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Political Behavior, Vol. 24, No. 3, September 2002 ( 2002)

PARTY POLARIZATION AND PARTYSTRUCTURING OF POLICY ATTITUDES:A Comparison of Three NES Panel Studies

Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M. Carsey

The conventional wisdom in the partisan change literature predicts that increasingparty conflict on one issue agenda leads to a decline in party conflict on anotheragendaa process called conflict displacement. We have argued that recent partypolitics in the United States has experienced conflict extension, with the Democraticand Republican parties in the electorate growing more polarized on cultural, racial,and social welfare issues, rather than conflict displacement. Here, we suggest thatthe failure of the literature to account for conflict extension results from incompleteassumptions about individual-level partisan change. The partisan change literaturetypically considers only issue-based change in party identification, which necessarilyleads to the aggregate prediction of conflict displacement. This ignores the possibilityof party-based change in issue attitudes. If party-based issue conversion does occur,the aggregate result can be conflict extension rather than conflict displacement. Ouranalysis uses data from the three-wave panel studies conducted by the National Elec-tion Studies in 1956, 1958, and 1960; in 1972, 1974, and 1976; and in 1992, 1994, and

1996 to assess our alternative account of individual-level partisan change. We showthat when Democratic and Republican elites are polarized on an issue, and party iden-tifiers are aware of those differences, some individuals respond by adjusting theirparty ties to conform to their issue positions, but others respond by adjusting theirissue positions to conform to their party identification.

Key words: political parties; party identification; elections; public opinion; voting be-havior; party realignment.

Geoffrey C. Layman, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt Univer-sity, Nashville, TN 37235 ([email protected]); Thomas M. Carsey, Associate Professor,

Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2230 ([email protected]).

199

0190-9320/02/0900-0199/0 2002 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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LAYMAN AND CARSEY200

The conventional wisdom in the literature on mass partisan change is that

party conflict is dominated byand party polarization takes shape alonga single policy dimension (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Key 1955; Schatt-schneider 1960; Sundquist 1983). During periods of stable party alignment,the parties mass coalitions are structured around that dimension, with eachcoalition unified by its attitudes toward the dominant agenda but divided onother issues that remain in the political background. Then, when a new issueagenda that cuts across the existing line of party cleavage emerges, party polar-ization on the new dimension coincides with a decline in party conflict on theold dimension. In short, the characteristic that identifies a party realignment[is] . . . the displacement of one conflict by another (Sundquist, 1983: 13, em-phasis in the original).

We show elsewhere (Layman and Carsey, 2000b, 2002) that the last 30years of American party politics have been characterized not by conflict dis-

placement, but by conflict extension. Public attitudes toward racial issuesand cultural issues, the two major domestic policy agendas that have emergedsince the 1960s, are distinct from and cut across both attitudes toward thesocial welfare and role of government issues that emerged during the NewDeal era and each other (Abramowitz 1994; Knoke, 1979; Layman and Carsey2002). However, increases in party polarization on these newer agendas havenot led to decreases in party differences on social welfare. Instead, the Demo-cratic and Republican mass coalitions have grown more polarized on socialwelfare, racial, and cultural issues.1

Why has recent partisan issue change not been characterized by conflictdisplacement? Put differently, why does the realignment literature point souniformly to conflict displacement when the recent evidence suggests thatconflict extension is quite possible? The reason, we contend, is that the litera-ture makes assumptions about both the behavior of party elites and the massresponse to it that, at least in contemporary American politics, may be faulty.

The partisan change literature generally assumes that political elites engagein partisan conflict on only one policy dimension at a time (Carmines andStimson 1989; Riker, 1982; Sundquist, 1983). Thus, when the parties elitesstake out distinct positions on the new issues, they presumably take centriststands on the old issues. As Schattschneider argues, a shift from the [old]alignment . . . to the [new] alignment . . . means that the old cleavage must beplayed down if the new conflict is to be exploited. . . . [I]t is impossible tokeep the old and cultivate the new at the same time (1960: 63). This assump-tion has not held in recent decades. The parties convention delegates, candi-dates, and members of Congress have grown increasingly polarized on social

welfare, racial, and cultural issues (Bond and Fleisher, 2000; Carmines andStimson, 1989; Layman, 2001; Layman and Carsey, 2000a; Poole and Rosen-

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PARTY POLARIZATION AND STRUCTURING OF POLICY ATTITUDES 201

thal, 1997; Rohde, 1991; Stone, Rapoport, and Abramowitz 1990). When party

elites polarize on multiple issue agendas, rather than just one, the parties inthe electorate may well follow suit.

However, the parties mass coalitions cannot follow if the realignment litera-tures assumptions about the individual-level processes of partisan changehold. Those assumptions do not allow for mass conflict extension and insteadpoint necessarily to conflict displacement. The individual-level basis of masspartisan change is the focus of this article. We begin by explicating moreclearly the individual-level theory underlying the conflict displacement argu-ment. Then, we offer an alternative account of individual partisan change thatcomports with aggregate-level conflict extension. We test our account usingdata from the three-wave panel studies conducted by the National ElectionStudies (NES) in 1956, 1958, and 1960; in 1972, 1974, and 1976; and in 1992,1994, and 1996.

CONFLICT DISPLACEMENT, CONFLICT EXTENSION

AND THE MICRO-LEVEL FOUNDATIONS OF PARTISAN CHANGE

The typical, and often only, individual-level explanation for party polariza-tion offered in the partisan change literature is issue-based change in partyidentification. Such change is triggered when party elites take increasinglydivergent positions on some new set of issues that cuts across the existing linesof party conflict. As a result, individuals with ideologically extreme views onthose new issues move into the party that shares their views, creating partycoalitions with more polarized aggregate positions on the new issues. Scholarsdisagree about from where the new party members come. Some argue that itis current partisans who switch their allegiances (Erikson and Tedin, 1981;Sundquist, 1983), while others contend that new partisans are mobilized fromthe ranks of independents and nonvoters (Andersen, 1979; Clubb, Flanigan,and Zingale, 1980). However, both sides agree that increases in partisan issuepolarization result from individuals changing their party ties rather than theirissue preferences.

If issue-based party conversion and party mobilization are the only individ-ual-level processes that produce increases in aggregate party polarization on anew issue, then the end result is very likely to be conflict displacement. Be-cause the new issues cross-cut the old issues that previously defined partyconflict, many individuals are cross-pressured on the two agendas. They agreewith their current party on the old issues, but prefer the other partys standon the new issues. If many of these individuals choose new party affiliations

based on their views on the new issues, there will be a movement into bothparties of individuals who support the stands of their new partys elites on the

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new issues but may not support the partys position on the old issues. This,

by itself, leads to increased polarization between the parties electoral coali-tions on the new issues and decreased polarization on the old issues.

Existing theories of partisan change fail to consider that, in response togrowing polarization between party elites on an issue, some citizens maychange their positions on the issue rather than their party ties. Althoughlargely absent from the realignment literature (but see Gerber and Jackson,1993; Hurley, 1989, 1991), the notion that, for some voters, partisanship maydrive issue positions rather than issue positions driving partisanship is not new.Individuals often change their issue positions in response to changes in thestands of elites who share their political predispositions (Zaller, 1992), andthis is true even for political activists, who tend to have more stable issueattitudes than ordinary citizens (Herrera, 1995; Rapoport and Stone, 1994).Moreover, a vast literature on voting behavior shows that party identification

structures attitudes on issues (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960;Markus and Converse, 1979). Party identification is also more stable over timethan are attitudes on specific issues (Converse and Markus, 1979; Green andPalmquist, 1990). Thus, if one causes the other, party identification may bemore likely than issue attitudes to be the causal force (Miller, 2000).

