Politics and the Human Dimension: Hubert Humphrey and Ronald ReaganAuthor(s): Max M. KampelmanSource: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 387-390Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30044322 .

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Politics and the Human Dimension:

Hubert Humphrey and Ronald Reagan

Max M. Kampelman

Political science, judging by the read- ing material that reaches my desk,

has become much more of a science than it was more than 50 years ago when I served on the faculties of the University of Minnesota and Bennington College. It is important that this development not distort the reality that politics and gov- ernment remain fundamentally human institutions. My own movement from the academy to practical politics, to private life, and to government service has re- inforced my view that the unpredictable human ingredient is an essential part of the political process-an obvious obser- vation but one difficult to quantify.

One of the university courses I taught was called "Problems of Democracy." An early lecture dealt with Gunnar Myrdahl's An American Dilemma, an effort by a European social scientist to report on the status of African Americans in our country. What impressed him was the broad consensus he found among all parties, groups, colors, and nationalities in our society that the United States "ought" to live by the democratic aspira- tions of our Founding Fathers; and that our development was a steady movement in that direction, i.e., broadening the franchise, eliminating slavery, equality of women. The movement of the "is" to the "ought," I told my students, was the es- sence of the political process, thereby illustrating that the human dimension is an inevitable ingredient of that phenomenon.

When my friend, Minneapolis Mayor Hubert H. Humphrey, newly elected U.S. senator, called me in Vermont and asked me to help him organize his Washington office, I looked at it as a splendid oppor- tunity not only to broaden my horizons as a teacher, but also to advance my per- sonal "oughts" within the political pro-

Max M. Kampelman was counselor of the State Department, U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Security and Coopera- tion in Europe, and ambassador and U.S. negotiator with the Soviet Union on Nuclear and Space Arms. He is now chairman emeritus of Freedom House; the American Academy of Diplomacy; and the George- town University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.

cess. I agreed, and unexpectedly hired myself to serve as his legislative counsel.

The Senate was then controlled by an alliance of very conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats determined to resist civil rights legislation. Humphrey had received wide notoriety as a result of his 1948 convention speech at the Demo- cratic Party convention, which led to a walkout from the convention by the Southerners. The elders of the Senate looked upon him as an unwelcome, hos- tile presence. Humphrey, on the other hand, was a warm friendly person, proud of the support he enjoyed from his many Republican friends in his state, and heav- ily influenced by a religious commitment to respect human beings, even oppo- nents. He was deeply disturbed by the hostile reception.

This is not the place to report on the events in Washington that led to his eventual recognition as a leader, but I vividly recall inadvertently hearing Sena- tor Walter George (D-GA) two or three years later talking about Humphrey to a few of his Southern colleagues in the Democratic Party Cloak Room: "You know this young fella [Humphrey] really believes all that civil rights stuff!" This was obviously a realization previously unimaginable to him and his Southern colleagues. It is here relevant to note that during Humphrey's 1954 re-election cam- paign in Minnesota, Senator George of- fered and did write to the bankers of the state supporting Humphrey's re-election.

The change was dramatically illus- trated in 1953, when Humphrey intro- duced and fought for a series of 11 tax "loophole" amendments, which were un- expectedly and thoroughly debated be- fore being defeated. Historically, bills from the powerful Finance Committee were simply approved without debate. In this case, the unusual and frequently heated debate lasted about a week. A growing number of senators attended to witness the unexpected drama. Following the last vote, Senator George and Senator Eugene Milliken (R-CO), the leaders of the Senate Finance Committee and of the opposition to the amendments, walked over to the junior senator and embraced him out of respect and admiration.

There was no doubt in my mind at any time during my six-year Senate ex-

perience that the human ingredient played a crucial role in the legislative process. Friendship, respect, and personal hostility played and continue to play an important role. Politics is indeed more than a science governed by principles and formulae alone. It is, furthermore, certainly not always predictable.

