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Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior
and Corporate Value
J.R. Davies
David Hillier
Patrick McColgan
JEL Classication: G32
Keywords: Ownership Structure; Capital Expenditure; Corporate Value; Tobin's Q.
The authors would like to thank John Capsta, Scott Linn, Andrew Marshall, JamesWansley and seminar participants at the Financial Management Association International(2001), European Financial Management Association (2002), Trinity College Dublin andUniversity of Strathclyde for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper.The normal caveat applies.
Department of Accounting & Finance, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. G4 0LN.Phone: 00 44 141 548 3889. Fax: 00 44 141 552 3547. Corresponding Author e-mail:[email protected].
October 24, 2002
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Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior andCorporate Value
Abstract
The nonlinear relationship between corporate value (Tobin's Q) and man-
agerial ownership is well documented. This has commonly been attributed
to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of cor-
porate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a more
complex structure for the corporate value { managerial ownership function,
which accounts for the eect of conicting managerial incentives and external
and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this specication as
the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership
- corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. This nding is at odds with
recent work by Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) who report that
corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa.
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1 Introduction
In a market without agency problems, corporate management will chooseinvestments that maximize the wealth of shareholders. In practice, com-
peting objectives that are incompatible with the classic shareholder wealth-
maximizing paradigm may also be pursued. Following Jensen and Meckling
(1976), a large literature has developed examining the eect of management
and their behavior on the performance and value of rms they control. A vi-
brant strand of this literature concerns the relationship between managerial
ownership levels, the direct investment decisions made by management andthe inherent value of the rm, as proxied by Tobin's Q ratio.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) provide evidence of a signicant non-linear
relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership. Specically,
corporate value increases with management equity holdings to a certain level
after which entrenchment behavior becomes dominant, leading to decreases
in rm value. Whereas, Morck et al. (1988) and Hermalin and Weisbach(1991) document a further change in the corporate value-managerial holdings
relationship at high levels of equity ownership, McConnell and Servaes (1990)
report no such change.
Recent work by Cho (1998) and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)
have shed doubt on these earlier ndings by controlling for the eects of en-
dogeneity and unobservable (to the econometrician) rm characteristics in
their analysis. Applying a two-stage least squares methodology, Cho (1998)showed that managerial ownership had no eect on corporate value and in-
vestment but that corporate value had a signicant impact on managerial
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ownership. Himmelberg et al. (1999) showed that controlling for endogeneity
eliminated the observed relationship between corporate value and managerial
ownership but also that a large proportion of the cross-sectional variation in
managerial holdings was explained by unobserved rm heterogeneity.
In this paper, we propose an alternative structure to the managerial
ownership-corporate value relationship which captures a more complex char-
acterization of the evolving behavior of managers. We argue that at high
levels of managerial ownership when external market discipline becomes in-
eective, there will be a resurgence of entrenchment behavior. With equity
holdings around 50%, managers will have gained implicit control of their
company, but still do not have objectives completely aligned to external
shareholders. Only at very high levels of managerial holdings, are incentives
akin to other shareholders.
In contrast to Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999), when this model
is applied to a large sample of rms incorporated in the UK, managerial
ownership is shown to have a signicant impact on corporate value. This re-
lationship is endogenous, and consistent with Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et
al. (1999), corporate value has a corresponding eect on levels of managerial
ownership. Surprisingly, we nd that although ownership levels are aected
by rm level capital expenditures (investment), there is no evidence of the
reverse occurring.
We provide a more detailed review of the relevant literature in the next
section. In section three we justify an examination of this issue using UK
data and discuss some important features of the UK market. In section
four we outline a simple model of managerial ownership in which corporate
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value increases non-linearly with management equity holdings. We present
empirical results in section ve and conclude in section six.
2 Overview of Relevant Literature
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) rst proposed that share ownership would
provide managers with an incentive to reduce private perquisite consump-
tion, empirical research has produced conicting results as to the veracity of
their proposals. An initial attempt to model a linear relationship between
corporate performance, as measured by accounting prot rate, and owner-
ship concentration was made unsuccessfully by Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
However, Morck et al. (1988) documented a signi cant non-linear relation
between ownership and value in their study of 371 Fortune 500 companies.
Their ndings point to a positive impact on corporate value for ownership lev-
els between 0% and 5% managerial ownership and a negative eect between
5% and 25%. This change in sign is attributed to managerial entrenchment,
when they gain enough power (with insucient external controls) so as to
be able to pursue their own objectives at the expense of shareholder value.
Although managerial interests will converge to that of shareholders as their
equity stake grows, behavior is still dominated by entrenchment. At levels of
ownership above 25%, Morck et al. (1988) found that the alignment of ob-
jectives became prominent and increases in ownership were associated with
higher levels of corporate value.
McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide some evidence to support Morck
et al. (1988). In a larger and more diverse sample, they report a signicant
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quadratic relation between managerial ownership and corporate value. As
ownership increases, so too does value. However, above equity holdings of
approximately 50% and 40% in their 1976 and 1986 samples respectively, rm
value declines. Their interpretation is attributed to initially increased man-
agerial incentives but with entrenchment prevailing at higher levels of owner-
ship. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) also report a non-monotonic
relationship between ownership and corporate value but with dierent turn-
ing points.1
More recent work has built upon the ndings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985)
who argue that levels of managerial ownership will be determined endoge-
nously in equilibrium. They nd ownership to be a function of the volatility
of a rm's stock. Managers holding large share stakes in their own rm nd
it more dicult to diversify their portfolio risk, and thus their incentive to
hold large shareholdings declines as the risk of their rm's stock increases.
