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1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University of Colorado at Colorado Springs UCCS Network/System Security Research Some of the research projects are sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory, under agreement number F49620-03-1-0207. It was sponsored by NISSC Summer/Fall2003 grants. Part of these results are supported by a generous gift from Fujitsu for Internet research.
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Page 1: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

1Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

C. Edward ChowXiaobo Joe Zhou

Yu CaiGanesh Godavari

Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Colorado at Colorado Springs

C. Edward ChowXiaobo Joe Zhou

Yu CaiGanesh Godavari

Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Colorado at Colorado Springs

UCCS Network/System Security ResearchUCCS Network/System Security Research

Some of the research projects are sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory, under agreement number F49620-03-1-0207. It was sponsored by NISSC

Summer/Fall2003 grants. Part of these results are supported by a generous gift from Fujitsu for Internet research.

Page 2: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

2Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Outline of the TalkOutline of the TalkOverview of Network/System Security Research Projects at

Network/System Lab Secure Collective Internet Defense (SCOLD): an Intrusion

Tolerance System. Autonomous Anti-DDoS (A2D2: )Integrated enhanced Snort IDS

with multi-level adaptive rate limiting firewall Secure Groupware for First Responders (SGFR): Integrated Group

Rekeying (Keystone) with Instant Massaging (Jabber) on MANET Secure Access Mobile Ad Hoc Network (SMANET): Implemented

PEAP module on freeRadius server, compared PEAP with TTLS First Responder Sensor Network (FRSN): Track Fire Fighters with

Crossbow Mote-based Sensor Network. Improving System Performance by QoS Regulations with Adaptive

Resource Management under Cyber Threats Intelligence/Information Fusion Secure Information Sharing

Overview of Network/System Security Research Projects at Network/System Lab Secure Collective Internet Defense (SCOLD): an Intrusion

Tolerance System. Autonomous Anti-DDoS (A2D2: )Integrated enhanced Snort IDS

with multi-level adaptive rate limiting firewall Secure Groupware for First Responders (SGFR): Integrated Group

Rekeying (Keystone) with Instant Massaging (Jabber) on MANET Secure Access Mobile Ad Hoc Network (SMANET): Implemented

PEAP module on freeRadius server, compared PEAP with TTLS First Responder Sensor Network (FRSN): Track Fire Fighters with

Crossbow Mote-based Sensor Network. Improving System Performance by QoS Regulations with Adaptive

Resource Management under Cyber Threats Intelligence/Information Fusion Secure Information Sharing

Page 3: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

3Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

UCCS Network/System Research LabUCCS Network/System Research Lab Director: Dr. C. Edward Chow (Network/Protocol) Assistant Professor: Dr. Xiaobo Zhou (Distributed Systems; QoS) Graduate students:

John Bicknell/Steve McCaughey/Anders Hansmat: Distributed Network Restoration/Network Survivability

Hekki Julkunen: Dynamic Packet Filter Chandra Prakash: High Available Linux kernel-based Content Switch Ganesh Godavari: Linux based Secure Web Switch Angela Cearns: Autonomous Anti-DDoS (A2D2) Testbed Longhua Li: IXP-based Content Switch David Wikinson: Secure DNS (update/query) with multiple indirect routing entries Nirmala Bulusu: Secure Wireless Access; PEAP vs. TTLS; enhance freeRadius server

with PEAP module (the above graduated) Yu Cai (Ph.D. research assistant): Proxy Server Based Multipath Routing; Secure

Collective Internet Defense; Information Fusion; Ganesh Godavari: (Ph.D. research assistant): Content Switching Rule Conflict Detection;

Secure Groupware; First Responder Sensor Network; Secure Information Sharing Frank Watson: enhanced TCP with multiple routes (User Mode Linux) Paul Fong: Wireless AODV Routing for sensor networks Murthy Andukuri/Jing Wu: iSCSI/VPN/MPLS Secure QoS Storage Network. Patricia Ferrao/Merlin Vincent: Web-based Collaborative System Sarah Jelinek: Enterprise Intrusion Detection and Response System (A2D2V2).

Page 4: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

4Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

UCCS Network Lab EquipmentUCCS Network Lab Equipment

Gigabit fiber connection to UCCS backbone Switch/Firewall/Wireless AP:

HP 4000 switch; 4 Linksys/Dlink Switches; 5 Intel 24 ports Fast Ethernet switch.

