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  • 111959

  • Euthyphro,

    Crito,Apolpgy,Symposium

  • PLATO

    Euthyphro,

    Apology,

    Crito, and

    Symposium

    The Jowett translation revised

    and with an Introduction by

    Moses Hadas

    A Gateway EditionRegnery Gateway

  • Copyright 1953 by Regnery Gateway, Inc.

    360 West Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois 60610-0890

    Manufactured in the United States of America

    Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 53-8797International Standard Book Number: 0-89526-916-3

    Published by Regnery Gateway, Inc.

  • Contents

    Euthyphro j

    Apology 25

    Giito 59

    Symposium 77

  • Introduction

    THE SIMPLEST description of Plato's Dialogues isthat they are reports of conversations in which the

    principal interlocutor is usually Socrates, and the sim-

    plest significant statement concerning Socrates' con-

    versations is that they proceeded from a conviction that

    the unexamined life is not worth living.Who was Socrates, who was Plato, and what is the

    nature of the Dialogues? The most dramatic and bestauthenticated episode in Socrates' career is his trial be-

    fore an Athenian court, in 399 B.C., on the charge of

    disbelieving in the gods of the state and persuadingothers to his disbelief. At the time of his condemnationhe was seventy, which means that his adult life fell inthe latter half of the fifth century, when Athens wasilluminated and informed by an unparalleled con-centration of men of genius. But whereas Sophocles andThucydides and Phidias have themselves provided tan-

    gible monuments of their genius, Socrates, like certainother great ethical teachers, wrote nothing, but left hismark on the minds of other men. His function, as hehimself put it, was to sting them into awareness like a

    gadfly and to serve as midwife for their own mentaltravails. Some of his hearers became wholly obsessedby his teaching and others resented him, some so

    strongly that they wished him dead. From what he saysabout himself and from what men who knew him have

  • Vi INTRODUCTION

    written we get this picture, or it may be caricature, ofhis life and habits: Socrates was a strikingly ugly man,trained as a stone carver, who went about Athens ask-

    ing questions and provoking discussions chiefly on

    ethical problems. He was followed and admired by a

    group composed for the most part of upper class youths.He might be described as a Sophist by a comic poet,but differed from the Sophists obviously in that he took

    no regular pupils and received no pay for his teaching.He believed in his own mission to question people andinduce them to think, and he sometimes went into a

    trance while pondering some problem.But such idiosyncrasies as these are of interest only

    if Socrates was actually the towering spiritual giant

    posterity has conceived him to be, and on the questionof his true stature our evidence is equivocal. The den-

    igration in Aristophanes9Clouds may be dismissed as

    intentional caricature. We are left then with what pur-port to be reports of his discourses as heard byXenophon and Plato respectively. Both men revere themaster, but their representations of him are strikinglyunlike, and it is difficult to determine where the truthlies. In Xenophon Socrates is a shrewd and benevolent

    sage who gives utilitarian counsel on practical concernsof life, but it may well be that Xenophon's own limita-tions rendered him incapable of appreciating the saintlyand intellectual qualities which Plato's accounts reflectThew qualities Socrates must surely have possessed, andthe more developed doctrines which Plato puts into hismouth may be legitimate implications of actual Socraticutterances. On the other hand, there is strong prob-ability that the content as well as the form of the

    dialogues owes a great deal to Plato himself.Plato was born in 428 B.C., and so was less than thirty

    at the death of Socrates; die most significant of the

    Dialogues are represented as having taken place when

  • INTRODUCTION VII

    he himself was only a child. On the other hand, he wasdoubtless steeped in Socratic teaching by his association

    with older members of the circle, among them his two

    older brothers, Glaucon and Adimantus, and particularlyhis uncles, Critias and Charmides. These latter were

    leading spirits in the oligarchic coup and atrocities of

    the Thirty in 404-403 B.C., and popular detestation of

    them and of other members of the circle certainly

    played its part in bringing about the condemnation of

    Socrates. Plato's political sympathies, like his birth, are

    aristocratic, and he shows the predilection for Spartacharacteristic of the oligarchic party. After the death of

    Socrates he left Athens, as did others of the Socratic

    circle, sojourned for a time at Megara, and is then said

    to have spent ten years in travel, to Gyrene, Egypt, and

    Italy. In Syracuse he became attached to Dion. By 387he was back in Athens and had founded the Academy,which was destined to continue active for nearly athousand years. The dialogues which Plato publishedmust not be taken as representative of his teaching in

    the Academy; in his autobiographical Seventh Epistlehe himself makes the rather startling statement that hehas never written his doctrine down :

    I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, norshall I ever do so in future; for there is no way of

    putting it into words like other studies. Acquaintancewith it must come rather after a long period of attend-ance on instruction in the subject itself and of close

    companionship, when suddenly, like a blaze kindled

    by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and atonce becomes self-sustaining.

    The Seventh Epistle was written mainly as an

    apologia for Plato's relationships with the court of

    Syracuse. In 368 Dion invited him to come to Syracuse,

  • Vlii INTRODUCTION

    to make a philosopher-king of his nephew Dionysius II,

    who had just succeeded Dionysius I as ruler. The move

    was construed as a scheme of Dion's to usurp power;Dion was exiled and Plato returned to Athens hi 366.

    In 362 he again went to Syracuse, on the invitation of

    Dionysius, but again failed to convert the king. Plato

    died in Athens in 347 B.C.

    Regardless of his stature as philosopher and teacher,Plato's eminence as a writer assures him a high place

    among the creative writers of the world. None has betterseized upon moments when men are most characteristi-

    cally human, that is, when they are discoursing on mat*ters of the mind and spirit, and fixed them in suchtruth and beauty. Merely as mimes, presenting to the

    life interactions of interesting types, most of the dia-

    logues would justify completely their claim as works of

    art. But when the play of personalities shapes beforethe eyes and ears of the audience significant truthsof profound ethical and moral consequence and leadsto a vision of a lofty spiritual goal, the dialogues mustbe reckoned among the most sublime utterances of man*kind. To appreciate the matchless skill with which thedialogue form is used, not to state a finished idea, but to

    represent its unfolding, one need only compare the useof the form by lesser men, where the interlocutors posequestions only to make an opening for the master'sex-cathedra answers.

