11

Psychological Explanations in Gricean Psychological Explanations in Gricean Pragmatics: Pragmatics:

An Argument from Cultural ‘Common An Argument from Cultural ‘Common Ground’Ground’

Kasia JaszczoltKasia Jaszczolt

University of CambridgeUniversity of Cambridge

22

Psychologism and post-Gricean Psychologism and post-Gricean pragmaticspragmatics

Fregean logic > truth-conditional Fregean logic > truth-conditional semantics > truth-conditional pragmaticssemantics > truth-conditional pragmatics

Does Frege’s ban on psychological Does Frege’s ban on psychological explanations in logic extend to pragmatic explanations in logic extend to pragmatic theory?theory?

33

Gottlob FregeGrundlagen der Arithmetik (1884: 90):

‘[t]here must be a sharp separation of the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective’

Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893: 202): ‘being true is quite different from being held as

true’ ‘corrupting intrusion’ [of psychology on logic]

44

‘‘The description of the origin of an idea should The description of the origin of an idea should not be taken for a definition, nor should the not be taken for a definition, nor should the account of the mental and physical conditions for account of the mental and physical conditions for becoming aware of a proposition be taken for a becoming aware of a proposition be taken for a proof (…). [A] proposition just as little ceases to proof (…). [A] proposition just as little ceases to be true when I am no longer thinking of it as the be true when I am no longer thinking of it as the Sun is extinguished when I close my eyes.’ Sun is extinguished when I close my eyes.’

Frege (1884: 88)Frege (1884: 88)

55

Frege’s review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Frege’s review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic IArithmetic I

‘If a geographer was given an oceanographic treatise to read which gave a psychological explanation of the origin of the oceans, he would undoubtedly get the impression that the author had missed the mark and shot past the thing itself in a most peculiar way. (…) Reading [Husserl’s] work has enabled me to gauge the extent of the devastation caused by the irruption of psychology into logic…’

Frege (1894: 209)

66

Q1:Q1: Should psychological explanations be present Should psychological explanations be present in definitions of in definitions of what is saidwhat is said, truth-conditional , truth-conditional content, explicature, etc?content, explicature, etc?

Q2:Q2: Should the psychology of utterance Should the psychology of utterance processing be considered in the discussions of processing be considered in the discussions of the boundary between semantics and the boundary between semantics and pragmatics? pragmatics?

77

Areas in which (moderate) Areas in which (moderate) psychologism is necessarypsychologism is necessary

[1][1] The selection of the perspective to be adopted: The selection of the perspective to be adopted: that of the speaker, the addressee, or a Model that of the speaker, the addressee, or a Model Speaker – Model Addressee interaction;Speaker – Model Addressee interaction;

[2][2] The unit on which pragmatic inference or The unit on which pragmatic inference or default enrichment operate;default enrichment operate;

[3][3] The definition and delimitation of automatic The definition and delimitation of automatic (default) interpretations vis-à-vis conscious (default) interpretations vis-à-vis conscious pragmatic inference;pragmatic inference;

[4][4] The definition of the unit of analysis (Primary The definition of the unit of analysis (Primary Meaning)Meaning)

88

Levinson’s (2000)Levinson’s (2000)

presumptive meaningspresumptive meanings

Jaszczolt’s (2005)Jaszczolt’s (2005)

meaning mergersmeaning mergers

[1][1] V +PV +P V +PV +P

[2][2] X +PX +P ? +P? +P

[3][3] X +P X +P X +PX +P

[4][4] X +PX +P V +PV +P

99

Radical Minimalism (Bach, e.g. 2006; Radical Minimalism (Bach, e.g. 2006; Atlas, e.g. forthcoming) Atlas, e.g. forthcoming) -P-P

1010

[1]: Whose perspective?[1]: Whose perspective?

The theory of utterance meaning The theory of utterance meaning (meaning(meaningnnnn) is to account for the meanings ) is to account for the meanings the speakers the speakers normallynormally convey and at the convey and at the same time the meanings the addressees same time the meanings the addressees normallynormally recover in the process of rational recover in the process of rational conversational interaction.conversational interaction.

