129 - NFPA

Report of the Committee on

Water Extinguishing Systems

Correlating Committee

Paul D. Smith, ~ n Gage-Babcock & Assodates Inc., CA

Robert E. Solomon, S ~ r ~ National Fire Protection Assn., MA

(Nonvoting)

Wayne E. Ault, Rolfe jensen &Assoc. Inc., IN RichardJ. Davis, Factory Mutual Research, MA Casimir J. Dryl¢~ M&M Protection Consultants, NY ThomasW. Jaeger, Gage Babcock & Assoc., Inc., VA Richard Mardneau, Mid Hudson Automatic Sprinkler Corp., NY

Rep. Nat'l Fire Sprinkler Assoc. James W. Nolan, James w. Nolan Co., IL Chester W. Schirmer, Schirmer Engineering Corp., NC William L. Testa, Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co., Inc., RI

Rep. Nat'l Fire Sprinkler Assoc.

Technical Committee on

]'we Pumps

T h o m ~ W. Jaeger, cha/rman Gage-Babcock & Associates. Inc., VA

Reginald L. Alien, Union Electric, MO Kerry M. Bell, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL Harold D. Brandex, Duke Power CO., NC

Rep. Electric Light Power Group/Edison Electric Inst. ThomasJ. Brown, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA Walter A. Damon, Schirmer Engineering Corp., IL ManuelJ. DeLerno, S-P-D Industries Inc., IL

Rep. Illinois Fire Prevention Assoc. David Dixon, Security Fire Protection, "IN

Rep. Nat'l Fire Sprinkler Assoc. Donald K. Dorini, Gulfstream Pump & Equipment CO., FL Russell E. Earle, The Port Authority of NY & NJ, NJ George W. lClach, Flach Consultants, LA Dennis N. Gage, ISO Commercial Risk Services, Inc., NJ RandallJarreth Patterson Pump Co., GA

Rep. Hydraulic Inst. John D.Jensen, Protection Consultants, Inc., ID Donald L. Johnson, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., IL

Rep. The Alliance of American Insurers James D. Kaldenbeck, Cummins Engine Company, IN

Rep. Engine Manufacturers Assn. Edward D. Leedy, Industrial Risk Insurers, IL IL T. Leichl, CIGNA Loss Constrol Services Group, Inc., DE Bernard McNamee, Underwriters Laboratories of Canada Richard Schneider, Joslyn Clark Controls, SC

Rep. Nat'I Electrical Manufacturers Assoc. JayA~ Stewart, Jay Stewart Assoc., Inc., M]

Rep. Chemical Manufacturers Assoc. Lee UIm, ITF Corporation, OH Ronald F. Zane, Darling Duro Inc., Canada

Alternates

LareneeA. Bey, Onan Corp., MN (Air.to R. Schneider)

Salvatore A. Chines, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT (Alt. to E. D. Leedy)

Graham Clarke, C, age-Babeock & Assodates, CA (Alt. to T. W.Jaeger)

Phmip A. Davis, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., PA (AIt. to D.Jolmson)

Donald Hanaea, Aurora Pump, IL (AlL to R. Jarrett) ,

Kenneth g. Isman, Nat 1 Fire Sprinkler Assn., NY (Alt. to D. Dixon)

John R. Kovacflt, Underwriters Laboratories, IL (Air. to K. M. Bell)

Terence A. Manning, Manning Electrical Systems, IncAL (AlL to M. DeLerno)

William N. Matthews, Duke Power Co.NC (Alt. to H. D. BrandesJr.)

William E. Wilcox, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA (Alt. to T.J. Brown)

Staff Liaison: Robert E. Solomon

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edidon. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred.

The Report of the Committee on Water Extinguishing Systems is presented for adoption.

This Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps and proposes for adoption amendments to NFPA 20-1990, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal for Pumps, published in Volume I of the 1992 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps which consists of 23 voting members; of whom 19 voted affirmatively, 2 negatively (Messrs. Brown and Flach), and 2 abstained (Messrs. DeLerno and Hansen).

Mr. Brown voted negatively stating." ~1. Proposal 20-6 ~Group" should replace "Scrap" in first line. 2. Proposal 20-14 (1-7.7.3) The addition of "Vertical" does not differentiate pumps for fire

protection from in-line circulators for hot water heating. Hot water circulators are frequently installed in the verdcal position. Refer- ence to a national standard such as ANSI B73.2 will accomplish the difference between the two types of pumps and at the same time satisfy the intent of the Committee. The tide of ANSI B73.2 should not be used as the reason to reject it.

3. Proposal 20-21 (2-6) Add "h%ted" before "automatic," so the sentence will read: ~_ach

pump shall be provided with a listed automatic relief valve set below the shut-off...".

4. Proposal 20-30 (2-10.6) (New) Replace ~reduced pressure back flow preventer waive or back flow

preventer valve" with "Approved backflow-prevenfion assembly." The sentence will read: "Ifa backfiow-prevention assembly is required by local authorities it shall be Approved and installed on the discharge side of the booster (fire) pumps." Second sentence as is. The University of Southern California - Foundation for Cross -

Connection Control and Hydraulic Research and American Water Works Assodation - Manual M14 require Approved assemblies consisting of the backflow device and inlet and outlet gate valves assembled and shipped by the manufacturer.

5. Proposal 20-41(3-1.1) Delete the last two sentences. There is no reason to arbitrarily

restrict the capadty of end-suction or in-line pumps. If the Committee feels there should be some restriction~ on these pumps then pump specific speed should be used. Better still, require that the pumps be in accordance with ANSI-B73.1 and ANSI-B73.2, except for dimension interchangeable.

6. Proposal 20-46 (3-4.1) . . Add, "Dyan Approved assembler" between ~mounted, ~ ano "on. ~

The sentence will then read: ~I'he pumps and driver shall be mounted by an Approved assembler on a common base plate...".

7. Proposal 20-58 (4-6.1.3) This proposal should be included in Chapter 2 because it is

applicable to all booster and fire pumps. 8. Proposal 20-101 (5-7.2) . . . . This proposal should be accepted as submitted .. if at all. A demy

supplyingpower to an electric motor driven fire pump materially increases the chance of a disaster. Delay load shedding plus delay starting auxiliary generating set plus delay transferring power plus delay starting fire pump driver all add up to a total delay which further reduces reliability of the fire protection system.

9. Proposal 20-139 (7-5.2.4) Delete 7-5.2.4(b). Dependence on one pump tJ~ start upon the

operation of another reduces reliability of the fire protection system far below an acceptable level.

10. Proposal 20-196 (~5.2.2) Replace "motor" with engine."

129

Mr. Flach voted negatively stating: "Log 193. The exception and requirements in the exception are

not justified. Confusion about power supply arrangements is not a good reason for the drastic changes. Th~s comment alSo applies to Proposal 20-78 submitted by the Technical Committee on F~we Pumps."

Mr. Delerno abstained stating: "I cannot in good conscience give my assent to this flawed

document. While I participated intimately in its preparation, I find upon seeing the final document that there are errors and conflicts within. It is my intent to prepare public comments to suggest corrections and at TCD ballot time make a final decision on casting an alIirmative or negative ballot In the meantime, I abstain. Two of the major flaws are: 1. It was not the intent of the Committee to no longer require that

transfer switches be specifically listed for fire pump service. 2. It was the intent of the Committee to comply with the direction

of the Standards Council to delete 0-3.4 as being outside of scope.*

Mr. Hansen abstained stating: ~l"he Hydraulic Institute recommends against Proposal Log #130

(which calls for increasing flow ratings of close-coupled in-line pumps) on the basis that the p roposedpump sizes especially at 3500 RPM have ~SUCTION SPECIFIC SPEEDS" that may have reached maximum safe design limits. Operating near and beyond these upper limits will affect both hydraulic and mechanical considerations regarding integrity and safe operating practices for this style of pump."

The Report has also been submitted to letter ballot of the Correlating Committee on Water Extinguishing Systems, which consists of 9 voting members of whom all 9 voted affirmatively.

130

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(Log # 42) 20-1 - (1-1): Accept in Principle SUBMITYER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add to end of last sentence:

%..nor requirements for periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire pump systems (see NFPA 25)." SUBSTANTIATION: Primary scope responsibility for these matters rests with NFPA 25 committee. COMMrITEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Add the recommended wording as suggested and delete "and maintenance." from the 6th line of Paragraph 1-1. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The additional reference to maintenance was removed to be consistent with the recommendation.

20- 6 - (1-7.1.1): Accept SUBM1TrE]~ Technical Committee on Fire PumFe R E C O ~ T I O N : Replace definition of Controller with:

Fire Pump Controller. For the purpose of this standard, a group of devices which serve to govern, in some predetermined manner, the starting and stopping of the fire pump driver as well as monitoring and signaling the status and condition of the fire pump unit. SUBSTANTIATION: The revised definition is more closely aligned with a similar definition for "controller" in NFPA 70. Since this Controller is for fire pumps induding ancillan/equipment, reference to same shouldbe made here. Also, see Committee Action on 20-62. COMMrrTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 4s) 20- 2 - (1-2): Accept SUBMITrER: M.J. DeLeroo, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

1. Delete "and maintenance." 2. Add "and" between "design" and "installation."

S ~ ~ T I O N : Primary scope responsibility for maintenance rests with NFPA 25 committee. COMMrrrEEACTION: Accept. Note: This applies to Paragraph 1-2.1.

(Log # 21) 20- 3 - (1-5.3(New)): Accept S U B ~ ManueiJ. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add new section as follows:

1-5.3 Certification of pro~er installation of each major component of the system per the reClUtrements of this standard shall be provided to the authority having jurisdiction prior to the field acceptance test. SUg.qTANTIATION: Many times the plans and specifications for new construction projects, while requiring conformance with NFPA 20 are either in confllct with or are silent concerning pertinent installation requirements. Further, inspectional authorities are sometimes unaware of the specialized requirements unique to fire pump installations. Requiring certification brings one additional check into the process by those most familiar with such installations. The addition of this paragraph strengthens the position of the

authority having jurisdiction to the obtaining of a satisfactory installation. COMMITIT.E ACTION: Accept.

20- 7- (1-7.1.1): Accept S U ] $ ~ Techmcal Committee on Fire Pumps RJrJ~OMMENDATION: Replace definition of Isolating Switch with:

Isolating Switch. A switch intended for isolating an electric circuit from its source of power. It has no interrupting raring and it is intended to be operated only after the circuit has [~en opened by some other means. SUBSTANTIATION: The revised definition comes from the National Electrical Code and is used here for consistency. Also, see Committee Action on 20-62. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

20- 8 - (1-7.1.1): Accept SUBMITI"F~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace definition of Disconnecting Means with:

Disconnecting Means. A device, group of device~, or other means (e.g., the circuit breaker in the fire pump controller) by which the conductors of a circuit can be disconnected from their source of

Smt~ANTIATION: The revised definition comes from NFPA 70 and is used here for consistency. It makes reference to a particular component in the pump controller to assist NFPA 20 users with the terminology. Also, see Committee Action on 20-62. C ~ M M r r r E E Ac"rION: Accept.

(Log # 4) 20- 4- (1-7, A-I-5.1): Reject S U B ~ : Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add a new definition of Unit Responsibility to Section 1-7 as follows:

"Unit Responsibility. The accountability to answer and resolve any and all problems as regards the proper installation, compatibility, performance, and acceptance of the equipment. Unit responsibility shall not be construed to mean purchase of all components from a

S ~ q ' r ~ T I O N : Unit responsibility is an undefined term in thepresent standard. The substantiation of Proposal 20-4 cites the problem. A definition that may be construed to mean purchase of all components from a single supplier could be considered a potential restrain of trade issue. C £ ) ~ ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See A-l-5.1 of the current standard. The Committee believes that the term is adequately covered in the Appendix. The term is not used in the body of the text.

(Log # 151) 20- 5 - (1-7): Reject SUBMITrER: Kenneth E. Isman, National Fire Sprinkler Associa- tion RECOMMENDATION: Insert a definition for "suction pipe". SUBSTANTIATION: Sections 2-8 and 2-9 contain specific requirements for "suction pipe", yet there is no guidance on how far back from the pump this extends. On a fire pump connected to a public water system, does the suction pipe go back to the connection to the public supply, or does i tgo all the way back to where the water is stored? COMMrrrEEACTION: Reject. No specific recommendation was made.

(Log # 126) 20-9- (1-7.3): Reject SU]$MITrE~ M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL PJECOMMENDATION: Relegate to appendix, except for 1-7.3.5. SUBSTANTIATION: None of the terms appears elsewhere in standard. COMMITIT~ ACTION: Reject. C O M ~ STATEMENT: While realizing that not all of these terms appear in the document, the Committee believes those definitions can assist users of the standard who are not closely acquainted with electric motor terminology.

(t~#5) 20-10 - (1-7.S21): Reject S U ] $ M 1 T ~ M.J. Stelzer, Lummus Crest, Inc. RECA)MMENDATION: Revise proposed definition for service factor to delete references to motor terminology. Revise to read: "The service factor is the multiplier which, when applied to the

rated horsepower, indicates a permissible horsepower loading which may be carried at the rated operation conditions. The multiplier 1.15 indicates that the driver may be overloaded to 1.15 times the rated horsepower." SUBSTANTIATION: Service factor is referenceci in 8-9.3.1 for right angle gear drives. The definition of this te rm in I-7.2, if required, shouldbe worded to apply to all applications in the Code. COMMITY]~ ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: The recommendation indicates that the motor can be overloaded at the rated condition, presumably the rated capacity of the pump. The most demanding point would tend to occur at 150 percent of rated capacity.