    Unlike the fate of other ancient writings, Plato's

    published works have all survived, and in good texts,but we have no external evidence for the chronologicalorder of their composition. Order is important for ap-prehending the development of Plato's thought, and onthe basis of minute stylistic criteria, reinforced by prob-ability on other grounds, scholars have been able toarrange the Dialogues hi three major groups. In thefirst or so-called "Socratic" group Socrates is the prin-

  • INTRODUCTION ix

    cipal figure and refutes the contentions of his opponentswithout himself proposing positive solutions. The vivid

    style and sharp delineation of character make thedialectic natural and dramatic. To this group belongApology (not strictly a dialogue), Crito, Charmides,Laches, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Ion,and Lysis. Socrates' position and techniques are thesame in the second group as in the first, but there are

    developments in both content and form. Some of thenew concepts, such as the theory of ideas, may beattributable to Plato himself, perhaps as developmentof germs in the actual teaching of Socrates. This groupis further characterized by the new use of myths, wherecreation*, of the imagination are employed to carry

    thought beyond the bounds of logic, as in presentingviews of eschatology. Some of the dialogues of this

    group are directed against the Sophists, who are rep-resented as morally inferior and unequal to Socrates indialectic. To this group belong Gorgias, Protagoras,Euthydemus, Cratylus, Phaedo, Republic, Meno, Al-cibiades I, Menexenus, Phaedrus, Symposium, Theaete-

    tus, and Parmenides. In the third group Socrates is less

    prominent or entirely absent, and the settings are less

    elaborate, the myths fewer and less important. In this

    group are included Sophistes, Politicus, Timaeus,

    Critias, Philebus, Laws, Epinomis.All the pieces presented in this volume have at least

    as their secondary purpose a kind of beatification of

    Socrates. His pre-eminence in reason, his devotion to

    his mission, his selfless concern for the spiritual welfare

    of his fellow men, the purity of his life, even his social

    gifts, are underscored. The Euthypkro may serve as amodel of the dialogues of the first group. Some commonterm of moral import, here piety, is examined with a

    view to determining its true meaning. The interlocutoroffers examples of pious conduct, approaching but not

  • X INTRODUCTION

    attaining a universal definition; as far as any answer

    to the problem is reached, it is that the various virtues

    are part of a single inclusive virtue,which must be the

    object of constant examination.If we are not given a

    ready definition, at least the complacency of our

    imagined knowledge is shaken, and we are left with a

    heightened sense of the importanceof pursuing true

    knowledge. The excellent characterization of the well-

    meaning bigot of the title and the gentle satire of

    utilitarian orthodoxy provide contrast for Socrates'

    superiority in both mind and spirit.The scene of the Euthyphro is the portico of the

    court where Socrates has come presumably on business

    connected with his trial. The Apology, more properlyDefense) is a version of Socrates' speech at the trial.

    Here Socrates is made to present, without coyness or

    swagger or unction, his own concept of his mission to

    sting men, like a gadfly, to self-examination and to serve

    as a midwife to their travail with ideas. In Crito

    Socrates' friend of that name tries to persuade him to

    escape from prison, where he is awaiting execution.

    Socrates insists that one wrong may not be righted bya retaliatory wrong, and affirms his loyalty to the laws,which he represents (and this is a Platonic myth in

    germ) as themselves asserting their claim upon him.The Symposium is again an effective encomium of

    Socrates, but it is also a dramatic masterpiece and an

    eloquent exposition of Plato's spiritual aspiration. Thesetting is the house of the tragic poet Agathon, where aselect group has gathered, about 416 B.G., to celebratetheir host's victory in a tragic competition. Instead ofthe usual forms of entertainment (hey decide to taketurns in pronouncing discourses on love. The firstspeech, by Phaedrus, sets forth the military advantagesof homosexual love, and Pausanias next introduces

  • INTRODUCTION XI

    a refinement by distinguishing between anob!e and a

    base love. The physician Eryximachus gives love a

    cosmic significance by basing it on naturalforces of

    attraction and repulsion. Aristophanes, who had been

    prevented from speakingin his proper turn by an attack

    of hiccups, explains love by a peculiarly Aristophanic

    cosmogony, at once fantastic and sentimental. Agathon

    concludes the series with a virtuoso exhibition of

    rhetoric, as empty in content as it is brilliant in fonn.

    Socrates, when his turn comes, uses a dialcrtiral ex-

    change to establish that the love in question is a desire

    for what we lack, and then he reports a long discourse

    on love which had been taught him by Dintima, the

    wise woman of Mantinea. Love is to proceed from thelove of one beautiful body to the love of many, and

    from beautiful bodies to beautiful characters, and so upthe ladder of love to union with the highest goodnessand beauty. It is not too much to call this speech, asA. E. Taylor does, "the narrative of the pilgrimage of

    a soul on the way of salvation, from the initial momentat which it feels the need for salvation to its final

    'consummation.'"

    Alcibiades, flown with wine and be-decked with ribbons, joins the party. He is at theheight of his glory, having been given the command ofthe Syracusan expedition but not yet having been dis-

    graced. Only Alcibiades, and Alcibiades drunk, couldtell the story of his attempted seduction of Socrates andits utter failure, and could thus demonstrate that Soc-rates' life was as lofty as his professions and that hehad, in fact, attained the vision of the true good. Thenarrator's memory of what followed is confused. He fellasleep, and when he awoke at dawn Socrates wasdiscoursing on the nature of comedy and tragedy withAristophanes (who could notoriously carry his liquor)and Agathon (who as host was bound to stay awake).

  • 301 INTRODUCTION

    Nowhere is Plato's art of combining the light touch with

    high seriousness better displayed. Even readers who findthe ascent of the ladder of love a distant and romantic

    enterprise must enjoy an evening of informal talk with

    the wits of Athens,

  • Euthyphro

    PERSONS: Socrates, EuthyphroSCENE: The Portico of the King Archon

    Euthyphro. What in the world can have made youleave your haunts in the Lyceum, Socrates, and what

    are you doing in the portico of the King Archon?

    Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before him, as

    lam?Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; indictment is the

    word which the Athenians use.

    Euth. What! I suppose that someone has been pros-

    ecuting you? I cannot believe that you are prosecuting

    anyone.

    Soc. Certainly not.

    Euth. Then someone else has been prosecuting you?Soc. Yes.

    Euth. And who is he?Soc. I hardly know the man myself, Euthyphro; he

    is a young man, I think, and not well known. His name,I believe, is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis.

    Perhaps you can recall a Meletus of Pitthis: he has a

    beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill

    grown.Euth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But

    what is the charge which he brings against you?Soc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge,

    which shows a good deal of character in the young man,

    and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He

    1

  • 2 PLATO

    says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who

    are their comipters. I fancy that he must be awise

    man, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man

    he is going to accuse me to the state, as to a mother,of corrupting his fellows. Of all our political men he

    is the only one who seems to me to begin in the rightway; it is right to take care of the young first and make

    them as good as possible, just as a good farmer naturally

    takes care of the young shoots first, and afterwards of

    the others. Meletus too is perhaps first purging us, who,as he says, are corrupting the young men as they sprout.Afterwards, when he has taken care of the elders, he

    will prove a very great benefactor to the state at

    least, that is what one would expect of a man whostarts from such a beginning.

    Euth. I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Soc-

    rates, that the opposite will turn out to be the truth.

    My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiminga blow at the very heart of the state. But tell me, whatdoes he say you do to corrupt the young?

    Soc. Absurd things, my friend, to hear his story. Hesays that I am a maker of gods, that I invent new godsand do not believe in the old ones; it is for the sake ofthe old gods, as he says, that he frames his indictment.Euth. I understand, Socrates; it is because of the

    divine sign which you say occasionally conies to you.He has brought this indictment against you on thegrounds that you are an innovator in matters of religion,and he is going into court to slander you because heknows that slanders on such subjects are readily re-ceived by the many. Why, even when I speak aboutdivine things in the assembly and foretell the future tothem they laugh at me and think I am crazy. Yet everyword I have said is true; they are simply jealous of oursort of people. We must not worry about them, butconfront them boldly.

