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WATER FUTURES:ASSESSMENT OF LONG-RANGEPATTERNS AND PROBLEMS

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: PAUL RASKINCONTRIBUTORS: PETER OLEICK, PAUL KIRSHEN,GIL PONTIUS A N D KENNETH STRZEPEK

Stockholm Environment InstituteBox 2142

S-103 14 StockholmSweden

Tel +46 8 723 0260Fax +46 8 723 0348

Responsible Editor, Karin HultcrantzCopy and Layout, Karin HultcrantzStockholm Environment Institute

© Copyright 1997 by the Stockholm Environment InstituteNo part of this report may be reproduced in any form by photostat, microfilm, or any other means, without

written permission from the publisher.

ISBN: 91 88714 45 4

Ill

FOREWORDA rapidly growing demand on freshwater resources, resulting in increased waterstress in several parts of the world, increasing pollution of freshwater resourcesand degraded ecosystems, made the UN Commission for SustainableDevelopment in 1994 call for a Comprehensive Assessment of the FreshwaterResources of the World. The final report (E/CN. 17/1997/9), prepared by aSteering Committee consisting of representatives for UN/DPCSD, FAO, UNEP,WMO, UNESCO, WHO, UNDP, UNIDO, the World Bank, and StockholmEnvironment Institute, is presented to the CSD 1997 and to the UN GeneralAssembly Special Session June 1997.

Within the process of the Assessment a number of background documentsand commissioned papers were prepared by experts with various professionalbackground. The document Water Futures: Assessment of Long-Range Patternsand Problems is one of these. As a scientifically based document, any opinionexpressed is that of the author(s) and does not necessarily reflect the opinion ofthe Steering Committee.

Stockholm, June 1997

Gunilla BjorklundExecutive secretaryComprehensive Freshwater Assessment

ABSTRACTWater requirements to the year 2025 at regional and national levels are examinedin order to assess emerging problems of stress on freshwater resources. Long-range water patterns will be governed by such future factors as population,economic scale and structure, technology, consumption patterns, agriculturalpractices and policy approaches. This study focuses on Conventional DevelopmentScenarios which are driven by: 1) commonly used demographic and economicprojections, 2) a convergence hypothesis that developing region consumption andproduction practices will evolve gradually in a globalizing economy toward thoseof industrialized regions, 3) an assumption of gradual technological advancewithout major surprises, and 4) the absence of major policy changes affectingwater needs or use.

The scenarios show a rapid increase in water requirements, especially indeveloping regions. Several indices are introduced for assessing the level of futurewater vulnerability at the country level. These include the use-to-resource ratio, agauge of average overall pressure on water resources and threats to aquaticecosystems; coefficient of variation of precipitation, a measure of hydrologicalfluctuations; storageto-flow ratio, an indicator of the capacity of infrastructure tomute such fluctuation; and import dependence, an index of reliance on inflowsfrom contiguous countries. To supplement these physical indices of vulnerability,a socio-economic coping capacity index {average future per capita income)represents a country's ability to endure emerging water problems anduncertainties. Together, the indices are used to signal changing water vulnerabilityfor each country as the scenarios unfold. The information is capsulated in a seriesof "water stress" maps.

The Conventional Development Scenarios are not predictions. Their poweris to reveal the consequences of common assumptions about the future and of

IV

policy complacency. We learn that such scenarios would bring a continuingdeterioration of water conditions in those areas that are already water scarce, andan extension of new water stress conditions in many places throughout the world.Conventional Development Scenarios do not represent a satisfactory future whenjudged on sustainable development criteria. However they are not inevitable. It issuggested how we might envision more sustainable and desirable futures, and actto achieve them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. CONTEXT AND GENERAL CONCEPTS 11.1 Purpose 11.2 A Systems Perspective 11.3 The Scenario Approach 5

2. SCENARIOS OF WATER DEVELOPMENT 82.1 Driving Forces 82.2 A Conventional Development Scenario for Water 112.3 Regionalization 122.4 Demographic and Economic Assumptions 132.5 Summary of Scenario Results 16

3. FUTURE WATER STRESS AND VULNERABILITY 223.1 Evaluation Indices 223.2 Data Sources 253.3 Evaluation of Future Water Problems 26

4. TOWARDS WATER SUSTAINABILITY 404.1 Policy Considerations 404.2 The Transition to Water Sustainability: A Vision 42

REFERENCES 48

APPENDIX 1: Current Data 51APPENDIX 2: Scenario Results for 2025 56APPENDIX 3: Stress Indices by Country 61APPENDIX 4: Composite Indices by Country 66APPENDIX 5: Notes on Conventional Development Scenario

Assumptions 71

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The Socio-Ecological System 3Figure 2. Global Linkages 3Figure 3. Driving Forces, Attractors, Sideswipes 7Figure 4. Global Water Withdrawal by Region, 1995-2025 19Figure 5. Water Withdrawal by Region and Sector in 1995 20Figure 6. Water Withdrawal by Region and Sector in 2025 CDS Mid-range

Case 20Figure 7. Reliability Index by Region for 1995:

Population in Each Classification 29Figure 8. Reliability Index by Region for 2025:

Population in Each Classification 29Figure 9. Use-to-Resource Index by Region for 1995:

Population in Each Classification 30Figure 10. Use-to-Resource Index by Region for 2025:

Population in Each Classification 30Figure 11. Coping Index by Region for 1995: Population in Each

Classification 31

VI

Figure 12. Coping Index by Region for 2025: Population in EachClassification 31

Figure 13. Water Resources Vulnerability Index I by Regionfor 1995: Population in Each Classification 34

Figure 14. Water Resources Vulnerability Index I by Regionfor 2025: Population in Each Classification 34

Figure 15. Water Resources Vulnerability Index II by Regionfor 1995: Population in Each Classification 35

Figure 16. Water Resources Vulnerability Index II byRegion for 2025: Population in Each Classification 35

Figure 17. Reliability Index for 2025 37Figure 18. Use-to-Resource Index for 2025 38Figure 19. Coping Capacity Index for 2025 38Figure 20. Water Resources Vulnerability Index I for 2025 39Figure 21. Water Resources Vulnerability Index II for 2025 39Figure 22. Domestic Intensities in the CDS 72Figure 23. Domestic Withdrawals in the CDS 72Figure 24. Manufacturing Water Intensities in the CDS 73Figure 25. Manufacturing Withdrawals in the CDS 74Figure 26. Cropping Intensities in the CDS 76Figure 27. Yield Response to Water and Non-Water Inputs 76Figure 28. Irrigation Water Intensities in the CDS 77Figure 29. Irrigation Water Withdrawals in the CDS 77

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Regional Structure 13Table 2. Population Projections (Millions) 14Table 3. GDP Projections (Billions US $1990) 16Table 4. GDP per Capita Projections (US $1990) 16Table 5. GDP and Water Intensity by Region in 2025 18Table 6. Global Water Projections 21Table 7. Stress Classification Distribution by Country and Population 28Table 8. Composite Index Distribution by Country and Population 33Table 9. Irrigated Land Area in the CDS (million hectares) 75

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 1

1. CONTEXT AND GENERAL CONCEPTS

1.1 PurposeAt its Second Session in 1994, the United Nations Commission on SustainableDevelopment (CSD) called for a comprehensive assessment of current and futurefreshwater resources, needs and problems. The Stockholm Environment Institute(SEI) was commissioned by the Swedish Government to assume the Swedishresponsibilities for preparing the assessment together with United Nationsorganizations. A Steering Committee for the Comprehensive Freshwater Assessment(referred to below as CFA) was established with representatives from SEI andrelevant United Nations organizations (the ACC Subcommittee on Water Resources,FAO, UNEP, WMO, UNESCO, WHO, UNDP, UNIDO, and the World Bank).

The CFA will submit a report for submission to the CSD and ultimately to theUN General Assembly. The report will be organized into four chapters:

1. A statement explaining the need for such an assessment;2. A description of the availability, quality and variability of freshwater

resources of the world and the use to which they are put at present;3. An investigation of current and future water needs and the problems

that must be faced at the global, regional and national levels;4. Strategies and options for the sustainable development of freshwater

resources of the world.

This document provides background information and analysis for Chapter 3 on waterneeds and problems. The focus is on emerging water problems to the year 2025.

Toward this end, the remainder of Part I of this document describes aconceptual framework for exploring long-range water issues. Part II examines abaseline Conventional Development Scenario, and reports a range of regional andglobal water withdrawal requirements for the year 2025. Part III considers theimplication of the scenario at the national level by introducing water stress andvulnerability indices, and applying them to identify current and emerging waterproblems. Finally Part IV discusses strategic implications, and sketches a vision of awater future offering a more positive alternative to conventional developmentscenarios.

1.2 A Systems PerspectiveWater plays a complex and multifaceted role in both human activities and naturalsystems. Consequently, an analytic framework for the comprehensive assessment ofwater issues must understand water uses and resources as embedded in widerecological and development processes. Two broad concepts critical to ourconsideration of long range water issues are sustainability and socio-ecologicalsystems.

At the 1992 Earth Summit, the nations of the world acknowledged that a newdevelopment model was needed for reconciling social, economic and environmentalgoals at global, national and local levels. Sustainable development would seek to

1The discussion is based on Raskin et al. (1996).

Raskin

provide for the people of today while protecting the quality of natural resources andecosystems for future generations.

Given the breadth of this new concept, it is not surprising that the termsustainable development has been used in a variety of ways (Lele, 1991). This isespecially the case since the concept has normative aspects. Indeed, a basic principleof sustainability — the call to protect ecological systems for future generations — is anethical appeal. Definitions of sustainability to some degree reflect the values of thoseusing them — a banker can speak of sustainable economic growth, anenvironmentalist can stress the idea of the intrinsic value of nature, or a socialreformer can insist that sustainability embrace the goals of social justice and povertyeradication.

To develop the sustainability concept further, it is useful to introduce thenotion of the socio-ecological system. As illustrated in Figure 1, the socio-ecologicalsystem is comprised of economic, social and ecological subsystems and theirinteractions (Shaw et al., 1991; Gallopin, 1994). The economic system includescapital, production and labor; the social subsystem includes consumption patterns,demographics and culture; and the ecological subsystem includes ecosystems, naturalresources and biophysical processes. Socio-ecological systems defined at river basin,national, regional and global scales interact through cultural influence, environmentalimpacts, transnational corporate and financial institutions, trade, global governance,etc. (see Figure 2).

In the broadest sense, sustainability refers to the capacity for socio-ecologicalsystems to persist unimpaired into the future. This by no means implies stasis — animpossibility in complex and dynamic systems — but rather the capacity to adapt anddevelop. A sustainable system is resilient in the face of extreme perturbations andflexible in responding to changing circumstances. Sustainability as a process ofdevelopment, not a final state, has ecological, social and economic dimensions. Whileit is difficult to define that process precisely, it is less difficult to identifyunsustainability, patterns that place the socio-ecological system at risk of devolutionand collapse.

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems

SocietyPopulationLifestyleCultureSocial Organization

EconomyAgricultureHouseholdsIndustryTransportServices

Environment Natura ResourcesAtmosphereHydrosphereLithosphereBiosphere

Figure 1. The Socio-Ecological System

EnvironmentTransnational Institutions and Trade

MigrationCulture

Geopolitics and Governance

Figure 2. Global Linkages

Raskin

It is useful to separate two dimensions of the sustainability problem —biophysical and socio-economic. In biophysical terms, sustainability implies themaintenance of ecosystems, bio-geochemical cycles, and the natural resource base atlevels that maintain the functional and structural integrity of natural systems. Thismeans that they can continue to support human material well-being, provideecological services and preserve the natural heritage for human appreciation. Beyondthese pragmatic goals, many would add as an ethical imperative that the protection ofthe biosphere is a valid end-in-itself. Biophysical sustainability requires that humanactivity not destroy the regenerative capacity of natural capital or irreversibly stressatmospheric, hydrological or terrestrial ecosystems with waste and pollution.

Sustainable development, from a biophysical perspective, puts focus onreducing the throughput — flows of materials and energy into and waste out ofproduction and consumption activities — toward levels that are within renewableresource flows and assimilative capacities of ecosystems. Sustainability implies livingon natural "interest", not unduly drawing down natural capital. Throughput levels, inturn, are dependent on consumption patterns, population levels, productiontechnologies, land-use management and other factors that determine the requirementsfor virgin materials and pollution loads. In one sense, the problem of sustainability isthe conflict between rising throughput rates, driven by growing economies, and finitebiospheric capacities.

In addition to the issue of the scale of biophysical impacts, there are criticalsocio-economic aspects of sustainability. The notion of social sustainability callsattention to the level and quality of stability, social cohesion and solidarity in society.To the degree that distributional equity, political participation, and access toeducation and health services are perceived to be acceptable, a social system willenjoy the commitment, loyalty and affiliation of its participants, and be prepared torespond better to changing endogenous and exogenous circumstances. At the otherextreme, a system which is inequitable and coercive tends to be more rigid, prone toconflict and less able to adapt gently to internal or external disturbances.

Finally, economic development may be a precondition for a transition tosustainability. The wide adoption of sustainability principles will require thateconomic systems and distribution patterns provide basic human needs, reliablelivelihoods and freedom from drudgery. Desperate people often focus on immediatesurvival questions, and discount the long range value of ecological preservation. Theeconomic development of poor countries and communities to meet these goals iscritical to sustainability. Rich countries and communities also have a developmentchallenge — the transformation of the model for development from ever-increasinggrowth in consumption, to a culture of material sufficiency and the growth of qualityvalues through, for example, the resurrection of stronger community ties, moremeaningful leisure activities and greater regard for nature.

In general, the concept of socio-economic development, the expansion orrealization of potentialities, must be distinguished from economic growth, or materialaccretion (Goodland et al., 1992). The latter is the hallmark of the industrial era anddoes not appear to be indefinitely maintainable. Human cultural, intellectual, artistic,social and technological development, together with the provision for basic physicalneeds, is not only compatible with sustainability, but essential for its realization.

Water Futures Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 5

The socio-ecological system as a whole is quite complex with many importantinteractions and linkages within and between social, economic and ecologicalsubsystems. Consequently, it is natural for policy-relevant exercises to concentrate onspecific aspects of the problem, e.g., energy use, agriculture, cities, atmosphericchemistry, marine biology and, the subject of this study, freshwater resources. Thereis no substitute for detailed treatments of themes and sectoral planning exercises.

At the same time, only by placing the sectoral components in the context ofthe socio-ecological whole can we gain adequate understanding and offer wise policydirections. It would be a perverse, albeit unintentional, outcome if efforts to achievesustainability in one area undermined the prospects for others.

The comprehensive water assessment illustrates the need for a systemsperspective. The historic tendency to view water sector problems from a narrowtechnical emphasis — hydrology, engineering, water management — is not sufficient tosupport the sustainability idea. In addition to the sectoral emphasis, evaluation ofwater resources, uses, and constraints in the context of sustainable developmentrequires consideration of several types of linkages. First, at the level of sectoralinteractions, water issues are linked to agriculture, industry, commercial and domesticuses. Water policy must pay attention to the demand side of the equation, and to theproblems of efficiency of water use, and the mix of economic activities. Second,water issues are linked spatially, as the analysis of competition for scarce waterresources often requires a comprehensive spatial framework to balance waterallocation between competing demand centers - urban and rural, upstream anddownstream, and among countries where shared international river basins raise waterplanning to a geo-political level. Third, water as an ecological resource requires thatthe question of the long term preservation of the integrity of water-dependent eco-systems and the hydrological system can no longer be ignored in water assessmentsand development.

Ultimately, exploring the interplay between human activities and waterresources raises fundamental questions. Will the resource intensive consumptionpatterns of the industrial countries persist and even grow? Will this type of life-styleremain the development goal universally? What will be future population levels? Willthere be greater economic and social equity among countries and among peoplewithin countries? What are the alternative forms of development for achieving thegoals of meeting human needs and aspirations and environmental sustainability?What are the implications for lifestyles, values, institutions and policies?

Different sets of answers to questions like these imply different water futures.As we begin to imagine alternative futures — and their water implications — we enterthe world of scenarios, a subject to which we now turn.

1.3 The Scenario ApproachLong range socio-ecological futures are inherently unpredictable. Three types ofindeterminacy can be distinguished. First, insufficient information on both the currentstate of the system and on forces governing its dynamics lead to statistical dispersionover possible future states. Second, even if precise information were available,complex systems are known to exhibit turbulent behavior, extreme sensitivity toinitial conditions and branching behaviors at various thresholds which thwart

Raskin

prediction (Gleick, 1987; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Finally, the future isunknowable to the degree it is the result of freely determined human choices.

While we cannot know what will be, we can use scenarios to tell plausibleand interesting stories about what could be. In theater parlance, a scenario is asummary of a play. Analogously, a development scenario is a structured narrative fordescribing the contours of alternative human futures. As applied to long rangeresource assessments, the scenario draws on both science — our understanding ofhistorical patterns, current conditions and physical and social processes — and theimagination to conceive, articulate and evaluate a range of socio-ecological pathways.