Cho (1998) extended the argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) by exam-
ining the interdependence of managerial ownership, investment, and corpo-
rate value. Initially, Cho (1998) reported the same non-monotonic relation
between ownership and value as found by Morck et al. (1988). Further-
more, he also found this same relation between levels of ownership and cor-
porate investment, suggesting that \ownership structure aects investment
and, therefore corporate value." (p. 114) However, drawing on Demsetz
1Hermalin and Weisbach use both OLS and instrumental variable regressions, the latterbeing an attempt to control for potential simultaneity between ownership and corporatevalue. However, they argue that such an approach is imperfect. In addition, Himmelberg
et al. (1999) are critical of an instrumental variables approach, as the instruments formanagerial ownership and corporate value will be similar and determined within the rm'scontracting environment.
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and Lehn (1985), simultaneous regression analysis was utilized to control for
endogenity and it was found that ownership structure was endogenously de-
termined by corporate value (as measured by Tobin's Q). It was also reported
that investment and not managerial ownership signicantly inuenced corpo-
rate value. Cho (1998) concluded that managers in rms with higher Tobin's
Q, or with better investment opportunities tend to hold a higher fraction of
their rm's shares. However, he found no evidence that managerial ownership
had a causal eect on investment or corporate value.
Himmelberg et al. (1999) interpret similar ndings of endogeneity in a
dierent manner. They propose that endogeneity provides evidence of dier-
ing optimal contracting relationships within various types of rms. In this
situation, incentives provided by managerial ownership will dier in impor-
tance depending on both observable and unobservable characteristics of a
rm's contracting environment. Their ndings point to the importance of
rm heterogeneity in determining levels of managerial holdings. Moreover,
when taking these unobserved factors into account, they found no evidence
of a causal relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value.
However, Zhou (2001) is heavily critical of the xed eects panel data ap-
proach employed by Himmelberg et al. (1999). He comments that such a
methodology will remove any cross-sectional variation in the data, and there-
fore, reveal no meaningful link between managerial ownership and corporate
value. Both Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Zhou (2001) argue that
cross-sectional variation is likely to be a signicant factor in any relationship
between managerial ownership and value.
With UK companies, Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Las-
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fer (1999) both utilize a cubic specication to model the corporate value-
managerial holdings relationship and both reported a signicant non-linear
functional form similar to Morck et al. (1988). Specically, Short and Keasey
(1999) document turning points of 12.99% and 41.99% and Faccio and Las-
fer (1999) document breakpoints of 19.68% and 54.12% in their sub-sample
of above average growth rms. However, neither study fully examines the
misspecifying impact of endogeneity on their results.2
3 UK Institutional FeaturesThe UK oers an interesting environment for the conduct of a study of this
kind in several respects. First, with roughly 2,500 national and multinational
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the UK is a major
international nancial market. Furthermore, corporate governance structures
in the UK are largely similar to those in the US in terms of corporate boards,
diverse ownership structures and active external markets which in theory
should contribute to improved managerial monitoring.
Investment practices in the UK resemble those of the United States, where
nancial institutions such as pension funds control 80% of UK securities. As
a consequence, the UK mirrors closely US corporate and nancial practices,
enabling meaningful comparisons with prior US-based studies.
Both the UK and US have nancial and regulatory traditions that are
2Whilst Faccio and Lasfer (1999) ignore this possible eect, Short and Keasey (1999)take ownership as a lagged value as at the end of 1988 and then measure value as theaverage for 1989 to 1992. As an alternative approach they also use xed year dummyvariables within a panel regression framework. However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) contendthat even such an approach doesn't adequately account for endogenity as the contractualnexus of a rm will change only very slowly over time.
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dierent from those of other developed economies such as Japan and Western
Europe. Evidence of this is provided by Dahya, McConnell and Travlos
(2002), who document the same statistically signicant relationship between
outsider dominated corporate boards and performance related management
turnover as that reported by Weisbach (1988) for US companies. This is in
contrast to Kang and Shivdasani (1995) who could nd no such relationship
existing in Japanese companies.
Any proposed similarity between the UK and US is tempered by the em-
pirical ndings of a poor disciplinary takeover market in the UK by Franks
and Mayer (1996) who, in contrast to the ndings of Martin and McConnell
(1991) for US corporate forms, nd no signicant relation between poor com-
pany performance, hostile takeovers and top management turnover. These
ndings point to a similarity between the UK and Germany where Franks
and Mayer (2000) discuss a lack of takeover market in which to provide man-
agement with incentives for maximising rm value. In addition, Short and
Keasey (1999) note that UK companies are substantially less active in their
use of takeover defences, largely due to opposition from nancial institu-
tions. Were this to be the case, managerial ownership would take on greater
signicance in the UK.
Institutional stakeholders in the UK are also likely to be more active in
their monitoring capacity than their US counterparts. As Short and Keasey
(1999) point out, the extreme geographical clustering of large institutions
within the City of London can lead to an eective but informal monitoring
mechanism for the management of London Stock Exchange listed companies.
In addition, Short and Keasey(1999) argue that much of the monitoring
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activity of UK institutions is carried out privately `behind closed doors' and
unlike many of their US counterparts, UK nancial institutions face no legal
duty to vote at company AGMs.
