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Tar Babies (or Projects)Tar Babies (or Projects)

IEM5010 Summer 2003IEM5010 Summer 2003

Paul E. Rossler, Ph.D., P.E.Paul E. Rossler, Ph.D., P.E.

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Programmed to fail?Programmed to fail?

““If we have such well-trained project If we have such well-trained project managers and engineers, why do we still see managers and engineers, why do we still see so many failures or instances of failure…? so many failures or instances of failure…? The answer is truly simple. It is because no The answer is truly simple. It is because no class, seminar, or book can possible define the class, seminar, or book can possible define the thousands of variables that exist for any given thousands of variables that exist for any given project, at any given time.”project, at any given time.”

Source: Brown, et al., 2000, p. 5Source: Brown, et al., 2000, p. 5

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What factors contribute to project What factors contribute to project success?success?

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Why are some projects more Why are some projects more difficult than others?difficult than others?

PathPath

Known, Known, certaincertain

Unknown, Unknown, uncertainuncertain

Unclear, Unclear, conflictingconflicting

Clear, Clear, alignedaligned

GoalGoal

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AntiPatterns in Project AntiPatterns in Project ManagementManagement

Summary spreadsheetSummary spreadsheet

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Factors in 10 technology Factors in 10 technology disastersdisasters

• Specifications decided by technology-Specifications decided by technology-illiterate customerilliterate customer

• Less than honest communicationLess than honest communication

• Relying on guesswork; Ignoring scale Relying on guesswork; Ignoring scale effectseffects

• Cutting corners to cut costCutting corners to cut cost

• Lack of attention to detailLack of attention to detail

Reference Excel spreadsheet

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Factors (continued)Factors (continued)

• Mismatch between new technology and old Mismatch between new technology and old onesones

• Foregoing proven technologies for novel Foregoing proven technologies for novel onesones

• Over-reliance on technologyOver-reliance on technology

• "Normal" accidents inherent in system "Normal" accidents inherent in system designdesign

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Insights from a tender ship for Insights from a tender ship for new-product developmentnew-product development

• Lack of external learning capabilityLack of external learning capability– Don’t imitate ideas unless you fully understand Don’t imitate ideas unless you fully understand

themthem

• Goal confusionGoal confusion– Clarify and focus the project goal on essential Clarify and focus the project goal on essential

user needsuser needs

• Obsession with speedObsession with speed– Use fast-paced development as a means, not an Use fast-paced development as a means, not an

end, without being hasty end, without being hasty Source: E. H. Kessler, P. E. Bierly and S. Gopalakrishnan, "Vasa syndrome: Insights from a 17th-century new-product disaster," Academy of Management Executive, volume 15, 3 2001, pp. 80-91.

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• Feedback system failureFeedback system failure– Keep an open mind and foster flexible problem Keep an open mind and foster flexible problem

solvingsolving

• Communication barriersCommunication barriers– Facilitate vertical- and horizontal-information Facilitate vertical- and horizontal-information

flows. Share and integrate knowledgeflows. Share and integrate knowledge

• Poor organizational memoryPoor organizational memory– Document and catalog areas of expertise. Document and catalog areas of expertise.

Create a knowledge bankCreate a knowledge bank

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• Top-management meddlingTop-management meddling– Don’t micromanage projects. Set objectives at Don’t micromanage projects. Set objectives at

the top levels and give teams the resources and the top levels and give teams the resources and autonomy to achieve themautonomy to achieve them

What makes some development What makes some development efforts succeed?efforts succeed?

Form Cross-Functional

Teams

Integration ofDiverse Skills

Based on Jassawalla, A.R. and H.C. Sashittal, Building collaborative cross-functional product teams. Academy of Management Executive, 1999. 13(3): p. 50-63.

Willingness toCooperate

Access to Informationand Resources

Top Management’sTolerance for Delays

and Failures

Level of Interpersonal Trust

Comfort LevelWith Changes

Team LeadershipCulture

Propensity to Experiment and Adapt

12Source: T. K. Abdel-Hamid and S. E. Madnick, "The elusive silver lining: How we fail to Source: T. K. Abdel-Hamid and S. E. Madnick, "The elusive silver lining: How we fail to learn from software development failures," learn from software development failures," Sloan Management ReviewSloan Management Review, Fall 1990, pp. 39-48., Fall 1990, pp. 39-48.

13A. Rodrigues and J. Bowers, "The role of system dynamics in project management," A. Rodrigues and J. Bowers, "The role of system dynamics in project management," International Journal of Project Management, volume 14, 4 1996, pp. 213-220.International Journal of Project Management, volume 14, 4 1996, pp. 213-220.

14A. Rodrigues and J. Bowers, 1996A. Rodrigues and J. Bowers, 1996

15A. Rodrigues and J. Bowers, 1996A. Rodrigues and J. Bowers, 1996

16Source: Rodrigues A. and Williams T, Source: Rodrigues A. and Williams T, http://www.managementscience.org/research/ab9606.asphttp://www.managementscience.org/research/ab9606.asp

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Why some projects fly and others Why some projects fly and others crash and burncrash and burn

DimensionsDimensions R100R100 R101R101

Competent technical Competent technical leadershipleadership

xx

Appropriate staffingAppropriate staffing xx

Use of appropriate Use of appropriate technologytechnology

xx

Reasonable expectationsReasonable expectations xx

Honesty toward engineered Honesty toward engineered objectobject

xx

Based on Squires, 1986Based on Squires, 1986

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Squires thinks that hierarchical Squires thinks that hierarchical structures cause problemsstructures cause problems

A. Squires, The tender ship: Governmental management of technological change A. Squires, The tender ship: Governmental management of technological change (Boston: Birkhauser, 1986).(Boston: Birkhauser, 1986).

