focused on corruption and political
reform activities. As a result, the grantee had to find alternative ways to continue its
activities.”61
Such examples relay the ability of the Egyptian government to challenge
programs it finds threatening, despite changes to the administration of democracy
assistance. During the summer of 2006, for example, the Egyptian government asked
two American organizations, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
58 Office of Inspector General, "Audit of USAID/Egypt's Democracy and Governance Activities," ed. United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.2009). 59 Ibid. 60 Bruce Abrams, former USAID Democracy and Governance Office, Cairo. Interview with the author, February 22, 2007. 61 General, "Audit of USAID/Egypt's Democracy and Governance Activities," 11.
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(NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) to stop their work in Egypt,
accusing them of interference in Egypt’s affairs. This request followed comments made
in an interview with IRI’s country director in which she said the government had not
undertaken any political reform.62 The government’s response demonstrated its
dexterity in containing opposition. The government could have forced both NDI and IRI
to leave the country—given how well connected both organizations are in Washington,
however, that move may have been too provocative. All foreign organizations are
required to register with the government, a process that can be held up for a variety of
reasons. An American at USAID’s Mission in Cairo relayed an example of this: An
organization has 60 days to register and on day 59 the government may ask for a piece
of documentation or have an inquiry, which would then start the clock again.63 Egypt
never gave formal registration to NDI or IRI. The incident thus suggests a procedure
that gives Egypt leeway so that organizations it deems problematic would be easy to
reject or dismiss under this line rather than by drawing attention that could be
construed as political.
Such actions relay the increasing politicization of U.S. democracy aid in Egypt
and the ability for a strategically important regime and ally to push back against aid
programs it found threatening or diluting programs to maintain components useful to
the state. Despite the publicity that ensued and incensed calls from members of
Congress and Egyptian civil society to cut aid or impose conditionality, aid—military,
economic, and that for democracy—continued to flow to the regime.
Case Study: Morocco
Like Egypt, Morocco entered the 1990s on uncertain economic footing. The
situation was not entirely dissimilar from that of the previous decade. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s the cost of financing a war with the Polisario front over the fate of the
Western Sahara and declining phosphate prices following a massive reduction in the
price of oil worldwide, created a strain not only on the government, but on the ability of
62 Gihan Shahine, "Two to Go," Al-Ahram Weekly, June 15-‐21 2006. 63 American USAID employee, Cairo. Anonymous phone interview with the author. November 8, 2006
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the population to survive as well. In 1981, a severe drought pushed the country into its
most serious economic crisis to date with disastrous effects on the Moroccan economy.
Food shortages, rural migration, rising unemployment, drops in GDP and a fall in
purchasing power forced the state to adopt a structural adjustment program.64
Surviving fiscal crisis in the 1980s necessitated the adoption of a new
development strategy that forced the palace to reorganize its power through the
extension and contraction of liberal reforms to protect a system of rule established by
King Hassan II. Though Morocco’s constitution describes the state as a constitutional
monarchy with an independent judiciary, all power lies with the king. The king
appoints (and can dismiss) the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the governors of
Morocco’s provinces. He can dissolve the parliament, call for new elections, revise the
constitution, and declare a state of emergency.65 The monarchy’s legitimacy is linked
both to its lineage to the Prophet Muhammad as well as its symbolic representation of
the state’s struggle for independence from France.66
Since independence, the institution of the monarchy in Morocco has been
described as “an evolving political construction” to denote its development and
relationship with Moroccan society.67 The regime’s base traditionally derives its
support from Morocco’s rural notables. Central to this strategy is the makhzen, or the
network of elites who control “bureaucratic, administrative, and infrastructural power
and therefore the state’s power.”68 This “makhzenian” system created post-‐
independence became the most important ideological and institutional component of
Hassan II’s legacy, ensuring support and deference to the monarchy through cooptation
64 Abdellatif Moutadayene, "Economic Crisis and Democratisation in Morocco," Journal of North African Studies 6, no. 3 (2001). 65 CEIP, "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms-‐-‐Morocco," in Arab Political Systems, ed. Carnegie Endowment and Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment and FRIDE, 2005). 66 Omar Bendourou, "Power and Opposition in Morocco," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (1996); Abdelhak Azzouzi, Autoritarisme Et Aleas De La Transition Democratique Dans Les Pays Du Maghreb (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006). 67Remy Leveau, "The Moroccan Monarchy: A Political System in Quest of a New Equilibrium," in Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity, ed. Joseph Kostiner (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 68 James N. Sater, Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco (New York: Routledge, 2007), 13.