Finally, Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) note the minority protec-
tion laws in the UK are far more stringent than those applied to US corpora-
tions. These laws may be vitally important in shielding minority shareholders
from expropriation by company management or other major shareholders.
4 Theoretical MotivationIn this section, we propose an alternative structure to the managerial holdings-
corporate value relationship and argue that the cubic, or simpler representa-
tions, used in earlier studies (see Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes
(1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al.
(1999) for US companies and Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Las-
fer (1999) for UK companies) are unnecessarily restrictive and misspecied.
The model that is presented in this paper captures further nonlinearities
in this relationship at high levels of managerial holdings and has a quintic
specication.
Management are faced with both negative and positive incentives to en-
sure that they follow objectives that maximize shareholder wealth. The ef-
fectiveness of incentives is potentially a function of the level of managerial
ownership in the rm. Since compensation packages such as stock options
are a transfer of wealth from shareholders to management, the value of these
incentives will lessen as management ownership increases. External market
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discipline is also a function of managerial ownership. Martin and McConnell
(1991) argue that the takeover market is an eective means of disciplining
management for poor performance. However, large shareholdings by top
management act as a deterrent for takeovers because of the greater ability
to oppose a hostile bid or drive up premiums to the point where bidders no
longer view the target company as a positive net present value investment,
[Stulz (1988)]. Finally, internal controls in the form of monitoring from large
shareholders and corporate boards should reduce the scope for managers to
diverge greatly from the interests of shareholders. Again, however, such dis-
cipline is likely to be inversely related to managerial control.
We view the propensity of management to maximize shareholder wealth
to be a function of three unobserved factors: external market discipline (even
if it is weak), internal controls and convergence of interests. Moreover, the
strength of each factor can be viewed as a function of the level of managerial
ownership in the rm.
4.1 Low levels of managerial ownership
For low levels of managerial ownership, external discipline and internal con-
trols or incentives will dominate behavior [see for example Fama (1980), Hart
(1983) and Jensen and Ruback (1983)] leading towards value maximization.
Empirically, Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin
and Weisbach (1991) and the original analysis of Cho (1998) report results
consistent with this behavior. However, there is also a possibility that lower
levels of ownership within this range have endogenously arisen from perfor-
mance related compensation packages, such as stock options and stock grants
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rather than increased ownership leading to higher Q ratios.
4.2 Intermediate levels of managerial ownership
At intermediate levels of managerial ownership, convergence of interests be-
comes stronger. However, with greater ownership comes greater power in
the form of voting rights. Managers may be able to maximise their own
wealth through increasing their perquisites and guaranteeing their employ-
ment at the expense of corporate value. In addition, whilst ownership in the
previous range may have arisen through the vesting of compensation plans,
it is unlikely that such plans will provide management with even a mod-
erate ownership stake in the rm. Although external market controls are
still in place, these and the eect of convergence of interests are not strong
enough to align the behavior of management to shareholders. Managerial
labour markets operate on the principal that managers can be removed for
poor performance and appropriately disciplined. Studies by Denis, Denis
and Sarin (1997) in the US and Dahya et al. (2002) in the UK both nd
an inverse relation between top-management turnover and managerial own-
ership. This lack of discipline provides evidence of a deciency in incentives
for managers to maximise shareholder value at this level of ownership. Em-
pirically, the management entrenchment hypothesis, as suggested by Fama
and Jensen (1983), has been veried by Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and
Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) amongst others.
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4.3 High levels of insider ownership (less than 50%)
As levels of managerial equity ownership increase, objectives converge furtherto those of shareholders. At ownership levels below 50%, management do not
have total control of the rm and external discipline still exists. While per-
haps no longer being subject to any major discipline from external markets,
it is likely that even at these levels of ownership, managers are still subject
to discipline from external block shareholders. This is particularly true in
the UK, where because of strong informal ties between institutions [Short
and Keasey (1999)], a lax regulatory environment concerning the ownership
of listed companies [Roe (1990)] and low monitoring costs [Faccio and Lasfer
(1999)], institutional activism is stronger than in the US.3 This suggests that
even at high ownership levels, blockholders may still be able to inuence man-
agerial decision-making. This alignment of interests together with external
controls that can be applied by blockholders may in eect lead to managers
reverting to a value maximising strategy, a pattern consistent with Morck et
al. (1988). This is also consistent with Franks et al.'s (2001) contention of
strong minority protection laws in the UK, combined with monitoring from
UK institutions, which may allow external shareholders to impose some form
of control on management.
3For a more in-depth discussion of the institutional dierences and similarities betweenthe United Kingdom and United States, see Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio andLasfer (1999).
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4.4 High levels of managerial ownership (greater than
50%)
At levels above 50% managerial ownership, management have complete con-
trol of their company. Although atomistic shareholders are likely to have
been unable to inuence managers at far lower levels of ownership than this,
there is always a possibility that a cartel of blockholders (allied with minority
shareholder's rights under UK company law) may be able to mount a chal-
lenge to corporate managers if they fail to make decisions in shareholders'
best interests. At greater than 50% managerial ownership, this possibilityis no longer likely to be a serious issue to management. Furthermore, at
levels of 50% managerial ownership the probability of a hostile takeover ef-
fectively becomes zero. The failure of external discipline at such ownership
levels combined with a lack of blockholder incentives above 50% may result
in a decrease in corporate value for a small window of managerial holdings
above this level. The fall in corporate value at this level can be considered
similar to that found by McConnell and Servaes (1990).
