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Gary Jing 02/16/06 Slide 3CONFIDENTIAL

Problem Solving Process

FMEA and K-T work from the same basicmodel

Kepner-Tregoe Potential Problem Analysis

POTENTIAL

PROBLEM

LIKELY

EFFECT

LIKELY

CAUSE

ACTIONSPREVENTIVECONTINGENT

- ADAPTIVE

-CORRECTIVE

TRIGGER

BB PPA & FMEA


BUMP HEAD

WALK INTO DOOR

PAINCANT SEE

GET GLASSES WEAR HELMET

REMOVE DOORS

LIKELY

CAUSE

POTENTIAL

PROBLEM

LIKELY

EFFECT

ACTIONSPREVENTIVE

CONTINGENT

- ADAPTIVE

-CORRECTIVE

Initial Problem

TRIGGER

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BUMP HEAD

WALK INTO DOOR

PAINCANT SEE

GET GLASSES WEAR HELMET

REMOVE DOORS

LIKELY

CAUSE

POTENTIAL

PROBLEM

LIKELY

EFFECT

ACTIONSPREVENTIVE

CONTINGENT

- ADAPTIVE

-CORRECTIVE

TRIGGER

CAUSE BECOMES

NEW PROBLEM

PROBLEM

BECOMES EFFECT

1st WHY

BB PPA & FMEA


BUMP HEAD

WALK INTO

DOOR AND

PAIN

CANT SEE

SURGERY

LIKELY

CAUSE

POTENTIAL

PROBLEM

LIKELY

EFFECT

ACTIONSPREVENTIVE

CONTINGENT

- ADAPTIVE

-CORRECTIVE

TRIGGER

GET GLASSES

NEAR

SIGHTED

1st WHY

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BUMP HEAD

WALK INTO

DOOR AND

PAIN

CANT SEE

SURGERY

LIKELY

CAUSE

POTENTIAL

PROBLEM

LIKELY

EFFECT

ACTIONSPREVENTIVE

CONTINGENT

- ADAPTIVE

-CORRECTIVE

TRIGGER

GET GLASSES

NEAR

SIGHTED

2nd WHY

BB PPA & FMEA


BUMP HEAD

WALK INTO

DOOR AND

PAIN

CANT SEE

SURGERY

LIKELY

CAUSE

POTENTIAL

PROBLEM

LIKELY

EFFECT

ACTIONSPREVENTIVE

CONTINGENT

- ADAPTIVE

-CORRECTIVE

TRIGGER

NEAR

SIGHTED

CUT OUT

STAR TREK

TOO MUCH

T.V.

HAVE WE FOUND ROOT CAUSE?

2nd WHY

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BUMP HEAD

WALK INTO

DOOR AND

PAIN

CANT SEE

SURGERY

LIKELY

CAUSE

POTENTIALPROBLEM

LIKELY

EFFECT

ACTIONSPREVENTIVE

CONTINGENT

- ADAPTIVE

-CORRECTIVE

NEAR

SIGHTED

CUT OUT

STAR TREK

TOO MUCH

T.V.

OR GONE TOO FAR !

2nd WHY

TRIGGER

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Determining Level of Analysis

POWER

GAGE

DESIGN

HANDLING

SET-UP

CONTAMINATION

TOOLING

OPERATOR ERROR

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

POWER

GAGE

DESIGN

HANDLING

SET-UP

CONTAMINATION

TOOLING

OPERATOR ERROR

Whats Wrong with This Picture?

NUMBER OF PROCESS FAILURE CAUSES

Too general. May need

to further drill down.

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PPA Definition

Potential Process Analysis is a systematic process

for uncovering and dealing with potential problems

that are reasonably likely to occur and therefore

worthy of attention

PPA can be applied to a project plan or to a

transactional process to determine areas of potential

problem and risk.

The New Rational Manager, Charles Kepner, Benjamin Tregoe, Princeton Research Press, 1981

BB PPA & FMEA


Form

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMSACTIVITY:

PLAN/ACTIONS

/TASKS

POTENTIAL

PROBLEMSEFFECTS LIKELY CAUSES SEV OCC

PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

CONTINGENT

ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FOR

CONTINGENT

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Identifying Specif ic Potential Problems

Be specific

Problem may be toobroad and need anarrower focus

Problem with delivery

What about delivery -late, early, damaged,wrong count, etc.

