1 TINA TRAN DANG, as Personal Representative of the Estate of HIEN THI TRAN, Plaintiff, v

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TINA TRAN DANG, as Personal Representative of the Estate of HIEN THI TRAN, Plaintiff, v. HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., a foreign corporation, HONDA R & D CO., LTD., a foreign corporation, AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a foreign corporation, HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC., a foreign corporation, TAKATA CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, TAKATA, INC., a foreign corporation, TK HOLDINGS INC., a foreign corporation, Defendants. /

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 9TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO.:

COMPLAINT

The Plaintiff, TINA TRAN DANG, as Personal Representative of the Estate of HIEN

THI TRAN, sues the Defendants, HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., HONDA R & D CO.,

LTD., AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC.,

TAKATA CORPORATION, TAKATA, INC., and TK HOLDINGS INC., and states:

INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS

1. This is an action for damages against Defendants in excess of Fifteen Thousand

Dollars ($15,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

2. At all times material hereto, Decedent, HIEN THI TRAN was a resident of

Orlando, Orange County, Florida.

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3. TINA TRAN DANG has been appointed the Personal Representative of the

Estate of HIEN THI TRAN. The Letter of Administration duly appointing TINA TRAN DANG

as the Personal Representative to act for the benefit of all potential beneficiaries is attached

hereto as Exhibit “A”.

4. All potential beneficiaries to a recovery for wrongful death of HIEN THI TRAN,

and their relationship to the deceased, are as follows:

a) The Estate of HIEN THI TRAN, c/o Tina Tran Dang, as Personal Representative of the Estate;

b) TINA TRAN DANG, the sister of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN;

c) PHI NGOC TRAN, the brother of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN;

d) TUAN NGOC TRAN, the brother of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN;

e) PHU NGOC TRAN; the brother of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN;

f) THUY THI TRAN; the sister of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN;

g) THANH THI TRAN; the sister of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN;

h) LOAN THI TRAN; the sister of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN; and

i) TRAN VIET HUNG; the brother of the decedent, HIEN THI TRAN.

5. The above referenced survivors and potential beneficiaries to a recovery for the

wrongful death of HIEN THI TRAN (hereinafter “TRAN”), are all blood relatives and siblings

of TRAN who were partly dependent upon same, and whom in their respective individual

capacities received support and services, including, but not limited to, tasks, usually of a

household nature, regularly performed by the decedent that will be a necessary expense to such

survivors of the decedent. TRAN was unmarried and had no lineal or adopted children. TRAN’s

parents are deceased. TRAN was fifty-one (51) at the time of her death.

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6. The Defendants, HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD., HONDA R & D CO., LTD,

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC., TAKATA

CORPORATION, TAKATA, INC., and TK HOLDINGS INC., are all directly responsible for

the wrongful death of TRAN that was caused by the explosion of the inflator incorporated into

the airbag safety system (herein referred to as “airbag safety system”, “Airbag Safety System”,

“airbag system”, “safety system”, or “airbag”) in the 2001 Honda Accord, VIN #

1HGCG165X1A005057, she owned (herein referred to as “her vehicle” or “Subject Vehicle”) on

September 29, 2014 that sent metal fragments of the airbag safety system’s inflator itself through

the airbag cushion striking TRAN causing fatal injuries that resulted in her ultimate death on

October 2, 2014.

7. Defendant HONDA MOTOR CO. LTD. (“HMC”) is a foreign for-profit corporation with

its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan. HMC designs, develops, manufactures,

assembles, tests, markets, promotes, advertises, distributes and sells motorcycles, automobiles,

and power products through its related subsidiaries and/or operating units, including HONDA R

& D CO., LTD., AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. and HONDA OF AMERICA,

MFG., INC., independent retail dealers, outlets, and authorized dealerships primarily in Japan,

North America, Europe, and Asia, including the Subject Vehicle. HMC has been directly

involved in the safety investigation and determinations made as to the motor vehicle safety issues

arising from the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of certain Honda brand vehicles

it designs, manufactures and distributes for sale to the consuming public, including the Subject

Vehicle. HMC has actively been involved in the developing knowledge of this motor vehicle

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safety issue by Honda entities over the last decade, and the actions and/or inactions of same

relating to this public safety hazard.

8. Defendant HONDA R & D CO., LTD. (“HRD”) is a foreign for-profit corporation with

its principal place of business in Waco, Japan. HRD, is a subsidiary of HMC, and working in

conjunction with HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD., AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. and

HONDA OF AMERICA, MFG., INC., is responsible for the research, design and development

of certain aspects of Honda brand vehicles, including testing and developing safety technologies

for same, and was responsible for the design, development, manufacture, assembly, testing,

distribution and sale of Honda brand vehicles utilizing Takata airbags primarily in Japan, North

America, Europe, and Asia, including the Subject Vehicle. HRD has been involved in the safety

investigation and determinations made as to the motor vehicle safety issues arising from the

defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of certain Honda brand vehicles it designs,

manufactures and distributes for sale to the consuming public, including the Subject Vehicle.

HRD has actively been involved in the developing knowledge of this motor vehicle safety issue

by Honda entities over the last decade, and the actions and/or inactions of same relating to this

public safety hazard.

9. Defendant AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. (“AHM”) is a California

corporation, with its headquarters in Torrance, California, that designs, manufactures, assembles,

tests, markets, promotes, advertises, distributes and sells HMC and/or Honda brand cars, trucks,

and sport utility vehicles in the United States, including the Subject Vehicle. AHM has been

identified by HMC as the “Manufacturer’s Agent” in its NHTSA communications related to this

motor vehicle safety issue involving exploding Takata airbags in Honda brand vehicles, and

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AHM has been directly involved in the safety investigation and determinations made as to the

motor vehicle safety issues arising from the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of

certain Honda brand vehicles it makes, including the Subject Vehicle. Additionally, AHM is

responsible for the distribution of such Honda brand vehicles in the United States, Puerto Rico

and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Moreover, AHM has actively been involved in the developing

knowledge of this motor vehicle safety issue by Honda entities over the last decade, and the

actions and/or inactions of same relating to this public safety hazard. Finally, to the extent the

United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”) by and through the Secretary of

Transportation has delegated authority to the Chief Counsel of the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (hereinafter “NHTSA”) by a “Special Order” dated November 5, 2014, to

investigate this safety issue, it is AHM who has been ordered to provide responses to “demands

[for] certain information and documents” provided and “signed under oath” no later than

“December 15, 2014”, as to its newly initiated “PE14-016 Air Bag Inflator Rupture”

investigation. See, Special Order Directed to American Honda Motor Co., Inc., dated November

5, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “B”.

10. Defendant HONDA OF AMERICA, MFG., INC. (“HAM”) is an Ohio

corporation, with its principal place of business in Marysville, Ohio, that designs, manufactures,

assembles, tests, markets, promotes, advertises, distributes and sells HMC and/or Honda brand

cars, trucks, and sport utility vehicles in the United States, including the Subject Vehicle. HAM

has been directly involved in the safety investigation and determinations made as to the motor

vehicle safety issues arising from the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of certain

Honda brand vehicles it makes, including the Subject Vehicle. Moreover, HAM has actively

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been involved in the developing knowledge of this motor vehicle safety issue by Honda entities

over the last decade, and the actions and/or inactions of same relating to this public safety

hazard.

11. Defendants HMC, HRD, AHM, and HAM are collectively referred to as “Honda”

or “Honda entities” or “Honda Defendants” herein.

12. Defendant TAKATA CORPORATION (‘TAKATA”) is a foreign for-profit

corporation with its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan. Takata is a specialized supplier

of automotive safety systems, that designs, manufactures, assembles, tests, markets, distributes,

and sells vehicle restraint systems to various Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEM’s”),

including Honda, in the United States and abroad, including specifically the airbag incorporated

and used by Honda in its supplemental airbag safety system in the Subject Vehicle. Takata is a

vertically-integrated company and manufactures component parts in its own facilities, and, then,

distributes same.

13. Defendant TAKATA, INC. (“TAKATA, INC.”) is a Delaware corporation and

subsidiary and/or operational unit of TAKATA. TAKATA INC. is in the business of designing,

manufacturing, assembling, testing, promoting, advertising, distributing and selling vehicle

restraint systems to various OEM’s, including Honda, including specifically the airbag

incorporated and used by Honda in its supplemental airbag safety system in the Subject Vehicle.

Takata is a vertically-integrated company and manufactures component parts in its own facilities,

and, then, distributes same.

14. Defendant TK HOLDINGS INC. (“TK HOLDINGS”) is a Delaware corporation

and subsidiary and/or operational unit of TAKATA. TK HOLDINGS, with its headquarters in

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Auburn Hills, Michigan, is in the business of designing, manufacturing, assembling, testing,

promoting, advertising, distributing and selling vehicle restraint systems to various OEM’s,

including Honda, including the airbag incorporated and used by Honda in its supplemental airbag

safety system in the Subject Vehicle. Additionally, TK HOLDINGS has also been identified in

various materials as manufacturing the “inflators” in the airbags which are rupturing or

exploding sending metal fragments or shrapnel into vehicle users, and the “propellant” or

explosive charge used within the inflator itself. TK Holdings also is involved in the distribution

of such airbag systems to OEM’s, including Honda. Moreover, to the extent the United States

Department of Transportation (“DOT”) by and through the Secretary of Transportation has

delegated authority to the Chief Counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(hereinafter “NHTSA”) by a “Special Order” dated October 30, 2014, to investigate this safety

issue, it is TK HOLDINGS who has been ordered to provide responses to “demands [for] certain

information and documents” provided and “signed under oath” no later than “December 1,

2014”, as to its newly initiated “PE14-016 Air Bag Inflator Rupture” investigation. See, Special

Order Directed to TK Holdings, Inc., dated October 30, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”.

15. TAKATA, TAKATA INC., and TK HOLDINGS are collectively referred to as

“Takata”, “Takata entities” or “Takata Defendants” herein.

16. Honda vehicles sold in the United States and abroad contain airbags designed and

manufactured by Takata in its own manufacturing facilities, who, then, also distributes same for

incorporation and use in Honda’s “Honda” and “Acura” brand vehicles as designed,

manufactured, assembled, marketed, promoted, advertised, distributed and sold by Honda in the

United States and abroad, including, specifically, the airbag that ruptured or exploded in the

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Subject Vehicle, a 2001 Honda Accord, causing the fatal injuries that directly led to the wrongful

death of TRAN that is the subject of this Complaint.

17. Defendant, HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD. (“HMC”), is a foreign

corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan with its principal place of business at

1-1, 2-chome, Minami-Aoyama, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-8556, Japan. HMC may be served by

and through the Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, and President of HMC under

Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention consistent with Florida law. In addition, HMC

may be served through Japan’s central authority pursuant to Article 5 of the Hague Convention

by APS International, Ltd., or similar entities. HMC conducts business in the State of Florida,

and regularly causes its products to be sold in Florida, specifically, Orange County.

18. The Defendant, HMC, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court

by doing, personally or through its agents, at all times material to this cause of action, the

following acts:

a) Committing a tortious act within this state by selling and delivering defective vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; b) Conducting and engaging in substantial business and other activities in Florida by selling and servicing Honda vehicles and component parts to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, wholesalers, dealers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; c) Causing injury to persons in Florida, including TRAN. At or about the time of said fatal injuries, the Defendant engaged in solicitation activities in Florida to purposefully promote the sale, consumption, and use of Honda vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject

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of this Complaint; and d) Selling Honda vehicles and component parts, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, with knowledge or reason to foresee that their Honda vehicles would be shipped in interstate commerce and would reach the market of Florida users or consumers.

19. Defendant, HONDA R & D CO., LTD. (“HRD”), is a foreign corporation

organized and existing under the laws of Japan with its principal place of business at Wako

Research Center, 1-4-1 Chuo, Wako 351-0-113, Japan. HRD may be served by and through the

Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, and President of HRD under Article 10(a) of

the Hague Service Convention consistent with Florida law. In addition, HRD may be served

through Japan’s central authority pursuant to Article 5 of the Hague Convention by APS

International, Ltd., or similar entities. HRD conducts business in the State of Florida, and

regularly causes its products to be sold in Florida, specifically, Orange County.

20. The Defendant, HRD, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court


following acts:

a) Committing a tortious act within this state by selling and delivering defective vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; b) Conducting and engaging in substantial business and other activities in Florida by selling and servicing Honda vehicles and component parts to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, wholesalers, dealers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade;

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c) Causing injury to persons in Florida, including TRAN. At or about the time of said fatal injuries, the Defendant engaged in solicitation activities in Florida to purposefully promote the sale, consumption, and use of Honda vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint; and d) Selling Honda vehicles and component parts, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, with knowledge or reason to foresee that their Honda vehicles would be shipped in interstate commerce and would reach the market of Florida users or consumers.

21. Defendant, AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. (“AHM”), is a California

Corporation authorized to conduct business in the State of Florida, and regularly causes its

products to be sold in Florida, specifically, Orange County.

22. The Defendant, AHM, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court


following acts:

a) Committing a tortious act within this state by selling and delivering defective vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; b) Conducting and engaging in substantial business and other activities in Florida by selling and servicing Honda vehicles and component parts to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, wholesalers, dealers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; c) Causing injury to persons in Florida, including TRAN. At or about the time of said fatal injuries, the Defendant engaged in solicitation activities in Florida to purposefully promote the sale, consumption, and use of Honda vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint; d) Selling Honda vehicles and component parts, including the Subject

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Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, with knowledge or reason to foresee that their Honda vehicles would be shipped in interstate commerce and would reach the market of Florida users or consumers; and e) Voluntarily qualifying to conduct business in this state by registering with the Florida Department of State and designating a resident agent for service of process in Florida at all times material to this action.

23. Defendant, HONDA OF AMERICA MFG., INC. (“HAM”), is an Ohio



24. The Defendant, HAM, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court


following acts:

a) Committing a tortious act within this state by selling and delivering defective vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; b) Conducting and engaging in substantial business and other activities in Florida by selling and servicing Honda vehicles and component parts to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, wholesalers, dealers, and brokers. Such Honda vehicles were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; c) Causing injury to persons in Florida, including TRAN. At or about the time of said fatal injuries, the Defendant engaged in solicitation activities in Florida to purposefully promote the sale, consumption, and use of Honda vehicles, including the subject Honda vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint; and d) Selling Honda vehicles and component parts, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, with knowledge or reason to foresee that their Honda vehicles would be shipped in interstate commerce and would reach the market of Florida users or consumers.

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25. Defendant, TAKATA CORPORATION (“TAKATA”), is a foreign corporation

organized and existing under the laws of Japan with its principal place of business at Shigeshisa

Takada, 12-31 Akasaka 2-Chome, Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan. TAKATA may be served by and

through the Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, and President of TAKATA under

Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention consistent with Florida law. In addition,

TAKATA may be served through Japan’s central authority pursuant to Article 5 of the Hague

Convention by APS International, Ltd., or similar entities. TAKATA conducts business in the

State of Florida, and regularly causes its products to be sold in Florida, specifically, Orange

County.

26. The Defendant, TAKATA, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court by doing, personally or through its agents, at all times material to this cause of action, the

following acts:

a) Committing a tortious act within this state by selling and delivering defective vehicles and/or component parts, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers. Such products were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; b) Conducting and engaging in substantial business and other activities in Florida by selling and delivering defective products, including the subject airbag system, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, wholesalers, dealers, and brokers. Such products were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; c) Causing injury to persons in Florida, including TRAN. At or about the time said fatal injuries occurred, Defendant engaged in solicitation activities in Florida to promote the sale, consumption, and use of its products and such products were consumed within Florida in the ordinary course of commerce, and Defendant was engaged in substantial and not

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isolated activity within this state; and d) Selling and delivering defective products to persons, firms, and corporations via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers, with knowledge or reason to foresee that they would be shipped in interstate commerce and would reach the market of Florida users and consumers.

27. Defendant, TAKATA, INC. (“TAKATA INC.”), is a Delaware Corporation

authorized to conduct business in the State of Florida, and regularly causes its products to be sold

in Florida, specifically, Orange County.

28. The Defendant, TAKATA INC., submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court by doing, personally or through its agents, at all times material to this cause of

action, the following acts:

a) Committing a tortious act within this state by selling and delivering defective vehicles and/or component parts, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers. Such products were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; b) Conducting and engaging in substantial business and other activities in Florida by selling and delivering defective products, including the subject airbag system, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, wholesalers, dealers, and brokers. Such products were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; c) Causing injury to persons in Florida, including TRAN. At or about the time said injuries occurred, Defendant engaged in solicitation activities in Florida to promote the sale, consumption, and use of its products and such products were consumed within Florida in the ordinary course of commerce, and Defendant was engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state; and d) Selling and delivering defective products to persons, firms, and corporations via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers, with

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knowledge or reason to foresee that they would be shipped in interstate commerce and would reach the market of Florida users and consumers.

29. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS INC. (“TK HOLDINGS”), is a Delaware



30. The Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court by doing, personally or through its agents, at all times material to this cause of

action, the following acts:

a) Committing a tortious act within this state by selling and delivering defective vehicles and/or component parts, including the Subject Vehicle which is the subject of this Complaint, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers. Such products were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; b) Conducting and engaging in substantial business and other activities in Florida by selling and delivering defective products, including the subject airbag system, to persons, firms, or corporations in this state via its distributors, wholesalers, dealers, and brokers. Such products were used by consumers in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce and trade; c) Causing injury to persons in Florida, including TRAN. At or about the time said injuries occurred, Defendant engaged in solicitation activities in Florida to promote the sale, consumption, and use of its products and such products were consumed within Florida in the ordinary course of commerce, and Defendant was engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state; d) Selling and delivering defective products to persons, firms, and corporations via its distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and brokers, with knowledge or reason to foresee that they would be shipped in interstate commerce and would reach the market of Florida users and consumers; and

e) Voluntarily qualifying to conduct business in this state by

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registering with the Florida Department of State and designating a resident agent for service of process in Florida at all times material to this action.

THE SUBJECT ACCIDENT

31. On September 29, 2014, TRAN was driving her vehicle, a 2001 Honda Accord,

VIN # 1HGCG165X1A005057, when she was involved in a moderate automobile accident at the

intersection of Valencia College Lane and Chickasaw Trail, in Orange County, Florida, as she

was making a left hand turn. See, Florida Highway Patrol diagram attached as Exhibit “D”.

While properly restrained by the Subject Vehicle’s shoulder and lap belt, TRAN made such turn

with the green light, and her vehicle was struck in the front by an oncoming motorist, triggering

the deployment of her 2001 Accord’s airbag safety system which was designed and

manufactured for use in her vehicle to provide protection from injuries in such foreseeable type

crashes. See, Id. However, instead of providing such protection as intended, the airbag system

failed, with the inflator of the airbag safety system rupturing and exploding upon receiving a

signal to deploy the airbag in this crash shooting metal fragments of the airbag safety system

itself through TRAN’s vehicle, such metal fragments or shrapnel striking her in the face, neck

and upper chest causing fatal injuries that resulted in her ultimate death three (3) days later on

October 2, 2014.

32. The accident involving TRAN was initially investigated by the Orange County

Sheriff’s Office (“Orange County”) as a homicide based upon the “stab like” wounds to TRAN’s

face, neck and upper body. In fact, as law enforcement worked diligently to identify the

circumstances surrounding the potential stabbing incident leading to TRAN being in a suspected

post-stabbing automobile accident as she may have fled an assailant, Orange County pursued

various leads and even identified a possible ”person-of-interest”. However, as the investigation

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continued, and with the Medical Examiner’s Office becoming involved after October 2, 2014,

when TRAN passed away three (3) days post-accident, the discovery that her fatal injuries were

caused by an exploding airbag in her 2001 Honda Accord was made. Orange County then closed

its investigative efforts, pending an investigation by the Florida Highway Patrol (“FHP”) who is

charged with investigating vehicular deaths in Florida like that involving TRAN. To date, the

final reports of Orange County, the Medical Examiner’s Office and FHP have not been released,

but, an examination by FHP of the Takata airbag safety system from the Subject Vehicle with the

assistance of NHTSA has confirmed that the inflator ruptured sending metal fragments from the

inflator itself through the airbag cushion. See, Photographs taken November 11, 2014 at the

FHP Investigative Inspection with NHTSA showing the ruptured inflator, a metal fragment

found, and the airbag cushion with documented exit holes from metal fragments, attached hereto

as Exhibit “E”.

33. Throughout this time, the family of TRAN was forced to live with the wide range

of emotions, questions, doubts, stress and trauma that accompanied not knowing or

understanding why TRAN was fatally killed. Now, as more and more is learned every day about

Honda and Takata, and their knowledge about the dangers posed by exploding Takata airbags

like that which killed TRAN, the family of TRAN must confront, process and come to grips with

the apparent wanton disregard for human life of Honda and Takata as demonstrated by their

actions and inactions leading to a death that was avoidable and unnecessary.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

34. When looking at the publically available historical record and continually

developing facts, as are plead with specificity herein, surrounding the public safety hazard posed

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by unreasonably dangerous and defective exploding Takata airbags in Honda brand vehicles, like

the airbag that ruptured and exploded in the 2001 Honda Accord that was being driven by TRAN

on September 29, 2014, causing her fatal injuries, a pattern of conscious disregard for the safety

of the consuming public, including, specifically, Honda brand vehicle owners like TRAN, is

seen.

35. The knowing and intentional decisions to voluntarily act or not act to notify the

public and/or voluntarily recall these unreasonably dangerous and defective vehicles with Takata

airbags, to disclose information or conceal it with respect to Other Similar Incidents (“OSIs”)

involving these defective airbags, or to comply with federal law or violate it by not timely and

appropriately reporting information known of with respect to other serious injuries and deaths

caused by such airbags to NHTSA, all reflect a series of historical corporate decisions by both

the Honda Defendants and Takata Defendants, and their upper management, to knowingly and

actively conceal and/or misrepresent to the public, NHTSA and persons like TRAN, who owned

a 2001 Honda Accord with an incorporated Takata airbag, the nature, scope and risks posed by

these airbags of which they knew or should have known. Such conduct, and their failure to act

or warn of same in a reasonable and responsible way over the years naturally and in a continuous

sequence, directly caused and contributed to the death of TRAN.

Takata and its Manufacture of Airbag Systems and Inflators

36. The Takata Defendants were responsible for the design, manufacture, assembly,

testing, marketing, promotion, advertising, distribution and sale of the Takata airbag safety

system that was incorporated into the Subject Vehicle by the Honda Defendants, who designed,

manufactured, assembled, tested, marketed, promoted, advertised, distributed and sold same.

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37. The Takata Defendants are reported as being the world’s second largest maker of

automotive safety devices, including airbags. Takata was a pioneer in developing driver side

airbags, being the first to market driver side airbags in the early 1980s.

38. Takata has supplied airbags to U.S. consumers and to state and local

governmental purchasers since at least 1983, and, as of 2007, it is reported that airbag safety

systems making up approximately 37.3% of Takata’s automotive safety products business.

39. Takata also designs, develops, tests and builds in-house other safety technologies,

including cushions, inflators, and propellants utilized in same, which are all components of

Takata-manufactured airbag safety systems.