Part of the reason that the realignment literature may ignore issue conver-sion as a source of partisan change is that realigning issues are generally easyissues that arouse strong emotions and deeply held attitudes (Carmines andStimson, 1989; Sundquist, 1983). However, party identification is more stableover time than are attitudes on even highly symbolic, emotion-laden issuessuch as abortion and civil rights (Converse and Markus 1979). In fact, weshow elsewhere that party-based issue conversion has played an importantrole in the growing polarization of the parties mass coalitions (Carsey andLayman, 1999b) and the parties activists (Carsey and Layman, 1999a; Laymanand Carsey, 1998) on the abortion issue.

All of this suggests that changes in the aggregate issue positions of theparties coalitions may occur through both issue-based party conversion andparty-based issue conversion. If that is true, then increased mass party polar-ization on multiple issue dimensions, even cross-cutting issue dimensions, ispossible. If partisan change is driven entirely by issue-based party conversion,then when a new issue dimension emerges and is orthogonal (i.e., cross-cutting)to an older issue dimension, the views individuals hold on the old and newissues will remain orthogonal over time. Thus, increased polarization on onedimension should result in decreased polarization on the other (i.e., conflictdisplacement). However, if some individuals change their issue positions

based on their partisanship, then what were previously uncorrelated issue po-sitions will become more closely related over time. Thus, the parties in theelectorate may become more polarized on the new issue dimension while

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remaining just as polarized, or growing even more polarized, on the older

dimension (i.e., conflict extension).2For example, imagine that social welfare serves as the main dividing line

between the parties when the new agenda of cultural issues emerges and cutsacross the social welfare cleavage. If party leaders take polarized stands onboth social welfare and cultural matters, then many party identifiers who agreewith their partys stand on social welfare will disagree with its stand on culture.Some of these cross-pressured individuals will switch their allegiances to theparty with which they agree on cultural issues, thus increasing the level ofpolarization between the parties coalitions on cultural concerns. However,some partisanseither new members or individuals who remained in theirold partyalso may change their views on social welfare and/or cultural is-sues. They may bring them closer to those of their partys leaders who arenow sending consistently liberal or conservative signals on both issue agendas. 3

The resulting convergence in the social welfare and cultural attitudes of partyidentifiers means that there will not necessarily be a decrease in party polar-ization on social welfare even as polarization on culture expands.

TEMPORAL AND CROSS-SECTIONAL VARIATION

IN PARTY STRUCTURING OF POLICY ATTITUDES

The extent to which party identification structures attitudes on policy issues,leading individuals to move their own policy attitudes toward more ideologi-cally extreme positions, should vary over time for the electorate as a wholeand across individuals at any point in time. At the aggregate level, the keyfactor is the degree to which Democratic and Republican elites are polarizedon particular issues or on multiple policy agendas. There are many reasonswhy citizens might change their outlooks on policy issues. However, there isno reason to expect the views of Democratic and Republican identifiers tomove in opposite directions unless Democratic and Republican leaders havetaken clearly different stands on the issues. As Zaller (1992) demonstrates,when political elites from different ideological or partisan camps agree witheach other on an issue, the most likely result at the mass level is that ordinarycitizens from the different camps will move together toward that main-stream position. When, however, Democratic and Republican elites are po-larized on an issue, the views of Democratic and Republican identifiers arelikely to polarize, with Democrats converting to more liberal positions andRepublicans growing more conservative.

Extending the argument to multiple, cross-cutting policy dimensions, there

is no obvious reason, outside the context of party politics, why citizens shouldhave consistently liberal or consistently conservative views on dissimilar issueagendas like social welfare, race, and culture. In fact, it might seem illogical

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to expect the same individual to favor, for example, a limited role for govern-

ment in promoting economic and racial equalitythe conservative view onsocial welfare and racebut an active role for government in promoting tradi-tional notions of social order and moralitythe conservative view on culture.

Such a package of issue positions, however, is not illogical because votersdevelop and express their views based on the alternatives presented by thetwo political parties (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Zaller, 1992). Inrecent years, the choice increasingly offered to voters is one between a Repub-lican party that takes consistently conservative positions on social welfare, ra-cial, and cultural issues and a Democratic party that is consistently liberal onall three agendas. Within this context, it is quite reasonable to expect thatsome Democratic identifiers may come to adopt liberal stands on all threeagendas, and some Republican identifiers may convert to conservative posi-tions on all three sets of issues. In a different partisan context, where the

parties elites are not differentiated on the various policy agendas or are polar-ized on some issues but not on others, we would not expect the views of partyidentifiers to converge toward a uniformly liberal or uniformly conservativeposition.

Our focus on the mass response to elite cues should not be taken to suggestthat partisan change is an entirely top-down process. Political elites do notalways generate new political issues, and, in fact, citizen activists may play agreater role than party leaders and elected officials in championing the issuesthat cause partisan change (Carmines, 1991). Moreover, increases in issuepolarization between the parties mass coalitions may be a cause of as well asa response to increases in elite-level partisan divisions. However, if individualDemocrats and individual Republicans in the mass electorate are moving inopposite directions on issues (especially multiple, cross-cutting sets of issues),there must be some reason for them to believe that the positions of theirparties (or the groups and ideological camps represented within their parties)are moving in opposite directions. Those party positions are defined by andevidenced by the issue stands of party elites.4 We are not concerned with thecauses of elite party polarization here, but only with how, and the extent towhich, individuals in the mass electorate respond to this polarization.

Two of the main sources of variation in how individuals should respond areparty attachment and awareness of elite-level party differences. Zaller (1992)suggests that citizens are most likely to receive and accept political cues fromelites who share their own political predispositions. Thus, as Democratic andRepublican elites grow more polarized on social welfare, racial, and culturalmatters, it should be Democratic and Republican identifiers who respond to

these cues by moving their own attitudes on the three agendas toward a con-sistently liberal or conservative outlook. In contrast, political independentsshould be unlikely to accept political cues from Democratic or Republican

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elites and thus unlikely to demonstrate constraint or increased ideological ex-

tremity.Of course, party identifiers, even strong party identifiers, are not all equally

likely to follow the ideological lead of party elites. Numerous scholars notethat politically sophisticated citizens are most likely to structure their ownissue preferences in a manner consistent with elite-level cues (Converse, 1964;Sniderman et al., 1991; Zaller, 1992). Political sophistication includes a num-ber of things, but the crucial element for us is recognition of where the partiesand their candidates stand relative to each other on political issues (Carmines,Renten, and Stimson, 1984). There is no reason to expect individual Republi-cans to convert to more conservative positions on an issue and individualDemocrats to move in a liberal direction unless they recognize that the Re-publican partys stand on the issue is clearly more conservative than that ofthe Democratic party.

THREE DIFFERENT POLITICAL ERAS WITH DIFFERENT EXPECTATIONS

FOR PARTY STRUCTURING

To test our hypotheses about individual-level differences in party-based is-sue conversion, we need data that records the same individuals attitudes to-ward and awareness of party differences on various issue agendas at multiplepoints in time. Each of the three-wave panel studies conducted by the NESfits that bill. The 197219741976 panel and the 199219941996 panel bothcontain questions in each of their waves about panel respondents attitudestoward social welfare, racial, and cultural issues and respondents awarenessof the relative positions of the two parties on those issues. Cultural issues suchas abortion and gender equality had not emerged on the political agenda atthe time of the 195619581960 panel study. However, that study includesindicators of panel respondents attitudes toward and awareness of party dif-ferences on social welfare and racial issues.

To test our hypotheses about temporal differences in party structuring ofmass issue attitudes, we need panel data from multiple political eras that differin the extent to which Democratic and Republican elites were polarized onissues and in the number of issue dimensions on which they were polarized.Fortunately, the three NES panels provide such differences in political con-text. The periods from 1956 to 1960, from 1972 to 1976, and from 1992 to1996 were quite different in terms of both the overall level of party polariza-tion and the number of issue agendas on which the parties were polarized.