131

NFPA 20 m A93 T C R

(Log # 6) 20- 11 - (1-7.3.5 (New)): Reject SUBM1TrER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add a new definition to read:

1-7.3.5 Normal Start A successful start or restart using any or all means (automatic, manual electric, or manual mechanical) likely to be encountered in a fire situation, such as momentary power outage, sudden pressure fluctuation and the like. SUBSTANTIATION: This appears to be the most appropriate way to handle the problems discussed in the referenced proposals. COMMITrEEACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee does not believe a need exists for the definition.

20-12 - (1-7.4.1): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace definition of Fire Pump Branch Circuit with: Branch Circuit. The circuit conductors between the final over-

current device protecting the circuit and the utilization equipment SUBSTANTIATION: The revised defmition comes from NFPA 70 and is used here for consistency. Also, see Committee Action on 20.62. CO MMITI'EE ACTION: Accept

SUBSTANTIATION: This definition taken from the current vertical turbine pump standards. I would also recommend that additional definitions listed in the AWWA E101-88 be incorporated into NFPA 20. Recognizing thatAWWA E101-88 is written for all vertical turbine pumA~s, some definitions would not apply to NFPA 20. COMMrrlT_~ACTION: Accept in Prindple. Change to:

"Vertical Lineshaft Turbine Pump. ~ and accept the proposers revised definition. C O ~ STATEMENT: The generally accepted title is Vertical Lineshaft Turbine Pump.

(Log # 128) 20.17- (1-7.7.10): Reject SUBMITrER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Redefine by adding either of the below to existing text:

1. "or other equivalent metallic corrosion resistant" 2. CA~ange "metallic" above to "metallic or non-metallic."

SU~gl"ANTIATION: Why should reader be left guessing as to meaning in standard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee does not intend for non-metallic materials to be used for pump sensing lines.

20-15- (1-7.4.2): Accept SUBM1TI'ER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace definition of Feeder with:

Feeder. All circuit conductors between the service equipment or the source of a separately derived system and the final branch-circuit over-current device. SUBSTANTIATION: The revised definition comes from NFPA 70 and is used here for consistency. Also, see Committee Action on 20.62. COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept

20. 18- (1-7.10): Accept SUBMITIT_~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace text with:

Additional Definitions. Additional applicable definitions may be found in the latest edition of "Hydraulic Institute Standards for Centrifugal Rotary and Redprocating Pumps" and NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 70 provides useful information on the particulars of the commonly used electrical terms of NFPA 20. In addition, electric motor driven fire pumps should really be designed using both NFPA 20 as well as NFPA 70 criteria. C O M M r r l T ~ ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 07) 20-14- (1-7.7.3): Accept SUBMITrER: Ronald F. Zane, Darling[ Duro RECOMMENDATION: Add Wertical before in-line pump.

New heading should read: WERTICAL IN-LINE PUMP." SUBSTANTIATION: Problem: The term in-line pump in the minds of fire protection people relates too easily to circulators.

Substantiation: By adding the word ~v'ertical" we differentiate for fire protection purposes between a true industrial heavy duty ty~.e in- line fire pump as compared to the m-llne circulator that is usually installed in the horizontal position for hot water heating. C O ~ ACTION: Accept.

(Log# 127) 20-15 - (1-7.7.5): Reject S U B ~ : M.~. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMFaNDATION: Delete text. SUBSTANTIATION: See 3-1.1 (in-line) and 3-1.2 qn horizontal or vertical position" for major exceptions to definition. Otherwise, find a better definition. COMM1TIT.~ ACTION: Reject. COMMITI~E STATEMENT: The definition is needed as the orientation of the shaft is used to help define the type and nature of the pump.

(Log # l f i~ 20-16 - (1-7.7.7): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO.: 1-7.7.7 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

1-7.7.7 Lineshaft Vertical Turbine Pump. Avertical shaft ceno'ifu- gal pump with rotating impeller or impellers, and with discharge from the pumping element coaxial with the shaft The pumping element is suspended by the conductor system, which enclos~es a system of vertical shafting used to transmit power to the impellers, the prime mover being external to the flow stream.

(Log # 40) 20-19 - (2-4(a), 2-4(b) (New)): Reject S U B ~ : Walter A, Damon, Deerfield, IL RECOMMENDATION: Renumber existing 2-4 to 2-4(a).

Add new 2-4(b) as follows: 2-4(b) Where the fire pump supplies hydraulically designed water-

based extinguishing systems, the installer shall provide a perma- nendy attached nameplate indicating the flow (gallons per minute) and pressure (psi) required at the pump discharge flange. Such name plates shall be provided for each system and placed on the wall of the pump room. SUI~TANTIATION: At present, there is no easy way to determine if the pump test indicates the pump will satisfy the design requirements of the system(s) it supplies. C O ~ ACTION: l~eje ct. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: T h e p u m p is tested to compare performance at the range of shut-offto I50 percent of rated capacity m accordance with Chapter 11. The pumps is not tested to verify that it can satisfy the system demand. NFPA 20 presumes that the pump has been selected to satisfy a system demand based upon NFPA 15 or some other appropriate system design s t a n d a r d .

20- 20 - (2-6): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise the second paragraph as follows:

"...relief valve shall be I in. (25.4 mm) for pumps with a rated capadty not exceeding 2500 gpm (9462 L/rain), 1 I / 4 in. (32 ram) forpumps with a rated capacity of 5000 to 5000 gpm (11,855 to 18,925 L/rain). SUBSTANTIATION: The Committee believes these larger sizes are more appro}~riate to allow for circulation of suflident water to keep the pump mthin proper temperature limits when operating under shut-off conditions. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept

132

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(Log # 142) 20. 21 - (2-6): Accept in Part SUBM1TrER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

2-6 Circulation Relief Valve. Each pump shall be provided with an automatic circulation relief valve set below the shut off pressure at minimum suction pressure. It shall provide circulation of sufficient water to prevent the pump from overheating when operating continuously with no discharge. It shall shut offwhen pump shuts off. Provisions shall be made for discharge to a drain and not be tied in with packing box drain.

Exception: This rule shall not apply to engine driven pumps for which engine cooling water is taken from pump discharge. SUIIgSTANTIATION.- Three problems include:

1. We have had several pumps in service that were damaged due to heat build up because of relief valves not designed to relieve enough water but met minimum sizes.

2. Numerous occasions on start-up, installers are required to repipe drains because of dual connections to drain o f packing box drain and circulation relief valve.

3. Circulation relief valves on low pressure pumps should shut-off when pumpis not operating after being set to relieve enough water not to overheat pump.

NOTE: This is a serious field problem that must be addressed. COMMITYEEAGTION: Accept in Part. Accept item I of substantiation. C O M M r r r E E STATEMENT: See Committee Proposal 20-20 on Paragraph 2-6. The Committee has recommended that the relief valve sizes be increased to help alleviate the buildup of heat. No action was accepted concerning the arrangement of drain piping and the shut-offissue. The Committee is of the opinion that the potential over heating problems will be further reduced with the increase in the relief valve size.

(Log # 17) 20- 2 2 - (2-6): Reject SUBMITTER: Locen Keitner, National Fire Suppression, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Circulation Valve. Each pump shall be provided with an automatic solenoid valve listed for fire protection service. Solenoid valve shall open when energized from the low voltage (115 Volt) AC supervi- sory circuit in the controller. Valve shall open when the pump starts and remain open until the pump stops. It shall provide circulation of sufficient water to prevent the pump from overheating when operating with no discharge. A 3 / 4 in. automatic solenoid valve shall be used for pumps with a rated capacity not exceeding 2500 GPM (9462 L/rain.); a 1 in. automatic solenoid valve shall be used for pumps with a rated capacity of 3000 to 5000 GPM (11355 to 18925 L/rain.). Provision shall be made for a discharge to a drain." SUBSTANTIATION: The circulation relief valve furnished by the fire pump manufacturers sometimes outlast the 1-year guarantee before you have to use a hammer to start and stop the flow. Even if it is operating properly, the suction pressure could drop leaving the total pressure, developed by the pump and suction, to be less than setting of the valve. If the pump started during this low suction pressure time, it would soon overheat. The use of a solenoid valve as a circulation valve is similar to the

solenoid in the heat exchanger piping on diesel drive pumps. COMMITIT.,E ACTION: Reject. COMMITIT.,E STATEMFaNT: Additional information must be provided concerning the availability of the solenoid valves, the specifics of the operation of the solenoid valve (i.e. powered dosed or powered open etc.) and the potential problems associated with using the controller as the source of power.

been sustained to pumppackings and shafts. The problem is encountered in industrial, mercantile and institutional properties. Weekly test operation of the pump, with observation of the circulation relief valve for proper operation, would greatly reduce the failures. However, many pumps are not being tested properly, if at all, in these days of doing more with less personnel.

Another problem is proper setting of the reliefvabze. Invariably, when the valve is set to operate properly with the primp running, it leaks when the pump is off. This creates a problem in cold climates when the cooling water discharges outdoors. Conversely, a valve adjusted so it doesn' t leak with the pump off will often fall to open when the pump is running.

The positive action of a solenoid valve would overcome the problem. A fuse in the circuit to the solenoid would prevent opening the overcurrent protective devices in the controller in case of a fault in the solenoid coiled or its circuit. If the fuse or solenoid circuit opened, there would be no more of a problem than is currently being experienced when the circulation relief valve falls to

° t~s"recognized--" that a circulation relief valve will dose when there is a demand for large quantities of water during a serious fire. This eliminates the waste of water from the valve. If is felt, however, that this is a comparatively small amount of water, and would not appreciably reduce the water available for fire fighting with the solenoid valve open continuously while the pump is running. COMM1TIT~E ACTION: Reject. COMM1TIT~E STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-22 (Log #17).

(Log # 41) 20- 24 - (2-7.1.1 (New)): Reject SLrBMITIT~: Walter A. Damon, Deerfield, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

2-7.1.1 The fire pump, driver and controller shall not be installed in a underground vault. S ~ T A N T I A T I O N : 1. Too many pump vaults lack adequate positive drainage, resulting in flooding, which c a u l s damage to pump controllers a n d / o r drivers, lighting, heating systems, etc.

2. OSHA may consider a pump vault as a confined space requiring confined space entry procedures. C O ~ ACTION: Reject. C O ~ STATEMENT: The item in this proposal is currently covered by 2-7.1. An underground vault could be adequately designed to prevent accumulation of water and it could be designed with adequate ventilation.

(Log # 182) 20- 25 - (2-8.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITI"ER: James. w. Nolan, Des Plaines, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete the requirement that suction piping shall be galvanized or painted on the insidel SUBSTANTIATION: This is an impractical requirementl If tuberculation is a problem for suction piping it should also be a problem for dischargepiping and end use components. t~OMMITrEEAC'rI'Olq: Accept in Principle. Change the second sentence to read:

"Where corrosive water conditions exist, steel suction pipe shall be galvanized or painted on the inside prior to..." No change to first and last sentence. C O ~ STATEMENT: Committee experience is such that most water quantity is good enough that this provision is typically not practical for all situations. The provisions should remain for those situations where the water is of a corrosive nature.

(Log # 204) 20. 23 - (2-6): Reject SUBMITrER: James A. Spear, LeRoy, NY RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

2-6 Cooling Circulation Valve. Each pump shall be equipped with an automatic means to provide circulation of sufficient water to prevent the pump from overheating when operating with no discharge. This means shall be either:

a. An automatic relief valve set below the shut off pressure of the Pbump at minimum expected suction pressure.

• A solenoid valve powered by a fused connection to the fire ppump branch circuit on electric motor driven pumps.

rovision shall be made for a discharge to a drain. NOTE: Last paragraph and exception to remain unchanged.

SUBSTANTIATION: Over 25 years of field experience has shown failure of circulation relief valves on electric motor driven fire pumps to be rule rather than the exception. Serious damage has

(Log # 183) 20- 9 6 - ( 2 - 9 . 2 ) : Reject SUBMITrER: James W. Nolan, Des Plalnes, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete reference to cement asbestos pipe as acceptable suction pipe. SUBb~ANTIATION: The EPA does not allow new installations of cement asbestos pipe. COMMITI'EE AC'rION: Reject. ODMMITrEE STATEMENT: Thispipe is permitted for use in portable water systems. The Committee is of the understanding that no restrictions have been placed on this material when it is used for transport of water.

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(Log # 7) 20- 27 - (2-9.4, Table 2-19): Reject SUBMITIT.R: Roger Blank,J,J. Blank Engineering Company RECOMMENDATION: Remove last sentence in text 2-9.4 and retain Table 2-19. Add the following to the end of Section 2-9.4:

"Refer to Table 2-19 for recommended Suction line sizes. Suction line size may be reduced from Table 2-19 sizes if adequate fire pump NPSH is maintained within limits under all conditions of operation as required by the fire pump manufacturer." SUBSTANTIATION: Many existin~ buildings have been required to remove adequately sized fire standpipe suction piping and install larger piping because NFPA 20 requires larger suction piping than good engineering practice would require.

For example, assume a system requires 1000 GPM. A 6 in. suction line at 5 PSI/100 ft friction and 12 ft /sec velocity would be ade.quate without a fire pump if length is short and street main pressure ,s high (to attain 65 PSIG residual at high point). But if street pressure is too low, a fire pump will be required. An 8 in. suction pipe would then be required for 1000 GPMper Table 2-19, even if the smaller 6 in. suction pipe could provide adequate flow, pressure drop, and fire pump NPSH. (Incidentally, ?,5 ft of 6 in. pipe is approximately equivalent to 100 ft of 8 in. based on friction). If suction were taken from a lake or gravity tank, the large suction sizes required by Table 2-10 are reasonable to avoid pump cavitation as dictated by figuring fire pump NPSH.