40. Airbags are a normal part of a vehicle’s supplemental occupant restraint safety

system. When an accident occurs, airbags inflate faster than the blink of an eye. Airbags are key

components in almost all automotive safety systems, and, although consumers cannot see them

perform under normal conditions with the naked eye, they soften the impact of collisions by

keeping passengers from contacting the steering wheel, dashboard, front glass, and other parts of

the automobile. Operators and passengers of a motor vehicle with airbags rely on the

manufacturers of such safety systems, and the vehicle it is incorporated into, to ensure the

airbags and vehicle are safe to use. Airbags have been one of the central safety features of any

motor vehicle made since 2000, like the 2001 Honda Accord owned by TRAN.

41. The Subject Vehicle, like potentially millions of similar vehicles that remain in

use on American roadways today, contains an airbag which was designed, manufactured,

assembled, tested, promoted, advertised, distributed and sold by the Takata Defendants to

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various original equipment manufacturers (“OEM’s”), including Honda, to be incorporated and

used as a supplemental safety restraint system.

41. However, as designed, made and distributed, the Takata airbags, instead of

protecting vehicle occupants from bodily injury during foreseeable accidents, violently rupture

and explode sending potentially lethal metal fragments through the airbag cushion and into

vehicle occupants who were meant to benefit from the supplemental protective benefits of what

is intended to be a safety device.

42. The airbags at issue in this case were developed by Takata in the late 1990’s in an

effort to make airbags more compact and to reduce the toxic fumes that earlier airbag models

emitted when deployed. The redesigned airbags are inflated by means of a “propellant”, or

explosive charge. With respect to Takata, such propellant has historically used “ammonium

nitrate” as a primary compound. That “propellant” or explosive is encased in a metal canister,

the “inflator”.

43. As can be seen from the below illustrative diagram, “propellant” is encased within

the airbag’s “inflator”. During assembly, the airbag inflator is inserted into the steering wheel

housing or module where the “airbag cushion” is held. In an accident the propellant is ignited in

the inflator to create rapidly expanding gases which serve to “deploy” the airbag itself when an

airbag is deemed necessary to provide supplement occupant protection in foreseeable frontal

crashes.

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44. The two Takata plants that manufacture airbags like that used in TRAN’s 2001

Honda Accord are Moses Lake, Washington, and Monclova, Mexico. These plants manufacture

propellant, airbag inflators, and modules as used in such airbag safety systems. Based upon

identifying marks on the airbag from the Subject Vehicle, it is believed that the propellant was

made in Moses Lake, Washington, and the inflator and module were made in Monclova, Mexico

in August, 2000. See, Photograph of Subject Vehicle airbag markings “HONDA 000 8414, 09 08

00, ‘S’ Assembled in Mexico with U.S.A. Components”, taken November 11, 2014, attached

hereto as Exhibit “F”. Additionally, Takata has distribution centers located within the United

States, with the main Distribution Center being located in Texas to facilitate the transportation

and distribution of its products.

45. Airbags manufactured by Takata, including the airbag at issue in this case, have

been installed in vehicles manufactured by at least ten different automakers, including Honda.

46. Takata has long promoted itself as a maker of “quality” airbag safety systems, and

has claimed to prioritize driver safety as its “dream.”

47. Based on that “dream,” they claimed to be “motivated by the preciousness of life”

and pledged to both “communicate openly and effectively.” The Takata Defendants have failed

to live up to this dream by designing, manufacturing, assembling, distributing, and selling

airbags that can cause serious bodily injury or death when they explode sending deadly shrapnel

into vehicle occupants, while, also, actively concealing and failing to communicate what was

known by them of these dangerous airbags over the past decade.

Honda and Takata Defendants Historical Knowledge of Safety Problem and Violations of Federal Law

22

48. The Honda and Takata Defendants have had actual knowledge of the nature,

scope and risks posed by the unreasonably dangerous and defective Takata airbags over the past

decade, with Honda and Takata having actual knowledge of an exploding Takata airbag incident

in 2004.

49. According to Honda, “[t]he first known rupture of a Takata airbag occurred in

Alabama” in 2004 and involved a 2002 Honda Accord, the same model vehicle as the Subject

Vehicle. See, The New York Times article entitled “Takata Saw and Hid Risks in Airbags in

2004, Former Workers Say”, dated November 6, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “G”.

50. With respect to the Takata Defendants, not only were they aware of the exploding

Takata airbag incident in Alabama in 2004, but, did a series of “secret tests” after it occurred to

look at why it happened. See, Id. As reported by The New York Times, “two former employees”

of Takata, “one of whom was a senior member of its testing lab”, “secretly conducted testing on

50 airbags it retrieved from scrapyards” after a Takata airbag “ruptured and spewed metal debris

at a driver in Alabama” in 2004. See, Id. During the secret tests “[t]he steel inflators in two of the

airbags cracked…, a condition that can lead to a rupture, the former employees said.” See, Id.

According to the article, the Takata employees were startled by the results, and “engineers began

designing possible fixes in preparation for a recall”. See, Id. “But instead of alerting federal

safety regulators to the possible danger, Takata executives discounted the results and ordered the

lab technicians to delete the testing data from their computers and dispose of the airbag inflators

in the trash”. See, Id. (emphasis added). “The secret tests, which have not been previously

disclosed, were performed after normal work hours and on weekends and holidays during

summer 2004 at Takata’s American headquarters in Auburn Hills, MI, the former employees

23

said”, and, “were supervised by Al Bernat, then Takata’s vice president for engineering”. See, Id.

(emphasis added).

51. Not much else is publically known of this 2004 Alabama incident, as “Takata and

Honda have declined to disclose further details of that accident, which ended in a settlement

between the automaker and driver, according to Honda.” See, Id. But, obviously, it is undisputed

that the danger of exploding Takata airbags in Honda brand vehicles has been known to Honda

and Takata for a decade.

52. Since 2004, both Honda and Takata have had a growing and continuing

awareness of consumer complaints, claims, and lawsuits that has provided them with knowledge

of the safety dangers of Takata airbags used by Honda.

53. Such knowledge, however, has been closely held amongst and between Honda

and Takata, while incident after incident occurred.

54. Honda, as an OEM who uses Takata airbags, and Takata, as a supplier of such

airbag systems, have contractual agreements that apply to their business dealings and the

purchase and use of such airbags in Honda brand vehicles. As is relevant to the claims and

settlements that have been entered into by Honda relating to exploding Takata airbags in Honda

brand vehicles, like the Alabama incident in 2004, an “indemnity” agreement exists that provides

that Takata reimburse, pay or otherwise compensate Honda for the financial impacts of settling

property, personal injury or wrongful death claims and/or lawsuits. Such agreements are just one

way Takata would obtain information of incidents involving Honda brand vehicles, and, by

which Honda would gain information from Takata over time.

24

55. Additionally, while working in concert and sharing information, Honda and

Takata have systematically implemented a strategy to “generally settle quickly” claims and/or

lawsuits alleging that an exploding Takata airbag caused property damage, a personal injury or a

wrongful death “before plaintiffs’ lawyers could seek internal documents”. See, Businessweek

article entitled “Warning: This Air Bag May Contain Shrapnel”, dated October 30, 2014,

attached hereto as Exhibit “H”. Such conduct by the Honda and Takata Defendants has involved

the decisions by the upper management of said companies, their legal departments, and the

outside counsel and agents utilized by these corporations to ensure the rapid settlement and

concealment of many incidents from the public, NHTSA and vehicle owners, like TRAN.

56. Moreover, by concealing such information, and actively undertaking to

aggressively and confidentially resolve claims and/or lawsuits, both Honda and Takata have

reaped the benefits of limiting future liability for such prior incidents by obtaining “releases”

from “liability” from said personal injury and wrongful death claimants to protect the Honda and

Takata Defendants from future claims by any such persons, estates or legally appropriate parties

or entities who resolved their claim(s) without the benefit or discovery of the knowledge that

Honda and Takata actively concealed for financial gain and protection from future liabilities.

57. Moreover, while Honda and Takata both have obligations to report such serious

injuries and deaths pursuant to federal law and regulations, both actively and knowingly

concealed certain events, information and incidents known to them, specifically including those

in which they were able to quickly and quietly resolve claims utilizing settlement tactics

requiring the execution of settlement documents with “confidentiality provisions” to keep said

incidents secret from the public, NHTSA and vehicle owners, like TRAN.

25

58. A review of information developed to date regarding exploding Takata airbag

incidents in support of the knowing, intentional conduct and scheme of Honda and Takata to hide

what was known to them of these events and incidents is apparent from a review of their legal

obligations as are imposed by federal law and regulations and Honda and Takata’s knowledge of

exploding Takata airbags incidents in Honda brand vehicles involving serious injuries and deaths

over the decade prior to the death of TRAN.

Legal Obligations of Honda and Takata to Report Incidents involving Serious Injuries or Death pursuant to Federal Law and Regulations

59. As more and more becomes known about Honda and Takata’s knowledge of the

public safety hazard posed by exploding Takata airbags and Takata’s actions to hide its

knowledge, see, CBS News report entitled “Report: Takata covered up airbag dangers decade

ago”, dated November 7, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “I”, and Honda brand vehicles

continue to be recalled in staggering numbers as scrutiny of Honda intensifies, see, Reuters

article entitled “Facing U.S. safety probe, Honda expands air bag recall”, dated November 6,

2014, attached as Exhibit “J”, the failures of both the Honda and Takata Defendants to comply

with their legal obligations to report serious injuries and deaths under the TREAD Act and 49

CFR § 579.21 must be examined and considered.

Honda and Takata have Violated Federal Law in the way of the Early Warning Reporting Requirements of the TREAD Act and 49 CFR § 579.21

60. Pursuant to the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and

Documentation (TREAD) Act, Honda and Takata, to the extent it had actual knowledge, had an

obligation pursuant to said federal law to provide “Information on incidents involving death or

injury” for “all light vehicles manufactured during a model year covered by the reporting period

26

and the nine model years prior to the earliest model year in the reporting period.” 49 C.F.R. §

579.21(b) (2009).

61. 49 U.S. Code § 30166(m)(3)(A) permits NHTSA to require manufacturers to

report information on "claims submitted to the manufacturer for serious injuries (including

death) from alleged defects in a motor vehicle or in motor vehicle equipment," and on "customer

satisfaction campaigns, consumer advisories, recalls or other activity involving the repair or

replacement of motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment." NHTSA defines claim as:

A written request or written demand for relief, including money or other compensation, assumption of expenditures, or equitable relief, related to a motor vehicle crash, accident, the failure of a component or system of a vehicle or an item of motor vehicle equipment, or a fire originating in or from a motor vehicle or a substance that leaked from a motor vehicle. Claim includes, but is not limited to, a demand in the absence of a lawsuit, a complaint initiating a lawsuit, an assertion or notice of litigation, a settlement, covenant not to sue or release of liability in the absence of a written demand, and a subrogation request. A claim exists regardless of any denial or refusal to pay it, and regardless of whether it has been settled or resolved in the manufacturer's favor. The existence of a claim may not be conditioned on the receipt of anything beyond the document(s) stating a claim.

49 C.F.R. § 579.4(c) (2009). 62. 49 U.S. Code § 30166(m)(3)(B) allows NHTSA to also require manufacturers to

report other "such information" that may help or assist in identifying safety defects.

63. Lastly, Section 30166(m)(3)(C) gives NHTSA authority to require reports where

the manufacturer receives actual notice of incidents involving deaths or serious injuries which

are alleged, or proven, to have been caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer's vehicle or

equipment. NHTSA defines notice as: "a document, other than a media article, that does not

include a demand for relief and that a manufacturer receives from a person other than NHTSA."

Id.

27

NHTSA requires manufacturers to: report each incident in which one or more persons are injured in the United States that is identified in a claim or notice, if the product was identified with minimal specificity and, as to notices, it was alleged or proved that the injury was caused by a possible defect in the product. For these manufacturers, the report would be combined with the reporting of incidents involving fatalities and include the same types of information.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 67 Fed. Reg. 45840-41 (July 10, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 579). It is also important to note NHTSA’s definition of injury:

At a minimum, we believe the reporting of some non-physical injuries may be desirable under the early warning rule. Consider for example a situation where an inadvertent air bag deployment did not cause physical injury but there is an alleged emotional injury. The inadvertent air bag deployment would be of interest to NHTSA since it could lead to physical injuries in other incidents.

Id. at 45840.

64. This definition emphasizes the purpose and importance of these Early Warning

Reporting (“EWR”) requirements. EWR requirements have been put in place to protect the

consumer. NHTSA cannot potentially satisfy their mandate and assess and evaluate potential

recalls if manufacturers, like Honda, are withholding or concealing information. NHTSA feels

that these reports are so imperative that they believe even reporting non-physical injuries is

important.

When Information Must be Reported

65. 49 U.S. Code § 30166(m)(3)(A) and (B) explain that the information covered by

those paragraphs shall be reported "periodically or upon request" by NHTSA.

66. 49 U.S. Code § 30166(m)(3)(C) states that the information covered by that

paragraph shall be reported "in such manner as [NHTSA] establishes by regulation." NHTSA has

28

established that reporting shall be done on a quarterly basis. These quarterly reports must be

submitted not later than 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter. NHTSA states, “[a]fter

all, the entire point of these rules is to obtain early warning information, and we want to

minimize any unnecessary delays in our review of this information.” Id. at 45864.

Takata is Included Under These Requirements

67. Under the TREAD Act, NHTSA also requires manufacturers of motor vehicle

equipment to submit Early Warning Reporting (“EWR”) information that may help or assist in

identifying safety-related defects. NHTSA states:

There are approximately 10,000 to 14,000 individual items of [original equipment] OE in a contemporary passenger car. Some are fabricated by the vehicle manufacturer, some by independent parts manufacturers, and some parts are incorporated into systems or modules assembled by various suppliers. There is a growing trend to packaging individual parts into a single unit, or module. For example, a steering wheel assembly may include an air bag, horn control, turn signal control, wiper control, ignition switch, cruise control, lighting controls, as well as associated wiring. Many of these units are assembled by a supplier, often with components from various manufacturers. Each of these fabricators or assemblers is also a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment.

Id. at 45832.

Therefore, the EWR requirements also apply to Takata, the manufacturer of the air bag

inflator and airbag at issue. However, NHTSA did not feel that it was necessary to require OE

manufacturers to have to report every incident involving an injury because the vehicle

manufacturer should be reporting this information. NHTSA adopted the policy that it would

require OE manufacturers to report only incidents involving deaths.

68. With the legal obligations of both Honda and Takata in mind, a historical review

of what was known by each of serious injury and death incidents in the decade prior to TRAN

being killed by an exploding Takata airbag in her 2001 Honda Accord evidences a systematic

29

course of conduct to conceal, delay and under report incidents by Honda and Takata as required

by federal law and regulations.

69. Also, Honda and Takata by affirmatively and intentionally concealing their

knowledge of the safety issues relating to exploding Takata airbags as such information became

known to them, violated the EWR requirements of Section 30166 of Title 49, United States

Code.

70. The historical facts known to date in that regard include, but are not limited to, the

incidents and events discussed below.

Takata Airbag Incidents Known of by Honda and Takata in Honda Vehicles

71. While not much information is available at this time about the exploding Takata

airbag incident that has been identified as having occurred in 2004 in Alabama in a 2002 Honda

Accord, such incident is currently recognized as the first known exploding Takata airbag incident

in a Honda brand vehicle.

72. In 2007, when looking at Honda brand vehicles, it is understood that Honda and

Takata were aware of at least three (3) Takata airbag ruptures resulting in jaw, facial and other

injuries between January and July 2007, with such incidents being investigated by Honda and

Takata beginning in July of that year. Little more is known of these incidents at this time.

73. Then, in mid-2008 another exploding Takata airbag incident occurred involving

an injury in another Honda brand vehicle. This incident, like those in 2004 and 2007, was

known to Honda and Takata, but, again, little information is publically available.

74. While it is clear that Honda was aware of the 2004 and 2007 incidents, and did

limited reporting to NHTSA, according to a report by The New York Times entitled “Air Bag

30

Flaw, Long Known to Honda and Takata, Led to Recalls”, dated September 11, 2014, “In none

of those four instances of ruptured airbags, The Times found, did Honda go beyond the standard

form and separately alert safety regulators to the most critical detail: that the airbag posed an

explosion risk.” See, The New York Times article entitled “Air Bag Flaw, Long Known to Honda

and Takata, Led to Recalls”, dated September 11, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “K”.

75. Then, in early 2009, within eight (8) months of each other, one woman was

seriously injured and two other women died in three (3) separate exploding airbag incidents. The

serious injury incident involved a 2001 Honda Civic, and the two (2) deaths in 2009 both

involved 2001 Honda Accords, the same model year vehicle as that of TRAN, who was also

driving a 2001 Honda Accord when she was killed over five (5) years later in 2014 by the same

defect.

76. On April 27, 2009, the first 2009 incident, Jennifer Griffin was severely injured

while driving a 2001 Honda Civic. The airbag in the vehicle exploded and sent a two-inch piece

of shrapnel flying into Ms. Griffin’s neck. Although Ms. Griffin survived, when highway

troopers found her, blood was gushing from the gash in her neck. As this incident involved an

alleged or proven serious injury caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer’s vehicle

incorporating a Takata airbag, and Defendants had actual knowledge of same, Defendants had

independent legal obligations to report this incident to the NHSTA consistent with the Early

Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The Defendants reported

this accident to NHSTA only after the accident was widely reported in the media. See, materials

related to this incident involving Ms. Griffin, including the accident report and pictures of the

car, airbag, and shrapnel, attached hereto as Exhibit “L”.

31

77. On May 27, 2009, Ashley Parham was killed while driving a 2001 Honda

Accord equipped with an airbag manufactured by Takata. Ms. Parham’s car bumped into

another car in a parking lot, resulting in the airbag deploying and exploding. Metal shrapnel

sliced opened her carotid artery and she bled to death while her brother observed from the

backseat of the vehicle. A lawsuit arising out of the accident was filed on behalf of the brother

against the Defendants in this case in the District Court of Oklahoma. As this incident involved

an alleged or proven serious injury caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer’s vehicle



Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The failure to timely and

appropriately report such incident involving a defective Takata airbag in this vehicle for which

Defendants had actual knowledge is a violation of federal law, is an act of affirmative

concealment with respect to the defect involved, and, reasonably could be expected to thwart the

ability of the NHTSA to perform their regulatory function to protect the public. See, materials

related to this incident involving Ms. Parham, including the Complaint, Answer, and Order

approving judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit “M”.

78. On December 24, 2009 Gurjit Rathore was killed while driving a 2001 Honda

Accord. Ms. Rathore’s neck was severed by metal shrapnel from the airbag inflator

manufactured by the Defendants. A lawsuit arising out of the accident was filed against the

Defendants in this case in Virginia. As this incident involved an alleged or proven serious injury

caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer’s vehicle incorporating a Takata airbag, and

Defendants had actual knowledge of same, Defendants had independent legal obligations to

32

report this incident to the NHSTA consistent with the Early Warning Report requirements of the

Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The Defendants reported this accident to NHSTA only after

receiving notice that a lawsuit was filed in relation to Ms. Rathore’s injuries. See, media reports

related to this incident involving Ms. Rathore, attached hereto as Exhibit “N”.

79. In 2010, the cycle of serious injuries from exploding Takata airbags continued.

80. On April 2, 2010, Kristy Williams was severely injured while driving a 2001

Honda Civic. Ms. Williams’ carotid artery was severed by shards of metal propelled from an

airbag manufactured by the Defendants. Her loss of blood led to several strokes, a seizure, and a

speech disorder. On May 20, 2010, a lawsuit arising out of the accident was filed against the

Defendants in this case in the State Court of Clayton County Georgia. As this incident involved




Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The Defendants reported

this accident to NHSTA only after receiving notice that a lawsuit was filed in relation to Ms.

Williams’ injuries. See, the Complaint filed in the suit arising out of this incident attached hereto

as Exhibit “O”.

81. On November 8, 2010, Suetania Emmanuel was severely injured while driving a

2002 Honda Civic. Ms. Emmanuel’s face and throat were split open by shards of metal

propelled from an airbag manufactured by the Defendants. On November 10, 2011, a lawsuit

arising out of the accident was filed in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands against the

Automobile Mechanic who allegedly may have negligently repaired the airbag inflator which

33

was recalled by Honda. Based on information and belief, Honda and Takata reached a

confidential settlement with the Plaintiff before suit was filed. As this incident involved an

alleged or proven serious injury caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer’s vehicle



Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The failure to timely and





related to this incident involving Ms. Emmanuel, including the accident report and Complaint,

attached hereto as Exhibit “P”.

82. With five (5) years having already passed since Honda and Takata first learned of

the dangers posed by exploding Takata airbags, another incident occurred in 2012. This 2012

incident yet again involved a 2001 Honda Accord, and happened two and a half (2 ½) years

prior to the Takata airbag in TRAN’s 2001 Honda Accord exploding.

83. On March 8, 2012, Sharonda Blowe was severely injured while driving a 2001

Honda Accord. Ms. Blowe suffered lacerations to the head and accompanying skull fractures

when she was struck by shards of metal propelled from an airbag manufactured by the

Defendants. The Defendants settled this matter confidentially. Based upon information and

belief, Defendants would have had actual knowledge of this incident that occurred on March 8th,

2012, in or about October, 2012. Accordingly, as this incident involved an alleged or proven

34

serious injury caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer’s vehicle incorporating a Takata

airbag, and Defendants had actual knowledge of same, Defendants have independent legal

obligations to report this incident to the NHSTA consistent with the intent of the Early Warning

Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The failure to timely and




ability of the NHTSA to perform their regulatory function to protect the public.. See, materials

related to this incident involving Ms. Blowe, including the accident report and a copy of the

VOQ complaint filed with NHSTA by Ms. Blowe’s representatives, attached hereto as Exhibit

“Q”.

84. In 2013, the incidents of Takata airbags exploding in Honda brand vehicles

continued to pile up, with more serious injuries occurring.

85. On August 6, 2013, Joseph C. Nasworthy was severely injured while driving a

2005 Honda Civic. Mr. Nasworthy suffered severe eye and nose lacerations when he was struck

by shards of metal propelled from an airbag manufactured by the Defendants. The Defendants

settled this matter confidentially. Based upon information and belief, Defendants would have had

actual knowledge of this incident that occurred on August 6, 2013, in or about November, 2013.

Accordingly, as this incident involved an alleged or proven serious injury caused by a possible

defect in the manufacturer’s vehicle incorporating a Takata airbag, and Defendants had actual

knowledge of same, Defendants have independent legal obligations to report this incident to the

NHSTA consistent with the Early Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR §

35

579.21. The failure to timely and appropriately report such incident involving a defective Takata

airbag in this vehicle for which Defendants had actual knowledge is a violation of federal law, is

an act of affirmative concealment with respect to the defect involved, and, reasonably could be

expected to thwart the ability of the NHTSA to perform their regulatory function to protect the

public. See, materials related to this incident involving Mr. Nasworthy, including the accident

report and a copy of the VOQ complaint filed with NHSTA by Mr. Nasworthy’s representatives,

attached hereto as Exhibit “R”.