The lack of issue voting, ideological sophistication, and attitudinal constraint

found in the NES surveys from 1952 through 1960 is well documented(Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964), and the relative lack of critical issuesand partisan conflict during the era has been cited as a reason for those find-

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ings (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976). To the extent that there were party

differences on domestic issues during this period, they were primarily on thesocial welfare concerns of the New Deal. Cultural issues had not yet emerged,and while racial issues such as desegregation and civil rights for African-Americans had come onto the scene, the parties stands on them were largelyindistinguishable (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). However, even party differ-ences on social welfare were muted in comparison to those of the early NewDeal years. The Republican nomination of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and1956 represented a victory for the moderate-liberal wing of the party, and thepolicies of Eisenhowers administration signaled a belief in the basic necessityof a social welfare safety net (Rae, 1989). The limited nature of partisan ideo-logical divisions generally would continue with the nominations of relativemoderates Nixon and Kennedy in 1960.

The domestic policy divisions between the two parties were both deeper

and broader by the early 1970s. The earlier decline of party differences onthe social welfare and economic role of government came to a halt with theRepublican presidential nomination of arch-conservative Barry Goldwater in1964 and with the expansion of the welfare state under Democratic PresidentLyndon Johnsons Great Society. Although the welfare policies of the Nixonadministration were fairly moderate, his campaign rhetoric was much moreconservative (Rae, 1989). The partisan consensus on civil rights was shatteredin 1964 when Johnson championed the Civil Rights Act and Goldwater op-posed it, and party differences on race would continue to grow into the 1970s(Carmines and Stimson 1989). In contrast, there was virtually no party differ-ence on cultural issues like abortion, womens rights, and school prayer. TheDemocrats did move to the cultural left in 1972 with the nomination ofGeorge McGovern. But, the parties in Congress remained virtually indistin-guishable on cultural issues, and the Democrats moved back to the culturalcenter in 1976 with the nomination of Born-Again Christian Jimmy Carter(Layman, 2001).

In the early-to-mid-1990s the partisan issue divide was deeper and widerthan in either of the two earlier periods. Ronald Reagans two presidentialcampaigns and 8-year presidency in the 1980s signaled a noticeable movementof the GOP to the right on all three domestic policy agendas. Reagan and hissupporters advocated substantial reductions in the federal governments rolein providing welfare and regulating the economy, strongly opposed raciallyliberal policies such as busing and affirmative action, and called for constitu-tional amendments to outlaw abortion and restore prayer to the public schools.This wide-ranging Republican conservatism was amplified even further in the

early 1990s as southern conservatives such as Newt Gingrich, Trent Lott, andDick Armey moved to the forefront of the GOP leadership and engineeredthe Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. By the mid 1990s, the parties

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activists and elected officials were more polarized on racial issues and social

welfare issues than they had been in the 1970s, and they had become clearlydifferentiated on cultural and moral issues (Bond and Fleisher, 2000; Layman,2001; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).

The differences in the partisan contexts of these three periods are evi-denced by differences in the degree to which participants in the three panelstudies were aware of party issue differences. Table 1 shows the percentageof respondents to the 1960 wave of the 19565860 panel, the 1976 wave ofthe 19727476 panel, and the 1996 wave of the 19929496 panel whorecognized that the Republican party was more conservative than the Demo-cratic party on various issues.5 Awareness of party issue differences increasedsubstantially across the three panel studies. Respondents in 1960 were almostentirely unaware of the GOP being more conservative than the Democrats onracial issues. That reflects the political reality that to the extent that there

were any party distinctions on civil rights issues in the 1950s and in 1960, itwas the Democratic party, with its strong base in the South, that was the moreconservative party (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). There was much greaterawareness of party differences on social welfare issues, but still only a minorityof respondents saw the Republicans as more conservative than the Democrats.

By 1976, awareness of party differences on both social welfare and racialissues had increased. A majority of panel respondents saw the Republicans asbeing more conservative than the Democrats on the issues of governmentresponsibility to guarantee jobs and government provision of medical insur-ance. There was still only a minority of respondents who recognized that theGOP was more conservative than the Democrats on issues of racial equality,but the minority was much more substantial in 1976 than it was in 1960. How-ever, reflecting the lack of partisan difference on cultural issues at the time,there was virtually no recognition that the Republicans had more conservativepositions than the Democrats on the issues of womens rights and abortion.

The fact that the parties were more polarized in the 1990s than they hadbeen in the earlier periods was clearly not lost on voters. Awareness of partydifferences was much greater among panel respondents in 1996 than it wasin the previous two NES panels on all three issue agendas. In fact, a majorityof panel respondents recognized that the GOP was more conservative thanthe Democratic party on every issue, and, on every issue except womensrights, it was a large majority.

These disparities in the level of mass awareness of partisan issue differencespoint to clearly different expectations for the three panel studies. In the 195619581960 panel, there should be some evidence of party identification struc-

turing attitudes toward social welfare issues, but no evidence of party-basedissue conversion on racial issues. In the 197219741976 panel, we shouldbegin to see evidence of party structuring of attitudes toward racial issues and

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TABLE 1. Awareness of Partisan Issue Differences in the 19561960,

19721976, and 19921996 Panels (in percentages)19561960 19721976 19921996

Panel Panel Panel

Issue and Group 1960a 1976b 1996b

Social WelfareGovernment Guarantee of Jobsc

All Panel Respondents 44.29 59.85 72.86Partisans 46.06 62.96 81.06Independents 38.64 59.69 66.40

Government Subsidizing Medical Cared

All Panel Respondents 41.32 51.65 73.00Partisans 43.97 53.92 77.74Independents 40.63 49.00 72.13

Government Services and SpendingAll Panel Respondents 76.05Partisans 79.66Independents 72.95

RacialGovernment Ensuring Fair Treatment for

Blacks in Employment and HousingAll Panel Respondents 24.95 Partisans 25.98 Independents 23.88

Government Efforts to Improve the Social andEconomic Position of Blacks

All Panel Respondents 47.51 67.22Partisans 49.36 71.29Independents 42.80 66.94

Government Intervention in School Desegrega-tionAll Panel Respondents 13.00 Partisans 14.26 Independents 11.19

Busing to Integrate SchoolsAll Panel Respondents 37.57 Partisans 38.86 Independents 36.53

CulturalWomens Rights

All Panel Respondents 23.47 55.63Partisans 25.95 56.62Independents 23.62 54.69

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TABLE 1. (Continued)

19561960 19721976 19921996Panel Panel Panel

Issue and Group 1960a 1976b 1996b

AbortionAll Panel Respondents 13.50e 62.39Partisans 12.73 66.46Independents 14.44 67.44

Source: National Election Studies Panels (195619581960, 197219741976, and 199219941996).

aThe entries for 1960 are the percentages of respondents who stated that the Democrats weremore likely to hold liberal positions or that the Republicans were more likely to hold conservativepositions.

bThe entries for 1976 and 1996 are the percentage of respondents who placed both parties onthe scale for the particular issue and who placed the Republicans to the right of the Democrats.Percentages in italics are based on placements of candidates when respondents were not askedabout parties.

cIn 1960, the question asked about the government seeing to it that everyone who wants towork can find a job. In 1976 and 1996, the question asked about the government seeing to itthat everyone has a job and a good standard of living.

dIn 1960, the question asked about the government helping people get doctors and hospitalcare at low cost. In 1976 and 1996 panels, the question asked about a government insuranceplan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses.

eIn 1976, respondents were asked to identify the party more likely to support a constitutionalamendment outlawing abortion.

more evidence than in the earlier panel of party structuring on social welfareissues. However, there should not be evidence of party-based issue conversion

on cultural issues. In the 199219941996 panel, we should see clear evi-dence of partisanship structuring attitudes toward social welfare, racial, andcultural issues. Moreover, because the parties elites were clearly differenti-ated on all three issue dimensions, we should see a pattern of party identifiersmerging their attitudes toward these three agendas. Because there were keyissue dimensions on which Democratic and Republican elites had not yettaken distinct positions, there should be less evidence of party identifiersbringing their attitudes toward different issue agendas together in the 19561960 and 19721976 panels.