4.5 Very high levels of managerial ownership
Finally, as managerial shareholdings rise to very high levels, management
eectively become sole owners of the company leading to value maximising
behavior. Consistent with Morck et al. (1988), Short and Keasey (1999),
Faccio and Lasfer (1999) and the initial ndings of Cho (1998), above a
certain level of ownership corporate managers are faced with such severe
nancial penalties for failing to maximise the value of their companies that
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they are forced to make decisions which will maximise rm value, regardless
of how this aects their preferences for corporate power.
4.6 Summary
Our characterisation of a highly nonlinear relationship between managerial
equity holdings and corporate value is in contrast to earlier studies [Morck et
al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990)4, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991),
Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999)], which posit fewer breakpoints
in their analysis. There is little theoretical basis on which the individual
breakpoints can be determined, and the ndings of Kole (1995) suggest that
these will be determined by the size of the rms in the sample. However,
it is expected that the second local maximum will be in the region of 50%
managerial ownership reecting the stage at which management gain total
control of the company. In the next section, the main tests of our hypotheses
will be carried out.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Description of the data
We use data on managerial and external block ownership for 1995 from the
Macmillan London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. The Year-
book provides summary accounting data including a consolidated balance
sheet, information on company directors, legal information on the company's4McConnell and Servaes (1988) modelled the corporate value-managerial ownership
relationship as a quadratic function, which by construction has only one turning point.
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lawyers, auditors and stockbrokers, principle activities, company history, cap-
ital and dividend payments and industrial sector for the vast majority of all
quoted companies and securities.5 The register could be considered similar
to the Value Line Investment Survey used in comparable US studies by, for
example, McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Denis et al. (1997).6 We re-
strict our attention to non-nancial companies only and require that each
rm have complete managerial and external ownership data for 1995, which
leaves 802 industrial companies in our sample. Data on capital expenditures,
total assets employed, after tax prots, depreciation, leverage, equity market
values and research and development costs are collected from Datastream.
We estimate Tobin's Q ratio (our proxy for corporate value) using the
formula below:
Q =MVEQ + PREF+ DEBT
BVASSETS(1)
Where
MVEQ= the year-end market value of the rm's common stock;
PREF = the year-end book value of the rm's preference shares (pre-
ferred stock);
DEBT = the year-end book value of the rm's total debt; and
BVASSETS= the total assets employed by the rm, which is measured
as total assets minus current liabilities.
Our measure is consistent with the modied version of the formula as
5Recently listed, merged or acquired rms are not included.6It should be noted that our data includes only the equity stakes of the company's
directors, whereas McConnell and Servaes (1990) ownership data also includes the hold-ings of company ocers. UK companies are not required to disclose the stakes of suchindividuals.
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used by Chung and Pruitt (1994) who nd that 96.6% of the variability in the
popular Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithm of Tobin's Q is explained by
their approximation. Our method also avoids the data availability problems
which arise from using the more rigorous algorithms proposed by Lindenberg
and Ross (1981) and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) as both require many
years data in estimating replacement costs of assets.
In addition, nancial reporting dierences between the UK and the US
make Tobin's Q a problematic measure to apply to UK data. Firms in the
UK have had far more freedom in revaluing their companies' xed assets than
those in the US and implicit in the more complex Lewellen and Badrinath
(1997) and Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithms is an assumption that
no revaluations have occurred. Updating previously revalued assets would
lead to an overestimation of the value of a rm's assets and as such would
understate the value of Tobin's Q. Furthermore, only including rms that
report separate pure historical cost accounts would introduce a bias in favour
of larger rms who would have an incentive to do so for the purpose of
international exchange listing requirements.
We use book value of preferred stock and long-term debt, rather than the
market values proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and Lewellen and
Badrinath (1997). In the UK there is a far less active market for the trading
of corporate debt than that which exists in the US, and as such it is more
dicult to obtain market values, even through using the relatively simple
bond rating tables as suggested by these previous studies. Since preference
shares make up such a minute proportion of traded capital in the UK it is
unlikely to be necessary to update this for market values. In a nal strati-
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cation of our sample, we mitigate the problem of potential outliers and trim
twenty-ve rms with the largest and smallest Tobin's Q measure, leaving a
nal sample of 752 rms.7
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample data. The mean
managerial ownership stake of all board members is 13.02%, which is similar
to comparable US studies, but slightly lower than Faccio and Lasfer (1999)
who report mean ownership of 16.7%.
Tobin's Q is slightly higher than that reported for related US work with
a mean value of 1.96. The standard deviation of Tobin's Q is 1.21 and is also
greater than other studies. However, it is substantially less than the mean
of 2.47 reported by Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2002) and is relatively
similar to the mean value of 1.86 Short and Keasey (1999) report for their
market valuation ratio.8 The most likely explanation for this dierence is
the greater heterogeneity of rms in our sample. UK rms in general also
tend to be smaller than their US counterparts which would also explain the
higher average Tobin's Q in our analysis.
The mean blockholder ownership is 37.34% and is on a par with that
reported for US rms by McConnell and Servaes (1990) (32.4%) and 34.57%
reported by Faccio and Lasfer (1999) for UK rms. The average capital ex-
penditure by rms in the sample is approximately $21 million and the cap-
ital expenditure to total assets employed ratio is approximately 0.1, which
7This is a larger sample than that used by Morck et al. (1988) - 371 rms, Cho (1998)- 326 rms and Himmelberg et. al (1999) - maximum 427 rms in any one year.
8Measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, minus
any intangibles. It should also be noted that Doukas et al. (2002) measure Q between1998 and 2000 which was the height of the technological boom on the UK stock market.Faccio and Lasfer (1999) fail to report summary statistics for this variable.
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is again similar to that reported by Cho (1998) for US companies. Debt
to Asset ratios average 0.14 and is lower than the UK average leverage ra-
tio for non-nancial rms. The full range of rm sizes are included in the
sample with the smallest company having an equity market capitalization
of$680,000 and the largest company's equity valued at approximately $26
billion. The mean company in the sample has a market capitalization of
$335 million, which is considerably smaller than the average rm traded on
NYSE, but is the equivalent of a FTSE 100 company in the UK.
Table 2 provides the distribution of sample statistics grouped by manager-
ial ownership. A very large proportion of the sample (62%) have managerial
ownership levels less than or equal to 10%. However, a large fraction of
companies (11%) also in the sample had boards which owned at least forty
percent of all outstanding equity. As would be expected, outside blockholder
ownership decreases with managerial ownership. At ownership levels of 30%,
blockholder ownership is slightly less at 24%. It is probable that external
discipline, as provided by blockholders, would still be strong at these lev-
els of managerial holdings, particularly where informal coalitions amongst
blockholders are more prominent [Short and Keasey (1999)]. At higher levels
of managerial holdings, blockholder ownership decreases sharply leading to
a collapse in the power of blockholders. For example, between 50% and 60%
managerial holdings, blockholder ownership falls by approximately half to
12.4% of the company's outstanding equity. Managerial ownership is a de-
creasing function of company size indicating that a high level of managerial
ownership is more prevalent in smaller size companies. Although rm sizes
in the UK are considerably smaller than US rms, the ratios in table 2 are
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similar to summary statistics provided in Morck et al. (1988), McConnell
and Servaes (1990), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999).
Table 2 also illustrates the non-linear relationship between Tobin's Q and
managerial holdings. Visual inspection points to two maximum points in
the region of 10% to 20% and 50% to 60% respectively. The convergence of
interests eect at very high levels of managerial ownership is not apparent at
this stage because of the large managerial ownership grouping for holdings
above 70%. However, the statistics for all other groupings are consistent with
our theoretical motivation.
5.2 Estimation of ownership breakpoints
In order to model the Tobin's Q - managerial ownership (IO) function as
having two maximum and two minimum turning points, we specify a quintic
function.
Q = 0 + 1IO + 2IO2 + 3IO
3 + 4IO4 + 5IO
5 + " (2)
For the nonlinear relationship discussed in section 4 to be valid, the co-
ecients in [2] must have the following signs: 0 > 0; 1 > 0; 2 < 0; 3 >
0;4 < 0; 5 > 0: The estimated values of the coecients in [2] are given in
table 3. The intercept coecient, which is an estimate of Tobin's Q in rms
with no managerial holdings, is 1.85. Each slope coecient is of the correct
sign and statistically signicant at the 5% level. Although the adjusted R2
is low, it is similar to that found in comparable US studies. The use of this
model as a basis to estimate managerial ownership breakpoints leads to four
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critical values: 7.01%, 26.0%, 51.4%, 75.7% and is illustrated in gure 1.
To establish the robustness of our regression model, the spline approach as
applied by Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) to
estimate managerial breakpoints was carried out using our generated break-
points. Table 4 presents the coecients resulting from the piecewise linear
regression. Similar to table 3, each coecient has the expected sign and all
but one variable is statistically signicant at the 5% level. The only variable
that is not signicant, IOover76%, has the correct sign. The probable cause
for the lack of signicance is the small number of rms in this managerial
ownership grouping.
An examination of these results suggests that Tobin's Q increases in rms
for managerial ownership levels up to 7% and then declines to ownership
levels of 26%. This is almost exactly the same as the breakpoints in Morck
et al. (1988) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) (5% and 25% respectively) and
is comparable to Cho (1998) who use breakpoints of 7% and 38%. However,
it diers from the UK studies of Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and
Lasfer (1999) who each report two turning points of 12.99% and 41.99% and
19.68% and 54.12% respectively. Earlier studies limited the turning points
to two but in our extension it is clear that there are another two turning
points at much higher levels of managerial ownership. It also appears that
market discipline has an inuence on managerial objectives up to the point
where the board takes complete control (51%). Tobin's Q then decreases
until ownership levels reach 76% after which Q increases.
Denis and Sarin (1999) argue that cross-sectional studies may be sub-
ject to bias, whereby they fail to account for events with potentially large
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valuation consequences.9 As a further test of robustness, we carried out the
quintic analysis for Managerial ownership and Tobin's Q for the same sample
of available rms in 1997.10 Again, each coecient was signicant with the
correct signs and the turning points from the estimated model were relatively
stable at 7.9%, 26.5%, 55.2% and 86.2%.
5.3 Endogenity of managerial equity ownership, in-
vestment and corporate value
To analyse for the eects of endogeneity in the managerial ownership, invest-ment and corporate value relationship we follow Cho (1998) and carry out
a simultaneous equations analysis using two stage least squares. Cho (1998)
and Himmelberg et al. (1999) showed that once endogeneity was controlled
for, the perceived impact of managerial ownership on corporate value dis-
appeared. Moreover, corporate value was found to positively aect levels of
managerial ownership.