  • EUTHYPHRO 3

    Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter

    of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise;but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much troublethemselves about him until he begins to impart his

    wisdom to others. When they suspect that he is makingothers like himself, then either from jealousy, as you

    say, or for some other reason they are angry.Euth. I have no desire to test their temper towards

    me in this matter.Soc. I dare say not, for you are reserved in your

    behaviour, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have

    a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody,and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid thatthe Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as Iwas saying, they would only laugh at me, as you saythat they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enoughin the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, andthen what the end will be you soothsayers only can

    predict.

    Euth. I dare say that the affair will end in nothing,Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I thinkthat I shall win my own.

    Soc. And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you thepursuer or the defendant?

    Euth. I am the pursuer.Soc. Of whom?Euth. You will think me mad when I tell you.Soc. Why, has the fugitive wings?Euth. Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.

    Soc. Who is he?Euth. My father.Soc. Your father! my good man?Euth. Yes.

    Soc. And of what is he accused?Euth. Of murder, Socrates.Soc. By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the

  • 4 PLATO

    common herd know of the nature of right and truth. Aman must be an extraordinary man, and have made

    great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his

    way to bring such an action.Euth. Indeed, Socrates, he must.

    Soc. I suppose that the man whom your father mur-dered was one of your relatives clearly he was; for if

    he had been a stranger you would never have thoughtof prosecuting him.

    Euth. I am amused, Socrates, at your making adistinction between one who is a relation and one whois not a relation; for surely the pollution is the same in

    either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer

    when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceedingagainst him. The real question is whether the murderedman has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty isto let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the

    murderer lives under the same roof with you and eatsat the same table, proceed against him. Now the manwho is dead was a poor dependant of mine who workedfor us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, andone day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrelwith one of our domestic servants and slew him. Myfather bound him hand and foot and threw him into aditch, and then sent to Athens to ask a religious expertwhat he should do with him. Meanwhile he neverattended to him and took no care about him, for he

    regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no greatharm would be done even if he did die. Now this wasjust what happened. For such was the effect of coldand hunger and chains upon him, that before the

    messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. Andmy father and family are angry with me for taking thepart of the murderer and prosecuting my father. Theysay that he did not kill him, and that if he did, thedead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take

  • EUTHYPHRO 5

    any notice, for it is impious for a son to prosecute his

    father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know the

    religious laws concerning piety and impiety.Soc. Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowl-

    edge of religion and of things pious and impious so

    very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as

    you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be

    doing an impious thing in bringing an action against

    your father?

    Euth. I should be of no use, Socrates, Euthyphrowould not be different from other men, if I did not

    have accurate knowledge of all such matters.

    Soc. Marvellous Euthyphro! I think that I cannot do

    better than be your disciple. Then before the trial withMeletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that

    I have always had a great interest in religious questions,and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations andinnovations in religion, I have become your disciple.You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge

    Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his

    opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to ap-prove of me, and not have me into court; but if youdisapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is

    my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young,but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he in-structs, and of his old father whom he admonishes andchastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, butwill go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to

    you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the

    court.

    Euth. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to

    indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him;the court shall have a great deal more to say to him

    than to me.

    Soc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirousof becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one

  • 6 PLATO

    appears to notice you not even this Meletus; but his

    sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he hasindicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure youto tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which yousaid that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other

    offences against the gods. What are they? Is not pietyin every action always the same? and impiety, again

    is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the

    same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which

    includes whatever is impious?Euth. To be sure, Socrates.Soc. And what is piety, and what is impiety?Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say,

    prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege,or of any similar crime whether he be your father or

    mother, or whoever he may be that makes no dif-

    ference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. Andplease to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof Iwill give you of the truth of my words, a proof whichI have already given to others: of the principle, I

    mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought notto go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as thebest and most righteous of the gods? and yet theyadmit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he

    wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too hadmutilated his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason.And yet when I proceed against my father, they areangry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way oftalking when the gods are concerned, and when I amconcerned.

    Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why Iam charged with impiety that I cannot away withthese stories about the gods? and therefore I supposethat people think me wrong. But, as you who are wellinformed about them approve of them, I cannot dobetter than assent to your superior wisdom. What else

  • EUTHYPHRO 7

    can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing aboutthem? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you reallybelieve that they are true.

    Euth. Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still,of which the world is in ignorance.

    Soc. And do you really believe that the gods foughtwith one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the

    like, as the poets say, and as you may see representedin the works of great artists? The temples are full of

    them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried

    up to the Acropolis at the great Panathcnaea, is em-broidered with them. Are all these tales of the godstrue, Euthyphro?

    Euth. Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell

    you, if you would like to hear them, many other thingsabout the gods which would quite amaze you.

    Soc. I dare say; and you shall tell me them at someother time when I have leisure. But just at present Iwould rather hear from you a more precise answer,which you have not as yet given, my friend, to thequestion, What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied,Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.

    Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates.Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro; b^t you would admit that

    there are many other pious acts?'Euth. There are.Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two

    or three examples of piety, but to explain the generalidea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do younot recollect that there was one idea which made the

    impious impious, and the pious pious?Euth. I remember.

    Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and thenI shall have a standard to which I may look, and bywhich I may measure actions, whether yours or thoseof any one else, and then I shall be able to say that

  • 8 PLATO

    such and such an action is pious, such another impious.Euth. I will tell you, if you like.

    Soc. I should very much like.Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods,

    and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

    Soc. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given methe sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what

    you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I

    make no doubt that you will prove the truth of yourwords.

    Eutk. Of course.Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are say-

    ing. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is

    pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the

    gods is impious, these two being the extreme oppositesof one another. Was not that said?

    Eutk. It was.

    Soc. And well said?Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so.

    Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admittedto have enmities and hatreds and differences?

    Euth. Yes, that was also said.Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and

    anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my goodfriend, differ about a number; do differences of thissort make us enemies and set us at variance with oneanother? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and putan end to them by a sum?

    Eutk. True.

    Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, dowe not quickly end the differences by measuring?

    Euth. Very true.Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light

    by resorting to a weighing machine?Eutk. To be sure.Soc. But what differences are there which cannot be

  • EUTHYPHRO 9

    thus decided, and which therefore make us angry andset us at enmity with one another? I dare say the

    answer does not occur to you at the moment, and there-fore I will suggest that these enmities arise when thematters of difference are the just and unjust, good and

    evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the

    points about which men differ, and about which whenwe are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences,you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?

    Euth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences

    about which we quarrel is such as you describe.Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro,

    when they occur, are of a like nature?Euth. Certainly they are.

    Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say,about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable anddishonourable: there would have been no quarrelsamong them, if there had been no such differenceswould there how?

    Euth. You are quite right.Soc. Does not each group love that which it deems

    noble and just and good, and hate the opposite, ofthem?

    Euth. Very true.Soc. But, as you say, the same things are regarded by

    some as just and by others as unjust, about these

    they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings

    among them.Euth. Very true.

    Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods andloved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to

    them?

    Euth. True.

    Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro,will be pious and also impious?