PARTISANSHIP AND ATTITUDINAL CONVERGENCE

IN THE THREE PANELS

We begin our analysis by testing two hypotheses about the relationshipbetween individuals attitudes on domestic policy issues in the periods from

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1956 to 1960, 1972 to 1976, and 1992 to 1996. First, panel respondents should

be more likely to merge their social welfare, racial, and cultural attitudes to-gether in the 19921996 panel than in the earlier two panels. Second, evenin the 1990s panel, we should see evidence of growing attitudinal convergenceonly among party identifiers and not among independents. Party identifiersshould be much more likely than independents to follow the lead of partyelites and merge their views on the three sets of issues toward a uniformlyliberal or uniformly conservative position.

To test these hypotheses, we conduct confirmatory factor analyses of theattitudes of 19561960 panel respondents on social welfare and racial issuesin both 1956 and 1960, and of the attitudes of 19721976 and 19921996panel respondents on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues in the first andthird waves of those panels.6 In all three panels, we conduct these analysesfor all panel respondents, respondents who identified with the same party in

both the first and third waves, and respondents who identified themselves asindependents in both the first and third waves.7We also estimate two differentmeasurement models for each group in each year: one with all of the issuesloading on a single latent variable and one with different issue dimensions(racial, social welfare, and cultural issues in the 19721976 panel and 19921996 panel, racial and social welfare in the 19561960 panel) loading on sepa-rate latent variables.8 To assess the relationship between attitudes towardthese three dimensions, we examine both the average standardized loading ofeach issue on one factor and the correlations between the different issue fac-tors in the multiple-factor solutions.9

Table 2 presents the results of these analyses for the 19561960 panel. Asexpected, this table shows no evidence of a convergence of the social welfareand racial attitudes of all panel respondents, party identifiers, or independentsbetween 1956 and 1960. Three of the four social welfare issues do have atleast slightly stronger loadings on a single factor in 1960 than in 1956 for eachgroup, but the loadings for the two racial issues are generally smaller in 1960than in 1956. There is no increase either in the average loading of all issueson the single factor or in the correlation between social welfare and racialattitudes in the two-factor solution for any of the three groups.

The results for the 19721976 panel, presented in Table 3, are very similar.Attitudes on social welfare issues among all respondents and partisans do loadmore strongly on the single factor in 1976 than in 1972. However, the loadingsof individual racial and cultural issues in 1976 tend to be either smaller thanor the same as those in 1972 for all groups. The average loading of all issueson the single factor does not increase over the course of the panel for any of

the three groups. In all cases, the correlations between the social welfare,racial, and cultural factors in the three-factor solution are smaller in 1976 thanin 1972.

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TABLE 2. Confirmatory Factor Analyses of Issue Attitudes for All

Respondents, Partisans, and Independents in the 19561960 PanelAll Panel

Respondentsa Partisansb Independentsc

1956 1960 1956 1960 1956 1960

One-Factor SolutionSocial Welfare Issues

Government ensures jobs 1.00 (.65) 1.00 (.69) 1.00 (.67) 1.00 (.69) 1.00 (.43) 1.00 (.71)Subsidized medical care .92 (.59) .91 (.65) .95 (.64) .95 (.67) .97 (.40) .78 (.54)Government aid for build-

ing schools .71 (.54) .81 (.59) .71 (.56) .85 (.61) .58 (.31) .63 (.46)Government intervention

in housing/power .39 (.25) .32 (.22) .43 (.29) .34 (.24) .78 (.35) .18 (.13)Racial Issues

School desegregation .35 (.21) .26 (.16) .24 (.15) .29 (.18) 1.22 (.46) .30 (.19)

Black employment andhousing .65 (.45) .52 (.40) .59 (.42) .54 (.41) .96 (.44) .50 (.38)

Average standardizedloading .45 .45 .46 .47 .40 .40

(N) (1132) (1132) (674) (674) (146) (146)2 (df= 9) 101.18 147.63 67.60 87.86 21.99 29.95d1/

e2 .94/.94 .98/.98 .93/.94 .98/.98 .88/.93 .97/.98

f1/g2 .85/.87 .96/.96 .83/.85 .96/.96 .72/.81 .94/.96

Two-Factor Solutionrsocial welfare and racial .40 .29 .32 .33 .30 .27

2 (df= 8) 26.71 18.08 20.62 15.68 6.02 4.70

2(2 factor vs. 1 factor) (df= 1) 74.47 129.55 46.98 72.18 15.97 25.25

d1/

e2 .99/.99 .99/.99 .99/.99 .99/1.00 .99/.99 .99/.99

f1/

g2 .99/.99 .99/.99 .99/.99 .99/1.00 .99/.99 .99/1.00

Source: 195619581960 National Election Studies Panel.Note: Entries are unstandardized factor loadings. The standardized loadings are in parentheses.

Analyses computed using full information maximum likelihood estimation with missing values.aOnly individuals who participated in all three waves of the panel study.bPanel respondents who identified themselves as Democrats (strong or weak) in both 1956 and

1960 and respondents who identified themselves as Republicans (strong or weak) in both 1956and 1960.

cPanel respondents who identified themselves as independents (leaning or non-leaning) in both1956 and 1960.

dBentler and Bonetts (1980) normed fit indexeBollens (1989a) incremental fit indexfBollens (1986) relative fit indexgBentler and Bonetts (1980) non-normed fit index*Not significant at p < .05. All other factor loadings, correlations, and 2 tests are significant at

p < .05.

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Respondents Partisans Independents

1972 1976 1972 1976 1972 1976

One-Factor SolutionSocial Welfare Issues

Government ensures jobs 1.00 (.44) 1.00 (.55) 1.00 (.50) 1.00 (.59) 1.00 (.40) 1.00 (.47)Progressive tax rate .50 (.19) .41 (.19) .45 (.19) .52 (.27) .68 (.21) .43 (.17)Government health insur-

ance .93 (.33) .92 (.41) .90 (.37) .95 (.47) 1.07 (.34) .91 (.35)Racial Issues

Government help forblacks 1.46 (.65) 1.23 (.67) 1.32 (.67) 1.08 (.65) 1.46 (.60) 1.48 (.68)

Rights of the accused 1.12 (.46) .67 (.34) .87 (.42) .62 (.35) 1.32 (.46) 1.03 (.42)

Pace of civil rights 1.25 (.56) .91 (.52) 1.18 (.62) .82 (.51) 1.31 (.50) 1.07 (.52)Busing 1.07 (.59) .96 (.61) 1.03 (.63) .94 (.65) 1.13 (.53) .97 (.51)School integration 1.85 (.53) 1.60 (.58) 1.77 (.60) 1.52 (.61) 1.79 (.42) 1.73 (.50)

Cultural IssuesWomens rights .89 (.34) .56 (.28) .60 (.26) .39 (.22) 1.58 (.52) 1.06 (.45)Legalize marijuana 1.12 (.44) .85 (.41) .68 (.34) .59 (.33) 2.03 (.61) 1.33 (.52)Abortion .59 (.26) .34 (.18) .24 (.12) .19 (.11) 1.44 (.51) .84 (.36)


(N) (1320) (1320) (650) (650) (297) (297)

2 (df= 44) 360.36 583.32 168.78 314.90 114.43 160.821/2 .91/.92 .86/.87 .92/.94 .85/.87 .89/.93 .84/.871/2 .87/.88 .79/.80 .88/.91 .77/.80 .83/.89 .75/.81

Three-Factor Solutionrsocial welfare and racial .65 .63 .71 .69 .69 .52rracial and cultural .55 .46 .49 .39 .71 .55

rsocial welfare and cultural .15 .09* .08* .02* .50 .262 (df= 41) 142.70 211.06 83.83 115.09 82.89 77.942(3 factor vs. 1 factor) (df= 3)

a 217.66 372.43 84.95 199.81 31.36 82.882(3 factor vs. 2 factor) (df= 2)

b 52.60 144.06 25.46 68.44 4.18* 33.191/2 .97/.98 .95/.96 .96/.98 .94/.96 .92/.96 .92/.961/2 .94/.96 .92/.93 .94/.97 .91/.94 .87/.93 .87/.93

Source: 197219741976 National Election Studies Panel.Note: See Table 2 for a description of the elements in the table.aComparing a model with social welfare, racial, and cultural attitudes loading on separate fac-

tors to one with all attitudes loading on a single factor.bComparing a model with social welfare, racial, and cultural attitudes loading on separate fac-

tors to one with social welfare and racial attitudes loading on the same factor and cultural attitudesloading on another factor.*Not significant at p < .05. All other factor loadings, correlations, and 2 tests are significant at

p < .05.