Sonicwall Pro 300 Firewall; 6 Intel VPN Firewall 8 Intel 7112 SSL accelerators; 4 7820 XML directors donated by Intel. Cisco 1200 Aironet Dual Band Access Point and 350 client PC/PCI

cards (both 802.11a and 802.11b cards). Intel IXP12EB network processor evaluation board

Servers: Two Dell PowerEdge Servers. Workstations/PCs:

8 Dell PCs (3Ghz-500Mhz); 12 HP PCs (500-233Mhz) 2 laptop PCs with Aironet 350 for mobile wireless 1 IPAQ3875 PDA OS: Linux Redhat 9, Fedora; Window XP/2000/2003

Gigabit fiber connection to UCCS backbone Switch/Firewall/Wireless AP:

HP 4000 switch; 4 Linksys/Dlink Switches; 5 Intel 24 ports Fast Ethernet switch.

Sonicwall Pro 300 Firewall; 6 Intel VPN Firewall 8 Intel 7112 SSL accelerators; 4 7820 XML directors donated by Intel. Cisco 1200 Aironet Dual Band Access Point and 350 client PC/PCI

cards (both 802.11a and 802.11b cards). Intel IXP12EB network processor evaluation board

Servers: Two Dell PowerEdge Servers. Workstations/PCs:

8 Dell PCs (3Ghz-500Mhz); 12 HP PCs (500-233Mhz) 2 laptop PCs with Aironet 350 for mobile wireless 1 IPAQ3875 PDA OS: Linux Redhat 9, Fedora; Window XP/2000/2003

Page 5: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

5Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Intrusion Related Research AreasIntrusion Related Research Areas

Intrusion PreventionGeneral Security Policy Ingress/Egress Filtering

Intrusion DetectionHoney potHost-based IDS Tripwire Anomaly DetectionMisuse Detection

Intrusion Response Identification/Traceback/PushbackIntrusion Tolerance

Intrusion PreventionGeneral Security Policy Ingress/Egress Filtering

Intrusion DetectionHoney potHost-based IDS Tripwire Anomaly DetectionMisuse Detection

Intrusion Response Identification/Traceback/PushbackIntrusion Tolerance

Page 6: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

6Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Wouldn’t it be Nice to Have Alternate Routes?Wouldn’t it be Nice to Have Alternate Routes?

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.mil net-b.mil net-c.mil

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

R2 R1R3

Alternate Gateways

DNS

DDoS Attack Traffic

Client Traffic

How to reroute clients traffic through R1-R3?

Multi-homing

Page 7: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

7Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Implement Alternate RoutesImplement Alternate Routes

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.mil net-b.mil net-c.mil

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

R2 R1R3

Alternate Gateways

DNS

DDoS Attack Traffic

Client Traffic

Need to Inform Clients or Client DNS servers!

But how to tell which Clients are not compromised?

How to hide IP addresses of

Alternate Gateways?

Page 8: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

8Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Possible Solution for Alternate RoutesPossible Solution for Alternate Routes

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.mil net-b.mil net-c.mil

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R R2R1 R3

New route via Proxy3 to R3

Proxy1

block

Proxy3Proxy2

Attack msgs blocked by IDSBlocked by IDS

Sends Reroute Command with DNS/IP Addr. Of

Proxy and VictimDistress Call

Page 9: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

9Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SCOLDPhase1SCOLDPhase1

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.mil net-b.mil net-c.mil

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

Proxy1

Proxy2Proxy3

R2

R1 R3

block

RerouteCoordinato

rAttack TrafficClient Traffic

1. IDS detects intrusion Blocks Attack Traffic Sends distress call to Reroute Coordinator

block

Page 10: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

10Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SCOLDPhase 2SCOLDPhase 2

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.mil net-b.mil net-c.mil

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

Proxy1

Proxy2 Proxy3

R2

R1 R3

block

Attack TrafficClient Traffic

1. IDS detects intrusion Blocks Attack Traffic Sends distress call to Reroute Coordinator

RerouteCoordinato

r

2. Sends Reroute Command with (DNS Name, IP Addr. Of victim,

Proxy Server(s)) to DNS

Page 11: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

11Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SCOLDPhase3SCOLDPhase3

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.mil net-b.mil net-c.mil

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R

R

Proxy1

Proxy2 Proxy3

R2

R1 R3

Attack TrafficClient Traffic

RerouteCoordinato

r

2. Sends Reroute Command with (DNS Name, IP Addr. Of victim,

Proxy Server(s)) to DNS

3. New route via Proxy3 to R3

3. New route via Proxy2 to R2

3. New route via Proxy1 to R1

R

block

Page 12: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

12Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SCOLDPhase4SCOLDPhase4

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.mil net-b.mil net-c.mil

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R

Proxy1

Proxy2Proxy3

R1

Attack TrafficClient Traffic

RerouteCoordinato

r

3. New route via Proxy3 to R3

3. New route via Proxy2 to R2

3. New route via Proxy1 to R1

R

block4a. Attack traffic detected by IDSblocked by Firewall

4. Attack traffic detected by IDSblocked by Firewall

R R

R3R2

Page 13: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

13Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SCOLD Secure DNS Updatewith New Indirect DNS EntriesSCOLD Secure DNS Update

with New Indirect DNS Entries

(target.targetnet.com, 133.41.96.7, ALT 203.55.57.102)