1111

Model Speaker – Model Addressee perspective Model Speaker – Model Addressee perspective

Saul 2002, Co-existence Thesis: both the Saul 2002, Co-existence Thesis: both the speaker and the addressee can be wrong about speaker and the addressee can be wrong about what is said. what is said.

Psychologism in [1]: Psychologism in [1]:

1212

Just as Frege, in Just as Frege, in Der GedankeDer Gedanke (1918-19), writes (1918-19), writes that the task of logic is not ‘investigating minds that the task of logic is not ‘investigating minds and contents of consciousness owned by and contents of consciousness owned by individual men’, the task is ‘the investigation of individual men’, the task is ‘the investigation of thethe mind; of mind; of thethe mind, not of minds’ (p. 342), so mind, not of minds’ (p. 342), so a theory of meaninga theory of meaningnnnn is the investigation of is the investigation of thethe

utterance meaning; utterance meaning; thethe meaning, not meanings meaning, not meanings for speakers or addressees. for speakers or addressees.

1313

[2]: The unit on which pragmatic inference/[2]: The unit on which pragmatic inference/default enrichment operatedefault enrichment operate

?? ‘…hypotheses about meaning are entertained ‘…hypotheses about meaning are entertained incrementally – as the words come in, as it incrementally – as the words come in, as it were.’ were.’ Levinson (2000: 5).Levinson (2000: 5).

= processing as = processing as explanandumexplanandum (psychologism?) (psychologism?)

1414

I-heuristic: I-heuristic: ‘‘What is expressed simply is stereotypically What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified’exemplified’

(1)(1) bread knifebread knife +>+> knife used for cutting breadknife used for cutting bread

kitchen knife kitchen knife +>+> knife used for preparing knife used for preparing food, food, e.g. choppinge.g. chopping

steel knifesteel knife +> +> knife made of steelknife made of steel

1515

(2) (2) a secretarya secretary +> a female one+> a female one

a road a road +> hard-surfaced one+> hard-surfaced one

I don’t like garlic. I don’t like garlic. +> I dislike garlic.+> I dislike garlic.

?? Cancellation problem: Cancellation problem:

(3)(3) Some (+> ‘not all’), in fact all, of the boys Some (+> ‘not all’), in fact all, of the boys came.came.

1616

‘‘John’s book is good.’ John’s book is good.’ ?? +> the one he read, wrote, borrowed…+> the one he read, wrote, borrowed…

Levinson (2000: 37)Levinson (2000: 37)vs. ‘Chomsky’s book is about grammar.’vs. ‘Chomsky’s book is about grammar.’

We need a theory that construes pragmatic inference We need a theory that construes pragmatic inference and defaults as operating on a unit that is adequate for and defaults as operating on a unit that is adequate for the case at hand, ranging from a morpheme to the entire the case at hand, ranging from a morpheme to the entire discourse.discourse.

1717

Atlas (2006): against ‘armchair psychologising’ Atlas (2006): against ‘armchair psychologising’ and in favour of ‘empirical psychology of and in favour of ‘empirical psychology of sentence-processing’. sentence-processing’.

But: ‘psychologising’ must appear before But: ‘psychologising’ must appear before empirical studies in order to identify the unit for empirical studies in order to identify the unit for experimental testing. experimental testing.

(cf. Recanati 2004 on automatic modulation)(cf. Recanati 2004 on automatic modulation)

Psychologism in [2]: Psychologism in [2]:

1818

[3]: Automatic default interpretations [3]: Automatic default interpretations vs. conscious pragmatic inferencevs. conscious pragmatic inference

Conscious or automatic?Conscious or automatic?

‘ ‘Leonardo’s painting was stolen from Leonardo’s painting was stolen from Czartoryskis’ Museum in KrakCzartoryskis’ Museum in Kraków.’ów.’

