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1 Risk Management and Risk Management and Regulatory Regulatory Compliance Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank [email protected]
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Page 1: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Risk Management and Risk Management and Regulatory ComplianceRegulatory Compliance

Yan Wang, Ph.D.Senior EconomistThe World Bank

[email protected]

Page 2: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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OutlineOutline• Focus on Regulatory capital and Compliance

– Objectives of banking regulation– Overview of statutory prudential requirements:

• Basel I and calculations• Credit risk charges for BS and OBS items• Factor-in Capital charge in individual loan decisions

– Basel II, three pillars– Pillar 1, credit, market and operational risk– Pillar 2, and Pillar 3– implications to Emerging Market Economies (EMEs)

• Link with accounting standards: Establishing consistency with corporate and statutory risk compliance and prudential standards– Good accounting practices

• Summary

Page 3: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Transactions Information

Loan Pricing Decision

RAROEC Data

ALM Data

Mkt Pricing Data

Lo

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ata

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Risk Models

Loan Approval

Regulatory Capital

Economic Capital

Sup & Reg Reports

Annual ReportsInvestor/

Mkt Reports

Company Data Updates

Economic Data Updates

Integrated View of Risk Management System

Page 4: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Objectives of Objectives of Banking regulationsBanking regulations

  Objectives

Tools Systemic Risk Consumer Protection

Capital Standards Yes yes

Disclosure standards Yes yes

Asset restrictions Yes  

Antitrust enforcement yes

Conflict-of-Interest rules   yes

Source: Herring and Litan (1995)

•To protect banks’ depositors•To ensure the reliability of public good, ie. Money;•To avoid systemic risk arising from domino effects•To maintain a high level of financial efficiency

Page 5: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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A survey question

Which of the following capital adequacy requirements have been implemented in your country?

1. Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio with only 4 risk buckets

2. #1 and off-balance sheet capital charges

3. Simplified Standardized Approach (SSA) in Basel II

4. Use risk-weights under Standardized Approach

5. Internal Ratings-Based (IRB)

Do you agree with the assessment below?

Page 6: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Compliance with Basic Core Principles is still Limited in Developing Countries: do you agree?

Source: Powell (2004)

Page 7: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Why should Loan Officers careWhy should Loan Officers careCapital adequacy requirements affect• Pricing of capital, by the degree of riskiness of

your new loan/credit• Selection of loan /credit products

(on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet?)

• Economic Value Added of an additional project as EVA= profit – (capital x k)CA requirements affect capital and k (discount rate or

cost factor)

• RAROC = EVA / capital• Your bottom line

Page 8: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Risk Management tools

Reducing Process CostsCost of loosing

businessReducing Financial Costs

SustainabilityRM

AutonomyDecision Making

Risk-Based pricing

Optimized Capital

Allocation

Continuos Improvement Initiation / Maintenance

Collection tools

Encourage usage of Credit Tools

CentralizedStrategy

DecentralizedExecution

Consistent portfolio growth, with quality, in a controlled environment

Risk Management Philosophy

Page 9: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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General Supervisory Expectations

Supervisory expectations concerning sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans • The bank's board of directors and senior management are responsible for ensuring that the

banks have appropriate credit risk assessment processes and effective internal controls commensurate with the size, nature and complexity of the bank's lending operations to consistently determine provisions for loan losses in accordance with the bank's stated policies and procedures, the applicable accounting framework and supervisory guidance.

• Banks should have a system in place to reliably classify loans on the basis of credit risk. • A bank's policies should appropriately address validation of any internal credit risk assessment

models. • A bank should adopt and document a sound loan loss methodology, which addresses

credit risk assessment policies, procedures and controls for assessing credit risk, identifying problem loans and determining loan loss provisions in a timely manner.

• A bank's aggregate amount of individual and collectively assessed loan loss provisions should be adequate to absorb estimated credit losses in the loan portfolio.

• A bank's use of experienced credit judgment and reasonable estimates are an essential part of the recognition and measurement of loan losses.

• A bank's credit risk assessment process for loans should provide the bank with the necessary tools, procedures and observable data to use for assessing credit risk, accounting for impairment of loans and for determining regulatory capital requirements.