203.55.57.103185.11.16.49

A set of alternate proxy servers for indirect routes

New DNS Entries:

Modified

Bind9

Modified

Bind9IP Tunnel

IP Tunnel

Modified

ClientResolveLibrary

Trusted DomainWAN

DMZ

ClientDomai

n

proxy2

Page 14: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

14Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SCOLD Indirect RoutingSCOLD Indirect Routing

IP tunnelIP tunnel

Page 15: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

15Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SCOLD Indirect Routing with Client running SCOLD client daemon

SCOLD Indirect Routing with Client running SCOLD client daemon

IP tunnelIP tunnel

Page 16: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

16Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Performance of SCOLD v0.1Performance of SCOLD v0.1

Table 1: Ping Response Time (on 3 hop route)

Table 2: SCOLD FTP/HTTP download Test (from client to target)

Table 1: Ping Response Time (on 3 hop route)

Table 2: SCOLD FTP/HTTP download Test (from client to target)

No DDoS attack, direct route

DDoS attack, direct route

No DDoS attack, indirect route

with DDoS attack indirect route Doc

Size

FTP HTTP FTP HTTP FTP HTTP FTP HTTP 100k 0.11 s 3.8 s 8.6 s 9.1 s 0.14 s 4.6 s 0.14 s 4.6 s 250k 0.28 s 11.3 s 19.5 s 13.3 s 0.31 s 11.6 s 0.31 s 11.6 s 500k 0.65 s 30.8 s 39 s 59 s 0.66 s 31.1 s 0.67 s 31.1 s 1000k 1.16 s 62.5 s 86 s 106 s 1.15 s 59 s 1.15 s 59 s 2000k 2.34 s 121 s 167 s 232 s 2.34 s 122 s 2.34 s 123 s

No DDoS attack direct route

DDoS attackdirect route

No DDoS attack indirect route

DDoS attack indirect route

0.49 ms 225 ms 0.65 ms 0.65 ms

Page 17: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

17Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Secure Collective DefenseSecure Collective Defense Main IdeaExplore secure alternate paths for clients to come in; Utilize geographically

separated proxy servers. Goal:

Provide secure alternate routes Hide IP addresses of alternate gateways

Techniques: Multiple Path (Indirect) Routing Enhanced Secure DNS extension: how to inform client DNS servers to add new DNS

entries with alternate routes (Not your normal DNS name/IP address mapping entry). Utilize a consortium of Proxy servers with IDS that hides the IP address of alternate

gateways. Partition clients to come in at different proxy servers.

can help identify the origin of spoofed attacks! How clients use the new multiple path indirect DNS entries and route traffic through

proxy servers? Use Sock protocol, modify resolver library

Page 18: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

18Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Current SCOLD Project ResultsCurrent SCOLD Project Results

Proposed new DNS entries for intrusion tolerance, containing multiple proxy servers info for establishing indirect routes.

Modified Bind9 DNS server to accept secure DNS updates and to serve queries with new indirect DNS entries.

Developed new secure DNS update utility to securely update target zone file in the new enhanced Bind9 DNS server.

Implemented new secure indirect routing protocol to allow client DNS to query target DNS during DDoS attack. to allow client to communicate with target server through proxy

server and alternate gateway.

Proposed new DNS entries for intrusion tolerance, containing multiple proxy servers info for establishing indirect routes.

Modified Bind9 DNS server to accept secure DNS updates and to serve queries with new indirect DNS entries.

Developed new secure DNS update utility to securely update target zone file in the new enhanced Bind9 DNS server.

Implemented new secure indirect routing protocol to allow client DNS to query target DNS during DDoS attack. to allow client to communicate with target server through proxy

server and alternate gateway.

Page 19: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

19Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Benefits of Secure Collective DefenseBenefits of Secure Collective Defense

Security When attacked, users switch to different routes dynamically Urgent/critical packets sent over multiple routes simultaneously Encrypted content sent over multiple routes Information on DDoS attacks used to isolate source of attacks

Reliability: Users can choose most reliable route dynamically Packet content spread over multiple routes Use redundant transmission or error correction to reduce PLR

Performance: Multiple indirect routes provide additional bandwidth Can be used for dynamic bandwidth provisioning

Security When attacked, users switch to different routes dynamically Urgent/critical packets sent over multiple routes simultaneously Encrypted content sent over multiple routes Information on DDoS attacks used to isolate source of attacks

Reliability: Users can choose most reliable route dynamically Packet content spread over multiple routes Use redundant transmission or error correction to reduce PLR

Performance: Multiple indirect routes provide additional bandwidth Can be used for dynamic bandwidth provisioning

Page 20: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

20Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Organic NetworkingOrganic Networking

One possible approach: Dynamic provisioning of multiple paths (direct and indirect routes)

Use secure DNS update to inform the clients

Use secure indirect routing for establishing alternate routes.