It is possible that if the model specication employed by these studies iswrong, what appears to be a lack of statistical signicance in the endoge-
nous variables in the simultaneous equations analysis may actually be due
to errors in variables arising from the intermediate regressions. We re-run
the two-stage least squares analysis of Cho (1998) using our more complex
specication.11 The control variables in our regression are the same as in
9Examples of such events may include receiving a takeover bid, top managementturnover, etc.
10
Some rms fell out of the sample because of mergers, delisting and being taken over.11Cho (1998) also attempts to control for specication error by re-estimating his si-multaneous regression analysis using managerial ownership as a linear variable and againnds no relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value. However, if in-
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Cho (1998). Namely, managerial ownership, investment and corporate value
are dened to be endogenously determined by each other as well as some
additional relevant exogenous variables. That is:
InsiderOwnership = f(market value of rm's common equity, corporate
value, investment, volatility of earnings, liquidity, industry)
CorporateValue = g(insider ownership, investment, nancial leverage,
asset size, industry, block ownership, largest stakeholder)
Investment = h(insider ownership, corporate value, volatility of earnings,
liquidity, industry)
In addition to the variables used by Cho (1998), we include blockholder
ownership and largest stakeholder in the corporate value regressions to reect
the potential impact of blockholder discipline in the UK and the role of a
founding or dominant individual on corporate value. All accounting and
market variables are taken at the nancial year-end from Datastream.
In table 5 we report results from the simultaneous equations analysis.
Taking the managerial ownership regression rst, all variables with the ex-
ception of investment have coecients with the expected sign. managerial
ownership is negatively related to the market value of equity, which reects
the fact that managerial wealth constraints and risk-aversion will prevent
them from holding substantial stakes in large rms. Firm level liquidity is
shown to be positively related to managerial ownership, which is a stronger
result than Cho (1998) who reported no signicance for this variable. Impor-
tantly, Tobin's Q is found to be signicant and positively related to the level
of managerial ownership. This is consistent with Cho (1998) but is opposed
deed there is a non-linear relationship between ownership and corporate value, such anapproach would fail to capture this
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to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) who nd the opposite eect. This result
suggests that managers tend to hold larger stakes in rms that are successful
or have higher corporate value. This may also be indicative of successful
managers beneting from equity related compensation policies.
The investment variable, which has a negative impact on managerial own-
ership is surprising as theory predicts that rm level investment will be pos-
itively related to managerial ownership. Himmelberg et al. (1999) contend
that rms with high investment spending will have high managerial owner-
ship to alleviate the monitoring problem caused by discretionary managerial
spending. However, Jensen (1986) argued that rms may over-invest as a
result of an earnings retention conict, rather than under-invest as Jensen
and Meckling's (1976) moral hazard theory would predict. When a rm is
in this situation, managers may be able to maximise their size-related com-
pensation, but are aware that this may ultimately reduce the value of their
shareholdings. Although tentative, this could in part explain the negative
relation between investment and ownership. Cho (1998) also nds a negative
(but insignicant) coecient on the investment variable using both capital
and research and development expenditures. In addition, further analysis
by Cho (1998) provided evidence of investment insignicantly decreasing in
general with managerial ownership.
The estimated coecients from the corporate value regression are given
in the second column of table 5. Corporate value is shown to be positively
related to investment and leverage. Whilst the investment coecient is as
expected, the sign of the leverage variable requires more discussion. Morck
et al. (1988) found that leverage had a negative but insignicant impact on
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corporate value and attributed this to the possibility of managers in highly
levered rms holding a higher than average level ownership. However con-
sistent with our results, McConnell and Servaes (1990) reported a positive
signicant coecient for leverage. Leverage can have various eects on rm
value. The notion that high debt levels lead to greater corporate value has
been argued by Modigliani and Miller (1963) with respect to valuable tax
shields, Ross (1977) and Myers (1977) with respect to a signalling hypothe-
sis and Jensen's (1986) free cash ow hypothesis. Ultimately, leverage is one
way of imposing external discipline on management and if it is eective, will
lead to increased corporate value.
We view the most important result from the corporate value regression
as being the signicance of the managerial ownership variables. Our results
indicate that although managerial ownership levels are determined by corpo-
rate value, corporate value itself is determined in part by managerial owner-
ship. This nding is at odds with Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999)
but consistent with the classical view of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
empirical work by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990).
Interestingly, blockholder ownership is shown to negatively impact To-
bin's Q. This result is consistent with Faccio and Lasfer (1999, 2000). They
nd that block ownership negatively impacts on corporate value and that
UK occupational pension funds are associated with poor performance in the
companies they invest in. McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that this
could be due to a conict of interests, which results from blockholders be-
ing forced into aligning themselves with managers so as not to jeopardize
their other dealings with the rm. Alternatively, the negative coecient
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may be explained by the strategic alignment hypothesis, which argues that
blockholders and managers nd it mutually benecial to cooperate with each
other, undertaking activity not necessarily value-maximising in nature. Fi-
nally, such ndings may be consistent with the arguments of Burkart, Gromb
and Panunzi (1997) in that too much block ownership will overly constrain
management and reduce their ability to take value maximising investment
decisions.
The investment regression coecients presented in column three of table
5 show a signicant positive eect of corporate value on investment and a
negative eect of prot volatility on investment. The nding that corporate
value has a positive eect on investment is consistent with the arguments of
Cho (1998) that highly valued rms will have large investment opportunities.
