Spontaneous Versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior

Baba Shiv, University of Iowa

Alexander Fedorikhin, University of Southern California

Forthcoming: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Address All Correspondence to: Baba ShivUniversity of IowaHenry B. Tippie College of BusinessS 370, Pappajohn Business BuildingIowa City, IA 52242-1000Tel: (319) 335-0932Email: baba-shiv@uiowa.edu

Abstract

This article identifies two routes through which affect and cognitions arising from a stimulus can

influence choices: a “lower-order” route where choices are influenced through automatic processes by

lower-order, and a “higher-order” route where choices are influenced through controlled processes by

either higher-order affect or higher-order consequence-related cognitions. Across three experiments the

extent of deliberation, mental preoccupation, and the nature of exposure to the stimuli were manipulated to

identify conditions under which lower-order affect, higher-order affect, or higher-order cognitions impact

choices. Respondents chose between two alternatives: one that was associated with more intense positive

affect, but less favorable cognitions (e.g., chocolate cake), and one that was associated with less intense

positive affect but more favorable cognitions (e.g., fruit-salad). Findings suggest that when the individual

makes the decision quickly and is mentally preoccupied while making the decision, choices are driven by

lower-order affect. When the individual deliberates on the decision without being mentally preoccupied and

the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, choices are driven by

higher-order affect. In both cases, the affect-laden option (e.g. chocolate cake) is selected. In all other

situations choices are driven by higher-order consequence-related cognitions, and the alternative that is

superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g. fruit salad) is selected. It is suggested that the effects of affective

reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals.

Key Words: Affect, Cognition, Automatic, Controlled, Self-Control, Impulse

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Reason guides but a small part of man, and that the leastinteresting. The rest obeys feelings, true or false, and passion,good or bad–Joseph Roux.

With all its cleverness, however, decision theory is somewhatcrippled emotionally, and thus detached from the emotional andvisceral richness of life–George Loewenstein (1996, p. 289).

Much of research on choice behavior has been predominantly cognitive in nature, and the role of

affect has received relatively little attention (for criticisms of such inattention, see Bettman, 1993; Hoch and

Loewenstein, 1991; Loewenstein, 1996; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, and Ritov

1997). Recently, decision making and consumer researchers have shown considerable interest in redressing

this imbalance with both theoretical (e.g., Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991; Loewenstein, 1996) and empirical

accounts (e.g., Garbarino and Edell, 1997; Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman, and Payne, 1997; Mellers et al.

1997; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999) of how affect influences choice behavior. The broad purpose of this

article is to add to this growing body of research.

More specifically, the focus of this paper is on choice behavior as influenced by task-induced affect

(i.e., affective reactions that arise directly from the decision task itself) rather than ambient affect (i.e.,

affective states that arise from background conditions such as fatigue and mood); the latter has been the

predominant focus of previous work on the role of affect in decision making (for the distinction between task-

induced and ambient affect, see Arkes, Herren, and Isen, 1988; Yates, 1990; Schwarz, 1990). Further,

most previous empirical work examining the effects of task-induced affect on choice has focused on negative

affect arising from the structure or difficulty of the task (Garbarino and Edell, 1997; Luce, 1998; Luce et al.

1997). In contrast, the focus of this article is on the effects of positive affect arising from the stimulus. (See

Fiske and Taylor, 1991, for a discussion of the importance of examining both negative and positive affect due

to their differential effects on memory, judgment, persuasion, and decision making.)

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A third difference between our work and previous empirical work is based on the distinction made by

Berkowitz (1993), Giner-Sorolla (1999), LeDoux (1996), and Wyer, Clore, and Isbell (1999) between

“lower-order” affective reactions, arising from relatively automatic processes, and “higher-order” affective

reactions, arising from relatively more controlled processes. The focus of most previous work has been either

exclusively on higher-order affect (e.g., Luce, 1998; Garbarino and Edell, 1997; Mellers et al., 1997) or

exclusively on lower-order affect (e.g., Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Zajonc, 1980). To the best of our

knowledge, little attempt has been made to investigate, in an integrative fashion, the two routes through which

affect can influence preferences.1 We contribute to the literature by focusing both on higher-order and lower-

order affect, delineating conditions under which each of these affective reactions are likely to influence

behavior.

Previewing briefly, we develop our conceptualization in the next section for choice-contexts that

individuals frequently experience, ones involving choices between options (e.g., chocolate cake) that are more

favorable on the affective dimension, but less favorable on the cognitive dimension, compared to other options

(e.g., fruit-salad). These contexts, involving familiar dilemmas analyzed under the rubric of “traps” by Cross

and Guyer (1980), “guilty pleasures” by Giner-Sorolla (1999), and “vices” by Wertenbroch (1998), pit the

positive affect associated with short-term rewards (both lower-order and higher-order affect) against the

negative deliberative thoughts about the long-term consequences (termed in this paper as consequence-related

cognitions).

We then present three experiments that explore conditions under which lower-order affect, higher-

order affect, or higher-order consequence-related cognitions influence behavior. Specifically, we examine the

effects of three factors on choice behavior: the extent to which the individual deliberates on the decision, the

extent to which the s/he is mentally preoccupied (i.e., is under cognitive load), and whether the choice options

are in full view of the individual when the decision is being deliberated upon. The experiments enable us to

make the following claims. First, the choice of guilty pleasures such as chocolate cake can be influenced by

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affect arising from both automatic and controlled processes. Second, when the individual makes the decision

quickly and is mentally preoccupied (i.e., is under cognitive load), the decision is driven by lower-order affect

resulting in a choice of guilty pleasures. Further, when the individual deliberates on the decision without being

mentally preoccupied and the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, the

decision is driven by higher-order affect resulting again in a choice of guilty pleasures. Third, in all other

conditions involving different levels of deliberation, cognitive load, and exposure to the options, consequence-

related cognitions predominate the positive affect, causing the individual to refrain from choosing the guilty

pleasures. Finally, the effects of affective reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive goals.

Throughout, we collect process measures to further increase our certainty regarding the proposed mechanisms

that give rise to lower-order and higher-order affect.

The Affective-Cognitive Model

Consider a scenario where an individual decides to have a snack and encounters two options–a piece

of chocolate cake and a serving of fruit-salad. The chocolate cake is more affect-laden compared to the fruit

salad, but also less favorable in terms of the long-term consequences. According to theories proposed by

Berkowitz (1993), LeDoux (1995, 1996), and Wyer et al. (1999), two processes are likely to be set in motion

by this encounter (see Figure 1). First, the lower-order structures of the brain that constantly monitor the

environment for events of affective significance receive information (i.e., lower-order cognitions) related to

affect-laden chocolate cake. These cognitions trigger the onset of lower-order processes (the lower path in

Figure 1), which occur spontaneously and give rise to lower-order affective reactions. In line with the model

proposed by Wyer et al. (1999), these lower-order affective reactions may then impact action tendencies

(approach or avoidance) through the activation of basic appetitive or aversive goals.2 For the cake/salad

scenario just described, the affective reactions are likely to be positive, and, therefore, the goals that are

activated are likely to be appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) in nature, resulting in action tendencies that favor

choosing the cake rather than the fruit-salad.

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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

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Second, information related to the stimulus may be subject to more deliberative processes (the upper

path in Figure 1), the outcome of which will depend on the focus of these higher-order processes. For the

cake/salad scenario, one possibility is that these higher-order processes will focus on the adverse

consequences of choosing the cake. The resulting consequence-related cognitions will activate avoidance

oriented goals (through the path linking higher-order cognitions and goals in Figure 1). The latter goals will

engender action tendencies inhibiting the approach-oriented tendencies that would be sparked initially by

lower-order processes. The ultimate outcome will, therefore, be one where the individual is less likely to

choose the cake.