Coordinate the selection of proxy servers for clients.

Critical for supporting wide area IDC system

One possible approach: Dynamic provisioning of multiple paths (direct and indirect routes)

Use secure DNS update to inform the clients

Use secure indirect routing for establishing alternate routes.

Coordinate the selection of proxy servers for clients.

Critical for supporting wide area IDC system

VPN

Consumer enterprise Headquarters Branch

IDC1(inB portal)

IDC3(data backup)

IDC2(BtoB/C portal)

VPN-CUGVPN-CUG

BtoB inB inB

Operation resource

backup resource

SharingBtoC

The Internet

Operation resource

Page 21: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

21Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2: Autonomous Anti DDoSA2D2: Autonomous Anti DDoS Main Idea Integrate enhanced IDS with adaptive firewall

for autonomous intrusion defense.

Goal:

Automate adaptive intrusion handling triggered by enhanced intrusion detection

Investigate the impact of various intrusion types on QoS

Techniques:

Enhanced Snort Plug-in with subnet spoofing detection

Adaptive rate limiting firewall with user defined threshold and intrusion history.

Page 22: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

22Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Attack

Attack Attack

Private Subnet192.168.0

Attack Network128.198.61

IP: 128.198.61.12NM: 255.255.255.128

GW: 128.198.61.1

eth0

Pluto

Titan

DMZ

Multi-LevelRate Limiting

Class-BasedQueuing(CBQ)

as Linux Router

Firewall(iptables)

Security Policy

IP: 192.168.0.1NM: 255.255.0.0

GW: 128.198.61.12

eth1

RealServer

Re

alS

erv

er

Tra

ffic

IDS

Ale

rts

tr

igg

er

Mu

lti-L

eve

lR

ate

-Lim

itin

g

IDS

70

% H

TT

P,

Re

alP

laye

r

1

5%

SM

TP

, P

OP

3

1

0%

SS

H,

SF

TP

5

% S

YN

, IC

MP

, D

NS

10 Mbps Hub

eth0

IP: 192.168.0.2NM: 255.255.0.0GW: 192.168.0.1

Public Network128.198

Internet

Alpha128.198.61.15

DDoSAgent

Gamma128.198.61.17

DDoSAgent

Beta128.198.61.16

DDoSAgent

Delta128.198.61.18

DDoSAgent

SimulatedInternet

100Mpbs Switch

Master Client& Handler

DDoS

Saturn128.198.61.11

NM: 255.255.255.128GW: 128.198.61.1

Autonomous Anti-DDoS Network(A2D2)

Client1128.198.a.195

Real Player Client

Client2128.198.b.82

Real Player Client

Client3128.198.c.31

Real Player Client

100Mpbs Switch

Page 23: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

23Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2 Multi-Level Adaptive Rate Limiting For

Anti-DDos Defense

A2D2 Multi-Level Adaptive Rate Limiting For

Anti-DDos Defense

IP: 128.198.61.12NM: 255.255.255.128

GW: 128.198.61.1

eth0

Firewall Gateway

Multi-LevelRate Limiting

as Linux Router

IP: 192.168.0.1NM: 255.255.0.0

GW: 128.198.61.12

eth1

IDS

snort.confFloodPreprocessor

Threshold

snort.confFloodRateLimiter

PreprocessorThresholds

rateif.conflevels, rate,expiration,port # etc.

./snort -A UNSOCK

report.c./alert

rateif.pl

Level 4

Open(5 days)

Level 3

100 p/s

Level 2

50 p/s

Level 1

Block(2 hrs)

Level 0

Block(2 days)

Level 1Expires

Page 24: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

24Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2 Results – Non-stop AttackA2D2 Results – Non-stop Attack

Packets Received: 8,039

Retransmission Request: 2,592

Retransmission Received: 35

Lost: 2,557

Connection Timed-out

Packets Received: 8,039

Retransmission Request: 2,592

Retransmission Received: 35

Lost: 2,557

Connection Timed-out

QoS Experienced at A2D2 Client

Page 25: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

25Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2 Results – UDP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy

A2D2 Results – UDP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy

Packets Received: 23,407

Retransmission Request: 0 Retransmission Received: 0 Lost: 0

Packets Received: 23,407

Retransmission Request: 0 Retransmission Received: 0 Lost: 0

QoS Experienced at A2D2 Client

Page 26: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

26Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2 Results – ICMP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy

A2D2 Results – ICMP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy

Packets Received: 7,127

Retransmission Request: 2,105

Retransmission Received: 4

Lost: 2,101

Connection Timed-out

Packets Received: 7,127

Retransmission Request: 2,105

Retransmission Received: 4

Lost: 2,101

Connection Timed-out

QoS Experienced at A2D2 Client

Page 27: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

27Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2 Results – ICMP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy & CBQ

A2D2 Results – ICMP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy & CBQ

Packets Received: 23,438

Retransmission Request: 0 Retransmission Received: 0 Lost: 0

Packets Received: 23,438

Retransmission Request: 0 Retransmission Received: 0 Lost: 0

QoS Experienced at A2D2 Client

Page 28: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

28Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2 Results – TCP AttackMitigation: Policy+CBQ

A2D2 Results – TCP AttackMitigation: Policy+CBQ

Packets Received: 22,179

Retransmission Request: 4,090

Retransmission Received: 2,641

Lost: 1,449

Screen Quality Impact

Packets Received: 22,179

Retransmission Request: 4,090

Retransmission Received: 2,641

Lost: 1,449

Screen Quality Impact

QoS Experienced at A2D2 Client

Page 29: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

29Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

A2D2 Results – TCP AttackMitigation: Policy+CBQ+RateA2D2 Results – TCP Attack

Mitigation: Policy+CBQ+Rate

Packets Received: 23,444

Retransmission Request: 49 – 1,376

Retransmission Received: 40 – 776

Lost: 9 – 600

Packets Received: 23,444

Retransmission Request: 49 – 1,376

Retransmission Received: 40 – 776

Lost: 9 – 600

QoS Experienced at A2D2 Client

Page 30: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

30Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Autonomous Anti-DDoS Organic Security System?

Autonomous Anti-DDoS Organic Security System?

IDIP DiscoveryCoordinator

FirewallIDIP Neighbor

Class-BasedQueuing

(CBQ)

Firewall(iptables)

Security Policy

Multi-LevelRate Limiting

eth0 eth1

Local IDS ResponseMulti-Level Adaptive

Rate Limiting

EnhancedIDS

+IDIP Application Layer

Cooperative TracebackCooperative Detection

Net RestructuringIntrusion Pushback

TracebackMsg Sent

IDIPNeighbor

NotificationTo IDIP

DiscoveryCoordinator

Rates Dependenton Traffic Type

SnortAlerts

InternetTraffic

Page 31: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

31Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SGFR: Secure Groupware for First Responder

SGFR: Secure Groupware for First Responder

Main Idea design a framework for enhancing security of groupware packages such as instant messenger and video monitoring/conferencing tool.

Goal: Investigate proper interface between group rekeying system and

groupware. Develop secure instant messaging system with remote group file download

and remote display. Experiment the prototype software on PDA with mobile ad hoc network. Integrate with stress level and tool usage effectiveness evaluation

This is a joint project with Dr. Chip Benight of psychology department at UCCS.

Techniques:

Scalable group key management (Keystone from UT Austin)

Efficient groupware (Jabber Instant Messaging System)

Mobile Ad Hoc Network (NIST)

Page 32: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

32Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SGFR FeaturesSGFR Features

Security Enhanced GroupwareInstant messenger

(JabberX)

Group Communication ServerInstant Messaging Server

(Jabber)

Psychology EvaluationStress Level Tracking

Effectiveness of Tool Usage(Keyboard/Mouse Event Tracking,History of Commands, Mistakes,

Popup Quiz?)

Group Key ManagmentSecure Group

Rekeying system(Keystone)

Page 33: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

33Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SGFR System ArchitectureSGFR System Architecture

SGFR Client

SGFR Client

SGFR Client

SGFR Group Key Server

SGFR Instant Messenger

Server

Group key distribution

Sign-in create/join chat groups

Registration/authentication

Encrypt/Decrypt msgs using group key

Page 34: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

34Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SGFR System Operation SGFR System Operation

Registrar

JabberXclient

ControlManager

KeyServer

Jabber Server

DataBroadcast

JabberXClient

JabberXClient

Multicast/Unicast

Rekey messages

Rekey messages

Registration

Requests

ApplicationData

Page 35: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

35Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Associate JabberX client with Keyserver and Jabber server

Associate JabberX client with Keyserver and Jabber server

Users login to the Jabber server If login successful, the client registers with the

Keyserver by presenting digital certificate. When a user creates/joins a group, the Keyserver

issues a group key to the client. When a user leaves the group, the Keyserver

generates a new group key for the remaining members of the group.

Group key can be refreshed periodically. Group key are used to encrypt data and authenticate the

group.

Users login to the Jabber server If login successful, the client registers with the

Keyserver by presenting digital certificate. When a user creates/joins a group, the Keyserver

issues a group key to the client. When a user leaves the group, the Keyserver

generates a new group key for the remaining members of the group.

