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1
MORE UPWARD AND ALSO MORE DOWNWARD MOBILITY?
COMPULSORY SCHOOLING IN THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE 20TH CENTURY
Wout Ultee - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
Presentation in the Department of Sociology,
Tel Aviv University February 24, 2005
2
In the 1990s it was found that only in Sweden and the Netherlands inequalities
in education had decreased
Some doubted the quality of the Dutch data leading to this conclusion
New findings indicate that with sufficient statistical power, a trend towards smaller
inequalities in education is present in other (post)industrial countries too
3
Previous Research Previous Research on the Netherlandson the Netherlands
Loglinear models with educational distributions for fathers and children (sons and daughters) fitted with
trend constraints on relative chances
Educational inequality decreased according to:uniform association and
diagonal densities
4
Present research: dataPresent research: data
Stacked file from 31 surveys21,899 men/20,903 women; age over 25Fifteen 5-year birth cohorts (1900-1974)Father’s education 4 categories (low –
high)Daughter’s/Son’s education 4 categories
(low – high)
5
Are questions about diagonal densities and uniform associations, or even questions
about odds ratio’s, pertinent research questions given the theories at issue?
A lower odds ratio may result from a higher odds to climb and
from a higher odds to fall.
What are current theories about?
6
Four hypotheses from the field of stratification
One from each generation of stratification studies
Present research: Present research: hypotheseshypotheses
7
Zero-generationZero-generation non-hypothesis non-hypothesis
There is a linear downward trend in uniform association and diagonal density
This hypothesis at best is about some unspecified macro force
8
First-generation First-generation hypothesishypothesis
A rising standard of living makes for lower uniform association and lower diagonal
density
This hypothesis is about the effect of a country characteristic, that is, about a
macro force or factor
9
Second-generation Second-generation hypothesishypothesis
State intervention makes for lower uniform association and diagonal density
This hypothesis is about effects of states
10
Third-generation Third-generation hypothesishypothesis
State intervention does not alter the density in the diagonal cell for the highest level of
education
This hypothesis is about the fate of elites in the hands of states
11
How to derive macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses?
Embedding the four Embedding the four hypotheses in general hypotheses in general
sociology:sociology:
12
Zero generation hypothesis derived
(post)industrialization requires more and more mobility, and this functional
prerequisite is met
Or: the increasing demand of employers for highly educated employees makes it worthwhile for employees to educate themselves and they therefore do so
13
First-generation First-generation hypothesis derivedhypothesis derived
Persons differ in financial resources; and the relation between a country’s average
income and its educational inequalities is an aggregate result of a general rise in income
14
Second-generation Second-generation hypothesis derivedhypothesis derived
Apart from individual actors there is an all powerful corporate actor: the state
(Coleman about corporate actors)
15
Two possible derivations from the
assumption of an intervening state:
The implicit old one and
The explicit new one
16
The implicit old one:
States provide stipends etc. for children of low
backgrounds and with outstanding intelligence to
attend university
17
My explicit new one:
States gradually raise the age until which schooling is
compulsory for everyone: first only primary school, now also a long period in
secondary school
18
Third-generation hypothesis Third-generation hypothesis derivedderived
Highly educated parents deploy strategies compensating for state policies raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends
States are not all-powerful:(Elias about a spiraling process as a
competitive outcome)(Bourdieu about compensatory strategies)
(Hout & Raftery about maximally maintained inequality)
19
All in all, the odds to move up for persons at the lower end of the social
scale increase,
While at the time these odds increase, the odds for persons at the upper end of the social scale do not fall, but increase
too.