Alternatively, the higher order processes may focus on the affect-laden attributes of the chocolate

cake, resulting in affectively significant higher-order cognitions. According to LeDoux (1995, 1996), the

limbic structures of the brain that give rise to lower-order affect also constantly receive information from the

higher-order cortical structures. If these higher-order cognitions turn out to be affectively significant, they are

likely to trigger the generation of higher-order affective reactions, and the activation of goals and action

tendencies (through the path linking higher-order affect and goals in Figure 1). For the cake/salad context,

the higher-order affective reactions are likely to be positive, and, therefore, are likely to activate goals that are

more appetitive (i.e., approach-oriented) in nature. The ultimate outcome will be one where the individual is

more likely to choose the cake. In the next section, we discuss factors that are likely to give rise to the

various scenarios delineated above. These factors, and their effects on the underlying processes and choice

outcomes, are presented in Table 1.

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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

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Factors Affecting Choice-Role of Cognitive Load, Decision Time, and the Nature of Stimulus Exposure

The discussion in the previous section suggests that lower-order processes occur spontaneously and,

therefore, impose few demands on processing resources. In contrast, higher-order processes are deliberative

in nature, and, therefore, impose demands on processing resources. Therefore, any factor that constrains

processing resources is likely to prevent the onset of higher-order processes, resulting in choices that are

influenced by lower-order processes, i.e., by lower-order affect. It is only when processing resources

become available that higher-order processes are likely to ensue. The question is, what are the factors that

influence the availability of processing resources, thereby, determining whether choices are influenced by

lower-order or by higher-order processes?

One factor that has been shown to influence processing resources is the level of cognitive load–the

greater the cognitive load, the lower the availability of such resources (see Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988;

Gilbert, Giesler, and Morris, 1995; Swann et al. 1990; Trope and Alfieri, 1997). A second factor that has

been widely known to influence the availability of processing resources is the time available to make the

decision–the availability of processing resources is higher when more time becomes available (see Jamieson

and Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski and Webster, 1991; Ratneshwar and Chaiken, 1991; Sanbonmatsu and Fazio,

1990). An examination of the two factors in combination suggests that when the level of cognitive load is high

and the time to make the decision is low (see the first column of Table 1), resources are likely to be least

available, which is when choices are driven by lower-order processes, i.e., by lower-order affect. The

findings reported in Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) are consistent with this prediction–when respondents were

under high cognitive load and when the time available to make the decision was low, they were more likely to

decide based on affect arising from lower-order processes and, therefore, more likely to choose chocolate

cake rather than fruit salad.

Extending the above logic, when the availability of processing resources is moderately high (i.e., when

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low cognitive load is combined with low time availability, or when high cognitive load is combined with high

time availability), or very high (i.e, when low cognitive load is combined with high time availability), higher-

order processes are likely to influence choices. The question is, under what conditions will these higher-order

processes focus on the negative consequences of choosing the guilty-pleasure to give rise to consequence-

related cognitions, or on the affect-laden properties of the guilty-pleasures to give rise to higher-order affect?

The work by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) suggests that when low cognitive load is combined with low time

availability (see column 2 of Table 1), choices are determined by higher-order consequence-related

cognitions. The findings reported in Shiv and Fedorikhin also suggest that when the time available for the

decision is low, higher-order affective reactions are less likely to be featured in the decision-making process

and that more time may be necessary for their generation.

To examine situations involving high time availability where higher-order affect or consequence-

related cognitions are likely to impact choice, we draw upon work by Mischel and his colleagues (e.g.,

Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1992). Using a “delay in gratification” paradigm, Mischel

and Ebbesen (1970) had children decide between an inferior, more immediate reward (fewer

cookies/pretzels) versus a superior, delayed reward (more cookies/pretzels). The nature of exposure to the

affect-laden stimulus was manipulated. In one condition, the reward was physically present in full view for the

entire time the children took to make their decisions. In another condition, the reward was presented for a

short duration and then removed from view. The results indicate that the children were less willing to choose

the delayed reward when the exposure to the affect-laden stimulus was high than when it was low. Though

the nature of processing that the children engaged in was not examined, it appears that increased exposure to

the affect-laden stimulus caused an increase in focus on the affect-laden properties of the reward, resulting in

higher-order cognitions that were related to these affect-laden properties. These cognitions, in turn, resulted

in positive affective reactions, appetitive goals, and, hence, approach-oriented action tendencies that caused

the children to give in to their temptations. In contrast, when the exposure was low, the children apparently

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focused less on the affect-laden properties of the reward. Therefore, the children were less likely to engage

in higher-order affective processes and more likely to engage in consequence-related higher-order processes

compared to when the exposure was high. These results suggest that, for the contexts examined in this paper,

when the time available to make a decision is high, and exposure to the options is also high, the choice is

more apt to be based on higher-order affective reactions.

A follow-up piece of work by Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1973), however, suggests that merely

having high exposure to the affect-laden option is not sufficient to generate higher-order affective reactions.

They again examined the willingness of children to wait for the superior delayed reward, but this time only

under conditions where the exposure to the reward was high. During the high exposure, some children were

instructed to think about the rewards while others were instructed to engage in distracting thoughts. Even

though the exposure to the rewards was high, children who were distracted waited longer than those who

were not. Presumably, the presence of cognitive load in the form of distractors caused a reduction in focus

on the affect-laden properties of the stimulus, which, in turn, reduced the occurrence of higher-order affect.

Together, the findings reported in Mischel and Ebbesen (1970) and Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1973)

suggest that, for the contexts being examined in this paper, when the time available to make the decision is

high and the exposure to the options is also high, (1) a higher level of cognitive load (see column 3 of Table 1)

will lead to a decrease in choice of the affect-laden option, and (2) a lower level of cognitive load (see column

4 of Table 1) will lead to an increase in choice of the affect-laden option.3

Finally, let us examine the effects that are likely to occur when the time available to decide is high but

the exposure to the options is low (columns 5 and 6 of Table 1). The findings reported by Mischel &

Ebbesen (1970) suggest that under such conditions, higher-order affective reactions are less likely to be

engendered, and choices are more likely to be influenced by consequence-related cognitions, which, in turn,

are likely to activate goals that are less appetitive in nature. Further, in line with dual-process theories (e.g.,

Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1999), a decrease in cognitive load is likely to result in a

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greater elaboration on the negative consequences of choosing the affect-laden option. Therefore, the pattern

of results is likely to be just the opposite of what we predict in conditions where the time available to decide is

high and the level of exposure is also high. Specifically as the level of cognitive load decreases goals are likely

to become less appetitive, and there should be fewer choices of the affect-laden option (see columns 5 and 6

of Table 1).

Summary of Predictions

As depicted in Figure 2, the discussion thus far gives rise to the following predictions. First, when the

time available for the decision is low, if the level of cognitive load is high, choices are more likely to be

influenced by lower order affect, and, hence, by goals that are more appetitive in nature. In contrast, if the

level of cognitive load is low, choices are more likely to be influenced by higher-order consequence-related

cognitions, and, hence, by goals that are less appetitive in nature. Therefore, as the level of cognitive load

decreases, choice of the affect-laden option is likely to increase.

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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

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Second, when the time available for the decision is high, the pattern of results under high versus low levels of

cognitive load will depend on the nature of exposure to the options. If the exposure to the options is high,

and cognitive load is low rather than high, choices are more likely to be influenced by affect and goals that are

more appetitive. In other words, the pattern of results on choice is likely to be just the reverse of what we

predict in the conditions where the time available for the decision is low. Finally, if the time available to

decide is high but the exposure to the options is low, then, as cognitive load increases, choice of the affect-

laden option will decrease.