• Supervisory evaluation of credit risk assessment for loans, controls and capital adequacy • Banking supervisors should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of a bank's credit risk policies

and practices for assessing loan quality. • Banking supervisors should be satisfied that the methods employed by a bank to calculate loan

loss provisions produce a reasonable and prudent measurement of estimated credit losses in the loan portfolio that are recognized in a timely manner.

• Banking supervisors should consider credit risk assessment and valuation policies and practices when assessing a bank's capital adequacy.

Page 10: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Incentives to undercount riskCapital allocation affects measured profitability and creates

tensions within the bank• Line managers have incentives to understate risk• Managers may like to influence system design to lower hurdles• Banks with a higher ratio of available capital to required capital can

expect lower funding costsCompliance and risk management may have limited information

on what happens in line units• Line unit personnel may have incentives not to be forthcoming• If choices about internal risk measures influence the bank's IRB

measures, required capital measures might be distortedInternal conflicts are important for several reasons• If risk measurement is twisted, decisions may be poor• Capital may be less than required for safety

Page 11: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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II. International Regulatory II. International Regulatory Standards (Basel I)Standards (Basel I)

• The 1988 Basel I Accord came into effect in 1992• Goal: to provide a set of minimum capital

requirements for commercial banks. • Objective: promote the safety and soundness of

the global financial system, and to create a level-playing field for internationally active banks.

• The Cooke ratio with only 4 risk buckets

• The risk-based capital charges attempted to create a greater penalty for riskier assets.

%8 AssetsweightedRisk

CapitalCookeRatio

Page 12: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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The 1996 AmendmentThe 1996 Amendment

• Amendment separates the bank assets to– Trading book: fin instruments for resale and

marked-to-market– Banking book: loans valued at historical cost

basis

• The 1996 Amendment adds capital charges for – The market risk of trading book and – The currency and commodity risk of banking

book

Page 13: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Risk Capital: definitionRisk Capital: definition• Tier 1 capital or core capital

– Equity capital or shareholders funds– Disclosed reserves: share premium, retained profits

and general reserves

• Tier 2 or supplementary capital– Undisclosed reserves– Asset revaluation reserves– Loan loss reserves– Hybrid debt capital instruments– Subordinated term debt (5 years and plus)

• Tier 3 for market risk only- ST subordinated debt with a maturity of two years and plus

Page 14: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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How to calculate Risk CapitalHow to calculate Risk Capital

• Of the 8% capital charge for credit risk, at least 50% must be covered by tier 1 capital

• Eligible tier 1 capital for CR + allowed tier 2 capital >= Credit Risk Charge (CRC)

• For on-balance sheet risk charges:

• Where N is the notional amount of asset i• See table below

)(%8%8 iiiNRWRWACRC

Page 15: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Risk capital weights by asset classRisk capital weights by asset class(on-balance sheet)(on-balance sheet)

Weights (RW) Asset Type

0% Cash held

  Claims on OECD central governments

  Claims on central gov't in national currency

20% Cash to be received

  Claims on OECD banks and regulated securities firms

  Claims on non-OECD banks below one year

  Claims on Multilateral development banks

  Claims on foreign OECD public-sector entities

50% Residential mortgage loans

100% Claims on the private sector (corporate debt, equity…)

  Claims on non-OECD banks above one year

  Real estate

  Plant and equipment

Page 16: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Off-Balance Sheet Risk Charges

• Banks expose to credit risk from off-balance sheet (OBS) items like Letters of credit (LC), swaps

• The Basel Accord computes a “credit exposure” through a credit conversion factors (CCFs). Identified 5 categories and CCFs (see next table)

• For the first four categories:

NotionalCCFsureCreditExpo

Page 17: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Credit Risk Charge (CRC) for OBS

)%50(%8)( ExposureCreditRWOBSCRCi

i

Example: CRC for letter of credit

Consider a letter of credit of $1.5 million with a domestic export corporation. What is the credit risk charge (CRC) for this letter of credit?