Additionally, it appears unreasonable to require larger suction piping from building-to-street than what is actually available in the street (especially if the smaller pipe will accommodate the required flow and fire pump NPSH). This has occurred many times here in Denver. C O M ~ ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The pump manufacturers require the 0 prig criteria to optimize operation of the pump. At pressures below 0 psig, air can come in around the pump packing thus potentially causing cavitation.

(Log # 187) 20- 28 - (2-9.5): Accept in Part in Principle SUBMITITA~: R.T. Leicht, CIGNA- Loss Control Services RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"When the suction supply is ~ sufficient pressure to be of material value without the pump, the pump will be installed with a bypass.

OR "When the suction supply is of sufficient pressure to be of material

value without the pump, the pump will be installed with a bypass." SUBSTANTIATION: The wording at present uses the words "...is under sufficientpressure..." which canbe , and has been, misinter- preted to mean qess than". The proposed revision better defines the Committee's intent. COMMrrTEEACTION: Accept in Part in Principle (the first option). Revise to read:

I "when the suction supply is subject to sufficient pressure to be of material value without-the pump, the pump shall be installed with a b ass." ~ M M I T I T ~ STATEMENT: The wording was modified slightly to be positive in terms of requiring the bypass.

(Log # 26) 20-29 - (2-9.6(c) Exception (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: M. Nuri Gurtan, Grinnel Corporation RECOMMENDATION: Add new Exception as follows:

"Exception: Elbows with a centerline plane parallel to a horizontal split-case pump shaft may be used where the distance between the flanges of suction nozzle and the elbow is greater than 3 times the suction pipe diameter." SUBSTANTIATION: It is necessary to be more specific on the issue of avoiding a horizontal elbow at suction side as occasionally it becomes necessary to change the suction pipe direction to be able to accommodate the pump room equipment in a restricted space.

We are requesting this clarification on the advice of Fire Marshal. Please see the pump layout approval of which is contingent upon your clarification.

NOTE: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMHI'ITEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Change the proposed excepfion to "10 times" instead of "3 times." COMMITIT~ STATEMENT: While still not being recommended, the Committee believes that if the elbow is 10 diameters away, the Pthroblem with the water staying to one side of the pump (as it enters

e pump) will be alleviated when the change in water direction is made this far away from the suction flange.

(LOg # 168) 20- 30 - (2-10.6 (New)): Accept SUBMITIT_~: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

2-10.6 I fa reduced pressure back flow preventer valve or back flow preventer valve is required by local authorities, it shall be installed on the discharge side of the fire pump. Pressure drops caused by these devices shall be included in the hydraulic calculations of the system. SUBSTANTIATION: The problem exists ... it must be addressed in the text not the appendixl

Also show arrangement in Figure A-2-9.5. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 129) 20- 31 - (2-18): Reject SUBMITrER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete text. SUBSTANTIATION: Superfluous. Obvious. COMMITIEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes this information is important enough to highlight in Chapter 2, although it is specifically covered by other sections of the Standard.

(Log # 8) 20- 32 - (Table 2-19): Accept SUBM1TrER: Ronald F. Zane, Darling division of P & S Water Industries, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revised text as follows:

Pump Rating No & Size of Hose Hose Header supply Valves in:

50 1 x 1-1/2 in. 1-1/4 in. 100 2 x 1-1/2 in. 2 in.

Revise as follows:

50 1 x 1-1/2 in. 1-1/2 in. 100 1 x 2-1/2 in. 2-1/2 in.

SUBSTANTIATION: One 50 GPM pump it makes no sense to supply a 1-1/4 in. header for a 1-1/2 in. valve.

On 100 GPM pump 2 in. headers are not standard for 2 only 1-1/2 in. valves. It is much simpler to supply 1 only 2-1/2 in. valve with a 2-1/2 in. header which is more compatible. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 29) 20-33- (Table 2-10): Accept in Principle SUBM1TIT~: Eric Larsen, Peerless Pump, A Sterling Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise text, apparent type error:

1990 states maximum 1987 stated minimum

SUBSTANTIATION: Change back to minimum. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMYITEE STATEMENT: This was correct by an errata issued in March of 1990.

(Log # 38) 20- 34 - (Table 2-19): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: Robert F. Summers, Crawford Sprinkler Co. RECOMMENDATION: Change the word q~.ximum ~ to qVlini- mum." SUBSTANTIATION: Size of relief lines for an extended distance. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMrlTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-33 (Log #'29).

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(Log # 59) 20- 35 - (Table 2-19): Accept SUBMITrF2R: Y. R. Reddy, Reddy Buffaloes Pump Co. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

A. Change Meter Device in. from 3 1 /2 to 3 in. on 250 GPM rating. B. Change Meter Device in. from 3 1 /2 to 4 in. on 300 GPM rating.

SUBSTANTIATION: Typographical error. COMMITTEE AUrION: Accept. COMMrlTEE STATEMENT: The Committee notes that a 3 1/2 in, meter does not exist.

(Log # 184) 20- 36 - (Table 2-19): Accept in Part in Prindple SUBMrlWER: James W. Nolan, Des Plaines, IL RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

1. Change Title to: ~Pipe sizes (Nominal)" 2. Change Suction and Discharge pipe sizes for 450 GPM and 500

GPM to 6 in. SUBSTANTIATION: 1. The 1987 Edition title was ~linimum..."

2. Common practice in piping a 450 GPM or 500 GPM Fire Pump is to utilize 6 in. suction anddischarge fittings; furthermore, UL does not list 5 in. Detector Check Valves, o r 5 i n Backflow Check Valves. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Part in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. Tide was changed back to "Minimum."

2. The Committee rejects the change to the suction size. Six in. meters and check valves can be used on the discharge line even if it is only 5 in.

(Log # 169) 20- 37- (2-19.4): Accept SUBMITrER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

2-19.4 ...type of pump is used, a relief valve sized to prevent over pressuring of system shall be installed on the pump discharge to

g revent damage to the fire protection system. UBSTANTIATION: The word suitable is not preventing manufac-

turers from undersizing the relief valve on pressure maintenance pumps. Attention must be brought to this field problem. When timers allow the pressure maintenance pump to run after the pressure setting ts met, the relief valve must be capable of relieving all excess pressure. Pumps without timers do not experience this problem as long as the pressure switch is functioning properly. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 64) 20- 38 - (2-21 (New)): Accept in Prindple SUBMFFrER: Gerald E. Lingenfelter, American Insurance Services

IGEro~_A~MMENDATION: Add a new Section 2-21 to read: 2-21 Couplings. 2-21.1 Couplings shall be listed or approved for f'we protection

service. SUBSTANTIATION: Pumps, drivers and controllers are required by this standard to be listed (see 2-2.1, 6-5.1.1, 7-1.1.1, 8-2.1.1 and 9-1.1.1). However, aweak link exists in that couplings are not required to be listed or otherwise approved. We are aware of some recently manufactured couplings that have failed and, thus, believe there is a need for such a requirement. COMMrlWEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: gee the Committee Action on Proposal 20-46 (Log #23).

(Log # 62) 20-40 - (3-1.1): Accept S U B ~ : Steven L. Wdliams, CNOBG RECOMMENDATION: Revise second sentence. Add the wording "end suction" to single stage pumps. This wording was inadvertently deleted since the last revision. SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph 3-1.1 as it is stated eliminates all standard cataloged fire pumps on the market which are above 500 FO m, since many fire pumps above 500 gpm are single stage pumps.

~ A C T I O N : Accept. NOTE: This was corrected by an errata issued in March of 1990. This paragraph has been further modified by action taken on Proposal 20-41 (Log #130).

(Log # 130) 20-41 - (3-1.1): Acceptin Principle 8 u B M r r r E ~ Ronald F. Zane, Darling Duro RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Delete "under 500 GPM (1892 L/min)" Replace with %f 1000 GPM (3785 L/ ra in)" Paragraph 3-1.1 should read: 3-1.1 Types. Horizontal pumps shall be of the split-case, end-

suction or in-line design. Single stage, end suction and in-line pumps shall be limited to capacities of 1000 GPM (3785 L/rain) . SUBSTANTIATION: The under 500 GPM limitation restricts the development of larger size in-line pumps which are more practical in the retrofit market due to space iimitatmns. COMMrrFEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Re~se 3-1.1 as follows:

5-1.1 Types. Horizontal pumps shall be of the split-case, end- suction or in-line design. Single stage close coupled vertical in-line

umps shall be limited to capacities not greater than 750 gpm (2838 /m~m). Single stage end-suction pumps shall be limited to

capacities not greater than 500 gpm (1892 gpm). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The test report submitted with this proposal shows that testing was done with a 750 gpm pump. The Committee is of the opinion that the use of select pumps (Close coupled, vertical in-fine types) can be expanded to larger capacities if documentation is available to support suchpumps. Based on the information currently available, pump sizes of 750 gpm and less of the close coupled, vertical in-line type will be recobmized by the Standard.

(Log # 203) 20- 42 - (3-1.1): Reject SUBMITrER: Charles M. Sauta, Midstate Hudson Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Delete ~capacities under 500 GPM (1891 L / m ) " Add "capaddes to 1000 GPM (3785 L/m) ~

SUBSTANTIATION: None. COMMrr rEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrr rEE STATEMENT: No substantiation was given. Also, see the Committee Action on Proposal 20-41 (Log #1.*,0.)

(Log # 205) 20-43- (3-1.1): Reject S U B M I T I T ~ RalphJ. Pimto, Franklin, MA REGOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Delete ~capacities under 500 GPM (1891 L /m)" Add "capacities to 1000 GPM (3785 L / m ) "

SUBSTANTIATION: None. C O M ~ ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: No substantiation was given.

(Log # 58) 20- 39 - (3-1.1): Reject SLIBMITI'ER: Bud Anderson, Hayes Pump, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Single stage and in-line pumps shall be limited to capacities under

~nn,~--~j~K~gTmA~qTIATION: "single stage ~ should be changed to "end- suction."

Because single stage includes both horizontal split case and end- suction. COMM Ac'rION: Reject, COMMITTEE STATEMENT: An errata was issued to this paragraph in March of 1990 to correct this paragraph. Action taken on Proposal 20-41 (Log #150) has further modified this paragraph.

(Log # 68) 20- 44- (3-1.2): Accept SUBl~TrER: Ronaid F. Zane, Darling Duro RECOMMENDATION: Revise wording:

"Application. The horizontal split case pump in horizontal or vertical position, end suction and verticalin-line pumps shall not be used where a static suction lift is involved." SUBSTANTIATION: This better describes the three types of pumps, split case, end suction and in-line, and eliminates confusion. C O M P A C T I O N : Accept. Editorially change this proposal to read:

%..and close coupled vertical in-line..." to be consistent with Proposal 20-41 (Log #130).

1&5

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(Log # 180) 20. 45- (5-1.3 (New)): Reject SUBMITIT.~: Ronald F. Zane, Darling Duro RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

5-1.3 Label. Each fire pump shall be provided with identifiable nameplate(s).preferably mounted on a solid bracket and attached to the pump casing.

Attachment to a steel base is not acceptable. SUBSTANTIATION: Some labels are tack welded to pump casings. They become loose and damaged during shipment and installation. A solid bracket ensures visibleidentification. COMMIT1T, E ACTION: Reject. COMMITIT.,E STATEMENT: The current requirements are adequate. The listing standards for pumps have requirements for the labeling method and attachment. The Committee is not aware of specific situations where this has been a problem.

(LOg # 23) 20- 46 - (5-4.1): Accept SUBMrrIT.~: Edward D. Leedy, Industrial Risk Insurers RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

I "The pump and driver shall be mounted on a common base plate and be connected by a flexible coupling listed for this service. SUBSTANTIATION: Since unit purchase was ruled out by the Standards Council, couplings not suitable for fire pump service are being used. Field experience has shown that some of these couplings have failed, rendering the fire pump useless. The pump, the driver, and the controller are required to be listed, therefore, the flexible coupling connecting the pump and the driver should also be required to be listed. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept.

(LOg # 17O) 20- 47 - (4-1.1): Accept SUBMrFIT_~: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Remove first sentence, start second sentence ~I'he vertical shaft turbine-type pump is particularly suitable for fire pump service when the..." SUBSTANTIATION: First sentence is a definition and is not correct. If definition is needed in this text, recommend using the definition change in an earlier proposal that is in accordance with AWWA E101-88. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 171) 20. 48 - (4-2.2.2): Accept SUBMITrER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise last sentence as follows:

"See the Hydraulic Institute Standards for Centrifugal, Rotary and Reciprocating Pumps, latest edition." SUBSTANTIATION: If latest edition is not proper, then update to last published edition. C O M P A C T I O N : Accept. Editorial Note: The edition will be put in the chapter on referenced publications.

(LOg # 172) 20. 49 - (4-2.4.1): Reject S U B M r r I ' F ~ Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"All casings shall be of material of sufficient strength and of such diameter and installed..." SUBSTANTIATION: Steel is not the only accepted material for casings in standard practice. COMMrITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Steel is the only casing material which has the strength characteristics to satisfy the intent of the Commit- tee. While plastic may be acceptable for non-fire protection vertical turbine pumps, the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps does not wish to permit its use.