In the next section, we report three experiments that were carried out to test these predictions.

Experiment 1 tested the first two predictions in a context involving a choice between chocolate cake and fruit

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salad. Process measures related to the basis of making the decision (affect versus consequence-related

cognitions) and to the focus of processing were also collected. Experiment 2 tested all three predictions in a

context involving a choice between pizza and soup. A measure related to the nature of the goals that

influenced choices was also collected. Experiment 3 delved into the role of goals in giving rise to the second

and third predictions (i.e., experiment 3's focus was restricted to situations where the time available for

deciding was high). Using a context involving choosing between a “party” vacation and a “body-toning”

vacation, experiment 3 manipulated appetitive goals as a means of testing our conceptualization.

Experiment 1

Design and Participants

Experiment 1 used a two-factor between-subjects design, with decision-mode as one factor (low

decision-time versus high decision-time, accompanied by high levels of exposure), and cognitive-load as

the second factor (high versus low). One hundred and ninety-five undergraduate students were randomly

assigned to the four conditions arising from the two factors.

Procedure

The experiment was carried out in two different rooms, with respondents leaving the first room, one

at a time, and making their choices on their way to the second room after being subject to the experimental

manipulations (first to cognitive-load and then to decision-mode), completely out of sight and earshot of the

other respondents. This was to control for social and normative factors, which could have otherwise

influenced respondents’ decisions. To disguise the actual purpose of the study, respondents were provided

with instructions at the beginning of the session stating that the experiment was about the effects of

background sounds and a change in environment on consumers’ memories for information and that, as part of

the study, they would be asked to go to another room. Further, respondents were told that they would be

provided with a choice of snacks as compensation for participating in the study (no mention was made of the

nature of the snacks; also note that the procedure was such that, as far as respondents were concerned, the

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choice task was incidental to the main experiment).

On exiting the first room, respondents were told of the procedure–they would first memorize a

number, then walk over to a first cart, which had two speakers, and listen to some background sounds that

would last for a minute and a half (the sounds emanating from these speakers could be controlled remotely by

the experimenter; neutral sounds were chosen based on a pretest4). They were told that after the sounds

stopped, they were to proceed to a second cart where they would find two snacks on display, decide which

snack they would like to have, choose a ticket for a snack, and then proceed to the second room. Before

respondents proceeded toward the “speakers” cart and then to the “snacks” cart, the cognitive-load

manipulation was carried out by adopting a procedure that has been widely used in the literature (e.g.,

Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Swann et al., 1990; Trope & Alfieri,

1997). One group of respondents (high cognitive-load condition) was requested to memorize a seven-digit

number; another group (low cognitive-load condition) was requested to memorize a two-digit number.

When a respondent was ready to proceed to the carts and then to the second room, the experimenter

opened an envelope, displayed briefly the number to be memorized, and then closed the envelope.

To manipulate the time available to decide, for one group of respondents (high decision-time

condition), the “speakers” cart was placed close to the “snacks” cart so that subjects knew about their choice

options and could, therefore, deliberate on their decision for the entire minute and a half that they were

listening to the background sounds. This procedure also ensured that the level of exposure to the snacks

would be high when the decision was being deliberated upon for a longer duration. For the other group of

respondents (low decision-time condition), the carts were placed far apart, and the “snacks” cart was

covered on three sides so that the snacks were not visible when respondents were listening to the background

sounds for a minute and a half. Only when the respondents in this condition got to the front of the “snacks”

cart did the snacks become visible. As in Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), most subjects in the low decision-time

condition took only 3 to 6 seconds to make their decisions (compared to the minute and a half in the high

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decision-time condition). Note that all subjects listened to the background sounds for a minute and a half,

but one group did so in the presence of the snacks, while the other did so in their absence.

After respondents had picked up the ticket for their chosen snack, they proceeded to the second

room, where they completed the various measures described below and then were debriefed. The ticket that

indicated each respondent’s choice of snacks was collected by a second experimenter and stapled onto the

experimental booklet. The experimenter also noted the time of day when the session was carried out to use

as a covariate in the various analyses.

Stimuli

Two snacks–a piece of chocolate cake with cherry topping and a serving of fruit salad–were on

display in transparent plastic containers that were placed on the second cart stationed between the two

rooms. To control for the prices and the supplier of these two snacks, a price sticker ($1) obtained from a

local grocery store was affixed to each of the containers that were on display. The snacks were chosen

based on findings reported in Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999) which suggest that cake elicits more intense positive

affect, but is associated with less favorable cognitions related to the consequences of consumption compared

to the fruit salad.

Measures

Respondents first recalled the number they had been asked to memorize and then responded to the

remaining measures. Except for the first (thought protocols) and the last (covariates) set of these remaining

measures, the scales for all the other measures were identical to the ones used by Shiv and Fedorikhin

(1999).

Respondents were first asked to describe, as completely as possible, whatever went through their

minds while they were deciding between the two snacks. The protocols were coded by two independent

judges for any mentions of rehearsals of the number that subjects had been instructed to memorize (interjudge

agreement was 100%). These thought protocols gave us an opportunity to check if the cognitive-load

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manipulation was successful–more respondents were expected to indicate that they had been busy rehearsing

the number when the level of this factor was high (i.e., when the number was long) than when it was low.

As in Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), each respondent was then asked to indicate the basis of his/her

choice on five seven-point items that were presented after the statement “My final decision about which snack

to choose was driven by—” These items were anchored by: “my thoughts (1)/my feelings (7),” “my

willpower (1)/my desire (7),” “my prudent self (1)/my impulsive self (7),” “the rational side of me (1)/the

emotional side of me (7),” and “my head (1)/my heart (7).” The Cronbach alpha for these items measuring

the basis for respondents’ decisions was 0.88, suggesting that the

responses to the five items could be averaged to form a single variable (Decision-Basis).

Finally, respondents indicated their gender, whether they were health-conscious individuals, and

whether they were cake and fruit salad fanatics (the last three measures were obtained using 7-point items

anchored by “seldom would describe me/ usually would describe me”). These measures, and the time-of-

day when each respondent participated in the experiment served as covariates in the various analyses. Of

these measures, respondents’ gender and the time-of-day did not covary significantly with any of the

dependent measures, and hence will not be discussed further.

Results

Manipulation Check. Respondents’ mentions in the thought protocols of having rehearsed the

number that they had been instructed to memorize served as a manipulation check for the cognitive-load

factor (more mentions were expected from respondents who memorized the 7-digit number than those who

memorized the 2-digit number). A logistic-regression with mention of mental rehearsal as the dependent

variable (coded as “mention=1" and “no mention=0"), and cognitive-load and decision-mode as the

independent variables revealed a significant main effect of cognitive-load (P2=71.7, p=.0001); none of the

other treatment effects were significant. The proportion (weighted average) of respondents mentioning that

they had rehearsed the number was significantly higher in the high cognitive-load condition (90.2%) than in

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the low cognitive-load condition (9.78%), suggesting that the manipulation of the cognitive-load factor was

successful.

Choice. We predicted that if the time available to make the decision was low, choice of the cake

would be higher when the level of cognitive load is high than when it is low. In contrast, if the time available

to make the decision is high and the level of exposure to the options is also high, choice of the cake would be

lower when the level of cognitive load is high rather than when it is low. Consistent with our predictions, a

logistic regression analysis revealed a significant decision-mode by cognitive-load interaction (P2=4.29,

p=.04, D2=.04)5.