Page 18: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Factor-in Credit Risk Charge in Factor-in Credit Risk Charge in loan decisionsloan decisions

• Compare the CRC for loan and LC or other OBS item [two examples]

• Monitor/ control credit exposure• Decision on granting or not granting loans

– Use EVA of a project as a benchmark where EVA= profit- (capital x k)

– Subtract a risk-based capital charge from profits as in a RAROC type system

Capital

k)(CapitalProfitRAROC

If the addition credit capital charge is higher, then the loan /contract is less worthwhile in term of RAROC.

Page 19: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Total Risk ChargeTotal Risk Charge

• Total risk charge is the sum of the credit risk charges (CRC incl both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet items) plus the market risk charge (MRC).

)(%8 AssetsadjustedriskTotalMRCCRCTRC

Page 20: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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III. Intro to Basel II III. Intro to Basel II

• BCBS finalized Basel II in June 2004• Implementation started in 2007 to EU banks• Advanced IRB to be available end 2007• Simultaneous operation of Basel I and Basel II

until 2008• United States pursuing a somewhat different

course– Implementing only advanced Internal Rating-based

(IRB) approach– Mandatory only for the most advanced / top banks

• Other authorities can proceed at their own pace

Page 21: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Basel II: Three PillarsBasel II: Three Pillars

• Pillar 1Capital

Requirements

• “Quantitative”

• Pillar 2Supervisory

Review

• Consistent review process

• Intervene timely• Risks not covered

in pillar 1• External factor

“Qualitative”

• Pillar 3

Disclosure

• Recommended disclosure for

• Capital structure• Risk exposure• Capital adequacy

“Market Forces”

•Credit risk•Market risk•Operational risk

Page 22: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Pillar 1:Pillar 1:Minimum Capital RequirementsMinimum Capital Requirements

• Capital requirements will have greater flexibility and reflect bank risk– Some banks will be allowed to assess risk internally,

subject to approval

• There will be a (new) explicit capital charge for “operational risk”– Risk unassociated with intrinsic asset values– Expected to comprise 20% of requirement

• Overall regulatory capital is not expected to change, but may increase or decrease for individual banks

Page 23: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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A.A. Approaches for Assessing Approaches for Assessing Credit RiskCredit Risk

• Simplified Standardized Approach (SSA)

• Standardized Approach

• Foundation Internal Ratings-Based (IRB)

• Advanced IRB

Page 24: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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1. Simplified Standardized Approach (SSA)

• Closest to Basel I• Some minor modifications

– Use Export Credit Agency ratings to calculate required capital for sovereign risk exposure

– Available on OECD web site

• Corporate capital still at 8%• Capital requirement for operational risk

– Uses Basic indicator approach– 15% of gross annual operating income

• Other modest changes– (lending to sovereign in own vs. foreign currency)

Page 25: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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2.Standardized Approach for Credit Risk Assessment

• Banks allocate their exposures to “risk buckets” defined by regulators

• Risk weights depend on borrower identity• Two methods of assigning risk weights

– One category below rating of headquarter country– External risk weighting of institution– For EME it is tricky as ratings for many firms are not

available –some tips here

• Risk mitigating factors also incorporated

Page 26: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Risk Weights Under Standardized Approach

  AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated

Claims on Sovereigns

0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100%

Claims on Banks Option 1 (rating

refers to sovereign)

20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100%

Claims on Banks Option 2 (rating refers to bank)

20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50%

Page 27: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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What if ratings are not available?What if ratings are not available?

• Tricks and tips• Quality of the collateral• Easiness in enforcing the collateral given default

–legal and liquidity issues• Any guarantees /insurance?• Export credit rating available?• Enterprise credit registry / information available?• Develop your own risk weights tables to be

reviewed by regulators

Page 28: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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3. IRB Approaches to Credit Risk Assessment

• Foundation-based approach– Banks can use their own estimates of loan default

probabilities– Probabilities are combined with standard estimated of

losses given default to determine value-at-risk

• Advanced approach– Banks estimate value-at-risk as well– Limited to most sophisticated banks

Page 29: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Regulatory Impact

• Overall capital requirements expected to be unchanged on average– Calibrated to “Standard loan”

• 1% default probability, 2.5 years maturity, 45% loss given default• 8% capital requirement