In 1975, as a lawyer in private life, I joined a bi-partisan group of prominent Washington activists concerned about Soviet military development, who created the Committee on the Present Danger. In an effort to stimulate negotiations be- tween Israel and its Arab neighbors, President Jimmy Carter had proposed that Russia be invited into the process, a step I considered dangerous. Knowing that California Governor Ronald Reagan had joined our Committee, I suggested to one of his active supporters that he ex- plore whether the governor would be willing to speak at a Palm Beach, Flor- ida, fundraising dinner sponsored by the American Friends of the Hebrew Univer- sity of Jerusalem, whose board I chaired. My purpose, I explained, was to send President Carter a political message. The governor agreed, and he and I met and spoke extensively at the dinner. He en- thusiastically reacted when he learned that I had come to Washington to work with and for Hubert Humphrey in the Senate. "Hubert was one of my good friends," he said, telling me that he fre- quently invited Humphrey to stay at the executive mansion. He said that their friendship began when they both helped create the anti-Communist liberal Ameri- cans for Democratic Action. "He helped me when I was president of the Screen Actors Guild," he continued. "He would have made a great president." During that warm, private conversation, he also made it clear that he was not a fan of Richard Nixon.

I was, therefore, not entirely surprised when newly appointed Secretary of State Alexander Haig unexpectedly telephoned me in December 1980, following Rea- gan's election to the presidency, to say that the president wanted me, a Demo- crat, to continue with my temporary dip- lomatic assignment to serve as our ambassador to the Conference on Secu- rity and Cooperation in Europe, a post to which I had been appointed by President

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Carter. Haig, whom I had known during his Nixon and NATO days, told me that the newly elected president was also ask- ing former Senator Mike Mansfield (D- MT) to continue as ambassador to Japan. I recalled witnessing an exchange be- tween Hubert Humphrey, then a senator, and a group of liberal friends who were severely critical of his occasional legisla- tive support of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In response, he firmly as- serted: "I don't know who your president is, Joe, but my president is Dwight Eisenhower, and if I can be helpful to my president in a manner consistent with my conscience, I will be."

Reagan's interest in the Madrid meet- ing, which lasted for three years, was genuine, given his hostility toward the Soviet Union. The work

of CSCE eventuailly un-

dermined the Soviet Union. The Reagan I came to know was not the Reagan described by my fellow Democrats or by the majority of the press at the time.

In 1982, in a discus- sion with Secretary of State George Shultz (who had succeeded Haig), I noted that the Soviets were losing the battle for public opinion in Europe and under- stood that they were un- able to stop NATO from deploying Pershing and cruise missiles to match the Soviet weapons. They were showing signs of a willingness to ac- cept our proposed final agreement. I told Secre- tary Shultz, however, that I was no longer sat- isfied with our demands, which were words and promises we had no way to enforce. This troubled me. As we talked, in response to the secretary's interest, I raised the possibility of requir- ing, as a prerequisite for ending the ne- gotiations, an agreement that the Soviets agree to release a number of Jews and human rights activists from the jails and mental institutions where they were in- carcerated, and permit them to leave Russia if they wished.

Shultz understood that this was chang- ing the rules in the middle of the game, and would not be well received by our NATO allies, let alone the Soviets. It was a decision, he said, for the president to make. Within an hour, we were at the White House to discuss it with the presi- dent. The secretary and I did not gloss

over the risk of angering our friends. Finally, the president said, "George, if [German Foreign Minister] Gentscher calls, you talk to him. If the chancellor calls, I'll deal with it."

In our discussion, I frankly admitted that I was uncertain how to proceed, since I had not anticipated that my ran- dom thoughts would progress so rapidly, or at all, to the president. The president said that he would like me to emphasize the release of the seven Siberian Pente- costals who had escaped the Moscow police by taking refuge in the American embassy. Our efforts over many months to arrange for their release had failed. The president told me that one of his first steps as president had been to inform the Soviet ambassador that if Moscow

wanted to have good relations with Rea- gan, safety for the Pentecostals would be the appropriate signal. He had heard nothing. As we left his office, the presi- dent opened a drawer in his desk, took out a sheet of paper, and said: "Max, see what you can do to help these people." It was a list of Jewish "refuseniks."