Also, rms with variable earnings will be reluctant to invest if future income
is uncertain. Managerial ownership is found to have no impact on rm level
investment. However, this may reect optimality in that investment policy
may be one way in which managers aect value, but not the only means.
Ultimately we view our ndings of a causal relation between ownership and
rm value as being of greater signicance than the lack of a relation between
ownership and investment. These results are consistent with Cho (1998) but
slightly stronger, in that volatility of earnings is signicant in our regressions
but insignicant in Cho (1998).
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6 Conclusions
Debate as to the relationship between corporate value and managerial own-ership in the US is still unresolved. Studies such as Morck et al. (1988), Mc-
Connell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) document
a non-linear relation between these two variables. More recent work by Cho
(1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) show
that when controlling for endogeneity, managerial ownership is determined
by corporate value but not vice-versa.
We argue that even accepting corporate value and managerial ownershipto be endogenously related to each other, misspecication of the managerial
holding-corporate value relationship may lead to spurious conclusions con-
cerning the direction of causality. Applying a quintic structure, we present
results which suggest that the correct form of this relationship is a double
humped curve. This is in contrast to other studies that have assumed a cubic
or quadratic specication and by construction only one hump.
The second hump or local maximum is attributed to a collapse in externalmarket discipline at or around the point where managers take overall control
of their rm. At this point - which is around 50% ownership, the management
is not suciently akin to owners but has sucient power to disregard any
form of external monitoring or discipline. This has a detrimental eect on
corporate value for a short window of managerial holdings. At high levels
of managerial ownership, managers eectively become owners of their rm
leading to a convergence of interests with other outside shareholders.Utilizing the quintic specication for managerial ownership, we show that
even when controlling for endogeneity, not only is corporate value a deter-
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minant of managerial ownership but managerial ownership is also a determi-
nant of corporate value. This nding is consistent with the classical work of
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as well as the early empirical work of Morck et al.
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) who do not control for endogeneity
in their analysis of corporate value and managerial ownership.
We believe our analysis to have several important contributions to the lit-
erature on corporate value. First, our quintic specication extends previous
work in this area and successfully captures the complex nonlinear relationship
between corporate value and managerial ownership. Second, by analysing
a completely dierent market which is similar in structure to the United
States, we strengthen the power and insights gained from earlier compara-
ble US studies. Third, we provide evidence that corporate value, rm level
investment and managerial holdings are interdependent on each other. This
has implications for the debate on the eectiveness of compensation policies
involving stock options for top managers. Moreover, our ndings suggest
that some levels of managerial ownership may not be benecial to outside
shareholders even when these levels are high. At the very least, this paper
has served to add to the debate concerning the importance of managerial
ownership on corporate value by providing evidence that even controlling for
endogenous eects, managerial ownership and stock compensation schemes
do have a signicant inuence on corporate value.
Our research has provided an initial step towards a more accurate char-
acterisation of the corporate value-managerial ownership relationship. While
we do not posit that our specication can be applied to every given data set,
we argue that previous research may be misspecied where it has failed to
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fully explore alternative specications of the managerial ownership { corpo-
rate value relationship.
Future work in this area may focus on other structural forms, which more
eectively reect the interdependence of managerial ownership and corporate
prospects. The nonlinear endogenous impact of blockholders on corporate
value and managerial ownership would also provide interesting insights on
the external discipline that is faced by rm managers and the role this has
on corporate value.
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8 Tables
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
Insider ownership data measures the total level of holdings held by company managementthat are greater than 0.5% of a company's equity. Blockholder data measures the totallevel of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company's eq-uity. Largest stakeholder is the largest single outside blockholder that holds at least 3%of company's outstanding equity. Capital expenditure (thousands), total assets employed(thousands), after tax prots, depreciation, leverage, equity market values (millions) andresearch and development costs (thousands)are collected from Datastream. Tobin's Q ismeasured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferredequity to the book value of assets in the rm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings datais taken from London Stock Exchange Handbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are forindustrial companies quoted on London Stock Exchange in 1995.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum MaximumInsider Holdings 13.02% 18.06% 0.00% 79.90%Blockholder Holdings 37.34% 23.57% 0.00% 100.00%Largest Stakeholder 18.82% 21.64% 0.00% 100.00%Capital Expenditures 21,221 75,317 7 1,024,200Total Assets Employed 255,642 1,583,274 268 37,774,000After Tax Prots less de-preciation
0.1425 0.4763 -10.977 3.4207
Debt/Assets Employed 0.1411 0.2252 0.0000 4.8358Market Value of Equity 335 1399 0.68 26,224Research and Develop-ment
2,918 44,108 0 1,198,988
Tobin's Q 1.9647 1.2092 0.4502 7.0997
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Table 2 - Breakdown of Sample by Insider Ownership
Insider ownership data measures the total level of holdings held by company management
that are greater than 0.5% of a company's equity. Blockholder data measures the totallevel of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company's eq-uity. Largest stakeholder is the largest single outside blockholder that holds at least 3%of company's outstanding equity. Capital expenditure (thousands), total assets employed(thousands), after tax prots, depreciation, leverage, equity market values (millions) andresearch and development costs (thousands) are collected from Datastream. Tobin's Q ismeasured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferredequity to the book value of assets in the rm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings datais taken from London Stock Exchange Handbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are forindustrial companies quoted on London Stock Exchange in 1995.