86. On or about September 1, 2013, Stephanie Erdman was severely injured while

driving a 2002 Honda Civic. Ms. Erdman was struck in the eye by shards of metal propelled

from an airbag manufactured by the Defendants. On May 29, 2014 a lawsuit arising out of the

accident was filed against the Defendants in this case in the District Court of Bexar County,

Texas. As this incident involved an alleged or proven serious injury caused by a possible defect

in the manufacturer’s vehicle incorporating a Takata airbag, and Defendants had actual

knowledge of same, Defendants have independent obligations to report this incident to the

NHSTA consistent with the intent of the Early Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act

and 49 CFR § 579.21. The failure to timely and appropriately report such incident involving a

defective Takata airbag in this vehicle for which Defendants had actual knowledge is an act of

affirmative concealment with respect to the defect involved, and, reasonably could be expected

to thwart the ability of the NHTSA to perform their regulatory function to protect the public. See,

materials related to this incident involving Ms. Erdman, including the Complaint and pictures of

the car, airbag, and shrapnel, attached hereto as Exhibit “S”.

36

87. On September 3, 2013, Hai Ming Xu (Devin Xu) was killed while driving a 2002

Acura TL sedan, a Honda vehicle, equipped with an airbag manufactured by Takata. The Los

Angeles County Coroner's Department report cited "apparent facial trauma due to foreign object

inside air bag," explaining further, “[t]he strength of the impact was high enough as to produce a

sudden, strong movement of the brain inside the skull which produced the bleeding.” As this

incident involved an alleged or proven serious injury caused by a possible defect in the

manufacturer’s vehicle incorporating a Takata airbag, and Defendants had actual knowledge of

same, Defendants have independent obligations to report this incident to the NHSTA consistent

with the intent of the Early Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21.

The failure to timely and appropriately report such incident involving a defective Takata airbag

in this vehicle for which Defendants had actual knowledge would be an act of affirmative



related to this incident involving Mr. Xu, including the accident report and an article reporting

on the accident, attached hereto as Exhibit “T”.

88. In 2014, after a full decade of developing knowledge of this safety defect, people

continued to be seriously injured and killed, including TRAN.

89. On May 29, 2014, Corey Burdick was severely injured while driving a 2001

Honda Civic. Mr. Burdick was struck in the eye by shards of metal propelled from an airbag

manufactured by the Defendants. On July 11, 2014, a lawsuit arising out of the accident was

filed against the Defendants in this case in the Fifth Circuit of Florida. As this incident involved


37

incorporating a Takata airbag, and Defendants had actual knowledge of same, Defendants have

independent obligations to report this incident to the NHSTA consistent with the intent of the

Early Warning Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The failure to

timely and appropriately report such incident involving a defective Takata airbag in this vehicle

for which Defendants had actual knowledge is an act of affirmative concealment with respect to

the defect involved, and, reasonably could be expected to thwart the ability of the NHTSA to

perform their regulatory function to protect the public. See, the Complaint involving this incident,

attached hereto as Exhibit “U”.

90. On or about July 7, 2014, Claribel Nunez was severely injured while driving a

2001 Honda Civic. Ms. Nunez was injured when shards of metal from the airbag were propelled

into her forehead. On October 23, 2014, a lawsuit arising out of the accident was filed against the

Defendants in this case in the Southern District of Florida. As this incident involved an alleged

or proven serious injury caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer’s vehicle incorporating a

Takata airbag, and Defendants had actual knowledge of same, Defendants have independent

obligations to report this incident to the NHSTA consistent with the intent of the Early Warning

Report requirements of the Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579.21. The failure to timely and


Defendants had actual knowledge would be an act of affirmative concealment with respect to the

defect involved, and, reasonably could be expected to thwart the ability of the NHTSA to

perform their regulatory function to protect the public. See, materials related to this incident

involving Ms. Nunez, including the accident report, Complaint, and pictures of the airbag and

shrapnel, attached hereto as Exhibit “V”.

38

91. On September 29, 2014, after a decade of knowledge about exploding Takata

airbags seriously injuring and killing unsuspecting consumers, users and owners of Honda brand

vehicles, TRAN was killed in her 2001 Honda Accord when she was involved in a foreseeable

frontal accident similar to those that occur every day around the country. See, Florida Traffic

Crash Report, dated September 29, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “W”. But for the defects in

her Takata airbag as incorporated by Honda in her vehicle, TRAN would have survived without

any life threatening injuries.

92. Based upon what is known of the actual knowledge of Honda and Takata of

exploding Takata airbag incidents in Honda brand vehicles alone, the Honda and Takata

Defendants have failed to meet their legal obligations to report said incidents to NHTSA in a

timely manner as required by federal law and regulations. Such conduct has placed the public at

risk, thwarted NHTSA’s ability to perform its mandate to protect same, and stands in stark

contrast to the public safety policies that underpin such obligations in the first instance for the

benefit of consumers and persons like TRAN.

93. Such violations can be seen in reviewing the below incorporated “Summary Chart

of Exploding Takata Airbag Incidents in Honda brand vehicles between 2009 and 2014”, as were

identified in support of this Complaint as follows:

39

Summary Chart of Exploding Takata Airbag Incidents in Honda brand vehicles between 2009 and 2014

LAST NAME

DATE OF ACCIDENT

MAKE, MODEL, & YEAR OF VEHICLE

SERIOUS INJURY

OR DEATH

DATE KNOWN

BY HONDA

DEADLINE TO

REPORT

DATE REPORTED

Jennifer Griffin

4/27/2009 2001 Honda Civic

Serious Injury

Unknown Unknown 2009, Third Quarter

Ashley Parham

5/27/2009 2001 Honda Accord

Death 8/6/20091 10/1/2009 NEVER REPORTED

Gurjit Rathore

12/24/2009 2001 Honda Accord

Death Unknown Unknown 2010, First Quarter

Kristy Williams

4/2/2010 2001 Honda Civic

Serious Injury

5/20/2010 7/1/2010 2010, Second Quarter

Suetania Emmanuel

11/8/2010 2002 Honda Civic

Serious Injury

Before 11/10/20112

Unknown NEVER REPORTED

Sharonda Blowe

3/8/2012 2001 Honda Accord

Serious Injury

10/20123 2/1/20134 NEVER REPORTED

Joseph C. Nasworthy


Serious Injury

11/20135 2/1/2014 NEVER REPORTED

Stephanie Erdman


Serious Injury

5/29/2014 7/1/2014 NEVER REPORTED

Hai Ming Xu

9/3/2013 2002 Acura TL

Death Unknown Unknown N/A

Corey Burdick

5/29/2014 2001 Honda Civic

Serious Injury

7/11/2014 10/1/2014 NEVER REPORTED

Claribel 7/7/2014 2001 Honda Serious 10/23/2014 2/1/2015 N/A

1 A lawsuit arising out of the accident was filed on behalf of Ms. Parham’s brother against the Defendants in this case in the District Court of Oklahoma; therefore, it is reasonable to assume the Defendant’s had actual knowledge of the accident on or before this date. 2 Suit was filed against the Automobile Mechanic who negligently repaired the airbag inflator that was recalled by Honda. Based upon information and belief, the matter was confidentially settled with the Defendants before this suit was filed. 3 Based upon information and belief, the Defendants would have had actual knowledge of this incident that occurred on 3/8/2012, on or about October 2012. 4 The Tread Act and 49 CFR § 579 require manufacturers to report on incidents involving vehicles less than 10 years old, despite this, the intent of the statute is clear in that this information should be reported to assist the NHSTA in protecting the public. (See also: Erdman, Xu, Burdick, and Nunez). 5 Based upon information and belief, the Defendants would have had actual knowledge of this incident that occurred 8/6/2013, on or about November 2013.

40

Nunez Civic Injury Additional Incidents or Events Known to Honda

94. In addition to what has been discovered to date by Plaintiff with respect to the

incidents described above where detailed facts and materials could be obtained, there also

appears to be numerous additional unreported incidents known of by Honda that remain

unspecified.

95. The independent search for information and facts by various news reporting

agencies since the death of TRAN has spurred responses from Honda about what it knew or

knows. As reported October 30, 2014, by Bloomberg, “Honda, Takata’s largest customer, has so

far confirmed two deaths and 30 injuries from the possible defect and is investigating two

additional deaths in Florida and California.” See, Bloomberg article entitled “Warning: This Air

Bag May Contain Shrapnel” dated October 30, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “X”(emphasis

added). The Florida death referenced in this news article as being “investigated” is believed to

be the September 29, 2014 exploding airbag incident involving TRAN. The California death

referenced as still being “investigated” is believed to be the September 3, 2013, death of Hai

Ming Xu (Devin Xu). Once these “deaths” are formally “confirmed” in some way by Honda6

and/or Takata, these additional two deaths bring the “known” deaths from defective and

unreasonably dangerous Takata airbags that have ruptured to four (4), with a growing number of

serious injuries still being uncovered.

6 As of November 11, 2014, the Honda Defendants have been provided information, including the Photographs attached hereto as Exhibit “E”, confirming the inflator rupture of the airbag system in the Subject Vehicle.

41

96. In fact, the Center for Auto Safety has been cited for its own investigative efforts,

making similar findings. As reported on October 24, 2014, by CNN “Three Honda drivers and

one driver of an Acura, which is also made by Honda, have been killed by the exploding airbags,

according to the Center for Auto Safety. Dozens more have suffered serious injuries, and two

drivers who were blinded in at least one eye.” See, the CNN news piece entitled “Honda CEO

takes $47,000 pay cut over recalls”, dated October 24, 2014, attached as Exhibit “Y”.

Additional Incidents Involving Takata Airbags in Non-Honda Vehicles Known to Takata

97. In addition to the above incidents involving the explosion of Takata airbags in

Honda brand vehicles, Takata, as a supplier of airbag safety systems to at least ten (10) other

automobile manufacturers, would have broad-based access to information about issues with its

airbags, as such manufactures, like Honda, have had incidents and concerns about exploding

Takata airbags in their vehicles of which the Takata Defendants would have had actual

knowledge.

98. While the first Honda brand vehicle exploding airbag incident is currently

believed to be the Alabama incident of 2004, the Takata Defendants have known since at least

2001 that Takata airbags, and particularly the inflator component, were defective, as Isuzu,

another OEM like Honda who incorporates and uses Takata airbag systems, was forced to make

a recall that year due to exploding Takata airbags.

99. Additionally, at least two incidents are known of that resulted from exploding

Takata airbags in non-Honda brand vehicles in 2013 and 2014 of which Takata had knowledge.

While the mechanism of the failure of such incidents has been explained or described as a parts

defect different from the prior incidents, such incidents have resulted in inflator failures causing

42

serious injuries and death just as has been occurring with other exploding Takata airbags for the

past decade.

100. On or about October 12, 2013, Brandi Owens was severely injured while driving

a non-Honda vehicle equipped with an airbag manufactured by Takata. Ms. Owens was involved

in a low-speed accident which resulted in the driver’s side airbag exploding with such force that

it detached from the steering wheel and struck her in the face, causing her left eye to rupture. On

April 28, 2014, a resulting lawsuit was filed against Takata and the manufacturer of the vehicle

in the Northern District of Georgia. This evidences the continuing safety hazard to the public

caused by Takata’s concealment of a known defect in its airbags. See, the filed Complaint

involving this incident, attached hereto as Exhibit “Z”.

101. On March 14, 2014, Susan Cosgrove was killed while driving another non-Honda

vehicle equipped with an airbag manufactured by Takata. Ms. Cosgrove was involved in a low-

speed accident which resulted in injuries leading to her death. Notably, Ms. Cosgrove did not

receive the recall notice on her vehicle until after the accident. This evidences the continuing

safety hazard to the public caused by Takata’s concealment of a known defect in its airbags. See,

materials related to this incident involving Ms. Cosgrove, including the accident report and

pictures of the airbag and shrapnel, attached hereto as Exhibit “AA”.

102. While the exact number of exploding Takata incidents causing injuries in all

vehicles is yet to be discovered, The New York Times has reported that “Complaints received by

regulators about various automakers blame Takata airbags for at least 139 injuries”. See, The

New York Times article entitled “Takata Saw and Hid Risks in Airbags in 2004, Former Workers

Say”, dated November 6, 2014, is attached hereto as Exhibit “G” (emphasis added).

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Honda and Takata’s Affirmative Concealment and Conduct in Violating Legal Obligations Thwarts NHTSA and Places the Unknowing Public at Risk

103. As the above historical record and information reflects, Honda and Takata have

thwarted the ability of the NHTSA to timely identify the significant public safety issue with

these airbags earlier so as to potentially act to protect the public per its mandate, and, through

such acts of intentional and knowing concealment, violated federal law.

104. These repeated violations of federal law, looked at from the potential and obvious

harm to the driving public, has attracted the attention of not only the government, but public

safety advocates like Clarence M. Ditlow, the Executive Director of the Center for Auto Safety

(“CAS”), located in Washington DC.

105. Two (2) years and ten (10) months before the death of TRAN, in a letter dated

December 5, 2011, Mr. Ditlow addressed the interplay of the illegal conduct of “Honda’s

submissions to NHTSA fail[ing] to disclose what it knew” and the continuing risk to the driving

public of the “lethal defect that kills and severely injures unsuspecting drivers” when he wrote

David Strickland, the Administrator of NHTSA to “seek a civil penalty against American Honda

Motor, Inc. [the designated “Manufacturer’s Agent” with NHTSA for HMC] for failing to

initiate a timely recall of defective driver airbag inflators that rupture and send shrapnel into the

driver.” See, the CAS Letter, dated December 5, 2011, attached hereto as Exhibit “BB”.

106. In seeking the maximum civil penalty against Honda for not recalling all defective

vehicles with exploding Takata airbag inflator modules when Honda first realized it had a mass

airbag defect on its hands, Mr. Ditlow wrote:

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NHTSA is to be commended for trying to get to the bottom of Honda’s obfuscation on defective driver airbag inflators in August 2009 when there were only two recalls. Since then, there have been three more Honda recalls for defective driver airbag inflators. It’s time to find out just exactly what Honda knew and when. This is a lethal defect that kills and severely injures unsuspecting drivers. Honda has known about this lethal defect since at least 2007 and perhaps as early as May 2004 as noted to NHTSA in September 2009 that it had “re-discovered” “an earlier unusual deployment.”

See, Id.

107. In view of the fact that Honda had clearly failed to comply with the EWR

reporting requirements in the TREAD Act and implementing NHTSA regulations as to the

Takata airbag mass defect, the Center also called on NHTSA to refer this matter to the Justice

Department for a criminal investigation under 18 USC § 1001. See, Id.

108. In a letter dated October 15, 2014, shortly after the death of TRAN, Mr. Ditlow of

CAS again wrote to NHTSA, again sharing the information the Center had developed. In this

later letter, Mr. Ditlow stated that “In the Takata airbag mass defect, the Center has uncovered an

even more egregious abuse of the invaluable EWR Death and Injury Reporting System – Honda

is not reporting all death and injury claims filed against it with NHTSA as required by the Tread

Act and NHTSA’s implementing regulation.” See, the CAS Letter, dated October 15, 2014,

attached hereto as Exhibit “CC”.

109. As these letters filed with the NHTSA report, a review of public filings shows that

Honda has failed to comply with federal law and regulations and has affirmatively concealed

incidents involving exploding Takata airbags, including, but not limited to, the May, 2009 death

of Ashley Parham in Oklahoma when the airbag in her 2001 Honda Accord exploded. See Id.

Such federal laws and regulations are subject to judicial notice by the Court, as is the federal

record and related filings that establish the affirmative concealment and under reporting by

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Honda and Takata of the defect in Takata airbags that has been causing serious injuries and

deaths for over a decade.

34. As of November 3, 2014, NHTSA has taken notice and is investigating Honda for

its reporting failures under federal law. Specifically, the United States Department of

Transportation (“DOT”) by and through the Secretary of Transportation has delegated authority

to the Chief Counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) by a

“Special Order” dated November 3, 2014, to “open[] an Audit Query, AQ14-004, to investigate

the extent and scope of certain EWR reporting failures by Honda, the reason(s) for such failures,

and the steps being taken by Honda to assure full compliance with TREAD reporting

requirements,” and has ordered Honda, through AHM, to provide responses “signed under oath”

no later than “November 24, 2014.” See, Special Order relative to AQ14-004 directed to

American Honda Motor, Co. Inc., dated November 3, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “DD”

(emphasis added).

Active Concealment through Confidential Settlements by Honda and Takata

110. Based upon the handling of claims of which Honda and Takata have had actual

knowledge, and the facts surrounding the quick “confidential settlement” of such claims as has

been reported, and, the corresponding pattern of failing to identify or report such events or

incidents involving serious injury or death as required by federal law as has been documented, a

scheme of active, affirmative and knowing concealment emerges.

111. Honda and Takata have systematically settled personal injury and wrongful death

claims that they were made aware of, and, upon resolution with those persons injured or affected

by the dangerous and defective Takata airbags in Honda vehicles, “confidentiality clauses” have

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been demanded to keep information of the breadth and extent of the known safety hazard secret.

These confidential settlements are part and parcel of a coordinated scheme amongst and between

Honda and Takata to intentionally and actively conceal information about this safety defect in

Honda vehicles from NHTSA, the consuming public at large, and owners like TRAN.

112. Such concealment, and the use of confidentiality, represents a decision-making

process of upper management at both Honda and Takata, who knowingly and intentionally

demanded such terms using their own general counsel, legal staff and outside law firms to

perpetrate same.

113. In fact, in light of federal law and regulations requiring Honda and Takata to

report serious injuries and deaths related to alleged exploding Takata airbags, and, the growing

and developing knowledge that Honda and Takata violated federal law in systematically under

reporting incidents in a timely and appropriate manner, the active use of confidential settlements

to conceal what the Honda and Takata Defendants knew facilitated the ability of these companies

to effectively hide this enormous public safety hazard for over a decade leading to unnecessary

injuries and deaths, including that of TRAN.

114. The safety defect involving the Takata airbags in various vehicles, including

specifically the airbag that exploded in the 2001 Honda Accord TRAN was driving September

29, 2014, is one which the Honda and Takata Defendants have known of for the better part of a

decade. Both Honda and Takata, through their respective officers, directors, partners, and/or

managing agents had actual knowledge that the Takata airbag made part of the Subject Vehicle

was defective in that it could rupture or explode with metal fragments striking and potentially

seriously injuring vehicle occupants like occurred to TRAN causing her fatal injuries.

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115. Honda and Takata also took affirmative steps to conceal the defect as has been

established by substantial facts by systematically under reporting serious injury and deaths from

this defect in violation of Defendants’ independent legal obligations to report same to the

NHSTA consistent with EWR requirements, the TREAD Act and 49 CFR § 579.21.

116. As noted by the CAS in a letter to NHTSA October 15, 2014, not only is Honda not

reporting its actual knowledge of exploding Takata airbag incidents, there is apparently a broader

overall pattern of under reporting of incidents involving serious injuries and deaths to NHTSA

by Honda. Specifically, the Center found that “Examination of EWR reports filed by Honda

versus GM and Toyota suggest that Honda is systematically under reporting Death and Injury

claims against the company.” See, the CAS Letter dated, October 15, 2014, attached hereto as

Exhibit “CC” (emphasis added).

117. Equally as troubling as Honda’s “under reporting”, is the apparent affirmative

misrepresentations to cover up the truth about the scope, implications, and nature of the

exploding airbag defect by both Honda and Takata. For example, when vehicles first began to be

recalled in 2008 and 2009, Takata told NHTSA back then that it had not provided any air bag

inflators that are the same or substantially similar to the inflators in vehicles covered by Recalls

08V-593 and 09V-259 to any customers other than Honda. The physical characteristics of the

inflator housing used in the Honda vehicles subject to these recalls are unique to Honda. That

representation, however, appears to be materially false or, at a minimum, misleading, as many

additional exploding airbag incidents have now been identified in non-Honda brand vehicles.

118. Similarly, Takata has often represented to the public its “policy of continuous

review and continuous improvement of its production methods to improve quality and to

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increase efficiency.” Yet, based on recent revelations from Takata employee whistleblowers,

such claims represent another apparent misrepresentation inconsistent with Takata’s actual

production practices. See, Reuters article entitled “Exclusive: Takata engineers struggled to

maintain air bag quality, documents reveal”, dated October 17, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit

“EE”; see also, The New York Times article entitled “Takata Saw and Hid Risk in Airbags 2004,

Former Workers Say”, dated November 6, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “G”.

119. The conduct, actions and inactions of the Honda and Takata Defendants in

responding to this massive public safety problem has only exasperated the issues and caused

unnecessary injuries and deaths that could have been prevented.

Inaction in the Face of Growing Knowledge Leads to TRAN’s death

120. After the death of two (2) women in 2009 due to exploding Takata airbags in

2001 model Honda Accord vehicles, which are the very model vehicle that was owned and being

driven by TRAN five (5) years later when her Takata airbag exploded on September 29, 2014, it

is difficult to explain why Honda and Takata continued to minimize and marginalize the scope

and nature of the problem.

121. Honda and Takata had every opportunity to act aggressively to protect the public

from the lethal risks of Takata airbags, and could have acted during that approximate five (5)

year period before TRAN’s fatal accident with the appropriate urgency to ensure such defective

airbags were removed from the marketplace, or, at least, given adequate, timely and appropriate

warnings of same consistent with the extreme risks posed.

122. While the death of TRAN involves a 2014 accident, her 2001 Honda Accord

would have been a mere nine (9) years old when Honda first deemed it defective under the

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Safety Act and recalled it. Not only would Honda have had actual knowledge that the Subject

Vehicle was in use at that time through various internal resources, there existed numerous other

viable and cost effective ways to gain such information. And, if Honda was not fully aware or

confident in the information it had to effectively conduct and complete the recall it undertook

voluntarily in 2009, or the expanding recalls thereafter, it should have acted to utilize publically

available sources of information, like CarFax, web-based technologies, or contract call-centers or

customer service personnel to ascertain and verify current owner details so as to act as necessary

to complete its recall(s) due to the deadly and continuing risks posed by defective Takata airbags.

123. As time progressed, and Honda brand vehicles with defective Takata airbags

remained on the road posing a hazard to owners and users, the grave importance of action

increased. Moreover, as the number of recalls increased or “expanded” over the years with

Honda and Takata’s growing knowledge, the importance of locating, notify and encouraging

owners of vehicles covered by such recalls, including those from prior recalls that had not been

fixed, grew in urgency and importance.

124. Throughout the relevant time, from the first discovery of the defective condition

in Honda brand vehicles with Takata airbags in 2004, through the deadly incidents in 2009

involving defective Takata airbags in 2001 Honda Accord vehicles like TRAN’s, and up until

September 29, 2014, the date that TRAN was fatally wounded by an exploding Takata airbag,

Honda failed to act to ensure the public, consumers and owners, like TRAN, had adequate

knowledge of the hazard of driving their vehicles every day without knowing it could kill them if

a foreseeable frontal accident triggering their airbag safety system should occur, and/or failed to

remove or repair the unreasonably dangerous and defective airbags as was their obligation.