Group key can be refreshed periodically. Group key are used to encrypt data and authenticate the

group.

Page 36: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

36Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Output of the Keystone Server

User ganesh joining group g1

User ayen joining group g1

First group key assigned to group

Second group key assigned to groupWhen a member

joined

Page 37: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

37Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Packet captured by Ethereal Packet Sniffer

Output of the Jabber server running on a machine

Encrypted “Hello”

Surrounded by <body>tag

Page 38: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

38Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Testing ResultsTesting Results

Runs Client Registration Time (ms)

Group Join Time (ms) Group Leave Time (ms)

1 279.62 233.46 135.54

2 249.28 652.74 126.78

3 253.93 706.04 769.08

4 259.46 118.15 434.12

Avg/Run 260.57 427.59 366.38

Table 1 time taken for client registration group join, group leave

File size Time Taken (ms)

8.5K 35302.47

25K 105986.05

60K 305934.53

195K 1007949.38

Table 2 time taken for file transfer

IBM Thinkpad Intel Pentium III 800MHz Server; IPAQ PDA StrongArm200MHz; Linux 2.4 Kernel;

802.11b Ad hoc Mode with NIST driver

Page 39: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

39Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

ConclusionConclusion A secure group communication software package SGFR v.0 was

developed. Use Digital Certificate to authenticate client access. Group keys are distributed when members join/leave or based

on some time period. Group key is used to encrypted the messages. Enhanced Jabber-based text chat with remote file download

and remote display. Lesson1: Fire fighters do not like stylus input and they carry

heavy load!! Lesson2: Fire fighter don’t care security; Police do!!

Ported the SGFR v.0 to run on handheld devices include iPAQ PDA running Linux and Sony PalmTop with 802.11b mobile ad hoc network.

A secure group communication software package SGFR v.0 was developed. Use Digital Certificate to authenticate client access. Group keys are distributed when members join/leave or based

on some time period. Group key is used to encrypted the messages. Enhanced Jabber-based text chat with remote file download

and remote display. Lesson1: Fire fighters do not like stylus input and they carry

heavy load!! Lesson2: Fire fighter don’t care security; Police do!!

Ported the SGFR v.0 to run on handheld devices include iPAQ PDA running Linux and Sony PalmTop with 802.11b mobile ad hoc network.

Page 40: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

40Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Secure Wireless Access ControlSecure Wireless Access Control Goal:

Compare performance of two proposed wireless authentication protocols, PEAP vs. TTLS.

Develop a PEAP module for freeRadius server on Linux.

Techniques/Tools used:

Xsupplicant, Window XP

freeRadius, Win 2003 server

OpenSSL

Page 41: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

41Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

UCCS Secure Wireless Access TestbedUCCS Secure Wireless Access Testbed

Client

RADIUS

Page 42: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

42Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Client/Server Machine ConfigurationsClient/Server Machine Configurations

Machine Spec IP Address OS Software

wiper.uccs.edu1.8 Ghz, 1 GB RAMRADIUS Server and

DHCP server

128.192.61.132 RedHat 9.0Running Linux

2.2.20-19.9 kernel

FreeRadiusModified

CVS snapshot radiusd-

09.03.03.tar.gz

willow.uccs.eduAccess Point

Cisco Aironet 1200

128.192.61.130 RedHat 9.0 Running Linux

2.2.20-19.9 kernel

Cisco 1200 series

Software

Toshiba – 366 Mhz, 512 MB

Wireless ClientUsing Cisco Aironet

350 PC Card

Dynamic IP address

128.192.61.144to

128.98.61.152

RedHat 6.2 running Linux 2.2.20-19.9

kernel

Open1x XsupplicantVersion 9.0

Hobbit – 1 Ghz Dell Optiplex, 512 MBWireless Client

Using Cisco Aironet 350 PCI Card

Dynamic IP address

128.192.61.144to

128.98.61.152

Windows XP-SP1And RedHat 9.0 Running Linux 2.2.20.9 kernel

Open1x Xsupplicant for

Linux and built in Service Pack for

XP

Page 43: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

43Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

PEAP vs. TTLS on Toshiba machine

PEAP vs. TTLS on Toshiba machine

PEAP vs TTLS[Toshiba - 366.604mhz]

500600700800900

100011001200130014001500

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

No. of Runs

Tim

e in

ms

ec

TTLS

PEAP

PEAP TTLS

Average 1046 949

Variance 8142 12060

Page 44: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

44Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

PEAP-TTLS Average Performances over varying Distances

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

DIST1 DIST2 DIST3 DIST4 DIST5

Distance Range

Ave

rag

e-T

ime/

mse

c

PEAP

TTLS

PEAP vs. TTLS Average Performance

PEAP vs. TTLS Average Performance

Page 45: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

45Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

ConclusionConclusion

Developed a Radius Server on Linux that supports both PEAP and TTLS.