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The estimates for the 19921996 panel, presented in Table 4, paint a very

different picture. Among all respondents, there is clear evidence of conver-gence in individuals views on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues. In thesingle-factor solution, the standardized loading of nearly every issue wasstronger in 1996 than in 1992, resulting in an average loading that was notice-ably larger in 1996. The correlations between latent social welfare, racial, andcultural attitudes in the three-factor model are also clearly larger in 1996 thanin 1992.10 Strikingly, the correlations between cultural attitudes and both socialwelfare and racial attitudes are not statistically significant in 1992 but areeasily significant in 1996.

As expected, the overall increase in the relationship between attitudes onthe three sets of domestic issues from 1992 to 1996 is due to growing attitudi-nal constraint among party identifiers and not among independents. The pat-terns for partisans are very similar to those for all respondents, with the aver-

age loading of the issues on a single factor and the correlations between thelatent factors in the three-factor model clearly increasing over the course ofthe panel study. Among independents, in contrast, the average loading of issueattitudes on a single factor actually declines slightly between the first and thirdwaves of the panel. The correlation between social welfare and racial attitudesin the three-factor model for independents is also noticeably lower in 1996than in 1992. The correlations between cultural attitudes and both social wel-fare and racial attitudes are statistically insignificant in both years. 11

Tables 2 through 4 present clear evidence for elite-driven party structuringof individual issue attitudes. Because Democratic and Republican elites werenot clearly differentiated on all of the domestic issue agendas in the periodsfrom 1956 to 1960 and from 1972 to 1976, there were no cues for partyidentifiers to merge together their attitudes on those agendas, and they didnot do so. In the early- to mid-1990s, however, the clear polarization of theparties on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues sent a clear message tocitizens about the elite-level ideological convergence on these issues. As ex-pected, party identifiers followed these cues and began to bring together theirviews on the three agendas. Independents did not follow the cues and showedno signs of increased constraint.

THE IMPACT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION ON ATTITUDINAL CHANGE

IN THE THREE PANELS

The differences between the degree of attitudinal convergence in the threepanel studies and between party identifiers and independents in the 1992

1996 panel suggest that when party elites take polarized stands on an issueagenda, party identification causes some individuals to change their attitudeson the issues. In other words, while some individuals respond to elite issue

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Respondents Partisans Independents

1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996

One-Factor SolutionRacial Issues

Government help forblacks .80 (.53) .87 (.69) .82 (.53) .85 (.70) .67 (.52) .74 (.51)

Racial equality in jobs 1.13 (.45) 1.28 (.54) 1.20 (.45) 1.23 (.55) 1.02 (.43) 1.43 (.46)Racial preferences in

hiring .78 (.45) .94 (.56) .65 (.37) .96 (.61) .69 (.48) .59 (.31)Social Welfare Issues

Spending to helphomeless .86 (.55) .87 (.53) .95 (.55) .91 (.56) .82 (.55) 1.18 (.55)

Government health in-surance .84 (.50) .86 (.59) 1.00 (.56) .93 (.66) .61 (.44) .87 (.53)

Government services/spending .70 (.53) .74 (.65) .75 (.55) .75 (.68) .62 (.55) .77 (.53)

Government ensuresjobs 1.00 (.65) 1.00 (.74) 1.00 (.64) 1.00 (.77) 1.00 (.70) 1.00 (.66)

Spending on welfare 1.08 (.58) .91 (.57) 1.14 (.57) .92 (.62) 1.03 (.62) .75 (.38)Spending to help the

poor 1.04 (.63) 1.07 (.66) 1.16 (.64) 1.11 (.69) .88 (.56) 1.24 (.61)Cultural Issues

Abortion .04 (.02)* .19 (.11) .22 (.11)* .23 (.15) .13 (.08)* .27 (.12)*Womens rights .18 (.13) .32 (.23) .16 (.10)* .31 (.23) .22 (.19)* .23 (.13)*School prayer .04 (.03)* .08 (.07)* .11 (.07)* .12 (.11)* .06 (.05)* .03 (.02)*


(N) (597) (597) (325) (325) (133) (133)2 (df= 54) 292.28 309.61 170.21 188.10 113.84 134.081/2 .90/.92 .90/.92 .89/.92 .90/.93 .86/.92 .82/.891/2 .86/.88 .86/.88 .84/.89 .86/.89 .79/.88 .74/.83

Three-Factor Solutionrsocial welfare and racial .71 .81 .69 .82 .81 .64rracial and cultural .07* .26 .15* .26 .13* .21*rsocial welfare and cultural .07* .23 .14* .28 .12* .11*

2 (df= 51) 146.22 178.41 93.76 96.68 68.45 98.87

2(3 factor vs. 1 factor) (df= 3) 146.06 131.20 76.45 91.42 45.39 35.21

2

(3 factor vs. 2 factor) (df= 2) 43.72 40.00 23.90 29.70 3.62* 9.361/2 .95/.97 .94/.96 .94/.97 .95/.98 .91/.98 .87/.931/2 92/.95 .91/.94 .91/.96 .92/.96 .87/.96 .80/.89

Source: 199219941996 National Election Studies Panel.Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for a description of the elements in the table.*Not significant at p < .05. All other factor loadings, correlations, and 2 tests are significant at

p < .05.

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polarization by changing their party identification based on their issue posi-

tions, others respond by bringing their issue attitudes closer to those of theirpartys leaders. To test this idea directly, we estimate structural equation mod-els that examine the reciprocal relationship over time between party identifi-cation and attitudes toward the various domestic policy agendas. We estimateseparate models for each issue dimension in each panel. We are able to makedirect comparisons between the estimates for the 197219741976 and 199219941996 panels because they share identical questions about the same is-sues. The 195619581960 panel has no issue questions in common with theother two panels. So, we begin with our comparison of the estimates for the1970s and 1990s panels, and then turn to the results for the first NES panelstudy.

Figure 1 illustrates the general form of our models, which correct for mea-surement error in both party identification and the particular issue attitude.

There is only one observed measure of party identification in the NES surveys:the standard 7-point party identification scale. To make direct comparisonsbetween the estimates for the 1970s panel and the 1990s panel, it is necessaryto examine only those issue questions that are included in all three waves ofboth panels. Since only one social welfare issue (government guarantee of jobsand a good standard of living), one racial issue (government responsibility tohelp racial minorities), and one cultural issue (womens rights) were askedabout in each wave of both panel studies, each model that we estimate in-cludes only one observed measure of attitudes toward the particular issuedimension. Thus, the measurement model for both party identification andissue attitude is the standard single-indicator measurement model in whichobserved party identification/issue attitude (in rectangles in Figure 1) in eachwave of the panel is a function of latent or true party identification/issueattitude (in ovals) and some random measurement error (E). The standardassumptions for the measurement errors and the structural disturbance terms(D) are that the covariances between the measurement errors and the latentvariables and between the measurement errors and the disturbance terms areall zero (Bollen, 1989b; Finkel, 1995).