Describe problems sothat they can be

addressed independently

WHAT

EXTENT

WHERE

WHEN

BB PPA & FMEA


Identifying Likely Causes

AndAnd PreventivePreventiveActionsActions

Effect of a preventive action:

remove, partially or totally, the likely cause of apotential problem

Effect of a contingent action:

reduce the impact of a problem that cannot be

prevented

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Sphere of Influence

Consider:

Sphere of influence

Span of Control

Some problems liewithin the teams /process owners control,some do not

SPHERE OF INFLUENCE(Influence or persuasion only)

SPAN OF CONTROL(Full authority)

BB PPA & FMEA



PLAN/ACTIONS

/TASKS

POTENTIAL

PROBLEMSEFFECTS LIKELY CAUSES

S

E

V

O

C

C

PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

CONTINGENT

ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FOR

CONTINGENT

ACTION

PPA Steps

This is a chronological list of tasks or

project steps showing the risk

(vulnerable) areas.

A risk area is:

- anything never done before

- overlapping responsibility or authority

- tight deadlines

- activities carried out at long distance.

describes the WHAT, WHERE, WHEN

and EXTENT of individual items and

timing for each step in plan

This column most likely to go wrong

within the area of risk. Anticipates

possible deviations from intended

target.

Ask what should happen and then

what could happen or go wrong.

Be specific but avoid in-depth

explanation.

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PLAN/ACTIONS

/TASKS

POTENTIAL


SE

V

OC

C

PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

CONTINGENT

ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FORCONTINGENT

ACTION

PPA Steps

This is what the customer of end user

sees as symptoms. It is the

consequence of the failure on the next

process, operation, product, customer,

etc.

Answers "What does the customer

experience as a result of the problem?"

Identify factors which could create or

cause the anticipated problem.

Use imagination, experience, and

logic to help you determine likely

causes.

Additional tools such as cause-effect

diagram or affinity diagram may be

helpful in isolating causes.

Several causes may exist for each

potential problem.

BB PPA & FMEA



PLAN/ACTIONS

/TASKS

POTENTIAL


S

E

V

O

C

C

PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

CONTINGENT

ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FOR

CONTINGENT

ACTION

PPA Steps

Assess threat in terms of severity and

likelihood, or occurrence.

Use HIGH, MED or LOW.

Or number scale ie. 1 10.

Preventive actions work on the

CAUSES.

Determine ways to keep likely causes

from creating potential problems.

List previous actions which are

feasible, and practical.

A preventive action can address one

or more causes.

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PLAN/ACTIONS

/TASKS

POTENTIAL


SE

V

OC

C

PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

CONTINGENT

ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FORCONTINGENT

ACTION

PPA Steps

Contingent actions reduce likely

EFFECTS. They are to minimize the

impact of a potential problem should it

occur.

Establishes a feedback that indicates

that a potential problem has occurred.

Its purpose is to activate a contingent

action.

Triggers should be automatic if

possible and include:

- how the problem will be spotted

- how the contingent action will be set

in motion.

BB PPA & FMEA


When to Use PPA

PPA is a simplified version of FMEA suitable forbusiness processes

Use PPA whenever experience and gut feeling saythat something could go wrong in the future.

PPA enables a person to make full use of his or herexperience.

Merely being able to remember a thousand horror

stories is of no use unless that body of informationcan be used to prevent more

Kepner-Tregoe

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Actions

The design or process must beimproved based on the results ofthe FMEA or PPA study.

A well-developed FMEA or PPA will be of

limited value without positive and effective

corrective actions.

BB PPA & FMEA


PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ACTIVITY: Inventory Accuracy

P LA NS /A CT IO NS /T AS KS P OT ENT IA L PRO BLE MS E FF ECT S LI KE LY C AUS ES S EV OCC P RE VE NT IV E A CTI ONS CO NT INGE NT A CT IONSTRIGGERS FOR

CONTINGENT ACTION

$267,753 32%

Perform cycle countsdaily.

High Dollar adjustmentsas it relates to frequency& consumption

$176,834 21%High Dollar adjustmentsas it relates to frequency

$158,438 19%High Dollar adjustmentsas it relates to frequency

$141,315 17%Complete transactions ina timely manner.