20
Theoretical lesson
Deriving macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses,
makes clear that worthwhile alternatives are around
21
The age until which schooling was compulsory in the Netherlands
changed as follows
Since 1900 until the age of 12 years
After 1948 until the age of 14 years
After 1969 until the age of 16 years
After the mid 1970s until the age of 18 years
22
12
34
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 1 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Men
23
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 2 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Men
24
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 3 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Men
25
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 4 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Men
26
12
34
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 5 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Women
27
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 6 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Women
28
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 7 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Women
29
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of
asso
ciat
ion
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
cohort specific association linear trend
GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 8 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Women
30
Stipends etc. in the Netherlands
Not only for keen working class boys
Also for upper class girls,
They are for everyone
31
How do macro variables influence uniform association and diagonal densities?
Few states ever sought to increase the odds for moving down.
Uniform association and diagonal densities derived from odds ratios
Odds ratios made up from an odds for moving up and an odds for moving down
Testing the third-generation Testing the third-generation hypothesis more severelyhypothesis more severely
32
Hypotheses about oddsHypotheses about odds
Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends, increases the odds
for moving up.But what does it do to the odds for
moving down?
33
02
46
810
stre
ngth
of o
dds
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974
dots proportional to sample size
intergenerational educational mobilityObserved Odds: Upward Move from Level 1 to Level 4
upward trend
34
0.2
.4.6
.81
stre
ngth
of o
dds
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort
Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974
dots proportional to sample size
intergenerational educational mobilityObserved Odds: Downward Move from Level 4 to Level 1
no trend or a downward trend
35
Dutch questions, Dutch theories,
Dutch data collection
36
Dutch questionsDutch questions
Two large questions about societies;– Various inequalities– Several aspects of cohesion
37
Dutch questions: serach for Dutch questions: serach for wrong ones, enrich existing wrong ones, enrich existing
onesones
Questions should not be about odds ratio’sQuestions should be about separate odds
38
Dutch theories
Not factor sociology
Versus
Actor sociology
39
Dutch theories
Not factor sociology
Versus
Actor sociology:
There is a third alternative
40
Dutch theoriesDutch theories
* Actor or individual sociology– Individuals– One goal– One shot
decisions– (all powerful)
state
* ActorS sociology– Egos and their
networks– Several goals– Sequential
decision processes– (intermediate)
collective actors
* Factor or macro forces sociology
- Industrialization
- Technology
- Ideology
- Average income
- General rise in education
41
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Family Survey Dutch Population– 1993– 1998– 2000– 2003
42
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Harry GanzeboomNan Dirk de Graaf
Paul de GraafGerbert Kraaykamp
Marcel LubbersAriana NeedWout Ultee
43
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Multi-Moment dataMulti-Actor data
Multi-Context data
44
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Multi-Moment dataMulti-Actor data
Multi-Context data
3 MAC data
45
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Series moments primary respondents– Job history
– Educational history– Income history– Housing history– Religious history– Smoking history
– Sport club history
46
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Point moments primary respondents– Parental, material, and cultural resources
– Leisure activities at age 18– Weight at age 25 and now
– Relation with boss at every job spell– Relation with co-workers at every job spell
47
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Past and present attitudes of the primary respondent
– Abortion– Foreigners
– Homosexuals
48
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Actors– Primary respondent
– Partner– Parent– Child
– Sibling
49
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Actors– Partner same questionnaire as respondents to
answer questions about the extent to which partner similarity is more than a byproduct of educational homogamy, and whether spouse
effects are present
50
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Actors– Parental questionnaire as a check upon
retrospective answers of the primary respondent – Additional questions about upbringing of
primary respondent
51
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Actors– Child
Questionnaire attuned to the issue of first generation upon third generation effects
52
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Actors– Sibling
Questionnaire in main aspects the same as questionnaire for primary respondents, so that
family effects can be estimated and the statistical power of models can be increased
53
Dutch data collectionDutch data collection
Contexts– Municipalities– Neighborhoods
– Schools– Employers
– Economic sectors– Sport clubs
54
Dutch data resultsDutch data results
Wim Bernasco Koen van Eijck Tamar Fischer
Maurice Gesthuizen Christiaan Monden Hester Moerbeek
Inge Sieben Wilfred Uunk
Herman van der Werfhorst Maarten Wolbers