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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

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Further, as shown in Figure 3, the choice-proportions across the various levels of the decision-mode

and cognitive-load factors were in line with our conceptualization. When the time available for the decision

was low, the proportion of subjects choosing the cake was higher when the level of cognitive load was high

(50.0%) than when it was low (29.8%; z=1.99, p<=.05). In contrast, when the time available for the decision

was high, the proportion of subjects choosing the cake was lower when the level of cognitive load was high

(36.5%) than when it was low (56.0%; z=1.97, p<.05).

Decision-Basis. The variable Decision-Basis (higher numbers indicate that respondents’ choices were

based more on affect than on cognitions) served to ascertain whether the decisions across the different

conditions were based on respondents’ affective reactions or cognitions. As shown in Figure 3, the pattern of

results for Decision-Basis mirrored that for choice. As with choice, an ANCOVA with Decision-Basis as the

dependent variable, and decision-mode and cognitive-load as the independent variables revealed a significant

2-way interaction (F1,191=9.87, p=.002, T2=.06). An examination of the means across various levels of

decison-mode and cognitive-load revealed that the results were consistent with our conceptualization. When

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the time available for the decision was low, subjects rated their choices as having been driven more by affect

when the level of cognitive load was high (M=4.00) than when it was low (3.28; F1,191=4.68, p=.03). When

the time available for the decision was high, subjects rated their choices as having been driven more by affect

when the level of cognitive load was low (M=4.05) than when it was high (3.32; F1,191=4.41, p=.04).

A test was carried out to examine if the significant interactive effect of the two independent variables on

choice (reported in the previous section) was mediated by Decision-Basis. According to Baron & Kenny

(1986), mediation is said to exist if three criteria are met: (1) the independent variable(s) (here, the interaction

between decision-mode and cognitive-load) influences the potential mediator (Decision-Basis), (2) the

potential mediator influences the dependent variable (choice), and (3) the relationship between the independent

and dependent variables is weakened when the mediator is introduced as a covariate. An ANOVA revealed

that the first criterion for mediation was supported by a significant interactive effect of the three independent

variables on Decision-Basis (F1,187=9.87, p<.002). A logistic regression analysis provided support to the

second criterion for mediation by revealing a significant effect of Decision-Basis on choice, (P2 =26.03,

p<.0001). Another logistic regression analysis provided support to the third criterion for mediation. The

significant 2-way interaction (reported in the previous section under the heading choice) was no longer

significant once Decision-Basis was included as a covariate in the model (P2=.004, p=.95). Thus, complete

support was obtained for all three criteria, suggesting that Decision-Basis did serve as a mediator between the

independent variables and choice.

Discussion

The results of experiment 1 indicate that, in a binary choice context, where one alternative (chocolate

cake) is superior on the affective dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension to the other (fruit salad),

choices are influenced by the time available for the decision and the level of cognitive load. As predicted, when

the time available for the decision was low, choice of the affect-laden option was higher when the level of

cognitive load was high than when it was low. When the time available for the decision was high, and

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respondents were exposed to the options for the entire duration when they were deliberating their decisions, the

pattern of results was just the opposite of when the time available for the decision was low–choice of the affect-

laden option was lower when the level of cognitive load was high than when it was low. Support for our

conceptualization was also obtained by using a process measure, Decision Basis, which indicated whether

respondents’ choices were driven by their affective reactions or by their cognitions. Results for this Decision-

Basis variable mirrored those for choice and tests revealed that Decision-Basis mediated the effects of

independent variables on choice.

Experiment 2

One purpose of experiment 2 was to replicate the core findings of experiment 1 using different choice-

options (pizza and soup). Another purpose of experiment 2 was to delve into the psychological processes that

potentially gave rise to findings related to the two key factors, decision-time and cognitive-load, in experiment

1. Specifically, the purpose of experiment 2 was to examine a third prediction that arose from our

conceptualization, one related to the moderating role of the nature of stimulus exposure. Note that in

experiment 1, respondents in the high decision-time conditions were also subject to high levels of exposure to

the options (i.e., the snacks were in full view during the entire time they deliberated on the decision). According

to our conceptualization, the pattern of results obtained in the high decision-time conditions of experiment 1

(choice of the affect-laden option increasing with a decrease in the level of cognitive load) will occur only when

the level of exposure is high. If the level of exposure is low, the pattern of results ought to be consistent with

dual-process theories–choice of the affect-laden option will get attenuated as the availability of processing

resources increases with a decrease in cognitive load.

Design and Procedure

Experiment 2 used a 3 (decision-mode) X 2 (cognitive-load) between-subject design. Two of the

three levels of the decision-mode factor remained the same as in experiment 1–in one level, the time available

for the decision was low (we label this level as low decision-time); in another level, the time available for the

16

decision was high, as was the level of exposure to the options (we label this level as high decision-time/high

exposure). In the third level of the decision-mode factor, the time available for the decision was high, but the

level of exposure to the options was low (we label this level as high decision-time/low exposure). The

procedure was similar across the various conditions. As in experiment 1, subjects first memorized either a 7-

digit or a 2-digit number, then listened to background sounds for a minute and a half, and then picked a ticket

for the food item of their choice (pizza or soup). Also, as in experiment 1, subjects in the low decision-time

conditions listened to background sounds without the food options being present, then moved to a second

cart that carried the food options, and then chose between the two options. (As in experiment 1, the time

taken for making the decision was low, ranging from 3 to 6 seconds, in this condition.) Again, as in

experiment 1, subjects in the high decision-time/high exposure conditions listened to the background

sounds in the presence of the choice options. In the high decision-time/low exposure conditions,

respondents were briefly exposed to the choice options before they moved to the “sound” cart, where they

then listened to the sounds with the choice options behind them and out of sight. To ensure that the

instructions were similar across the various conditions, subjects were told the following when they emerged

from the first room: “You will now memorize a number and then walk up to the speakers out there.” In the

high decision-time/low exposure conditions, the following instruction was added: “But before you do that,

please take a look at the food-items you will be choosing from today.” Subjects were then told, “When you

get to the speakers, this device will be switched on and you will listen to background sounds for a minute and

a half. Now, these are meant to be background sounds, so you could be thinking of whatever you want

when you listen to the sounds.” In all conditions involving high decision times, the following instruction was

added: “For example, you could be thinking of which food-item you will choose today, or anything else you

may desire.”

Stimuli

Instead of the cake and fruit salad that were used as stimuli in experiment 1, experiment 2 used two

17

food-items, a slice of pizza and a bowl of tomato soup, the former being associated with more positive affect

but less favorable cognitions compared to the latter as revealed in a pretest.

Measures

The measures used were similar to those in experiment 1. In addition respondents were asked to

indicate on a 7-point scale (disagree [1]/agree [7]) the extent to which their thoughts focused on the number

they had been asked to memorize when listening to the background sounds. This measure served to check if

the cognitive-load manipulation was successful. Further, each respondent was asked to indicate, on 7-point

scales, the extent to which appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals were brought to bear in the decision.

These items were anchored by “my goal was one of avoiding gratification (1)”/ “my goal was one of seeking

gratification (7),” my goal was one of avoiding indulging (1)”/ “my goal was one of indulging (7),” my goal

was one of avoiding pleasure (1)”/ “my goal was one of seeking pleasure (7),” and “my goal was one of

keeping my impulses in check (1)”/ “my goal was one of satisfying my impulses (7).” The Cronbach alpha for

these four items was 0.90, so the responses were averaged to form a single variable (Decision-Goal), with

higher numbers indicating that the goal was more appetitive or gratification-seeking in nature.