High Dollar adjustmentsas it relates to frequency

(Returns from completedwork orders)

Inaccurate adjustments$70,144 8%

High Dollar adjustmentsas it relates to frequency

Inventory is not accuratebecause of a poor count

Single out the wantedadjustment before adifferent tracking /reporting system is inplace

Actual us e ofinventory and notransactioncompleted to relieveinventory

Inaccurate Count

Period End Adjustments

Correct Inventory

Planned adjustments

Correct Transactions

Adjustments made afterdoing a period endphysical count

Many variables increasethe chance of aninaccurate count.

Current practicedoes not allow for aclean break in Workin process &available inventory

Adjustments are made inSAP to correct inventorythat was not initiallyentered correctly

Inventory is skewed andrequirements are notaccurate

Perform cycle counts toassure accurate materialflow.

Can not complete anwork order.

Adjustments made after aproblem occurs. (Materialissue initiates a count)

Reusable packaging isintended adjustment, butis treated as unwanted.

Skew the magnitude ofthe adjustment problem

The current businesspractice doesn'tseparate the wantedfrom unwanted.

Started to separatelyaccount wanted fromunwanted.

The variables of openwork orders increasethe chance of acounting error

Put the 1st operation onthe work order as pickcomponents andbackflush. Discreteissue components


Inventory should havebeen entered using adifferent (correct)transaction.

Example AGB project : PPA Inventory Accuracy

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ACTIVITY: Inventory Accuracy

P LA NS /A CT IO NS /T AS KS P OT ENT IA L PRO BLE MS E FF ECT S LI KE LY C AUS ES S EV OCC P RE VE NT IV E ACTI ONS CO NT INGE NT A CT IONSEASINESS TO

TACKLE

$267,753 32%

Perform cycle countsdaily.

Difficult

$176,834 21%Moderate

$158,438 19%Easy

$141,315 17%Complete transactions ina timely manner.

Moderate

(Returns from completedwork orders)

Inaccurate adjustments$70,144 8%

Difficult

Incorrect Transactions

Inventory is not accuratebecause of a poor count

Single out the wantedadjustment before adifferent tracking /reporting system is inplace

Actual us e ofinventory and notransactioncompleted to relieveinventory

Inaccurate Count

Perform cycle counts toassure accurate materialflow.

Started to separatelyaccount wanted fromunwanted.

The variables of openwork orders increasethe chance of acounting error


Skew the magnitude ofthe adjustment problem

The current businesspractice doesn'tseparate the wantedfrom unwanted.

Period End Adjustments

Correct Inventory

Planned adjustments


Inventory should havebeen entered using adifferent (correct)transaction.

Adjustments made afterdoing a period endphysical count

Many variables increasethe chance of aninaccurate count.

Current practicedoes not allow for aclean break in Workin process &available inventory

Adjustments are made inSAP to correct inventorythat was not initiallyentered correctly

Inventory is skewed andrequirements are notaccurate

Can not complete anwork order.

Adjustments made after aproblem occurs. (Materialissue initiates a count)

Reusable packaging isintended adjustment, butis treated as unwanted.

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ANAL YZE PHASE CONCLUSIONS

Measurement Grid - AGB Project, Potting Leaks

Measur

e No. Measurement Issue

Interdependence

Between

Measurements Additional Comments Plan Results

1 Strength of 5 minute epoxy on Grommet. 5, 7

Epoxy needed? Use one-part epoxy or

sealant? Out gassing an issue.

Test for strength andleaking.

Sandy will build 10 when the

newgrommet comes in appox.

8/12/05 if needed. Epoxy not neededwith newgrommet.

2

Clearance height requirement within

flowcover. 3, 4, 5,

Helen will measure wire

clearance

3

Ability to solder wires with varied

conductor lengths.

Move cable depth during soldering?

Heat shrink a benefit? No change

Ran 20 test units, wires didn't

interfer with the sensors on the

flowmeter.

4

Height of potting required. Min, Max.

Nominal andVariability by operator.

Boardheight reducedwith el imination

of RTV?

Helen measure existing potting

height on 50 covers/ Complete.

5 Affects of eliminating RTV. 7 Leak potential

6

cover. Min, Max., Nominal and

Variability by operator. 9

Opportunity for a fixture to firmly

establish the length? Helen/Sandy Determinedto be 1 in.