(Log # 173) 20- 50 - (4-3.1): Accept in Principle S L r B ~ Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

4-5.1 Head. The pump head shall be either the aboveground or belowground discharge type. It shall be designed to support the driver, column assembly, bowl assembly, maximum down thrust and the oil tube tension nut or packing container. SUBSTANTIATION: When the vertical pump is in an operating mode the thrust developed by pressure adds downward force on the pump head. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise 4-3.1 as follows:

4-3.1 Head. The pump head shill be either the aboveground or belowground discharge type. It shall be designed to support the driver, pump, column assembly, bowl assembly, maximum down thrust and the oil tube tension nut or packing container. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The modification made by the Committee addresses the provision to also support the weight of the pump. The change still supports the intent of the submitter.

(Log # 181) 20. 51 - (4-3.1.1 (New), A-11-2.6.3(g) 3): Reject SUBMrITER: Brian F. Foster, The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspec- tion and Insurance Co. RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add 4-3.1.1 as follows:

4-3.1.1 The discharge pressure of a vertical turbine pump assembly shall be rated at the centerline of the discharge flange.

2. Revise A-11-2.6.S(g)3 as follows: Delete "3) Distance to the water level."

SUBSTANTIATION: I am requesting the changes to clarify a misleading section in Appendix A-11-2.6.3(g)3. Vertical Pumps 3) ..."Distance to the water level." The appendix wording is apparently asking for an elevation correction i n t h e discharge head pressure. It is my understanding that the dischargepressure stamped on the pump is at the centerline of the pump discharge. Based on this understanding, Item 3) is inappropriate. COMM1TIT_,E ACTION: Reject. COMMrrTEE STATEMENT: This is outside the industry practice as governed by NFPA 20. In addition, the water level at the bowl assembly is used to evaluate the design and performance of the pump.

(Log # 145) 20- 52 - (4-5.2.4 (New)); Accept SUBMrITER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

"The pump line shafting shall be sized so critical speed shall be 25 percent above and below the operating speed of the pump. Operating speed shall include all speeds from shut-off to the 150 percent point of the pump which vary on engine drives." SUBSTANTIATION: Vertical pump lineshafting are generally designed to operate at rated speed at the rating point and meet the 25 percent above and below criteria. On engine drives the operating speed at shut-off and the 150 percent point may put the pump in a vibratin~ mode which can cause destruction in the 30 minutes required to run on the weekly test or during a fire when the pump

rates at the 150A~ercent point. MrlTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 144) 20-55- (4-3.3.2): Accept SUBMITrER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

4-$.3.2 Impellers shall be of the enclosed type and shall be of bronze or other suitable material in accordance with the chemical analysis of the water and experience in the area. SUBSTANTIATION: Clearance requirements of open impellers on well pumps of up to 200 feet in length will not allow the pump to be operated at shut-off without damage to impellers because of the shaft stretch change from rated point to shut off point. Open impellers are set at the rated point and with the added thrust at shut- offwill stretch the shaft to the point of rubbing the bottom on the intermediate. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Accept.

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(Log # 145) 20-54- (4-4.3.2): Accept SUBMrITER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

4-4.3.2 The foundation for vertical pumps shall be substantially built to carry the entire weight of the pump and driver plus the maximum down thrust. Foundation bolts shall be prowded to firmly anchor the pump to the foundation. SUBSTANTIATION: When the vertical pump is in an operating mode the thrust developed by discharge pressure adds downward force on the pump foundation. COMMITTEE ACt"ION: AccepL

(Log # 14o) 20- 55 - (4-4.3.4): Accept S u B M r r I T ~ : Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMF~NDATION: Revise text as follows:

4-4.3.4 The top of the foundation shall be carefully leveled to permit the pump to hang freely over a well pit on a short-coupled pump. On a well pump the pump head shall be positioned plumb- over the well which is not necessarily level. SUBSTANTIATION: Wells are not always drilled exactly vertical which will not allow leveling of the well head. C O M M r r r F ~ A c r I O N : Accept.

(Log # 125) 20-50- (4-5.3 (New)): Accept SUBMFITER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

4-5.3 Each fire pump shall have its own dedicated driver and each driver shall have its own dedicated controller. SUBSTANTIATION: 2-Z2 prohibits dual driver pumps; this proposal prohibits dual driver controller and dual controller drivers. COMM1TrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 30) 20- 57 - (4-5.1.3): Accept S U B ~ : D.P. Nolan, Aberdeen, Scotland RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

"Water cooled gear drives shall be equipped with a visual means to determine if water circulation is occurring. ~ SUBSTANTIATION: Many gear drives run hot, it is difficult to determine if adequate water cooling is occurring internally if the cooling water is a totally dosed system. A visual sight glass, temp g~i uge or dump to an open basis is preferred.

nfernal corrosion may limit water flow with a rapid heat input during a line rupture. COMMrrl'EEAC'I"ION: Accept. Editorially renumber as 4-5.1.3.3.

(Log # o3) 20- 58 - (4-6.1.3 (New)): Accept $UBMITrER: Norman Barratt, Fire Pump Testing & Sales, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

"¢¢henever the impeller in a labelled fire pump is replaced with an identical impeller and /o r rotating assembly, a field re-test of the pump unit must be performed. The re-test is to be conducted by the pump manufacturer, or his representative, or pump qualified person who is so designated by the appropriate authorities. The field re-test results shall equal the original pump performance as indicated by the original factory certified test curve, whenever it is available, and it shallbe within the accuracy limits of field testing as stated elsewhere in NFPA 20. ~ SUBffrANTIATION: The impeller(s) in a centrifugal pump can become excessively worn or damaged due to any number of reason that would require its replacement. It is not practical to take the pump out of service for shipment back to the factory for installation of a new impeller and factory testing, therefore the replacement impeller(s) should be installed in the field and then a full field test performed to verify that the pump is performing properly. During the replacement of the impeller, the person who is designated to perform the testing shouldbe present, as it is easy to get the im Iler o f a centrifu pump in backwards ~ O p e ~ A C T I ~ : Accept. Editorially, change "labelled" to "listed" in line 1.

(Log # 147) 20- 59 - (4-7.1.1): Accept in Principle S U ] B ~ Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Before starting the unit for the first time after installation, all electrical connections to the motor and discharge piping from the pump shall be checked. With the top drive coupling removed, the drive shaft shall be centered in the du tch for proper alignment and the motor shall be momentarily operated to ensure *.hat it rotates in the counter clockwise direction. With the top drive coupling reinstalled, the impellers shall be set for proper clearance according to manufacturers instruction." SUBff]?ANTIATION: Misalignment causinl~ vibration is a n~a~or problem with vertical pumps. Simply checking that the shaft Is centered in the clutch could prevent vibration probnems. The last sentence, in the existin, g text. is in incorrect order. Propose checking ruth manufacturers instructions on proper clearance smce the clearance varies from different manufacturers. C O M M 1 T ~ A C T I O N : Accept in Principle. Revise to read:

4-7.1.1 Before starting the unit for the first time after installation, all field installed electrical connections and discharge piping from the pump shall be checked. With the top drive coupling removed, the drive shaft shall be centered in the top drive coupling for proper alignment and the motor shall be momentarily operated to ensure that it rotates in the proper direction. With the top drive coupling reinstalled, the impellers shall be set for proper clearance according to manufacturers instructions. COMMITrEg STATEMENT: The modification addresses the concern expressed by the submitter. This procedure will further reduce any problems associated with alignment of these pumps.

(Log # 148) 20- 00 - (4-7.1.2): Accept S L r B ~ Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMgNDATION: Revise text as follows:

4-7.1.2 With the above precautions taken, the pump shall be started and allowed to run. The operation shall be observed for vibration while running, with vibration limits per hydraulic institute standards. Driver shall be observed for proper operation. SUBSTANTIATION: Vibration limits should have guidance. COMM1TrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 57) 20- 61 - (Chapter 5): Reject SUBMrrrER: John D.Jensen, Idaho Falls, ID RECOMMENDATION: Delete entire chapter. SUBSTANTIATION: The use of fire pumps for high rise application is no longer a special application. Numerous ~isted a n d approved pumps are available for each application. The exception pumps should also be listed. No technical justification exists for the special situation to continue. C O M ~ AcrloN: Reject. C O ~ STATEMENT: The Committee continues to believe that high rise buildings still require some special provisions. Chapter 5 has certain paragraphs (such as 5-2.3 and 5-4.2.2) which are mostly unique to pumps in high rise buildings.

20- 02 - (0-1): Accept SUBMITIX~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace text with:

"General This chapter outlines the minimum requirements of electrical power to motors driving fire pumps and the minimum performance requirements of all intermediate equipment betaken the service(s) and the pump, including the motor(s) excepting the fire pump controller, its accessories and power transfer switch (see Chapter 7). All electrical equipment shall, as a minimum, comply with NFPA 70, National Electrical Cx~de." SUBSTANTIATION: The revised description better defines what subjects are governed by Chapter 6. It has been modified to exclude the source of power since that is understood and must be evaluated on a case by case basis.

In October of 1990, the NFPA Standards Council directed the restructured Technical Committee on Fire Pumps to develop a plan to segregate the requirements of NFPA 20 between performance and installation provisions. This plan is directed at those elements in NFPA 20 which relate excluswely to the requirements dealing with electrical services to the fire pump controller and motor.

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In order to implement this plan, a special Task Force composed of members from the National Electrical Code Committee a n d t h e Technical Committee on Fire Pumps met for one day to develop a list of items and issues to be addressed. Fifteen elements were developed in order to allow the Fire Pump Committee to proceed with the performance/installation separation provisions for NFPA 20. After completion of this meeting, the Technical Committee on Fire

Pumps met for one day in April of 1991. The purpose of this meeting was to review the Task Force Report and decide on specifics of accomplishing the recommendations contained in the Task Force Report. During this meeting,, it was decided to appoint an ad-hoc group, known as the Electrical Ca)de Task Force (later changed to NFPA 20/70 Task Group) to detail a plan which would sufficiently separeae Nte the issues.

FPA 20/70 Task Group met in August, 1991 and January and March, 1992 to develop a report for the entire Technical Committee on Fire Pumps. This report concerned the recommendations as charged by the Standards Council and as directed by the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps. At issue were the numerous problems associated with interpretations of thd Chapter 6 and 7 requirements of the previous standard. This group developed various recommendations to allow for better coordination between the equipment requirements and the reliability of the power supply.

These recommendations were later modified and accepted to become Technical Committee proposals. The proposals are intended to further define and describe those provisions of NFPA 20 and to delete those items, when possible, which are in scope of NFPA 70. COMMITYEE AG"rION: Accept.

20- 63 - (6-2.1): Accept S L r B ~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace text with:

"Utility Service. Where power is supplied by a public utility service connection, the service shall be located and arranged to minimize the possibility of damage by fire from within the premises and exposing hazards." SUIISTANTIATION: Protection against a possible rather than a probable fire is the main issue inherent in many of the requirements of Chapter 6. Also, see Committee Action on 20-62. C O ~ ACTION: Accept.

20- 64 - (6-2.2): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace text with:

"Single Private Power Station. Where power is supplied from a single private power station, the station shall be of non-combustible construction, located and protected to minimize the possibility of damage by fire." SUBSTANTIATION: See Committee Action on 20-52 and 20-63. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 32) 20- 65 - (6-2, 6-2.1, 6-2.2, 6-2.5 (New)): Accept in Principle SL1BMrrTER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: 1. Revise 6-2, 6-2.1 and 6-2.2 as follows:

6-2 Power Source(s). Power shall be supplied to the fire pump by one or more of the following reliable sources:

6-2.1 Utility Service. Where power is supplied by a public utility service connection, the service shall be located and arranged to minimize the probability of damage by fire from within the premises and exposing hazards.

6-2.2* Single Power Station. Where power is supplied from a single private power station, the station shall be of noncombustible construction, located and protected to minimize the probability of damage by fire.

2. Add new 6-2.3 as follows: 6-2.3 A reliable source possesses the following characteristics: (a) Infrequent power disruptions from environmental or man-

made conditions. (b) A separate service connection or connection to the supply side

of the servme disconnect. (c) Service and feeder conductors either buried under 2 inches of

concrete or encased in 2 inches of concrete or brick within a building. SUBSTANTIATION: These changes implement paragraphs 6 and 9 Attachment II of NFPA | 0 / 7 0 TaskForce minutes of 12/15/90 as directed by the Standards Council.

COMMrrrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Place the proposed 6-2.5 material as a new section A-6-2.3. COMMFITEE STATEMENT: The recommendations in the ~r~aAOSal were incorporated into the proposals developed by the

20/70 Task Force concerning the power supply sources. The information concerning criteria for the reliability of the source is more appropriate for inclusion in the Appendix.

(Log # 33) 20- 66 - (6-2.5, 6-2.3.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

6-2.4 Other Sources. 6-$.4.1 Where reliable power the characteristics ofO-2.$(A )

cannot be obtained from a private power station or utility service, it shall be from two or more of either of the above or in combination, or one or more of the above in combination with an emergency generator (see 6-2.3.2), all as approved by the authority having jurisdiction. The power sources shall be arranged so that a fire at one source will not cause an interruption at the other source(s). SUBSTANTIATION: The new proposed 6-2.3 defines three characteristics of a reliable source. NFPA 20-1990 intends that only 6-2.3 (A) pertain to a non-reliable source. No trade off of substitut- ing two or more sources for not meeting 6-2.3(B) or 6-2.3(C) is considered acceptable (see F.I. #87-4). COMMIT1T~AC'I'ION: Accept in Principle. COMM1TYEE STATEMENT: The information developed by the NFPA 20/70 Task Force concluded that no further modification of this paragraph was needed. Proposal 20-65 (Log #32) will guide the user to further considerations concerning reliability of power sources.