Even with these constraints, the measurement models for party identifica-tion and issue attitude remain underidentified. In order to identify the model,we employ a standard set of restrictions proposed by Wiley and Wiley (1970).We assume that the error variances of observed party identification/issue atti-tude are equal over time, that the measurement errors are uncorrelated witheach other, and that the effects of observed party identification/issue attitudeon latent party identification/issue attitude are all equal to one. The latter con-

straint also ensures that unobserved party identification/issue attitude has thesame scale as the observed 7-point indicator of party identification/issue atti-tude.12

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FIG. 1. Structural equation model of cross-lagged effects between party identificationand issue attitudes.

Note: Stabilities and cross-lagged effects for pairs of variables at T1 and T2 and the same pairof variables at T2 and T3 are constrained to be equal to each other.

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The structural portion of the model proposes that there are cross-lagged

effects between true party identification and true issue attitude over time: Anindividuals issue attitude at one time point is a function of his or her attitudeat the previous time point and his or her party identification at the previoustime point. An individuals party identification at one time point is a functionof his or her party identification and issue attitude at the previous time point.Because the model controls for both variables values at the previous timepoint, the lagged effects of partisanship on issue attitude and of issue attitudeon partisanship can be interpreted as the effect of one variable on changes inthe other variable over time (Finkel, 1995).

We model the relationship between issue attitude and partisanship as recip-rocal, but not simultaneous, for two reasons. First, and most importantly, oursubstantive focus differs from that of the voting behavior literature wheremodels of synchronous effects between party identification and issue attitudes

generally are found (Page and Jones, 1979). We are not interested in whetherparty identification is exogenous or endogenous to issue attitudes at a singlepoint in time. Instead, we are interested in the effect of party identificationon changes over time in issue attitude and of issue attitudes on changes overtime in party identification. The cross-lagged-effects model is better equippedto examine this than is a model of contemporaneous effects. Second, Finkel(1995) demonstrates that the cross-lagged models applicability is not limitedto discrete time processes of change. It is also appropriate even if we assumethat the reciprocal effects between variables occur continuously over time.13

Under these circumstances, the cross-lagged model tends not to be mislead-ing about the direction of causal influence (Dwyer, 1983: 352).

Table 5 presents the estimates of the stability coefficients and cross-laggedeffects in our models for both the 1970s and 1990s panels.14 The strong andstatistically significant stability coefficients indicate that both party identifica-tion and issue attitudes are highly stable over time, with, as past work hasshown (Converse and Markus, 1979; Green and Palmquist, 1990), partisanshipbeing especially stable. Despite the enduring nature of these orientations, wedo find some evidence of reciprocal effects between partisanship and issueattitudes over time.

In the 19721976 period, the parties had distinct stands on social welfareand racial issues, but not on cultural issues. Thus, we should see evidence ofindividuals changing their party identification in response to their social wel-fare and racial attitudes and of individuals altering their social welfare andracial attitudes in response to their partisanship, but not of cross-lagged effectsbetween party identification and cultural attitudes. These expectations are

clearly met. On cultural issues, ones previous party identification has no effecton the change in ones attitudes on cultural issues between 1972 and 1974(1974 and 1976). Similarly, ones cultural attitudes in 1972 (1974) have no

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TABLE 5. Estimates of Structural Coefficients in the Models of Cross-Lagged

Effects Between Party Identification and Issue Attitudes in the197219741976 and 199219941996 Panels

Social Welfare Racial Cultural(Government (Government (WomensEnsures Jobs) Help for Blacks) Rights) andand Party ID and Party ID Party ID

197219741976 PanelStabilities of Latent Variablesa

1972 Party ID 1974 Party ID .96 (.97) .96 (.97) .97 (.97)1974 Party ID 1976 Party ID .96 (.97) .96 (.98) .97 (.98)1972 Issue Attitude 1974 Issue

Attitude .81 (.86) .86 (.84) .83 (.85)1974 Issue Attitude 1976 Issue

Attitude .81 (.87) .86 (.90) .83 (.92)Cross-Lagged Effects Between Latent

Variablesa1972 Party ID 1974 Issue Attitude .11 (.14) .04 (.05) .006 (.006)*1974 Party ID 1976 Issue Attitude .11 (.15) .04 (.05) .006 (.007)*1972 Issue Attitude 1974 Party ID .07 (.05) .03 (.03) .002 (.002)*1974 Issue Attitude 1976 Party ID .07 (.05) .03 (.03) .002 (.002)*

(N) (1320) (1320) (1320)

2 (df= 9) 49.69 41.43 33.88




Attitude .84 (1.01) .80 (.89) .98 (.95)Cross-Lagged Effects Between Latent

Variablesa1992 Party ID 1994 Issue Attitude .11 (.16) .09 (.12) .04 (.06)1994 Party ID 1996 Issue Attitude .11 (.20) .09 (.14) .04 (.06)1992 Issue Attitude 1994 Party ID .13 (.09) .07 (.05) .02 (.01)*1994 Issue Attitude 1996 Party ID .13 (.09) .07 (.05) .02 (.02)*

(N) (597) (597) (597)2 (df= 9) 100.84 60.43 9.84*

Source: 197219741976 and 199219941996 National Election Studies Panels.Note: The entries are unstandardized coefficients. Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.

All observed indicators range from 1 (most liberal/Democratic) to 7 (most conservative/Republi-can). Analyses computed using full information maximum likelihood estimation with missing val-ues. All variables in the structural model are latent variables with loadings of 1.0 on observedindicators. 1, 2, 1, and 2 all range from .97 to 1.00.

aStabilities and cross-lagged effects for pairs of variables in 1972 (or 1992) and 1974 (or 1994)and the same pair of variables in 1974 (or 1994) and 1976 (or 1996) are constrained to be equal

to each other.*Not significant at p < .05. All other factor loadings, regression weights, and 2 tests are signifi-cant at p < .05.

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bearing on the change in ones party identification between 1972 and 1974

(1974 and 1976). On social welfare and racial issues, there is support for therealignment literatures conventional wisdom that partisan issue polarizationleads individuals to alter their party ties. Individuals with conservative atti-tudes on social welfare and racial issues in 1972 (1974) were more likely thanindividuals with liberal views on those issues to move their party identificationin a Republican direction between 1972 and 1974 (1974 and 1976). However,we also find evidence of existing partisans changing their positions on socialwelfare and racial issues to bring them closer to those of their parties elites.Republicans were more likely than Democrats to move their attitudes on theseissues in a conservative direction. Specifically, a one-unit increase in Republi-can party identification in 1972 (1974) leads to an increase in conservatism of.11 on social welfare and of .04 on race between 1972 and 1974 (1974 and1976).

In the 1990s, Democratic and Republican elites were clearly divided oncultural issues and were even more polarized on social welfare and race thanthey were in the 1970s. Thus, we should see evidence of party structuring ofissue attitudes on all three issue agendas and the impact of partisanship onsocial welfare and racial attitude change should be larger than it was in the1970s. These expectations are met almost entirely. The impact of party identi-fication on changes in racial attitudes over the panel waves is not only statisti-cally significant but is also more than twice as large in the 1990s as in the1970s. An increase of one unit in Republican party identification in 1992(1994) leads to an increase of .09 in racial issue conservatism between 1992and 1994 (1994 and 1996). Racial issue attitudes also have a significant effecton changes in party identification over the three panel waves. There is noevidence of attitudes toward womens rights leading to changes in party identi-fication in the 1990s. However, unlike in the 1970s panel, there is evidenceof party structuring of attitudes toward womens rights, with an increase ofone unit in affiliation with the GOP in 1992 (1994) leading to an increase of.04 in conservatism between 1992 and 1994 (1994 and 1996). Finally, Republi-cans were significantly more likely than Democrats to change their social wel-fare attitudes in a conservative direction, just as social welfare conservativeswere significantly more likely than social welfare liberals to become moreclosely aligned with the GOP over the waves of the panel. The standardizedeffects indicate that the effect of partisanship on changes in social welfareattitudes are slightly larger in the 1990s panel than in the 1970s panel.15