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and fragmentation of the opposition.69 Though a multi-‐party system was established,
political parties have been fragmented with little ability to pressure the monarchy. This
design was set by the king to maintain rivalry between different groups so as to “appear
as both indispensable mediator and unique source of favors and pebends”70.
Austerity measures implemented in response to fiscal crisis during the 1980s
generated opposition from workers to which the palace responded with arrests, jailing
opposition leaders and suspending party newspapers.71 The palace did not acquiesce
easily to demands for more political freedoms. The palace was more willing to concede
economic reforms to the opposition, reducing price increases and “dangling the hope of
greater political inclusion” in exchange for not participating in future strikes.72
Fiscal crisis in 1990 forced the government to enact another structural
adjustment program, which again prompted strikes and riots in Morocco’s larger
cities.73 The King responded with more extensions to the opposition, inviting members
to join the government and negotiating with the unions. Overcoming past divisions,
members of five opposition parties formed the Kutla (block) to pressure the palace to
revise the constitution and reinforce both the parliament and the prime minister’s
power.74 The palace rejected their demands and again, attempted to co-‐opt
dissatisfaction by offering Kutla’s leaders cabinet ministries.75 This dynamic between
the opposition and the palace continued for the 1990s. The result was the gradual
extension of liberal reforms marked by reversals when the palace perceived its stability
or interests at risk.
Economic and political reforms initiated in the early 1990s were followed by the
palace’s attempt to address its human rights record for the first time. For years,
governments and human rights organizations criticized the state for abuses, 69 Abdeslam Maghraoui, "Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VI's Morocco," Middle East Report, no. 218 (2001): 12-‐17. 70 Abdallah Hammoudi, Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundation of Moroccan Authoritarianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 33. 71 Lust-‐Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World, 130-‐31. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Moutadayene, "Economic Crisis and Democratisation in Morocco." 75 Lust-‐Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World, 136.
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particularly the condition of political prisoners held at the prison in Tazmamart, the
existence of which the palace had denied for years.76 After pressure from abroad,
notably the U.S. government, Hassan II finally released political prisoners and closed
Tazmamart.77 The palace’s adoption of economic and political reforms and its
acknowledgement of past human rights violations seemed to suggest not only the
embrace of a new development path, but that of a more liberal era for the palace as well.
This context sparked USAID’s initial interest in starting a democracy program in
Morocco. Though Egypt was highlighted as an important state in which to begin such
efforts, discussions between USAID staff and those within the U.S. Department of State’s
Bureau for Near East Affairs also considered establishing a program in Morocco. The
former director of USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance recalls supporting a
democracy program in Morocco, citing Hassan II’s actions then as signaling a tide of
change.78 Given that similar openings did not exist elsewhere in the region, and that
the U.S. had leverage with the king, he recommended establishing a rule of law program
as part of a democracy strategy in Morocco.79
Support for a democracy program in Morocco though was not unanimous within
USAID’s Washington office and its Mission in Rabat whose director was reluctant to
establish a program in the country. This hesitancy may have reflected a desire to limit
U.S. pressure to the regime’s human rights record, especially given Morocco’s
contribution of troops in 1991 to the U.S. coalition in Iraq and its moderate views on
regional issues like the Arab-‐Israeli conflict.80 Eventually, recalls USAID’s former
Democracy Office director, a deal was ‘cut’ in which “Washington agreed not to push
bureaucratically for democracy to the U.S. Mission in Morocco and the Bureau for Near
76 HRW, "Human Rights Watch World Report 1992," (Washington, D.C.1992). 77 Human Rights Watch’s 1992 report suggests that the amount of aid allocated to Morocco that year from the United States played a role in King Hassan II’s decision. In 1992, the Administration requested “$113 million including $40 million in foreign military financing, $1.1 million for the International Military Education and Training Program, $12 million in Economic Support Funds, $23 million in development assistance, and $36.7 million in food aid.” 815. 78 Gerald Hyman, former director of the Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID. Interview with the author, Washington, D.C., July 7, 2008. 79 Ibid 80 HRW, "Human Rights Watch World Report 1992."