Results

Manipulation Check. Respondents’ ratings of the extent to which they thought about the number they

had been asked to memorize served to assess the success of the cognitive-load manipulation. An

ANCOVA with decision-mode and cognitive-load as the two independent variables revealed a significant

main effect of cognitive-load (F1,204=20.4, p=.0001), and none of the other treatment effects were

significant. The extent to which respondents thought about the memorized number was significantly higher in

the high cognitive-load condition (M=6.37) than in the low cognitive-load condition (M=4.79).

Choice. We predicted a replication of the results obtained in experiment 1, i.e., as the level of

cognitive load decreases, choice of the affect-laden option, i.e., the pizza will (1) get attenuated in the low

decision-time conditions, and (2) get enhanced in the high decision-time/high exposure conditions. In

18

addition, we predicted that in the high decision-time/low exposure conditions, the pattern of results will

follow dual-process theories–attenuation as the level of cognitive load decreases. A logistic regression

analysis revealed a significant decision-mode by cognitive-load interaction (P2=10.93, p=.0009, D2=.10).

As can be seen in Figure 4, experiment 2 replicated the core findings of experiment 1. In the low decision-

time conditions the proportion of respondents choosing the pizza was higher when the level of cognitive load

was high (78.1%) than when it was low (51.4%; z=2.28, p<.01). In the high decision-time/high exposure

conditions, the proportion of respondents choosing the pizza was lower when the level of cognitive load was

high (51.4%) than when it was low (78.4%; z=2.39, p<.01).

____________________________________

INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

_____________________________________

The pattern of results in the high decision-time/low exposure conditions was different than that in the

high decision-time/high exposure conditions. The proportion of respondents choosing the pizza was 55.6%

and 45.2% respectively in the high and low cognitive-load conditions respectively. Though the difference in

proportions was not statistically significant, the pattern of results was directionally consistent with our

conceptualization related to dual-process theories.

Decision-Goal. The variable Decision-Goal served to ascertain whether appetitive goals were

activated in conditions where the choice of the pizza was high. As shown in Figure 4, the pattern of results

for Decision-Goal mirrored that for choice. As with choice, an ANCOVA with Decision-Goal as the

dependent variable, and decision-mode and cognitive-load as the independent variables revealed a

significant 2-way interaction (F2,200=4.24, p=.01, T2=.09).

Consistent with our conceptualization, in the low decision-time conditions, respondents rated their

choices as having been influenced more by gratification-seeking goals when the level of cognitive load was

high (M=5.55) than when it was low (4.83; F1,200=5.05, p=.03). In the high decision-time/high exposure

19

conditions, respondents rated their choices as having been influenced more by gratification-seeking goals

when the level of cognitive load was low (M=5.29) than when it was high (4.74; F1,200=3.55, p=.06). In the

high decision-time/low exposure conditions, respondents’ ratings of appetitive goals were directionally

consistent with dual-process theories–higher when the level of cognitive load was high (M=4.90) than when it

was low (4.70; p=n.s.).

A Baron & Kenny (1986) test was carried out to examine if the significant interactive effect of

cognitive-load and decision-mode on choice (reported in the previous section) was mediated by Decision-

Goal. An ANCOVA revealed that the first criterion for mediation was supported by a significant interactive

effect of the two independent variables, decision-mode and cognitive-load, on Decision-Goal (F2,200=4.24,

p=.01). A logistic regression analysis provided support to the second criterion for mediation by revealing a

significant effect of Decision-Goal on choice, (c2 =45.4, p<.0001). Another logistic regression analysis

provided support to the third criterion for mediation–the effect of the independent variable on choice (the 2-

way interaction that was significant at the 0.0009 level) was weakened when Decision-Goal was included as

a covariate in the model (c2=6.06, p=.01). Thus, complete support was obtained for all three criteria,

suggesting that Decision-Goal served as a mediator between the independent variables and choice.

Discussion

Experiment 2 replicated the core findings of experiment 1 using a different set of stimulus material. The

findings of experiment 2 also indicate that the pattern of results obtained in high decision-time conditions in

experiment 1 occurs only when the level of exposure to the options is also high. As predicted, when the time

available for the decision was high, but the level of exposure was low, the results seemed to be directionally

consistent with dual-process theories. Specifically, the choice of the

affect-laden option seemed to decrease as the level of cognitive load decreased. Support for our

conceptualization related to the activation of appetitive goals was also obtained by using a process measure,

Decision-Goal, which indicated whether respondents’ choices were driven more or less by appetitive (i.e.,

20

gratification-seeking) goals. Results for this Decision-Goal variable mirrored those for choice, and tests

revealed that Decision-Goal mediated the effects of independent variables on choice.

Experiment 3

The purpose of experiment 3 was to examine, using a different set of stimuli (non food-related, unlike

experiments 1 and 2), the underlying processes in conditions where the time available for the decision is high

and the level of cognitive load is low. Recall that the pattern of results observed thus far has been contrary to

dual-process theories in the high decision-time/high exposure conditions and consistent with such theories in

the high decision-time/low exposure conditions. To account for these pattern of results, we have argued that

it is the physical presence of the affect-laden option during longer decision times and low cognitive loads that

causes an activation of appetitive goals, which, in turn, causes a shift in preferences to the affect-laden option.

Further, we have argued that if, under these conditions, the affect-laden option is only briefly presented, such

shifts in preferences will not occur because appetitive goals are less likely to get activated.

Experiment 3 served to test these arguments by having Decision-Goal as an independent variable

rather than as a dependent variable (which was how we tested our conceptualization 2). Decision-Goal was

then crossed with the level of exposure, the other independent variable of interest in experiment 3 (note that

the cognitive-load factor was dropped, i.e., cognitive load was maintained at low levels in this experiment).

The logic that was used to test our conceptualization in experiment 3 was as follows. If it is true that when the

decision time is high and cognitive load is low, the higher choice of the affect-laden option at high levels of

exposure is caused by the activation of appetitive goals, then activating these goals through a priming task

should cause choices in the low exposure conditions to resemble those in the high exposure conditions. In

other words, one should expect an interaction between the level of exposure and the decision goal with the

following pattern of choices: when appetitive goals are not primed, the pattern of results in experiment 2

ought to be replicated (higher choice of the affect-laded option when the level of exposure is high than when it

is low); when appetitive goals are primed, the pattern of results should be similar irrespective of the level of

21

the level of exposure.

Design and Procedure

Experiment 3 used a 2 (goal-priming: yes versus no) X 2 (decision-mode) between-subject design.

Two of the three levels of the decision-mode factor that were used in experiment 2 were used in experiment

3–those involving high decision times (i.e., high decision-time/high exposure and high decision-time/low

exposure; the low decision-time conditions were dropped). The procedure that was employed was similar to

that used in the high decision-time conditions of experiment 2, except that subjects did not have to memorize

the number before listening to the background sounds (since the cognitive-load factor was not included in

experiment 3). One other difference between experiments 3 and 2 was that the background sounds were

changed from “sounds on a cliff” to just plain static. The reason was that one of the choice options involved a

“party-vacation” in Bora Bora, and “sounds from the cliff” might have caused respondents to think that we

expected them to choose the “party-vacation.”