In so doing, scenarios can illuminate the relationships within the total system,and the relationship between human actions and the whole complex of interconnectedoutcomes. It is this added insight, leading to more informed and rational action, that isthe foremost goal of scenarios, rather than prediction of the future. Scenarios helppolicy makers and managers understand how the world might change, recognize whenit is changing, and if it does change, know what to do (Schwartz, 1991). Scenarios arenot projections or forecasts; indeed, scenarios may not even be probable. Rather, theyprovide a cognitive aid for visualizing alternative futures, for examining theinteractions of socio-economic and environmental change, and for guiding policyformulation.

A water scenario includes assumptions about many interacting elements:population and demographic patterns, life-styles and consumption patterns, economicscale and structure, technology and efficiency, policies and institutions. A scenario isa what //"proposition. What are the implications if a vision of a possible future were tooccur, as described by assumptions for each of these factors? What are theconsequences for the sustainable use of freshwater resources?

Current socio-ecological states are subject to initial driving forces. Thescenario narrative is, in part, a story of how the driving forces evolve (see Figure 3).However, the system evolution is not a simple mechanical unfolding from the past,because it is subject to human intention. Images, symbols and visions of the futurecan be sufficiently powerful to redirect beliefs, behaviors, policies, and institutionstoward some futures and away from others. Thus Figure 3 shows also attractive andrepulsive forces. Attracting attributes of future states might include consistency withsustainability principles — futures which remain within certain biophysical boundaryconditions — and human well-being — futures which meet various criteria for humanwelfare and fulfilment.

Negative images of possible future states also play a role in galvanizing effortsto redirect system evolution away from pathways leading to undesirable outcomes. Soa spectrum of scenarios ranging from Utopian to dystopian extremes are useful forbringing visions of future possibilities back to the present. In this sense, the attractiveand repulsive forces may influence the driving forces and human development.

The final set of interactions illustrated in Figure 3, the sideswipes, aresurprising future occurrences which can powerfully influence the evolution of thesystem. However, they are very difficult to predict. Extreme events — a third worldwar, the diffusion of cheap nuclear fusion power, the ascendancy of fundamentalismas a dominant world movement, a major natural disaster, a rampant global epidemic,a breakdown of the climate system — would have a strong influence on the global

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 7

future, though probabilities cannot be assigned, nor can the universe of possibleevents even be described.

DrivingForces Attractive

Forces

Sideswipes

Past Present Future

Figure 3. Driving Forces, Attractors, Sideswipes

How can the scenario framework be used to illuminate emerging water issuesin the 21st century? We begin to address this question in the next section.

Raskin

2 SCENARIOS OF WATER DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Driving Forces2

We begin by identifying several significant driving forces now operating at the globallevel. These transnational trends condition future activities and ultimately influencethe scale and pattern of water use. Significant trends and processes include populationgrowth, urbanization, economic globalization, cultural homogenization,environmental degradation and technological innovation. Together, they are stronglyinteracting aspects of a unitary global phenomenon, a process which we callconventional development.

Although the linkages between population growth and the environment are notstraightforward, for a given set of socio-economic development conditions,population growth tends to increase the pressure on resources and the environment.This effect is most pronounced among the very rich (where each additional personaccounts for large incremental resource use) and the desperately poor (where the logicof survival may lead to the over use of natural capital to meet immediate needs).Beyond environmental and resource pressures, population growth can add to the riskof social friction, illegal migration, and international tension.

Global population will nearly double to over ten billion people by the year2050, according to mid-range United Nations forecasts (Bulatao et al., 1989; UnitedNations, 1992a; UNPF, 1995). Fully 95 percent of the additional population will be indeveloping countries where population is projected to grow from about 4 billion in1990 to 8.6 billion in 2050. With current populations in poor regions heavilyweighted toward the young, there is inherent momentum for growth. Almost half ofthe projected population growth in developing countries would occur even if fertilityrates instantly decreased to replacement levels (Bongaarts, 1994).

Rapid urbanization is another significant demographic trend with importantimplications for water infrastructure. The world is in the midst of a massive planetarytransition from a predominately rural to a heavily urban society. Urban populationincreased between 1950 and 1990 by a factor of 3 with substantial further growthexpected, mostly in developing regions. At current growth patterns, 85% of additionalpopulation will be urban, and the urban fraction of total population is expected tocontinue to rise from less than 50% today to nearly 70% projected for 2025 (UnitedNations, 1991).

The number and size of huge megacities has expanded apace. In 1950, therewere two metropolitan areas with populations over eight million, New York andLondon (Harrison, 1992). By the year 1990 there were twenty (fourteen in developingcountries). By 2000, there will be fifteen to twenty megacities with population over20 million. Almost universally, urban planning institutions have been too weak tocope with rapid urban growth, turning towns into cities, cities into megacities, and, ifcurrent trends continue, megacities into continuous networks of urban centers. Thedeterioration of inner cities in some areas and the growth of shanty towns on theperiphery in others, undermines social cohesion with the visible rise of socialdisparities, crime and violence. The elite adopt affluent urban life styles amidst a

2 The discussion draws from Raskin et al. (1996).

Water Futures Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 9

growing underclass living in squalor, often with inadequate sanitary, health andeducational services.

As the urban population increases, so do urban water stresses related toincreased spatial concentration of households and industry. These include the need forexpensive infrastructure to supply and distribute high quality water, and to dispose ofwaste products to protect human health and environmental quality.

Another major transnational process is the expansion and transformation ofthe world economy. Accelerated by advances in information technology and thegrowth of international trade agreements, the organization of production andconsumer markets are becoming progressively globalized. Two fundamental trends —the emergence of new national economic powers and the growth in transnationalcorporations — will alter the political and economic landscape in the coming decades.

The world economy is becoming more regionally pluralistic as economiesexpand in developing countries, Japan and the European Union. The economy ofChina could grow past that of the United States in the next twenty years, with otherAsian and Latin American countries becoming progressively more significant playersin the global economy. Under mid-range economic projections, the size of theeconomies of developing countries taken in aggregate in 2025 will be about the sizeof all industrial countries today.

Interacting with the emergence of new national centers is the second structuraltransition, the increasing role of transnational corporations. The growth of hugeenterprises operating in a planetary marketplace is a extension of the expansionistdynamic inherent in competitive market systems. Beyond the growth of the worldeconomy itself, technological and institutional factors have accelerated the transitionfrom national to transnational corporations. The revolution in communicationstechnology, information processing, and transportation have facilitated the ability oftransnationals to move facilities, products and people to the corporation's economicadvantage (Reich, 1991).

At the same time, new trade agreements and the globalization of financial andcurrency markets have combined with post-World War II economic liberalization tochallenge residual protectionist restrictions. Meanwhile, the expansion of moderninfrastructure and stable legal frameworks facilitates the globalization process. Anunusual coalition of forces resists these trends including nationally based economicinterests, geopolitical isolationists and environmentalists who raise serious concernsabout the impact of global competition on environmental protection and communitystability (Daly, 1993). There is significant potential for political tensions to growbetween stateless corporations with little allegiance to any country and the nation-state of the 21st century. Whether these tensions are resolved through a gradualbalancing of global and national governance and regulatory structures, or whetherthey are the source of clashes and destabilization, will be an important sub-theme inthe story of the 21st century (Wager, 1992).

Catalyzed by the explosion of information technology and ubiquity ofelectronic media, American consumer culture is rapidly permeating many societies.The rise of a global consumerist culture - acquisitive, youth-oriented, hedonistic — isboth a result and a driver of economic globalization. At the same time, the forces ofglobal culture homogenization trigger reactions that can increase tensions betweenand within nations, while reducing cultural diversity.

10 Raskin

Several next wave technological innovations and trends may be identified thathave the potential for affecting global dynamics significantly. Information technology(IT) — computers, the internet, telecommunications — was identified above as acatalyst for the globalization of financial, labor, and product markets. TT will likelycontinue to impact massively the structure of production units (down-sizing, just-in-time manufacturing), the nature of work (telecommuting, marketing and salestechniques) and leisure time (home shopping, interactive gaming, media access). Thetechnology also has the potential to exacerbate tensions between those societies whoare connected and those who are not connected to the information superhighway.

Advances in biotechnology could have an array of significant effects on futuresociety including increased crop yields with lower chemical inputs, more effectivePharmaceuticals, and, if the human gene is successfully mapped, identification andprevention of disease. The technology also raises a host of environmental risks (e.g.,introduction of bio-engineered genomic material in plants that leads to populationexplosions and centers of disease resistance), ethical problems (e.g., the geneticengineering of humans) and political and economic concerns (e.g., new forms ofdependency of developing countries on the international agro-industrial system).

Lastly, the miniaturization of mechanics — microdynamics — couldfundamentally alter medicine and some industrial processes (NSF, 1989). Theultimate in this direction would be nanotechnology, the engineering of computers,motors and machines at the molecular level. While still in the early stages of researchand development, nanodevices could revolutionize medical practices, materialscience, computer performance and many other applications. In one sense,nanotechnology could be a dramatic continuation of the twentieth century process ofdematerialization, where progressively less material input is required per unit product,and automation, where smart machines replace manual labor. In addition to its effectson products, nanotechnology — along with other technological development — candiminish environmental pressure and reduce labor requirements through robotization .The latter, if not linked to a general scaling back of average work loads, couldradically reduce employment opportunities. In general, these productivity enhancingtechnologies could have a profound effect on future societies with the potential bothfor increasing wealth while eliminating drudgery and environmental pressure or — ifnot coupled to other social and cultural changes — for massive social displacement.

Finally, environmental degradation as a transnational process is nowrecognized as a cardinal phenomenon of our era, and may be considered anothersignificant transnational driving force. International concern has grown about humanimpacts on the atmosphere, water resources, the bio-accumulation of toxicsubstances, species loss, and the degradation of ecosystems. The cumulative effects ofglobal environmental insults cannot be known precisely, but could have significantdetrimental effects on economic performance, human health, social stability, and eveninternational security. The realization that individual countries cannot insulatethemselves from global environmental impacts is changing the basis on whichindustrialized countries allocate foreign assistance and is stimulating a series ofinternational discussions and treaties to abate pressures on natural systems, possibly aharbinger of new forms of global governance.

One of the first indications that water pollution is no longer a localphenomenon was the discovery in the 1960s of contamination of Antarctic ice. A

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 11

number of anthropogenic activities are causing water pollution beyond localwatershed boundaries: (1) fallout from atmospheric pollution due to fossil fuelburning, industrial production, mining, smelting, and agriculture, (2) groundwaterpumping in coastal and semi-arid areas that causes groundwater salinization, (3) largescale deforestation, (4) damming of rivers, and (5) destruction of wetlands (Meybecket al., 1989). Increasingly, these problems are found in rapidly growing andindustrializing countries where environmental regulations are frequently non-existentor ineffective.

There are other potentially significant global-level processes affecting waterissues. For example, climate change would cause significant distortions ofhydrological cycles with implications for the distribution of water resources, theincidence of diseases from water-borne vectors, and the frequency and severity ofstorms, floods and droughts (Epstein and Sharp, 1994).

2.2 A Conventional Development Scenario for WaterAs a first step in assessing water scenarios for the 21st century, we examine theimplications for the future of today's driving forces, current policies and orthodoxnotions of development. To that end, we introduce a Conventional DevelopmentScenario (CDS)3 for global water analysis. The CDS is neither a prediction of whatwill happen nor a statement of what should happen. It describes the direction we areheaded and the problems we may encounter — if current patterns and driving forcesare played out.

The CDS scenario is useful as a cognitive aid for understanding theconstraints on business-as-usual development, and a reference for exploring thetiming and scale of policy measures required for more favorable developmentscenarios. Though we will focus here on the water aspects of the CDS, it should benoted that the scenario was developed as a comprehensive analysis covering suchissues as energy, water, food, land use, economy, etc., and the linkages among them(Raskin et al., 1996).

The guiding principles of the CDS are evolution, convergence, andintegration. Demographic, socio-economic and technological patterns graduallyevolve without significant surprises, radical technological innovations, orfundamental policy changes. Developing and transitional regions are assumed toconverge gradually toward OECD economic and water practices. Ultimately, in theCDS, the world becomes progressively more integrated both economically andculturally.

The conventional development paradigm assumes that the engines foreconomic growth and wealth allocation are unregulated markets, private investment,and competition; population increases at mid-range projections with a continuation ofrapid urbanization; industrialization progressively absorbs nations and regions on theperiphery of the marketed world economy; human motives are dominated by the valueof possessive individualism with material wealth the basis for the "good life"; and thenation-state survives as the central unit of governance.

3The phrase business-as-usual is widely used to refer to a future in which current patterns are projected assumingthe gradual evolution of structural patterns and no significant changes in policy. We use the term conventionaldevelopment to underscore the normative content of such a scenario, which assumes the maintenance of a set ofhistorically contingent values, behaviors and social and political assumptions.

12 Raskin

2.3 RegionalizationThe spatial structure for long range global assessment requires enough resolution forexploring important global variations and trade patterns, while not exceeding theavailability of data and the capacity to grasp the main contours of the global system.For purposes of this analysis, we have grouped countries into ten global regions,based on the comparability of socio-economic development and geopoliticalconsiderations. The regional groupings and the countries included in each aredisplayed in Table 1.

There are many alternative ways of defining global regions, e.g., by dominantreligio-cultural practices, by agro-ecological zones, by river basin, by socio-economicsystem. Furthermore, there is never a sharp demarcation between regions, so certaincountries can arguably be moved from one region to another without doing violenceto the analysis. No configurations are without conceptual complications and dauntingdata problems. The regional structure employed here is reasonably manageable whilepreserving sufficient spatial detail for the purposes of understanding major globalinteractions and trends.

Water Futures .-Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 13

Table 1. Regional Structure

North AmericaUSACanada

Western EuropeAustriaBelgiumDenmarkFinlandFranceGermany (All)GreeceGreenlandIcelandIrelandItalyLuxembourgNetherlandsNorwayPortugalSpainSwedenSwitzerlandTurkeyUnited KingdomYugoslavia (former)

OECD PacificAustraliaFijiJapanNew Zealand

Former Soviet Union(FSU)Former Soviet Unionand Baltic States

Eastern EuropeAlbaniaBulgariaCzechoslovakia(former)HungaryPolandRomania

AfricaAlgeriaAngolaBeninBotswanaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCentral AfricanRepublicChadCongoEgyptEthiopiaGabonGambiaGhanaGuineaGuinea BissauIvory CoastKenyaLesothoLiberiaLibyaMadagascarMalawiMaliMauritaniaMauritiusMoroccoMozambiqueNamibiaNigerNigeria

Africa (contd)ReunionRwandaSenegalSierra LeoneSomaliaSouth AfricaSudanSwazilandTanzaniaTogoTunisiaUgandaZaireZambiaZimbabwe

Latin AmericaArgentinaBoliviaBrazilChileColombiaCosta RicaCubaDominican RepublicEcuadorEl SalvadorGuatemalaGuyanaHaitiHondurasJamaicaMexicoNicaraguaPanamaParaguayPeruSurinamTrinidad & TobagoUruguayVenezuela

Middle EastAfghanistanBahrainCyprusIranIraqIsraelJordanKuwaitLebanonOmanQatarSaudi ArabiaSyriaUnited Arab EmiratesYemen

China +ChinaKorea, DPRLaosMongoliaVietnam

South & South EastAsiaBangladeshBhutanBruneiBurmaHong KongIndiaIndonesiaKampucheaKorea, Republic ofMalaysiaNepalPakistanPapua New GuineaPhilippinesSingaporeSri LankaTaiwanThailand

2.4 Demographic and Economic AssumptionsThe CDS population and economic assumptions are compatible with the mid-rangescenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1990a-b; IPCC,1992a-b). The IPCC exercise included an extensive international process thatinvolved analysts representing all regions of the world. Regional populationprojections for the CDS are presented in Table 2. World population approaches 10billion by the year 2050 with most of the increase in developing regions. By contrast,population in "industrial" and "transitional" regions4 are relatively stable in thescenario, as their share of world population decrease from about 20% to 13%.

4We shall sometimes use the terms "industrial" for the three OECD regions and "transitional" for the FSU andEastern Europe regions.

14 Raskin

Table 2. Population Projections (Millions)

Region

North AmericaWestern EuropeOECD PacificFormer Soviet UnionEastern EuropeAfricaLatin AmericaMiddle EastChina +South & East AsiaWorld

IndustrialTransitionalDeveloping

1990277

456

145

289

100

640

445

151

1,2231,564

5,290

878

389

4,023

2025330

489

161

332

115

1,519699

384

1,7332,6348,395

980

447

6,968

2050322477

157

349

121

2,204812

557

1,8673,214

10,080

956

470

8,654

Growth Rate (Wear)1990-2025

0.5

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.4

2.5

1.3

2.7

1.0

1.5

1.3

0.3

0.4

1.6

2025-2050-0.1-0.1-0.10.2

0.2

1.5

0.6

1.5

0.3

0.8

0.7

-0.10.2

0.9

Source: values for 1990 from the World Bank (1993a); projections from World Bank analysis (Bulatao et al., 1989)and the United Nations (1992a).