    Euth. So I should suppose.

  • 10 PLATO

    Soc. Then, my friend, I remade with surprise that

    you have not answered the question which I asked.

    For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what actionis both pious and impious: but now it would seem that

    what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And

    therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you

    may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but

    disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is ac-

    ceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Hera, and

    there may be other gods who have similar differencesof opinion.

    Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would

    be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer;

    there would be no difference of opinion about that.

    Soc. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did youever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort

    of evil-doer ought to be let off?

    Euth. I should rather say that these are the questions

    which they are always arguing, especially in courts of

    law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is

    nothing which they will not do or say in their owndefence.

    Soc. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and

    yet say that they ought not to be punished?Euth. No; they do not.Soc. Then there are some things which they do not

    venture to say and do: for they do not venture to arguethat the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their

    guilt, do they not?Euth. Yes.

    Soc. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer shouldnot be punished, but they argue about the fact of whothe evil-doer is, and what he did and when?

    Euth. True.

    Soc. And the gods are hi the same case, if as youassert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of

  • EUTHYPHRO 1 1

    them say while others deny that injustice is done

    among them. For surely neither god nor man will everventure to say that the doer of injustice is not to be

    punished?Euth. That is true, Socrates, in the main.Soc. But they join issue about the particulars gods

    and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they disputeabout some act which is called in question, and which

    by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust.Is not that true?

    Euth. Quite true.

    Soc. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tellme, for my better instruction and information, whatproof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a

    servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains

    by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is

    put in chains before he who bound him can learn fromthe interpreters of religion what he ought to do with

    him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an onea son ought to proceed against his father and accusehim of murder. How would you show that all the godsabsolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to methat they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as longas I live.

    Euth. It will be a difficult task; but I could make thematter very clear indeed to you.

    Soc. I understand; you mean to say that I am not soquick of apprehension as the judges: for to them youwill be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful

    to the gods.Euth. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen

    to me.

    Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that

    you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came

    into my mind while you were speaking; I said to my-self: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me

  • 12 PLATO

    that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as

    unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of

    piety and impiety? For granting that this action maybe hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not

    adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which

    is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasingand dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro, 1 do notask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that

    all the gods condemn and abominate such an action.

    But I will amend the definition so far as to say that

    what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love

    pious or holy; and what some of them love and others

    hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of

    piety and impiety?Buth. Why not, Socrates?Soc. Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned,

    Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether thisadmission will greatly assist you in the task of in-

    structing me as you promised, is a matter for you toconsider.

    Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods loveis pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate,impious.

    Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this,Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement onour own authority and that of others? What do yousay?

    Eutk. We should enquire; and I believe that thestatement will stand the test of enquiry.

    Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in alittle while. The point which I should first wish tounderstand is whether the pious or holy is belovedby the gods because it is holy, or holy because it isbeloved of the gods.

    Euth. I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.Soc. I will endeavour to explain: we speak of carry-

  • EUTHYPHRO 13

    ing and we speak of being carried, of leading and beingled, seeing and being seen. You know that in all suchcases there is a difference, and you know also in whatthe difference lies?

    Euth. I think that I understand.

    Soc. And is not that which is beloved distinct fromthat which loves?

    Euth. Certainly.Soc. Well; and now tell me, is that which is earned

    in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for

    some other reason?Euth. No; that is the reason.Soc. And the same is true of what is led and of what

    is seen?

    Euth. True.

    Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but

    conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led

    because it is in the state of being led, or carried because

    it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of

    this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaningwill be intelligible; and my meaning is this: If any-thing becomes or is affected, it does not become becauseit is in a state of becoming: it is in a state of be-

    coming because it becomes; and it is not affected be-

    cause it is in a state of being affected: it is in a state

    of being affected because it is affected. Do you not

    agree?Euth. Yes.

    Soc. Is not that which is loved in some state eitherof becoming or of being affected?

    Euth. Yes.

    Soc. And the same holds as in the previous in-

    stances; the state of being loved follows the act of

    being loved, and not the act the state.

    Euth. Certainly.Soc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is

  • 14 PLATO

    not piety, according to your definition,loved by all the

    gods?Euth. Yes.

    Sac. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other

    reason?

    Eutk. No, that is the reason.

    Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because

    it is loved?

    Eutk. So it seems.

    Soc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved bythem, and is hi a state to be loved of them because it

    is loved of them?

    Eutk. Certainly.Soc. Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro,

    is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of god, as

    you affirm; but they are two different things.Eutk. How do you mean, Socrates?Soc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowl-

    edged by us to be loved because it is holy, not to be

    holy because it is loved.

    Euth. Yes.

    Soc. But that which is dear to the gods is dear tothem because it is loved by them, not loved by thembecause it is dear to them.

    Eutk. True.

    Soc. But then, friend Euthyphro, piety and what isdear to the gods are not identical. If the gods hadloved piety because it is pious, they would also haveloved what is dear to them because it is dear to them;but if what is dear to them had been dear to thembecause they loved it, then piety too would have been

    piety because they loved it. But now you see that thereverse is the case, and that they are quite differentfrom one another. The one is of a kind to be lovedbecause it is loved, and the other is loved because itis of a land to be loved. Thus you appear to me,

  • EUTHYPHRO 15

    Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of

    holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence

    the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But youstill refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness.And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide

    your treasure, but to tell me once more what holinessor piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (forthat is a matter about which we will not quarrel); andwhat is impiety?

    Eutk. I really do not know, Socrates, how to expresswhat I mean. For somehow or other our arguments,on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn roundand walk away from us.

    Soc. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiworkof my ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer orpropounder of them, you might say that my argumentswalk away and will not remain fixed where they are

    placed because I am a descendant of his. But now,since these notions are your own, you must find some

    other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow,show an inclination to be on the move.

    Euth. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the

    Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, cer-

    tainly, but you make them move or go round, for theywould never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

    Soc. Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: forwhereas he only made his own inventions to move, Imove those of other people as well. And the beauty ofit is, that I would rather not. For I would give thewisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, tobe able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enoughof this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myselfendeavor to show you how you might instruct me inthe nature of piety; and I hope that you will not

    grudge your labour. Tell me, then, Is not that which

    is pious necessarily just?

  • 16 PLATO

    Euth. Yes.

    Soc. And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is thatwhich is pious all just, but that which is just, only in

    part and not all, pious?Euth. I do not understand you, Socrates.

    Soc. And yet I know that you are as much wiserthan I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying,revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes

    you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real

    difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I mayexplain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The

    poet (Stasinus) sings

    'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also

    reverence.'

    Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in whatrespect?

    Euth. By all means.Soc. I should not say that where there is fear there

    is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fearpoverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not

    perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.

    Euth. Very true.Soc. But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who

    has a feeling of reverence and shame about the com-mission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill

    reputation.

    Euth. No doubt.Soc. Then we are wrong in saying that where there

    is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, wherethere is reverence there is also fear. But there is not

    always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a moreextended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just

  • EUTHYPHRO 17

    as the odd is a part of number, and number is a moreextended notion than the odd. I suppose that youfollow me now?

    Euth. Quite well.

    Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant toraise when I asked whether the just is always the pious,or the pious always the just; and whether there may notbe justice where there is not piety; for justice is themore extended notion of which piety is only a part.Do you dissent?

    Euth. No, I think that you are quite right.Soc. Now observe what follows. If piety is a part of

    justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part?If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases;for instance, if you had asked me what is an evennumber, and what part of number the even is, I shouldhave had no difficulty in replying, a number which isnot indivisible by two, but divisible by two. Do you notagree?

    Eutk. Yes, I quite agree.Soc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part

    of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tellMeletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for im-piety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in thenature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.

    Euth. To me, Socrates, piety or holiness appears tobe that part of justice which attends to the gods, as

    there is the other part of justice which attends to men.

    Soc. That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little

    point about which I should like to have further in-

    formation, What is the meaning of 'attention*? Forattention can hardly be used in the same sense when

    applied to the gods as when applied to other things.For instance, horses are said to require attention, and

    not every person is able to attend to them, but only a

    person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?

  • 18 PLATO

    Euth. Certainly.Soc. I should suppose that the art of horsemanship

    is the art of attending to horses?

    Euth. Yes.

    Soc. Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but

    only the huntsman?

    Euth. True.

    Soc. And I should also conceive that the art of thehuntsman is the art of attending to dogs?

    Euth. Yes.

    Soc. As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to

    oxen?

    Euth. Very true.

    Soc. In like manner holiness or piety is the art of

    attending to the gods? that would be your meaning,Euthyphro?

    Euth. Yes.

    Soc. And is not attention always designed for the goodor benefit of that to which the attention is given? As inthe case of horses, you may observe that when attendedto by the horseman's art they are benefited and im-

    proved, are they not?

    Euth. True.

    Soc. As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art,and the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other

    things are tended or attended for their good and not fortheir hurt?

    Euth. Certainly, not for their hurtSoc. But for their good?Euth. Of course.Soc. And does piety or holiness, which has been

    defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefitor improve them? Would you say that when you doa holy act you make any of the gods better?Euth. No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.Soc. And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did.

  • EUTHYPHRO 19

    I asked you the question about the nature of the

    attention, because I thought that you did not.

    Euth. You do me justice, Socrates; that is not thesort of attention which I mean.

    Soc. Good: but I must still ask what is this attentionto the gods which is called piety?

    Euth. It is such, Socrates, as servants show to theirmasters.

    Soc. I understand a sort of ministration to the gods.Euth. Exactly.Soc. Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service,

    having in view the attainment of some object would

    you not say of health?

    Euth. I should.

    Soc. Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?

    Euth. Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a

    ship.

    Soc. As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a view to the building of a house?

    Euth. Yes.

    Soc. And now tell me, my good friend, about the artwhich ministers to the gods: what work does that helpto accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say,you are of all men living the one who is best instructedin religion.

    Euth. And I speak the truth, Socrates.Soc. Tell me then, in the name of Zeus, what is that

    fair work which the gods do by the help of our minis-trations?

    Euth. Many and fair, Socrates, are the works whichthey do.

    Soc. Why, my friend, and so are those of a general.But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not saythat victory in war is the chief of them?

    Euth. Certainly.

  • 20 PLATO

    Soc. Many and fair, too, are the works of the hus-

    bandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work isthe production of food from the earth?

    Eutk. Exactly.Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the

    gods, which is the chief or principal one?

    Ruth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn

    all these things accurately is a long labour. Let mesimply say that piety or holiness is learning how toplease the gods in word and deed, by prayers andsacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and

    states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the

    gods, is their ruin and destruction.

    Soc. I think that you could have answered in muchfewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthy-phro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you arenot disposed to instruct me clearly not: else why, whenwe reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you onlyanswered me I should have truly learned of you by thistime the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a ques-tion is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whitherhe leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what isthe pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that theyare a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?Buth. Yes, I do.

    Soc. And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayeris asking of the gods?

    Euth. Yes, Socrates.

    Soc. Upon this view, then, piety is a science of ask-ing and giving?

    Eutk. You understand me capitally, Socrates.Soc. Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary

    of your science, and give my mind to it, and thereforenothing which you say will be thrown away upon me.Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service

  • EUTHYPHRO 21

    to the gods? Do you mean that we ask of them and

    give to them?

    Euth. Yes, I do.

    Soc. Is not the right way of asking to ask of themwhat we want?

    Euth. Certainly.

    Soc. And the right way of giving is to give to themin return what they want of us. There would be no

    meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he

    does not want.

    Euth. Very true, Socrates.

    Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods andmen have of doing business with one another?

    Euth. That is an expression which you may use, if youlike.

    Soc. But I have no particular liking for anything but

    the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me whatbenefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no

    doubt about what they give to us; for there is no goodthing which they do not give; but how we can give anygood thing to them in return is far from being equallyclear. If they give everything and we give nothing, thatmust be an affair of business in which we have verygreatly the advantage of them.

    Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefitaccrues to the gods from our gifts?

    Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of

    gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I

    was just now saying, what pleases them?Soc. Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not bene-

    ficial or dear to them?

    Euth. I should say that nothing could be dearer.

    Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that

    piety is dear to the gods?

  • 22 PLATO

    Eutk. Certainly.Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your

    words not standing firm, but walking away? Will youaccuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk

    away, not perceiving that there is another and far

    greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go roundin a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as youwill perceive, comes round to the same point. Were wenot saying that the holy or pious was not the same withthat which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?

    Euth. I quite remember.

    Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the

    gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to

    them do you see?

    Euth. True.

    Soc. Then either we were wrong in our former asser-

    tion; or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.Euth. So it seems.Soc. Then we must begin again and ask, What is

    piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be wearyof pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you notto scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, andtell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he;and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until youtell. If you had not certainly known the nature of pietyand impiety, I am confident that you would never, onbehalf of a serf, have charged your aged father withmurder. You would not have run such a risk of doingwrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have hadtoo much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure,therefore, that you know the nature of piety and im-piety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do nothide your knowledge.

    Euth. Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry,and must go now.

    Soc. Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in

  • EUTHYPHRO 23

    despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in thenature of piety and impiety; and then I might have

    cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would

    have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthy-phro, and had given up rash innovations and specula-tions, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and

    that now I am about to lead a better life.

  • Apology

    How YOU have been affected by my accusers, menof Athens, I cannot tell; but I know that they almostmade me forget who I was so persuasively did theyspeak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth.But of the many falsehoods told by them, there was onewhich quite amazed me; I mean when they said that

    you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselvesto be deceived because I am clever. To say this, whenthey were certain to be detected as soon as I openedmy lips and proved myself to be anything but a cleverspeaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless un-less by cleverness they mean telling the truth; for if suchis their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But inhow different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying,they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from meyou shall hear the whole truth: not, however, deliveredafter their manner in a set oration duly ornamented withwords and phrases. No, by heaven! But I shall use thewords and arguments which occur to me at the moment;for I am confident that what I say is just. At my timeof life I ought not to be appearing before you, men of

    Athens, hi the character of a juvenile orator let no one

    expect it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me afavour: If I defend myself hi my accustomed manner,and you hear me using the words which I have been inthe habit of using in the agora, at the tables of the

    25

  • 26 PLATO

    money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not

    to be surprised, and not to make a disturbance on this

    account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and

    appearing now for the first time in a court of law, I am

    quite a stranger to the language of the place; and there-

    fore I would have you regard me as if I were really a

    stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in hisnative tongue, and after the fashion of his country:Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind themanner, which may or may not be good; but think onlyof the truth of my words, and give heed to that. That isthe function of a judge, as it is the function of an orator

    to speak the truth.