The procedure for manipulating appetitive goals was adapted from Chartrand & Bargh (1996) and

Ramanathan (2000). The experiment was introduced as three separate studies being carried out by different

faculty. In the “first study,” purportedly about consumers’ opinions on various products, respondents were

presented with three scenarios, one involving purchase of a car, another involving renting an apartment, and

the third involving purchase of a mattress. After reading each scenario, respondents evaluated the product

described in the scenario. For one group of respondents, only gratificatory attributes were presented in the

scenario (e.g., “luxurious leather trim,” “new-car smell,” and “sunlight streaming down the sunroof” for the

car; “bright and sunny with an awesome fireplace,”and “an artfully decorated living room with hardwood

floors” for the apartment; “cozy and warm,” and “soft velvety fabric that will be gentle on your skin” for the

mattress). For another group, only more utilitarian attributes were presented (e.g., “high reliability,” “good

workmanship,” and “one that will last a long time” for the car; “apartment that will help you quickly repay

22

your college loans” and “a good neighborhood, but otherwise a simple, down-to-earth, nothing-fancy” for the

apartment; “inflate quickly” and “retain the air-pressure for a full night” for the mattress). The various

attributes were selected based on separate pretests that were adapted from Dhar & Wertenbroch (2000)

and Strahilevitz and Myers (1998), and the expectation was that appetitive goals will be activated for the

former group of respondents and not for the latter. Respondents then took part in a “second study,” which

served as a filler task, and then a “third study” whose procedure was similar to that used in experiments 1 and

2.

A concern that we had was that the procedure used to manipulate goals will also affect mood states,

resulting in a potential confound. Specifically, subjects who would be evaluating products described on

gratificatory attributes could be put into mood states that were more positive than those who would be

evaluating products described on utilitarian attributes. To reduce the viability of this alternative account, we

carried out a pretest, the procedure of which was quite similar to the “first study” of Experiment 3. Thirty-six

subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Following the “first study,” which was identical to

the one that formed part of Experiment 3, subjects took part in a “second study” purportedly about the

development of some scales for future research. As part of this study, subjects were presented with 20 items

from Watson, Clark, & Tellegen’s (1988) PANAS scales to assess their mood states. Responses to 10

items were averaged to form the Positive Affect variable, while the remaining 10 items were averaged to form

the Negative Affect variable. Between-subject ANOVA’s with the Positive Affect and Negative Affect

variables as the dependent variables revealed no significant effects (F<1), reducing the possibility that mood

served as a potential confound in Experiment 3.

Stimuli

Instead of the pizza and soup that were used in experiment 2, experiment 3 used two vacation-

packages, a party vacation in Bora Bora, and a body-toning vacation in the foothills of the Rockies. Subjects

23

were told in the first room that they would be entered in a lottery and that the winner of the lottery could choose

between two vacations worth around $900 (the vacation-packages were not mentioned). As will be discussed

shortly, measures were collected in experiment 3 to ensure that the vacation-packages had the desired

characteristics–the “party” vacation being associated with more positive affect but less favorable consequence-

related cognitions compared to the “body-toning” vacation.

Measures

The measures used were similar to those in experiment 2. In addition, respondents were asked to

rate if the following statements were apt descriptions of each of the two vacation packages (one at a time,

with the order counterbalanced–none of the treatment effects involving the order of measurement was

significant in the relevant analyses): “I could sense a desire to take it,” “I felt a strong, irresistible urge to take

it,” “I felt an impulse to take it,” and “The emotional side of me was aroused when I saw it.” These items

were anchored by “description not apt (1)/description apt (7).” Cronbach’s alpha for these items measuring

the affective nature of the two vacation packages was 0.87 for the “party” vacation and 0.91 for the “body-

toning” vacation, suggesting that the items could be averaged to form one variable for each of the two

vacation packages (Affectparty and Affectbody). Respondents’ cognitions about the consequences of taking the

two vacation packages were obtained on four 7-point items for each of the two packages (one at a time, with

the order counterbalanced–again, none of the treatment effects involving the order of measurement was

significant in the relevant analyses). The scales were anchored by “harmful (1)/beneficial (7),” “not good for

health (1)/good for health (7),” “a foolish choice (1)/a wise choice (7),” and “useless (1)/useful (7).”

Cronbach’s alpha for these items was 0.88 for the “party” vacation and 0.83 for the “body-toning” vacation,

and, therefore, the responses were averaged to form one variable for each of the two vacations (Cogparty and

Cogbody).

Finally, to rule out demand effects respondents were asked 4 open-ended questions adapted from

24

Chartrand & Bargh (1996) and Ramanathan (2000): “What do you think was the purpose of this study?”

“Do you think any of the different studies that you took part in thus far are related to one another (please

elaborate)?” “Do you think anything you did or did not do on any one of the studies affected anything you

did or did not do on any other study (please elaborate)?” and “Did you find anything unusual about any of the

studies you took part in thus far (please elaborate)?” None of the responses to these four questions were in

the affirmative, suggesting that the observed effects were not due to experimenter demand.

Results

Stimulus Characteristics. Within-subject analyses with the affect and cognitions related to the

vacation packages as the dependent variables and the type-of-vacation, priming, and decision-mode as the

independent variables revealed significant main-effects of type-of-vacation for both of the dependent

variables, and none of the other treatment effects were significant. Affectparty (M=5.48) was significantly

greater than Affectbody (M=2.52; F1,199=524.02, p=.0001), and Cogparty (M=4.28) was significantly lower

than Cogbody (M=6.18; F1,199=300.85, p=.0001). These results suggest that the stimulus-material had the

desired characteristics.

Choice. We predicted a replication of the results obtained in the high decision-time, low cognitive-

load conditions of experiment 2 when appetitive goals are not primed–choice of the affect-laden option

(“party” vacation) will be higher when the level of exposure is high than when it is low. In contrast, we

predicted that, when appetitive goals are primed, choice of the affect laden option in the low exposure

condition will increase to approach the choice levels in the high exposure condition.

Consistent with our predictions, a logistic regression analysis revealed a significant decision-mode by

priming interaction (P2 =4.27, p=.04, D2=.04), in addition to main effects of decision-mode (P2=5.12,

p=.02, D2=.06) and priming (P2=4.43, p=.04, D2=.05). More specifically, as can be seen in Figure 5,

under conditions where appetitive goals were not primed, choice of the affect-laden option (“party” vacation)

25

was higher when the level of exposure was high (80%) than when it was low (49%; z=3.16, p<.01). In

contrast, when appetitive goals were primed, choice of the affect laden option was similar across the high

(81%) and low levels of exposure (79.5%; p>.20).

_____________________________________

INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

_____________________________________

Decision-Goal. The variable Decision-Goal served to ascertain whether gratification-seeking goals

were activated in conditions where the choice of the “party” vacation was high. As shown in Figure 5, the

pattern of results for Decision-Goal mirrored that for choice. As with choice, an ANCOVA with Decision-

Goal as the dependent variable, and decision-mode and priming as the independent variables revealed a

significant 2-way interaction (F1,185=4.17, p=.04, T2=.04), in addition to significant main-effects of decision-

mode (F1,185=8.35, p=.004, T2=.08) and priming (F1,185=5.86, p=.02, T2=.06).

Consistent with our conceptualization, under conditions where goals were not primed, respondents

rated their choices as having been influenced more by appetitive goals when the level of exposure was high

(M=5.50) than when it was low (M=4.38; F1,185=12.14, p=.0006). When goals were primed, respondents

rated their choices as having been influenced by appetitive goals both in the high (M=5.62) and low levels of

exposure (M=5.43) conditions (p>.20).

A Baron & Kenny (1986) test was carried out to examine if the significant interactive effect of

cognitive-load and decision-mode on choice (reported in the previous section) was mediated by Decision-

Goal. An ANCOVA revealed that the first criterion for mediation was supported by a significant interactive

effect of the two independent variables, decision-mode and priming, on Decision-Goal (F1,185=4.17, p=.04).

A logistic regression analysis provided support to the second criterion for mediation by revealing a significant

effect of Decision-Goal on choice, (P2 =39.5, p<.0001). Another logistic regression analysis provided

26

support for the third criterion for mediation–the effect of the independent variable on choice (the 2-way

interaction that was significant at the 0.04 level) was weakened when Decision-Goal was included as a

covariate in the model (P2 =3.07, p=.08). Thus, complete support was obtained for all three criteria,

suggesting that Decision-Goal did serve as a mediator between the independent variables and choice.