PEAP is relatively more influenced by Client’s processor speeds, distance range and network transient nature as compared to TTLS.

Although the higher performance shown by TTLS over PEAP is negligible, it is worth noting that TTLS was outperforming PEAP on an average by 10% in all the tests.

The enhanced Radius Server can serve both Windows and Linux clients.

Developed a Radius Server on Linux that supports both PEAP and TTLS.

PEAP is relatively more influenced by Client’s processor speeds, distance range and network transient nature as compared to TTLS.

Although the higher performance shown by TTLS over PEAP is negligible, it is worth noting that TTLS was outperforming PEAP on an average by 10% in all the tests.

The enhanced Radius Server can serve both Windows and Linux clients.

Page 46: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

46Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

First Responder Sensor NetworkFirst Responder Sensor Network

Goal: How wireless sensor network can assist first responders.

Status:Created a wireless sensor testbed with Crossbow Professional Mote Kits and Intel stargate gateway devices.

Current Tasks: Investigate how to deploy sensor networks (pre-

planned/dynamically deployed). Develop algorithms for tracking first responders using

wireless sensors. Security in SMANET+FRSN.

Goal: How wireless sensor network can assist first responders.

Status:Created a wireless sensor testbed with Crossbow Professional Mote Kits and Intel stargate gateway devices.

Current Tasks: Investigate how to deploy sensor networks (pre-

planned/dynamically deployed). Develop algorithms for tracking first responders using

wireless sensors. Security in SMANET+FRSN.

Page 47: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

47Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Scenario 1:Preplanned Wireless Sensors

Scenario 1:Preplanned Wireless Sensors

Building is surveyed and deployed with wireless sensors and include floor plan info in the gateway device.

When there is fire, first responders can tap into the secure wireless sensor network to find the condition of the building and over with the floor plan picture.

Building is surveyed and deployed with wireless sensors and include floor plan info in the gateway device.

When there is fire, first responders can tap into the secure wireless sensor network to find the condition of the building and over with the floor plan picture.

Page 48: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

48Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Scenario 2: Dynamically Deploy Sensors

Scenario 2: Dynamically Deploy Sensors

Fire Fighter drops the wireless sensors along the route in. If sensors detects temperature increase or location movement!!, they relay the

date through multiple hop wireless sensor network to both the team inside and the team outside.

Fire Fighter drops the wireless sensors along the route in. If sensors detects temperature increase or location movement!!, they relay the

date through multiple hop wireless sensor network to both the team inside and the team outside.

Page 49: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

49Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Secure Access to Sensor NetworkSecure Access to Sensor Network

Terrorist may access the sensors and information on the gateway.

Need authentication for secure access. Need encryption for avoid sniffing by terrorist. Need redundancy for fault tolerance and verifying the

sensor results.

Terrorist may access the sensors and information on the gateway.

Need authentication for secure access. Need encryption for avoid sniffing by terrorist. Need redundancy for fault tolerance and verifying the

sensor results.

Page 50: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

50Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Improving System Performance by QoS Regulations with Adaptive Resource Management under Cyber Threats

Xiaobo Joe Zhou

Page 51: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

51Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Information FusionInformation Fusion

Project Goal: Intelligence/information fusion among multiple

agencies. Starting with federal/state/city agencies extend it to including those from Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

How to exchange, verify, correlate intelligence information for decision support,

How to allocate resources and coordinate sensors in different agencies for a set of tasks with different priority

Project Goal: Intelligence/information fusion among multiple

agencies. Starting with federal/state/city agencies extend it to including those from Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

How to exchange, verify, correlate intelligence information for decision support,

How to allocate resources and coordinate sensors in different agencies for a set of tasks with different priority

Page 52: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

52Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Related WorksRelated Works Multilayered Video

Deliver Multimedia Streams with Flexible QoS via a Multicast DAG, Jiong Yang, UIUC, ICDCS 03

Source-adaptive multilayered multicast algorithms for real-time video distribution, Brett Vickers, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 2000

An End-to-End Adaptation Protocol for Layered Video Multicast Using Optimal Rate Allocation, Ya-Qin Zhang, IEEE Transaction on Multimedia 2004

QoS and multipath Admission Control and Dynamic Adaptation for a

Proportional-Delay DiffServ-Enabled Web Server, Sam C. M. Lee, John C. S. Lui, David K. Y. Yau, SIGMETRICS 2002

Parallel Access For Mirror Sites in the Internet, Pablo Rodriguez, et al., Infocom 1999