‘‘Larry’s book is a thrilling account of negation.’Larry’s book is a thrilling account of negation.’

+ ‘bread/kitchen/steel knife’+ ‘bread/kitchen/steel knife’

1919

A:A: So, is this your first film?So, is this your first film?B:B: No, it’s my twenty second.No, it’s my twenty second.A:A: Any favourites among the twenty two?Any favourites among the twenty two?B:B: Working with Leonardo.Working with Leonardo.A: A: da Vinci?da Vinci?B: B: DiCaprio.DiCaprio.A:A: Of course. And is he your favourite Italian Of course. And is he your favourite Italian

director?director?(Richard Curtiss, (Richard Curtiss, Notting HillNotting Hill, 1999), 1999)

2020

‘‘We advertised for a new nanny.’We advertised for a new nanny.’

+> a female nanny+> a female nanny

Situational contextSituational context (used for conscious (used for conscious inference) or inference) or common groundcommon ground (exploited in (exploited in automatic, unreflective inference)?automatic, unreflective inference)?

+ level of specificity at which the default meaning + level of specificity at which the default meaning endsends

2121

Arguments from psychology are needed in order Arguments from psychology are needed in order to postulate a hypothesis on the demarcation to postulate a hypothesis on the demarcation between automatic and conscious between automatic and conscious interpretations as ‘food for experimentation’.interpretations as ‘food for experimentation’.

Psychologism in [3]: Psychologism in [3]:

2222

[4]: Unit of analysis[4]: Unit of analysis

Primary Meaning: what is intended by MS and Primary Meaning: what is intended by MS and recovered by MA as ‘the main message’recovered by MA as ‘the main message’

Q3:Q3: Should primary meaning obey the syntactic Should primary meaning obey the syntactic constraint?constraint? (cf.(cf. what is said, explicature what is said, explicature))

Psychologism in [4]: Psychologism in [4]:

2323

Primary Meaning is the most salient meaning Primary Meaning is the most salient meaning that can be assumed to be intended by the that can be assumed to be intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee. It need not obey the syntactic Addressee. It need not obey the syntactic constraint (cf. Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007)constraint (cf. Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007)

(modelled as merger representations in Default Semantics, loosely (modelled as merger representations in Default Semantics, loosely modelled on DRSs of DRT, Kamp and Reyle 1993; Kamp and van modelled on DRSs of DRT, Kamp and Reyle 1993; Kamp and van Eijck 1997; Kamp, van Genabith and Reyle forthcoming)Eijck 1997; Kamp, van Genabith and Reyle forthcoming)

2424

(4)(4) I haven’t eaten.I haven’t eaten.

(5)(5) I haven’t eaten lunch yet.I haven’t eaten lunch yet.

(6)(6) I am hungry.I am hungry.

2525

‘devastation caused by the irruption of psychology into [pragmatics]’ (G. Frege)

The definitions of proposition, utterance meaning, default enrichment/modulation, pragmatic inference require a decision on the perspective: S, A, MS/MA;

This is a decision within the domain of the psychology of processing. It is not a decision as to whether to admit psychologism into pragmatic theory. S, A, MS/MA perspectives are all ‘contaminated’, albeit to different degrees (vs. Saul 2002, Co-Existence Thesis).

2626

G. FregeG. Frege, Logic, Logic (1897/1969: 250): (1897/1969: 250):

‘‘Logic is concerned with the laws of truth, not Logic is concerned with the laws of truth, not with the laws of holding something to be true, with the laws of holding something to be true, not with the question of how people think, but not with the question of how people think, but with the question of how they must think if they with the question of how they must think if they are not to miss the truth.’ are not to miss the truth.’

2727

Respected by truth-conditional semantics and post-Respected by truth-conditional semantics and post-Gricean pragmatics:Gricean pragmatics:

‘ ‘being true’ is ‘placeless and timeless’ (Frege 1893: 203)being true’ is ‘placeless and timeless’ (Frege 1893: 203) Thoughts (Thoughts (GedankenGedanken) (Frege 1918-19) are MS/MA ) (Frege 1918-19) are MS/MA

meanings; they are not mental entities.meanings; they are not mental entities.