Population projections are sensitive to the assumed trend in total fertility rate(TFR, the number of children per female) particularly in developing regions. Themid-range projection assumes that the TFR approaches the replacement rate in themid-21st century, the value (about 2.06) at which populations become stable. If theTFR is assumed to approach 2.17 over the next century, for example, populationprojections would rise to about 13 billion by 2050 (Haub, 1994). Future fertility rateswill depend on such factors as the character of economic development, the status ofwomen, the degree of persistence of traditional cultural patterns, and diseaseincidence. In the spirit of the CDS, we assume mid-range projections that incorporatea gradual global transition to "modern" developed country population patterns andsocio-economic patterns.

Current values and typical mid-range projections for economic activity areshown in Table 3, along with average annual growth rates over the periods 1990-2025and 2025-2050. Rates of growth are seen to be somewhat more rapid in thedeveloping regions than the industrial and transitional regions. The industrial regionshare of gross world product decreases — from about 80% in 1990 to 60% in 2050.

To explore the income and equity implications of these projections, GDP percapita is reported in Table 4. Also shown are growth rates in GDP per capita, whichare significantly less than total GDP growth rates in developing countries because ofhigh population growth rates. The projections show a very gradual North-Southconvergence in the sense that the ratio of average GDP per capita in industrial regionsto developing regions decreases from 22 to 15. However, the absolute difference inaverage per capita income increases substantially. Comparing industrial anddeveloping regions, rises from about 18,000 $/capita in 1990 to 55,000 $/capita by2050 as northern incomes soar. The conventional development world remains aprofoundly inequitable one.

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 15

The GDP values are aggregate measures of economic scale. In the CDS, thecomposition of economic output is assumed to change with gradual changes inconsumption patterns. In the OECD regions, the service sector provides an increasingshare of overall economic activity, while agriculture and industrial shares decrease. Inaddition, the scenario captures the leveling in OECD countries of the per capitagrowth of material consumption over recent decades (Williams et al, 1987;Bernardini and Galli, 1993), as the subsectoral composition of industrial productionchanges with time. Output per capita of materials intensive industries (e.g., iron andsteel, non-ferrous metals, non-metallic minerals, paper and pulp, and chemicals), isassumed to stabilize and in some cases decrease. Non-OECD regions are assumed toconverge toward OECD economic structures with increasing GDP per capita. Basedon these processes, the changing composition of economic activity is reflected in theCDS at two levels: among sectors (domestic, industrial, and agricultural) and amongsubsectors within the sectors (Raskin and Margolis, 1995).

The CDS analyses water withdrawal by economic sector: domestic, industry,and agriculture. Within each economic sector, water is analyzed by specific activity inthe sector, for example sanitation end-uses in the domestic sector, paper production inthe industry sector, or irrigation in the agriculture sector. For each activity, the CDSprojects the level of the activity (for example, populations, value-added or cropoutput), and the water intensity of the activity (for example, the volume of water usedper person, value-added or crop output). Multiplication of the level of activity by thewater intensity gives the total of water use for each activity. The sum over allactivities in each sector gives the volume of water withdrawal by sector. Please referto Appendix 5 for a summary of technical assumptions governing sectoral water usein the CDS.

16 Raskin

Table 3. GDP Projections (Billions US $1990)

Region

North AmericaWestern EuropeOECD PacificFormer Soviet UnionEastern EuropeAfricaLatin AmericaMiddle EastChina +South & East AsiaWorld

IndustrialTransitionalDeveloping

19906,0407,1713,524

854

210

401

994

541

451

1,04321,230

16,7351,0653,430

202514,88415,9178,1001,898

467

1,6573,0182,2372,6984,943

55,820

38,9012,366

14,553

205021,06323,66011,7482,756

679

4,2456,0385,0716,391

12,63194,282

56,4713,435

34,376

Growth Rate (%/Year)1990-2025

2.62.32.42.32.34.13.24.15.24.52.8

2.4

2.34.2

2025-2050

1.41.61.5

1.5

1.5

3.8

2.8

3.3

3.5

3.8

2.1

1.5

1.5

3.5

Source: values for 1990 from the World Bank (1993a); growth rates from IPCC (1992b), which are generally withinthe range of World Bank projections.

Table 4. GDP per Capita Projections (US $1990)

Region

North AmericaWestern EuropeOECD PacificFormer Soviet UnionEastern EuropeAfricaLatin AmericaMiddle EastChina +South & East Asia

World

IndustrialTransitionalDeveloping

199021,80415,72624,3042,9562,108

626

2,2333,585

369

667

4,013

19,0602,738

853

202545,127

32,54850,3015,7124,0731,0914,3155,832

1,557

1,8776,649

39,6995,2922,089

205065,477

49,60774,8037,8895,6261,9267,4359,1103,4233,9309,354

59,0897,3083,972

Growth Rate (%/Year)1990-2025

2.1

2.1

2.1

1.9

1.9

1.6

1.91.4

4.2

3.0

1.5

2.1

1.9

2.6

2025-20501.5

1.7

1.6

1.3

1.3

2.3

2.2

1.8

3.2

3.0

1.4

1.6

1.3

2.6

Source: values for 1990 from the World Bank (1993a); growth rates from IPCC (1992b).

2.5 Summary of Scenario ResultsThe CDS mid-range results are based on the population and economic assumptionssummarized above and on detailed sectoral and end-use analysis (summarized inAppendix 5). To examine uncertainty, we develop high and low cases to reflect thesensitivity to variation in both the scale of regional economic activity and the intensityof regional water requirements. A range of economic activities is generated byvarying the mid-range CDS annual growth rate in income to 2025 by + 10%. Then

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 17

each regional income is multiplied by the regional population in 2025 to produce therange reported in Table 5.

To reflect uncertainty in water intensity, we first note that average aggregatewater intensity (water/GDP) changes over time for two distinct reasons: 1) structuralchanges in the economy and 2) technological and management improvements in theefficiency in end-use water uses. Structural changes affect average water intensity asthe composition of the economy changes among sectors and subsectors which havevery different water intensities (e.g., form manufacturing to services, or from heavy tolight industry). Structural changes are assumed to be invariant across the CDS's highand low cases. High and low case adjustments are applied to technologicalimprovement by varying mid-range values. Technological improvements decreaseend-use water intensities in the mid-range scenario by about 10% globally by 2025,with some variation by region (e.g., in North America the water intensity decreases16%). The high case assumes only 90% of regional technological improvements arerealized by 2025 (e.g., the decrease in water intensity in North America is 14.4%).The low case assumes that technological improvements are 10% greater than in themid-range case (e.g., water intensities decreases in North America is 17.6%).

The assumptions for the three cases for 2025 are collected in Table 5. Annualwater requirements by region are computed as the product of future water intensityand GDP. The results are summarized graphically in Figure 4. Water withdrawals bycountry in 1995 and in 2025 are reported in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.

18 Raskin

Table 5. GDP and Water Intensity by Region in 2025

REGION Low Mid High

GDP (109 1990 US $)

North AmericaWestern EuropeOECD PacificFSU

Eastern EuropeAfricaLatin AmericaMiddle EastChina*S&E Asia

WORLD

Water Intensity (liters / $)

North AmericaWestern EuropeOECD PacificFSU

Eastern EuropeAfricaLatin AmericaMiddle EastChina+

S&E AsiaWORLD

13,857

14,8097,5361,776

438

1,568

2,8252,1342,342

4,46451,751

40.819.617.0

255.5174.6

152.5121.5141.4

287.8328.487.7

14,89215,9168,0991,896

468

1,6573,0162,2402,6984,944

55,826

41.519.817.2

258.7177.4

153.8122.5142.5290.7330.7

89.7

16,002

17,1038,7032,024

499

1,7513,2192,3513,1065,474

60,232

42.220.117.3

261.8180.1155.2123.5143.6293.6

333.091.8

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 19

5.5

5.0

4.03 o

g lI 2 3.0fc oS S 2.5

S 1.51.0

0.5

0.0

• S&E Asia

• China+

• Middle East

B Latin America

• Africa

El Eastern Europe

• FSU

nOECD Pacific

•Western Europe

• North America

1995 2025 LOW 2025 MID

YEAR

2025 HIGH

Figure 4. Global Water Withdrawal by Region, 1995-2025

In the CDS mid-range case, annual global water withdrawal grows from 3,700cubic kilometers in 1995 to 5,000 cubic kilometers in 2025, an increase of 35%. Thelargest absolute increases occur in S&E Asia (493 additional cubic kilometers) andChina+ (231 additional cubic kilometers). This reflects the fact that in 1995 about31% of the global withdrawals are attributable to South & East Asia, and 15% toChina+. The largest relative increases in 2025 withdrawals in the mid-range case arein Middle East (60% higher than 1995) and Africa (53% higher). More generally, thenon-OECD grows by 42% while the OECD grows by 15% in the mid-range case.

The high and low case global withdrawals in 2025 are 4500 and 5500,respectively, representing a 23% and 49% increase over the 1995 value. Growthremains greater in the non-OECD where water withdrawal increases from 1995 to2025 by 29% (low case) to 58% (high case), compared to the OECD where waterwithdrawal increases by 5% (low case) to 25% (high case).

Regional withdrawals disaggregated by sector are reported in Figures 5 and 6for 1995 and mid-range case in 2025, respectively. Between 1995 and 2025, irrigationremains the dominant water end-use in developing regions, though it accounts for adecreasing fraction of total water use. Water withdrawals for industry increase in allregions in both absolute quantity and in fractional share of the total. The domesticsector (households and services) grows substantially in developing regions.

20 Raskin

• Agriculture

• Industry

• Domestic

IWE Pacific FSU

IME China* S&E

Asia

Figure 5. Water Withdrawal by Region and Sector in 1995

I 1 I

• Agriculture

• Industry

• Domestic

WE Pacific FSU EE Africa LA

REGION

ME Cbins+ S&EAsia

Figure 6. Water Withdrawal by Region and Sector In 2025 CDS Mid-range Case

Mid-range CDS withdrawals in 2025 represent about twelve percent of theaverage annual runoff of just over 42,000 km (Shiklomanov, 1996). For severalreasons, the sufficiency of freshwater is more problematic than might appear fromgross comparisons of resources and requirements. First, most of the annual runoff isin the form of floods, leaving only about one-third, or 14,000 km3 per year, as asteady supply (L'vovich, 1974). However, flood control measures, especiallyreservoir construction, can increase this supply by storing water during high flowperiods for use during dry seasons. Second, surface water availability to meetwithdrawal requirements is limited by competing in-stream uses. Most fundamentally,

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 21

sustainable water development requires that adequate flows be maintained in riversfor the protection of river, lake, and wetland ecosystems. Third, regional averagesmask the spatial and temporal variance of freshwater resource and requirementpatterns.

As the competition for limited resources increases with expanding water use,water quality often deteriorates and ecosystem maintenance is compromised. In theabsence of policies to address these tensions, water competition can evolve intodiscord between groups dependent on the same resources. Conflicts can arise betweenimmediate and longer term needs, with the latter often the loser. Furthermore,inadequate or degraded water is a matter of life and death in developing regionswhere an estimated 25,000 people die daily from water-related diseases (UNEP,1991).

The CDS results are compared to other studies in Table 6. Several globalwater demand projections were conducted from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, and aftera hiatus again in the 1990s. The earlier studies generally projected higher withdrawalsthan the more recent ones. The CDS continues this trend.

Table 6. Global Water ProjectionsStudyNikitopoulos (1967)L'vovlch (1974)Falkenmark and Lindh (1974)Falkenmark and Lindh (1976)de Mare (1976)WRI (1990)Shiklomanov(1993)Conventional DevelopmentScenario - this study

World Withdrawal (km3)673070008380

3986, 49616080

4195-43505190

4500, 5000, 5500

Year200020002000

2000, 2015200020002000

2025 (low, mid, high)

World withdrawal in 1995 is estimated at 3700 cubic kilometers.

The lower estimates of future water requirements in the CDS reflect moremoderate growth rates in population and economic scale, the incorporation of anassumed shift in the structure of the economy toward less water intensive activities(such as the service sector) and continuing improvements in water use efficiency. Theanalysis does not simply project historic trends, but captures the changing dynamicsof water use in a disaggregated analytic framework. We find that problems of waterscarcity and ecosystem pressure, while not likely to be as severe as soon as suggestedby earlier global projections, will nevertheless be of continuing concern in theabsence of policies for sustainable water use.

We take up the question of future water stress in Part III. For better spatialresolution, we zoom in to the national level as the unit of analysis, introduce relevantindices of water vulnerability, and explore the implications of the CDS for watersustainability in 2025.

22 Raskin

3 FUTURE WATER STRESS AND VULNERABILITYThe aim of this section is to examine the implications of the scenario for watersustainability to the year 2025. The regional analysis described in the previous sectionprovided broad insight into changing water use and resource patterns in a globalcontext. But the spatial resolution is too coarse for detailed assessment. Ideally, theanalysis would be conducted at the river basin level where the relationship amongwater resources, human requirements and ecosystems is most direct. But acomprehensive global assessment that is built from numerous river basins would be aproblematic undertaking due to the sheer scale of the effort and to the lack of acomprehensive water data base organized by basin.

Here we strike a balance between regional and local spatial scales byconducting the assessment of future water issues by zooming down from the regionalto the national level, where data are available. We first introduce the criteria used forevaluating water stress, then summarize the scenario data, and finally evaluate currentand emerging water stress and vulnerability by country.

3.1 Evaluation IndicesThere are many factors influencing the adequacy of a nation's water system —withdrawal requirements, ecosystem conditions, supply infrastructure, and waterresources and their variability. Consequently, there is no simple way to design asingle measure of water sustainability. However, progress can be made in assessingnational water conditions by developing a set of relevant metrics — variables that aimto capture key aspects of water stress, supply reliability and the economic capacity forcoping with water problems. The metrics can then be combined in various way toprovide planners and policy makers with simple screening measures for assessingwater resource vulnerability. But it must be stressed that such indicators are onlyrough guides for flagging situations which require more detailed analytic and policyattention.We wish to develop metrics of water vulnerability. The concept of resourcevulnerability has been associated with the inability to sustain economic and socialactivity commensurate with a region's goals (Kulshreshtha, 1993). In a sustainabilitycontext, the socio-economic emphasis must be complemented by considerationsranging from the vulnerability of aquatic ecosystems to pressures due to humandevelopment. Thus, a nation may be said to be water vulnerable if its capacity both tosustain its aquatic ecosystem and to provide its population with a desired level ofeconomic and social development, is compromised by the nature of its hydrologicsystem, its water resources infrastructure or its water management system.

In this analysis, five separate measures are considered for assessing aspects ofa nation's water resources stress:

• storage-to-flow ratio, national reservoir storage capacity divided by averageannual water supply, measures the capacity of water resources infrastructure tocope with water fluctuations. Higher ratios imply more resilience against floodsand droughts (Fiering, 1990; Strzepek et al., 1996).

• coefficient of variation of precipitation (COV), the standard deviation of annualprecipitation divided by the mean annual precipitation, measures the degree of

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 23

variability in annual hydrological patterns and the sensitivity of rainfed agricultureto variations in precipitation. The higher the COV, the more variable theprecipitation.

• import dependence, the percentage of a national water supply that flows fromexternal sources, measures the geopolitical security of national water resources.Higher percentages reflect greater vulnerability (FAO, 1995; Raskin et al., 1995);availability is dependent on developments in upstream riverine countries and themaintenance of international allocation arrangements. Also, downstream nationsare subject to degradation of water quality.

• use-to-resource ratio, the annual water withdrawals divided by annual renewablewater resources, provides an overall gauge of the average pressure on availableresources and the threat to aquatic ecosystems.

• average income, GDP per capita, serves as a proxy for a nation's capacity to copewith water problems and uncertainties, and to deliver basic water services to itscitizens

These measures are selected for their relevance to the issue of watervulnerability, and for the availability of data to quantify them both now and in thescenarios. The three variables - storage-to-flow ratio, COV, and import dependence -- represent different aspects of water resources reliability. The use-to-resource ratioreflects the physical pressure on water resources, on average. Finally, average incomerecognizes that the level of vulnerability depends on economic coping capacity.

The Reliability IndexTo reduce the complexity, we first create a composite reliability index by combiningthe storage-to-flow, COV, and import dependence measures. Each measure is dividedinto four classes and designated 1, 2, 3, or 4 denoting, respectively, no stress, lowstress, stress, and high stress. The following procedure is used.

Storage-to-FlowS/QClassification

>0.61

0.3 - 0.62

0.3 - 0.23

<0.24

Note: Fiering and Matalas (1990) and Gleick (1990) suggest that river basins with S/Q less than 0.6 arevulnerable. The further demarcations at 0.3 and 0.2 are based on review of a number of river basinsglobally. If a nation uses little of its available supply, storage is not an important issue. To reflect this,if the use-to-resource ratio is 0.1 or less, the S/Q classification is set to 1.