Insider Ownership
Level
Number
ofFirms
Block-
holderOwn-ership%
Tobin's
Q
Total
AssetsEm-ployed
Capital
Ex-pendi-tures/AssetsEm-ployed
Liquidity
0 I/O 10% 464 43.3 1.952 393,861 0.106 0.13010 I/O 20% 87 34.5 2.033 44,093 0.161 0.12920 I/O 30% 75 34.4 1.736 26,186 0.124 0.15730 I/O 40% 41 24.0 2.109 34,322 0.117 0.19440 I/O 50% 34 22.7 2.113 35,864 0.114 0.19450 I/O 60% 26 13.0 2.257 28,190 0.100 0.17760 I/O 70% 21 12.7 1.933 14,234 0.099 0.169
70 I/O 100% 4 5.8 1.808 10,127 0.114 0.239
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Table 3 - Regression Results for Tobin's Q on Insider Ownership
The following equation was estimated using data for 752 rms listed on London Stock
Exchange during 1995.
Q = 0 + 1IO + 2IO2 + 3IO
3 + 4IO4 + 5IO
5 + "
where Q is Tobin's Q and IO is insider ownership. Insider ownership data is taken fromLondon Stock Exchange Yearbook and Tobin's Q is calculated from Datastream.
Variable Intercept IO IO2 IO3 IO4 IO5
Coecient 1.85 0.12 -0.013 4.63 x 104 -6.73 x 106 3.36 x 108
t-statistic 28.14 3.23 -3.08 2.82 -2.53 2.24Adj:R2 0:017 F 2:651
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Table 4 - Regression Results for Tobin's Q on Insider Ownership
The following equation was estimated using data for 752 rms listed on London Stock
Exchange during 1995.
Q = 0 + 1IOupto7% + 2IO7%to26% + 3IO26%to51% + 4IO51%to76% + 5IOover76% + "
where Q is Tobin's Q andIOupto7% =insider ownership if insider ownership < 7%, =7% if insider ownership >
7%.IO7%to26% = 0 if insider ownership < 7%, = insider ownership minus 7% if 7% 26%.IO26%to51% = 0 if insider ownership < 26%, = insider ownership minus 26% if 26% 51%.IO51%to76% = 0 if insider ownership < 51%, = insider ownership minus 51% if 51% 26%.
IOover76% = 0 if insider ownership < 76%, = insider ownership minus 76% if insiderownership > 76%.Insider ownership data is taken from London Stock Exchange Yearbook and Tobin's
Q is calculated from Datastream.
Variable Intercept IOupto7% IO7%to26% IO26%to51% IO51%to76% IOover76%Coecient 1.854 0.056 -0.020 0.0187 -0.053 0.624t-statistic 28.38 2.93 -2.62 2.57 -1.99 1.12Adj:R2 0.012 F 2.769
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Table 5 - Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Insider Ownership,Corporate Value and Investment
Results from a simultaneous equations analysis of insider ownership, corporate value andinvestment for 752 rms, using the two stage least squares method to estimate the followingequations:
InsiderOwnership = f(market value of rm's common equity, corporate value, in-vestment, volatility of earnings, liquidity, industry)
CorporateV alue = g(insider ownership, investment, nancial leverage, asset size, in-dustry, block ownership, largest stakeholder)
Investment = h(insider ownership, corporate value, volatility of earnings, liquidity,industry)
In the above equation, Insider ownership measures the total level of holdings held bycompany management that are greater than 0.5% of a company's equity. Blockholderdata measures the total level of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than3% of a company's equity. Largest stakeholder is the largest single outside blockholder
that holds at least 3% of company's outstanding equity. Investment is dened as capitalexpenditure/total assets employed, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets andliquidity is measured as cash ow divided by total assets. Capital expenditure, total assetsemployed, after tax prots, depreciation, leverage, equity market values and prot volatili-ties are collected from Datastream. Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the market valueof equity and book values of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in therm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings data is taken from London Stock ExchangeHandbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are for industrial companies quoted on LondonStock Exchange in 1995. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
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Table 5(cont.) - Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Insider Own-ership, Corporate Value and Investment
Variable Insider Ownership Corporate Value InvestmentMVEQ -1.8 x 105
(-3.74)Tobin's Q 0.127
(4.63)0.073(2.35)
Volatility -1.0 x 106
(-0.74)3.89x106
(-2.86)Liquidity 0.035
(2.24)0.013(1.01)
Investment -1.314(-2.67)
5.136(2.23)
Leverage 1.088
(4.36)Asset Size 3.33x108
(1.17)Largest Stake -0.020
(-0.06)Blockholder -0.837
(-2.60)IO 1.588
(3.07)-0.035(-0.46)
IO2 -0.395(-2.22)
0.018(0.72)
IO3 0.037(1.64)
-0.003(-0.92)
IO4
-0.001(-1.14)
1.72x104
(1.03)IO5 1.9x105
(0.76)-3.12x107
(-1.07)Industrydummy
Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.045 0.033 0.009F 8.014 3.497 2.497
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Figure 1
Estimated relationship between Tobins Q and Insider Ownership
Tobins Q was modelled as a quintic function of insider ownership using ordinary least
squares regression. The estimated regression line is:5846342
1036.31073.61063.4013.012.085.1 IOxIOxIOxIOIOQ
+++=
Estimated Relationship between Tobin's Q and Insider
Ownership
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
2.20
2.40
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Insider Ownership
Tobin'sQ