Discussion

By manipulating appetitive goals, experiment 3 demonstrated that the pattern of results observed in

the high decision-time, low cognitive-load conditions of experiment 2 occur due to the activation of

appetitive goals when the level of exposure is high, and a lack of activation when the level of exposure is low.

Further support for our conceptualization related to the activation of appetitive goals was obtained by using a

process measure, Decision-Goal, which indicated whether respondents’ choices were driven more or less by

appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals. Results for this Decision-Goal variable mirrored those for choice

and tests revealed that Decision-Goal mediated the effects of independent variables on choice.

General Discussion

Summary of Findings

The purpose of this article was to examine the effects of “lower-order” affect and “higher-order” affect

and cognitions on the choice of options often termed as guilty pleasures (Giner-Sorolla, 1999) or vices

(Wertenbroch, 1998). Based on the Affective Cognitive Model, we made three primary predictions. First,

we predicted that if the time available for the decision is low, choices are more likely to be influenced by affect

(lower-order) and by goals that are more appetitive in nature when the level of cognitive load is high than when

it is low. Hence, choice of the affect laden option is likely to be higher when the level of cognitive load is high

than when it is low. Second, if the time available for the decision is high, the pattern of results under high

versus low levels of cognitive load will depend on the nature of exposure to the options. If the exposure to the

options is high, choices are more likely to be influenced by affect (higher-order) and by goals that are more

27

appetitive in nature, when the level of cognitive load is low than when it is high. In other words, we predicted

that the pattern of results on choice would be just the reverse of what we predicted in the conditions where the

time for the decision is low. Third, if the time available to decide is high but the exposure to the options is low,

choices are less likely to be influenced by affect (higher-order), and, in line with dual-process theories, choice

of the affect-laden option is likely to be attenuated when cognitive load decreases.

The above propositions were tested in binary choice contexts in which one of the alternatives

(chocolate cake, pizza, a party vacation in experiments 1, 2, and 3 respectively) was superior on the affective

dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension compared to the other alternative (fruit salad, soup, and a

body-toning vacation in experiments 1, 2, and 3). Findings from the three experiments supported our

predictions. Moreover, findings related to two process measures, a self-reported measure of the basis of

respondents’ decisions and a self-reported measure of the goals that were brought to bear in the decision,

supported our conceptualization. In the conditions where choices of the affect-laden options were high,

subjects were more apt to indicate that their choices had been influenced primarily by affect and by appetitive

goals than in conditions where choices of the affect-laden options were low.

Theoretical and Managerial Implications

Our work, together with recent empirical research by Garbarino & Edell (1997), Luce (1998),

Mellers et al. (1997), and Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), clearly point to the importance of examining the role of

task-induced affect in choice behavior. Previous empirical work in this area suggests that choices can be

influenced by affect arising from higher order processes, such as making trade-offs between attribute values

(Luce, 1998), expending high cognitive effort (Garbarino & Edell, 1997), and making risky decisions (Mellers

et al., 1997). Choices can also be influenced by by affect arising from the stimulus in a relatively spontaneous

manner, with little involvement of higher order cognitive processes (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). But, to the best

of our knowledge, our research is the first attempt to integrate these two broad themes, and examine the

effects of both lower-order and higher-order affect.

28

Our findings have implications for consumers and marketers as well. The core findings related to the

effects of constrained processing resources and low levels of exposure on choice suggest that when consumers

don’t spend too much time on making a decision (as is often the case for many consumer packaged goods

[see Dickson & Sawyer, 1990]), any factor that increases cognitive load in the shopping environment is likely

to increase buying based on affect rather than cognitions. Consumers, therefore, need to be aware of potential

actions that marketers might take to influence decisions involving actions designed to constrain processing

resources, such as having distracting music or displays in the shopping environment. Another consequence,

which derives from anecdotal evidence that we obtained from a local grocery-store manager is that reducing

the check-out time can also cause consumers to deliberate less about what’s in their shopping carts and make

them more prone to leaving the store with products they chose on impulse. Alternatively, our findings related

to higher-order affective processes suggest that consumers would be better off not choosing guilty pleasures or

vices by avoiding “excessive” exposure to such products.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The conclusions in this article are made with the usual caveats about decision making experiments that

are conducted in controlled environments. Even though the experiments used real alternatives rather than

scenarios, they were conducted in a binary choice context and in a non-shopping environment. In other

words, the propositions arising from our affective-cognitive model were tested in a context that was devoid of

much of the richness that surrounds real world choices. It is quite possible that as research in this topic area

moves closer to reflecting how people behave in the real world, further refinement to the theorizing and

conclusions presented in this article will be needed. Delineated below are several promising research

directions.

The traditional view of affect-driven behavior as being irrational has had a long history, dating back to

as early as the turn of this century with work in psychoanalysis (Freud, 1911), a view that is still shared by

contemporary researchers (e.g., Rook, 1987; Rook & Fisher, 1995). One question that future research needs

29

to address is how decision makers view such behaviors and how these views translate into the choices they

make. Preliminary results from our follow-up work suggest that, in contrast to researchers’ view of affect-

based behavior, decision makers don’t seem to view such behavior as normatively inappropriate, at least

immediately after the behavior occurs. In an experiment that was similar to the ones reported in this article,

respondents who had been subject to cognitive load were asked, immediately after they had indicated their

choices, how satisfied they were with their decisions and whether they would like to change their mind about

the option that they chose. To our surprise, as high as ninety-percent of respondents who chose the affect-

laden option stated that they would not change their minds, a percentage that was no different than that of

respondents who chose the non-affect-laden option. Satisfaction with the decision was not different between

these two groups either, despite cognitions about consuming the affect-laden option being unfavorable, as

reported in this article. An interesting question for future research is whether these results will hold with the

passage of time following the decision or whether the short-run satisfaction will turn into regret as time passes,

a possibility that arises from recent work on regret (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1995).

In this paper, the affective-cognitive model was applied to the context of choice behaviors. An

attempt to widen the applicability of the model will be to examine it in non-choice contexts as well. For

example, the model may be applied to explain seemingly conflicting findings on the role of affect in

counterfactual thinking. While recent work by Roese & Hur (1997) suggests that negative affect is a key

antecedent to counterfactual thinking, previous work suggests that negative affect is actually a consequence of

counterfactual thinking (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993;

Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995). It is quite possible that negative outcomes spontaneously engender

“lower-order” negative affect, which, in turn activates “higher-order” counterfactual thinking. These “higher-

order” counterfactual thoughts could then engender “higher-order” affective reactions if the decision-maker

dwells on these thoughts for a sufficiently long period of time in the absence of distractors (see Roese, 1997

and Roese & Hur, 1997 for similar arguments to explain the bi-directional causal linkage between affect and

30

counterfactual thinking).

Another direction that future research may take is to test our affective-cognitive model in different

contexts. One such context could be where the focus is on negative affect, for example disgust, an emotion

that has been widely examined in the literature (e.g., Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994; Rozin, Markwith, &

Stoess, 1997). More specifically, one could examine a binary choice context involving disgust, where the

negative affect elicited by one alternative is more intense, but the cognitions are more favorable, than for the

other alternative. For example, one could envisage a situation where the decision maker is choosing between

irradiated meat which is slightly discolored and, consequently, may elicit reactions related to disgust, but is

more healthy than non-irradiated meat. Examining the proposed affective-cognitive model in such different

contexts will considerably bolster its validity.