Coefficient of Variation of PrecipitationCOVClassification

<0.061

0.06-0.122

0.12-0.183

>0.184

Note: The classifications are based on a statistical analysis of national COVs for 158 nations. Thedistribution of COVs resembled a log-normal distribution with a mean of 0.12. The value of 0.12 wasselected as the cutoff between low stress and stress, as 60% of nations were below 0.12. Thebreakpoints on either side were set so that 80 percent of the nations fell within class 2 and 3. Thereasonableness of these breakpoints were tested by comparing the COV classifications to knownconditions in various river basins.

24 Raskin

Import Dependence% ImportedClassification

< 1 51

15-252

25-503

> 5 04

Note: When comparing this index with the use-to-resource ratio, recall that the water "resource" in thelatter index is assumed to include both domestically controlled resources and international flows.

The composite water supply Reliability Index is computed by adding theclassification scores for storage-to-flow ratio, COV, and import dependence, thenclassifying the sum as follows:

Reliability IndexComposite ScoreClassification

1-31

4-62

7-93

10-124

The Use-to-Resource RatioThe use-to-resource ratio is an index which serves as a proxy for average water-related stress on both ecosystems and socio-economic systems. Average annualresource flows (Q) include both domestic resources and inflows from other countries.Again, four classes are defined ranging from a value of 1 for no stress to 4 for highstress.

Use-to-Resource RatioWithdrawal/QClassification

< 01

.1 0.1-0.22

0.2 - 0.43

>0.44

Note: According to Falkenmark and Lindh (1976), Szesztay (1970), Kulshrestha (1993) and Strzepeket al. (1996), at ratios greater than 20 percent, water stress can begin to be a limiting factor oneconomic development. The other demarcations are based on estimates in the literature.

Coping CapacityThe coping capacity index breakpoints are taken at standard World Bank incomeclassifications which are assumed to be correlated with the economic and institutionalability of countries to endure water stress, and to provide and maintain basic waterservices (Najlis, 1996). As with the other indices, four classes are defined rangingfrom a value of 1 for no stress to 4 for high stress.

Coping CapacityGNP/capitaClassification

Index>8625

18625 - 2786

22786-

3695 <695

4

Composite Water Resources Vulnerability IndicesThe indicator framework we have developed relies on three separate aspects of waterstress. The reliability index provides the aspect of resource uncertainty due to importdependence, precipitation variability, and the capacity to weather import andhydrological fluctuations. The use-to-resource adds an aspect of general water stress.The coping capacity index is included in recognition that a nation's watervulnerability is dependent, not only on physical conditions, but the capacity torespond and manage those conditions.

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 25

Of course, a nation's water situation cannot be reduced to several simplevariables, since it is often a composite of conditions in relatively autonomous riverbasins and dependent on many details. The indicators we have introduced must beinterpreted as rough and suggestive signals of possible water stress for any specificcountry.

In this spirit, as a final step in developing a broad-brush picture of current andfuture water vulnerability, we synthesize the three indices into a composite waterresources vulnerability index. There is no definitive theory or empirical basis formerging such incommensurate indices. Numerous mathematical procedures may beused for combining and weighting them into a common measure. Consequently,different analysts and stakeholders legitimately can weigh the variables in alternativeways. Without advancing a preference here, we offer two approaches for distilling theinformation into a composite vulnerability index for ease of viewing results.

Water Resources Vulnerability Index I (WRVI-I). This index weighs equallythe three separate water resource stress indices; reliability, use-to-resource, andcoping capacity. This approach assumes that the indices can compensate for oneanother, with a high score on one balancing a low score on another. For each nation,the classification values for each of the three stress indices are added to give a"combined score", which is then classified as follows :

Water Resources Vulnerability Index I (WRVI-I)Combined ScoreClassification

1-31

4-62

7-93

10-124

The Water Resources Vulnerability Index II (WRVI-II). In this formulation ofthe composite vulnerability index, the WRVI-II is set equal to the maximum value ofthe three individual stress indices ~ reliability, use-to-resource, and coping capacity.In other words, if any of the three variables has a value of 4, the WRVI-II is set at 4; ifthe highest value of the variables is 3, the WRVI-II is 3, and so on. This approachprovides a stronger signal of vulnerability by assuming that a nation is vulnerable if itis vulnerable in any of the separate dimensions.

3.2 Data SourcesThe next step is to apply this evaluation framework at country and regional levels. Weconsider conditions in two years — 1995 and 2025. For 2025, we use the results of thethree Conventional Development Scenario cases (low, mid-range, high) introduced inSection II. We explore also the sensitivity of the results to variations in hydrologicalpatterns that might be induced by climate change.

To conduct this analysis, country-level data for each of the basic indices arerequired. The data for 1995 is shown in Appendix 1. Withdrawal and supply data aredrawn from recent compilations conducted for the Comprehensive FreshwaterAssessment (Najlis, 1996; Shiklomanov, 1996). Reservoir storage data are from theWorld Register of Dams (ICOLD, 1988; Strzepek et al., 1996), which cover over20,000 reservoirs (including those under construction) in over 100 countries through1988 (note that reservoir construction has declined sharply since the survey). Forcountries with no information, it is assumed that there are no major storage reservoirs.

26 Raskin

The annual coefficient of variation (COV), the standard deviation divided by themean, of national precipitation is based on 1 degree gridded values of annual meanand standard deviation (Legates and Willmott, 1990), interpolated to 0.5 degree gridsand averaged for each country.

Conventional Development Scenario results for national water requirements in2025 for the low, mid-range, and high cases are based on regional growth rates (seeAppendix 2). Future national-level incomes in the three scenario cases are also basedon the regional growth rates. Lacking a basis for projecting storage changes, it isassumed that no new reservoir capacity is added in the next 30 years. While this willcertainly not be the case, only a few large reservoirs are now under construction, andnew projects will take many years to design, to construct, and to pass environmentaland local concerns. For most nations, additional storage capacity is unlikely to changethe storage-to-flow (S/Q) classification. In the standard scenario, hydrology is notsubject to climate change impacts, so the COV and water supply data for 2025 are thesame as for 1995.

Finally, an analysis of sensitivity to climate change was conducted. Based onCDS assumptions, annual greenhouse gas emissions to the year 2025 were read intotwo different global climate models. The Max Plank Institute (MPI) and the GoddardFluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) general circulation models were run in atransient mode and estimates of changes in temperature and precipitation over aglobal grid were produced for the 2030 decadal average. These changes intemperature and precipitation were then used as input to a model of annual riverrunoff, and changes in national water supply were computed (Yates and Strzepek,1996). The GFDL results show a 2.5 percent increase in global runoff with 73 nationshaving a decrease in flow and 85 nations having an increase. The MPI results show a5.3 percent increase in global runoff with 70 nations having decreases and 88countries having increases in runoff.

3.3 Evaluation of Future Water ProblemsWith this information, we are able to apply the evaluation framework at the nationallevel. The full results of the classification procedure are collected for each country inAppendix 3, for each of the three water stress indices, and in Appendix 4, for the twocomposite water vulnerability indices. To gain insight into these results, we beginwith a global summary. Table 7 presents the distribution of countries and populationsfor each of the three stress indices broken down by classification for 1995, and for2025 under various scenario conditions.

Considering first the reliability index, we see from Table 7 that the number ofcountries in each of the stress classifications does not vary much across 2025scenarios, nor between 1995 and 2025. However, due to population growth, thenumber of people in countries under reliability stress conditions (classifications 3 and4) is likely to grow substantially, from 3.5 billion in 1995 to about 5.3 billion in 2025,or about 63% of the world's people. That many more people may be at risk todroughts and floods. Figure 7 and 8 shows that this type of stress is found primarily inAsia, North Africa and the Middle East, and that is where the problem will grow inthe future. Figure 17 shows a geographical view by country. The problem results fromlarge variability of precipitation, inadequate storage to buffer this variability and/orhigh import dependence. In many cases, this stress can be addressed by building

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 27

storage, but this can require large capital outlays, be environmentally costly, and insome cases, prohibited by topography.

Turning to the use-to-resource ratio, we see from Table 7 that the number ofcountries in stress classifications 3 and 4 is likely to increase in the scenarios, even inthe low-range case. For the CDS mid-range, the number of countries under stressgrows from 41 in 1995 to 53 in 2025. In terms of population, the number living insuch countries grows substantially, from 1.9 billion to about 5.3 billion, an increase ofsome 3.4 billion. The population in stress conditions as a percentage of total worldpopulation rises from about 34% to 63%. Affected populations are concentrated inChina, Central Asia, the Indian Sub-continent, the Middle East and North Africa (seeFigures 9 and 10). These nations are posed with the challenge of economicdevelopment, while investing heavily in water infrastructure and protecting theiraquatic ecosystems. Figure 18 shows a geographical view by country.

The coping capacity index in Table 7 shows that, consistent with the robusteconomic growth assumptions of the Conventional Development Scenarios, thenumber of countries under stress (classifications 3 and 4) decrease from 112 in 1995to about 85 in 2025. This follows from the assumed greater capacity to deliver waterservices to their citizens and provide a resilient infrastructure in the face ofheightened physical pressure on water resources and environments. However, becausepopulation growth is most rapid in the poorer countries, the number of people in thelow income classifications actually increases, from 4.4 billion in 1995 to 5.9 billion in2025, some 70% of the world's people. Despite the assumed economic progress,serious poverty persists, including most of Africa and Asia (Figure 11 and 12). Figure19 shows a geographical view by country.

28 Raskin

Table 7. Stress Classification Distribution by Country and Population

Number of Countriesclassification reliability use/resource

19951

234

2025

CDS LOW1234

CDS MID-RANGE123

4

CDS HIGH1

2

34

16

76

57

11

15

77

5612

15

735913

15735913

CDS MID-RANGE (climate Change MPI)1

234

15725914

CDS MID-RANGE (climate change GFDL)1234

15

74

57

14

98

21

22

19

95

14

26

25

90

17

27

26

90

12

27

31

89

17

27

27

90

17

27

26

coping

27

21

54

58

34

33

56

37

35

39

53

33

3738

5233

35

39

53

33

35

39

53

33

Population (millions

reliability use/resource

147

2,0253,283

241

251

3,004

4,691

449

251

2,8544,822

469

251

2,854

4,822469

251

2,792

4,877476

251

2,8854,784

476

1,6932,0681,462

474

2,623640

4,0491,083

2,454639

2,7622,540

2,454360

2,9262,656

2,455710

4,1271,104

2,478714

4,1141,090

)

coping

830

484

1,1803,203

1,0961,2573,1732,870

1,0971,421

4,5061,371

1,1401,3854,5001,371

1,0971,4214,5061,371

1,0971,4214,5061,371

1 = no stress2 = low stress3 = stress4 = high stress

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 29

2

,800

,600

,400

,200

,000

800

600

400

200

0

11=No Stress D2=Low Stress B3=Stress • 4=High Stress

n AN Amer w Europe Pacific FSU E Europe Africa LAmsr Mid Easl China* S&E Asia

Figure 7. Reliability Index by Region for 1995: Population in Each Classification

g

Q.

o

1,800

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

11 =No Stress D 2=Low Stress • 3=Stress • 4=High Stress

Jl r l •N Amgr W Europg Pacific FSU E Europe Africa

REGION

LAmer Mid East China+ S&E Asia

Figure 8. Reliability Index by Region for 2025: Population in Each Classification

30 Raskin

o • "0.

,800

,600

,400

,200

,000

800

600

400

200

0

11=No Stress Q2=l_ow Stress H3=Stress •4=High Stress

N Amer W Europs Pacific FSU E Europe Africa L Amer Mid East Oiina+ S&E Asia

Figure 9. Use-to-Resource Index by Region for 1995: Population in Each Classification

1,600

1,400

Z 1,200

.AT

KIo

ns

PO

PU

t(m

ill

400

200

• 1=No Stress a 2

.1N Amer

AW Europs

=Low Stress E3=Stress B4=High Stress

Jl InPacific FSU E Europe Africa L Amsr

REGION

1

Mid East China* S&E Asia

Figure 10. Use-to-Resource Index by Region for 2025: Population in Each Classification

Water Futures .-Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 31

2,200

2,000

1,800

1,600

— 1,400(A

g 1,200

= 1,000

"•" 800

600400

200

0

11=No Stress D2=Low Stress B3=Stress • 4=High Stress

• I - • IN Amer W Europe Pacific FSU E Europe Africa L Amer Mid Easl China* E&E Asia

REGION

Figure 11. Coping Index by Region for 1995: Population in Each Classification

2,200

2,000

1,800

1,600

„ 1,400

O 1.200

= 1,000w 800

600

400

200

0

11=No Stress O 2=Low Stress B3=Stress • 4=High Stress

I I • JLN Amer W Europe Pacific FSU E Europe Africa

REGION

L Amer Mid Easl China+

Figure 12. Coping Index by Region for 2025: Population in Each Classification

In an effort to convey a simple "bottom line" result, we turn to the twocomposite water resource vulnerability indices introduced in Section III-A. Recallthat the first composite index adds the three stress indices (WRVI-I) and the secondtakes the maximum value of the three indices across the indices (WRVI-II). Theresults are shown in Table 8.

Focusing on WRVI-I, we see that the number of countries in stress(classifications 3 and 4) decreases from 100 in 1995 to about 89 to 92 in 2025depending on the scenario variation. This is because the improvement in copingcapacity (income growth) compensates for greater resource stress. This formulationof the composite index might appeal to those whose world view includes optimismabout the possibility for substitutability of built capital for natural capital and aboutthe capacity for economic growth alone to address adequately resource and

32 Raskin

environmental problems. However, even in this optimistic view, we see from Table 8that the number of people classified as stressed grows from about 4.2 billion in 1995to about 6.2 billion in 2025. The problem is illustrated in Figures 13 and 14 whichsuggest the increase of water resource vulnerability in developing regions.

Turning now to the second water resources vulnerability index (WRVI-II),Table 8 shows that more countries and people are classified as vulnerable than wasthe case for WRVI-I. The number so classified grows from about 5.1 billion in 1995to about 7.6 billion in 2025. Fully 90% of the world's population is reported asvulnerable in 2025, with nearly 50% highly vulnerable. The regional patterns aredisplayed in Figures 15 and 16 showing that Africa, China+ and the Middle Eastaccount for most of the stressed population in both 1995 and 2025. However, theUSA and much of Latin America now become vulnerable under the WRVI-IIformulation. The higher estimates are a result of the construction of WRVI-II inwhich vulnerability in any single index is treated as determinative of overallvulnerability. In contrast, to WRVI-I, this second formulation might appeal to thosewith a world view which is pessimistic about the substitutability of built capital fornatural capital, and sees vulnerability as being related to the weakest link in the chainof environmental pressure, resource reliability, and development.

Water Futures Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 33

Table 8. Composite Index Distribution by Country and Population

Number of

classification

19951

2

3

4

202$

CDS LOW1234

CDS MID-RANGE1

2

3

4

CDS HIGH12

34

CDS MID-RANGE (climate change1

2

3

4

CDS MID-RANGE (climate change1

2

3

4

WRVI-I

4

56

84

16

4

65

74

17

4

67

74

15

4

64

74

18

MPI)4

667317

GFDL)4

677415

Countries

WRVI-II

4

19

58

79

4

28

62

66

4

26

67

63

4

25

63

68

4

276564

4

26

68

62

Population

WRVI-I

50

1,4612,7971,388

55

2,1223,9912,228

552,0994,0612,181

551,8434,279

2,218

55

2,0905,476

774

55

2,0995,511

731

(millions)WRVI-II

50

581

1,5123,554

55

794

3,5903,957

55

714

3,712

3,915

55656

3,6544,031

55730

5,1322,479

55714

5,1692,458

1 = no vulnerability2 = low vulnerability3 - vulnerability4 = high vulnerability

34 Raskin

I

2,200

2,000

1,800

1,600

„ 1,400

0 1.20°

1 1.000

800

600

400

200

0

11=No Vulnerability D2=Low Vulnerability • ^Vulnerability •4=High Vulnerability

N Amer W Europe Pacific FSU E Europe Africa

REGION

L Amer Mid East China* S&E Asii

Figure 13. Water Resources Vulnerability Index I by Region for 1995: Population in EachClassification

.ATI

ON

ions

)P

OP

Ul

(mill

2,200

2,000

1,800

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

• 1=No Vulnerability

JlN Amer

IW Europe

•2=Low Vulnerability B3=Vulnerability B4=High Vulnerability

nPacific

1n ^ riFSU E Europe Africa L Amer Mid East China* S&E Asia

REGION

Figure 14. Water Resources Vulnerability Index I by Region for 2025: Population in EachClassification

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 35

ION

<

PO

PU

L

2,200

2,000

1,800

1,600

^ 1,400

g 1,200

(milf

600

4O0

200

0

• 1=No Vulnerability

•

J1 JN Amer W Europe

• 2=Low Vulnerability ^^Vulnerability B4=High Vulnerability

•1j L ^ J n. •

1

1JuPacific FSU E Europe Africa L Amer Mid East China-*- S&E Asia

REGION

Figure 15. Water Resources Vulnerability Index II by Region for 1995: Population in EachClassification

2,200

2,000 11 =No Vulnerability • 2=Low Vulnerability • 3=Vulnerability • 4=Hgh Vulnerability

N Amer W Europe Pacific FSU E Europe Africa L Amar Mid East China* S&E Asia

Figure 16. Water Resources Vulnerability Index II by Region for 2025: Population in EachClassification

36 Raskin

Regarding the sensitivity to climate change, we note from the tables thatnational impacts tend to cancel out, producing very little change on the global scale.However, these gross average changes probably mask considerable disruption thatmight be induced by local shifts to wetter or drier conditions. It should be noted thatthe analysis here was performed for the 2030 decadal average where globaltemperature increase is less than 1°C. A global temperature increase of more than2.0°C, commonly estimated for the year 2100 and beyond, would have more dramaticimpacts on water supplies and irrigation requirements.