I returned to Madrid with authority to proceed. My decision to move quietly with the KGB general who was the chief deputy in the Soviet delegation proved correct. After he expressed a great deal of consternation and anger, I said it was his duty to deliver my president's mes- sage to his superiors in Moscow. He did. A few days later, he informed me that Head of the KGB Yuri Andropov had authorized him to negotiate with me on

the condition that nobody other than me, Secretary Shultz, and the president be informed. No other Soviet officials, in- cluding their Washington ambassador, were to be informed.

Our negotiation proceeded success- fully. The Pentecostals in the embassy, together with their families in Sibera (a total, as I recall, of more than 80 peo- ple), were permitted to leave the country and, via Israel, to reach Germany. A large number of Soviet human rights ac- tivists were released from jails with many thousands permitted to leave the country. President Reagan never publicly took credit for this development.

During the Madrid meeting, there was a change in the Soviet leadership and I sensed an opportunity. When I returned

to Washington for a few

Hubert H. Hum phrey (center) with a group of APSA Congressional Fello in the early 1970.

ays, at a sess WILt

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagle- berger, I made my sug- gestion. Eagleberger told me that he had made a contrary recommendation to the secretary of state the previous day, but he wanted the secretary to hear my reasoning. We walked next door and, after hearing me, Secre- tary Shultz said that he too had, that very morn- ing, recommended to the president the opposite course of action. He then said that the president should hear my views, whereupon he tele- phoned the White House and informed me I was scheduled to meet the president at 9 AM the next day.

The next day, as I was admitted to the Oval Of-

fice, it was clear I was interrupting a staff meeting. The president explained my presence to those in attendance. I presented my suggestion. Chief of Staff Jim Baker said that he agreed with Shultz's contrary recommendation of the previous day. Counselor to the President Ed Meese supported Baker's position, as did two or three others. The president, sensing that I might be disappointed, spoke up. "Don't pay attention to these fellows, Max," he said. "Not one of them was ever a Democrat!"

Shortly after the Madrid meeting in 1983 and my return to my law office, Secretary Shultz called me to say that the president wanted to see me. When we met, President Reagan told me he was troubled that the American embassy in

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Moscow was the only embassy that placed observers outside the Jewish syn- agogue on Friday nights to insure that the Soviets would not harass those at- tending religious services there. He wanted our European allies to join the effort. He was, therefore, writing per- sonal letters to a number of European Heads of Government urging their par- ticipation. Would I deliver those letters and discuss his objectives with them? I did as he asked, using an Air Force plane for transportation. This, too, was never publicized.

In the summer of 1985, President Re- agan asked me to return to government service and head the American delega- tion in new nuclear arms negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva. I had earlier resisted the suggestion, explaining that I was not technically qualified. Sec- retary Shultz told me that the president looked upon me as a good negotiator and that technical assistance would be avail- able to me. I reluctantly agreed.

The first meeting between Soviet Pre- mier Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan took place in Geneva in Decem- ber 1985. Years later, Gorbachev told me that his security people had advised him, as he prepared for the meeting, that Rea- gan was an elderly movie star in a role that did not fit him. When Gorbachev arrived for the meeting, he said, wrapped up against the bitter cold in a thick Rus- sian fur coat, he found not a frail old man but an active Reagan-coatless- who came energetically out the door and down the steps to meet his car. He greeted Gorbachev warmly, and sug- gested that they let the diplomats meet formally while he and Gorbachev walked to a nearby cabin where they could talk and get to know one another. They talked for a number of hours in the pres- ence only of their interpreters.