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East Affairs in exchange for the right to look at this [issue] again and revise [it] for the
next country plan.”81
When democracy programs eventually began in the mid 1990s, their orientation
mirrored those in Egypt. Strategy and concept papers at the outset of programs relay
the Agency’s vision of democracy as one that is inextricably linked first with economic
reform, which would remain for the rest of the decade.82 In 1994, USAID began
integrating democracy into its objectives for encouraging economic growth in Morocco.
The first project was a $19 million Financial Markets Development (FMD) project
whose purpose was “to increase and diversify the sources of finance needed by
Moroccan private enterprises at all levels of the economy, i.e. large, medium, small, and
micro enterprises.”83 One of the project’s aims was to increase the number of
shareholders of publicly held stocks, which is described as supportive to
democratization in Morocco.84
The approach taken at this juncture with its emphasis on establishing support
for market reform may have reflected caution on the part of USAID. Given the state of
the Moroccan economy at the outset of the decade, the Agency may have felt it had more
latitude in promoting and shaping its particular vision of reform. Introducing reforms
pressing for more explicit political liberalization when Morocco was undergoing
adjustment may have threatened stabilization and risked alienating the regime from
future efforts. The orientation of USAID’s program may also have been an attempt to
push for an open door. Morocco’s incentives for cooperating with USAID go beyond
ensuring domestic stability. Efforts to strengthen relations with its neighbors in Europe
were then underway and USAID’s programs may have been to mirror similar efforts to
81 Gerald Hyman. Interview with the author. 82 USAID, "Morocco Fy1992-‐95 Action Plan," ed. United States Agency for International Development (Rabat1991). 83 ———, "USAID Morocco: 1994-‐95 Mission Director's Narrative [Annual Budget Submission, FY 1994-‐95]," ed. United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.1994). 84 ———, "USAID/Morocco Country Program Strategy 1995-‐2000," ed. USAID (Arlington, VA1994).
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capitalize on Morocco’s desire to project itself abroad as amenable to both economic
and political liberalization.85
By 1995, for example, Morocco was accelerating economic reforms within the
country and enhancing trade and diplomatic relations with Europe by joining the
Barcelona Process that year.86 Morocco’s participation in that process and subsequent
discussions to implement free trade agreements with the European Union and the
United States signaled openness to economic integration and the ideas of political
reform pushed by both the EU and the United States. Other developments seemed to
relay the King’s willingness to expand further the political arena. In 1996, the King’s
policy of alternance was adopted referring to reforms “which were to allow the
formation of governments based on any coalition of parties in parliament, such as one
formed by a center-‐left coalition, rather than, as had been the case so far, governments
formed by loyalist right wing parties.”87 Shortly after, prominent members of the
opposition in Morocco returned from exile. In 1998, the King nominated the formerly
exiled leader of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Abderrahmane Youssoufi,
as the first leftist prime minister since independence.