The sensitivity to economic and technical assumptions is reflected in theresults for the high and low CDS cases. The low scenario shows almost no changerelative to the mid-range case in populations in any of the classes for either of theindices. This is because reduced coping capacity is counteracted by reduced water useand a lower use to supply ratio. The high case shows only minor changes in copingstress, but significant changes in stress as reflected in the use-to-resource index due togreater water use. These changes lead to significant changes in classifications in bothwater resource vulnerability indices. However, comparing the results for the twocomposite indices in Table 8, we conclude that the basic findings of this study arerobust against the economic, technological and climate change variations considered.

The results are displayed geographically for the year 2025 for each of thecomponent stress indices in Figures 17 through 19. The composite water resourcevulnerability indices are mapped in Figures 20 and 21, respectively. The picturesreflect a range of assumptions and philosophical dispositions. But in all casesconsidered, we can conclude that problems of water stress and vulnerability are likelyto persist and grow with time. That is, unless initiatives are taken to transition awayfrom a Conventional Development Scenario and toward water sustainability.

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 37

Classification

no stress

low stress

stress

high stress

Figure 17. Reliability Index for 2025

38 Raskin

Figure 18. Use-to-Resource Index for 2025

Figure 19. Coping Capacity Index for 2025

Classification

^ ^ | no stress

HUH low stress

WS?\ stress| ^ H high stress

Water Futures.Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 39

Figure 20. Water Resources Vulnerability Index I for 2025

Figure 21. Water Resources Vulnerability Index II for 2025

40 Raskin

4. TOWARDS WATER SUSTAINABILITYThis study has examined water issues at global, regional and national levels ofanalysis. To examine possible conditions in the future, a long-term ConventionalDevelopment Scenario was introduced. The scenario incorporates commonly heldassumptions on population and economic growth, progressive globalization of cultureand commerce, and a gradual convergence of developing and industrial economies. Aframework was developed for evaluating water stress and vulnerability today and inthe future, which included a set of indices to gauge the degree of pressure on waterresources, the reliability of those resources and the economic capacity to cope withwater adversity. The scenario — were it to occur — shows persistent and serious waterproblems which deepen with time. A conventional picture of development includesgrowing stress on water resources, human health and eco-systems. Moreover, thescenario contains the seeds of continuing socio-economic problems due to thepersistence of poverty, the failure to achieve global equity and the increase in localconflict over scarce water and other resources.

4.1 Policy ConsiderationsBut no scenario is inevitable, the future is determined, at least in part, by the actionsthat are taken to avoid unsustainable futures. What alternative scenarios should beconsidered? What types of initiatives could foster water sustainability?

The task is to find a pathway to a vision of a future society which isenvironmentally and socially sustainable, and which can endure and flourish in amanner which respects human rights, preserves ecosystems and provides a decent lifefor all. This must include acting to improve human health, food security, andemployment opportunities all in a context which keeps aggregate human pressures onnatural resource and environmental systems within tolerance levels for sustainability.

A sustainable water vision would include initiatives for promoting the rapiddevelopment and deployment of technologies that are highly environmentallyfriendly. This would require a mobilization of political will to introduce programs andpolicies for the deployment of highly efficient end use equipment (e.g., irrigationsystems, household fixtures and toilets, industrial processes), water recovery andground-surface water conjunctive use projects, improved water system managementtechniques, drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, and environmental protectionand reclamation activities.

The evaluation has shown a correlation of future water vulnerability topersistent poverty in developing regions, in the context of rapid population growth.To address the equity aspects of sustainability, the alternative vision would assumestronger convergence of development between poor and rich countries. Acceleratedindustrialization throughout the developing world is fostered by a combination ofeconomic globalization led by transnational corporations, concerted internationalpolicy, strengthening of market and financial institutions, and open technologytransfer. Aggregate consumption levels are driven higher as average per capitaincomes increase. In scenarios with greater equity, it is likely that demands on watersystems would increase relative to CDS levels, all else equal, due to more rapidgrowth in consumption and production in the populous developing regions. However,this could be offset by the effects of a greater economic capacity to deploy efficient

Water Futures.Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 41

water-use technology, less population growth and stronger institutional capacity tomange water resources better.

Beyond better technology and greater equity, one can conceive of fundamentalchanges in social organization and values that could contribute positively to watersustainability. For example, more dispersed settlement patterns based on communitieswith tighter integration of work and personal life could slow urbanization andassociated water and health pressures. Population growth could moderate with the riseof the sustainability world-view, the empowerment of women and a more equitabledistribution of wealth. Consumerism could be supplanted by a philosophy ofvoluntary simplicity which seeks a comfortable, but not profligate, level of materialwell-being, as society strives for a high degree of economic and social equality, againreducing water stress. Small scale technology and greater degrees of regional self-reliance could complement global infrastructures and trade.

There is a growing international consensus on the principles that shouldgovern water policy (United Nations, 1992b; Young et. al., 1994, World Bank,1993b). Under these principles, actions should be based on a comprehensive analytic

framework, proper valuation of water resources, environmental protection,stakeholder participation, capacity building, and institutional coordination anddecentralization. Though a detailed policy discussion is beyond the scope of thispaper, (policy implications are taken up in Chapter 4 of the ComprehensiveFreshwater Assessment), a water sector policy agenda for a transition to watersustainability would clearly seek to avert water conflict, control pollution, avoiddegradation of agriculture lands, prevent drought-related crop failures and provideadequate urban water and sanitation infrastructure. These goals require appropriatemanagement initiatives, such as water-sharing regulations, water quality policy, landfertility protection, drought-proofing technologies, and water infrastructure provisionand maintenance.

More generally, as we have seen, water is part of a complex socio-ecologicalsystem that is evolving in uncertain ways. Thus, there are many factors drivingproblems of water provision and water resources. We have stressed that the waterproblem is intersectoral — interacting strongly with agriculture, energy use, socio-economic development, and ecosystems — and spatially nested — having river basinswhich are parts of countries, which are parts of regions, which are parts of a globalsystem.

Consequently, the chain of influences effecting water resources and use can bequite indirect. As we have argued, global drivers can have a strong influence on theeconomic development, environmental conditions and water requirements at nationaland river basin levels. Furthermore, policies that affect a range of local activities —farming practices in agriculture, settlement patterns, energy needs and options,economic growth, demographics, etc. — can have important implications for water, aswell. For these reasons, in the transition to sustainability, water planning and policymust be comprehensive and integrated, taking into account the interplay betweenwater and other factors both now and in future scenarios.

42 Raskin

4.2 The Transition to Water Sustainability: A Vision5

As we have seen, under conventional development conditions, the world of the futureis likely to require a share of the Earth's limited renewable fresh water that is evenlarger than today's. This water will come at an increasing financial and ecologicalprice. The Conventional Development Scenario, with the nagging water supply andenvironmental problems identified above, is not inevitable. The future is uncertain,unpredictable, and complex — and dependent on human choices yet to be made.

But we know where we are today with millions dying every year from water-related diseases, the destruction of aquatic ecosystems and fisheries worldwide,growing political disputes over water that crosses political borders, and increasingcompetition for water in water-short regions. The CDS examines a future based onpresent policies and institutions, the gradual evolution of technological trends, andconventional assumptions on population growth and economic development. As wehave seen in Section HI, under these conditions, many areas of the world will continueto face water stress, billions of people will be unserved or underserved by basic waterservices, and the natural environment will continue to suffer.

Conventional development visions follow a road toward a future that looksmuch like today, a road that many would not elect to take if there were a choice. Wedo have a choice. We can choose a different path and a different future. But we mustmake that choice soon, for every day we delay, moves us further in the wrongdirection.

Many alternative futures can be imagined. Some representing far worse socio-economic and environmental conditions than envisioned in the CDS, others far morefavorable (Gallopin et al., 1996). Unless we visualize where we want to be, it will notbe possible to craft the policies and institutions - and to apply the technologies andtools — that will take us there. And once having described a future, there can be noguarantee we can ever attain it. In the end, a vision is not a prediction. It is a storyabout the directions the future can take. Here is one vision of a transition to watersustainability.

It is the year 2050. The population of the earth has reached nearly 10 billionand is stabilizing. Major efforts have been undertaken to restore the environment forthe sustainable development of humankind at a decent quality of life. In particular,these efforts have focused on fresh water, recognized as an essential renewableresource.

Beginning in the 1990s, a series of major international water conferences andmeetings refocused global attention on freshwater issues, particularly the humansuffering resulting from the lack of access to basic water supplies, inadequateavailability of sanitation services, and the growing threats to global food sufficiencydue to declining per-capita irrigated land and grain production. At the same time,political conflicts over shared international rivers and watercourses raised the issue ofenvironmental security to the highest political levels. Last but not least, therelationship between freshwater resources and long-term ecosystem health wasincreasingly highlighted.

By the end of the 1990s, progress had been made toward identifying a seriesof explicit goals and principles to guide long-term water planning and management.

' This section is drawn from Gleick (1996).

Water Futures:Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 43

Building on the Mar del Plata, Dublin, and UNCED Agenda 21 principles, these goalshave often been modified and refined in the intervening decades, but they mark thefirst explicit attempt to integrate water resources supply, use, and management in atruly sustainable way.

As a top international priority, basic human needs for water were identifiedand have at last been largely met. At the Earth Summit of 2002, "Universal Access"programs (for water, food, telecommunications, education, and health service) wereadopted by all nations, and access to clean water was made a top and permanentpriority. Governments, aid agencies, private corporations, and non-governmentalorganizations joined forces in the Global Water Partnership to meet the goal ofproviding this basic need universally with a flexible and varied combination oftechnologies and institutions. By 2025, 95 percent of the global population had accessto a basic water requirement for drinking, sanitation services, cleaning, and foodpreparation. The financial cost of meeting these basic needs has proven to be modestand far outweighed by vast savings in health costs, improvements in workerproductivity, and the freeing up of time for women and children for educational,commercial, and community activities.

At the same time, domestic water use in the developed world has becomemuch more efficient and equitably allocated. The efficiency improvements begun inthe late 1990s to cope with droughts, and to avoid the need for expensive andcontroversial new supplies, have been extended to all reaches of domestic life. Totalmunicipal supplies are widely supplemented by extensive use of reclaimed urbanwastewater for non-potable uses and inexpensive water efficiency equipment iswidely available.

Advocates of desalination believe that large-scale cost-effective systems arejust a decade or two away. The price has dropped substantially due to the availabilityof inexpensive photovoltaic systems, but capital construction and maintenance costsremain above the costs of demand management programs in most regions. In aridrural coastal areas lacking municipal water infrastructure, basic needs are being metby small modular solar desalination systems. More widespread solar desalination ispracticed in arid coastal countries where water-use efficiency is high, wateravailability is low, investment capital is available, and solar energy is abundant,particularly in the Persian Gulf and North Africa.

Water-related diseases are being conquered. The international effort to meetthe basic water requirements of all people, combined with effective education aboutsanitation practices and wide improvements in access and quality of medical care,have greatly reduced both the prevalence and severity of human suffering from water-related diseases. Guinea worm was the first water-related disease to be eliminated,around the turn of the century. Attention then turned to schistosomiasis and trachoma,both of which were completely eradicated by 2030. The incidence of childhooddiarrhea has also been drastically reduced as the sources have been identified andattacked and as treatment has become universally available. Cholera has been broughtunder control after the seventh (1991 to 2003) and eighth (2009 to 2016) greatpandemics. Malaria and typhoid, which have expanded in range, still plague certainregions, but biological controls of disease vectors are making inroads on the drug-resistant strains prevalent during the early part of the century. The links between avariety of cancers and chemical contamination of water in the heavily industrialized

44 Raskin

nations continue to be discovered, but new methods for preventing suchcontamination and for cleaning up contaminated waters are reducing health risks.

The spread of cryptosporidium and new strains of bacteria throughout NorthAmerica, Japan, and Europe was halted by 2020 through the wider application of acombination of watershed protection policies and effective large-scale filtrationtechnology. At the height of the worst urban outbreaks, an enormous demand forbottled water and home water-purification systems developed in the richer markets.This market has now largely disappeared and most large cities now send samples oftheir drinking water to the annual taste-testing competition held every summer at thefamous Stockholm Water Festival in an effort to win the prestigious annual prize forthe best-tasting urban drinking water on each continent.

Serious water-related conflicts are now regularly resolved in formalnegotiations. The early part of the 21st century saw a series of minor and majorwater-related conflicts. After the military skirmishes between Hungary and Slovakiaacross the Danube, the more serious intra-regional conflicts in India and southernAsia over the Cauvery, Narmada, Ganges, and Mekong rivers, and the intentionalcontamination of shared groundwater aquifers on the border between the UnitedStates and Mexico, new international water tribunals were set up to hear and mediatedisputes. By 2010, however, unresolved disputes in southern Africa over thedevelopment of regional rivers and the bombings of both Turkish and Syrian dams onthe Euphrates led to a widely attended international diplomatic Congress, at whichbinding principles of conflict resolution and negotiation were accepted.

In the years following the Congress, formal treaties and river basincommissions were put in place for nearly all of the world's major shared rivers. TheNew Nile River Treaty of 2017, for example, has been signed by all 14 nations of theNile Basin and includes provisions for sharing both water and water experts. Thesetreaties also include allocation agreements during droughts and floods, provisions forformal negotiations of disputes, and a sharing of responsibility for environmental andecological protections. Upon request, United Nation hydrologists and environmentalscientists help to monitor water treaties remotely using on-site survey equipment andthe orbiting "Hydra" satellite system, which provides real-time observations of waterconditions everywhere on the Earth.

The Middle East — a region thought by many to be the most vulnerable towater-related conflicts - has turned out to be a model for regional cooperation andwater sharing. Effective joint basin management commissions, first set up betweenIsrael and Jordan in the treaty of 1994 over the Jordan River, have now beenestablished for the Tigris, Euphrates, and Orontes rivers. After sporadic conflict overdam projects on the Euphrates River, international negotiators helped Turkey, Syria,and Iraq work out a sharing arrangement that equitably distributed both the benefitsand the costs of river developments. A water-sharing agreement has been worked outbetween the Israelis and the Palestinians over groundwater aquifers in the West Bank.

Basic ecosystems water needs are being identified and met. The massextinction in the Aral Sea and Lake Victoria in the 1980s and 1990s and in theYangtze and Mekong rivers in the 2010s, combined with widespread extinction inother aquatic systems, led to the adoption of national and international actions toprotect ecosystems. Since 2025, the number and types of internationally threatenedand endangered aquatic species have begun to diminish following implementation of

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 45

comprehensive minimum environmental water commitments, internationalagreements on species protection and management, and the identification andprotection of critical habitats around the world. All international aid and developmentprojects now include explicit ecosystem protection and management components.

Restoration efforts are also well underway in coastal and inland wetlandsaround the world following the collapse of coastal fisheries in Asia, the NorthAtlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and along the coastline of western Africa. Internationaldelta protection agreements are in place for the Mekong, the Nile, the Niger, theZambesi, the Ganges/Brahmaputra, the Colorado, and dozens of other internationalrivers. The loss of wetlands has been stopped, and innovative management is nowactually creating new wetlands at the mouth of many of the largest rivers in the world.The Mississippi River delta has begun to expand rapidly following a plan designed togive in to the river's natural inclinations to meander.

Regional monitoring programs are keeping exotic species invasions to aminimum and international teams of ecologists are working to eliminate invasionsthat have successfully taken hold. The zebra mussel still clogs waterways in NorthAmerica, but the water hyacinth is being defeated in Africa. The sea lamprey,accidentally introduced into the Great Lakes region of the United States and Canadawas unintentionally wiped out by commercial over fishing in the 2010. It had beenidentified as a delicacy in the late 1990s and widely exported to Europe and Asia forover a decade.

Following the 2015 agreement among the six nations sharing the Aral Seabasin, flows of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers into the Sea have reached theirhighest levels in half a century. The agreement instituted effective joint watermanagement among the parties, a substantial reduction in cotton production in theregion, and vast improvements in irrigation efficiency. The surface area of the AralSea is now approximately 55,000 square kilometers, an increase of nearly 30 percentsince the 1990s, but still more than 10,000 square kilometers below natural levels.The devastating health problems suffered by the regions inhabitants from the 1980sthrough the early part of the 21st century are abating, and work is underway to restorea fishery in the Sea.