20- 67 - (6-3, 6-3.1,6-3.1.1): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace text with:

6-3 Power Supply Lines. 6-$.1 Circuit Conductors. 6-3.1.1 Service entrance conductors or fire pump feeder conduc-

tors shall be physically routed outside the building(s) and shall be installed as service entrance conductors in compliance with Article 23O-6 of NFPA 7O.

Exception No. 1: Where service entrance conductors or fire pump feeder conductors must be routed through the building(s), they shall be installed under, or enclosed within not less than 2 in. (51 mm) of concrete or brick in accordance with Article 230-6 of NFPA 70.

Exception No. 2: Where fire pump feeder conductors are routed through the building(s) they shall be permitted to be listed electrical circuit protective systems with a minimum of I hour fire resistance. The installation shall comply with the restrictions provided for in the listing. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 20 require the power supply for a fire pump to remain in place and functional during all but the most catastrophic type of failure. Recognizing that pumps and control equipment cannot always be positioned on an exterior wall, some allowance must be made to allow the conductors to be run through the structure. This revised section addresses the need to protect the conductors

from fire exposure as well as the need to provide for some physical protection to the conductors. Traditionally, NFPA 20 has used the service conductor i~rovisions of NFPA 70 to achieve this level of protection for service as well as feeder conductors. Recognizing that other criteria exists for feeder conductors, the Committee has decided that it would be beneficial to specifically discuss those items. The revised paragraph now recognizes those traditional protective

measures as well as the use of other "systems" to provide me ~,~plemental protection for the feeder conductors.

MMITrEEACTION: Accept.

(Log # $) 20- 68 - (6-$.1.1): Reject S U B ~ : Edwin C. Denham, Robinet & Associates Consulting Engineers Inc.,. RECOMMENDATION: Revise Exception as follows:

Exception: Use of mineral insulated cable listed for 2 hr fire resistance by a national testing agency shall meet the requirements of this section when installing fire pumps in an existing facility.

1 N

N F P A 20 ~ A93 T C R

SUBSTANTIATION: Most fire pump installations in existing buildings are faced with excessive costs and great difficulty in trying to comply with this section of the code. The MI products offer a satisfactory engineeringsolution. COMMITTEE-AG"I'ION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See revised paragraph 6-3.1.1 and its exception. The Committee revised this section with Proposal 20-67 to coordinate with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. The revised material will not prohibit MI type cable but it will address the need for a %ystem ~ to provide fire resistance as well as physical protection.

m ~

• (Log # M) 20-69- (6-S.I.1,A-6-$.l,A-6-2.3(c) (New)): Acceptin Principle SUBMrrTER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: 1. Delete 6-~.1.1.

2. Change A-6-3.1 to A-6-2. 5. Add a new A-6-2.5(c) to read: A-6-2.3(c). Under premise fire conditions, service and feeder

conductors are susceptible to failure from collapsing structural and other members within the premise as well as from fire. under fire conditions generated by overcurrent within these conductors, the characteristics of 6-2.5(c) minimize the possibility office spread. SUBSTANTIATION: These changes implement Paragraph 6 Attachment II of NFPA 20/70 Task Force minutes of 12/15/90 as directed b~v the Standard Council. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITIT~ STATEMENT: The language by Committee Proposal 20.227 for A-6-S.I.1 addressed the issue of conductor protection. This should satisfy the intent of the submitter.

(Log # 193) 20. 70 - (6-3.1.1, 6-5.2, 6-5.5, and Figure 6-$.2): Accept in Principle SUBMrIWER: Carrol Burtner, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NF_~A) RECOMMENDATION: Replace existing 6-5.1.1 through 6-3.3 (including figure 6-$.2) with following new 6-5.1.1, 6-3.2, 6-5.$ and Figure 6-5.2.

6-5.1.1" The fire pump power supply conductors shah be physically routed outside thebuilding(s) , excluding the electrical switch gear room and the pump room, and shall be treated as service conductors in compliance with Article 230, NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.

Exception: When the fire pump power supply conductors must be routedthrough the building(s), they shall be buried or enclosed in 2 in. (51 ram) of concrete or brick in accordance with Article 250-6, NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.

6-5.2 Power Supply. The power supply from the source to the Fire Pump Motor shall be as shown in Arrangements A, B, or C of Figure 6-5.2. (Shown on nextpage.)

NOTE= For arrangements ut i i~ 'ng an Alternate power source, refer to Section 7-8 and Figure 7-8.

6-5.5 Power Supply Arrangements From Source to Pump Motor. 1. Arrangement A. There shall not be any disconnecting means

nor power supply protective devices between the power supply and the Fire Pump Controller.

Exception: When, in the interest of life safety, the authority having jurisdiction mandates a disconnecting means between the power supply and the fire pump controller, the disconnecting means shall comply with the following:

(a) If the disconnecting means contains overcurrent protection, the overcurrent protection shall be sized not to open at the sum of the locked rotor currents of the fire pump motor(s),jockey pump motor(s), and associated fire pump accessory equipment.

(b) The disconnecting means shall be lockable m the ON position.

(c) Aplacard shall be installed on the disconnecting means stating ~F'tre Pump Disconnecting Means". The letters shall be at least I in. (25.4 mm) in height.

(d) A placard shall be ~placed adjacent to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnecting means, the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked), the combined sum of the locked rotor currents o f the fire pump motor(s) ad accessory equipment and the size of the overcurrent protection if supplied.

(e) The disconnecting means shall be supervised to indicate when it is open. Supervision shall consist of an audible and visual signal at the point of constant attendance.

2. Arrangement B. When a transformer serves a fire pump, there shall not be any disconnecting means nor power supply protective devices between the transformer and the Fire Pump Controller.

(a) The transformer primary protective device shall be sized in accordance with NEC 450.5(a) (5).

(b) The transformer primary disconnecting me~as shall be Iockable in the ON position.

(c) A placard shall be installed on the transformer primary disconnecting means stating "Fire Pump Disconnecting Means". The letters shall be at least I in. (25.4 mm) in height.

(d) A placard shall be placed adjacent to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnecting means, the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked), the combined sum of the locked rotor currents o f the fire pump motor(s) and accessory equipment and the size of the overcurrent protection.

(e) The disconnecting means shall be supervised to indicate when it is open. Supervision shall consist of an audible and visual signal at apo in t of constant attendance.

5. Arrangement C. When a transformer serves a plant load and a fire pump, there shall not be any disconnecting means nor power supply protective devices between the transformer :and the Fire Pump Con~oller.

(a) The transformer primary protection shall be sized to carry the sum of the Locked rotor Currents of the Fire Pump Motor(s) and the maximum plant load.

(b) The disconnecting means shall be lockable in the ON position.

(c) A placard shall be installed on the ~sconnect ing means stating Wire Pump Disconnecting Means . The letters shall be at least I in. (25.4 ram) in height.

(d) A placard shall be placed next to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnecting means, the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked), the combined sum of the locked rotor currents of the fire pump motor and accessory equipment and the size of the overcurrent protection.

Exception: I f a wansfer switch is connected ahead of the Fire Pump Controller, it shall be permitted to have a disconnecting means and power supply protective devices, provided that the disconnecting means is within sight of the lrn-e Purap Con~oller, and the power supply protective devices are sized to carry the sum of the Locked Rotor Current of the Fire Pump Motor and the accessory equipment. $UBbWANTIATION: Confusion exists on power arrangements to the fire pump controller and whether and when ~pstrearn" disconnect/protective devices may be installed in the fire pump pewer, sup. ply circuit. This proposal clarifies installation, and .defines applica~on of controllers, automatic transfer swRches, and disconnect/protective devices. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMrrIT.~ STATEMENT: The items brought 'up in this proposal have been incorporated into the series of revisions concerning the power supply arrangements. The Committee has elected to show only two arrangements. See the Osmmittee Action on 20.227 concerning Paragraph A-6-5.1.1.

(Log # 199) 20- 71 - (6-5.1.1): Accept in Principle S U B ~ Robert H. Keis, Fhst State Inspection Ago/., Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Remove the word ~eeder" twice in the Section. The Section would then read in part:

"Fhe fire pump circuit conductors shall be physically routed outside of the building excluding the electrical sw~tch gear room and the pump room. When the fire pump conductors must be muted through building(s), they shall be buried..." SUBffrANTIATION: The single line in Figure 6-3.2 seems to indicate that the only disconnecting means is the primary disconnect ahead of the primary transformer. This disconnec~ is usually the utility cut-outs, but could be a customer owned primary switch, then the fire pump controller is directly connected to the secondary side of the transformer ahead of all other disconnects. If this is to be the way the installation is to be made, the words "feeder" should be removed. "Feeder" by definition from NFPA 70: All circuit conductors between the service equipment or the source of a separately derived system and the final branch-circmit overcurrent device. The text of 6-3.5 implies that the pump controller is to be the "service equipment" andas such there is no feeder conductors. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMrr rEE STATEMENT: The Comnuttee has revised this section completely to address the general catego D, of power supply lines and the specific categories of service entrance conductors and feeder conductors. This distinction should satisfy the intent of the submitter. See Committee Proposal 20-67 for paragraph 6-5.

139

NFPA 20 - - A93 TCR

ARRAN( EMENT A

POVER SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS

TO O~9~eP I~rv¢~ |winches

NEC ~ ' [ ~

(op't:on~t)

F¢$ Pue~p Moto? Utibz~tion V ~ g e

~ervi¢~ conductor $ NCC Z30

[see 6-3.3 ¢1)1

ARRANGEMENT B

TO ocher sev'v;ce sw;t(;hes ,~n=l ptGn't toacig,. NEC ZZ0-7

~J4..AJ

To ?tP¢ I~ut'KO GM]I IOB~I (optiO~at)

NOPI'IQ| SOUr'C~ irt~tJl~

r~e Pu~p Con'tr'o(ter L*'~" Of" " "" Tr=nsFer"

req~;re~l)

FROM SOURCE TO MOTOR

ARRANGEMENT C

Service Eciu~neh¢ NCC 230 P~r~ E

C ohhecl~;Oh pep NrC 450-3 (a)(3)

NOPRO( Source ;nput

F',r Ir PuMP ControLler

or TrcmsFer

Switch (VI1en

req~ir'ed)

To +';re pur~D • ux Io~ds (opt;onat)

Serv=¢e [qu~e. ' i : NEC 2310 P¢Lrt £

/ 'v ' , ,...AJ

Connection per N~"C 450-3 (IX3)

i TransfoP~er Secondary 0werClJrrehl~

toGds.

Normal ~Our'Ci' input

r~-e Pu~P ControLLer

~IC=.. TransFer

(Vheh requ;red)

F'tgure 6-3.2

Proposal 20-70, Log #193

140

N F P A 20 ~ A 9 3 T C R

(Log # 210) 20- 72 - (6-3.1.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITrEI~ L @ Milne, Pyrotenax USA Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change the second sentence to rea~k

"When the fire pump feeder conductors must be routed through building(s), they shal /be buffed or enclosed by 2 inches (51 mm) of concrete or they shall be Type MI cable with af i re resistive classification." SUI~TANTIATION: The current wording of 6-3.1.1 allows for / i re resistive Type MI cable to be used for fire pump conductors, but it is not specific enough regarding other performance factors critical to reliable fire pump operation. Although it happens only rarely, the current wording also gives rise to unnecessary questions of interpretation. Type MI cable, with a fire resistive rating from a qualified testing

laboratory, has been widely used for conductors to the/ i re p u m p room. In fact for retrofit installations, fire resistive Type MIis often the only means of assuring conductor reliability during emergency conditions. The installation flexibility provided by having more than one method to achieve compliance is particularly important now with the increasing number of sprinkler retrofits and consequently, in many cases,/ire pump retrofits. Although concrete enca~men t may be reliably accomplished during the construction of most new buildings, it may be nearly impossible to achieve in a retrofit installation. This is due to the difficulties of reliable concrete encasement when the electrical run must circumvent existing structures and pass through limited access areas.

Since the basic concept behind the NFPA 20 document is to do all possible to allow the fire pump to operate to failure, there are more reasons to support Type MI cable for retrofit installations than there is for concrete encased conduit.

1. Due to its solid construction and an electrical insulating material having a density greater than the copper in the sheath and conductor(s), Type MI cable can be crushed to half of its original diameter and still remain functional.

The UL fire test re~]uired the tes~cl cables be subjected to a 30 psi fire hose test immediately following the fire endurance portion of the test. The purpose of this portion of the test was to subject the test samples to "the impact, erosion, and cooling effects of a water hose stream" (see excerpts from NFPA 251 andUI subject 1724). Additionally, I submit a report of tests performed at ETL Testing Laboratories, Inc. These tests show the exceptional mechanical strength of Type MI cable. Two different power cables were submitted for ~sting---the largest Type MI cable available (single conductor 500 kcmil) and a multiple conductor power cable (four conductor 6 AWG). Both power cables were subjected to 120,000 psi crushing force, the maximum available at this laboratory. Although both cables were compressed to less than half their original diameter through the test, they each passed 500 volt insulation resistance testing. Therefore even if the cable is subjected to mechanical stress, the fire pump will continue to function.

2. Type MI cable can function through the potential overload condiu~ons of a fire pump system. Conduit and wire has a limited life when subjected to the ovedoad conditions of locked rotor.