    First, then, men of Athens, I have to reply to older

    charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go onto recent accusations and accusers. For of old I have had

    many accusers, who have accused me falsely to youduring many years; and I am more afraid of them thanof Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, intheir own way. But far more dangerous are the others,who began when you were children, and took possessionof your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one

    Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about things inthe air and searched into the earth beneath, and madethe worse argument appear the stronger. The dissemina-tors of this tale are the accusers whom I dread; for theirhearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not be-lieve in the existence of the gods. And they are many,and their charges against me are of ancient date, andthey were made by them in the days when you weremore impressible than you are now in childhood, orit may have been in youth and the cause when heardwent by default, for there was none to answer. Andhardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the namesof my accusers; unless in the chance case of a writerof comedies. All who from envy and malice have per-

  • APOLOGY 27

    suaded you-^some of them having first convinced them-selves all this class of men are most difficult to dealwith; for I cannot have them up here, and cross-examine

    them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadowsin my own defence, and argue when there is no onewho answers. I will ask you then to assume with me,as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds; onerecent, the other ancient: and I hope that you will see

    the propriety of my answering the latter first, for theseaccusations you heard long before the others, and muchoftener.

    Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavor toclear away in a short time, a slander which has lasted a

    long time. May I succeed, if to succeed be for my goodand yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! The taskis not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it.And so leaving the event with God, in obedience to thelaw I will now make my defence.

    I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the

    accusation which has given rise to the slander of me,and in fact has encouraged Meletus to prefer this chargeagainst me. Well, what do the slanderers say? Theyshall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their wordsin an affidavit:

    'Socratesjs ,an^vil-doera ,ju^_a bujgy-

    body, who .searchedmjo^fiuigs under the earth and in

    heaven^ and he makes thelvoree"~argument appear the

    stronger^ aliS he "teaches trie afojresaid7 doctrines , to

    others.5

    Such is the nature of the accusation: it is justwhat you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristoph-anes, who has introduced a man whom he calls Soc-rates, going about and saying that he walks in air, and

    talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which

    I do not pretend to know either much or little notthat I mean to speak disparagingly of any one who is astudent of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if

    Meletus could bring so grave a charge against me. But

  • 28 PLATO

    the simple truth is, Athenians, that I have nothing to

    do with physical speculations. Very many of those here

    present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I

    appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell

    your neighbours whether any of you have ever knownme hold forth in few words or in many upon suchmatters. From this you will know that other statements

    commonly made about me are as false as this one.As little foundation is there for the report that I am

    a teacher, and take money; this accusation has no more

    truth in it than the other. Although, if a man were

    really able to instruct mankind, to receive money for

    giving instruction would, in my opinion, be an honourto him. There is Gorgias of Leontini, and Prodicus of

    Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the

    cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leavetheir own citizens by whom they might be taught fornothing, and come to them whom they not only pay,but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them.There is at this time a Parian sage residing in Athens,of whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him inthis way: I came across a man who has spent a worldof money on the Sophists/ Callias, the son of Hipponi-cus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: 'Cal-

    lias,' I said, 'if your two sons were foals or calves, therewould be no difficulty in finding some one to put overthem; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmerprobably, who would improve and perfect them in theirown proper virtue and excellence; but as they are huma^beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them.Is there any one who understands the excellence whicJ*belongs to men and to citizens? You must have thoughtabout the matter, for you have sons; is there any one?'There is,' he said. 'Who is he?' said I; 'and of whatcountry? and what does he charge?' 'Evenus the Parian,'he replied; 'he is the man, and his charge is five minae.'

  • APOLOGY 29

    Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this

    wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate charge. HadI the same, I should have been very proud and con-

    ceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of thekind.

    I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will

    reply, 'Yes, Socrates, but what is the origin of theseaccusations which are brought against you; there must

    have been something strange which you have been do-

    ing? All these rumours and this talk about you would

    never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell

    us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be

    sorry to judge hastily of you.' Now I regard this as afair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to youthe reason why I am called wise and have such an evilfame. Please to attend then. And although some of youmay think that I am joking, I declare that I will tellyou the entire truth.

    Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come ofa certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask mewhat kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as mayperhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am in-clined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons ofwhom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom,which I may fail to describe, because I have it not my-self; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is

    taking away my character. And here, men of Athens,il must beg you not to interrupt with your noise even if

    J seem to be boasting. For the word which I will speak

  • 30 PLATO

    know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and hewent to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell himwhether as I was saying, I must beg you not to inter-

    rupt he asked the oracle to tell him whether any onewas wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess an-

    swered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon isdead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will con-firm the truth of what I am saying.Why do I mention this? Because I am going to ex-

    plain to you why I have such an evil name. When Iheard the answer, I said to myself, What can the godmean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? forI know that I have no wisdom, small or great. Whatthen can he mean when he says that I am the wisestof men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that wouldbe against his nature. After long consideration, I

    thought of a method of trying the question. I reflectedthat if I could only find a man wiser than myself, thenI might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. Ishould say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser thanI am; but you said that I was the wisest.' AccordinglyI went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, andobserved him his name I need not mention; he was apublic figure whom I selected for examination andthe result was as follows: When I began to talk withhim, I could not help thinking that he was not reallywise, although he was thought wise by many, and stillwiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain tohim that he thought himself wise, but was not reallywise; and the consequence was that he hated me, andhis enmity was shared by several who were present andheard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I wentaway: Well, although I do not suppose that either of usknows anything really fine and good, I am better offthan he is, for he knows nothing, and thinks that heknows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this

  • APOLOGY 31

    latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the ad-

    vantage of him. Then I went to another who had still

    higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion wasexactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of

    him, and of many others besides him.Then I went to one man after another, being not un-

    conscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I la-

    mented and feared this: But necessity was laid upon me,the word of the god, I thought, ought to be con-

    sidered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who

    appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle.

    And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!for I must tell you the truth the result of my missionwas just this: I found that the men most in repute wereall but the most foolish; and that others less esteemed

    were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale

    of my wanderings and of the 'Herculean' labours, as Imay call them, which I endured only to find at last theoracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the

    poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, Isaid to myself, you will be instantly detected; now youwill find out that you are more ignorant than they are.

    Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate

    passages in their own writings, and asked what was the

    meaning of them thinking that they would teach mesomething. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamedto confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardlya person present who would not have talked betterabout their poetry than they did themselves. Then Iknew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but bya sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners

    or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but donot understand the meaning of them. The poets ap-peared to me to be much in the same case; and I fur-ther observed that upon the strength of their poetrythey believed themselves to be the wisest of men in

  • 32 PLATO

    other things in which they were not wise. So I departed,

    conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same

    reason that I was superior to the politicians.At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious

    that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was surethat they knew many fine things; and here I was not

    mistaken, for they did know many things of which Iwas ignorant, and Jn this they certainly were wiser than

    I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell

    into the same errors as the poets; because they were

    good workmen they thought that they also knew all sortsof high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed

    their wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf

    of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was,neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or

    like them in both; and I made answer to myself and tothe oracle that I was better off as I was.

    This investigation has led to my having many enemiesof the worst and most dangerous kind, and has givenoccasion also to many calumnies. And I am called a"wise man," for my hearers always imagine that I my-self possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others:but perhaps the truth is, men of Athens, that the god isreally wise; and by his answer he intends to show thatthe wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is notspeaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by wayof illustration, as if he said, He, you human beings, isthe wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdomis in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world,obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry intothe wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger, whoappears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindi-cation of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; andmy occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time togive either to any public matter of interest or to any

  • APOLOGY 33

    concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reasonof my devotion to the god.There is another thing: young men of the richer

    classes, who have not much to do, come about me oftheir own accord; they like to hear the pretenders ex-amined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to

    examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they

    quickly discover, who think that they know something,but really know little or nothing; and then those whoare examined by them instead of being angry withthemselves are angry with me: This confounded Soc-

    rates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth! andthen if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he

    practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell;but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss,they repeat the ready-made charges which are used

    against all philosophers about teaching things up in the

    clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and

    making the worse argument appear the stronger; for

    they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowl-

    edge has been detected which is the truth; and as theyare numerous and ambitious and energetic; they speak

    earnestly and persuasively about me and have filled

    your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. Andthis is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus andAnytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who hasa quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, onbehalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on be-

    half of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning,I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumnyall in a moment. And this, men of Athens, is the truthand the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have

    dissembled nothing. And yet, I know that my plainnessof speech makes them hate me, and what is their

    hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?

  • 34 PLATO,'

    Hence has arisen the prejudice against me; and this

    is the reason of it, as you will find out either in this or

    in any future enquiry.I have said enough in my defence against the first

    class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. Theyare headed by Meletus, that good man and true loverof his country, as he calls himself. Against these, too, I

    must try to make a defence: Let their affidavit beread: it contains something of this kind: It says that

    Socrates is a doer of evil, ytho corrupts the youth; andwho does not believe in the gods of the state, but hasother new divinities of his own. Such is the charge;and now let us examine the particular counts. He saysthat I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth; but Isay, men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, inthat he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest,and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretendedzeal and interest about matters in which he really neverhad the smallest interest. And the truth of this I willendeavour to prove to you.Come here, Meletus, tell me: You think it a matter

    of great importance, do you not, that the young shouldbe as good as possible?

    Yes, I do.

    Come now, tell the gentlemen here who it is who im-proves them. Obviously you know, for [as your namesignifies] you are a man who cares. You have found theman who corrupts them, as you say, and are citing andaccusing me before these gentlemen; speak, then, andtell them further who it is who improves the young.Observe, Meletus, that you are silent and have nothingto say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a veryconsiderable proof of what I was saying, that you havenever really eared? Speak up, friend, and tell us whomakes the young better?

  • APOLOGY 35

    The laws.But that, my good sir, is not my question. I want to

    know who the person is, who, in the first place, knowsthe laws.

    The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.

    What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they areable to instruct and improve the young?

    Certainly they are.

    What, all of them, or some only and not others?All of them.

    By the goddess Hera, that is good news! There are

    plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the

    audience, do they improve them?

    Yes, they do.

    And the senators?Yes, the senators improve them.

    But perhaps the members of the assembly corruptthem? or do they too improve them?

    They improve diem.Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all

    with the exception of myself; and I alone am their cor-rupter? Is that what you affirm?That is what I stoutly affirm.I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose

    I ask you a question: How about horses? Does one mando them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact

    opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good, orat least not many; the trainer of horses, that is to say,does them good, and others who have to do with themrather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses,or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether

    you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would bethe condition of youth if they had one corrupter only,and all the rest of the world were their improvers. But

    you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had

  • 36 PLATO

    a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in

    your not caring about the very things which you bring

    against me.

    And now, Meletus, I will ask you another questionby Zeus I will: Which is better, to live among bad

    citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say;the question is one which may be easily answered. Donot the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do

    them evil?

    Certainly.

    And is there any one who would rather be injuredthan benefited by those who live with him? Answer, mygood friend, the law requires you to answer does anyone like to be injured?

    Certainly not.

    And when you accuse me of corrupting and de-

    teriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them

    intentionally or unintentionally?

    Intentionally, I say.

    But you have just admitted that the good do their

    neighbours good, and evil do them evil. Now, is that atruth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus

    early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness andignorance as not to know that if a man with whom Ihave to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to beharmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and inten-

    tionally, too so you say, although neither I nor anyother human being is ever likely to be convinced byyou. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corruptthem unintentionally; and on either view of the case

    you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has nocognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to havetaken me privately, and warned and admonished me;for if I had been better advised, I should have left off

    doing what I only did unintentionally no doubt I

    should; but you would have nothing to say to me and

  • APOLOGY 37

    refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in thiscourt, which is a place not of instruction, but of punish-ment.

    It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was say-ing, that Meletus has no care at all, great or small,about the matter. But still I should like to know, Mele-

    tus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I sup-pose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I

    teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state

    acknowledges, but some other new divinities of spiritualagencies in their stead. These are the lessons by whichI corrupt the youth, as you say.

    Yes, that I say emphatically.

    Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speak-ing, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms,what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether

    you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some

    gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and amnot an entire atheist this you do not lay to my charge,

    but only you say that they are not the same godswhich the city recognizes the charge is that they are

    different gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheistsimply, and a teacher of atheism?

    I mean the latter that you are a complete atheist.What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think

    so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the

    godhead of the sun or moon, like other men?I assure you, judges, that he does not: for he says that

    the sun is stone, nd the moon earth.Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing

    Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of the

    judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such a degree asnot to know that these doctrines are found in the booksof Anaxagoras the Glazomenian, which are full of them.

    And so, forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them

    by Socrates when they can not infrequently be bought

  • 38 PLATO

    in the theatre for a drachma (if the price is high); they

    might then laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father

    these extraordinary views. But by Zeus, Meletus, do you

    reallythmlc that I do not believe in any god?

    I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none

    at all.

    Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am prettysure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot help

    thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and

    impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a

    spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has henot compounded a riddle, thinking to try me? He saidto himself: I shall see whether the wise Socrates will

    discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I shallbe able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he

    certainly does appear to me to contradict himself inthe indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is

    guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believingin them but this is not like a person who is in earnest.

    I should like you, men of Athens, to join me hi ex-amining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do

    you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audienceof my request that they would not make a disturbanceif I speak in my accustomed manner.Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of

    human things, and not of human beings? ... I wish,men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be al-ways trying to get up an interruption. Did ever anyman believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or influte-playing, and not in flute-players? No, my friend;I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse toanswer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. Butnow please to answer the next question: Can a man be-lieve in divine things and not in divinities?He cannot.