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125. Honda vehicles like the Subject Vehicle are driven for a long useful life7 by many

people. With each year, each owner or user, and each mile driven, the risk of an accident and a

dangerous deployment in a foreseeable crash event increased. Honda vehicles have long been

marketed and promoted by Honda for their long useful life, with Honda’s own website reflecting

“Member Stories” about the enormous amount of miles Honda brand vehicles can be driven.

They even have a “Honda Mile Makers Medals” that allows owners to report their “notable

milestones” as they pass various markers between “100,000” and “1,000,000+”. See, the screen

print of “Honda Mile Makers – Owner Stories – Official Honda Web Site”, dated 10/27/14,

attached hereto as Exhibit “FF”. This failure to act for over five (5) years to actually remove

the defective Takata airbags it had identified was a breach of Honda and Takata’s duties, and

contributed to the death of TRAN, who had no knowledge of any such recalls or the hidden

danger in her vehicle.

126. In fact, the Honda and Takata Defendants knowing and affirmative acts of

concealment, and the misleading and confusing information they chose to share over time to

explain away the exploding Takata airbag problem, deprived TRAN, as well as NHTSA and the

public, of knowledge of the full and complete nature of the defect and the lethal danger that

exists in vehicles with Takata airbags, like the Subject Vehicle.

127. As reported by Car and Driver on September 15, 2014, in a news article entitled

“Honda and Takata Allegedly Knew About Deaths, Injuries from Exploding Airbags for Years

Before Recall Expansion”, “And while Honda was one of the 11 automakers sharing the same

7 In fact, Honda brand vehicles like the Accord have a longer than normal useful life compared to many other vehicles. Accordingly, Honda should have assumed or presumed their vehicles may remain in use as they acted.

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airbag supplier, that company in particular is alleged to have known about the problem well

before the others and to have kept critical details such as airbag ruptures, injuries, and deaths

involving its vehicles away from federal regulators and the public.” See, Car and Driver article

entitled “Honda and Takata Allegedly Knew About Deaths, Injuries from Exploding Airbags for

Years Before Recall Expansion”, dated September 15, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “GG”.

128. Although Honda has now acknowledged to safety regulators that Takata’s airbags

are defective, for years, the Honda and Takata Defendants did not fully investigate or disclose

the seriousness of the issue, and, in fact, downplayed the widespread prevalence of the problem.

Nowhere is this more event than how Honda, the largest buyer of Takata airbag systems from

Takata, has handled notifying the public, NHTSA and owners, like TRAN, of the safety defect in

their Honda brand vehicles through their ever expanding safety notification programs and recalls.

Recall History related to Honda Brand Vehicles by Honda

2008: Recall 08V-593

129. A review of recall related information shows that Takata shared the results of

certain of its “inflator survey analysis” with Honda in November of 2008. That analysis, along

with the fact that Honda had experienced three (3) exploding airbag incidents in 2007 with

injuries and another in mid-2008, all served to place Honda on notice of a serious airbag inflator

safety issue, and triggered a Honda recall. While taking action, it bears note that this voluntary

recall by Honda occurred over four years after the first Takata airbag explosion incident in a

Honda brand vehicle in Alabama in 2004, and was extremely limited in scope, covering only

about 4,200 vehicles.

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130. The November, 2008 recall involved certain 2001 Honda Accord and Civic

vehicles to replace airbags that “could produce excessive internal pressure,” causing “the inflator

to rupture,” projecting metal fragments through the airbag cushion (“2008 Recall”). See, Honda

Recall Notification 08V-593, dated November 11, 2008, attached hereto as Exhibit “HH”.

2009: Recall 09V-259

131. In June of 2009, Takata provided a follow up report to Honda on its November,

2008 analysis, stating that issues related to propellant production appeared to have caused the

improper inflator performance.

132. Thereafter, Honda learned of at least two (2) additional incidents in 2009, one of

which was the May 27, 2009, death of Ashley Parham who was killed while driving a 2001

Honda Accord equipped with an airbag manufactured by Takata.

133. As a result of communications with Takata, and in the face of additional claims of

“unusual deployments” that could not be explained by the logic underpinning the 2008 Recall,

on June 30, 2009, Honda expanded the recall to 440,000 vehicles, which included 2001 and 2002

Civic, Accord, and Acura vehicles (“2009 Recall”).

134. The 2009 Recall was the first time the Subject Vehicle was included within a

recall by Honda deeming the vehicle defective pursuant to the Safety Act.

135. In August, 2009, the NHTSA Recall Management Division sent Honda an

information request to explain why it did not include 2009 Recall vehicles in the 2008 Recall,

and “to evaluate the timeliness of [Honda’s] recent defect decision.” See, Honda Recall

Notification 09V-259, dated August 19, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit “II”.

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136. NHTSA also wanted to know “the difference between the driver’s airbag inflators

in those vehicles from the inflators in the 09V-259 vehicles and explain how this distinction, or

any other between the two sets of vehicles, convinced HMC at the time that it did not need to

include the latter set in the 08V-593 recall population.” See, Id.

137. The NHTSA Recall Management Division further requested that Honda provide

complaints, lawsuits, warranty claims, and field reports, along with an explanation of the

“unusual deployments” and Honda’s investigative efforts. See, Id.

138. In Honda’s September, 2009 reply to the NHTSA, the automaker said that its

information about the “unusual deployments” came from Takata: “We understood the causal

factors to be related to airbag propellant due to handling of the propellant during airbag inflator

module assembly.” See, letter from Honda American Motor Co. to NHTSA, dated September 16,

2009, attached hereto as Exhibit “JJ”, at Page 1.

139. Honda also reported, based on information from Takata, the problem with the

airbags was isolated to the “production of the airbag propellant prior to assembly of the

inflators.” Specifically, the cause was “related to the process of pressing the propellant into

wafers that were later installed into the inflator modules,” and limited to “one production

process” involving one high-precision compression press that was used to form the propellant

into wafers, the automaker told NHTSA. See, Id. at Page 1.

140. Honda also disclosed to the NHTSA that it had fielded nine complaints and one

lawsuit related to the 2008 and 2009 Recalls. Honda also, for the first time, told NHTSA about

the 2004 incident involving an “unusual deployment” of the vehicles airbag. Honda claimed that

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it “only recently were reminded of this incident,” and that, until recently, Honda “had not

associated it with the [2008 Recall] campaign.” See, Id. at Page 4.

141. In its communications with the NHTSA, Takata continually gave misleading or

incorrect information about the airbags it manufactured that were part of the recalls.

142. On November 20, 2009, the NHTSA requested information from Takata as part of

their ongoing investigation into the airbag inflators that triggered the 2009 Recall.

143. Takata submitted a partial response to NHTSA on December 23, 2009 (“Partial

Response”), and then a full response on February 19, 2010 (“Full Response”). See, Letter from

Takata to NHTSA, dated December 23, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit “KK”; see also, Letter

from Takata to NHTSA, dated February 19, 2010, attached hereto as Exhibit “LL”. Both

responses provided vague and misleading information about the seriousness of the problem.

144. In both responses, Takata asserted that there were no substantive design

differences between the inflators in the airbags at issue in the two recalls. However, in the Full

Response, Takata states that there were, in fact, differences in the production processes between

the lots. See, Id.

145. In both responses, Takata asserted that the defects only existed in specific lots

manufactured between certain dates. They claimed that the inflators involved in the 2008 Recall

were manufactured between October 29, 2000 and December 1, 2000. Takata further claimed

that inflators involved in the 2009 Recall were manufactured between August 23, 2000 and

February 25, 2001. See, Id.

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146. Takata did not provide the dates the inflators were shipped, as the NHTSA

requested, because, as Takata admitted, its records did not have that information. Instead, they

gave just the manufacturing dates.

147. In both the Partial Response to NHTSA on December 23, 2009, and the Full

Response on February 19, 2010, Takata stated that: “Takata has not provided any airbag inflators

that are the same or substantially similar to the inflators in vehicles covered by the recalls in

2008 and 2009 to any customers other than Honda. The physical characteristics of the inflator

housing used in the Honda vehicles subject to these recalls are unique to Honda.” See, Id. These

statements would prove to be untrue.

148. In its Full Response, Takata asserted that the defect identified in the 2009 Recall

was the result of a single compression press, although Takata recommended to Honda that a

small number of other vehicles with propellant processed on a different press be recalled as well.

See, Id.

149. In the Full Response, Takata asserted that the defective parts were all

manufactured on a particular press (the “Stokes press”) in a single manufacturing plant. Takata

further asserted that while they did manufacture 2,400 inflators using the same process as the

defective inflators, the design was different and “[t]herefore Takata is convinced that the

inflators sold [redacted] contain no safety-related defect.” See, Id. at Page 5.

150. Takata wrote in its Full Response that it “believed – [redacted] – that expanding

the recall to include all vehicles equipped with inflators manufactured with Stokes propellant

produced through and including February 28, 2001 would capture all inflators with tablets that

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had a risk of producing overly energetic combustion. This recommendation, as well as the

analysis that supported it, was presented to Honda on June 12 2009.” See, Id. at Page 11-12.

151. Both Honda and Takata represented to the public and the NHTSA that the total

number of affected vehicles was quite small.

2010: Recall 10V-041

152. In 2010, merely months after its previous recall, Honda announced a third recall

for an additional 379,000 vehicles, including 2002 Honda CR-V, 2002 Honda Odyssey, 2003

Honda Pilot, 2002-2003 Acura 3.2TL, and 2003 Acura 3.2CL vehicles, while adding more 2001

and 2002 Accords and Civics to its 2009 Recall list (“2010 Recall”). See, Honda Recall

Notification 10V-04, dated February 9, 2010, attached hereto as Exhibit “MM”.

153. Honda’s explanation for the airbag defects changed yet again. Honda explained

as of 2010 that there are two different manufacturing processes utilized in the preparation of

airbag propellant. While one process was said to be within specification, the other was said to

not be. Honda’s expanded recall reached those vehicles employing airbags that had utilized

manufacturing processes not within specification. See, Id.

154. The Subject Vehicle was again identified within the scope of the 2010 Recall for a

second time, as it was Honda’s policy and/or practice to include previously recalled vehicles in

new or “expanded” recalls which effectively encompasses the sub-set of the smaller, previous

recall(s) for the same defect issue.

2011: Recall 11V-260

155. In April 2011, Honda filed a Part 573 Defect and Noncompliance report for 2,430

replacement service part airbag modules that might have been installed in vehicles covered by

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previous recall expansions (“2011 Parts Recall”). See, Honda Recall Notification 11V-260,

dated April 27, 2011, attached hereto as Exhibit “NN”.

156. On December 1, 2011, the 2011 Parts Recall was expanded relative to defects in

Takata airbags to add 1,709,477 vehicles (“2011 Recall”).

The 2011 Recall was the third time the Subject Vehicle was identified within the scope

of an expanding Takata airbag recall, as Honda once again moved to add vehicles to the list to be

recalled for this defect.

2013: Recall 13V-132

157. By 2013, it became clear that the defective airbag issue was far more widespread

than Takata or Honda initially reported to the NHTSA. See, Honda Recall Notification 13V-132,

dated April 10, 2013, attached hereto as Exhibit “OO”.

158. According to Honda’s 2013 Defect and Noncompliance Report, an exploding

airbag in Puerto Rico in October, 2011 prompted Honda to ask permission from the NHTSA to

collect “healthy” airbag modules to see if “abnormal combustion was possible.” Honda found

that even so-called “healthy” airbags could abnormally combust in certain conditions.

159. On February 8, 2013, NHTSA and Honda met to discuss the “ongoing

investigation” into Honda’s defective Takata airbags. Honda admitted at that time that “A

recreation of propellant production using the same methods as were used during 2001-2002

production periods indicated that it was possible for propellant produced during 2001-2002 to be

manufactured out of specification without the manufacturing processes correctly identifying and

removing the out of specification propellant.” See, Letter from Honda to NHTSA dated April 10,

2013, attached hereto as Exhibit “PP”, at Page 2-3 (emphasis added).

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160. Separately, Honda was informed by the supplier of another potential concern

related to airbag inflator production that could affect the performance of these airbag modules.

See, Id.

161. On April 10, 2013, Honda filed a Recall Notification (“2013 Recall”) for their

2001-2003 Civic, 2002-2003 CR-V, and 2002 Odyssey vehicles with the NHTSA. In that

notification, Honda asserted that 561,422 vehicles could be affected by the following part defect:

“In certain vehicles, the passenger’s (frontal) airbag inflator could produce excessive internal

pressure. If an affected airbag deploys, the increased internal pressure may cause the inflator to

rupture. In the event of an inflator rupture, metal fragments could be propelled upward toward

the windshield, or downward toward the front passenger’s foot well, potentially causing injury to

a vehicle occupant.” See, Id. at Page 2.

162. On April 11, 2013, Takata filed a Defect Information Report titled “Certain

Airbag Inflators Used as Original Equipment” (“Takata DIR”). In that report, Takata identified

the defective airbags as follows: “Certain airbag inflators installed in frontal passenger-side

airbag modules equipped with propellant wafers manufactured at Takata’s Moses Lake,

Washington plant during the period from April 13 2000 (start of production) through September

11, 2002…and certain airbag inflators manufactured at Takata’s Monclova, Mexico plant during

the period from October 4, 2001 (start of production) through October 31, 2002…”. See,

Takata’s DIR, dated April 22, 2013, attached hereto as Exhibit “QQ”, at Page 3. This

disclosure, coming years after Takata knew or should have known of the nature and scope of the

problem, related directly to the Subject Vehicle, which was made in August, 2000.

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163. It also wasn’t until its April, 2013 Report that Takata finally admitted that its

affected inflators were installed as original equipment in vehicles manufactured by car

manufacturers other than Honda, including Toyota, Nissan, Mazda, and BMW. See, Id. at Page

2-3.

164. Takata asserted that it did not know how many inflators were installed in vehicles,

as it did not have those records. See, Id. at Page 3. While it did not have the information to

estimate the number of vehicles affected, Takata still insisted that the total number of installed

inflators would be extremely low.

165. Takata described the “Defect” as follows: “Some propellant wafers produced at

Takata’s plant in Moses Lake, Washington, between April 13, 2000 and September 11, 2002

may have been produced with an inadequate compaction force. . . . In addition some propellant

wafers used in inflators produced at Takata’s plant in Monclova, Mexico between October 4,

2001 and October 31, 2002, may have been exposed to uncontrolled moisture conditions. These

wafers could have absorbed moisture beyond the allowable limits . . . . In both cases propellant

could potentially deteriorate over time due to environmental factors, which could lead to over-

aggressive combustion in the event of an airbag deployment. This could create excessive

internal pressure within the inflator and the body of the inflator could rupture.” See, Id. at Page

3-4.

2014: Recall 14V-351 / First “Recall Notification” sent to TRAN received After her Death

166. Recall 14V-351, which again included the Subject Vehicle for a fourth time, was

initiated in or about August 29, 2014 (“2014 Recall”). Yet again, Honda moved to “expand” the

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scope of its formal and informal “recall” activities, and more vehicles were added. See, Honda

Recall Notification 14V-351, dated August 29, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “RR”.

167. The NHTSA “Summary” of 2014 Recall stated that “American Honda Motor Co.,

Inc. (HONDA) is conducting a limited regional recall for certain model year 2001-2007 Accord

(4-cylinder), 2001-2001 Accord (V6)” “in Florida” “and equipped with Takata-Brand air bag

inflators. Upon deployment of the driver side frontal air bag, excessive internal pressure may

cause the inflator to rupture.” See, the “Recall Results Look-up by VIN” from the NHTSA

Safercar.gov website, dated 10/27/2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “SS”.

168. The “Safety Risk” identified by NHTSA in the 2014 Recall stated: “In the event

of a crash necessitating deployment of the driver side frontal air bag, the inflator could rupture

with metal fragments striking and potentially seriously injuring the vehicle occupants.” See, Id.

169. The “Remedy” identified by NHTSA in the 2014 Recall is stated as: “Honda will

notify owners, and dealers with inspect the vehicles and replace any defective air bag inflators,

as necessary, free of charge.” See, Id.

170. From the time that the Subject Vehicle was first subject to an airbag inflator recall

under the 2009 Recall (Recall 09V-259), with Honda deeming the Subject Vehicle defective

under the Safety Act, it has continued to be the subject of multiple duplicative recalls of the same

original airbag inflator (2010 Recall, 10V-041; 2011 Recall, 11V-260; and, the 2014 Recall,

14V-351) as the Subject Vehicle has again and again been “rolled into” the scope of the

expanding recalls as they have been issued.

171. At no time, however, in the five (5) years since the 2009 Recall was begun until

the accident that killed TRAN, and, despite the purported sending of no less than three (3) recall

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notification to other “current” owners of the Subject Vehicle between 2009–2011, was the

original Takata airbag, including the inflator, actually ever fixed or replaced in the Subject

Vehicle so as to remove the exploding Takata airbag from the marketplace and make the vehicle

safe.

172. All of the recalls, regardless of when they occurred or their scope, ultimately

share a common issue and repair, and to a consumer and owner, like TRAN, the most important

thing to know would be whether their individual vehicle requires a repair to make it safe to use.

173. Moreover, as evidenced by the mere sending of most recent 2014 Recall

notification relating to of August 29, 2014 (Recall 14V-351), that, again, included the Subject

Vehicle for a fourth time, and, for the first time resulted in a “Safety Recall Notice” being

sent to TRAN’s home shortly after her death on October 2, 2014, Honda and Takata were

obviously aware that the Subject Vehicle remained unfixed or unrepaired, and that none of the

prior three (3) recalls had been “completed” with respect to making the Subject Vehicle

reasonably safe for use. See, Honda “Safety Recall Notice”, dated “September 2014”, as was

directed to “Hien Tran”, attached hereto as Exhibit “TT”.

174. At no time prior to the death of TRAN, did she receive any other “Safety Recall

Notice”, nor was she aware of any safety issue that posed a risk to her life by merely using her

vehicle.

175. Moreover, while it is unknown if TRAN ever had the benefit of reviewing a

“CarFax Vehicle History Report” (“CarFax”) for the Subject Vehicle, the fact is that the CarFax

for this vehicle shows “No Recalls Reported” for the period of time this vehicle was owned by

prior owners between 2001 and June 4, 2013, when TRAN bought the Subject Vehicle for her

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personal use. See, the CarFax Vehicle History Report for the Subject 2001 Honda Accord,

attached hereto as Exhibit “UU”.

176. Additionally, while there is no reason to think that TRAN would have had a

reason to suspect that she should run the Subject Vehicle’s Vehicle Identification Number

(“VIN”) through the Official Honda Website for recall related information and a status of efforts

as to her vehicle, the fact is that had she done so it would have likely misled her into believing

her car had been fixed by a prior owner because of how the Official Honda Website appears to

report the Subject Vehicle as having been fixed. This issue on Honda’s own website just adds to

the concerns over how it effectuates recalls, and how the public and owners, like TRAN, can

protect themselves.

177. Thus, despite Honda having taken the step of deeming the Subject 2001 Honda

Accord Vehicle defective as of the 2009 Recall in recalling same consistent with the Safety Act,

the fact is that the Subject Vehicle remained on the road in a dangerous and defective condition

that was known to be potentially deadly by both Honda and Takata.

178. Additionally, because of the Honda and Takata Defendants conduct, actions and

inactions with respect to their respective knowledge of the exploding Takata airbag crisis, and

the incomplete, misleading and inconsistent reporting and communications regarding same, the

Subject Vehicle remained in use, in a unreasonably dangerous and defective condition that,

ultimately, caused the death of TRAN when the hidden danger of the exploding airbag revealed

itself with fatal consequences on September 29, 2014.

179. In recent exploding airbag incidents, first responders have been baffled by the fact

that victims of apparently minor accidents suffered injuries more consistent with being shot or

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stabbed repeatedly. In large part, the confusion relating to these airbag explosions stems from

the lack of awareness of the problem by the public, NHTSA, and owners of vehicle’s with

Takata airbags, like TRAN. Certainly, the actions and inactions of Honda and Takata relative to

this safety issue have contributed to same.

180. But for the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the Takata airbag

incorporated into the Subject Vehicle by Honda, TRAN would not have been fatally injured in

the accident that resulted in her airbag deploying, and, as to the defective condition in the Takata

airbag safety system used in her 2001 Honda Accord, both Takata and Honda bear responsibility.

Honda Has Breached its Enforceable Duty to Recall under the Safety Act

181. By Honda declaring the Subject Vehicle defective under the Safety Act by and

through Recall 09V-259, dated June 30, 2009, Honda undertook and had an enforceable duty to

recall. With the undertaking of an enforceable duty to perform a recall, Honda had an obligation

to perform and complete said recall in a reasonable manner so as not to leave owners, consumers

and foreseeable users at risk of being seriously injured or killed due to the defective condition

identified.

182. With respect to the Subject Vehicle, despite being declared defective by Honda on

or about June 30, 2009 by the 2009 Recall, and then being the subject of additional recalls in the

form of the 2010 Recall and 2011 Recall, which reaffirmed the prior duty previously undertaken

and expanded the scope and nature of the actions necessary to satisfy same reasonably, the

Subject Vehicle was never fixed or repaired and the Recalls were never “completed” by Honda

as to the Subject Vehicle.

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183. A CarFax, as mentioned above, is a tool often used by consumers, car purchasers,

dealers and others looking at vehicular history or safety issues. When a CarFax is run on this

vehicle it provides information that can be used to identify all prior and current owners, and the

CarFax for the Subject Vehicle is no different. See, Id. A CarFax is a means by which both

Honda and Takata could have reasonably obtained information of the “current” owner of the

Subject Vehicle as it issued each respective recall. A CarFax is by no means the only way to

identify ownership details or owner data, but, a CarFax is certainly well recognized for being one

such source.

184. That said, Honda and Takata both had available means and opportunity to take the

actions needed to complete the recalls undertaken within the five (5) years preceding the fatal

accident involving TRAN.

185. Despite such ability, both Honda and Takata failed to provide notice of the

defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the Subject Vehicle’s Takata airbag system to

TRAN, or any prior owners of the Subject Vehicle between October 26, 2000, when it was first

titled for use by its “first owner” in Flushing, New York, and June 4, 2013, when the Subject

Vehicle was purchased by TRAN in Orlando, Florida. See, Id.

186. However, because of Honda’s failure to complete the recalls as required to satisfy

its enforceable duty to recall to ensure the safety of those using effected vehicles, the Subject

Vehicle remained in use in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. This directly led

to TRAN’s ultimate death on October 2, 2014, approximately five (5) years and three (3) months

after Honda first identified the hazard posed by the Takata airbag system that was installed by

Honda in the Subject Vehicle.

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187. The fact of three (3) recalls not being completed as to the Subject Vehicle in a

reasonable manner in the years before this tragedy on September 29, 2014, is something that

Honda was aware of, and through inaction exposed TRAN to foreseeable bodily injury or death.

188. Physical evidence also supports the fact that the Subject Vehicle was never fixed

or repaired. Recent examination of the airbag system in the Subject Vehicle by the Florida

Highway Patrol and NHTSA has confirmed the fact that the Takata airbag safety system in the

Subject Vehicle was a 2000 model year air bag system, see, Photograph of Subject Vehicle

airbag markings “HONDA 000 8414, 09 08 00, ‘S’ Assembled in Mexico with U.S.A.