3. Fwe resistive Type M] arrives at the job site with a 2 hour fire resistive rating. This is confirmed by tests at Underwriters Laborato- r ies--conduit encasement is not.

NOTF= Supporting material is available for review at NFPA

ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE S T A ~ : See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-67 concerning paragraph 6-3.

(Log# 211) 20- 74 - (6-3.1.1 Exception (New)): Reject SUBM1TIlgl~ L.j . Miine, Pyrotenax USA Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add the following exception to 6-3.1.1:

Exception: When the fire pump feeder conductors are Type MI cable with af i re resistive classification of at least 2 hours, the above does not apply. SUBSTANTIATION: The current wording of 6-3.1.1 allows for fire resistive Type MI cable to be used for fire pump conductors, but it is not specific enough regarding other performance factors critical to reliable fire pump operation. Although it happens only rarely, the current wording also gives rise to unnecessary questions of interpretation. Type ]Vll cable, with a fire resistive rating from a qualified testing

laboratory, has been widely used for conductors to ~he fire pump room. In fact for retrofit installations, fire resistive :type MIis often the only means of assuring conductor reliability during emergency conditions. The installation flexibility provided by [laving more than one method to achieve compliance is particularly inlportant now with the increasing number of sprinkler retrofits and consequently, in many cases, fire pump retrofits. Although concrete encasement may be reliably accomplished during the construction of most new buildings, it may be nearly impossible to achieve in a retrofit installation. This is due to the difficulties of reliable concrete encasement when the electrical run must circumvent existing structures and pass through limited access areas.

Since the basic concept behind the NFPA 20 document is to do all possible to allow the fire pump to operate to failure, there are more reasons to support Type MI cable for retrofit installations than there is for concrete encased conduit.

1. Due to its solid construction and an electrical insulating material having a density greater than the copper in the sheath and conductor(s), Type MI cable can be crushed to half of its original diameter and stiff remain functional.

The UL fire test required the tested cables be subjected to a 30 psi fire hose test immediately following the fire endurance portion of the test. The purpose of this portion of the test was to subject the test samples to "the impact, erosion, and cooling effects o t a water hose stream" (see excerpts from NFPA 251 and UL subject 1724). Additionally, I submit a report of tests performed at ETL Testing Laboratories, Inc. These tests show the exceptional mechanical strength of Type MI cable. Two different power cables were submitted for tes t ing~the largest Type MI cable ac.filable (single conductor 500 kcmil) and a multiple conductor power cable (four conductor 6 AWG). Both power cables were subjected to 120,000 psi crushing force, the maximum available at this laboratory. Although both cables were compressed to less than half their original diameter through the test, they each passed 500 volt insulation resistance testing. Therefore even if the cable is subjected to mechanical stress, the fire pump will continue to function.

2. Type MI cable can function through the potential overload conditions of a fire pump system. Conduit and wire has a limited life when subjected to the overload conditions of locked rotor.

3. Fire resistive Type MI arrives at the job site with a 2 hour fire resistive rating. This is confirmed by tests at Underwriters Laborato- ries--conduit encasement is not.

NOTE: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

COMM1TYEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: The Committee does not believe that the 2 hour criteria is needed. The Committee has decided that 1 hour is suflident.

(Log # 9) 20- 73 - (6-3.1.1 Exception (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITYER: L.James Milne, Pyrotenax USA, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add the following exception to 6-3.1.1:

"Type MI mineral insulated, metal-sheathed cables having a fire resistance rating of 1 hour or more are acceptable." SU]gSTA_NTIATION: This will reinstate type MI cable into NFPA 20 as itwas through the 1980 issue. COMMITI~.EACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-72 (Log #210). A specific exception is not needed since thebase paragraph of revised 6-3.1.1 will permit such special products. See the Committee Action on 20-67.

20. 75 - (6-3.1.2): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

6-3.1.2 Al lpump room wiring shall be in rigid, in~ermediate or liquid tight flexible metal conduit or Type MI cable. SUKSTANTIAT/ON: Other proposals for NFPA 20 permit select types of wiring systems for the feeder conductors to a pump. In order to recognize those systems, this paragraph should be modified so as not to conflict with the other requirements. COMMITIT, E ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 10) 20- 76 - (6-3.1.4 and 6-7.1 Exception (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITIT.R: Wm. F. Stelter, Master Control Systems, In~ RECOMMENDATION: Do not revise the text in paragraph 6-7.1 and add the following to paragraph 6-3.1.4:

Exception: For manual starting, the voltage shall not drop more than 35 percent below normal under motor starting conditions.

141

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

SUBSTANTIATION: Since the contractor does not require any control power during manual operation, a drop below 15 percent will not affect manual operation. In addition, a 35 percent drop during manual starting approximates normal reduced voltage starting. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise exception to read:

Exception: For emergency run mechanical starting (See %5.$.2) this limitation shall not apply. COMMrr rEE STATEMENT: The 35 percent value is too restrictive. As long as the pump starts and runs, the Committee believes any voltage drop is acceptable.

(Log # 100) 20- 77- (6-3.1.4): Reject S U B ~ : Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add a second sentence:

"An on-site generator shall not exceed a maximum transient voltage dip of 25 percent below generator rated voltage under motor starting conditions." SUBSTANTIATION: Defines the voltage dip performance of the emergency generator under motor starting conditions, per NEMA Standard MG 1-16.48.


COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITFEE STATEMENT: Requirements for generators is outside the Scope of NFPA 20 and is more appropriate for inclusion in NFPA 110.

20- 78 - (6-3.2): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace textwith:

6-3.2* Power Supply Arrangements from Normal Source to Pump Motor. The power supply from the source to the motor shall conform with Arrangement "A" or Arrangement "B" as follows:

6-3.2.1 Arrangement A (when service voltage is utilization voltage). There shall be no disconnecting means or power supply protective device(s) between the power supply and the fire pump controller.

Exception*: Where permitted by the authority having jurisdiction, a disconnecting means and power supply protective dewce(s) shall be permitted to be installed between the power supply and the fire pump controller. The disconnecting means and the power supply protective device(s) shall comply with the following:

(a) The overcurrent protective device(s) shall be selected or set to indefinitely carry the sum of the locked rotor current of the fire ~ump motor(s) and the jockey pump and the full load current(s) of

e associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply.

(b) The disconnecting means shall be lockable in the "ON" position.

(c) A placard shall be externally installed on the disconnecting means stating, "Fire Pump Disconnecting M e a n s / T h e letters shall be at least 1 in. (25.4 mm) in height.

(d) A placard shall be placed adjacent to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnecting means and the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked).

(e) The disconnecting means shall be supervised closed by one of the following methods:

1. Centrm station, proprietary, or remote station signal service. 2. Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an

audible signal at a constantly attended po in t 3. Locking the disconnecting mean(closed. 4. Sealing of disconnect means and approved weekly recorded

inspections when disconnect means are located within fenced ' enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner.

6-3.2.2 Arrangement B. Where a transformer serves a fire pump, there shall n o t b e any services disconnecting means or power supply protective device(s) between the transformer and the fire pump controller.

(a) The transformer primary protective device shall be sized in accordance with NFPA 70, Article 450.3(a).

(b) The transformer primary disconnecting means shall be Iockahle in the "ON" position.

(c) A placard shall be externally installed on the transformer primary disconnectingmeans stating, "Fire Pump Disconnecting Means." The letters shall he at least 1 in. (25.4 ram) in height.

The required size, type a n d / o r setting of the overcurrent protective device(s) shall be recorded on the disconnecting means.

(d) A placard shall be placed adjacent to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnecting means and the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked).

142

(e) The disconnecting means shall be supervised dosed by one of the following methods:

1. Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal service. 2. Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an

audible signal at a constantly attended poin t 3. Locking the disconnecting means closed. 4. Sealing of disconnect means and approved weekly recorded

inspections when disconnect means are located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner.

Exception to 6-3.2.1 and 6-3.2.2: If a power transfer switch is connected ahead of the fire pump

controller, a disconnecting means and power supply protective device(s) shall be provided with the disconnecting means within sight of the fire pump controller. The power supply protective device(s) shall be selected or set to indefinitely carry the sum of the locked rotor current of the fire .pump motor and the full loads of the jockey pump and accessory eqmpment. SUI~TANTIATION: The allowed arrangements of the electrical power supply to the fire pump motor have been unclear in most editions of this Standard. While the intent of NFPA 20 has been and continues to be to allow for an uninterrupted, continuous source of ~ower to the pump, the requirements for achieving this have not

een widely understood. Ideally, no equipment (disconnecting means, overcurrent

protection, etc.) should be present in the power supply conductor lines between the source and the controller. In reality, certain situations arise when an additional disconnecting means may be necessary in this power supply line to allow for maintenance on select equipment such as power transfer switches, transformers and the like. Although the current edition of NFPA 20 recognizes the need for special exceptions to this rule, the current format results in many requests for interpretation and appears as a direct conflict in NFPA 20-1990.

The revised section greatly improves on the current language and prescribes the performance requirements of special disconnecting means and overcurrent protection device(s). In addition, the new Appendix issues proposed for this paragraph will help to clarify the

tended arrangements. Also, see the Committee Action on Proposal 20-62 and 20-157. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept.

20- 79 - (6-3.3 and 6-3.4.2): Accept S U B ~ : Technical Committee on Hre Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Delete these paragraphs and exceptions in their entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: The action taken on Proposal 20-78 has alleviated the need for this wording. COMMrlTEE AC'rlON: Accept.

(Log # 164) 20. 80- (6-3.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: Ronald P. Luxenberg, Burke, VA RECOMMENDATION: Add the following sentence:

"Power supply protective devices provided as per section 6-3.4.1, which may also function as disconnecting means, shall be permitted." SUBSTANTIATION: There is a conflict between section 6-5.$ and section 6-3.4.1. Some designers, interpret section. .6"3" 3 as indicating that NO overcurrent protection can be provided m fire pump feeder circuits, since almost all overcurrent protective devices also function as disconnecting means. This can create extremely unsafe conditions, as lack of any overcurrent protection on this circuit could cause a fire if a fault were to occur. In many arrangements emergency lighting could be lost if a fault on the fire pump feeder is not cleared. COMMYITEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-78 relating to the revised 6-3.2. The new wording speaks to a disconnecting means and a power supply protective device. This should satisfy the intent of the submitter.

(Log # 177) 20- B1 - (6-S.$): Accept in Principle SuBMrIWER: ManuelJ. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Replace existing text with:

6-3.3 Dedicated Service. A dedicated service connection to the public utility supply or private power station ahead of all plant service equipment shall be provided for the fire pump(s) or the fire

N F P A 2 0 m A 9 3 T C R

pump system (fire pump(s),jockey pump(s), and pump room auxiliary equipment). There shall be no disconnecting means within the fire pump feeder circuit.

Exception No. 1: Transfer switch(es) in the feeder circuit shall be permitted.

Exception No. 2: The isolating switch and disconnecting means within the fire pump controller (see Chapter 7). SUBSTANTIATION: These changes implement Paragraph 9 Attachment II of NFPA 20/70 Task Force Minutes of 10/13/90 as directed by the Standards Council. Further, they clarify the intent expressed in formal interpretation #87-4 (City of Baltimore). C O M P A C T I O N : Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-78 relating to paragraph 6-3.2. This should satisfy the intent of the submitter.

(Log # 201) 20- 82 - (0-3.3): Accept in Principle S U B M 1 T ~ Robert H. Keis, First State Inspection Ago/., Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete the words "feeder" twice in the Section.

The section would then read: ~i'he f i repump shall be connected ahead of all plant disconnecting means. There shall be no disconnecting means within the fire pump circuit."

Exception remains as is. SUBSTANTIATION: This section when combined with the single line diagram in Figure 6-3.2 and the wording in the Exception to the rule appears to be an exercise in double talk.

The single line in Figure 6-3.2 seems to indicate that the only disconnecting means is the primary disconnect ahead of the primary transformer. This disconnect is usually the utility cut-outs, but could be a customer owned primary switch, then the fire pump controller is directly connected to the secondary side of the transformer ahead of all other disconnects. If this is the way the installation is to be made, the words "feeder" should be removed. "Feeder" by definition from NFPA 70: All circuit conductors between the service equipment or the source of a separately derived system and the final branch-circuit overcurrent device." The text of 6-3.3 implies that the pump controller is to be the "service equipment" and as such there ~re no feeder conductors. All pump controllers are now listed and labeled for use as "service equipment". There is no need for another disconnect except if the installation is in MI Cable which is routed through the building (see proposal for new Exception).

See also proposal to Section 6-3.1.1. COMMIT~.,EACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The Committee deleted this paragraph altogether. The arrangement of the "circuit" will now address the service conductor a n d t h e feeder conductor to distin- guish between the two. See Committee Action on Proposal 20-67.

(Log # 200) 20- 83 - (6-3.3 Exception, Exception No. 2 (New)): Reject SUBMrlq'ER: Robert H. Keis, First State Inspection Ago/., Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Number present Exception as No. 1 and add second Exception under this Section to read as follows:

Exception No. 2: Where the fire pump conductors are routed through the building in Mineral-Insulated, Metal-Sheathed Cable (Type MI), there shall be a feeder disconnecting means to comply with Section 6-3.4.2. SUBSTANTIATION: For correlation with proposal to 6-3.1.1 and 6-3.$. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-68 (Log #$).