Agricultural water is now efficiently used and allocated. One of the greatestconcerns facing the world in the early part of the 21st century was the challenge ofproducing food for the world's billions. Shortfalls of grain began to appear in the firstdecade of the new millennium as major nations such as China began to make largepurchases on the international markets. By 2012, China, India, Nigeria, Indonesia,Egypt, and Bangladesh were competing in world markets for grain, while traditionalexporters such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States had cut back onexport volumes to meet internal and regional needs. Saudi Arabia, a major wheatexporter in the 1980s and 1990s, saw its agricultural exports collapse aftergroundwater overdraft depleted or permanently damaged its fossil aquifers.

Between 2012 and 2018, the simultaneous great droughts in North American,Chinese, and Indian led to the reappearance of famines in Africa and southern Asia,as well as extremely high food prices in the United States and Canada. Food riots inthe winter of 2017 in the USA and seven European countries forced a re-evaluation offood and water policies, the elimination of water subsidies, widespread improvementsin irrigation efficiency, and substantial shifts in cropping patterns.

46 Raskin

By 2020, the return of the rains and the new policy changes began to reducepressures and to increase the nutritional status of the world's poorest inhabitants. Inparticular, the enormous regional disparities in diet evident at the end of the 20thcentury began to close, as the large-scale consumption of meat in the industrializedworld decreased. A rapid drop in beef and lamb consumption, driven by higher prices,the public health disasters in Great Britain, the EC, Japan, and the United Statesattributed to contaminated meat, better education about the adverse health effects ofeating meat, and new policies on land management, has freed up substantial quantitiesof land, irrigation capacity, and grain and cereal crops for direct human consumption.

At the same time, new varieties of rainfed crops began to appear on themarket. These genetically improved crops have substantially increased yields fromrainfed lands, which remain the majority of all agricultural land. A renewed interest intraditional farming techniques in semi-arid regions combined with inexpensive high-tech water monitoring equipment and new crop varieties has encouraged a rethinkingof agricultural aid policies, improved production without new irrigation requirements,and resulted in great demand for farming advice from experts in developing countries.

On irrigated lands, overall irrigation efficiency has improved dramaticallywith the universal adoption of high-efficiency sprinklers and drip irrigation onappropriate crops and lands. Water-use efficiency has also improved due to advancesin sensor and computer technology that permit farmers to inexpensively andaccurately monitor soil moisture and to apply water only when needed. Many farmersare now tied directly into regional weather forecasting centers that help avoidunnecessary irrigation prior to natural precipitation. The trend away from pesticideand herbicide use, and toward integrated pest management and the use of innovativeground cover, has further reduced overall irrigation requirements while maintaininghigh yields, soil fertility, and water quality.

In many arid countries, limited but highly efficient agricultural production isstill maintained with high-quality reclaimed urban wastewater. Middle East waterexperts, who pioneered this approach, are in high demand in many parts of Africa,Asia, and Latin America as countries make an effort to maximize their use of thisunder-utilized resource.

By 2030, great improvements in food distribution and storage permittedcountries to rely more on international markets and have reduced the impacts ofsevere droughts and other forms of climatic variability. Water trading among marketsectors is common, reflecting a greater emphasis on economic mechanisms to meetwater needs. Communities have a major say in water trading, however, and the priceof water reflects community and environmental values, as well as purely marketvalues.

A new focus on global food sufficiency has replaced the old nationalisticconcept of food security, which led many countries in arid and semi-arid regions tooverdraft fossil groundwater and invest in unsustainable irrigation projects during thelate 1900s. International development efforts have refocused on non-agriculturaldevelopments in water-short countries, such as industrial and commercial activities.These activities provide sufficient capital to permit food-buying nations to meet foodshortfalls on the international market. No country in the world is completely foodself-sufficient, yet the world as a whole maintains adequate food production and

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems Al

storage. Average populations in all regions now receive the minimum recommendednumber of calories, though pockets of malnourishment still remain.

Among the unresolved problems of the 21st century is the question of how bestto address the impacts of the greenhouse effect. All efforts at rational watermanagement continue to be complicated by the effects of global climate change.Global warming was recognized by the scientific community in the 1980s and 1990s,but it was not seriously acknowledged by politicians until well after 2000, at whichpoint it was too late to prevent many major impacts.

Climatic changes have had particularly severe effects on regional waterresources management. Rainfall patterns have changed, the frequency and intensity ofstorms has increased in many places, and reservoirs and municipal water supplysystems designed for one set of conditions have had to be redesigned or managed forquite different conditions. One positive outcome has been the training of a whole newgeneration of water managers much more comfortable with the concepts ofoperational flexibility and resilient water management, rather than relying on thetraditional approach of using past trends to forecast future conditions.

Despite these remaining uncertainties and the continuing challenges facingwater managers and planners everywhere, the wide sharing of water data andinformation on successful management strategies and the great improvements sincethe late 1990s have led to a spirit of international cooperation throughout the world'swater community. The enormous efforts of the past several decades have led to thefeeling that the worst threats to global and regional stability from water problems arefinally behind us and that sustainable water management will be a permanent fixturethroughout the world.

48 Raskin

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Bongaarts, J. 1994. "Population Policy Options in the developing World." Science.263:771-776.

Bulatao, R., E. Bos, P. Stephens and M. Vu. 1989. Population Projections.Washington, DC: World Bank. Working Paper 5328-331.

Daly, H. 1993. "The Perils of Free Trade". Scientific American, November 1993.de Mare, Lennart. 1976. Resources - Needs - Problems: An Assessment of the World

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Fiering M. and N. Matalas. 1990. "Decision-Making Under Uncertainty. In P.Waggoner (ed.). Climate Change and the US Water Resources. New York: JohnWiley and Sons.

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 1992. 'Agrostat' computer diskettes.Rome: UN Food and Agriculture Organization. This data base includes thecontents of FAO's Production Yearbooks and Food Balance Sheets for allcountries since 1961.

. 1995. Irrigation in Africa in Figures, Water Reports 7. Rome: FAO.Funtowicz, S. and J. Ravetz. 1993. "Science for the Post-Normal Age", Futures 25:

739-755.Gallopin, G. 1994. Impoverishment and Sustainable Development. A Systems

Approach. Winnipeg, Canada: International Institute for SustainableDevelopment.

Gallopin, G,, A. Hammond, P. Raskin, and R. Swart. 1997 (forthcoming). BranchPoints: Global Scenarios and Human Choice. Stockholm: StockholmEnvironment Institute.

Gleick, J. 1987. Chaos: Making of a New Science. New York: Viking.Gleick, P.H. 1990. "Vulnerability of Water Systems". In P. Waggoner (ed.). Climate

Change and the US Water Resources. New York: John Wiley and Sons.Gleick, P.H. 1997. Water 2050: A Sustainable Vision. Oakland, CA: Pacific Institute

for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security. (Report prepared forthe Comprehensive Freshwater Assessment, in preparation).

Goodland, R., H. Daly, and S. El Serafy. 1992. Population, Technology, and Lifestyle.Washington, DC: Island Press.

Harrison, P. 1992. The Third Revolution. Environment, Population and a SustainableWorld. London: I.B. Tauris & Co.

Haub, C. 1994. Population Reference Bureau, Inc. Private Communication.Heady, E. and R. Hexem. 1978. Water Production Functions for Irrigated

Agriculture. Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press.

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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 1990a. Climate Change; TheIPCC Scientific Assessment. J. Houghton, G. Jenkins, and J. Ephraums, Eds.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

. 1990b. Emissions Scenarios. Prepared by the Response Strategies WorkingGroup of the IPCC. (April).

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. 1992b. 1992 IPCC Supplement. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.International Commission of Large Dams (ICOLD). 1988. World Register of Dams.

Paris: ICOLD.Kendall, H., and D. Pimentel. 1994. "Constraints on the Expansion of the Global

Food Supply," Ambio 23/3:198-205.Kulshreshtha, S. 1993. World Water Resources and Regional Vulnerability: Impact of

Future Changes. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for AppliedSystems Analysis.

Leach, G. 1995. Global Land and Food Supply in the 21st Century. Stockholm:Stockholm Environment Institute.

Legates and Willmott. 1990. Global Gridded Database of Precipitation andTemperature (electronic version). Boulder, CO: National Center forAtmospheric Research.

Lele, S. 1991. "Sustainable Development: A Critical Review", World Development,Vol. 19, p. 607-621.

L'vovich, M. 1974. World Water Resources and their Future. English translation byR. L. Nace published in 1979, American Geophysical Union, Chelsea,Michigan: LithoCrafters, Inc.

Meybeck, M, D. Chapman, ,and R. Helmer. 1989. Global Freshwater Quality, A FirstAssessment. World Health Organization and United Nations EnvironmentProgramme. Cambridge, U.S.A.: Blackwell.

Najlis, P. (Officer-in-charge, Energy and Natural Resources Branch. Division forSustainable Development, DPCSD). 1996. personal communication.

National Science Foundation (NSF). 1989. Small Machines, Large Opportunities: AReport on the Emerging Field of Microdynamics. Washington, DC: NationalScience Foundation.

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50 Raskin

Shaw, R., G. Gallopin, P. Weaver and S. Oberg. 1991. Sustainable Development: ASystems Approach. Laxenberg, Austria: International Institute for AppliedSystems Analysis.

Shiklomanov, I. 1993. "World Fresh Water Resources" in P. Gleick (ed.). Water inCrisis. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shiklomanov, I. 1996. Assessment of Water Resources and Water Availability in theWorld. Prepared for Background Document for Chapter 2 of ComprehensiveFreshwater Assessment. St. Petersburg: State Hydrological Institute.

Strzepek, K., Niemann, Somlyody and S. Kulreshthsa. 1996. A Global Assessment ofNational Water Resources Vulnerabilities: Sensitivities, Assumptions, andDriving Forces. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied SystemsAnalysis (forthcoming).

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. 1992a. Long-Range World Population Projections. New York: United NationsPopulation Division.

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Young, G., J. Dooge, and J. Rodda. 1994. Global Water Resource Issues. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Water FuturesrAssessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 51

APPENDIX 1: CURRENT DATA

CountryN AMERICACanadaUSA

W EUROPEAustriaBelgiumBosnia/HerzeCroatiaDenmarkFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceIcelandIrelandItalyMacedoniaNetherlandsNorwayPortugalSloveniaSpainSwedenSwitzerlandTurkeyUKYugoslavia

PACIFICAustraliaFijiJapanNew Zealand

FSUArmeniaAzerbaijanBelarusEstoniaGeorgia

GDP/cap.(1994$)

19,51025,880

24,63022,870

1,5002,000

27,97018,85023,42025,5807,700

24,63013,53019,300

82022,01026,3909,3206,490

13,44023,53035,7602,500

18,3402,000

18,0002,250

34,63013,350

660730

2,8703,080

580

Withdrawal(106

47,246492,259

2,4249,2371,3541,7601,2102,243

38,57047,303

7,109167808

56,362847

8,0392,0777,257

76230,9682,9901,146

36,23711,9294,248

27,31233

91,9451,992

4,10917,0612,9793,2204,054

1995Supply

cubic meters)

2,901,0002,478,000

90,30012,500

265,000265,000

13,000113,000198,000171,00058,700

168,00050,000

167,000265,00090,000

392,00069,600

265,000111,300180,00050,000

193,10071,000

265,000

343,00028,600

547,000327,000

13,30033,00073,80017,60065,200

Storage

791,916898,000

2,491171n.a.n.a.29

18,88012,6422,582

11,4501,464

94111,095

n.a.9,3666,3807,744

n.a.54,61221,435

n.a.179,816

8,207508,269

92,274153

88,17622,729

n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.

Imports(% supply)

21

383343431539

4423065

4389

24543

12

1540

43

0000

1661292712

Coeff. ofVariation

0.050.05

0.190.100.150.120.060.040.100.110.110.170.090.160.130.030.120.160.110.150.060.190.110.100.12

0.060.190.120.19

0.060.060.020.070.06

See text for data sources.

52 Raskin

CountryKazakhstanKyrgyztanLatviaLithuaniaMoldovaRussiaTajikistanTurkmenistanUkraineUzbekistan

E EUROPEAlbaniaBulgariaCzech Rep.HungaryPolandRomaniaSlovakia

AFRICAAlgeriaAngolaBeninBotswanaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCape VerdeCARChadComorosCongoCote d'lvoireDjiboutiEgyptEq. GuineaEritreaEthiopiaGabonGambiaGhanaGuinea

GDP/cap.(1994 $)

1,560850

2,0101,3201,0602,340

4701,0002,210

970

3801,2503,2003,8402,4101,2701,950

1,650900370

2,800300160680930370180510620610780720430100100

3,880330410520

Withdrawal(106

44,13812,953

6734,4163,787

116,42214,95026,18634,62391,842

35613,5762,7276,678

12,34925,173

1,818

5,042628154120412127500

3085

2181351

94111

55,43212

2402,156

7836

325936

1995Supply

cubic meters)169,40061,70034,00024,20013,700

4,498,000101,30072,000

231,000129,600

21,300205,000

58,200120,00056,200

208,00030,800

14,300184,00025,80014,70017,5003,600

268,000300

141,00043,000

1,020832,00077,700

2,30068,50030,000

8,800110,000164,000

8,00053,200

226,000

Storage

n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.

5,0497,6894,394

212,824

12,569n.a.

7,95910,757

1,734155

2,0030

13,5260000

4437,219

0174,535

00

914220

0296,113

241

Imports(% supply)

330

494383

547961576

5391

0951282

0

30

6080

00000

650

731

8797

068

00

6343

0

Coeff. ofVariation

0.070.150.020.020.040.060.020.120.040.08

0.150.120.090.050.050.080.14

0.140.070.060.070.060.090.050.120.030.110.090.040.050.230.440.070.190.120.040.110.060.08

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 53

CountryGuinea-BissauKenyaLesothoLiberiaLibyaMadagascarMalawiMaliMauritaniaMauritiusMoroccoMozambiqueNamibiaNigerNigeriaRwandaSenegalSierra LeoneSomaliaSouth AfricaSudanSwazilandTanzaniaTogoTunisiaUgandaZaireZambiaZimbabwe

L AMERICAArgentinaBoliviaBrazilChileColombiaCosta RicaCubaDominican R.EcuadorEl SalvadorGuatemalaGuyana

GDP/cap.(1994$)

240250720500

1,000200170250480

3,1501,140

901,970

230280

80600160300

3,040300

1,100140320

1,790190300350500

8,110770

2,9703,5201,6702,400

8001,3301,2801,3601,200

530

Withdrawal(106

222,454

62168

4,75123,135

9711,7461,851

39011,540

655278628

4,648809

1,702445914

14,89017,800

7581,193

1153,391

217422

1,7591,527

35,8121,557

46,85623,203

6,0311,4649,5853,4836,6771,0841,5011,501

1995Supply

cubic meters)27,00030,2005,200

232,000600

337,00018,700

100,00011,4002,200

30,000216,00045,50032,500

280,0006,300

39,400160,00013,50050,000

154,0004,500

89,00012,0009,000

66,0001,019,000

116,00020,000

994,000300,000

6,950,000468,000

1,070,00095,00034,50020,000

314,00019,000

116,000241,000

Storage

02,357

70

336425

313,440

0560

8,072632

041,338

011,520

220

28,6893

2501,1351,7112,685

20053

208165,021

123,6990

706,2597,7779,9652,2261,6182,2267,025

174460

0

Imports(% supply)

41330

14006

4096

00

548689210

330

56107742104

4441

83130

300

25000000000

Coeff. ofVariation

0.130.140.110.110.260.090.120.130.140.090.200.070.140.140.070.100.120.090.150.110.140.140.080.070.180.080.040.040.06

0.120.110.040.270.130.180.070.160.240.080.260.09

See text for data sources.

54 Raskin

CountryHaitiHondurasJamaicaMexicoNicaraguaPanamaParaguayPeruSurinameTrinidad/Tob.UruguayVenezuela

MID EASTAfghanistanBahrainIranIraqIsraelJordanKuwaitLebanonOmanQatarSaudi ArabiaSyriaUAEYemen

CHINA+ChinaKorea (DPR)LaosMongoliaViet Nam

S & E ASIABangladeshBhutanCambodiaIndiaIndonesiaKorea (Rep.)