Components”, taken November 11, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “VV”, which is consistent

with such airbag being the original equipment (“OE”) airbag as would have been installed when

this 2001 Honda Accord was assembled and made.

189. Additionally, based upon information and belief, the Subject Vehicle was never

taken into a Honda affiliated dealership or other repair facility to be fixed, repaired or replaced

by its prior owners or TRAN.

190. As such, it is reasonable to assume that Honda’s tracking system(s) would show

that its recalls made as to the Subject Vehicle’s airbag safety system had not been “completed”.

Further, in the absence of any warranty claim being made by a Honda affiliated dealership

related to the Subject Vehicle establishing it was fixed or repaired, Honda knew or should have

known this vehicle remained unreasonably dangerous while it was in use and could cause serious

injury or death if Honda did not act to actually complete the recalls.

191. In fact, Honda is required to provide data and reporting to NHTSA relative to its

conduct and actions in performing recalls, and, a review of the completion rate data for the 2009

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and 2010 Recalls which involved the Subject Vehicle shows that approximately twenty five

percent (25%) of all such unreasonably dangerous and defective recalled vehicles known to be

potentially fatal for Honda consumer’s and users to operate remained unfixed after the recalls.

That equates to roughly “1 in 4” vehicle drivers and users being left at risk despite Honda’s

knowledge of the critical need to take these defective Takata airbags out of service.

192. Simply stated, Honda had a duty to replace the defective Takata airbag in the

Subject Vehicle owned by TRAN in accordance with Honda’s recall decisions under the Safety

Act. See, 49 CFR, Part 573. The failure to accomplish or complete the recalls relative to the

Subject Vehicle in a timely and appropriate fashion as would be reasonable in light of the hazard

of serious injury or death if not completed, constitutes and breach of said duty and directly led to

the death of TRAN when the defective Takata airbag exploded in her vehicle on September 29,

2014.

193. Additionally, Honda, was obligated and undertook a common law duty pursuant

to Florida law to act reasonably with respect to the lethal hazard of exploding Takata airbags

having voluntarily undertaken to notify and repair effected vehicles, inclusive of the Subject

Vehicle, that posed a significant and continuing hazard to any user who may come to be in a

foreseeable frontal crash deploying the airbag safety system as a supplemental protective

measure. Such voluntarily undertaken “Safety Improvement Campaigns” that were “not being

conducted under the Safety Act” per Honda, created a duty upon Honda to conduct same

reasonably. See, Honda letter to NHTSA entitled “Honda and Acura Driver Airbag Safety

Improvement Campaign”, dated June 19, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “WW” (emphasis

added).

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194. According to Honda’s own “Campaign Plan”: “The owners of all vehicles will be

contacted by mail and asked to take their vehicle to a Honda or Acura automobile dealer. The

dealer will replace the driver’s airbag inflator, free of charge.” See, Id, at Page 3. Such letter

was submitted June 19, 2014. See, Id.

195. This “Safety Improvement Campaign” was acknowledged by NHTSA by letter

dated June 23, 2014, wherein the Agency responded saying: “We confirm that Honda has

notified the agency that it has not decided there is a safety defect in its vehicles, and is

conducting this recall out of an abundance of caution in the absence of a cognizable defect trend.

The objectives of the recall are twofold. The primary goal is to protect the drivers and passengers

in these areas for which there have been isolated incidents of inflator rupture on a wide variety of

manufacturer makes and models.” See, NHTSA letter entitled “Driver Side Air Bag Inflator may

Rupture”, dated June 23, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “XX” (emphasis added).

196. Despite the “primary goal” of the Safety Improvement Campaign to “protect the

drivers and passengers”, and knowledge that the Subject Vehicle had not been fixed per any of

the formal recalls spanning the preceding five (5) years, Honda did not act with the urgency

required by the danger of exploding Takata airbags.

197. In fact, while Honda was publically touting its efforts to protect those who were at

foreseeable risk of harm through its own “Safety Improvement Campaign”, behind the scenes,

the actual implementation and administration of the campaign was anything but urgent.

198. For example, on September 22, 2014, Honda’s “Interactive Network”, a

communications network used between the Honda Defendants and Honda and Acura dealerships,

shows a communication sent by “American Honda Parts, Service & Technical Division,

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Campaign Administration” to “All Honda Service Managers and Personnel” relative to the issue

of servicing cars with Takata airbags, which stated “Because not all part numbers are available in

abundant supply, American Honda asks that dealers do not proactively contact consumers at this

time. While American Honda wishes to accommodate any drive-in customers requesting repair,

actual notification of customers will occur as parts to support those notifications become

available.” See, Interactive Network posting entitled “2001-11 Multi-Model Airbag Inflator

Recalls INFORMATION UPDATE”, dated September 22, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “YY”

(emphasis added).

199. Exactly one (1) week later, TRAN was killed when the airbag in her 2001 Honda

Accord ruptured and exploded sending deadly metal fragments or shrapnel through her airbag

cushion causing fatal injuries.

200. Ultimately, Honda did provide “actual notification” to TRAN by two (2) separate

mailers. Both were delivered after her death.

201. The first mailer was received at TRAN’s correct home address bearing her correct

name by her grieving family in early October shortly after she passed away from her injuries.

See, Honda’s Safety Recall Notice for the Subject Vehicle entitled “IMPORTANT SAFETY

RECALL NOTICE”, dated “September 2014”, attached hereto as Exhibit “TT”. As this mailer

itself confirms, Honda had accurate information available to it for contacting TRAN regarding its

recall efforts, and could have done so before this unnecessary tragedy occurred had it acted

reasonably in light of its knowledge.

202. The second mailer was again received at TRAN’s correct home address bearing

her correct name by her family. This colorful, descriptive two-side mailer entitled “URGENT

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RECALL NOTICE AIRBAG INFLATOR” was received in early November, and asked owners

to “PLEASE HURRY!” and to “CALL YOUR CUSTOMER CARE HOTLINE SPECIALIST

RIGHT NOW AT 1-866-498-6390 TO SCHEDULE YOUR FREE REPAIR.” See, Honda’s

mailer entitled “Urgent Recall Notice Airbag Inflator”, received in early November, 2014,

attached hereto as Exhibit “ZZ”. As this secondary mailer itself confirms, Honda had accurate

information available to it for contacting TRAN per its Safety Improvement Campaign efforts,

and could have done so before this unnecessary tragedy occurred had it acted reasonably in light

of its knowledge.

203. Additionally, the second mailer, as created, designed and sent by Honda also

stands as an example of a “warning” that was more appropriate for the risks and hazards posed

by these airbags and the potential harms should they rupture or explode. Prior communications

by Honda and Takata relative to unreasonably dangerous and defective Takata airbag safety

systems in Honda brand vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle, were inadequate. Considering

existing knowledge at the relevant periods in time relative to the efficacy of warnings and

warning or safety campaigns, many of the communications by Honda and Takata were lacking in

how they were presented, their communication of the risk or hazard involved, and the nature of

the potential harm so as to cause those who may receive same to understand and appreciate the

immediate and continuing risks of exploding Takata airbags and the potentially lethal

consequences.

204. The failure to accomplish or complete the “Safety Improvement Campaign”

relative to the Subject Vehicle in a timely and appropriate fashion as would be reasonable in light

of the hazard of serious injury or death if not completed, constitutes a breach of said voluntarily

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undertaken duty and directly led to the death of TRAN when a defective Takata airbag exploded

in her vehicle on September 29, 2014.

205. At the end of the day, the Subject Vehicle had a defective and unreasonably

dangerous Takata airbag system incorporated into it by Honda, and, both Takata and Honda bear

responsibility for such airbag.

Takata’s Deviation from Established Design, Manufacturing and Quality Control Guidelines, Specifications and Rules Lead to Production of Defective Takata Airbags

206. As the extensive history of serious injuries and deaths evidences relative to

exploding Takata airbags, and the continuing expansion of recall efforts by Honda and Takata

reflects, there simply exist unreasonably dangerous and defective Takata airbags that have

inflators that are rupturing and/or exploding when the Takata airbag is triggered in foreseeable

crashes to provide the vehicle user(s) with supplemental accident protection as intended.

207. The “reasons”, “explanations” or “causes” for such ruptures and explosions have

been varied over time from both Honda and Takata as they try to explain away incidents and

justify ever-expanding recalls and safety improvement campaigns despite the prior assurances of

these entities to having addressed the safety issues. However, a review of statements, filings,

and reporting by both the Honda and Takata Defendants reveals acknowledged deviations from

safe practices as recognized within the industry and as are deemed state-of-the art when it comes

to the safe design, manufacturing, testing, and distribution of airbags for use.

208. In designing, developing, and conducting testing to ascertain a safe and reliable

manufacturing process to make propellant, inflators and completed airbag safety systems, Takata

made decisions as to how to source raw materials, how storage of materials could impact their

quality, the type of qualified manufacturing presses and machinery to utilize, the process and

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specifications for making propellant wafers and inflators to obtain the performance

characteristics desired for safe and intended airbag deployments, quality standards and

specifications for continuous and consistent manufacturing results, and the controls and quality

control measures necessary to ensure the uniform, consistent and verifiable manufacturing and

production of the explosive propellant, inflators, and, other airbag components to be used, to

ensure the making of reliable and safe airbag safety systems.

209. Additionally, in order to supply its products to its buyers, including automobile

manufactures like Honda, Takata established policies, procedures, standards, methods and

quality control measures and protocols to ensure the proper and effective distribution, shipping

and transport of their products through their own supply and distribution network.

210. Having made the myriad of design, manufacturing and quality control decisions

necessary to reasonably ensure the safe and reliable production of propellant, inflators and

completed airbag safety systems, Takata, then, due to production capacity issues from a growing

demand for their products and other financial and business reasons, failed to ensure the proper

sourcing and storage of raw materials, deviated from its own requirements with respect to the

types of qualified manufacturing presses and machinery that could be used to make propellant,

inflators and airbag safety systems, started using differing processes and a lessened capacity to

meet specifications to ensure the safe deployment of their airbags, deviated from the quality

standards and specifications for the overall manufacturing of Takata made propellant, inflators

and airbag systems, and failed to adhere to the same controls and quality control measures tested

and determined to be necessary to ensure the uniform, consistent and verifiable manufacture and

production of quality explosive propellant, inflators, and, other airbag components as used, to

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ensure their airbag safety systems were safe for use when distributed and sold. See, Reuters

article entitled “Exclusive: Takata engineers struggle to maintain airbag quality, documents

reveal”, dated October 17, 2014, attached as Exhibit “EE”.

211. As a result of such decisions and manufacturing practices, Takata produced

unreasonably dangerous and defective explosive propellant, inflators and airbags that where then

distributed and sold to at least ten (10) automobile manufacturers which caused multiple serious

injuries and deaths, including TRAN’s.

212. With “11 million” cars having already been recalled in the United States that

incorporated Takata airbags, the question remains as to how many other vehicles are also

impacted by this defect in the face of the changing explanations of Takata. See, Reuters article

“Exclusive: Takata changes chemical compound involved in air bag recall”, dated November

12, 2014, attached as Exhibit “AAA”. “Since 2000, Takata has made more than 100 million

inflators according to industry estimates and company data”, which raises serious safety

concerns. See, id. If, as recent changes by Takata in its propellant formula or “recipe” implicate,

and, the formula for the propellant used throughout this period degrades over time and is

unpredictably volatile if exposed to heat and moisture, then, massive continuing issues may exist,

and, Takata, despite making billions over the last decade, may be faced with significant financial

concerns to remedy its failures.

213. These financial realities may explain, in part, Takata’s inconsistent and changing

approach to downplaying this massive public safety issue that has already been determined to

impact millions of cars. If 100 million inflators have been sold in the past 14 years with the

same propellant design concern, then, the costs of replacing all those inflators could be

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enormous. Currently, if a consumer searches for a replacement “Airbag” for a “Driver”, the

retail replacement on discount websites like www.airbagcenter.com, shows a cost for such airbag

system for the driver’s location as two hundred twenty five dollars ($225.00). See, screen

capture of www.airbagcenter.com replacement cost screen for a 2001 Honda Accord driver’s

airbag, attached hereto as Exhibit “BBB”. To replace 100 million of those systems in total

could cost billions. Of course, the actual cost of replacing only the inflator is less, but the cost of

having to pay the dealerships for the time and expenses of conducting the replacement work has

to also be considered. Based on information from a repairing dealership, generally an inflator

will cost a consumer approximately seventy dollars ($70.00), and the labor is usually about two

hundred twenty five dollars ($225.00). It is not difficult to see how financial motives may well

be at play in the incomplete, misleading, and changing explanations of Takata for the continuing

occurrence of Takata airbag ruptures.

214. Certainly, over the past decade, Takata has continued to represent to the public,

OEM’s and NHTSA that the safety issues with its airbags have been addressed, and minimized

the significance and scope of the problem.

215. Takata, though employees like its spokeswoman, Alby Berman, continues to tout

Takata’s commitment to making “quality” products through public statements to media like that

to Reuters, when Ms. Berman stated “Takata remains focused on its mission_to produce the

highest quality products to ensure the safety of the driving and riding public.” See, Reuter’s

article entitled “Exclusive: Takata engineers struggled to maintain airbag quality, documents

reveal”, dated October 17, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “EE” (emphasis added). While

such statements espouse lofty goals, and, are obviously meant to re-assure the public of the

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safety of Takata made products that remain on the road, such claims, to the extent they are

inaccurate and do not reflect actual effort and “focus”, have the dangerous propensity to mislead

the public and even OEM’s, like Honda.

216. Honda spokeswoman, Akemi Ando, for example told Reuters in Janaury, 2014

that “Takata has been supplying airbags to fulfill Honda’s order quantity while guaranteeing the

quality of their components”, which, if taken at face value, is only exasperating the problem.

The ever expanding declaration of Takata airbags as defective with each new recall simply belies

the assurances of “quality” by Takata as the problems persist. See, Reuters article entitled

“Special Report: Deadly airbags backfire on firm that crossed “dangerous bridge’”, dated

January 13, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “CCC”.

217. The fact is that Takata is speaking out of both sides of its mouth, having already

also admitted errors like it did with Reuters in a January, 2014 interview where it reported that

“Where Takata now says it went wrong is in making those [propellant] wafers.” See, Id. Takata

also acknowledged that “It failed to properly store propellant to shield it from moisture, which

can cause it to crumble many years later. Some wafers were pressed together with too little

force.” See, Id.

218. Takata is also completely changing course with respect to the “propellant” that is

over-pressurizing the inflators in its airbags causing them to rupture shooting metal fragments at

vehicle users. On November 12, 2014, Reuters published an article “Exclusive: Takata changes

chemical compound involved in air bag recall”, which reported how “Takata Corp. has modified

the composition of an airbag propellant that contained a volatile chemical at the center of a recall

of millions of cars worldwide, the company told Reuters.” See, Reuters article “Exclusive:

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Takata changes chemical compound involved in air bag recall”, dated November 12, 2014,

attached as Exhibit “AAA”.

219. The Reuters Exclusive illuminated a number of items that have been suspected,

but, to date, had not been admitted or acknowledged by Takata, or its OEM buyers, like Honda.

First, the “Takata official, who did not want to be named but spoke on behalf of the company”

told Reuters that the shift or “change” in the “recipe” to a new composition that reduced the use

of “ammonium nitrate” from that used in airbags, like TRAN’s, “was safer than the one before”.

See, Id. Of course, Takata has stated that “There is no admission of a defect with the original

version”, and explains how they “changed the composition in an effort to improve quality”, but,

the fact remains that they have serious issues with how the propellant used is performing. See,

Id. Takata has admitted in a more limited fashion, however, that “the original version of the

compound, when exposed to moisture or improperly processed, can cause the inflators to

explode with excess force, spraying metal shards inside the car.” See, Id.

220. Airbag designers who have been following the developing story about Takata’s

airbag problems have begun to comment on “why” Takata inflators are exploding. One such

comment has been that: “At the core of Takata’s woes lies its choice of propellant formulation.

The airbag industry’s propellant engineers are well aware of the issues associated with

ammonium nitrate (AN) and moisture. What Takata apparently missed out on was the difficulty

of mitigating these issues and the significance of a failure. Airbag inflators have numerous leak

paths, sealed with combinations of welds, tapes, gaskets and plastic components. For Takata,

with their AN based propellant, the criticality of these seals makes for a design, manufacturing

and quality control nightmare. Since all inflators leak, acceptable leak rate, leak detection and

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reliability of seals is crucial. The effect of a failure is particularly alarming. With AN, when the

propellant absorbs sufficient moisture, propellant tablet structural integrity is lost, creating an

overpressure situation when the inflator is functioned. Unable to contain this pressure, an inflator

rapid disassembly occurs. The result is injury to the vehicle occupant due to inflator

fragmentation and material ejection.” See, the Automotive News article entitled “A harsher light

on Takata” posted on Autonews.com, which generated the above “comment” (unprintable) after

the article ran on November 9, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “DDD”. If such evaluation is

true, it sheds light on the recent changes to the propellant formula by Takata.

221. Considering what is known as of now, it appears that Takata may well have

design, manufacturing and quality control problems that are all interacting to seriously injure and

kill consumers and users of vehicles with Takata airbags. Design choices, like using

“ammonium nitrate, an inexpensive chemical commonly found in fertilizer and explosives”,

versus using the slightly more expensive “guanidine nitrate” as the main ingredient which is

“less volatile”, may be just one safety issue at the root of the problems. See, Reuters article

“Exclusive: Takata changes chemical compound involved in air bag recall”, dated November

12, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “AAA”. How the inflator itself was designed and tested,

may also be a contributing factor. Typically high pressure testing is conducted of containers so

that, if they become over-pressurized, they fail in a manner that does not involve “exploding”

sending metal fragments flying. With incident after incident of dangerous explosions sending

metal fragments flying at vehicle occupants, a lack of proper design efforts, FMEA testing and

high pressure testing are all implicated. And, of course, any time cost saving decisions are made

at the expensive of quality and safety, such conduct must be scrutinized.

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222. The decisions and actions of Takata in deviating from its established design and

manufacturing specifications, quality control guidelines, and recognized and accepted industry

standards for the manufacture and production of products resulted in multiple safety issues and

concerns that negatively impacted the ability of Takata airbags to safely perform as intended

when deployed in foreseeable crashes like TRAN’s.

223. Those safety issues and concerns that have been implicated to date include, but

are not limited to: inadequate supply chain management, poor design decisions with respect to

propellant formulation and inflator containers, propellant wafers made with inadequate

compaction force; propellant wafers exposed to elevated moisture during the manufacturing

process, which, when coupled with thermal cycling in vehicles over time cause the propellant

density to decline; inadequate and non-compliant processing of propellant into a wafer on certain

Stokes high-compression machines; improper handling of the propellant during the

manufacturing process; production of propellant wafers with lower material density; improper

sealing of propellant; out-of-specification propellant produced during 2001-2002 with quality

control that was inadequate to identify and remove dangerous and defective out-of-specification

propellant from the manufacturing process; non-complaint and out-of-specification airbag

inflators with an incorrect part(s); utilization of unreliable methods of sampling production;

construction of inflators that can develop excessive internal pressure and deploy energetically

and/or rupture in a manner not intended per the design; final production of propellant, inflators

and airbags that will explode due to inflator ruptures that send metal and plastic fragments into

the vehicle occupant compartment; and, otherwise creating a final airbag safety system product

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that is susceptible to foreseeable failure with prolonged exposure to heat and humidity over the

lifecycle of the vehicle said airbag system would foreseeably be utilized in.

224. The Takata Defendants failures to ensure the safe manufacture of airbags in their

manufacturing plants have recently been confirmed by the investigative efforts of the news

agency, Reuters. In an “Exclusive” article dated October 17, 2014, Reuters reported that “As

recently as 2011, supervisors at Takata’s Monclova plant were reporting potentially lethal

defects in the manufacturing process. Based on internal Takata documents, Takata was unable to

meet its own standards for safety up until at least 2011.” See, Reuters article entitled “Exclusive:

Takata engineers struggled to maintain air bag quality, documents reveal”, dated October 17,

2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “EE”. Additionally, despite the variety of existing theories

proposed by Takata to federal regulators as to the sources of the defects, according to documents

reviewed by Reuters, Takata also cited rust, bad welds, and even chewing gum dropped into at

least one inflator as reasons for the defects. See, Id. The same documents are reported as also

showing that in 2002, Takata’s plant in Mexico allowed a defect rate that was “six to eight times

above” acceptable limits, or roughly 60 to 80 defective parts for every 1 million airbag inflators

shipped. See, Id.

225. All of this information as reported serves as evidence of significant deviations

from recognized standards of care occurring in the manufacture of Takata airbags.

226. Additionally, despite establishing policies, procedures, standards, methods and

quality control measures and protocols to ensure the proper and effective distribution of their

products post-production through their own supply and distribution network, Takata ignored

identified problems and safety concerns in the operation of its distribution chain and centers as

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Takata struggled to meet increasing demand for its products without properly accounting for

what was necessary to accomplish same safely without placing consumers and users of vehicles

using Takata products, including their airbags, at risk of serious injury or death.

227. Such failures included exposing Takata made propellant, inflators and airbags to

moisture and weather during transport, shipping and distribution, mishandling such products

causing damage to the propellant, inflators and airbags, and, otherwise ignoring observations and

recommendations relative to problems in the transport, shipping and distribution of airbag safety

system products as were made by Takata’s own employees and management as such safety

concerns were identified. See, The New York Times article entitled “Takata Saw and Hid Risk in

Airbags 2004, Former Workers Say” dated November 6, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “G”.

228. The numerous issues and concerns with the design, manufacture, testing,

distribution and sale of Takata airbags as addressed herein represents an unacceptable deviation

by Takata from recognized safe practices and industry standards, and, in a natural and continuous

sequence, have directly led to serious injuries and deaths when Takata airbags have foreseeably

ruptured causing metal fragments to strike vehicle occupants upon deployment of the Takata

airbag safety systems causing serious injuries and deaths, like that of TRAN.

Honda’s Deviation from Established Safety Practices Lead to Use of Defective Takata Airbags

229. Takata’s failures in designing, manufacturing, testing, distributing and warning

about the unreasonably dangerous and defective condition of Takata made airbags, however, also

implicates similar failures by Honda, who made its own decision to select and utilize Takata

airbags in its production vehicles for sale to its “customers” and the consuming public, including

persons like TRAN.

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230. In selecting Takata airbags for use, Honda had its own independent duties and

obligations, as are well recognized and common practice for other OEM’s, to ensure the safety

systems they incorporate into their vehicles are designed, manufactured, inspected, tested and

delivered in a condition free of defects that could foreseeably cause serious injuries or deaths.

231. Honda had an obligation to conduct reasonable visits and inspections to

independently confirm that the Takata airbags they selected for use were made in a safe and

reliable manner consistent with agreed upon designs, manufacturing processes, and quality

control measures and safeguards, including continuous and ongoing testing. Honda failed to

meet such independent duties and obligations, deviating from the standard of care and common

practices as recognized within the industry and by other OEM’s.

232. Had Honda undertaken its obligations properly, Honda would have reasonably

been able to identify the significant safety issues and concerns with respect to Takata’s design

and manufacture of Honda airbags.