Both the EU and the United States applauded this development, seeing
alternance as the first major political opening from the regime and a sign to continue
the orientation of its democracy program. Little attention was given in project and
strategy reports to the motivations and context for the launch of alternance. As Martin-‐
Munoz relays, the reforms that followed were motivated by multiple factors ranging
from the country’s economic crisis, the persistence of the Western Sahara conflict,
enhanced economic relations with Europe and the king’s desire to leave a stable
85 For an extensive account of domestic politics within Morocco and efforts by the regime to expand economic development with Europe, see Gema Martin-‐Muñoz, "Political Reform and Social Change in the Maghreb," Mediterranean Politics 5, no. 1 (2000). 86 The EU initiated the Barcelona Process to strengthen ties between Europe and the Mediterranean through the promotion of democracy, civil society, and economic prosperity. For more on the process see Said Haddadi, "Two Cheers for Whom? The European Union and Democratization in Morocco," Democratization 9, no. 1 (2002). 87 Lise Storm, Democratization in Morocco : The Political Elite and Struggles for Power in the Post-Independence State, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics 5 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007).
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political legacy to his successor.88 Alternance thus represented more than a desire to
liberalize the kingdom, but a decision done to ensure the economic and political
survival of the regime.
The orientation of USAID’s democracy program continued to focus on support
for privatization and other components of economic reform, mirroring the palace’s own
reform agenda. For the first time, however, strategy reports detail the uneven process
of economic reform and the effects of change generated by its supported vision of
reform. Regarding the pace of economic reform in the country, the report notes that
reforms to date “have been disproportionately adverse for small farmers and the rural
agricultural labor force, the urban unemployed, the under employed, and
women…financial markets are not delivering access to credit in an efficient or equitable
manner—lower income groups are crowded out by the demands of established, well-‐
connected private businesses and public enterprises.”89 Despite these observations,
little change was made to the orientation of the programs and objections were not
raised with the government about the distribution of economic reforms. Indeed, as a
Moroccan working with USAID’s Mission then recalled there was an unquestioned
assumption that benefits from Morocco’s economic reforms would eventually be
distributed throughout society.90
U.S. Democracy Assistance after 2002
Despite the expanded focus and attention on democracy in the region after 2002,
USAID’s emphasis on economic growth continued to dominate the orientation of their
democracy program in Morocco. Shortly before 2001 though budget cuts in
Washington forced USAID to consider cutting its program in Morocco. As a former
democracy offer recalls, the king was able to successfully lobby for its continuance
viewing its presence as an important symbol of U.S. cooperation as well as an important
source of potential resources with which to leverage against its dominant trading
88 Martin-‐Muñoz, "Political Reform and Social Change in the Maghreb," 97-‐98. 89 USAID, "USAID/Morocco Country Program Strategy 1995-‐2000." 90 Taha Berrada, current staff with USAID’s Democracy and Governance Office in Rabat and the former Regional Director of Urban Planning at USAID’s Mission in Rabat in the early 1990s. Interview with the author, Rabat. May 21, 2009.
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partners in the EU.91 Post September 11th concerns about security and terrorist
bombings in Casablanca prompted the expansion of democracy programs though ones
that continued to mirror the palace’s own reform agenda. A Moroccan USAID employee
noted a shift in that programs previously oriented toward development became
political due to heavy influence then coming from Washington.92 Despite little tension
with the government in executing democracy programs, a ‘branding waiver’ was made
for the Agency’s Parliamentary Reform Project. Typically, USAID demonstrates
ownership of its programs through stickers on equipment purchased or in publications.
The Agency’s democracy officer at that time recalls that the waiver was done to avoid
political baggage.93
In 2005, a Local Governance Project was awarded to the Research Triangle
Institute (RTI) a contracting company based in the United States to train and give
technical assistance to nine regional audit courts; design and implement a national
budgeting system; and facilitate access to long-‐term financing.94 Another component of
the project called ‘Cities without Slums’ was launched to improve living conditions in
shantytowns or relocate residents to formal neighborhoods. After the Casablanca
bombings, the palace amplified its efforts to eradicate slums seeing their growth as a
security threat and a potential incubator of terrorist activity. Focusing on slum
eradication thus addressed both a security issue close to both Morocco and the United
States. A contractor in Rabat criticized the orientation of such programs to fix slums.