  • APOLOGY 39

    How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, bythe assistance of the court! But then you swear in the

    indictment that I teach and believe in divine things

    (new or old, no matter for that) ; at any rate, I believein things so you say and swear in the affidavit; and

    yet if I believe in divine things, how can I help believ-

    ing in divinities; must I not? To be sure I must; andtherefore I may assume that your silence gives consent.Now do we not say that divinities are either gods orsons of gods? Yes or no?

    Certainly they are.

    Then if I believe in divinities, as you yourself admit,and if the divinities are a kind of gods, that is what I

    call your facetious riddle. You say that I do not believein gods, and then again that I do believe in gods,inasmuch as I believe in divinities. For if the divinities

    are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphsor by any other mothers, of whom they are said to bethe sons what human being will ever believe thatthere are no gods if they are the sons of gods? You

    might as well affirm the existence of mules, and denythat of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could

    only have been intended by you to make trial of me.You have put this into the indictment because you had

    nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who hasa particle of understanding will ever be convinced by

    you that the same men can believe in divine and

    superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are

    gods and demigods and heroes.I have said enough in answer to the charge of

    Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary; but I

    know only too well how many are the enmities whichI have incurred, and this is what will be my destructionif I am destroyed; not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, butthe prejudice and resentment of the world, which has

  • 40 PLATO

    been the death of many good men, and will probablybe the death of many more; there is no danger of mybeing the last of them.

    Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Soc-

    rates, of a course of life which is likely to bring youto an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There

    you are mistaken: a man who is good for anythingought not to calculate the chance of living or dying;he ought only to consider whether in doing anythinghe is doing right or wrong acting the part of a goodman or of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroeswho fell at Troy were not good for much, and the sonof Thetis above all, who altogether despised dangerin comparison with disgrace; and when he was so

    eager to slay Hector, his goddess mother said to him,that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew

    Hector, he would die himself Tate,' she said, inthese or the like words, 'waits for you next after Hector';he, receiving this warning, utterly despised danger and

    death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to livein dishonour, and not to avenge his friend. 'Let medie forthwith,* he replies, 'and be avenged of myenemy, rather than abide here by the beaked ships, a

    laughing-stock and a burden of the earth.' Had Achillesany thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's

    place is, whether the place which he has chosen orthat in which he has been placed by a commander,there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; heshould not think of death or of anything but of dis-

    grace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true saying.Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, men of

    Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generalswhom you chose to command me at Potidaea andAmphipolis and Delium, remained where they placedme, like any other man, facing death if now, when,as I conceive and imagine, the god orders me to fulfil

  • APOLOGY 41

    the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and

    other men, I were to desert my post through fearof death, or any other fear; that would indeed be

    strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for

    denying the existence of. the gods, if I disobeyed the

    oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying that I

    was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of deathis indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom,

    being a pretence of knowing the unknown; and no oneknows whether death, which men in their fear ap-prehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatestgood. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the

    ignorance which is the conceit that man knows whathe does not know? And in this respect only I believemyself to differ from men in general, and may perhapsclaim to be wiser than they are: that whereas I knowbut little of the world below, I do not suppose that

    I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedienceto a better, whether god or man, is evil and dis-

    honourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possiblegood rather than a certain evil.

    And therefore if you let me go now, and are notconvinced by Anytus, who said mat since I had been

    prosecuted I must be put to death (or if not that I

    ought never to have been prosecuted at all); and that

    if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined

    by listening to my words if you say to me, Socrates,this time we will not mind Anytus, and you shall belet off, but upon one condition, that you are not to

    enquire and speculate in this way any more, and thatif you are caught doing so again you shall die; if

    this was the condition on which you let me go, I shouldreply: Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but Ishall obey the god rather than you, and while I have

    life and strength I shall never cease from the practiceand teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom

  • 42 PLATO

    I meet and saying to him after my manner: You, myfriend, a citizen of the great and mighty and wise

    city of Athens, are you not ashamed of heaping upthe greatest amount of money and honour and reputa-

    tion, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and

    the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never

    regard or heed at all? And if the person with whomI am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do notleave him or let him go at once; but I proceed to

    interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and

    if I tfrinV that he has no virtue in him, but only saysthat he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the

    greater, and overvaluing the less. And I shall repeatthe same words to every one whom I meet, young andold, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens,inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that thisis the command of the god; and I believe that no

    greater good has ever happened in the state than myservice to the god. For I do nothing but go about

    persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take

    thought for your persons or your properties, but first

    and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement ofthe soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money,but that from virtue comes money and every other goodof man, public as well as private. This is my teaching,and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth,I am a mischievous person. But if any one says thatthis is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth.Therefore, men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytusbids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not;but whichever you do, understand that I shall neveralter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there

    was an understanding between us that you should hearme to the end: I have something more to say, atwhich you may be inclined to cry out; but I believe

  • APOLOGY 43

    that to hear me will be good for you, and thereforeI beg that you will not cry out. I would have youknow, that if you kill such an one as I am, you will

    injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Nothingwill injure me, not Meletus nor yet Anytus they can-

    not, for a bad man is not permitted to injure a betterthan himself. I do not deny that Anytus may, perhaps,kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him ofcivil rights; and he may imagine, and others mayimagine, that he is inflicting a great injury upon him:but there I do not agree. For the evil of doing ashe is doing the evil of unjustly taking away the lifeof another is greater far.

    And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue formy own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that youmay not sin against the god by condemning me, whoam his gift to you. For if you kill me you will noteasily find a successor to me, who, if I may use sucha ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, givento the state; and the state is a great and noble steed

    who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and

    requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly whichthe god has attached to the state, and all day longand in all places am always fastening upon you,arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You willnot easily find another like me, and therefore I would

    advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feelout of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakenedfrom sleep) , and you think that you might easily strike

    me dead as Anytus advises, and then you would sleepon for the remainder of your lives, unless God in hiscare of you sent you another gadfly. When I say thatI am given to you by the god, the proof of my missionis this: if I had been like other men, I should not

    have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seenthe neglect of them during all these years, and have

  • 44 PLATO

    been doing yours,, coming to you individually like a

    father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue;

    such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature.If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations hadbeen paid, there would have been some sense in mydoing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even the

    impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have everexacted or sought pay of any one; of that they have no

    witness. And I have a sufficient witness to the truth ofwhat I say my poverty.Some one may wonder why I go about in private

    giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of

    others, but do not venture to come forward in publicand advise the state. I will tell you why. You haveheard me speak at sundry times and in divers places ofan oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the divinitywhich Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This sign,which is a kind of voice, first began to come to mewhen I was a child; it always forbids but never com-mands me to do anything which I am going to do.This is what deters me from being a politician. Andrightly, as I think. For I am certain, men of Athens,that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perishedlong ago, and done no good either to you or to myself.And do not be offended at my telling you the truth:for the truth is, that no man who goes to war with youor any other multitude, honestly striving against the

    many lawless and unrighteous deeds which are done ina state, will save his life; he who will fight for theright, if he would live even for a brief spac


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