7

Leak potential with the smaller

grommet. Water test with coldandhot water? Mike- Complete 7/19/05 No leak aroundcable.

8

Height of the cable jacket within the

cover to remain above the potting. Min,

Max. Nominal andVariability by

operator. 6, 4, 3, 2 Test with existing cable jacket length. Helen/Sandy

We dida GR& Ron the jacket

length of the cable to determine the

it is the same. Determinedthat it is

consistant andhadthe cable extend1

in. out of the cover on the test units .

9

Connecting IFCcover cable length

requirements andoptions. 6

Extendthe cable allowing less

protrusion of the flowmeter cover

cable?

Is current cable length usable

with the flowmeter cable being

shorter.

Measuredunits in inventory, the

cable length in the cover is

consistantly 6 5/16 in. long. Using

the test units on a IFC, we were able

to plug in the cables with out any

issues.

10

Look at a 1 part epoxy for aroundthe

cable If needed Mike - Locktite Rep. Not neededwith the newgrommet.

11 Potting Process

Lock down boardwith stop-lock prior

to potting topof board.

Sandy, Try different ways of

potting to helpstandardize the

process.

Example AGB project: Pott ing Leaks

BB PPA & FMEA


FMEA

Describe FMEA principles and techniques Summarize the concepts, definitions,

application options and relationships withother tools

Perform a FMEA

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Background

Developed in the early 60s by NASA

to fail-proof Apollo missions.

Adopted in early 70s by US Navy .

By late 80s, automotive industry had

implemented FMEA and began

requiring suppliers do the same.

Liability costs were the main driving

force.

Used sporadically throughoutindustry during 1980s.

BB PPA & FMEA


Definition of FMEA

1. Identify and prevent potential problems in anew system

2. Prioritize action to attack causes in our rootcause analysis

3. Document the project teams thinking process

FMEA is a systematic evaluation procedure

whose purpose is to:

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Benefit of FMEA

After root cause analysis, you will have

numerous causes that need to be

investigated

Which one do you pick first?

Why do you pick that one?

BB PPA & FMEA


Process FMEA Form

Process Name:

Responsible:

Process Step /

InputPotent ia l Fai lure Mode Potent ia l Fai lure Effects

S

E

V

Potential Causes

O

C

C

Current Controls

D

E

T

R

P

N

Actions

RecommendedResp.

What is the

process step/

Input under

investigation?

In what ways does the Key

Input go wrong?

What is the impact on the

Key Output Variables

(Customer Requirements) or

internal requirements?

How

Severeistheeffecttothe

customer? What causes the Key Input to

go wrong?

How

oftendoescauseorFMo

ccur? What are the existing controls

and procedures (inspection and

test) that prevent either the cause

or the Failure Mode? Should

include an SOP number.

HowwellcanyoudetectcauseorFM? What are the actions

for reducing the

occurrence ofthe

Cause, or improving

detection? Should

have actions only on

high RPN's or easy

fixes.

Who Is

Responsible

for the

recommende

d action?

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Prepared by:

FMEA Date

(Orig)

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Failure to perform a defined function

Something occurring that you don'texpect, or want

Wrong application

A Failure Mode is . . .

BB PPA & FMEA


Risk Priority Number

SEVERITY of the effect

As it applies to the effects on the local system, nextlevel, and end user.

Scale of 1 (least severe) to 10 (most severe)

OCCURRENCE frequency of the cause

Likelihood that a specific cause will occur and result in aspecific failure mode

Scale of 1 (least often) to 10 (most often)

DETECTION system for spotting the failure

Ability of the current / proposed control mechanism todetect and identify the failure mode

Scale of 10 (no detection) to 1 (good detection)

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Generation of a Risk Priority Number