• Capital requirements will be increasing in credit risk assessments

• Capital Requirements will also be adjusted for credit risk concentration– Excessive exposure to a single borrower subject to additional

capital requirement– Exceptionally low exposure can lead to reduction at discretion

of domestic regulator

Page 30: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Numerical Example

• $10 billion loan• Basel I: Capital Requirement $800 million• Basel II:

– If the loan is healthy: Capital Requirement $100 million

– If Bad loan: Capital Requirement $4.5 billion

• Bottom Line: Extensive sensitivity to credit risk under the new program

Page 31: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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B. Operational RiskB. Operational Risk

• Basel II also includes a capital requirement for operational risk– On average, will offset reduced requirement on rated loans under

standardized approach– But may not be offset for EMEs with many unrated firms

• Operational Risk also has three alternative methods /approaches– Basic Indicator– Standardized– Advanced Measurement

• Basel II Accord Total Risk Charge is

ORCMRCCRCTRC

Page 32: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Pillar 2:Pillar 2:Supervisory ReviewSupervisory Review

• Committee confirmed the need for supervisory review in addition to minimum capital requirements

• Supervisors will determine soundness of internal processes used to assess capital adequacy and bank risk

• Intervention under conditions where violations are found

Page 33: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Four key principles

• Banks are responsible for assessing capital adequacy

• Supervisors role in assessing internal monitoring of bank

• Banks are normally expected to operate with capital above regulatory minimum

• Supervisors should intervene into problem banks at an “early stage”

Page 34: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Pillar 3:Pillar 3:Market DisciplineMarket Discipline

• Disclosure is necessary for market participants to assess the risk profile and capital adequacy of banks

• Proposals provide guidance on disclosure• Capital structure• Risk Exposure• Control Environment

• Self-discipline• “Bailing in” of private sector

Page 35: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Pros and Cons of Basel IIPros and Cons of Basel II

• Creates more risk-sensitive capital charges for credit risk and incl operational risk – benefits banks with large portfolios and high grade corporate credits.

• Criticisms of Basel II:– Growing gap between best practice and pillar 1– Banks operate in diverse environment cannot benefit– Capability to provide fair regulation that is not uniform– Differences btw regulatory constraint and RM– The coherence btw new regulation and new

accounting rules

Page 36: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Implementation of Basel

• To implement Basel II the banks require expensive projects with long lead times• Train staff• Gather historical loss data• Build risk models• Improve IT systems• Implement policies and procedures• One of their first steps is to ask “what will the

supervisors accept?” So, it is country specific

Page 37: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Implementation Challenges• Systems Changes: Many banks have recently revamped their

rating systems to be two-dimensional; others are preparing for this fundamental change. Most have little experience with this approach.

• Experts Versus Models: Commonly used expert-judgment based systems may be used, but may face a challenging hurdle in meeting supervisory standards.

• Rating Philosophy: Banks must more fully articulate their rating approach (not just “point-in-time” or “through-the-cycle”) and reflect that choice in other aspects of the rating system.

• Accuracy and Validation: Banks must work to develop appropriate tests of ratings accuracy; the exact nature will depend on details of each bank’s rating philosophy.

Page 38: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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IV. Link with Accting Standards IV. Link with Accting Standards

•Safety and Quality of Loans depends on sound generally accepted accounting practices consistently applied. Basle Committee has prepared a lit of sound practices. (Next Slide)

•Int’l Accting Standard Committee (IASC)/ IASB has been revising principles

Questions: •How many of these are applied in your country, in your institution, in your bank and by you?

•Has the accounting association in your country issued guidance? Are all IASC standards applied or only some?

•What are the risks of not having good accounting practices?

Page 39: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Good Accounting Practices

Foundations for Sound Accounting 1.A bank should adopt a sound system for

managing credit risk.2. Judgments by management relating to the

recognition and measurement of impairment should be made in accordance with documented policies and procedures that reflect such principles as consistency and prudence.

3.The selection and application of accounting policies and procedures should conform with fundamental accounting concepts.

Page 40: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Good Accounting Practices (Cont’d)ACCOUNTING FOR LOANSRecognition, discontinuing recognition and measurement4) A bank should recognize a loan, whether originated or purchased, in its

balance sheet when the bank becomes a party to the contractual provisions that comprise the loan.