Finally, from a theory-building perspective, future research needs to follow-up on recent advances in

neuropsychology on emotions (e.g., LeDoux, 1996). For example, one direction could be to examine

neurological and physiological changes that occur when decision makers are behaving based on “lower-order”

versus “higher-order” affect, and to assess how well the measures of affect that have been used by us and

others correlate with neurological and physiological measures. Research in this direction will serve to integrate

psychological and biological approaches to understanding affect, a strategy that is being advocated by a

number of researchers (e.g., Isen, 1990; Lang, 1993) to increase “our understanding of all these phenomena

and the processes that contribute to them” (Isen, 1990, p. 89).

Conclusion

In much previous decision making research, people have been characterized as “thinking machines,”

driven purely by cognitions. We believe that this is a poor reflection of reality. Moreover, the work by

Dickson and Sawyer (1990), examining how people actually make decisions in various shopping contexts,

suggests that people are not always “mindful” decision makers as has often been portrayed in the literature, but

tend to make their decisions “mindlessly” as well. This article was an attempt at integrating these two broad

themes with the hope that it will infuse more life and realism into an already exciting area of research in decision

31

making.

32

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1. We thank Bob Wyer for bringing this fact to our attention.

2. In Figure 1, the path from lower-order cognitions to goals has been represented as a dotted line because

of the ambiguity that exists in the literature on this issue. LeDoux (1995, 1996) argues that action

tendencies arising from lower-order processes occur only through the generation of spontaneously

evoked lower-order affective reactions. In contrast, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) propose that

goals, and hence action tendencies, can be activated independently by lower-order cognitions. A

resolution of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper. However, note that for the contexts

being examined in this paper, the valence of both lower-order cognitions and affective reactions is

likely to be the same (positive) and, hence, our core proposition related to the impact of lower-

order processes on choice is unlikely to be affected whether or not we include the direct path from

lower-order cognitions to goals.

3. Note that in conditions where the decision time is high and the level of exposure is also high (columns 3

and 4 of Table 1) we are predicting a reversal in the pattern of results compared to conditions where

the decision time is low (columns 1 and 2 of Table 1). This reversal in the pattern of results might, at

first blush, seem to contradict traditional dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Petty

& Cacioppo, 1986). According to these theories, in the high decision-time conditions a decrease in

the level of cognitive load should lead to an even further decrease in the choice of the affect-laden

option. In other words, we should be observing an amplification of the effect rather than its reversal.

However, as per recent formulations of dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999;

Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1999), for an

amplification of effects to occur, decision goals need to remain unchanged as the level of processing

FOOTNOTES

39

resources changes. As shown in Figure 1, what we predict is a shift in goals within the high

decision-time condition as the level of cognitive load changes, giving rise to the predicted reversal in

choices. The predicted results are, therefore, not inconsistent with dual-process theories.

4. Six different sounds– “traffic at a busy intersection,” “rain in a tropical forest,” “thunderstorm,” “sounds

on a cliff,” “mall parking lot,” and “mountain stream” were each evaluated by sixteen pretest subjects

from the same population as the main experiment. The sounds were evaluated on three 7-point

items anchored by “bad (-3)/good (+3),” “unpleasant (-3)/pleasant (+3),” and “not likable (-

3)/likable (+3).” Since the Cronbach alpha was 0.89 for these items, they were averaged to form

one evaluation for each of the six different sounds. The mean rating for “sounds on a cliff” was

found to lie closest to the mid-point, which was anchored by “neither (lower anchor) nor (upper

anchor).”

5. The effect sizes obtained in this and the other two experiments are comparable to those commonly

observed in consumer research. For example, in a meta-analysis of effect sizes, Peterson, Albaum,

and Beltramini (1985) report average sizes with college students of .105 for main effects and .05 for

interactions.

40

AUTHOR NOTE

Baba Shiv is an Assistant Professor at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242-1000, and

Alexander Fedorikhin is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA

90089-0443. The authors wish to thank Jim Bettman, Cathy Cole, Irwin Levin, Debbie MacInnis, Suresh

Ramanathan, Dennis Rook, Gary Russell, Bob Wyer, the participants of the Affect and Decision Making

Camp, Ohio State University, and the Judgment and Decision Making Seminar Series at the University of

Iowa for their invaluable feedback and guidance at various stages of this project. The authors also wish to

thank the associate editor and three reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier versions of the

manuscript. Finally, the authors extend their thanks to Hisashi Kurata, Sangkil Moon, Angelo Licursi and

Sam Farrington for their help in administering the experiments and coding the thought protocols.

Table 1

Predicted Effects of Cognitive Load, Decision Time and Level of Exposure on Processing Resources, the Nature of Underlying Processes,Focus of Underlying Processes, Goals, and Choice

Low Decision Time High Decision TimeHigh Level of Exposure Low Level of Exposure

High Low High Low High LowCognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Load Load Load Load Load Load

Availability of Processing Very Low Moderately Moderately Very High Moderately Very High Resources High High High

Nature of Underlying Lower- Higher- Higher- Higher- Higher- Higher-Processes Order Order Order Order Order Order

Focus of Underlying Lower- Higher- Higher- Higher- Higher Higher-Processes Order Order Order Order Order Order

Cognitions Cognitions Cognitions Affect Cognitions Cognitions

Goals Appetitive Aversive Aversive Appetitive Aversive Very Aversive

Likelihood of Choice Cake Fruit-salad Fruit-salad Cake Fruit-salad Fruit-Salad(For the cake/salad (more so than in scenario) the previous column)

Figure 1. Affective-Cognitive Model.

Stimulus

Higher-orderCognitions

GoalsAction

Tendency Behavior

Higher-orderAffect

Lower-orderCognitions

Lower-orderAffect

*

* See footnote # 2

42

Low DecisionTime

High DecisionTime/HighExposure

High DecisionTime/LowExposure

High Cognitive Load

Low Cognitive Load

Figure 2. Predicted Pattern of Results on Choice, Positive Affect, and Appetitive Goals as a Function of Cognitive Load, Decision Time,

and Level of Exposure

43

5 0

36.5

29.8

5 6

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

L o w D e c i s i o n T i m e H i g h D e c i s i o n T i m e / H i g h

Exposure

Ch

oice

of

Cak

e

H i g h C o g n i t i v e L o a d L o w C o g n i t i v e L o a d

Figure 3. Choice and Decision-Basis as Functions of Decision-Time and Cognitive-Load (Data Collapsed across Consumer Impulsivity)--Experiment 1

4

3.323.28

4.05

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

L o w D e c i s i o n T i m e H i g h D e c i s i o n T i m e / H i g h

Exposure

Dec

isio

n-B

asis

H i g h C o g n i t i v e L o a d L o w C o g n i t i v e L o a d

44

78.1

51.455.6

51.4

76.9

45.2

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Low DecisionTime

High DecisionTime/HighExposure

High DecisionTime/LowExposure

Cho

ice

of P

izza

High Cognitive Load Low Cognitive Load

Figure 4. Choice and Decision-Goal as Functions of Decision-Time, Level of Exposure, and Cognitive-Load--Experiment 2

5.55

4.744.94.83

5.29

4.7

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

LowDecision

Time

HighDecision

Time/HighExposure

HighDecision

Time/LowExposure

Dec

isio

n-G

oal

High Cognitive Load Low Cognitive Load

45

80 81

49

79.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

No Priming Priming

Cho

ice

of "

Par

ty"

Vac

atio

n

High Exposure Low Exposure

Figure 5. Choice and Decision-Goal as Functions of Priming and Level of Exposure--Experiment 3

5.55.62

4.38

5.43

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

No Priming Priming

Dec

isio

n-G

oal

High Exposure Low Exposure

46