233. A reasonable undertaking by Honda would have revealed, among other possible

issues, the following: inadequate raw materials and supply chain management by Takata,

deficient design specifications as to the formula for the propellant to be used and the inflator

containers to be used to house same by Takata; propellant wafers made with inadequate

compaction force by Takata; propellant wafers exposed to elevated moisture during the

manufacturing process by Takata, which, when coupled with thermal cycling in vehicles over

time cause the propellant density to decline; inadequate and non-compliant processing of

propellant into a wafer on certain Stokes high-compression machines by Takata; improper

handling of the propellant during the manufacturing process by Takata; production of propellant

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wafers with lower material density by Takata; improper sealing of propellant by Takata; out-of-

specification propellant produced during 2001-2002 with quality control that was inadequate to

identify and remove dangerous and defective out-of-specification propellant from the

manufacturing process by Takata; non-complaint and out-of-specification airbag inflators with

an incorrect part(s) made by Takata; utilization of unreliable methods of sampling production by

Takata; construction of inflators that can develop excessive internal pressure and deploy

energetically and/or rupture in a manner not intended per the design used by Takata; final

production of propellant, inflators and airbags made by Takata that will explode due to inflator

ruptures that send metal fragments into the vehicle occupant compartment; and, otherwise could

have identified and acted to cure the problem and issue of Takata producing airbag safety system

products, including the airbag in TRAN’s vehicle, that are susceptible to foreseeable failure with

prolonged exposure to heat and humidity over the lifecycle of the Honda brand vehicles said

airbag systems are utilized in.

234. Honda has even acknowledged that “manufacturing error” has occurred with

Takata, and, with the exercise of reasonable care, Honda could have acted to address same before

dangerous and defective airbag safety systems were incorporated and installed in Honda brand

vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle. See, Honda Service Bulletin 10-039, entitled “Safety

Recall: Replacement Driver’s Airbag Inflator Can Be Over-Pressurized”, dated September 12,

2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “EEE”. Honda, in its “Service Bulletin” dated September 12,

2014, relative to “Replacement Driver’s Airbag Inflator Can Be Over-Pressurized”, recognized

that “A small number of airbag modules with defective inflators were sold”, and stated that “A

manufacturing error can produce over-pressurization of some replacement driver’s (front) airbag

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inflators during airbag deployment … [and] may cause an inflator casing to rupture. Metal

fragments could pass through the airbag cushion material, possibly causing an injury or fatality

to vehicle occupants.” See, Id. (emphasis added).

235. Similarly, on February 8, 2013, Honda, in a meeting with NHTSA over the

Agency’s “ongoing investigation” into Honda’s defective Takata airbags, admitted that “A

recreation of propellant production using the same methods as were used during 2001-2002

production periods indicated that it was possible for propellant produced during 2001-2002 to be

manufactured out of specification without the manufacturing processes correctly identifying and

removing the out of specification propellant.” See, Letter from Honda to NHTSA, dated April

10, 2013, attached hereto as Exhibit “PP”, at Page 2-3 (emphasis added).

236. Additionally, had Honda exercised reasonable care and complied with recognized

safe practices and industry standards relative to ensuring the quality of the component parts

chosen to be sourced for use from outside suppliers, like Takata, Honda would have known, or

should have known, of the safety issues and concerns with Takata’s distribution chain. Honda’s

failure to conduct regular and continuing inspections, to visit distribution facilities, to review

materials and documents to ensure that proper policies, procedures, protocols and checks were in

place and being complied with, and, to otherwise ensure quality control was maintained during

transport and shipping, allowed problems and safety concerns in Takata’s operation of its

distribution chain and centers to persist and continue endangering Honda brand vehicle

customers, users, and owners, like TRAN.

237. Moreover, Honda, by conducting its own product quality control and performance

testing on a regular and continuing basis as Takata airbags were received by Honda for

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incorporation into Honda brand vehicles, could have identified and prevented unnecessary

serious injuries and deaths from occurring.

238. It is a generally accepted industry practice and custom to conduct regular,

ongoing and independent testing and quality control of component parts as they are received

from a third-party supplier. Not only must an OEM, like Honda, enter into a business

relationship initially with reasonable safe guards built in to ensure quality componentry is being

made and delivered, but, as the OEM is ultimately the one using the component as part of its

final product, such OEM’s have a well-recognized obligation and duty to take the steps

necessary to ensure the components used are actually of the quality desired so as to match their

design specifications and perform as intended. As a “Chrysler spokesperson” recently

acknowledged when asked about Chrysler’s lack of Takata airbag issues in its vehicles despite

using Takata and other suppliers, “[our components] benefit from robust manufacturing

processes and are subject to rigorous daily testing. None [have] exhibited the failure modes that

have prompted current investigations.” See, Reuters article “Exclusive: Takata changes chemical

compound involved in air bag recall”, dated November 12, 2014, attached as Exhibit “AAA”.

The disparity of problems experienced by Honda as compared to other OEM’s, like Chrysler,

who has described “robust manufacturing processes” and “daily testing” as part of its quality

control, suggests that Honda may well have failed to undertake its obligations in a similar

reasonable fashion.

239. This is particularly true as incident after incident continued to occur in Honda

brand vehicles over the past decade. Despite purported assurances by Takata that all safety

concerns relative to the design, manufacture, testing, and/or distribution of its airbags had been

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addressed, Honda had its own responsibilities and obligations to ascertain if safety defects

existed in Honda brand vehicles, and to take the necessary action to address same. With an ever

increasing number of Honda brand vehicles being recalled due to the risks posed by exploding

Takata airbags, it is apparent that Honda failed to act reasonably to itself try to proactively

identify, address and resolve the ongoing dangers posed by Takata airbags in Honda brand

vehicle so as to protect its customers, users, and owners, like TRAN.

240. As Allan J. Kam, “a former senior enforcement official for N.H.T.S.A.” was

quoted as saying by The New York Times relative to this safety issue, “even one exploding air

bag should have set off alarms at Honda.” He went on to say that “When you have something

like that, you put all your resources into conducting a thorough investigation. You don’t just

delegate out the responsibility to your supplier.” See, The New York Times article entitled “Air

Bag Flaw, Long Known to Honda and Takata, Led to Recalls”, dated September 11, 2014,

attached hereto as Exhibit “K” (emphasis added). Unfortunately, looking at how Honda

“examined” and “investigated” the issue of exploding Takata airbags since 2004, as is reflected

in many of their written disclosures to NHTSA, a heavy reliance and “delegation” of their own

non-delegable duties is seen.

241. The numerous issues and concerns with respect to Honda and the design,

manufacture, testing, distribution and use of Takata airbags in Honda brand vehicles, including

the Subject Vehicle, as addressed herein represents an unacceptable deviation by Honda from

recognized safe practices and industry standards, and, in a natural and continuous sequence, have

directly led to serious injuries and deaths when Takata airbags have foreseeably ruptured causing

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metal fragments to strike Honda brand vehicle occupants upon deployment of the Takata airbag

safety systems causing serious injuries and deaths, like that of TRAN.

New Federal Investigations and Drastic Actions Taken as of October 2014 after the Death of TRAN

242. In the wake of the discovery of the continuing and unresolved public safety

hazard posed by exploding Takata airbags, the federal government and the agencies tasked with

helping to protect the public and to prosecute civil and criminal violations of law, have jumped

into action to uncover the continuing nature of the risks posed by Takata airbags, whether

broader remedial action may be necessary to protect the public, and why information was not

disclosed as required by law or in the interest of public safety and the preservation of human

lives.

243. In a rare Consumer Advisory dated October 22, 2014, the NHTSA took action to

stress the seriousness of the most recent safety recall, saying: “The National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration urges owners of certain Toyota, Honda, Mazda, BMW, Nissan,

Mitsubishi, Subaru, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors vehicles to act immediately on recall

notices to replace defective Takata airbags. Over seven million vehicles are involved in these

recalls, which have occurred as far back as 18 months ago and as recently as Monday. The

message comes with urgency, especially for owners of vehicles affected by regional recalls in the

following areas: Florida, Puerto Rico, limited areas near the Gulf of Mexico in Texas, Alabama,

Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana, as well as Guam, Saipan, American Samoa, Virgin Islands

and Hawaii.”

244. Additionally, as more and more information becomes publically available about

what both Takata and Honda knew over time, and how they failed to make EWR disclosures as

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required by federal law and regulations, both NHTSA and the Department of Justice have

become more actively involved in ferreting out the truth.

245. With respect to Takata, the DOT has delegated authority to the Chief Counsel of

NHTSA by a “Special Order” dated October 30, 2014, to investigate what Takata knew and

knows, with TK HOLDINGS having been ordered to provide responses to “demands [for]

certain information and documents” “signed under oath” no later than “December 1, 2014”, as to

the newly initiated “PE14-016 Air Bag Inflator Rupture” investigation. See, Special Order

Directed to TK Holdings, Inc., dated October 30, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”.

246. With respect to Honda, the DOT has delegated authority to the Chief Counsel of

NHTSA by a “Special Order” dated November 5, 2014, to investigate what Honda knew and

knows, with AHM having been ordered to provide responses to “demands [for] certain

information and documents” “signed under oath” no later than “December 15, 2014”, as to the

newly initiated “PE14-016 Air Bag Inflator Rupture” investigation. See, Special Order Directed

to American Honda Motor, Co., Inc., dated November 5, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “B”;

see, also Automotive News article entitled “Honda ordered to deliver airbag documents to

NHTSA”, dated November 5, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “FFF”.

247. As reported by CBS News on November 7, 2014, late on November 6th the

“NHTSA said it is ‘actively investigating Honda for its early warning reporting and compelling

Honda to produce documents and answer questions under oath dating back to 1998. We will

leave no stone unturned as we review everything we have and new information we receive. Any

additional information that may aid our ongoing investigation is welcome and encourages current

and former employees to please contact NHTSA directly’.” See, the CBS News report entitled

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“Report: Takata covered up airbag dangers decade ago”, dated November 7, 2014, attached

hereto as Exhibit “I”.

248. These comments came on the heels of revelations by Takata whistleblowers to the

The New York Times that “Japanese air bag manufacturer Takata knew ten years ago that its

airbags could explode with deadly force, but covered up the results of secret tests”. See, Id. As

reported by The New York Times, “two former employees” of Takata, “one of whom was a

senior member of its testing lab”, “secretly conducted testing on 50 airbags it retrieved from

scrapyards” after a Takata airbag “ruptured and spewed metal debris at a driver in Alabama” in

2004. See, The New York Times article entitled “Takata Saw and Hid Risk in Airbags 2004,

Former Workers Say”, dated November 6, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “G”. During the

secret tests “[t]he steel inflators in two of the airbags cracked…, a condition that can lead to a

rupture, the former employees said.” See, Id. According to the article, the Takata employees

were startled by the results, and “engineers began designing possible fixes in preparation for a

recall”. See, Id. “But instead of alerting federal safety regulators to the possible danger, Takata

executives discounted the results and ordered the lab technicians to delete the testing data from

their computers and dispose of the airbag inflators in the trash”. See, Id. (emphasis added). “The

secret tests, which have not been previously disclosed, were performed after normal work hours

and on weekends and holidays during summer 2004 at Takata’s American headquarters in

Auburn Hills, Mich., the former employees said”, and, “were supervised by Al Bernat, then

Takata’s vice president for engineering”. See, Id. (emphasis added).

249. And, as to both, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has now also been

reported as investigating whether Honda and/or Takata misled U.S. regulators and hid

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information. On November 9, 2014, Automotive News reported on congressional calls to DOJ

to do just that based on the recent New York Times report of Takata conducting and then

destroying secret tests in 2004, citing Sens. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., and Edward Markey,

D-Mass., as saying “If the reports are true, the company must be held accountable for the horrific

deaths and injuries that its wrongdoing caused. These allegations are credible and shocking –

plainly warranting a prompt and aggressive probe.” See, Automotive News article “A harsher

light on Takata”, dated November 9, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “DDD”.

250. Other automotive manufacturers are also taking dramatic action as more

information is learned of the extent, scope and potentially deadly risks associated with Takata

airbags. Like NHTSA and the DOJ, they are reacting to the development of information about

this massive safety issue as it becomes public after years of active concealment and

misrepresentations by Takata and Honda, the largest OEM user of Takata airbag systems.

251. In response to the resulting airbag replacement parts shortage, Toyota has taken

the extreme step of disabling passenger airbags entirely and putting a “Do Not Sit Here” decal in

the vehicle until a proper repair can be made. In the alternative, Toyota is advising customers to

not drive their vehicles with Takata airbags until the airbags can be replaced.

252. Congress is also concerned with this serious problem. U.S. Senators Richard

Blumenthal and Edward J. Markey, in a letter to the Department of Transportation, “urge[d] [the

DOT] to provide clear guidance regarding [NHTSA’s] October 21st Consumer Advisory about

potentially defective Takata airbags.” See, Letter from U.S. Senators Richard Blumenthal and

Edward J. Markey to the U.S. Department of Transportation, dated October 23, 2014, attached

hereto as Exhibit “GGG”.

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253. The Senators expressed their belief “that NHTSA should immediately issue a

nation-wide safety recall on all the affected cars, regardless of where the car is registered.

NHTSA’s October 21, 2014 Consumer Advisory provided “no factual basis for distinguishing

between states or regions of the country regarding the potential severe danger of this defect to

motorists. All state experience seasons of heat and humidity . . . Replacement parts are,

‘essential to personal safety,’ for all drivers whether they live in New England or Florida, and the

NHTSA should immediately issue a nation-wide recall that protects all drivers.” See, Id.

254. Considering the wave of new and disturbing information coming in daily about

the conduct of Takata and Honda, on Thursday, November 20th, 2014, a U.S. Senate Committee

is set to begin hearings into the recalls of defective Takata airbags. See, Automotive News article

entitled “Senate to hold hearing on Takata airbag recalls; company subpoenaed by U.S. grand

jury”, dated November 13, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “HHH”. According to the recent

Automotive news article, not only will this be the first chance for “lawmakers to publically

question Takata”, but, “[l]awmakers are also expected to question, Honda, Takata’s biggest

customer. All five fatalities linked to Takata airbags have been in Honda vehicles.” See, Id.

255. With mounting pressure and scrutiny from NHTSA, DOJ, Congress and safety

groups, Honda on November 6, 2014, again announced yet another “expanded recall.” See, the

CBS News piece entitled “Honda expands Takata air bag recall in southern states” dated

November 7, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit “III”. As reported by CBS News “The expansion

comes just a few days after the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration demanded

information in an investigation from Honda about air bag recalls. The agency is looking into

whether Honda failed to report information as required by law.” See, Id.; see also, Reuters

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article entitled “Facing U.S. safety probe, Honda expands air bag recall”, dated November 6,

2014, attached as Exhibit “J”.

COUNT I

STRICT LIABILITY OF HMC 256. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety

system and/or Subject Vehicle, as well as this Defendant's relationship to other parties named

herein, the Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 to 30 by reference and realleges same.

257. With respect to facts, historical information, and certain conduct, action and/or

inactions of this Honda Defendant relative to this Strict Liability Count, including factual and

legal details pled specifically in support of same, including this Defendant's legal duties and

obligations as recognized, accepted or otherwise imposed by state law, common law, and/or

federal law and regulations, the Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 31 to Z by reference

and realleges same.

258. Defendant, HMC, at all times material hereto, was engaged in the business of

designing, manufacturing, assembling, testing, marketing, promoting, advertising, distributing

and selling Honda brand vehicles such as the Subject Vehicle to the public.

259. Defendant, HMC, as the maker of the Subject Vehicle with an incorporated

Takata airbag safety system who placed such vehicle into the marketplace so as to be distributed

and sold in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition, is strictly liable for the physical

harm caused by the Subject Vehicle’s airbag safety system, when, upon deployment of its

driver’s side frontal air bag, the inflator in same ruptured causing metal fragments to strike

TRAN causing fatal injuries in this foreseeable accident which occurred on September 29, 2014,

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ultimately, resulting in her death on October 2, 2014. See, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts,

§402A.

260. Defendant, HMC, in incorporating a Takata airbag safety system into the Subject

Vehicle which it made and sold, which is not a component system that, once incorporated, is

subject to any routine maintenance, adjustment or diagnostic review that would change its

condition from how it was designed, manufactured and installed, would have expected the

Takata airbag safety system in the Subject Vehicle to reach the user or consumer without

substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.

261. In this instance, the Subject Vehicle, and its incorporated Takata airbag safety

system, reached TRAN without substantial change, and, just as when it was originally made and

sold by HMC, such vehicle and its airbag safety system remained a life threatening hazard when

the Subject Vehicle was purchased by TRAN on June 4, 2013. Further, the Subject Vehicle and

its incorporated Takata airbag safety system was not substantially changed from the time it was

purchased by TRAN on or about June 4, 2013, until the date of this accident on September 29,

2014.

262. Defendant, HMC, placed the Subject Vehicle on the market with knowledge that

it would be used without inspection for defects and dangers. The Defendant knew, or should

have known, that ultimate users, operators, or passengers would not and could not properly

inspect this product, including its airbag safety system, for defects and dangerous conditions, and

that detection of such defects and dangers would be beyond the capabilities of such persons.

263. The inherently and unreasonably defective and dangerous condition of the Subject

Vehicle’s Takata airbag system is a condition that was not readily apparent to TRAN, or

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similarly situated users, operators, consumers and owners, who could foreseeably be seriously

injured or killed by said defective airbag safety system should it be deployed as intended to

provide supplemental occupant protection in a foreseeable frontal crash like occurred here.

264. Defendant, HMC, having actual knowledge, failed to provide notice of the




Vehicle was purchased by TRAN in Orlando, Florida.

265. Defendant, HMC, has affirmatively concealed over the past decade the defective

and unreasonably dangerous condition of the Subject Vehicle’s Takata airbag system from the

public, NHTSA, and owners, including TRAN, and, such ongoing and continuous conduct,

actions and inactions as has been specifically pled in this Complaint over time has foreseeably

contributed to and/or caused the general public, NHTSA and owners, like TRAN, to be unaware

of the dangers of exploding Takata airbags and/or lack an understanding or appreciation for the

magnitude of the problem and potentially lethal harms of same.

266. As a consequence, TRAN did not know of the dangerous condition in the Subject

Vehicle at the time of purchase. Additionally, TRAN did not know of the dangerous condition

during the period of her ownership and use of the Subject Vehicle prior to the subject accident.

Had TRAN been informed at any time prior to purchasing the Subject Vehicle of the potentially

lethal defect in the airbag system, she would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle, and,

accordingly, she would not have been exposed to said defective and unreasonably dangerous

condition. Further, had TRAN been informed at any time during the period of her ownership and

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use of the Subject Vehicle prior to the subject accident of the potentially lethal defect in the

airbag system, she would not have continued to drive and use the Subject Vehicle without having

the condition corrected, and, accordingly, she would not have been exposed to the defective and

unreasonably dangerous condition as described above when she was in an accident on September

29, 2014.

267. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was defective and unreasonably

dangerous to ultimate users, operators, consumers and owners, including TRAN, when designed,

manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold by Defendant, HMC. The defects in the Airbag

Safety System in the Subject Vehicle include, but are not limited to:

a. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when deployed as intended in a foreseeable frontal accident to provide the driver with supplemental occupant protection;

b. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle had an unreasonably dangerous propensity to rupture upon inflation due to excessive internal pressure, resulting in metal fragments passing through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking vehicle drivers, like TRAN;

c. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was unreasonably dangerous because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when deployed as intended, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;

d. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was unreasonably dangerous

because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when it deployed in a manner reasonably foreseeable to HMC, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;

e. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was unreasonably dangerous

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because of its design in that the risk of danger in the design outweighed the benefits when deployed as intended, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;

f. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was unreasonably dangerous

and defective with an inflator having a propensity to rupture upon inflation sending metal fragments flying through the airbag cushion material because: it was not produced in accordance with available alternative designs that were safer, feasible, and technically practicable; it was not state of the art and was not designed and manufactured to the level of technical knowledge that existed when it was made; and, it was made in such a way that it posed a risk of danger to vehicle users, like TRAN, that outweighed the benefits of that airbag safety system as designed and manufactured;

g. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was unreasonably dangerous

as manufactured as it did not conform to its intended design and perform as safely as the intended design would have performed, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN; and

h. The Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was unreasonably dangerous

and defective due to HMC’s failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks addressed herein that were known or knowable to HMC in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and/or medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution, including the use of appropriate warning stickers, placards, or documentation to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions described herein.

268. At the time of the accident, the Subject Vehicle, including specifically its airbag

safety system, was substantially unchanged from its condition, as set forth above, when sold and

distributed by the Defendant, HMC.

269. For the reasons set forth above, and as addressed in the preceding portions of this

Complaint as have been specifically incorporated and realleged, the Subject Vehicle was

unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable users, including TRAN, who was the driver of the

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Subject Vehicle in an ordinary and foreseeable manner. At the time HMC released the Subject

Vehicle with its airbag safety system into the stream of commerce, non-defective designs were

economically and technologically feasible and the use of same on the Subject Vehicle would

have been a safer alternative design which would have significantly reduced the risk of

Plaintiff’s injuries without substantially impairing the utility of the Subject Vehicle and its airbag

safety system.

270. The defects described above directly and proximately caused the fatal injuries

sustained by TRAN in this foreseeable accident, in that they directly and in natural and

continuous sequence produced or contributed substantially to TRAN’s death.

271. As a result of the death of TRAN, the Estate of HIEN THI TRAN, has suffered

damages including medical or funeral expenses due to her death which have become a charge

against her Estate or that were paid on behalf of the Decedent, suffered the loss of future

earnings and net accumulations, and all other damages as allowed by Florida Statutes Sec.

768.21. Additionally, pursuant to Florida Statutes Sec. 768.21, Tina Tran Dang, the sister of

HIEN THI TRAN, has suffered damages including loss of support and services. Phi Ngoc Tran,

the brother of HIEN THI TRAN, has suffered damages including loss of support and services.

Tuan Ngoc Tran, the brother of HIEN THI TRAN, has suffered damages including loss of

support and services. Phu Ngoc Tran, the brother of HIEN THI TRAN, has suffered damages

including loss of support and services. Thuy Thi Tran, the sister of HIEN THI TRAN, has

suffered damages including loss of support and services. Thanh Thi Tran, the sister of HIEN THI

TRAN, has suffered damages including loss of support and services. Loan Thi Tran, the sister of

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HIEN THI TRAN, has suffered damages including loss of support and services. Tran Viet Hung,


WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendant, HMC, for

compensatory damages, costs, and interest, and for such other relief as the Court deems just and

demands a trial by jury on all issues as a matter of right.

COUNT II

NEGLIGENCE OF HMC

272. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety




inactions of this Honda Defendant relative to this Negligence Count, including factual and legal

details pled specifically in support of same, including this Defendant's legal duties and

obligations as recognized or otherwise imposed by state law, common law, and/or federal law

and regulations, the Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs Y to Z by reference and realleges

same.