Multilayered Video Deliver Multimedia Streams with Flexible QoS via a Multicast

DAG, Jiong Yang, UIUC, ICDCS 03 Source-adaptive multilayered multicast algorithms for real-

time video distribution, Brett Vickers, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 2000

An End-to-End Adaptation Protocol for Layered Video Multicast Using Optimal Rate Allocation, Ya-Qin Zhang, IEEE Transaction on Multimedia 2004

QoS and multipath Admission Control and Dynamic Adaptation for a

Proportional-Delay DiffServ-Enabled Web Server, Sam C. M. Lee, John C. S. Lui, David K. Y. Yau, SIGMETRICS 2002

Parallel Access For Mirror Sites in the Internet, Pablo Rodriguez, et al., Infocom 1999

Page 53: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

53Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Research DirectionResearch Direction

Data Fusion Operations Artificial Neural Network for merging results from multiple

classifiers Negotiation/Coordination Protocol [Idian, CIDF, IDMEF,

IDIP] Specific test cases: distributed intrusion detection,

compromised node detection, tracking with sensors. Data transmission in data fusion

Techniques for guaranteeing the quality of service for the prioritized sensor information fusion/delivery

Multilayered video encoding and distribution multilayered information data classification and transportation

Feedback control mechanism Comment? Other important research topics/directions?

Data Fusion Operations Artificial Neural Network for merging results from multiple

classifiers Negotiation/Coordination Protocol [Idian, CIDF, IDMEF,

IDIP] Specific test cases: distributed intrusion detection,

compromised node detection, tracking with sensors. Data transmission in data fusion

Techniques for guaranteeing the quality of service for the prioritized sensor information fusion/delivery

Multilayered video encoding and distribution multilayered information data classification and transportation

Feedback control mechanism Comment? Other important research topics/directions?

Page 54: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

54Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Secure Information SharingSecure Information Sharing

Project Goal:Secure Intelligence/information sharing among

multiple agencies/organizationsHow to exchange, verify information and provide

security and non repudiationHow to share information between different agencies

and protect against misuse of authority during information sharing

Project Goal:Secure Intelligence/information sharing among

multiple agencies/organizationsHow to exchange, verify information and provide

security and non repudiationHow to share information between different agencies

and protect against misuse of authority during information sharing

Page 55: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

55Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Related WorksRelated Works NIST standard on Role Based Access Control An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for

Authorization – RFC 3281 IETF Working Group on Public Key Infrastructure

(X.509) Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure

Standards Validation http://www.permis.org/

Akenti Distributed Access Control http://www-itg.lbl.gov/

NIST standard on Role Based Access Control An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for

Authorization – RFC 3281 IETF Working Group on Public Key Infrastructure

(X.509) Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure

Standards Validation http://www.permis.org/

Akenti Distributed Access Control http://www-itg.lbl.gov/

Page 56: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

56Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

Research DirectionResearch Direction

Data Sharing Operations Access control mechanism for sharing information Mandatory, Discretionary, and Role Based Access Control

Mechanisms Specific test cases: File Distribution, Directory Access

Control, secure instant messaging for group communications

Attribute Certificate profile for Authorization Provide non repudiation and Role Based Access Control Easy to Manage than certificates -- Short life span than

certificates Provide resource access for short duration; tighter control,

misuse avoidance, and increased responsibility Comment? Other important research topics/directions?

Data Sharing Operations Access control mechanism for sharing information Mandatory, Discretionary, and Role Based Access Control

Mechanisms Specific test cases: File Distribution, Directory Access

Control, secure instant messaging for group communications

Attribute Certificate profile for Authorization Provide non repudiation and Role Based Access Control Easy to Manage than certificates -- Short life span than

certificates Provide resource access for short duration; tighter control,

misuse avoidance, and increased responsibility Comment? Other important research topics/directions?

Page 57: 1 Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security C. Edward Chow Xiaobo Joe Zhou Yu Cai Ganesh Godavari Department of Computer Science University.

57Pfleeger Visit 4/13/2004 UCCS Network/System Security

SummarySummary

We have innovated ideas on intrusion tolerance We have developed expertise in

Secure DNS system Organic Networking? Secure multiple path indirect routing Organic Networking? Autonomous security system with Enhanced IDS+Firewall

Organic Security? Secure wireless access and MANET Group key management Secure groupware Wireless sensor network for first responders Content switching Network restoration QoS (proportional differential services)

Developing expertise in information fusion/sharing.

We have innovated ideas on intrusion tolerance We have developed expertise in

Secure DNS system Organic Networking? Secure multiple path indirect routing Organic Networking? Autonomous security system with Enhanced IDS+Firewall

Organic Security? Secure wireless access and MANET Group key management Secure groupware Wireless sensor network for first responders Content switching Network restoration QoS (proportional differential services)

Developing expertise in information fusion/sharing.


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