Neo-Fregean ThoughtNeo-Fregean Thought when no syntactic constraint on when no syntactic constraint on Primary Meaning as in Default Semantics or late-Primary Meaning as in Default Semantics or late-Wittgensteinian Meaning Eliminativism (Recanati 2005).Wittgensteinian Meaning Eliminativism (Recanati 2005).

2828

ConclusionConclusion

While Gricean theory of meaningWhile Gricean theory of meaningnnnn respects respects

Frege’s rejection of psychological explanations Frege’s rejection of psychological explanations from logic, it must resort to psychology in from logic, it must resort to psychology in choosing and defining the object of study of choosing and defining the object of study of pragmatics.pragmatics.

2929

Further questionsFurther questions

Q4:Q4: Does semantic minimalism (Cappelen and Does semantic minimalism (Cappelen and Lepore 2005, Borg 2004) respect Frege’s Lepore 2005, Borg 2004) respect Frege’s ban on psychologism?ban on psychologism?

A4:A4: No, if it resorts to Propositionalism (Bach No, if it resorts to Propositionalism (Bach 2004, 2005, 2006). See Jaszczolt 2007.2004, 2005, 2006). See Jaszczolt 2007.

3030

Q5:Q5: Should we ban propositions in order to ban Should we ban propositions in order to ban psychologism, or to retain propositions and psychologism, or to retain propositions and admit some modest dose of psychologism?admit some modest dose of psychologism?

A5:A5: I argued for the latter because a I argued for the latter because a proposition-proposition- free semantics that is properly free semantics that is properly formally formally constrained and compositional is for constrained and compositional is for me me inconceivable. Exorcising propositions inconceivable. Exorcising propositions means exorcising truth conditions, or placing means exorcising truth conditions, or placing them on the wrong side of the semantics/ them on the wrong side of the semantics/ pragmatics boundary. pragmatics boundary.

3131

Select ReferencesSelect References

Atlas, J. D. 2006. ‘Remarks on F. Recanati’s Atlas, J. D. 2006. ‘Remarks on F. Recanati’s Literal Meaning’Literal Meaning’. . Manuscript.Manuscript.

Atlas, J. D. forthcoming. ‘Meaning, propositions, context, and Atlas, J. D. forthcoming. ‘Meaning, propositions, context, and semantical underdeterminacy’. In: G. Preyer (ed.). semantical underdeterminacy’. In: G. Preyer (ed.). Essays on Essays on Insensitive SemanticsInsensitive Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bach, K. 2004. ‘Minding the gap’. In: C. Bianchi (ed.). Bach, K. 2004. ‘Minding the gap’. In: C. Bianchi (ed.). The The Semantics/Pragmatics DistinctionSemantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 27-. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 27-43.43.

Bach, K. 2005. ‘Context Bach, K. 2005. ‘Context ex Machinaex Machina’. In: Z. G. Szabó (ed.). ’. In: Z. G. Szabó (ed.). Semantics Semantics versus Pragmaticsversus Pragmatics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 15-44.. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 15-44.

Bach, K. 2006. ‘The excluded middle: Semantic minimalism without Bach, K. 2006. ‘The excluded middle: Semantic minimalism without minimal propositions’. Unpublished paper.minimal propositions’. Unpublished paper.

Borg, E. 2004. Borg, E. 2004. Minimal SemanticsMinimal Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. 2005a. Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. 2005a. Insensitive Semantics: a Defense Insensitive Semantics: a Defense

of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralismof Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Oxford: . Oxford: Blackwell.Blackwell.

3232

Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. 2005b. ‘A tall tale: In defense of Semantic Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. 2005b. ‘A tall tale: In defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism’. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism’. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). (eds). Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and TruthTruth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 197-219.. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 197-219.

van Eijck, J. and H. Kamp. 1997. ‘Representing discourse in context’. van Eijck, J. and H. Kamp. 1997. ‘Representing discourse in context’. In: J. van Benthem and A. ter Meulen (eds). In: J. van Benthem and A. ter Meulen (eds). Handbook of Logic and Handbook of Logic and LanguageLanguage. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 179-237.. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 179-237.