274. Defendant, HMC, had a duty to properly and adequately design, manufacture,

assemble, test, inspect, label, provide adequate warnings for, package, distribute, and sell the

Subject Vehicle, including its incorporated airbag safety system, in a reasonably safe condition so as

not to present a danger to members of the general public who reasonably and expectedly under

ordinary circumstances would come into contact with the Subject Vehicle and its airbag safety

system, including TRAN.

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275. Defendant, HMC, knew or in the exercise of due care should have known that the

Subject Vehicle with its incorporated Takata airbag safety system would be used without inspection

in an unreasonably dangerous condition and would create a foreseeable and unreasonable zone of

risk of harm to users, including TRAN.

276. Defendant, HMC, breached its duty by negligently designing, manufacturing,

assembling, testing, inspecting, labeling, packaging, failing to warn, distributing, and selling the

Subject Vehicle with its incorporated Airbag Safety System when it was not in a reasonably safe

condition for foreseeable use, as follows:

a. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle would perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when deployed as intended in a foreseeable frontal accident to provide the driver with supplemental occupant protection;

b. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was safe, and would not rupture upon inflation due to excessive internal pressure, resulting in metal fragments passing through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking vehicle drivers, like TRAN;

c. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System to be incorporated into the Subject

Vehicle as supplied by a third-party, namely Takata, would be designed, manufactured, tested, distributed and provided for purchase in a manner to ensure it was free of design and/or manufacturing defects, and/or would not otherwise be damaged or compromised during the distribution process before use;

d. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was not

unreasonably dangerous because of its design so that the driver’s front airbag inflator could produce excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;

e. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was not

unreasonably dangerous and defective with an inflator having a propensity to rupture upon inflation sending metal fragments flying through the airbag cushion material because: it was not produced in accordance with available alternative designs that were safer, feasible, and technically practicable; it was

98

not state of the art and was not designed and manufactured to the level of technical knowledge that existed when it was made; and, it was made in such a way that it posed a risk of danger to vehicle users, like TRAN, that outweighed the benefits of that airbag safety system as designed and manufactured;

f. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was not

unreasonably dangerous as manufactured so that the driver’s front airbag inflator could produce excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;

g. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System as delivered for incorporation into

the Subject Vehicle was not damaged or rendered unreasonably dangerous due to damage or compromise sustained during transport or shipping;

h. Failing to require and ensure verification of the use of reasonable testing and

quality control checks on a continuing basis by Takata during the design, development, manufacture, distribution and final delivery/acceptance processes relative to the Airbag Safety System before its incorporation into the Subject Vehicle where it would then not be further susceptible or subject to further inspection before delivery to foreseeable users of the Subject Vehicle;

i. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System was safe for incorporation and use

in the Subject Vehicle before being incorporated and used by undertaking reasonable steps, including the utilization of testing, quality control and other recognized measures on a continuing basis to ensure product quality for safe use;

j. Failing to ensure the defective Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle

was fixed, repaired, or made safe in a reasonable and timely manner pursuant to the recall(s) of the Subject Vehicle by HMC pursuant to the Safety Act;

k. Failing to ensure timely notification and completion of the repair of the

Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle upon voluntarily undertaking the duty to do so, including, specifically the initiation of Honda’s safety improvement campaign(s); and

l. Failing to warn or adequately warn by using stickers, placards, or other proper

documentation, or notice, to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions and risks, as stated above, which a user would not reasonably expect to find in the product and which HMC had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable,

99

developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, with respect to the use and operation of the Subject Vehicle.

277. The negligence described above, inclusive of the conduct, actions and inactions as

addressed in the preceding portions of this Complaint as have been specifically incorporated and

realleged, directly and proximately caused the wrongful death of TRAN, in that it directly and in

natural and continuous sequence, produced or contributed substantially to TRAN’s death.















WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, HMC, for



100

COUNT III

STRICT LIABILITY OF HRD 279. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety








and realleges same.

281. Defendant, HRD, at all times material hereto, was engaged in the business of



282. Defendant, HRD, as the maker of the Subject Vehicle with an incorporated Takata

airbag safety system who placed such vehicle into the marketplace so as to be distributed and

sold in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition, is strictly liable for the physical harm

caused by the Subject Vehicle’s airbag safety system, when, upon deployment of its driver’s side

frontal air bag, the inflator in same ruptured causing metal fragments to strike TRAN causing

fatal injuries in this foreseeable accident which occurred on September 29, 2014, ultimately,

resulting in her death on October 2, 2014. See, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, §402A.

101

283. Defendant, HRD, in incorporating a Takata airbag safety system into the Subject








sold by HRD, such vehicle and its airbag safety system remained a life threatening hazard when




2014.

285. Defendant, HRD, placed the Subject Vehicle on the market with knowledge that it

would be used without inspection for defects and dangers. The Defendant knew, or should have

known, that ultimate users, operators, or passengers would not and could not properly inspect

this product, including its airbag safety system, for defects and dangerous conditions, and that

detection of such defects and dangers would be beyond the capabilities of such persons.




102



287. Defendant, HRD, having actual knowledge, failed to provide notice of the





288. Defendant, HRD, has affirmatively concealed over the past decade the defective















103




29, 2014.



manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold by Defendant, HRD. The defects in the Airbag






because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when it deployed in a manner reasonably foreseeable to HRD, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;


because of its design in that the risk of danger in the design outweighed the benefits when deployed as intended, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator

104

produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;






and defective due to HRD’s failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks addressed herein that were known or knowable to HRD in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and/or medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution, including the use of appropriate warning stickers, placards, or documentation to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions described herein.



distributed by the Defendant, HRD.




Subject Vehicle in an ordinary and foreseeable manner. At the time HRD released the Subject

105





safety system.


















106

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendant, HRD, for



COUNT IV

NEGLIGENCE OF HRD









same.

297. Defendant, HRD, had a duty to properly and adequately design, manufacture,






298. Defendant, HRD, knew or in the exercise of due care should have known that the


107



299. Defendant, HRD, breached its duty by negligently designing, manufacturing,











unreasonably dangerous and defective with an inflator having a propensity to rupture upon inflation sending metal fragments flying through the airbag cushion material because: it was not produced in accordance with available alternative designs that were safer, feasible, and technically practicable; it was not state of the art and was not designed and manufactured to the level of technical knowledge that existed when it was made; and, it was made in such a way that it posed a risk of danger to vehicle users, like TRAN, that outweighed the benefits of that airbag safety system as designed and

108

manufactured;

f. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was not unreasonably dangerous as manufactured so that the driver’s front airbag inflator could produce excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;








was fixed, repaired, or made safe in a reasonable and timely manner pursuant to the recall(s) of the Subject Vehicle by HRD pursuant to the Safety Act;




documentation, or notice, to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions and risks, as stated above, which a user would not reasonably expect to find in the product and which HRD had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, with respect to the use and operation of the Subject Vehicle.

109



















WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, HRD, for



110

COUNT V

STRICT LIABILITY OF AHM 302. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety








and realleges same.

304. Defendant, AHM, at all times material hereto, was engaged in the business of



305. Defendant, AHM, as the maker of the Subject Vehicle with an incorporated







§402A.

111

306. Defendant, AHM, in incorporating a Takata airbag safety system into the Subject








sold by AHM, such vehicle and its airbag safety system remained a life threatening hazard when




2014.

308. Defendant, AHM, placed the Subject Vehicle on the market with knowledge that








112



310. Defendant, AHM, having actual knowledge, failed to provide notice of the





311. Defendant, AHM, has affirmatively concealed over the past decade the defective















113




29, 2014.



manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold by Defendant, AHM. The defects in the Airbag






because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when it deployed in a manner reasonably foreseeable to AHM, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;



114







and defective due to AHM’s failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks addressed herein that were known or knowable to AHM in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and/or medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution, including the use of appropriate warning stickers, placards, or documentation to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions described herein.



distributed by the Defendant, AHM.




Subject Vehicle in an ordinary and foreseeable manner. At the time AHM released the Subject

115





safety system.


















116

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendant, AHM, for



COUNT VI

NEGLIGENCE OF AHM









same.

320. Defendant, AHM, had a duty to properly and adequately design, manufacture,






321. Defendant, AHM, knew or in the exercise of due care should have known that the


117



322. Defendant, AHM, breached its duty by negligently designing, manufacturing,












118

manufactured;









was fixed, repaired, or made safe in a reasonable and timely manner pursuant to the recall(s) of the Subject Vehicle by AHM pursuant to the Safety Act;




documentation, or notice, to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions and risks, as stated above, which a user would not reasonably expect to find in the product and which AHM had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, with respect to the use and operation of the Subject Vehicle.

119



















WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, AHM, for



120

COUNT VII

(Violation of Florida’s Unfair & Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.))

325. This claim is brought on behalf of TRAN against AHM.





inactions of the Honda and Takata Defendants, including this Defendant, relative to this Florida

Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“FUDTPA”) Count, including factual and legal

details pled specifically in support of same, and this Defendant's legal duties and obligations as

recognized, accepted or otherwise imposed by state law, common law, and/or federal law and

regulations, the Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 31 to Z by reference and realleges same.

328. TRAN was a “consumer” within the meaning of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive

Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7).

329. Defendants engaged in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. §

501.203(8).

330. The FUDTPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or

practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce....”

Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1). Defendants participated in unfair and deceptive trade practices that

violated the FUDTPA causing TRAN actual damages as described herein, and, accordingly,

FUDPTA authorizes a consumer, like TRAN, to recover actual damages, attorney’s fees, and

court costs for said violation. See, Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §

121

501.201 et seq. In the instant Count, Plaintiff is seeking recovery based on the cost of the

unreasonably dangerous and defective 2001 Honda Accord and/or its airbag safety system

which, as incorporated, had a lethal propensity for harm and rendered the Subject Vehicle

without value or diminished value due to said condition at all times material hereto, including the

Subject Vehicle’s current unusable condition.

331. In the course of its business, Defendant, AHM, willfully failed to disclose and

actively concealed the dangers and risks posed by the Takata airbags in the Subject Vehicle as

described herein and otherwise engaged in activities with a tendency or capacity to deceive.

Defendants also engaged in unlawful trade practices by employing deception, deceptive acts or

practices, fraud, misrepresentations, or concealment, suppression or omission of any material

fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection

with the sale of defective Honda brand vehicles incorporating Takata airbag safety systems.

332. As alleged herein, Defendant, AHM, knew of the Takata airbags’ dangers and

risks, while the public, including TRAN, was deceived by the Defendants’ omission into

believing the Subject Vehicle, Honda brand vehicles, and/or Takata airbag safety systems as

used in same were safe, and the information could not have reasonably been known by the

consumer.

333. The Defendant, AHM, knew or should have known that its conduct violated the

FUDTPA.

334. As alleged herein, the Defendant, AHM, made material statements about the

safety and reliability of the Subject Vehicle, Honda brand vehicles, and/or Takata airbag safety

systems as used in same that were either false or misleading.

122

335. Defendant, AHM, engaged in deceptive trade practices when it failed to fully and

accurately disclose material information concerning the Subject Vehicle, similar Honda brand

vehicles with dangerous Takata airbags incorporated into same, and/or about exploding Takata

airbags of which they knew. Defendant, AHM, deliberately withheld the information about the

propensity of Takata airbag safety systems to rupture upon deployment sending metal and plastic

fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the

vehicle’s driver or other occupants.

336. To protect their profits and to avoid remediation costs and a public relations

nightmare, Defendant, AHM, concealed the Takata airbag dangers and defects and their tragic

consequences and allowed unsuspecting used car purchasers, like TRAN, to continue to buy used

vehicles with unreasonably dangerous and defective exploding Takata airbag safety systems that

they would then drive.

337. The Defendant, AHM, owed Florida consumers, including TRAN, a duty to

disclose the dangerous and defective nature of Honda brand vehicles with Takata airbags,

including the potentially lethal risk that the Takata airbag would explode and/or rupture sending

metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the

vehicle’s driver or other occupants, because they:

(a) Possessed exclusive knowledge of the defects rendering Honda brand

vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags inherently more

dangerous and unreliable than similar vehicles and/or airbags;

(b) Intentionally concealed the hazardous situation with Honda brand vehicles

like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags through their deceptive marketing

123

campaign, rolling or expanding recall approach, and public statements that were designed

to hide the life-threatening problems from the Florida public and consumers, like TRAN;

and/or

(c) Made incomplete representations about the safety and reliability of Honda

brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags generally and/or the

Takata airbags in particular, while purposefully withholding material facts from the

Florida public and consumers, like TRAN, that contradicted these representations.

338. The Honda brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags

and the Takata airbags as a safety system posed and/or pose an unreasonable risk of death or

serious bodily injury to the Florida public and consumers and users of Honda brand vehicles like

the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags, because they are unreasonably dangerous and

the driver’s front airbag inflator is susceptible to producing excessive internal pressure upon

deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion

material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver or other vehicle occupants.

339. The unfair or deceptive acts or practices of Defendant, AHM, were likely to

deceive reasonable consumers, including TRAN, about the true safety and reliability of Honda

brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags and/or Takata airbags. The

Defendant intentionally and knowingly misrepresented material facts regarding the Honda brand

vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags and/or Takata airbags with an

intent to mislead the Florida public and consumers, like TRAN.

340. The propensity of Honda brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective

Takata airbags to have their Takata airbags explode or rupture upon deployment was material to

124

the Florida public and consumers, like TRAN. Had the Florida public and consumers, including

TRAN, known that their Honda brand vehicle had these serious safety defects because of the

incorporated Takata airbag safety system, such consumers, including TRAN, would either not

have purchased such Honda brand vehicles with Takata airbags, or would have stopped using

same if they were already owned until the danger of such airbags was cured.

341. TRAN as a consumer and the owner of the Subject Vehicle which she purchased

on or about June 4, 2013, and operated up until the subject accident on September 29, 2014, has

been actually damaged by Defendant’s misrepresentations, concealment, and non-disclosure of

the dangers and risks posed by the Takata airbags in the Subject Vehicle. Such vehicle has a

greatly diminished value due to it having a lethal Takata airbag system incorporated into it by

Honda, and, due to the failure of Honda and Takata to timely disclose and remedy the dangers

and risks posed by said Takata airbag safety system, such vehicle is not useable or sellable at fair

market value.

342. As a direct and proximate result of violations by the Defendant, AHM, of the

FUDTPA, TRAN, a Florida consumer who purchased and continued to use a Honda brand

vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbag until the date of the accident has

suffered actual damage.

343. TRAN is entitled to recover actual damages under Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2) and

attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1).

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, AHM, for unfair,

unlawful, and/or deceptive practices, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and proper relief

available under the FUDTPA and demands a trial by jury on all issues as a matter of right.

125

COUNT VIII

STRICT LIABILITY OF HAM 344. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety








and realleges same.

346. Defendant, HAM, at all times material hereto, was engaged in the business of



347. Defendant, HAM, as the maker of the Subject Vehicle with an incorporated







§402A.

126

348. Defendant, HAM, in incorporating a Takata airbag safety system into the Subject








sold by HAM, such vehicle and its airbag safety system remained a life threatening hazard when




2014.

350. Defendant, HAM, placed the Subject Vehicle on the market with knowledge that








127



352. Defendant, HAM, having actual knowledge, failed to provide notice of the





353. Defendant, HAM, has affirmatively concealed over the past decade the defective















128




29, 2014.



manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold by Defendant, HAM. The defects in the Airbag






because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when it deployed in a manner reasonably foreseeable to HAM, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;



129







and defective due to HAM’s failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks addressed herein that were known or knowable to HAM in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and/or medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution, including the use of appropriate warning stickers, placards, or documentation to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions described herein.



distributed by the Defendant, HAM.




Subject Vehicle in an ordinary and foreseeable manner. At the time HAM released the Subject

130





safety system.


















131

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendant, HAM, for



COUNT IX

NEGLIGENCE OF HAM









same.

362. Defendant, HAM, had a duty to properly and adequately design, manufacture,






363. Defendant, HAM, knew or in the exercise of due care should have known that the


132



364. Defendant, HAM, breached its duty by negligently designing, manufacturing,












133

manufactured;









was fixed, repaired, or made safe in a reasonable and timely manner pursuant to the recall(s) of the Subject Vehicle by HAM pursuant to the Safety Act;




documentation, or notice, to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions and risks, as stated above, which a user would not reasonably expect to find in the product and which HAM had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, with respect to the use and operation of the Subject Vehicle.

134



















WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, HAM, for



135

COUNT X

STRICT LIABILITY OF TAKATA 367. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety




inactions of this Takata Defendant relative to this Strict Liability Count, including factual and




and realleges same.

369. Defendant, TAKATA, at all times material hereto, was engaged in the business of

designing, manufacturing, testing, marketing, promoting, advertising, distributing and selling

restraint systems, specifically including airbag safety systems, to automobile manufacturers, like

Honda, who would incorporate such airbag safety systems into their vehicles like was done by

Honda here when it incorporated a Takata airbag safety system into the Subject Vehicle.

370. Defendant, TAKATA, as the maker of the Takata airbag safety system

incorporated into the Subject Vehicle who placed such airbag system into the marketplace so as

to be distributed and sold in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition, is strictly liable

for the physical harm caused by the Subject Vehicle’s airbag safety system, when, upon

deployment of its driver’s side frontal airbag, the inflator in same ruptured causing metal

fragments to strike TRAN causing fatal injuries in this foreseeable accident which occurred on

136

September 29, 2014, ultimately, resulting in her death on October 2, 2014. See, Restatement of

the Law, Second, Torts, §402A.

371. Defendant, TAKATA, in making and selling a Takata airbag safety system to

Honda to be incorporated into the Subject Vehicle, which is not a component system that, once

incorporated, is subject to any routine maintenance, adjustment or diagnostic review that would

change its condition from how it was designed, manufactured and installed, would have expected

the Takata airbag safety system in the Subject Vehicle to reach the user or consumer without




sold by TAKATA to Honda and installed into the Subject Vehicle as delivered, such vehicle and

its airbag safety system remained a life threatening hazard when the Subject Vehicle was

purchased by TRAN on June 4, 2013. Further, the Subject Vehicle and its incorporated Takata

airbag safety system was not substantially changed from the time it was purchased by TRAN on

or about June 4, 2013, until the date of this accident on September 29, 2014.

373. Defendant, TAKATA, placed the Takata airbag safety system as incorporated into

the Subject Vehicle on the market with knowledge that it would be used without inspection for

defects and dangers. The Defendant knew, or should have known, that ultimate users, operators,

or passengers would not and could not properly inspect this product, including specifically its

airbag safety system, for defects and dangerous conditions, and that detection of such defects and

dangers would be beyond the capabilities of such persons.

137






375. Defendant, TAKATA, having actual knowledge, failed to provide notice of the





376. Defendant, TAKATA, has affirmatively concealed over the past decade the

defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the Subject Vehicle’s Takata airbag system

from the public, NHTSA, and owners, including TRAN, and, such ongoing and continuous

conduct, actions and inactions as has been specifically pled in this Complaint over time has

foreseeably contributed to and/or caused the general public, NHTSA and owners, like TRAN, to

be unaware of the dangers of exploding Takata airbags and/or lack an understanding or

appreciation for the magnitude of the problem and potentially lethal harms of same.






138







29, 2014.



manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold by Defendant, TAKATA. The defects in the

Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle include, but are not limited to:





because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when it deployed in a manner reasonably foreseeable to TAKATA, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending

139

metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;








and defective due to TAKATA’s failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks addressed herein that were known or knowable to TAKATA in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and/or medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution, including the use of appropriate warning stickers, placards, or documentation to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions described herein.



distributed by the Defendant, TAKATA.

140

380. For the reasons set forth above, the Takata airbag safety system in the Subject

Vehicle was unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable users, including TRAN, who was the driver

of the Subject Vehicle in an ordinary and foreseeable manner. At the time TAKATA released

the airbag safety system used by Honda in the Subject Vehicle into the stream of commerce,

non-defective designs were economically and technologically feasible and the use of same on the

Subject Vehicle would have been a safer alternative design which would have significantly

reduced the risk of Plaintiff’s injuries without substantially impairing the utility of the Subject

Vehicle and its airbag safety system.















141




WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendant, TAKATA, for



COUNT XI

NEGLIGENCE OF TAKATA





inactions of this Takata Defendant relative to this Negligence Count, including factual and legal




and realleges same.

385. Defendant, TAKATA, had a duty to properly and adequately design, manufacture,

assemble, test, inspect, label, provide adequate warnings for, package, distribute, and sell the airbag

safety system that was incorporated into the Subject Vehicle, in a reasonably safe condition so as


142



386. Defendant, TAKATA, knew or in the exercise of due care should have known that

the Subject Vehicle with its incorporated Takata airbag safety system would be used without

inspection in an unreasonably dangerous condition and would create a foreseeable and unreasonable

zone of risk of harm to users, including TRAN.

387. Defendant, TAKATA, breached its duty by negligently designing, manufacturing,







Vehicle as supplied by TAKATA would be designed, manufactured, tested, distributed and provided for purchase in a manner to ensure it was free of design and/or manufacturing defects, and/or would not otherwise be damaged or compromised during the distribution process before use;




unreasonably dangerous and defective with an inflator having a propensity to

143

rupture upon inflation sending metal fragments flying through the airbag cushion material because: it was not produced in accordance with available alternative designs that were safer, feasible, and technically practicable; it was not state of the art and was not designed and manufactured to the level of technical knowledge that existed when it was made; and, it was made in such a way that it posed a risk of danger to vehicle users, like TRAN, that outweighed the benefits of that airbag safety system as designed and manufactured;




the Subject Vehicle was not damaged or rendered unreasonably dangerous due to damage or compromise during transport or shipping;


quality control checks on a continuing basis during the design, development, manufacture, distribution and final delivery/acceptance processes relative to the Airbag Safety System before its incorporation into the Subject Vehicle where it would then not be further susceptible or subject to further inspection before delivery to foreseeable users of the Subject Vehicle;


in the Subject Vehicle before being provided to Honda by undertaking reasonable steps, including the utilization of testing, quality control and other recognized measures on a continuing basis to ensure product quality for safe use;


was fixed, repaired, or made safe in a reasonable and timely manner pursuant to the recall(s) of the Subject Vehicle by Honda pursuant to the Safety Act;


Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle upon voluntarily undertaking the duty to do so, including, specifically the initiation of safety campaigns or product recall type activities; and


documentation, or notice, to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions and risks, as stated above, which a user would not reasonably expect to find in the

144

product and which TAKATA had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, with respect to the use and operation of the Subject Vehicle.



















WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, TAKATA, for


145


COUNT XII

STRICT LIABILITY OF TAKATA, INC. 390. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety








and realleges same.

392. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., at all times material hereto, was engaged in the

business of designing, manufacturing, testing, marketing, promoting, advertising, distributing

and selling restraint systems, specifically including airbag safety systems, to automobile

manufacturers, like Honda, who would incorporate such airbag safety systems into their vehicles

like was done by Honda here when it incorporated a Takata airbag safety system into the Subject

Vehicle.

393. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., as the maker of the Takata airbag safety system




146





394. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., in making and selling a Takata airbag safety system

to Honda to be incorporated into the Subject Vehicle, which is not a component system that,

once incorporated, is subject to any routine maintenance, adjustment or diagnostic review that

would change its condition from how it was designed, manufactured and installed, would have

expected the Takata airbag safety system in the Subject Vehicle to reach the user or consumer

without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.



sold by TAKATA, INC. to Honda and installed into the Subject Vehicle as delivered, such

vehicle and its airbag safety system remained a life threatening hazard when the Subject Vehicle

was purchased by TRAN on June 4, 2013. Further, the Subject Vehicle and its incorporated

Takata airbag safety system was not substantially changed from the time it was purchased by

TRAN on or about June 4, 2013, until the date of this accident on September 29, 2014.

396. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., placed the Takata airbag safety system as

incorporated into the Subject Vehicle on the market with knowledge that it would be used

without inspection for defects and dangers. The Defendant knew, or should have known, that

ultimate users, operators, or passengers would not and could not properly inspect this product,

147

including specifically its airbag safety system, for defects and dangerous conditions, and that







398. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., having actual knowledge, failed to provide notice of

the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the Subject Vehicle’s Takata airbag

system to TRAN, or any prior owners of the Subject Vehicle between October 26, 2000, when it

was first titled for use by its “first owner” in Flushing, New York, and June 4, 2013, when the

Subject Vehicle was purchased by TRAN in Orlando, Florida.

399. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., has affirmatively concealed over the past decade the










148









29, 2014.



manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold by Defendant, TAKATA, INC. The defects in the

Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle include, but are not limited to:





149

because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when it deployed in a manner reasonably foreseeable to TAKATA, INC., in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;








and defective due to TAKATA, INC.’s failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks addressed herein that were known or knowable to TAKATA, INC. in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and/or medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution, including the use of appropriate warning stickers, placards, or documentation to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions described herein.

150



distributed by the Defendant, TAKATA, INC.



of the Subject Vehicle in an ordinary and foreseeable manner. At the time TAKATA, INC.

released the airbag safety system used by Honda in the Subject Vehicle into the stream of

commerce, non-defective designs were economically and technologically feasible and the use of

same on the Subject Vehicle would have been a safer alternative design which would have

significantly reduced the risk of Plaintiff’s injuries without substantially impairing the utility of

the Subject Vehicle and its airbag safety system.












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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendant, TAKATA, INC.,

for compensatory damages, costs, and interest, and for such other relief as the Court deems just

and demands a trial by jury on all issues as a matter of right.

COUNT XIII

NEGLIGENCE OF TAKATA, INC.









and realleges same.

408. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., had a duty to properly and adequately design,

manufacture, assemble, test, inspect, label, provide adequate warnings for, package, distribute, and

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sell the airbag safety system that was incorporated into the Subject Vehicle, in a reasonably safe

condition so as not to present a danger to members of the general public who reasonably and

expectedly under ordinary circumstances would come into contact with the Subject Vehicle and its

airbag safety system, including TRAN.

409. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., knew or in the exercise of due care should have known

that the Subject Vehicle with its incorporated Takata airbag safety system would be used without

inspection in an unreasonably dangerous condition and would create a foreseeable and unreasonable

zone of risk of harm to users, including TRAN.

410. Defendant, TAKATA, INC., breached its duty by negligently designing,

manufacturing, assembling, testing, inspecting, labeling, packaging, failing to warn, distributing,

and selling the Subject Vehicle with its incorporated Airbag Safety System when it was not in a

reasonably safe condition for foreseeable use, as follows:




Vehicle as supplied by TAKATA, INC. would be designed, manufactured, tested, distributed and provided for purchase in a manner to ensure it was free of design and/or manufacturing defects, and/or would not otherwise be damaged or compromised during the distribution process before use;


unreasonably dangerous because of its design so that the driver’s front airbag inflator could produce excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion

153

material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;

e. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was not unreasonably dangerous and defective with an inflator having a propensity to rupture upon inflation sending metal fragments flying through the airbag cushion material because: it was not produced in accordance with available alternative designs that were safer, feasible, and technically practicable; it was not state of the art and was not designed and manufactured to the level of technical knowledge that existed when it was made; and, it was made in such a way that it posed a risk of danger to vehicle users, like TRAN, that outweighed the benefits of that airbag safety system as designed and manufactured;













154


documentation, or notice, to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions and risks, as stated above, which a user would not reasonably expect to find in the product and which TAKATA, INC. had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, with respect to the use and operation of the Subject Vehicle.



















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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, TAKATA, INC.,



COUNT XIV

STRICT LIABILITY OF TK HOLDINGS 413. With respect to the relationship of this Defendant to the subject airbag safety








and realleges same.

415. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, at all times material hereto, was engaged in the

business of designing, manufacturing, testing, marketing, promoting, advertising, distributing

and selling restraint systems, specifically including airbag safety systems, to automobile

manufacturers, like Honda, who would incorporate such airbag safety systems into their vehicles

like was done by Honda here when it incorporated a Takata airbag safety system into the Subject

Vehicle.

416. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, as the maker of the Takata airbag safety system


156







417. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, in making and selling a Takata airbag safety system

to Honda to be incorporated into the Subject Vehicle, which is not a component system that,

once incorporated, is subject to any routine maintenance, adjustment or diagnostic review that

would change its condition from how it was designed, manufactured and installed, would have

expected the Takata airbag safety system in the Subject Vehicle to reach the user or consumer

without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.



sold by TK HOLDINGS to Honda and installed into the Subject Vehicle as delivered, such

vehicle and its airbag safety system remained a life threatening hazard when the Subject Vehicle

was purchased by TRAN on June 4, 2013. Further, the Subject Vehicle and its incorporated

Takata airbag safety system was not substantially changed from the time it was purchased by

TRAN on or about June 4, 2013, until the date of this accident on September 29, 2014.

419. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, placed the Takata airbag safety system as

incorporated into the Subject Vehicle on the market with knowledge that it would be used

without inspection for defects and dangers. The Defendant knew, or should have known, that

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ultimate users, operators, or passengers would not and could not properly inspect this product,

including specifically its airbag safety system, for defects and dangerous conditions, and that







421. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, having actual knowledge, failed to provide notice of

the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the Subject Vehicle’s Takata airbag

system to TRAN, or any prior owners of the Subject Vehicle between October 26, 2000, when it

was first titled for use by its “first owner” in Flushing, New York, and June 4, 2013, when the

Subject Vehicle was purchased by TRAN in Orlando, Florida.

422. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, has affirmatively concealed over the past decade the









158










29, 2014.



manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold by Defendant, TK HOLDINGS. The defects in

the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle include, but are not limited to:




159


because of its design in that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when it deployed in a manner reasonably foreseeable to TK HOLDINGS, in that the driver’s front airbag inflator produced excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;








and defective due to TK HOLDINGS’s failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks addressed herein that were known or knowable to TK HOLDINGS in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and/or medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution, including the use of appropriate warning stickers, placards, or documentation to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions described herein.

160



distributed by the Defendant, TK HOLDINGS.



of the Subject Vehicle in an ordinary and foreseeable manner. At the time TK HOLDINGS

released the airbag safety system used by Honda in the Subject Vehicle into the stream of

commerce, non-defective designs were economically and technologically feasible and the use of

same on the Subject Vehicle would have been a safer alternative design which would have

significantly reduced the risk of Plaintiff’s injuries without substantially impairing the utility of

the Subject Vehicle and its airbag safety system.












161







WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, demands judgment against Defendant, TK HOLDINGS,



COUNT XV

NEGLIGENCE OF TK HOLDINGS









and realleges same.

431. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, had a duty to properly and adequately design,

manufacture, assemble, test, inspect, label, provide adequate warnings for, package, distribute, and

162

sell the airbag safety system that was incorporated into the Subject Vehicle, in a reasonably safe

condition so as not to present a danger to members of the general public who reasonably and

expectedly under ordinary circumstances would come into contact with the Subject Vehicle and its

airbag safety system, including TRAN.

432. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, knew or in the exercise of due care should have

known that the Subject Vehicle with its incorporated Takata airbag safety system would be used

without inspection in an unreasonably dangerous condition and would create a foreseeable and

unreasonable zone of risk of harm to users, including TRAN.

433. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, breached its duty by negligently designing,

manufacturing, assembling, testing, inspecting, labeling, packaging, failing to warn, distributing,

and selling the Subject Vehicle with its incorporated Airbag Safety System when it was not in a

reasonably safe condition for foreseeable use, as follows:




Vehicle as supplied by TK HOLDINGS would be designed, manufactured, tested, distributed and provided for purchase in a manner to ensure it was free of design and/or manufacturing defects, and/or would not otherwise be damaged or compromised during the distribution process before use;


unreasonably dangerous because of its design so that the driver’s front airbag inflator could produce excessive internal pressure upon deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion

163

material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver, TRAN;

e. Failing to ensure the Airbag Safety System in the Subject Vehicle was not unreasonably dangerous and defective with an inflator having a propensity to rupture upon inflation sending metal fragments flying through the airbag cushion material because: it was not produced in accordance with available alternative designs that were safer, feasible, and technically practicable; it was not state of the art and was not designed and manufactured to the level of technical knowledge that existed when it was made; and, it was made in such a way that it posed a risk of danger to vehicle users, like TRAN, that outweighed the benefits of that airbag safety system as designed and manufactured;













164


documentation, or notice, to alert users regarding the hazardous conditions and risks, as stated above, which a user would not reasonably expect to find in the product and which TK HOLDINGS had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, with respect to the use and operation of the Subject Vehicle.



















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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, TK HOLDINGS,



COUNT XVI

(Violation of Florida’s Unfair & Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.))

436. This claim is brought on behalf of TRAN against TK HOLDINGS.





inactions of the Honda and Takata Defendants, including this Defendant, relative to this Florida

Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“FUDTPA”) Count, including factual and legal

details pled specifically in support of same, and this Defendant's legal duties and obligations as

recognized, accepted or otherwise imposed by state law, common law, and/or federal law and

regulations, the Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 31 to Z by reference and realleges same.

439. TRAN was a “consumer” within the meaning of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive

Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7).

440. Defendants engaged in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. §

501.203(8).

441. The FUDTPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or

practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce....”

Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1). Defendants participated in unfair and deceptive trade practices that

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violated the FUDTPA causing TRAN actual damages as described herein, and, accordingly,

FUDPTA authorizes a consumer, like TRAN, to recover actual damages, attorney’s fees, and

court costs for said violation. See, Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §

501.201 et seq. In the instant Count, Plaintiff is seeking recovery based on the cost of the

unreasonably dangerous and defective 2001 Honda Accord and/or its airbag safety system

which, as incorporated, had a lethal propensity for harm and rendered the Subject Vehicle

without value or diminished value due to said condition at all times material hereto, including the

Subject Vehicle’s current unusable condition.

442. In the course of its business, Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, willfully failed to

disclose and actively concealed the dangers and risks posed by the Takata airbags in the Subject

Vehicle as described herein and otherwise engaged in activities with a tendency or capacity to

deceive. Defendants also engaged in unlawful trade practices by employing deception, deceptive

acts or practices, fraud, misrepresentations, or concealment, suppression or omission of any

material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in

connection with the sale of defective Honda brand vehicles incorporating Takata airbag safety

systems.

443. As alleged herein, Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, knew of the Takata airbags’

dangers and risks, while the public, including TRAN, was deceived by the Defendants’ omission

into believing the Subject Vehicle, Honda brand vehicles, and/or Takata airbag safety systems as

used in same were safe, and the information could not have reasonably been known by the

consumer.

167

444. The Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, knew or should have known that its conduct

violated the FUDTPA.

445. As alleged herein, the Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, made material statements

about the safety and reliability of the Subject Vehicle, Honda brand vehicles, and/or Takata

airbag safety systems as used in same that were either false or misleading.

446. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, engaged in deceptive trade practices when it failed

to fully and accurately disclose material information concerning the Subject Vehicle, similar

Honda brand vehicles with dangerous Takata airbags incorporated into same, and/or about

exploding Takata airbags of which they knew. Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, deliberately

withheld the information about the propensity of Takata airbag safety systems to rupture upon

deployment sending metal and plastic fragments through the airbag cushion material into the

occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver or other occupants.

447. To protect their profits and to avoid remediation costs and a public relations

nightmare, Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, concealed the Takata airbag dangers and defects and

their tragic consequences and allowed unsuspecting used car purchasers, like TRAN, to continue

to buy used vehicles with unreasonably dangerous and defective exploding Takata airbag safety

systems that they would then drive.

448. The Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, owed Florida consumers, including TRAN, a

duty to disclose the dangerous and defective nature of Honda brand vehicles with Takata airbags,

including the potentially lethal risk that the Takata airbag would explode and/or rupture sending

metal fragments through the airbag cushion material into the occupant compartment striking the

vehicle’s driver or other occupants, because they:

168

(a) Possessed exclusive knowledge of the defects rendering Honda brand

vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags inherently more

dangerous and unreliable than similar vehicles and/or airbags;

(b) Intentionally concealed the hazardous situation with Honda brand vehicles

like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags through their deceptive marketing

campaign, rolling or expanding recall approach, and public statements that were designed

to hide the life-threatening problems from the Florida public and consumers, like TRAN;

and/or

(c) Made incomplete representations about the safety and reliability of Honda

brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags generally and/or the

Takata airbags in particular, while purposefully withholding material facts from the

Florida public and consumers, like TRAN, that contradicted these representations.

449. The Honda brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags

and the Takata airbags as a safety system posed and/or pose an unreasonable risk of death or

serious bodily injury to the Florida public and consumers and users of Honda brand vehicles like

the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags, because they are unreasonably dangerous and

the driver’s front airbag inflator is susceptible to producing excessive internal pressure upon

deployment causing the inflator to rupture sending metal fragments through the airbag cushion

material into the occupant compartment striking the vehicle’s driver or other vehicle occupants.

450. The unfair or deceptive acts or practices of Defendant, TK HOLDINGS, were

likely to deceive reasonable consumers, including TRAN, about the true safety and reliability of

Honda brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags and/or Takata

169

airbags. The Defendant intentionally and knowingly misrepresented material facts regarding the

Honda brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbags and/or Takata

airbags with an intent to mislead the Florida public and consumers, like TRAN.

451. The propensity of Honda brand vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective

Takata airbags to have their Takata airbags explode or rupture upon deployment was material to

the Florida public and consumers, like TRAN. Had the Florida public and consumers, including

TRAN, known that their Honda brand vehicle had these serious safety defects because of the

incorporated Takata airbag safety system, such consumers, including TRAN, would either not

have purchased such Honda brand vehicles with Takata airbags, or would have stopped using

same if they were already owned until the danger of such airbags was cured.

452. TRAN as a consumer and the owner of the Subject Vehicle which she purchased

on or about June 4, 2013, and operated up until the subject accident on September 29, 2014, has

been actually damaged by Defendant’s misrepresentations, concealment, and non-disclosure of

the dangers and risks posed by the Takata airbags in the Subject Vehicle. Such vehicle has a

greatly diminished value due to it having a lethal Takata airbag system incorporated into it by

Honda, and, due to the failure of Honda and Takata to timely disclose and remedy the dangers

and risks posed by said Takata airbag safety system, such vehicle is not useable or sellable at fair

market value.

453. As a direct and proximate result of violations by the Defendant, TK HOLDINGS,

of the FUDTPA, TRAN, a Florida consumer who purchased and continued to use a Honda brand

vehicles like the Subject Vehicle with defective Takata airbag until the date of the accident has

suffered actual damage.

170

454. TRAN is entitled to recover actual damages under Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2) and

attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1).

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demand judgment against Defendant, TK HOLDINGS,

for unfair, unlawful, and/or deceptive practices, attorneys’ fees, and any other just and proper

relief available under the FUDTPA and demands a trial by jury on all issues as a matter of right.

TABLE OF EXHIBITS

To ensure that the Court and parties hereto have an easily accessible list of the

“Exhibits” referenced and incorporated by Plaintiff into this Complaint in support of the

allegations made, that are also submitted in support of the sixteen (16) Counts contained herein,

the Plaintiff would attached a “Table of Exhibits”. Such Table of Exhibits is as follows:

A. The “Letters of Administration” duly appointing Tine Tran Dang as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Hien Thi Tran to act for the benefit of all potential beneficiaries;

B. Special Order Directed to American Honda Motor Co., Inc., dated November 5, 2014;

C. Special Order Directed to TK Holdings, Inc., dated October 30, 2014;

D. Florida Highway Patrol diagram;

E. Photographs taken November 11, 2014 at the FHP Investigative Inspection with NHTSA showing the ruptured inflator, a metal fragment found, and the airbag cushion with documented exit holes from metal fragments;

F. Photograph of Subject Vehicle airbag markings “HONDA 000 8414, 09 08 00, ‘S’ Assembled in Mexico with U.S.A. Components”, taken November 11, 2014;

G. The New York Times article entitled “Takata Saw and Hid Risks in Airbags in 2004, Former Workers Say”, dated November 6, 2014;

H. Businessweek article entitled “Warning: This Air Bag May Contain Shrapnel”, dated October 30, 2014;

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I. CBS News report entitled “Report: Takata covered up airbag dangers decade ago”, dated November 7, 2014;

J. Reuters article entitled “Facing U.S. safety probe, Honda expands air bag recall”, dated November 6, 2014;

K. The New York Times article entitled “Air Bag Flaw, Long Known to Honda and Takata,

Led to Recalls”, dated September 11, 2014;

L. Materials related to this incident involving Ms. Griffin, including the accident report and pictures of the car, airbag, and shrapnel;

M. Materials related to this incident involving Ms. Parham, including the Complaint, Answer, and Order approving judgment;

N. Media reports related to this incident involving Ms. Rathore;

O. Williams Complaint filed in the suit arising out of said incident;

P. Materials related to this incident involving Ms. Emmanuel, including the accident report and Complaint;

Q. Materials related to this incident involving Ms. Blowe, including the accident report and a copy of the VOQ complaint filed with NHSTA by Ms. Blowe’s representatives;

R. Materials related to this incident involving Mr. Nasworthy, including the accident report and a copy of the VOQ complaint filed with NHSTA by Mr. Nasworthy’s representatives;

S. Materials related to this incident involving Ms. Erdman, including the Complaint and pictures of the car, airbag, and shrapnel;

T. Materials related to this incident involving Mr. Xu, including the accident report and an article reporting on the accident;

U. Burdick Complaint involving said incident;

V. Materials related to the incident involving Ms. Nunez, including the accident report, Complaint, and pictures of the airbag and shrapnel;

W. Florida Traffic Crash Report, dated September 29, 2014;

X. Bloomberg article entitled “Warning: This Air Bag May Contain Shrapnel”, dated October 30, 2014;

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Y. CNN news piece entitled “Honda CEO takes $47,000 pay cut over recalls”, dated

October 24, 2014;

Z. Owens Complaint involving this incident;

AA. Materials related to this incident involving Ms. Cosgrove, including the accident report and pictures of the airbag and shrapnel;

BB. CAS Letter, dated December 5, 2011;

CC. CAS Letter, dated October 15, 2014;

DD. Special Order relative to NHTSA investigation AQ14-004 directed to American Honda

Motor, Co. Inc., dated November 3, 2014;

EE. Reuters article entitled “Exclusive: Takata engineers struggled to maintain air bag quality, documents reveal”, dated October 17, 2014;

FF. Screen print of “Honda Mile Makers – Owner Stories – Official Honda Web Site”,

dated 10/27/14; GG. Car and Driver article entitled “Honda and Takata Allegedly Knew About Deaths,

Injuries from Exploding Airbags for Years Before Recall Expansion”, dated September 15, 2014;

HH. Honda Recall Notification 08V-593, dated November 11, 2008;

II. Honda Recall Notification 09V-259, dated August 19, 2009;

JJ. Letter from Honda American Motor Co. to NHTSA, dated September 16, 2009;

KK. Letter from Takata to NHTSA, dated December 23, 2009;

LL. Letter from Takata to NHTSA, dated February 19, 2010;

MM. Honda Recall Notification 10V-04, dated February 9, 2010;

NN. Honda Recall Notification 11V-260, dated April 27, 2011;

OO. Honda Recall Notification 13V-132, dated April 10, 2013;

PP. Letter from Honda to NHTSA, dated April 10, 2013;

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QQ. Takata’s DIR, dated April 22, 2013;

RR. Honda Recall Notification 14V-351, dated August 29, 2014;

SS. “Recall Results Look-up by VIN” from the NHTSA Safercar.gov website, dated 10/27/2014;

TT. Honda “Safety Recall Notice”, dated “September 2014” as was directed to “Hien

Tran”; UU. CarFax Vehicle History Report for the Subject 2001 Honda Accord; VV. Photograph of Subject Vehicle airbag markings “HONDA 000 8414, 09 08 00, ‘S’

Assembled in Mexico with U.S.A. Components”, taken November 11, 2014; WW. Honda letter to NHTSA entitled “Honda and Acura Driver Airbag Safety

Improvement Campaign”, dated June 19, 2014; XX. NHTSA letter entitled “Driver Side Air Bag Inflator may Rupture”, dated June 23,

2014; YY. Interactive Network posting entitled “2001-11 Multi-Model Airbag Inflator Recalls

INFORMATION UPDATE”, dated September 22, 2014; ZZ. Honda’s mailer entitled “Urgent Recall Notice Airbag Inflator”, received in early

November, 2014 by Plaintiff; AAA. Reuters article “Exclusive: Takata changes chemical compound involved in air bag

recall”, dated November 12, 2013; BBB. Screen capture of www.airbagcenter.com replacement cost screen for a 2001 Honda

Accord driver’s airbag; CCC. Reuters article entitled “Special Report: Deadly airbags backfire on firm that crossed

‘dangerous bridge’”, dated January 13, 2014; DDD. Automotive News article entitled “A harsher light on Takata” posted on

Autonews.com, which generated “comment” (unprintable) after the article ran on November 9, 2014;

EEE. Honda Service Bulletin 10-039, entitled “Safety Recall: Replacement Driver’s Airbag

Inflator Can Be Over-Pressurized”, dated September 12, 2014;

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FFF. Automotive News article entitled “Honda ordered to deliver airbag documents to NHTSA”, dated November 5, 2014;

GGG. Letter from U.S. Senators Richard Blumenthal and Edward J. Markey to the U.S.

Department of Transportation, dated October 23, 2014; HHH. Automotive News article entitled “Senate to hold hearing on Takata airbag recalls;

company subpoenaed by U.S. grand jury”, dated November 13, 2014; and III. CBS News piece entitled “Honda expands Takata air bag recall in southern states”

dated November 7, 2014.

DATED this 17th day of November, 2014,

s/ Henry N. Didier, Jr. Henry N. Didier, Jr. Florida Bar No.: 0065218 Didier Law Firm, P.A. 1203 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32804 Telephone: 407.895.3401 Facsimile: 407.895.3408 Attorneys for Plaintiff and

s/ Debra Wilkinson Botwin Debra Wilkinson Botwin Florida Bar No.: 0773591 Debra Wilkinson Botwin, LLC P.O. Box 568126 Orlando, FL 32856-8126 Telephone: 1-321- 206-1713 Fax: 1-407-893-7558 Attorney for the Plaintiff

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1 TINA TRAN DANG, as Personal Representative of the Estate of HIEN THI TRAN, Plaintiff, v

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