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He also thinks that maestros of He also thinks that maestros of technology are key to successtechnology are key to success

• Possess great technical and managerial Possess great technical and managerial skillsskills– Didn’t rush into management but served Didn’t rush into management but served

apprenticeships that provided tests of competenceapprenticeships that provided tests of competence

– Focus on improvement rather than innovationFocus on improvement rather than innovation

– Aren’t seduced by gadgets or new technologyAren’t seduced by gadgets or new technology

• Understand Watson-Watts Law of Third Understand Watson-Watts Law of Third BestBest

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Maestros of technology Maestros of technology (continued)(continued)

• Show tremendous loyalty to the project’s Show tremendous loyalty to the project’s objectivesobjectives

• WorkaholicsWorkaholics

• Get around; know what’s happeningGet around; know what’s happening

• Aren’t concerned about positionAren’t concerned about position

• Help others become maestrosHelp others become maestros

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Complex projects require a great Complex projects require a great many maestros and…many maestros and…

• A great leader who ensures they cooperate A great leader who ensures they cooperate and who sorts things out when they don’tand who sorts things out when they don’t

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Key variables cited by SquiresKey variables cited by Squires

• Project DirectionProject Direction

• Technical LeadershipTechnical Leadership

• StaffingStaffing

• Management StructureManagement Structure

• Organizational StructureOrganizational Structure

• Key StagesKey Stages

• Project ManagementProject Management

• CultureCulture

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Key concepts throughout bookKey concepts throughout book

• Maestro of technologyMaestro of technology

• Probity (adherence to the highest principles Probity (adherence to the highest principles and ideas)and ideas)

• Flexibly extensive organizationFlexibly extensive organization

• The oxcart and the ditchThe oxcart and the ditch

• DeadlinesDeadlines

• Watson-Watts LawWatson-Watts Law

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Watson-WattsWatson-WattsLaw of Third BestLaw of Third Best

Best never comes.Best never comes.

Second best takes too long or costs too much.Second best takes too long or costs too much.

Pick the third best and get on with it.Pick the third best and get on with it.

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Key concepts (continued)Key concepts (continued)

• Apprenticeships and the rush to Apprenticeships and the rush to managementmanagement

• Focus on improvement versus innovationFocus on improvement versus innovation

• Euphoria of gadgets (“suckers for the gold Euphoria of gadgets (“suckers for the gold brick”)brick”)– Prejudice against the “old way”Prejudice against the “old way”

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Key concepts (continued)Key concepts (continued)

• Recognizing expertiseRecognizing expertise

• Flexibility of thought (and comfort with Flexibility of thought (and comfort with errorserrors

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Harvey provides a fundamental Harvey provides a fundamental insight to project difficultiesinsight to project difficulties

““The inability to manage agreement - not the The inability to manage agreement - not the inability to manage conflict - is the essential inability to manage conflict - is the essential symptom that defines organizations caught in symptom that defines organizations caught in the web of the Abilene Paradox.”the web of the Abilene Paradox.”

Source: J. B. Harvey, Source: J. B. Harvey, The Abilene Paradox and other meditations on The Abilene Paradox and other meditations on managementmanagement (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988). (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988).

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The Abilene ParadoxThe Abilene Paradox

““Organizations frequently take actions in Organizations frequently take actions in contradiction to the data they have for dealing contradiction to the data they have for dealing with problems and, as a result, compound with problems and, as a result, compound their problems rather than solving them.”their problems rather than solving them.”

Source: J. B. Harvey, Source: J. B. Harvey, The Abilene Paradox and other meditations on The Abilene Paradox and other meditations on managementmanagement (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988). (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988).

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Some underlying causes of the Some underlying causes of the paradoxparadox

(1)(1) Action anxietyAction anxiety

(2)(2) Negative fantasiesNegative fantasies

(3)(3) Real riskReal risk

(4)(4) Separation anxietySeparation anxiety

(5)(5) Psychological reversal of riskPsychological reversal of risk

Source: J. B. HarveySource: J. B. Harvey

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Is there a solution?Is there a solution?

““Most individuals like quick, ‘clean,’ ‘no-Most individuals like quick, ‘clean,’ ‘no-risk’ solutions to organizational problems. risk’ solutions to organizational problems. Furthermore, they tend to prefer solutions Furthermore, they tend to prefer solutions based on mechanics and technology, rather based on mechanics and technology, rather than on attitudes of "being." Unfortunately, than on attitudes of "being." Unfortunately, the underlying reality of the paradox makes it the underlying reality of the paradox makes it impossible to provide either no-risk solutions impossible to provide either no-risk solutions or action technologies that are divorced from or action technologies that are divorced from existential attitudes and realities.”existential attitudes and realities.”Source: J. B. HarveySource: J. B. Harvey