Table 6 presents the measurement and structural coefficients for cross-lagged models of the relationship between party identification and social wel-

fare attitudes and between party identification and racial attitudes in the195619581960 panel. Because there is only one observed indicator of partyidentification, its measurement model has the same restrictions as the models

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TABLE 6. Estimates of Measurement and Structural Coefficients

in the Models of Cross-Lagged Effects Between Party Identificationand Issue Attitudes in the 195619581960 Panel

SocialWelfare RacialAttitudes Attitudes

Factor Loadingsa

Latent Party ID Observed Party ID1956 1.00 (.94) 1.00 (.94)1958 1.00 (.94) 1.00 (.94)1960 1.00 (.94) 1.00 (.94)

Social Welfare Attitudes Govt. Guarantee Jobs1956 1.00 (.56) 1958 1.00 (.54) 1960 1.00 (.61)

Social Welfare Attitudes Govt. in Housing and Power1956 .40 (.22) 1958 .40 (.23) 1960 .40 (.24)

Social Welfare Attitudes Govt. Aid for Schools1956 .96 (.62) 1958 .96 (.58) 1960 .96 (.63)

Racial Attitudes Black Employment/Housing1956 1.00 (.62)1958 1.00 (.68)1960 1.00 (.67)

Racial Attitudes School Desegregation1956 1.05 (.52)1958 1.05 (.58)

1960 1.05 (.57)Stabilities of Latent Variablesb

1956 Party ID 1958 Party ID .96 (.94) .97 (.94)1958 Party ID 1960 Party ID .96 (.97) .97 (.98)1956 Issue Attitude 1958 Issue Attitude .99 (.99) .99 (.89)1958 Issue Attitude 1960 Issue Attitude .99 (.91) .99 (.99)

Cross-Lagged Effects Between Latent Variablesb

1956 Party ID 1958 Issue Attitude .08 (.12) .04 (.05)1958 Party ID 1960 Issue Attitude .08 (.11) .04 (.06)1956 Issue Attitude 1958 Party ID .07 (.04) .03 (.02)*1958 Issue Attitude 1960 Party ID .07 (.05) .03 (.02)*

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SocialWelfare RacialAttitudes Attitudes

(N) (1132) (1132)

2 (df) 233.99 (53) 104.92 (25)1/2 .99/.99 .99/.991/2 .98/.99 .99/.99

Source: 195619581960 National Election Studies Panel.Note: The entries are unstandardized coefficients. Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.

All observed indicators range from 1 (most liberal/Democratic) to 7 (most conservative/Republi-can). Analyses computed using full information maximum likelihood estimation with missingvalues.

aThe loadings of the latent variables on the observed indicators are constrained to be equal

across panel waves.bStabilities and cross-lagged effects for pairs of variables in 1956 and 1958 and the same pairof variables in 1958 and 1960 are constrained to be equal to each other.*Not significant at p < .05. All other factor loadings, regression weights, and 2 tests are signifi-

cant at p < .05.

for the 1970s and 1990s panels. However, because there are three indicatorsof social welfare attitudes and two indicators of racial attitudes in 1956, 1958,and 1960, we are able to relax some of the restrictions in those measurementmodels.16

Given that party differences on social welfare had existed since the initiationof the New Deal, but the parties had not yet taken distinct stands on civilrights, we would expect party identification to have a reciprocal relationshipwith social welfare attitudes but not with racial attitudes in the 195619581960 panel. Those expectations are largely met. Republicans are significantlymore likely than Democrats to change their social welfare attitudes in a con-servative direction, while social welfare conservatives are more likely than so-cial welfare liberals to grow more attached to the GOP over time. Racialattitudes are not related to changes over time in party identification. Partyidentification does have a significant effect on changes in racial attitudes, butthe effect is a negative one. Republican identifiers are more likely than Demo-crats to move their racial policy attitudes in a liberal direction. That may bedue to the GOPs traditional reputation as the party of Lincoln and the Demo-crats position as the party of the Jim Crow South, or to the Republicans inCongress being more supportive than the Democrats of civil rights legislation

in the 1940s and 1950s (Carmines and Stimson, 1989).The results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that when the parties elites takepolarized stands on a set of issues, the resulting increase in the polarization of

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the parties in the electorate results not just from issue-based changes in party

identification but also from party-based changes in issue attitudes: party iden-tifiers bringing their attitudes closer into line with their partys stands. Whenthe parties elites are not clearly different on an issue, party plays no role instructuring attitudes on the issue and issue attitudes play no role in shapingparty identification.

AWARENESS OF PARTY DIFFERENCES AND PARTY STRUCTURING

OF ISSUE ATTITUDES IN THE THREE PANELS

A number of scholars have shown that the key factor linking party elitepolarization on an issue to the polarization of the parties mass coalitions onthat issue is mass awareness of party differences (Carmines and Stimson, 1989;Hetherington, 2001; Zaller, 1992). Unless individuals are aware that the par-

ties are differentiated on an issue, there is no reason for them to change theirparty identification based on their attitudes on the issue (Carmines and Stim-son, 1989), and there is no reason for them to alter their attitudes on the issuebased on their party identification (Layman and Carsey, 2002). Thus, we sus-pect that the reason that the reciprocal effects of party identification and issueattitudes on each other over time are stronger in the 19921996 panel thanin the 19561960 and 19721976 panels is that respondents in the 1990s weremore aware than respondents in the other two panels that the Republicanparty was more conservative than the Democratic party on social welfare,racial, and cultural issues.

To test this idea directly, we reestimate our cross-lagged models separatelyfor individuals who see the GOP as being more conservative than the Demo-crats on the particular issue and for individuals who do not perceive suchpartisan differences. If differential levels of awareness account for the differ-ent results in the three panel studies, then when we control for awareness, weshould see the same patterns across the panels. Among individuals who recog-nize that the Republican party is more conservative than the Democratic partyon an issue, there should be evidence of party identification affecting changesin issue attitudes and of issue attitudes affecting changes in party identifica-tion. Among individuals who are not aware of those differences, there shouldbe no reciprocal effects over time between party identification and issue atti-tudes.17

We begin with the two panels for which we can make direct comparisons.Table 7 presents the estimates of structural coefficients in our models in the19721976 and 19921996 panels for respondents who were not aware of

partisan issue differences and individuals who were aware of those differ-ences.18 As expected, the results for the two panel studies are nearly identical.In both panels, there is no evidence of reciprocal effects between party identi-

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TABLE 7. Cross-Lagged Effects Between Party Identification and Issue

Attitudes by Awareness of Party Differences on Issues: Estimatesof Structural Coefficients in the 197219741976 and199219941996 Panels


Not Aware of Party Differences on theIssue


1972 Party ID 1974 Party ID .97 (.97) .99 (.99) .95 (.96)1974 Party ID 1976 Party ID .97 (.97) .99 (1.02) .95 (.96)1972 Issue Attitude 1974 Issue



Variablesa

1972 Party ID 1974 Issue Attitude .03 (.04)* .04 (.05)* .03 (.04)*1974 Party ID 1976 Issue Attitude .03 (.04)* .04 (.05)* .03 (.04)*1972 Issue Attitude 1974 Party ID .01 (.01)* .01 (.01)* .02 (.02)*1974 Issue Attitude 1976 Party ID .01 (.01)* .01 (.01)* .02 (.02)*

(N) (382) (519) (820)

2 (df= 9) 7.70* 13.89* 19.59



Attitude 1.20 (.99) .70 (.80) 1.05 (.98)1994 Issue Attitude 1996 Issue

Attitude 1.20 (2.11) .70 (.75) 1.05 (.95)Cross-Lagged Effects Between Latent

Variablesa

1992 Party ID 1994 Issue Attitude .03 (.05)* .02 (.03)* .03 (.05)*1994 Party ID 1996 Issue Attitude .03 (.10)* .02 (.04)* .03 (.05)*1992 Issue Attitude 1994 Party ID .14 (.07)* .05 (.04)* .12 (.06)1994 Issue Attitude 1996 Party ID .14 (.09)* .05 (.04)* .12 (.07)