Following the Geneva meeting, Rea- gan informed his cabinet that "Maggie [British Prime Minister Thatcher] was right. We can do business with Gor- bachev." When I returned to the Geneva negotiations in January, Viktor Karpov, the chief Soviet negotiator, took me aside to say: "I have instructions from my highest authority not to attack your presi- dent." Two human beings had met and decided that they could relate to one another.

With Gorbachev humanizing the So- viet system, another summit meeting took place in Moscow. Custom appar- ently called for President Reagan to re- ciprocate Gorbachev's hospitality by hosting a dinner at the American Em- bassy for the Soviet delegation and guests during the last evening of the visit. Reagan instructed our embassy to

invite a number of Soviet human rights activists so that there was at least one of them sitting at every table next to a So- viet government official. Judging by the active discussions between them in Rus- sian at every table, the impressive and gutsy move worked.

At the beginning of the evening, I no- ticed the entry of Dr. Andre Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner, who had just returned to Moscow from exile in Gorky. I greeted them and escorted them to the reception line. Sakharov told me that he had never met Gorbachev. When we reached the president and Mrs. Reagan, I introduced them. Reagan embraced them, then turned and introduced them to Gor- bachev with a big smile. Gorbachev re- sponded with a warm greeting of his own, and they conversed for a time in Russian. At the dinner, furthermore, on the instruction of the president, the am- bassador welcomed the leaders of the Moscow human rights community as guests. Here too was an illustration of the Reagan I knew, a decent human being, and not the Reagan that many of my friends believed they knew.

The nuclear arms negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva resulted in two treaties, one which provided for the total elimination of intermediate range nuclear missiles by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the other which re- duced long-range nuclear missiles by about 50% as a step toward total elimi- nation, which was the president's objec- tive. During the negotiations, I made a point of keeping interested senators of both parties fully informed, given the fact that treaties' constitutionally require Senate confirmation.

Prior to the opening of the negotia- tions in Geneva, Secretary Weinberger warned the president, at a White House National Security meeting which I at- tended, that the Senate Democratic leader, Robert Byrd (WV), was prepar- ing to form a committee to oversee the negotiations. Weinberger saw this as an infringement of the president's constitu- tional authority. Others spoke up urging the president to resist Byrd. The presi- dent asked me what I thought. I told him that in Madrid, I had found members of Congress to be helpful, but that I did not know anything about the Byrd move. The president ended the discussion by asking me to meet with Byrd. I did, and we reached a mutual agreement on a role for the bi-partisan group he was forming. The group helped our negotiations signif- icantly. What impressed me particularly was the senator's statement that he had checked with the president before taking steps to form the group and the president had agreed such a group would be ben-

eficial. He had no concerns about dimin- ishing or compromising his power.

Shortly after the Geneva talks began, the House of Representatives was sched- uled to vote on whether to acquire 23 additional MX missiles. The White House asked me to return to Washington for a day or two to speak with members of Congress in support of the measure, because it appeared the measure would fail. I reluctantly agreed, but insisted that my first visit be with Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-MA), who was leading the opposition to the appropriation. I had known the speaker for years, having first met him when I worked with Humphrey. Most of our conversation that morning did not deal with the missiles, but I sensed he understood my view that our Geneva negotiations were aimed at en- suring that the Russians and the U.S. would make mutual reductions. I felt we should request equivalent Soviet reduc- tions rather than act unilaterally. The speaker, looking at a sheet on his desk, said the president was behind about 30 votes. As the day progressed and I met with other members of Congress, primar- ily Democrats, I sensed a change.

At the end of the day, I reported to the president that I thought the speaker was quietly helping us. He instructed his sec- retary to get the speaker on the phone. Though I was privy to only one side of the conversation, what I heard was two tough Irish men who liked each other, jovially cussing each other and generally behaving like friends. I remember the president saying: "Max tells me you may finally be a patriot! It's about time!" The next day, the House narrowly approved the missile acquisition. O'Neill voted against it.