(Log # 165) 20- 84 - (6-3.4): Accept in Part SUBM1TrER: Ronal-d P. Luxenberg, Burke, VA RECOMMENDATION: Delete entirely and replace with the following:

"Any plant power disconnecting means provided, shall not disconnect the power supply to the fire pump feeder circuit." SUI~TANTIATION: Except for the last sentence, 6-3.4 is a general statement which has nothing to do with fire pumps. It should be located elsewhere, perhaps in the NEC. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept in Part. COMMITI~E STATEMENT: Paragraph 6-$.4 was modified by Proposal 20-79. Proposal 20-78 established circumstances by which disconnecting means/overcurrent protection is permitted by the

Standard. The Committee is of the opinion that these provisions are within the scope of NFPA 20 since they relate direclJy to reliability issues concerning the operation of the pump.

(Log # 166) 20- 85 - (0-3.4.1): Reject SUBM1TrER: Ronald P. Luxenberg, Burke, VA RECOMMENDATION: Add the following sentence:

"Under engineering supervision, this may be achieved by provision of protective devices which are selectively coordinated with the protective devices in the fire pump controller." SUBSTANTIATION: As currently written, many designers interpret this paragraph as saying that the power supply protective devices must be able to carry the full locked rotor current of the fire pump motor indefinitely. In reality, it is only necessary for the protective device to carry this current for 20 seconds, as section 7-4.4 requires the overcurrent protective device in the fire pump started to trip within a maximum of 20 seconds. The current interpretation requires fuses and circuit breakers to be much larger than is necessary, and in fact much larger than the capacity of the wiring to which they are connected. This addition would accomplish the same goal as the current rule, but allow more reasonably sized overcurrent protective devices. Selective coordination is a technique commonly used in electrical systems design. COMM1TYEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITYEE STATEMENT: The Committee allows overcurrent

~ rotective devices only under very select circumstances. NFPA 20 as established what those conditions are. See Committee Action on

Proposal 20-78.

(LOg# 11) 20- 86- (6-3.4.1 Exception (New)): Reject S U B ~ : James S. Nasby, Skokie, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add exception such as:

Exception: Where current limiting fuses, circuit breakers, or cable protectors are required by local codes or utility rules, such devices shall not open at (e.g. be rated to continuously carry) the sum of the locked rotor currents of the fire pump motor(s) and all other connected (pumphouse) loads. SUBSTANTIATION: By eliminating this requirement completely, the standard abdicates all control over such devices whenever they are installed. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: The Committee has not eliminated this requirement. It exists in the revised 6-3.2. See Committee Action on Proposal 20-78.

(Log # 44) 20- 87- (6-3.4.2): Reject SUBM1TrER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Replace last six words with:

"...and the full load current(s) of all associated fire pump accessory equipment so connected." SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: This paragraph was deleted by Committee Proposal 20-79.

(Log# 178) 20- 88 - (6-3.4.2): Accept SLIBMITI'ER: ManueI-J. DeLeruo, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete 6-3.4.2. SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph conflicts with 6-3.3. Formal interpretation #87-4 (city of Baltimore) indicates Committee intent to select 6-3.$ and not 6-$.4.2. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 156) 20- 89 - (6-3.4.2): Reject SUBMI'ITER: Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Delete the present 6-$.4.2 and replace with the following:

"When power supply protective devices (fuses or circuit breakers) are installed in fire pump service equipment ahead of the fire pump controller, such devices shall selectively coordinate with and shall not open within the time current curve of the fire pump circuit breakers. See 7-4.3."

1 4 3

NFPA 20 ~ A93 TCR

SUBSTANTIATION: Summarizing the main )~oints from the attached documentation: 1) an upstream device sized to carry LRA continuously would be worthless in terms of short circuit protection and would allow a let-through current that may be detrimental to the withstand ability of the fire pump controller, and 2) taken together with the requirement of 6-3.5 to size cables at 125 percent of FLAresults in a 600/125 percent OCD to cable mismatch, which according to General Electric date could result in the upstream device opening at considerably less than its rated current.


COMMYITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This paragraph was deletedin its entirety. See Committee Action on Proposal 20-85 (Log #166).

(Log # 161) 20- 90 - (6-3.4.2 Exception): Reject SUBMITIT.R: Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Revise Exception to read:

"On-site generator power system feeder protection shall be per 6- 7.6." SUBSTANTIATION: To clarify that the overcurrent protective device upstream of the controller on the emergency s,de need not be sized so that it will not open on locked rotor current where the emergency source is an on-site generator. COMMITI~E ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This paragraph was deleted by Committee Proposal 26-79.

20- 91 - (6-S.5): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

"Capacity of Lines. Conductors between the power service and the fire l~ump motor shall be sized per NFPA 70, Article 430 as appropriate to the installation." SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 70 provides guidance on the rules for sizing of conductors to all electric motors. In addition, the currently used 125 percent provision may not be sufficient for all situations involving multiple electric motor driven pumps. COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 186) 20- 92 - (6-5.1.1): Reject SUBMrITER: James w. Nolan, Des Piaines, IL , RECOMMENDATION: Change the word "Listed to "Recognized". SUBSTANTIATION: There are no listed motors available in the marketplace; however, most if no t all motors have certain compo- ~ ~ ° ~ ) ~ - , l e O c o l ~ g n : i~ed?cYt.Y a lab° rato r Y"

The term "recogni " is not defined by the submitter or in NFPA 20. The Committee continues to believe that steps should be taken to have electric motors listed for fire pump service.

(Log-# 70) 20- 93 - (6-5.1.3): Accept in Principle SUBM1TIT~: James. L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise to read:

6-5.1.3 All motors shall be rated for continuous duty and shall be applied only at voltages of 90 percent to 100 percent of their nameplate rated voltage. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial; clarifies wording. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise as follows:

6-5.1.3 All motors shall be rated for continuous duty and shall be applied only at voltages of +/- 10 percent of the motor nameplate v o l t a e .

C O ~ . , E STATEMENT: The Committee believes the substitute wording better defines this requirement.

m ~

(Log # 45) 20- 94 - (6-5.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: M.J. DeLemo, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Substitute as follows:

"The motor capacity shall be such that the maximum motor current shall not exceed the motor rated full load current multiplied by the service factor."

144

Exception to remain. SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph 6-3.1.$ permits 95 percent rated voltage to exist. Why then should a voltage correction be permitted? Further, as presently written, the use of the service factor is not permitted (although used in practice). C, OMMI"ITEE ACI'ION: Accept in Principle. Revise as follows:

6-5.2.1 The motor capacity shall be such that the maximum motor current shall not exceed the motor rated full load current multiplied by the service factor. The maximum service factor at which a motor can be used is 1.15. These service factors shall be in accordance with NEMA Standard MG-I."

No change to the current exception. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The Committee does not intend to restrict the motor service factor. This service factor, however, should not be in excess of 1.15 and should be applied in accordance with the appropriate standard, NEMA MG-1 m this case, for this type of electric motor.

(LOg # 71) 20- 95 - (6-5.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMIT1T, R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to:

6-5.2.1 All motors shall be of such capacity that actual current at rate voltage (and on ac motors rated frequency) will not exceed rated full load current multiplied by the motor service factor. SUBSTANTIATION: To permit utilization of service factor in considering motor application. COMMrlTEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-94 (LOg #45).

(Log # 72) 20- 96 - (6-5.3.3): Reject SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to:

6-5.3.3 A motor field connection diagram for multiple lead motors shall be permanently a ~ e d to the outside of the motor by the motor manufacturer. SUBSTANTIATION: Assigns proper responsibility to the motor mfr. COMMITI~E Ac'rION: Reject. COMMITFEE STATEMENT: The recommendation does not address existing field problems concerning wiring connections between the controller and the motor.

(Log # 25) 20-97- (6-6): Reject S U B ~ : Edward D. Leedy, Industrial Risk Insurers RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

~l'he motor shall be connected to horizontal shaft pumps by means of a flexible coupling listed for this service." SUBb~rANTIATION: Since unit purchase was ruled out by the Standards Council, couplings not suitable for fire pump service are beingused. Field experience has shown that some of these couplings have failed, rendering the fire pump useless. The pump, the driver, and the controller are required to be listed, therefore the flexible, cou ling. connecting the pump and the driver should also be requwed to ~e hsted. COMMYITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: This is more appropriately governed in Paragraph 3-4.1. A proposal to this paragraph (3-4.1) was accepted by the Committee. See Committee Action on Proposal 20-46 (Log #23).

(Log # 46) 20- 98 - (6-6.3): Reject S U B M I T r E ~ M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete 6-6.$. SUBSTANTIATION: Since 6-5.1.1 now requires listed motors, the need for 606.$ no longer exists. Further, shouldn' t 6-6.$ (if it remains) cover TENV motors also? COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMM1TI'EE STATEMENT: There are no electric motors which are currently available for this service. Until such motors become available, the Committee wishes to retain this paragraph.

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(Log # 73) 20- 99 - (6-6.4): Reject SUBMITIT, R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECDMMENDATION: Reword to:

0-6.4 Fire pump motors shall be installed so that their current rcoC~m flgoParts are 12 inches (305 ram) or more above the pump

o r .

SUBSTANTIATION: Clarify that electrical parts must be installed 12 inches above floor. COMMI'IWEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes the existing text is adequate.

%1.1.2 The controller and transfer switch shall I~: suitable for the available short circuit current at line terminals of controller and transfer switch and shall be marked "suitable for use on a circuit c~aable of delivering not more than _ _ amperes r.m.s, symmetri-

t volts a.c." NOTE: The blank spaces shown shall have appropriate numbers filled in for each installation.

SU~TAHTIATION: This change is format oriented. Action taken on Proposal 20-233 (Log #20) deleted a portion of the text from current 7-1.1.1(b) and moved it to the Appendix. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 103) 20-100 - (6-7.1): Reject SUBMITTER: Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

~t'he generator shall be capable of supplying the motor locked rotor current for a minimum of 20 seconds at a minimum recovery voltage of 90 percent generator rated voltage." SUBSTANTIATION: It is not uncommon for engineers to interpret NFPA 20 as requiring the emergency generator to be sized to provide locked rotor current continuously within the rating of the generator. Generators are capable of supplying approximately 2.5 - 3 X rated kVA for motor starting, making oversizing of the generator set unnecessary. The proposed wording is compatible with NEMA Standard MG 1-16.48, Synchronous Generator Transient Voltage Regulation.

NOTE: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA

ACTION: Reject. COMMITIT.E STATEMENT: This item is outside the scope of NFPA 20 and is more appropriate for inclusion in NFPA 110.

(Log # 74) 20-101 - (6-7.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITI'ER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to:

6-7.2 Automatic shedding of loads not required for fire protection is permitted immediately prior to the starting of the fire pump(s). This load shedding may not delay starting of the fire pump(s) by more than 5 seconds. SUBSTANTIATION: Sets maximum delay time. COMMrIWEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise as follows: 6-7.2 Automatic shedding of loads not required for fire protection

is permitted immediately prior to starting of the fire pump(s). This load shedding shall not delay starting of the fire pump(s) by more than 10 seconds. COMM1TI'EE STATEMENT: The Committee believes the 10 second delay is more reasonable. A number of sequenced events may have to take place prior to starting thepump. Thus the 10 second time limit may be more reasonable for those situations.

(Log # 35) 20-104- (7-1.1.2): Reject S u B M r r r E I ~ M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add the word ~components" between "and" and "completely." SUBSTAN'rI&TION: A revised definition of controller has been mandated by the Standards Council to comply with NFPA 70. The addition of the word "components" brings 7-1.1.2 into line with the NFPA 70 definition of controller. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrrYEE STATEMENT: While the Gommit t~ did adopt a version of the NFPA 70 definition of controller, the Committee does not believe this proposed change is warranted in this paragraph.

(Log # 47) 20-105 - (7-1.1.2): Accept S U B ~ M.J. DeLemo, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add "when so used" between ~servlce equipmen t" and "and." SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 20-1990 permits service equipment upstream of the fire pump controller. Under this condition, there is no justification (other than preference for no upstream disconnect) for mandating this requirement. A standard cannot mandate a Pcoreference.

MMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

m ~

(Log # 75) 20-100 - (%2.2): Reject SUl iMITI 'F~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change second sentence to read:

"Controllers shall be installed so that current carrying.parts are 12 inches (305 mm) or more above the pump room floor. SUBSTANTIATION: Makes it clear that the current carrying parts of the controller must be installed 12 inches above the floor- not that they must be 12 inches above the controller bottom or that the controller enclosure bottom must be 12 inches alxJve the floor. COMMITYEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-00 (Log #73).

20-102 - (7-1): Accept SUBMITI'ER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Replace with:

"Application. This chapter provides requirements for minimum I perfo-rmance of electric controllers, both automatic and non- I automatic, and electric power transfer equipment for electric motors driving fire pumps. Accessory devices including alarm monitoring and signaling means are included when necessary to ensure the minimum performance of the aforementioned equipment." SUBSTANTIATION: This revision is made to ensure that the thlt~rformance of the pump is enhanced through reliability relating to

e controller. Also, see Committee Action on Proposal 20-62. COMMrFFEE ACTION: Accept.

20-103 - (7-1.1.1, 7-1.1.2): Accept SUBMnWER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

1. Delete 7-1.1.1 (b) from here andplace in Appendix. 2. Renumber current 7-1.1.1 (a) as 7-1.1.2 as well as the rest of this

section. 3. Revised section to read: %1.1.1 All controllers shall be specifically listed for electric motor

driven fire pump service.