RPN = O x S x D

Occurrence x

Severity x

Detection

BB PPA & FMEA


Risk Priority Number

With this number we can now prioritize the causes to tacklefirst

Others

Policy

Assig

nment

Discip

line

50239171716855680

0.65.122.272.1

100.099.494.372.1

80000

70000

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

100

80

60

40

20

0

Adjus tme nt

CausesCountPercentCum %

Percent

Count

Adjus tment causes - 12 pay p eriods

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Process

1. Assemble team2. Complete Failure Mode column and Cause column by using

primary causes on the root cause analysis

3. For each failure mode list the effect

4. List control systems for each failure mode in place today todetect the failure mode

5. Score Severity column through team consensus (1-10)

6. Score Occurrence column by reaching a team consensus (1-10)

7. Score Detection column through team consensus (10-1)

8. Calculate your RPN

9. Draw your Pareto Chart and identify 80% to carry over toanalyze

BB PPA & FMEA


Levels of FMEA

It is important to realize that an FMEA can be applied tocauses further down the root cause tree to further refinethe KPIV list for analyze

This is very applicable in large projects and is a way oftasking out smaller projects to Green Belts

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Example FMEA

Process Step / Input Potent ial Failure Mode Potential Failure Effects

S

E

V

Potential Causes

O

C

C

Current Controls

D

E

T

R

P

N

What is the process

step/ Input under

investigation?

In what ways does the Key

Input go wrong?

What is the impact on the

Key Output Variables

(Customer Requirements) or

internal requirements?

How

Severeis

theeffect

tothecustomer?

What causes the Key Input to

go wrong?

How

oftendoescauseor

FMo

ccur?

What are the existing controls

and procedures (inspection

and test) that prevent either

the cause or the Failure

Mode? Should include an

SOP number.

How

wellcan

youdetect

causeorFM?

Assemble isolator

into flow body

m is si ng i s ol at or C on ta mi na te s c us to me r

processes

8 operator does not install

isolator

1 Isolator Burn-in process 10 80

missing o-ring fails to calibrate 8 operator does not install o-ring 1 Isolator Burn-in process 1 8

retaining ring improperly

torqued

fai ls t o c al ibra te 8 op era to r d oe s no t t orq ue

retaining ring


fails leak test 8 operator does not torque

retaining ring


sensor uns table, dri ft y 8 operator does not torque

retaining ring

2 Isolator Burn-in process

Characterize test

5 80

Connect units to

pressure fittings

L oo se c on ne ct io n f ai ls l ea k t es t 8 O pe ra to r d oe s n ot p ro pe rl y

secure fittings


Tight connection (Strip

fitting)

fails leak test 8 Operator over tightens fittings 1 Isolator Burn-in process 2 16

C ro ss th re ad in g t he fi tt in g f ai ls le ak te st 8 O pe ra to r d oe s n ot pr op er ly

secure fittings


Load Units Into Oven Dropped units Fails calibration 8 Operator drops unit 1 Isolator Burn-in process 1 8

Dropped units damage to fitting 8 Operator drops unit 1 Isolator Burn-in process 1 8

Dropped units Cosmetic damage to fitting 8 Operator drops unit 1 Isolator Burn-in process 5 40

Connect Air Inlet To

Pressure Fitting

L oo se c on ne ct io n f ai ls l ea k t es t 8 O pe ra to r d oe s n ot p ro pe rl y

secure fittings


Tight connection (Strip

fitting)

fails leak test 8 Operator over tightens fittings 1 Isolator Burn-in process 2 16

C ro ss th re ad in g t he fi tt in g f ai ls le ak te st 8 O pe ra to r d oe s n ot pr op er ly

secure fittings


Damaged inlet hose fails leak test 8 Over use 4 Opeator training 1 32

Apply Air Pressure Low/No air pressure Leaks may not be found 8 Tank pressure is low 1 Isolator Burn-in process 1 8

Low/No air pressure mid

burnin cycle

Unit may fail leak check 8 Leak in system 1 Equip maintenance 10 80

AGB project: Isolator Burn-In Time Reduction

BB PPA & FMEA


Example FMEA / PPA for High Impact

Causes

Expected

biggest

gain

High

priority

failures

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FMEA Exercise

Conduct an FMEA for setting

up and firing the catapult.

Perform an FMEA on the

catapult in groups of 5 or

less.

45 minutes followed by a 5

minute presentation by

selected groups during

which the instructor asks

questions and discusses

some of the subtleties ofFMEA.

BB PPA & FMEA


Recap

Introduce Potential Problem Analysis (PPA) Introduce FMEA

Describe FMEA principles and techniques Summarize the concepts, definitions, application

options and relationships with other tools

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