In all of these developments, the human ingredient was crucial and indis- pensable. This was the Ronald Reagan I, a Democrat, knew, worked for, respected, and appreciated. This was not the Re- agan that I and the world read about. Why? This leads inevitably to the press.

It is unwise to make an enemy of the town crier, particularly one with huge financial resources in a society that con- stitutionally protects freedom of the press. Given the constitutional protec- tions, the power of the press, unlike other power centers in our society, has few restraints. Ideally one would hope that professionalism and self-restraint would provide the necessary protections against excessive power.

My teaching role at the University of Minnesota attracted students from the school of journalism. I learned that they were taught that news stories must begin with a "lead," an attention-arresting statement. I believe that a process of

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distortion may well begin with this early lesson. Walter Cronkite once wrote that the "hyper compression" of the news "clearly can lead to a disaster in a de- mocracy." John B. Oakes of the New York Times condemned the press's ten- dency to produce "chewing gum for the brain" with its emphasis on the "scoop" which frequently tends toward distortion. Ben Bradlee, the Washington Post's for- mer executive editor, asserted that "the press won in Watergate" and then ex- pressed the hope that the press would not "misuse" the power. Dan Rather and CBS provided the most recent example of excessive zeal. A former ombudsman of the Washington Post once wrote, "It is a rare day that I do not see a news story that betrays a reporter's feelings in a way an editor of the old school would not have tolerated."

The media has clearly assumed the role for itself of putting before the nation the agenda of its unfinished business. In that connection, one cannot ignore the fact that Washington journalists, who are generally well educated and committed to the principles of their chosen profes- sion, are also citizens with opinions. A survey by the Pew Research Center of more than 500 national and local report- ers and editors found that 34% of na- tional journalists described themselves as "liberal" while 7% described themselves as "conservative." This is to be com- pared to 20% of the public who identify themselves as "liberal" while 33% de-

scribe themselves as "conservative." This is certainly relevant to any examination of the press and its impact on the public's attitude toward political person- alities and developments.

A further item of concern, particularly in politics, can be labeled "the boys and girls on the bus" syndrome. The vast majority of political events are covered by groups of reporters who spend a great deal of time together before, during, and after each event. The determination, for example, as to whether the event was "successful" or "disappointing" becomes a group decision by the reporters present, and that determination then colors their reporting. This phenomenon is subject to further manipulation by the politicians organizing the events, who seek to influ- ence the "group think" because it so di- rectly affects public opinion.

This brief analysis is not intended to provide a full understanding of a vital and complex issue of democratic con- cern, but it is, I believe, a partial expla- nation of why, for example, the Reagan I knew was not the Reagan presented to us by the media until after his death.

The press in America as an institution is periodically and sporadically conscious of its need to earn its Constitutional pro- tections with self-regulation. Responsible professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and stockbrokers, have clear standards for entrance as a result of formal proce- dures for qualifying and disqualifying. But there is no such process in journal-

ism. Examinations, qualifications, stan- dards, and "disbarment" or its equivalent do not exist in journalism. Those require- ments may or may not be appropriate for journalism (I believe they are) but a re- porter and his editor can inflict great damage to our society by consciously or accidentally polluting the wells of infor- mation with distortion and exaggeration. Clearly, additional measures for self- regulation are appropriate. The recent decision by the New York Times to ap- point a form of ombudsman, a practice which appears to be growing in the press, is a timid gesture in that direction. The press could well make a significant contribution to our democracy were it to adopt a code of ethics that would, for example, address the issue of personal bias by journalists and editors. There are also dangers of disproportion arising out of the business of competition for circulation.

None of this is intended to undermine or question the immense amount of study and analysis of politics which fills our literature. Our students are today better equipped to understand the growing complexities of government, particularly democratic government, in a divided world which is adjusting to the enormous changes demanded by the globalization of economics, science, industry, and communication. It is, rather, to urge that the human dimension not be ignored in the course of this adjustment.

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