GDP/cap.(1994 $)

230600

1,5404,180

3402,5801,5802,110

8603,7404,6602,760

3007,4602,0001,000

14,53014,44019,420

1,5005,140

12,8207,0501,346

21,430280

5301,000

320300200

220400230320880

8,260

Withdrawal(106

471,656

41484,209

1,6881,975

54118,726

518163

4,3254,446

35,704334

85,60852,2592,277

907472

1,178524226

5,09210,907

6573,397

504,31516,407

1,260657

30,851

26,46723

660607,227

83,06129,558

1995Supply

cubic meters)11,00063,400

8,300357,400175,000144,000314,00040,000

200,0005,100

124,0001,317,000

50,000290

117,500109,200

2,2001,700

7585,6002,103

1958,760

53,700797

4,902

2,800,00067,000

270,00024,600

376,000

2,357,00095,000

498,1002,085,0002,530,000

66,100

Storage

011,353

220101,458

4605,314

33,2903,854

2048

17,345163,757

3,1580

16,36469,683

0830000

3,039327

00

279,12234,2867,400

0165

6,501311237

267,35714,24914,153

Imports(% supply)

0130000

70000

5235

000

6023240

11000

5200

00000

420

821100

Coeff. ofVariation

0.160.150.180.130.130.120.050.220.040.050.090.11

0.130.100.130.120.290.300.100.400.210.020.100.180.060.24

0.110.080.090.080.10

0.110.350.120.100.070.07

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 55

CountryMalaysiaMyanmarNepalPakistanPapua/NGPhilippinesSingaporeSri LankaThailand

GDP/cap.(1994$)

3,480660200430

1,240950

22,500640

2,410

Withdrawal(106

13,0584,6943,284

278,844120

49,035211

10,41035,042

1995Supply

cubic meters)456,000

1,082,000170,000468,000801,000323,000

60043,200

179,000

Storage

23,6402,324

14522,981

337,088

756,272

58,660

Imports(% supply)

000

360000

39

Coeff. ofVariation

0.080.130.150.130.100.120.080.200.10

See text for data sources.

56 Raskin

APPENDIX 2: SCENARIO RESULTS FOR 2025

CountryN AMERICACanadaUSA

W EUROPEAustriaBelgiumBosnia/HerzeCroatiaDenmarkFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceIcelandIrelandItalyMacedoniaNetherlandsNorwayPortugalSloveniaSpainSwedenSwitzerlandTurkeyUKYugoslavia

PACIFICAustraliaFijiJapanNew Zealand

FSUArmeniaAzerbaijanBelarusEstoniaGeorgia

Conventional Development ScenarioGDP/person (1990LOW

32,45943,057

44,07540,9262,6843,579

50,05233,73241,91045,77513,77944,07524,21234,537

1,46739,38747,22516,67811,61424,05142,10762,4654,474

32,8193,579

26,4083,301

50,80619,586

1,7891,9787,7778,3471,572

MID

34,88446,274

47,36943,9842,8853,846

53,79236,25345,04249,19614,80947,36926,02137,118

1,57742,33050,75417,92412,48225,84845,25367,1334,808

35,2723,846

28,3823,548

54,60321,050

1,9092,1128,3038,9101,678

US$)HIGH

37,48549,724

50,90147,264

3,1004,133

57,80338,95648,40052,86415,91350,90127,96139,886

1,69545,48654,53819,26113,41227,77548,62872,139

5,16737,9024,133

30,4983,812

58,67522,620

2,0382,2548,8629,5101,791

WithdrawalLOW

49,559516,358

2,5549,7351,4271,8551,2752,363

40,64949,8527,492

176852

59,399893

8,4722,1887,648

80332,6373,1511,207

38,18912,5724,477

28,91335

97,3342,109

4,89020,3033,5453,8324,825

for 2025(106 cubic

MID

54,127563,962

2,78110,597

1,5542,0191,3882,573

44,24954,267

8,156191927

64,659972

9,2222,3828,325

87435,5273,4311,314

41,57113,6854,873

31,29338

105,3492,282

5,28421,940

3,8314,1415,213

meters)HIGH

59,094615,707

3,02611,532

1,6912,1971,5102,800

48,15259,0548,876

2081,009

70,3641,057

10,0362,5929,060

95138,6623,7331,430

45,23914,8925,303

33,86441

114,0012,470

5,70923,7024,1394,4735,632

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 57

CountryKazakhstanKyrgyztanLatviaLithuaniaMoldovaRussiaTajikistanTurkmenistanUkraineUzbekistan

E EUROPEAlbaniaBulgariaCzech Rep.HungaryPolandRomaniaSlovakia

AFRICAAlgeriaAngolaBeninBotswanaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCape VerdeCARChadComorosCongoCote d'lvoireDjiboutiEgyptEq. GuineaEritreaEthiopiaGabonGambiaGhanaGuinea

Conventional Development ScenarioGDP/person (1990LOW4,2272,3035,4473,5772,8736,3411,2742,7105,9892,629

6652,1895,6036,7244,2202,2243,414

2,7671,509

6214,696

503268

1,1411,560

621302855

1,0401,0231,3081,208

721168168

6,508553688872

MID4,5132,4595,8153,8193,0666,7691,3602,8936,3932,806

7102,3365,9807,1764,5042,3733,644

2,9241,595

6564,962

532284

1,2051,648

656319904

1,0991,0811,3821,276

762177177

6,876585727922

US$)HIGH4,8172,6256,2064,0763,2737,2251,4513,0886,8242,995

7582,4936,3827,6584,8062,5333,889

3,0891,685

6935,242

562300

1,2731,741

693337955

1,1611,1421,4601,348

805187187

7,264618768974

WithdrawalLOW

52,52315,414

8005,2544,507

138,54117,79031,16141,201

109,291

43516,5853,3318,158

15,08630,752

2,220

7,230900221172591181717

43122312

1973

1,35016

79,48717

3443,092

11252

4661,343

for 2025(106 cubic

MID56,75816,657

8655,6784,870

149,71119,22533,67344,523

118,103

47117,9803,6118,844

16,35433,337

2,407

7,706960236184629193764

461303332077

1,43917

84,71819

3663,296

11956

4971,431

meters)HIGH

61,31817,995

9346,1345,261

161,73820,76936,37848,100

127,590

51119,4843,9139,584

17,72336,1272,609

8,2121,023

25119667120681449

1393542282

1,53318

90,27820

3903,512

12759

5301,525

See text for data sources.

58 Raskin

CountryGuinea-BissauKenyaLesothoLiberiaLibyaMadagascarMalawiMaliMauritaniaMauritiusMoroccoMozambiqueNamibiaNigerNigeriaRwandaSenegalSierra LeoneSomaliaSouth AfricaSudanSwazilandTanzaniaTogoTunisiaUgandaZaireZambiaZimbabwe

L AMERICAArgentinaBoliviaBrazilChileColombiaCosta RicaCubaDominican REcuadorEl SalvadorGuatemalaGuyana

Conventional Development ScenarioGDP/person (1990LOW

403419

1,208839

1,677335285419805

5,2831,912

1513,304

386470134

1,006268503

5,099503

1,845235537

3,002319503587839

10,494996

3,8434,5552,1613,1061,0351,7211,6561,7601,553

686

MID425443

1,276886

1,772354301443851

5,5822,020

1593,491

408496142

1,063284532

5,387532

1,949248567

3,172337532620886

11,2021,0644,1024,8622,3073,3151,1051,8371,7681,8791,658

732

US$)HIGH

449468

1,348936

1,872374318468899

5,8982,134

1693,688

431524150

1,123300562

5,692562

2,059262599

3,351356562655936

11,9571,1354,3795,1902,4623,5381,1791,9611,8872,0051,769

781

WithdrawalLOW

313,518

89241

6,81333,174

1,3922,5042,654

56016,548

939398901

6,6641,1602,440

6381,311

21,35125,524

1,0881,710

1654,863

311605

2,5222,190

47,7682,076

62,49830,949

8,0451,953

12,7844,6468,9061,4462,0022,003

for 2025(106 cubic

MID33

3,75095

2577,261

35,3571,4842,6682,828

59617,637

1,000424960

7,1031,2372,601

6801,397

22,75627,204

1,1591,823

1765,183

331645

2,6882,334

51,3992,234

67,24933,3018,6562,101

13,7564,9999,5831,5562,1552,155

meters)HIGH

353,996

101274

7,73837,678

1,5812,8443,014

63618,794

1,066452

1,0237,5691,3182,771

7251,489

24,24928,989

1,2351,943

1885,523

353688

2,8642,487

55,2952,403

72,34735,8269,3132,260

14,7995,379

10,3091,6742,3182,318

Water Futures: Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems 59

CountryHaitiHondurasJamaicaMexicoNicaraguaPanamaParaguayPeruSurinameTrinidad/Tob.UruguayVenezuela

MID EASTAfghanistanBahrainIranIraqIsraelJordanKuwaitLebanonOmanQatarSaudi ArabiaSyriaUAEYemen

CHINA+ChinaKorea (DPR)LaosMongoliaViet Nam

S & E ASIABangladeshBhutanCambodiaIndiaIndonesiaKorea (Rep.)

Conventional Development ScenarioGDP/person (1990LOW

298776

1,9935,409

4403,3392,0452,7301,1134,8406,0303,571

51512,8043,4331,716

24,93824,78433,331

2,5758,822

22,00412,1002,310

36,781481

1,3812,605

834782521

475864497691

1,90117,844

MID318829

2,1275,774

4703,5642,1822,9151,1885,1666,4373,812

54013,4393,6031,802

26,17626,01434,9862,7029,260

23,09612,7012,425

38,607504

1,5913,001

960900600

526957550766

2,10519,762

US$)HIGH

339885

2,2706,163

5013,8042,3293,1111,2685,5146,8704,069

56714,1063,7821,891

27,47427,30336,7202,8369,719

24,24013,3302,545

40,520529

1,8313,4551,1061,036

691

5831,060

609848

2,33121,880

WithdrawalLOW

632,209

552112,323

2,2522,634

72124,978

691217

5,7695,930

53,981505

129,43079,011

3,4431,371

7141,781

792342

7,69816,490

9945,136

614,24219,983

1,535800

37,576

33,98729

848779,736106,65937,956

for 2025(106 cubic

MID67

2,377594

120,8602,4232,834

77626,876

744233

6,2076,381

57,105534

136,92183,5843,6421,450

7551,884

838362

8,14417,444

1,0525,434

714,59023,247

1,785931

43,714

37,90332

945869,589118,94942,330

meters)HIGH

732,557

639130,022

2,6073,049

83528,914

800251

6,6786,864

60,402565

144,82788,4103,8521,534

7991,992

886382

8,61418,452

1,1125,748

830,77727,027

2,0761,083

50,822

42,25636

1,054969,462132,61147,191

See text for data sources.

60 Raskin

CountryMalaysiaMyanmarNepalPakistanPapua/NGPhilippinesSingaporeSri LankaThailand

Conventional Development ScenarioGDP/person (1990LOW7,5181,426

432929

2,6792,052

48,6051,3835,206

MID8,3261,579

4781,0292,9672,273

53,8311,5315,766

US$)HIGH9,2181,748

5301,1393,2852,516

59,6011,6956,384

WithdrawalLOW

16,7686,0274,217

358,061153

62,966271

13,36844,997

for 2025(106 cubic

MID18,7006,7224,703

399,323171

70,222302

14,90850,183

meters)HIGH20,8487,4945,243

445,185191

78,287337

16,62155,946

61

APPENDIX 3: STRESS INDICES BY COUNTRY

CountryN AMERICACanadaUSA

W EUROPEAustriaBelgiumBosnia/HerzeCroatiaDenmarkFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceIcelandIrelandItalyMacedoniaNetherlandsNorwayPortugalSloveniaSpainSwedenSwitzerlandTurkeyUKYugoslavia

PACIFICAustraliaFijiJapanNew Zealand

FSUArmenia

ri

12

33322133322332242211232

2232

3

1995

u/r

12

14111123211311121311221

1121

3

cc

11

11331111211131112111313

1311

4

ri

12

33322133322332242211232

2232

3

Conventional DevelopmentScenario (CDS) for 2025

LOWu/r

13

14111133211311121311221

1121

3

cc

11

11321111111131111111212

1211

3

ri

12

33323133322333242211232

2232

3

MIDu/r

13

14112133211312121311321

1121

3

cc

11

11221111111131111111212

1211

3

HIGHri

12

33323133322333242211232

2232

3

u/r

13

14112133211412121311331

1131

4

[

cc

11

11221111111131111111212

1211

3

CDS -MIDwith climate <

ri

12

33323133322332242211232

2232

3

MPIu/r

13

14112133211311121311321

1121

3

cc

11

11221111111131111111212

1211

3

case:hange

GDFLri

12

33323133322333242211232

2232

3

u/r

13

14112133211312121311321

1121

3

cc

11

11221111111131111111212

1211

3

ri = reliability index, u/r = use-to-resource ratio index, cc = coping capacity index.1= no stress,..., 4 = high stress. See text in section III for discussion of indices.MPI = Max Plank Institute method, GFDL = Goddard Fluid Dynamics Laboratorymethod.

62 Raskin

CountryAzerbaijanBelarusEstoniaGeorgiaKazakhstanKyrgyztanLatviaLithuaniaMoldovaRussiaTajikistanTurkmenistanUkraineUzbekistan

E EUROPEAlbaniaBulgariaCzech Rep.HungaryPolandRomaniaSlovakia

AFRICAAlgeriaAngolaBeninBotswanaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCape VerdeCARChadComorosCongoCote d'lvoireDjiboutiEgyptEq. GuineaEritrea

ri42313324323323

3322242

22231211131213323

1995

u/r

41213312312324

1111321

31111111111111411

cc32243333334333

4322333

33424443444443344

ri

42313324323323

3322242

22231212131213323

Conventional DevelopmentScenario (CDS) for 2025

LOWu/r41313313312424

1111321

41111112111111411

cc32232322223323

4322232

33424433443333334

ri42313324323323

3322242

22231212131213323

MIDu/r

41313313312424

1111321

41111112111111411

cc32132322223222

3322232

23424433443333334

HIGFri

42313324323323

3322242

22231212131213323

u/r41313313313434

1111321

41111112111111411

[

cc31132322223222

3322232

23424433443333334

CDS -MIDwith climate (

ri42313324323323

3322242

22231212131213324

MPIu/r41313313312424

1111331

41111112111111413

cc

32132322223222

3322232

23424433443333334

case:hange

GDFLri

42313324323323

3322242

22231212131213324

u/r

41313313312424

1111321

41111112111111

414

cc32132322223222

3322232

23424433443333334

63

CountryEthiopiaGabonGambiaGhanaGuineaGuinea-BissauKenyaLesothoLiberiaLibyaMadagascarMalawiMaliMauritaniaMauritiusMoroccoMozambiqueNamibiaNigerNigeriaRwandaSenegalSierra LeoneSomaliaSouth AfricaSudanSwazilandTanzaniaTogoTunisiaUgandaZaireZambiaZimbabwe

L AMERICAArgentinaBoliviaBrazil

ri2132233123223423333233232442232122

222

1995

u/r

1111111114111223111121113221131111

111

cc

4244444343444423434444442434434444

232

ri

2132234123223423333233232442232122

222

Conventional DevelopmentScenario

LOWu/r1111112114111334111121114231141112

111

cc

4244344333444323424443442434424443

132

ri

2132234123323423333233242442232122

222

(CDS) for 2025MIEu/r

1111112114211334111121124231141112

111

1

cc

4243344333444323424443442434424443

132

HIGHri

2132234123323423333233242442232122

222

u/r

1111112114211334111131124231141112

111

cc

4243344333444323424443442434424443

132

CDS -MID casewith climate change

ri

2132234123323423333233242442232122

222

MPIu/r1111112114211334111121124231141112

111

cc

4243344333444323424443442434424443

132

GDFLri2132234123223423333233242442232122

222

u/r

1111112114111334111121124231141112

111

cc4243344333444323424443442434424443

132

ri = reliability index, u/r - use-to-resource ratio index, cc = coping capacity index.1- no stress,..., 4 = high stress. See text in section III for discussion of indices.MPI = Max Plank Institute method, GFDL = Goddard Fluid Dynamics Laboratorymethod.

64 Raskin

CountryChileColombiaCosta RicaCubaDominican R.EcuadorEl SalvadorGuatemalaGuyanaHaitiHondurasJamaicaMexicoNicaraguaPanamaParaguayPeruSurinameTrinidad/Tob.UruguayVenezuela

MID EASTAfghanistanBahrainIranIraqIsraelJordanKuwaitLebanonOmanQatarSaudi ArabiaSyriaUAEYemen

CHINA+ChinaKorea (DPR)Laos

ri222332222222322231132

32334433322433

322

1995

u/r111321111111311141111

44444443344344

231

cc

233333334443243333223

42331113212314

434

<Conventional DevelopmentScenario (CDS) for 2025

LOWri

222332222222322231132

32334433322433

322

u/r

111331111111311141111

44444443344344

331

cc

232333334433242333222

41231113111314

333

ri

222332222222322231132

32334433322433

322

MIDu/r

111331111111311141111

44444443344344

331

cc

232333333433242323222

41231113111314

323

HIGHri

222332222222322231132

32334433322433

322

u/r <111431111111311141111

44444443444344

341

;c

232333333433242323222

41231112111314

323

CDS -MIDwith climate (

ri

222332322222322231132

32334433322433

322

MPIu/r111431211111311141111

44444443444344

331

cc

232333333433242323222

41231113111314

323

casechange

GDFLri

222332222222322231132

32334433322433

322

u/r111331111111311141111

44444443344344

331

CC

232333333433242323222

41231113111314

323

65

CountryMongoliaViet Nam

S & E ASIABangladeshBhutanCambodiaIndiaIndonesiaKorea (Rep.)MalaysiaMyanmarNepalPakistanPapua/NGPhilippinesSingaporeSri LankaThailand

ri

22

223322222423233

1995

u/r11

111314111412332

cc

44

444432244433143

ri

22

223322222423233

Conventional DevelopmentScenario

LOWu/r

11

111314111412433

cc

34

434431234333132

ri

23

223322222423233

(CDS) for 2025MIDu/r12

111414111413433

cc34

434331234323132

HIG1-ri

23

223322222423233

u/r

12

111414111413433

[

cc34

434331134323132

CDS -MIDwith climate <

ri23

223323222423233

MPIu/r12

111314111412433

cc

34

434331234323132

case;hange

GDFLri

23

223322222423233

u/r12

111314111412433

cc

34

434331234323132

ri = reliability index, u/r = use-to-resource ratio index, cc = coping capacity index.1= no stress,..., 4 = high stress. See text in section III for discussion of indices.MPI = Max Plank Institute method, GFDL = Goddard Fluid Dynamics Laboratorymethod.