5) A bank should remove a loan (or a portion of a loan) from its balance sheet when the bank realizes the rights to benefits specified in the contract, the rights expire or the bank surrenders or otherwise loses control of the contractual rights that comprise the loan (or a portion of the loan).

6) A bank should measure a loan, initially, at cost, which is the fair value of the consideration given for it.

Impairment - recognition and measurement7) A bank should identify and recognize impairment in a loan or a collectively

assessed group of loans when it is probable that the bank will not be able to collect, or there is no longer reasonable assurance that the bank will collect, all amounts due according to the contractual terms of the loan agreement. The impairment should be recognized by reducing the carrying amount of the loan(s) through an allowance or charge-off and charging the income statement in the period in which the impairment occurs.

8)A bank should measure an impaired loan at its estimated realizable value

Page 41: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Good Accounting Practices (Cont’d)Restructured troubled loans9) A bank should recognize a loan as a restructured troubled loan when the lender, for

economic or legal reasons related to the borrower’s financial difficulties, grants a concession to the borrower that it would not otherwise consider.

10) A bank should measure a restructured troubled loan by reducing its recorded investment to net realizable value, taking into account the cost of all concessions at the date of restructuring. The reduction in the recorded investment should be recorded as a charge to the income statement in the period in which the loan is restructured.

Adequacy of the overall allowance11) The aggregate amount of specific and general allowances should be adequate to

absorb estimated credit losses associated with the loan portfolio.

Income recognition12-13) A bank should recognize interest income on an unimpaired loan on an accrual

basis. [Shortened]

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

14-23) A bank should disclose information about the accounting policies and methods followed to account for loans and the allowance for impairment. (shortened)

Page 42: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Accounting Standards: IAS 39

• IAS 39 establishes principles for recognizing, measuring, and disclosing information about financial assets and financial liabilities.

• A good understanding of this standard is absolutely necessary for any loan officer. – If you know IAS 39 then you can ask the right

risk questions

Page 43: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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V. Best practices going beyond IIV. Best practices going beyond II

24 sound RM practices: G-30 report in 1993• Role of senior management• Marking derivatives to market on a daily basis• Measuring market risk • Performing stress simulations• Investing and funding forecast• Independent market risk mgmt• Measuring credit exposure• Independent credit risk mgmt function

Page 44: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Risk Management and Compliance Risk Management and Compliance Key Operational QuestionsKey Operational Questions• Who has the ownership of credit risk function and framework.?• What are the responsibilities for the management of credit-related work

groups? • Is there a credit portfolio group, credit modeling team, credit risk policy and

reporting teams? • The credit portfolio group --- Does it support the credit officer by

complementing a typically rather transaction-focused view with monitoring expected and unexpected losses of the credit book, reviewing provisions, etc?

• Who is responsible for compilation and risk reporting, including information on limit excesses, counterparty ratings, exposures, concentrations, etc.

• Who oversees supervision of credit data quality, process and delivery of all critical credit risk information to various stakeholders and the board?

• Who deals with external credit bodies such as rating agencies and regulators.

• Who has ownership of credit processes, including limit setting, provisioning, credit stress and scenario testing and calculating capital requirements.

• Is there benchmarking of performance of credit risk functions between business units?

Page 45: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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SummarySummary• Financial regulations are crucial to reduce systemic risk and

protect consumers. Recent examples during the financial market turmoil

• CRC affect your loan/pricing decision and your bottom-line• Compliance with Basel I as well as SSA approach• Implications for individual loans / credit products/contracts

• The principles of Basel II should be considered by EME: three pillars. Most country uses SSA approach

• Pros and cons of Basel II are discussed• Challenges of implementation are discussed• Established the Link between compliance with accounting

standards• A list of good accounting practices are provided• Countrywide Financial: what has failed? discussion

Page 46: 1 Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance Yan Wang, Ph.D. Senior Economist The World Bank ywang2@worldbank.org.

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Countrywide Financial (CFC)Countrywide Financial (CFC)

• Over-exposure to sub-prime mortgage instruments. Bought by BoA in Jan08 at $4bn


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