Frege, G. 1884. Frege, G. 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahlmathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl. . Introduction. Breslau: W. Koebner. Introduction. Breslau: W. Koebner. Transl. by M. Beaney in: M. Transl. by M. Beaney in: M. Beaney (ed.). 1997. Beaney (ed.). 1997. The Frege ReaderThe Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 84-91.. Oxford: Blackwell. 84-91.

Frege, G. 1893. Frege, G. 1893. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Vol. 1. Preface. Jena: H. Vol. 1. Preface. Jena: H. Pohle. Transl. by M. Beaney in: M. Beaney (ed.). 1997. Pohle. Transl. by M. Beaney in: M. Beaney (ed.). 1997. The Frege The Frege ReaderReader. Oxford: Blackwell. 194-208.. Oxford: Blackwell. 194-208.

Frege, G. 1894. Review of E. G. Husserl, Frege, G. 1894. Review of E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I Philosophie der Arithmetik I ((Philosophy of Arithmetic IPhilosophy of Arithmetic I). ). Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritikphilosophische Kritik 103. Transl. by H. Kaal in: G. Frege. 1984. 103. Transl. by H. Kaal in: G. Frege. 1984.

3333

Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and PhilosophyCollected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy ed. by B. ed. by B. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell. 195-209. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell. 195-209.

Frege, G. 1897/1969. Frege, G. 1897/1969. LogicLogic. In: 1969. . In: 1969. Nachgelassene SchriftenNachgelassene Schriften. . Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Transl. by P. Long and R. White in: 1979. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Transl. by P. Long and R. White in: 1979. Posthumous WritingsPosthumous Writings. Oxford: Blackwell. Sections 1 (‘Introduction’) . Oxford: Blackwell. Sections 1 (‘Introduction’) and 2 (‘Separating a thought from its trappings’) reprinted in: M. and 2 (‘Separating a thought from its trappings’) reprinted in: M. Beaney (ed.). 1997. Beaney (ed.). 1997. The Frege ReaderThe Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 227-250.. Oxford: Blackwell. 227-250.

Frege, G. 1906/1976. Frege, G. 1906/1976. Letters to Husserl, 1906Letters to Husserl, 1906. In: 1976. . In: 1976. Wissenschaftlicher BriefwechselWissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Transl. by . Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Transl. by H. Kaal in: G. Frege. 1980. H. Kaal in: G. Frege. 1980. Philosophical and Mathematical Philosophical and Mathematical CorrespondenceCorrespondence ed. by B. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell. 66-71. ed. by B. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell. 66-71. Reprinted in: M. Beaney (ed.). 1997. Reprinted in: M. Beaney (ed.). 1997. The Frege ReaderThe Frege Reader. Oxford: . Oxford: Blackwell. 301-307.Blackwell. 301-307.

Frege, G. 1918-19. ‘Der Gedanke’. Frege, G. 1918-19. ‘Der Gedanke’. Beiträge zur Philosophie des Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismusdeutschen Idealismus I. Transl. as ‘Thoughts’ (Part I of I. Transl. as ‘Thoughts’ (Part I of Logical Logical InvestigationsInvestigations) by P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff in: G. Frege. 1984. ) by P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff in: G. Frege. 1984. Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy

3434

ed. by B. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted in: M. Beaney ed. by B. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted in: M. Beaney (ed.). 1997. (ed.). 1997. The Frege ReaderThe Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 325-345. . Oxford: Blackwell. 325-345.