66 Raskin

APPENDIX 4: COMPOSITE INDICES BY COUNTRY

CountryN AMERICACanadaUSA

W EUROPEAustriaBelgiumBosnia/HerzeCroatiaDenmarkFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceIcelandIrelandItalyMacedoniaNetherlandsNorwayPortugalSloveniaSpainSwedenSwitzerlandTurkeyUKYugoslavia

PACIFICAustraliaFijiJapanNew Zealand

FSUArmeniaAzerbaijanBelarusEstonia

1995

I

12

23322123322332232211322

2222

4423

nl2

34332133322332242311333

2332

4423

Conventional DevelopmentScenario(CDS) for 2025

LOWI

12

23322133222332232211222

2222

3423

nl3

34322133322332242311232

2232

3423

MIDI

12

23222133222332232211322

2222

3423

n13

34323133322333242311332

2232

3423

HIGHI

12

23222133222332232211332

2232

4423

II

13

34323133322433242311332

2232

4423

CDS - MID casewith climate change

MPII

12

23222133222332232211322

2222

3423

II

13

34323133322332242311332

2232

3423

GDFLI

12

23222133222332232211322

2222

3423

nl3

34

323133322333242311332

2232

3423

67

CountryGeorgiaKazakhstanKyrgyztanLatviaLithuaniaMoldovaRussiaTajikistanTurkmenistanUkraineUzbekistan

E EUROPEAlbaniaBulgariaCzech Rep.HungaryPolandRomaniaSlovakia

AFRICAAlgeriaAngolaBeninBotswanaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCape VerdeCARChadComorosCongoCote d'lvoireDjiboutiEgyptEq. GuineaEritrea

I

23323323334

3322332

32322322232323433

1995

n43334334334

4322343

33434443444443444

Conventional DevelopmentScenario(CDS) for 2025

LOWI

23323323424

3322332

32322323232223423

n33324323424

4322342

43434433443333

4*.

34

MIDI

23323323323

3322332

32322323232223423

n33324323424

3322342

43434433443333434

HIGHI23323323333

3322332

32322323232223423

II

33324323434

3322342

434344334

-pi

3333434

CDS - MID casewith climate change

MPII23323323323

3322342

32322323232223424

n33324323424

3322342

43434433443333434

GDFLI

23323323323

3322332

32322323232223424

II33324323424

3322342

43434433443333434

I - Water Resources Vulnerability Index - 1 . II = Water Resources Vulnerability Index - II.1 - no vulnerability, ... , 4 = high vulnerability. See text in section III for discussion of indices.MPI = Max Plank Institute method, GFDL = Goddard Fluid Dynamics Laboratorymethod.

68 Raskin

CountryEthiopiaGabonGambiaGhanaGuineaGuinea-BissauKenyaLesothoLiberiaLibyaMadagascarMalawiMaliMauritaniaMauritiusMoroccoMozambiqueNamibiaNigerNigeriaRwandaSenegalSierra LeoneSomaliaSouth Africa

SwazilandTanzaniaTogoTunisiaUgandaZaireZambiaZimbabwe

L AMERICAArgentinaBoliviaBrazilChileColombiaCosta Rica

1995

I

3233333234333423333333333A

433333233

222222

II

424

4444344444423434444443/i444434444

232233

Conventional DevelopmentScenario(CDS) for 2025

LOWI3233234224333434323333333/i

443333233

222222

n4244344334444434434443444,1

444444443

232232

MIDI3232234224333434323333343A

443333233

222222

n4243344334444434434443444/i444444443

232232

HIGHI

3232234224333434323343343

43333233

222222

II

4243344334444434434443444

44444443

232232

CDS - MID casewith climate change

MPII

3232234224

333434323333343

43333233

222222

II

424334433444443443444344

i -p

i

44444443

232232

GDFLI3232234224333434323333343

43333233

222222

n4243344334444434434443444/i

444444443

232232

69

CountryCubaDominican R.EcuadorEl SalvadorGuatemalaGuyanaHaitiHondurasJamaicaMexicoNicaraguaPanamaParaguayPeruSurinameTrinidad/Tob.UruguayVenezuela

MID EASTAfghanistanBahrainIranIraqIsraelJordanKuwaitLebanonOmanQatarSaudi ArabiaSyriaUAEYemen

CHINA+ChinaKorea (DPR)Laos

1995

I

332223332332242222

43443333333434

333

n333334443343343233

44444443344444

43

-pi

Conventional DevelopmentScenario(CDS) for 2025

LOWI

332223322332242222

43343333333434

332

n333334433342343232

44444443344444

333

MIDI

332222322332232222

43343333333434

332

n333333433342343232

44444443344444

333

HIGHI432222322332232222

43343333333434

332

n433333433342343232

44444443444444

343

<̂DS - MID casewith climate change

I432322322332232222

43343333333434

332

MPIII43333343 -3342343232

44444443444444

333

GDFLI332222322332232222

4i3343333333434

332

n333333433342343232

44444443344444

333

I = Water Resources Vulnerability Index - 1 . II = Water Resources Vulnerability Index - II.1 = no vulnerability,..., 4 = high vulnerability. See text in section III for discussion of indices.MPI = Max Plank Institute method, GFDL = Goddard Fluid Dynamics Laboratorymethod.

70 Raskin

CountryMongoliaViet Nam

S & E ASIABangladeshBhutanCambodiaIndiaIndonesiaKorea (Rep.)MalaysiaMyanmarNepalPakistanPapua/NGPhilippinesSingaporeSri LankaThailand

1995

I33

333423233423243

n44

444434244433343

Conventional DevelopmentScenario(CDS) for 2025

LOWI23

323423223423333

II34

434434234433433

MIDI23

323423223423333

n34

434434234423433

HIGHI23

323423223423333

n34

434434234423433

CDS - MID casewith climate change

MPII23

323323223423333

n34

434334234423433

GDFLI23

323323223423333

n34

434334234423433

71

APPENDIX 5: NOTES ON CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOASSUMPTIONSThe CDS builds up water requirements at the regional level in as much detail ascurrent data permits. Disaggregation of the analysis puts emphasis on thedevelopment assumptions underlying the scenario — the character of the economy,household water service, power production, irrigation, etc. -- and the technologiesthat might be used to transmit and use water. Unlike aggregate methods, thedisaggregated approach can pick up changes in the patterns of water use, in thecomposition of economic activity and in technology.

The population and macro-economic assumptions governing the scenarioare presented in Section H In this Appendix, we summarize the sectoralassumptions underlying the CDS. For more details, see Raskin et al. (1995).

We begin with the domestic sector which, in comprehensive globaltabulations, is taken to include water use in households and in the service sector.Water is used in households for consumption, toilets, dish washing, bathing,cleaning, and outdoor use (e.g., lawn watering, car washing, decorative uses). Theservice sector includes such water intensive establishments as restaurants,cleaners, hotels, and hospitals. Data limitations require that we aggregate overthese diverse activities. Domestic water requirements are described as the productof two factors: population and water intensity. In this case, water intensity isdefined as water use per person. Domestic water intensities in a given regionreflect many factors, for example, income levels, water infrastructure, technology,and water availability. CDS intensities are presented in Figure 22. This reflectscontinued improvement in water use efficiency from recent years in OECDregions. In the non-OECD regions, patterns are assumed to converge towardOECD values as incomes grow.

Domestic water withdrawals are computed by multiplying these intensitiesby the population assumptions in the scenario (described in Section H-D). Theresults are shown in Figure 23. Water use in the OECD regions changes little sincepopulation growth is slow and water intensities either decrease somewhat or aresteady; however, the other regions show large increases. Burgeoning populationsand economies are projected to drive domestic withdrawals in South andSoutheast Asia in 2050 to almost five times the 1990 value, while in China+,withdrawals grow by almost a factor of three. From 1990, annual global domesticwithdrawals increase by 60% in 2025 and by more than 100% in 2025.

72

250

200

150

100 - M —

Source: Raskin et al. (1995).

Figure 22. Domestic Intensities in the CDS

Figure 23. Domestic Withdrawals in the CDS

73

The industrial sector accounts for approximately 22% of current globalfresh water withdrawals. In addition to standard industrial activities(manufacturing, mining, quarrying, and construction) industry data also includesenergy sector uses (thermoelectric generation and petroleum refining). This broadgrouping masks differing development and technological patterns across industrialsubsectors and regions, hi the scenario, manufacturing, refining, andthermoelectric generation are treated separately.

Manufacturing water intensity trends depend on assumptions on useefficiency (e.g., degree of on-site water recycling), processes employed, andproduct mix. In the OECD regions, the rising share of the less water-intensivemanufacturing sectors in itself lowers aggregate manufacturing water intensity.This is traced to the stable per capita output of traditional heavy industries such asiron and steel, non-ferrous metals, paper and pulp and chemicals (Raskin andMargolis, 1995). Consequently, the mix of manufacturing output shifts towardless water intensive subsectors, thereby lowering the aggregate manufacturingwater intensity. Increasing efficiency and the changing mix of industrial activitiesare reflected in the CDS manufacturing intensities shown in Figure 24.Manufacturing practices in the non-OECD regions are assumed to convergetoward those in the OECD regions as incomes rise.

Figure 24. Manufacturing Water Intensities in the CDS

Combining activity and intensity figures, we arrive at the manufacturingwater withdrawal scenario shown in Figure 25. Globally, annual waterwithdrawals in the sector increase by 2050 to nearly triple the 1990 value.Regional variations are due to the interplay of region-specific assumptions aboutindustrial scale, structure and water intensity, as outlined in Section II. Thedramatic growth in developing regions is particularly striking. For example, the

74

combined withdrawals of China+ and South and East Asia rises to a level greaterthan the world total in 1990. These increases in manufacturing water withdrawalsare despite considerable decreases in water intensities during the scenario. Waterwithdrawal for manufacturing is added to water withdrawal for petroleum refiningand thermoelectric generation to produce the total water withdrawal in theindustry sector.

140 1

• 2025• 2050

Figure 25. Manufacturing Withdrawals in the CDS

Nearly 70% of current global fresh water withdrawals are for agriculturalapplications, primarily for irrigation. Irrigated agriculture contributes about one-third of global crop production (Kendall and Pimentel, 1994). Roughly 16% of theworld's cultivated land is currently under irrigation, with yields typically muchhigher than for rain-fed agriculture. For example, in the United States irrigatedfarming yields averages about four times those of rain-fed farms (Bajwa et al.,1987).

Table 9 shows the CDS assumptions on expansion of irrigated land area tothe year 2050 (Leach, 1995). In Table 9, irrigated land area refers to any land thatis in the irrigated agricultural system (including fallow) during the course of ayear. The cropping intensity refers to the average number of harvests per year onthe irrigated land area. For example, land that is harvested on alternate years has acropping intensity of 0.5. Figure 26 shows the CDS assumptions for increases incropping intensities. The harvested area is the irrigated land area times thecropping intensity. For example, if one hectare is harvested two times per year,then its harvested area is 2 hectares.

Irrigation water intensities, defined as withdrawals per harvested area,depend on a number of interacting factors. These include crop mix, land quality,weather conditions, irrigation methods, management practices, non-water inputs,relative prices of water and crops, and yield response to irrigation. Figure 27

75

illustrates the relationship between yield response and water intensity of irrigatedagriculture. Different curves are shown for different levels of non-water inputs.The crop yields in the conventional development scenario increase for tworeasons: 1) there is increase in water intensity, and 2) there is improvement in non-water agricultural inputs such as management practices, chemical application, andbio-engineered crop varieties. Empirical estimates for the increase in yieldassociated with an increase in water intensity were drawn from Heady and Hexem(1978). By 2025, the increase in intensities of both water and non-water inputsmeans that annual irrigated water use would have to increase by approximately30% relative to current practices in order for annual crop production to double.

These increases in irrigated water requirements are offset partially in thescenario by an increase in the fraction of applied water that is used in plant uptake.While the potential for more water efficient irrigation practices is significant,implementation generally requires increased capital investments. Given thelimited capital available for such investments, especially in developing countries,it is unlikely that the full technical potential will be achieved under conventionaldevelopment assumptions. The CDS assumes 8% efficiency increase from 1990 to2025.

Combining these factors, we arrive at the CDS irrigation intensitiesdisplayed in Figure 28. Multiplying the irrigated land area times the croppingintensities times the water intensities, we arrive at the irrigation water withdrawalscenario shown in Figure 29.

Table 9. Irrigated Land Area in the CDS (million hectares)

Region

North AmericaWestern EuropeOECD PacificFSUEastern EuropeAfricaLatin AmericaMiddle EastChina +S&E AsiaWorld

199019

18

5

21

6

11

16

13

49

80

237

2025

20

20

6

23

6

12

18

15

54

92

265

2050

21

21

6

25

7

13

20

16

57

96

281

Growth Rate (%/year)

1990-20250.1

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.4

0.3

2025-2050

0.2

0.3

0.1

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

Source: Values for 1990 from FAO (1992), scenario assumptions from Leach (1995).

76

Figure 26. Cropping Intensities in the CDS

<vV,

3 1y A.>- CL

ob Years

very high non-water inputshigher non-water inputs

— — scenario pathcurrent practicelower non-water inputs

WATER INPUTS(volume of water / harvested area)

Figure 27. Yield Response to Water and Non-Water Inputs

(Q

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Irrigation Withdrawals (km3)

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N Amer

W Europe

Pac OECD

FSU

E Europe

Africa

Lat Amer

Mid East

China+

S&E Asia

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Irrigation Intensities (1000 m3 per harvested ha)

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COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THEFRESHWATER RESOURCES OF THE WORLD

Background Reports:

1. Lundkvist, J, and Falkenmark, M. World Freshwater Problems, Call for a New Realism. ISBN:

91-88714-43-8.

2. Shiklomanov, I. A. Assessment of Water Resources and Water Availability of the World. WMO.

(Order from the World Meterological Organization).

3vkaskin, P., Gleick, P., Kirshen, P., Pontius, G. and Strzepek, K. Water Futures: Assessment ofLong-range Patterns and Problems. ISBN: 91 -88714-45-4.

4. Lundkvist, J. and Gleick, P. Sustaining Our Waters into the 21st Century. ISBN: 91-88714-44-6.

\/ 5. Brismar, A. Freshwater and Gender, A Policy Assessment. ISBN: 91-88714-40-3.

^ 6. Kjellen, M. and McGranahan, G. Urban Water, Towards Health and Sustainability, ISBN: 91-

88714-42-X.

t / 7 . Seabright, P. Water: Commodity or Social Institution? ISBN: 91-88714-46-2.

y- 8. Wallensteen, P. and Swain, A. International Fresh Water Resources: Source of Conflict or Co-operation. ISBN: 91-88714-47-0.

These reports can be ordered from:Stockholm Environment Institute, Communications, Box 2142, S-103 14 Stockholm, Sweden.Fax: +46 8 7230348. E-mail: orders@sei.se WWW: http://www.sei.se/

Stockholm Environment InstituteThe Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) was established by the Swedish Parliament in 1989 as an inde-pendent foundation for the purpose of carrying out global environment and development research. The Instituteis governed by an international Board whose members are drawn from developing and industrialized countriesworldwide.

Central to the Institute's work have been activities surrounding the Rio UNCED conference, and previ-ous to this, the Brandt and Palme Commissions and the work of the World Commission for Environment andDevelopment. Apart from its working linkages with the relevant specialised agencies of the UN system, aparticular feature of SEI's work programme is the role it has played in the development and application ofAgenda 21, the action plan for the next century.

A major aim of SEI's work is to bring together scientific research and policy development. The Instituteapplies scientific and technical analyses in environmental and development issues of regional and global im-portance. The impacts of different policies are assessed, providing insights into strategy options for sociallyresponsible environmental management and economic and social development.

The results of the research are made available through publications, the organisation of and participationin conferences, seminars and university courses, and also through the development of software packages foruse in the exploration of scientific problems. SEI has also developed a specialised library which functions as acentral catalyst in the short-term and long-term work of the Institute.

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