(N) (149) (179) (256)

2 (df= 9) 15.93* 17.23 14.15*

Aware of Party Differences on the Issue197219741976 PanelStabilities of Latent Variablesa

1972 Party ID 1974 Party ID .95 (.97) .94 (.94) 1.02 (1.01)1974 Party ID 1976 Party ID .95 (.96) .94 (.95) 1.02 (1.04)

1972 Issue Attitude 1974 IssueAttitude .77 (.83) .87 (.88) .75 (.82)1974 Issue Attitude 1976 Issue

Attitude .77 (.82) .87 (.89) .75 (.83)

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Cross-Lagged Effects Between LatentVariablesa

1972 Party ID 1974 Issue Attitude .18 (.26) .12 (.17) .10 (.11)1974 Party ID 1976 Issue Attitude .18 (.27) .12 (.17) .10 (.12)1972 Issue Attitude 1974 Party ID .11 (.09) .11 (.08) .04 (.04)1974 Issue Attitude 1976 Party ID .11 (.08) .11 (.08) .04 (.04)

(N) (615) (500) (253)2 (df= 9) 79.41 52.35 21.14





Variablesa

1992 Party ID 1994 Issue Attitude .14 (.21) .12 (.18) .09 (.13)1994 Party ID 1996 Issue Attitude .14 (.23) .12 (.21) .09 (.13)1992 Issue Attitude 1994 Party ID .18 (.12) .15 (.10) .09 (.06)1994 Issue Attitude 1996 Party ID .18 (.12) .15 (.10) .09 (.06)

(N) (400) (367) (321)

2 (df= 9) 92.25 61.83 29.10

Source: 197219741976 and 199219941996 National Election Studies Panels.Note: The entries are unstandardized coefficients. Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.

All observed indicators range from 1 (most liberal/Democratic) to 7 (most conservative/Republi-can). Analyses computed using full information maximum likelihood estimation with missing val-ues. All variables in the structural model are latent variables with loadings of 1.0 on observedindicators. 1, 2, 1, and 2 all range from .97 to 1.00.

aStabilities and cross-lagged effects for pairs of variables in 1972 (or 1992) and 1974 (or 1994)and the same pair of variables in 1974 (or 1994) and 1976 (or 1996) are constrained to be equalto each other.*Not significant at p < .05. All other factor loadings, regression weights, and 2 tests are signifi-

cant at p < .05.

fication and attitudes on any of the three issues for individuals who are notaware of where the parties stand relative to each other on those issues. Theonly case in which there is a statistically significant lagged effect of eitherparty identification or issue attitude on the other is the effect of attitude on

womens rights in 1992 (1994) on changes in party identification between 1992and 1994 (1994 and 1996), but this effect is negative.

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In contrast, the reciprocal effects of party identification and issue attitudes

for individuals who are aware of party differences on issues are statisticallysignificant and in the expected direction in both the 1970s and the 1990s.Republicans in 1972 (1974) or 1992 (1994) are more likely than Democratsto convert to more conservative positions on social welfare, racial, and culturalissues between 1972 and 1974 (1974 and 1976) or between 1992 and 1994(1994 and 1996). Conservatives on all three issue agendas in 1972 (1974) or1992 (1994) are more likely than liberals on those agendas to become moreclosely aligned with the GOP between 1972 and 1974 (1974 and 1976) orbetween 1992 and 1994 (1994 and 1996).

Table 8 shows the estimates for 195619581960 panel respondents ofcross-lagged effects between party identification and attitudes on two individ-ual social welfare issues (government guarantee of jobs and government inter-vention in housing and power) and one individual racial issue (government

ensuring fair treatment for blacks in jobs and housing).19 We estimate themodels separately for respondents who view the Republicans as being moreconservative than the Democrats on those issues and for respondents who donot recognize such partisan differences.

The results are very similar to those for the 1970s and 1990s panels. Amongrespondents who do not see the Republicans as more conservative than theDemocrats on issues, there generally are either no reciprocal effects betweenpartisanship and issue attitudes or effects that are not in the expected direc-tion. The one exception is a small, but statistically significant, effect of atti-tudes toward government ensuring jobs on changes in party identification.There are significant cross-lagged effects between party identification and atti-tudes toward government ensuring fair treatment for blacks. However, thoseeffects are negative, with Republicans being more likely than Democrats tochange their issue attitudes in a liberal direction, and racial liberals beingmore likely than racial conservatives to become more Republican over time.

In contrast, the cross-lagged effects are all significant and in the expecteddirection for respondents who do see the GOP as more conservative than theDemocrats on issues. Republican identifiers are more likely than Democratsto convert in a conservative direction on the issues, and conservatives on theissues are more likely than liberals to become more closely identified with theRepublican Party.

In sum, these results show that awareness of party issue differences plays amajor role in translating party elite polarization on an issue into individual-level partisan change. However, that change may take more than one form.As the realignment literature predicts, some individuals who come to see the

parties as taking distinct stands on an issue change their party identificationsto conform with their views on the issue. But, what the literature largely ig-

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TABL

E8.Cross-LaggedEffectsBetweenPartyIdentificationandIssueAttitud

esbyAwarenessofPartyDifferenceson

Issues:EstimatesofStructuralC

oefficientsinthe195619581960P

anel

Govt.Ensure

Government

G

overnment

FairTreatment

Guarantee

Int

erventionin

forBlacksinJobs

ofJobs

HousingandPower

andHousing

NotAware

Aware

NotAw

are

Aware

NotAware

Aw

are

StabilitiesofLatentVariablesa

1956PartyID

1958PartyID

.95

(.94)

.93(.95)

.96(.97)

.96(.94)

.97

(.95)

.91(.92)

1958PartyID

1960PartyID

.95

(.98)

.93(.96)

.96(.98)

.96(.96)

.97

(.98)

.91(.99)

1956IssueAtt.

1958IssueAtt.

.89

(.87)

.89(.91)

.85(.85)

.77(.98)

.92

(.93)

.96(.92)

1958IssueAtt.

1960IssueAtt.

.89

(.92)

.89(.95)

.85(.85)

.77(.69)

.92

(.96)

.96(.99)

Cross-LaggedEffectsBetweenLatentVariablesa

1956PartyID

1958IssueAtt.

.001(.001)*

.20(.24)

.02(.03)*

.26(.44)

.0

6(.0

8)

.15(.16)

1958PartyID

1960IssueAtt.

.001(.001)*

.20(.25)

.02(.03)*

.26(.40)

.0

6(.0

8)

.15(.16)

1956IssueAtt.

1958PartyID

.04

(.04)

.08(.07)

.03(.02)*

.09(.06)

.0

1(.0

03)

.08(.07)

1958IssueAtt.

1960PartyID

.04

(.04)

.08(.07)

.03(.02)*

.09(.06)

.0

1(.0

03)

.08(.08)

(N)

(551)

(438)

(493

)

(366)

(725)

(241)

2

(df=9)

16.1

0*

23.0

2

8.76

*

79.9

2

7.3

1*

11.14*

Sourc

e:1956

1958

1960NationalElectionStudiesPanels.

Note:Theentriesareunstandardizedcoefficients.

Standardizedcoefficientsareinparentheses.

Allobservedindicatorsrangefrom

1(mostliberal/

Democ

ratic)to7(mostconservative/Republican).Analysescomputedusingfullinformationmaximum

likelihoodestimationwithmissingvalue

s.All

variable

sinthestructuralmodelarelatentvariableswithloadingsof1.0onobservedindicators.1,

2,1,and2

allrangefrom

.96to1.0

0.

aStab

ilitiesandcross-laggedeffectsforpairsofvar

iablesin1956and1958andthesamepairofvariablesin1958and1960areconstrainedtobe

equaltoeachother.

*Not

significantatp

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