Giora, R. 2003. Giora, R. 2003. On Our Mind: Salience, Context, and Figurative On Our Mind: Salience, Context, and Figurative LanguageLanguage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2005. Jaszczolt, K. M. 2005. Default Semantics: Foundations of a Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of CommunicationCompositional Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford . Oxford: Oxford University Press.University Press.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2006a. ‘Defaults in semantics and pragmatics’. Jaszczolt, K. M. 2006a. ‘Defaults in semantics and pragmatics’. Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta. , ed. E. N. Zalta. http://http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.htmlplato.stanford.edu/contents.html

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2006b. ‘Meaning merger: Pragmatic inference, Jaszczolt, K. M. 2006b. ‘Meaning merger: Pragmatic inference, defaults, and compositionality’. defaults, and compositionality’. Intercultural PragmaticsIntercultural Pragmatics 3.2. 195- 3.2. 195-212.212.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2007. ‘On being post-Gricean’. In: R. A. Nilsen, N. A. Jaszczolt, K. M. 2007. ‘On being post-Gricean’. In: R. A. Nilsen, N. A. A. Amfo and K. Borthen (eds). A. Amfo and K. Borthen (eds). Interpreting Utterances: Pragmatics Interpreting Utterances: Pragmatics and Its Interfacesand Its Interfaces. . Essays in Honour of Thorstein Fretheim. Essays in Honour of Thorstein Fretheim. Oslo: Oslo: Novus. 21-38.Novus. 21-38.

3535

Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming . ‘Semantics and pragmatics: The Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming . ‘Semantics and pragmatics: The boundary issue’. In: K. von Heusinger, P. Portner and C. Maienborn. boundary issue’. In: K. von Heusinger, P. Portner and C. Maienborn. Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language MeaningMeaning. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Kamp, H., J. van Genabith and U. Reyle. forthcoming. ‘Discourse Kamp, H., J. van Genabith and U. Reyle. forthcoming. ‘Discourse Representation Theory’. In: D.M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds). Representation Theory’. In: D.M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds). Handbook of Philosophical LogicHandbook of Philosophical Logic. Second edition.. Second edition.

Kamp, H. and U. Reyle. 1993. Kamp, H. and U. Reyle. 1993. From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation TheoryDiscourse Representation Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Katsos, N. 2007. ‘The semantics/pragmatics interface from an Katsos, N. 2007. ‘The semantics/pragmatics interface from an experimental perspective: The case of scalar implicature’. experimental perspective: The case of scalar implicature’. Manuscript.Manuscript.

Levinson, S. C. 2000.Levinson, S. C. 2000. Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of GeneralizedConversational ImplicatureGeneralizedConversational Implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Noveck, I. A. and D. Sperber (eds). 2004. Noveck, I. A. and D. Sperber (eds). 2004. Experimental PragmaticsExperimental Pragmatics. . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

3636

Recanati, F. 2004. Recanati, F. 2004. Literal MeaningLiteral Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Press.

Recanati, F. 2005. ‘Literalism and contextualism: Some varieties’. In: Recanati, F. 2005. ‘Literalism and contextualism: Some varieties’. In: G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds). Contextualism in Philosophy: Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and TruthKnowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 171-196.. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 171-196.

Saul, J. M. 2002. ‘What is said and psychological reality; Grice’s project Saul, J. M. 2002. ‘What is said and psychological reality; Grice’s project and relevance theorists’ criticisms’. and relevance theorists’ criticisms’. Linguistics and PhilosophyLinguistics and Philosophy 25. 25. 347-372.347-372.

Sysoeva, A. and K. Jaszczolt. 2007. ‘Composing utterance meaning: Sysoeva, A. and K. Jaszczolt. 2007. ‘Composing utterance meaning: An interface between pragmatics and psychology’. Paper presented An interface between pragmatics and psychology’. Paper presented at the 10th International Pragmatics Conference, Göteborg, 10 July at the 10th International Pragmatics Conference, Göteborg, 10 July 2007.2007.

Veltman, F. 1996. ‘Defaults in update semantics’. Veltman, F. 1996. ‘Defaults in update semantics’. Journal of Journal of Philosophical LogicPhilosophical Logic 25. 221-261. 25. 221-261.