For him, such programs are unsustainable and fail to address substantive issues
underlying the persistence of slums such as the lack of jobs and escalating
unemployment in the country.95
These neglected dynamics of Morocco’s reform program seldom feature in the
Agency’s project, policy, and strategy reports for its democracy program. The only
91 Ted Lawrence, Democracy and Governance Office, USAID Mission in Rabat. Interview with the author, May 15, 2009. 92 Taha Berrada. Interview, May 21, 2009, Rabat. 93 Ted Lawrence. Interview, May 15, 2009, Rabat. 94 Research Triangle Institute, "Local Governance Project (LGP) Final Project Report," (Research Triangle Park, NC2009). 95 Jeff England, Chief of Party, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Interview with the author, May 21, 2009. Rabat.
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suggestion that democracy programs oriented to support the palace’s reform agenda
might be strengthening rather challenging the regime came in a 2001 democracy
assessment commissioned by USAID. A scholar of Moroccan politics conducted the
assessment and criticized the entire orientation of the Agency’s program. In particular,
he focused on the Agency’s preference to include decentralization projects as part of
their democracy strategy in Morocco, challenging their supposed link to political reform
in the country. In Morocco, he explains, “the process of decentralization is not driven
primarily by political considerations—i.e. by a desire to empower populations at the
local level and increase the autonomy of communities and regions…authorities seem
interested in that process only to the extent that it can serve as a vehicle through which
economic development might be spurred.”96
The assessment recommends discontinuing decentralization as a component of
democracy aid given USAID’s limited resources and the slow pace of decentralization
relative to other forms of democracy aid. This pace, the report notes, is not likely to
change because of “strong inertia, the centralized mind-‐set of key decision makers, and
the resistance of powerful interests that would be threatened by genuine
decentralization.”97 Decentralization programs were not cut, however, and continue to
comprise a core component of the Agency’s democracy program in Morocco.
Conclusion
Over the last decade, the United States has devoted significant resources toward
democracy promotion in the Middle East, with seemingly little impact in the region as
concluded in a recent USAID study attempting to assess such efforts. Case studies of
past efforts in Egypt and Morocco, two of the highest recipients of U.S. democracy
assistance in the region illuminated reasons for this dynamic focusing on how
democracy was conceptualized by the United States and the motivations and
capabilities for both states to challenge aid efforts. In both states, democracy programs
were framed in terms of their benefit to the economy. This orientation reflected an
96 Guilain P. Denoeux, "Morocco Democracy Assessment Update," ed. Management Systems International (MSI) (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2001). 97 Ibid.
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institutional preference for a market oriented democracy as well as a strategy used to
sell democracy programs to resistant regimes. Their ability to resist this strategy and
dilute programs to their benefit was shaped by their level of dependence and strategic
importance to the United States.
As a strategically important and dependent state, Egypt was able to challenge
efforts by the United States to promote democracy. Insulated by its strategic value, the
regime could safely resist such efforts to extract benefits for its own purposes without
fear of punishment. By contrast, Morocco’s lower strategic value to and dependence on
the United States enabled it to evade pressures for greater political reforms. Assistance
from the EU exceeded that from the United States, offering a potential leverage point for
the state to use against a form of assistance it found too threatening. Lacking this
relationship, the United States would be hesitant to push Morocco aggressively on
reform and risk losing a foothold from which to advocate for reform even if limited.
These dynamics provide insight into why democracy efforts have been limited
through both the conceptualization of democracy promoted and the subsequent
dilutions regimes have been able to make to aid programs. If the conception of
democracy guiding strategies in both states has been oriented in this way, then the
question of the quality of democracy promoted in supporting this mode warrants
further attention. The socioeconomic grievances underlying recent uprisings in the
Arab world are testament to the frustration and desperation experienced by many as a
result of reform strategies followed by regimes in the region. They are also reminders
for more deliberate, restrained efforts in constructing future democracy strategies
responsive to citizens rather than the predilections of authoritarian regimes.
.
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