20-107 - (%2.3): Accept SUBMIT]'ER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

"Working clearances around controllers shall comply with NFPA 70, Article 110." SUBSTANTIATION: This revision is presented since the clearance issue is more appropriately handled by NFPA 70. Also, see Commit- tee Action on Proposal 20-62. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 132) 20-108 - (%$.3.1): Reject SUBMrIWER: Steven L. Williams, CNOBG/A.E RECOMMENDATION: Delete "the downward vertical." Replace with "a source vertically above the controller endosure." SUBSTANTIATION: The current wording is not dear. Since the fire codes can be hard to understand, we should rrmke every effort to clarify the wording. COMMrr rEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes the current wording is adequate. The Committee has no experience where this wording has created problems.

1 4 5

NFPA 20 - - A93 TCR

20-109 - (7-3.3.2): Accept SUBMrl'TER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

7-3.3.2 Grounding. The enclosure(s) shall be grounded in accordance with NFPA 70, Article 250. SUKgTANTIATION: This revision is presented since the grounding issue is more appropriately handled by NFPA 70. Also, see Commit- tee Action on Pfop6sal 20-62. COMMrFrEE AC'I'ION: Accept.

(Log # 48) 20-110 - (7-3.6 and 7-4.2.1): Accept SUBMITI'ER: M.j. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: 1. 7-3.6 Delete last sentence.

2. Remove "(see 7-3.6)" from 7-4.2.1. SUBSTANTIATION: Statement is obvious, therefore unnecessary. COMMIIWEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 76) 20-111 - (7-3.7): Reject SUBMITIYR: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "Wiring" to "Field Connection" so that article reads:

7-3.7 Field Connection Diagrams and Instructions. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies that a diagram necessary for field installation and connection must be available m the installer. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrFrEE STATEMENT: The Committee wants this information to be included for future maintenance of the controller and not just for installation purposes.

(LOg # 77) 20-112- (7-3.7.1): Reject SUBMITrER: JamesL. Boyer, Firetrol, .Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change wiring to "field connection" so that article reads:

7-3.7.1 Afield connection diagram shall be provided and permanently attached to the inside of the controller enclosure. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies that a diagram necessary for field installation and connection must be available to the installer. COMMITYEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-111 (Log #76).

(Log # 79) 20-113 - (%3.7.2): Reject SUBMrITER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "wiring" to "field connection" to read:

7-3.7.2 All the field wiring terminals shall be plainly marked to correspond to the field connection diagram furnished. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies that the field connection terminals and diagram must be similarly marked` C~MMITI'EE AC'I'ION: Reject COMMITrEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-111 (Log #76).

(Log # 27) 20-114- (7-4.1): Reject S U B ~ R. Schneider, Lancaster, SC RECOMMENDATION: Delete "line terminal" and replace with "phase." Revised text to read:

7-4.1 Voltage Surge Arrester. Voltage surge arresters complying with ANSI C02.1 or CO2.11 shall be installed from each phase of the isolating switch to ground (see %3.3.2). These device(s) shall be rated to suppress voltage surges above rated line voltage. SUlk~I'ANTIATION: The attachment of arresters to the line terminal of the isolating switch is an unsafe practice because the arresters cannot be readily disconnected` The voltage surge protective aspects afforded by attesters connected to the load side of the isolating switch is essentially equivalent, COMM1TIT~ ACTION: Reject. Cg3MMFITEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-115 (Log #78).

(Log # 78) 20- 115 - (7-4.1): Accept in Prindple SUBM1TrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to:

7-4.1 Voltage Surge Arrester. Avoltage surge arrester complying with ANSI C62.1 or C62.11 shall be installed from each line terminal, or from each load terminal, of the isolating switch to ground (see 7-3.2). The surge arrestor shall be rated to suppress voltage surges above line voltage. Operation of the surge arrester shall not cause either the isolating switch or the circuit breaker to O Den.n . sUBSTANTIATION: Alternate location of attester; assures that the surge arrester will not trip an inherently protected isolating switch or a circuit breaker. O D M ~ A C T I O N : Accept in Principle. Accept the proposal as written, except for the last sentence. Place this sentence in A-7-4.1 as follows:

A-7-4.1 Operation of the surge arrester should not cause either the isolating switch or the circuit breaker to open. C . ~ M ~ E ffrATEMENT: There is no guarantee that operation of the surge arrester will still allow the circuit breaker to remain closed. While realizing that most devices allow the isolating switch to remain closed, the Committee is aware of some equipment that would cause the isolating switch to open.

(Log # 212) 20-116 - (7-4.1): Accept in Principle S U B b l I T r E ~ Win. F. Stelter, Lake Bluff, IL RECOMMENDATION: Change the word line in the fire sentence to load. The sentence will read:

Woltage surge arresters complying with ANSI C02.1 or C02.11 shall be installed from each load terminal of the isolating switch to

rUBSTANTIATIOund (see 7 - 3 . 3 . 2 ) . " O N : Surge arresters can fail violently and cause

injury and property damage. Since the line terminals of the isolating switch may be connected to a service without any disconnecting means, field service personnel will not be able to avoid the possibility of a surge arrester failure while servicing the controller. However, by a l lo~ng the arrester on the load side of the isolating switch, it will be disconnected when the isolation switch is opened. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.- COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-115 (Log #78).

146

(Log # 218) 20-117 - (7-4.1 Exception (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMrlTER: James. s. Nasby, Lake Bluff, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add the following exception to 7-4.1:

"Exception: These voltage surge attesters shall not be mandatory if the controller can withstand a 10 kilo-volt impulse." SUBSTANTIATION: Voltage surge attesters work by momentarily shunting the power source to ground anytime a voltage impulse exceeds the line voltage. Normally these arresters are capable of shunting the voltage impulse the ground without damage. However, some power sources are large enough to generate transients that will rupture these arresters. A ruptured arrester can create an a rdng fault at the service entrance which will destroy the controller and /o r the service conductors.

However, by designing the controller to have a high impulse voltage capability, tt will withstand the transient voltage without damage so an arrester is not needed.

The existing wording is a design rather than a performance requirement. Safety and reliability problems are not addressed. Specifically:

- for equipment having a higher voltage surge withstand than the rest of power system, it is more reliable (and safer) NOT to shunt surge energy into the equipment, - upstream impedances on high fault services are low and often

unknown, - the degradation ofarresters after sufficient surge energy

absorption is eliminated, - follow-on current flow (in degraded or hot arresters) is elimi-

nated, - 10.0 Kv is the max. value cited in IEEE C62.41 and C62.45 for

service entrance equipment. This is well above typical 6.0 Kv "spark- over of clearances ~.

- IEEE C62.41 (Guide for Surge Voltages in Low-Voltage A.C. Power Circuits) is based on measured system surge'voltages and wave forms.

- IEEE C62.45 provides procedures on surge withstand testing. IEEE C62.1 (1989 revision title - Standard for Gapped Silicon-

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

Carbide Surge Arresters for A.C. Power Circuits) provides testing methods for an'esters, but not their performance (surge clamping) requirements. The same is true for IEEE C62.11 (Standard for Metal-Oxide Surge Attesters for A.C. Power Circuits) which covers Zinc-oxide attesters which normally do not have gaps. COMM1TrEEACTION: Accept in Prindple. Add the following new Exception No. 2 to 7-4.1:

Exception No. 2: These voltage surge arresters shall not be mandatory if the controller can withstand a 10 kV impulse in accordance with ANSI/IEEE 62.41 without damage. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee extended the exception to allow conformance with a specific standard. This will provide the user with guidance for establishing this criteria.

(Log # 133) 20-118 - (7-4.2): Reject SUBM1TTER: Steven L. WHiiams, CNOBG/A.E RECOMMENDATION: Delete "either having." Replace with "both switches shall have." SUB.b~ANTIATION: The current wording is not dear. Since the fire codes can be hard to understand, we should make every effort to clarify the wording. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-119 (Log #80).

(Log # 80) 20-119 - (7-4.2.1): Accept SUBMIT1T.I~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete "either" and add "or greater than" to read:

7-4.2.1 The isolating switch shall be a manually operable motor circuit switch or a molded case switch having a horsepower rating equal to or greater than the motor horsepower. SUBSTANTIATION: Allows latitude in oversizing switch. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log# 81) 20-120 - (7-4.2.1 and 7-4.2.2): Reject SUBMIT1T~ James L. Boyer, Firetroi, Inc. RECOMMENI~ATION: Delete existing 7-4.2.2 and renumber existing second 7-4.2.1 to 7-4.2.2:

7-4.2.~ The isolating switchshall be externally o~erable (see %3.6). SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial; currently two articles 7-4.2.1; existing 7-4.2.2 duplicates 7-4.2.1 Exception No. 1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMM1TIT.E STATEMENT: The Committee disagrees that the information is identical in 7-4.2.1 exception and the second 7-4.2.1. One is for switches and the other is spedfically for a molded case switch.

NOTE: The duplicate 7-4.2.1 's will be correctly numbered.

COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The entire section is about isolating switches. The Committee does not see where the additional wording is of benefit.

(Log # 84) 20-123 - (7-4.3.2): Accept SUBMITrER: James L.Boyer, Fwetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change word ~ripping" to word "operating" in item 3. so that it reads:

3. A nameplate w~th the legend CIRCUIT BREAKER - DISCON- NECTING MEANS in letters not less than 3 /8 in. (10 mm) high shall be located on the outside of the controller enclosure adjacent to the means for operating the circuit breaker. SUIggrANTIATION: "Operating" is appropriate in place of archaic "tripping." C O ~ ACTION: Accept.

(LOg # 217) 20-124- (7-4.3.3 Item 5): Accept SUBM1TrER: James S, Nasby, Lake Bluff, IL RECOMMEND~ATION: Reword to add references to emergency starting:

5. The drcui t breaker shall permit normal and emergency run mechanical starting the motor with out tripping (see 6-5.1.4).

NOTE: Old section 6-5.1.2 was editorially left offofNFPA 20-1990. It should be added back in as paragraph 6-5.1.4.

It reads: Electric motor induced transients must be coordinated with subsection 7-4.3.3 to prevent nuisance tripping of motor controller protective devices. SUBSTANTIATION: Section 7-5.3.2 has renamed the manual mechanical operator as an Emergency Run Mechanical Control at Controller. This will cause full voltage starting (locked rotor current) on reduced voltage starting controllers. It must be clear that the breaker must NOT t r ip(open) under this starting method. The existing wording refers only to "normal starting." COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept.

The Committee will be adding in the new 6-5.1.4 (6-5.1.2 from the 1987 edition) as a substantive change rather than as an editorial change.

(Log # 85) 20-125 - (7-4.4(1)(b)): Accept SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Omit "up to" and add "a minimum of ' so that paragraph reads:

(b) Calibrated and set at a minimum of 300 percent of motor full load current. SUBSTANTIATION: Assures the circuit breaker will not trip at 300

~ cent motor FLA. MMrl'IT.E ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 82) 20-121 - (7-4.2.1 Exception No. 2): Reject S U B M r l T E ~ James L. Boyer, Fwetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add "in conjunction with" and reword to:

Exception No. 2: A molded case isolating switch may have self- protecting instantaneous short circuit overcurrent protection provided that this switch shall not trip unless in conjunction with the tripping of the circuit breaker in the same controller. SUBSTANTIATION: Assures that the circuit breaker provides load interruption. COMM1TrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: This criteria is best left up to the listing agency. In addition, there is no method to verify such a provision once the equipment is installed.

(Log # 8o) 20-126 - (7-4.4.4): Reject SUBMITIT.R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "device" to "circuit breaker" and add "drcuit breaker" before "tripping" so that paragraph reads:

4. It shall be possible to reset the drcui t breaker for operation immediately after circuit breaker tripping, with the tripping characteristics thereafter remaining unchanged. SUBSTANTIATION: To be sure that it is understood that the

~ h refers to the circuit breaker and not an auxiliary tripping

COMMrrl 'EE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrF.~ STATEMENT: This device does not need to be a part of the circuit breaker.

(Log # 83) 20-122 - (7-4.2.4): Reject SUBMrrTER: JamesL. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add "isolating" to last phrase so that article reads:

%..in order to permit opening or closing of the isolating switch." SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial; darifies that the discussion item is the isolating switch.

(Log # 87) 20-127 - (7-4.5 and 7-4.5.1): Accept S U B ~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "starter" to "conUtctor":

7-4.5 Motor Contactor. 7-4.5.1 The motor contactor shall be of the magnetic typewith a

contactor in each ungrounded conductor.

147

NFPA 20 - - A93 TCR

SUBSTANTIATION: A starter includes overload protection; a contactor does not. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 88) 20-128 - (7-4.5.2): Accept S U e ~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change word "starters" to "controllers":

"7.4.5.2 For electrical operation ofreducedvoltage controllers, timed automatic acceleration... SUBSTANTIATION: Controllers is more appropriately defined. COMMIWFEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 89) 20- 129 - (7-4.5.6): Accept SUBMI'IWEI: James L.Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "starter" to ~contactor" and add ~he" to read:

"7-4.5.6 No undervoltage...actuation of the motor contactor automatically or manually. ~ SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial; contactor is appropriate. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log# 131) 20-130 - (7-4.6): Reject SUBMrrrER: RichardJ. Zelm, Gen-Pac, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

"Controllers shall be equipped with an Automatic Insulation Tester and Monitor to continuously test and display the winding insulation resistance while the motor is idle. The test voltage shall be equal to or greater than that of the motor line voltage. Alarm contacts and visible indicator must be provided to signal when the insulation resistance falls below a minimum safe operating level in accordance with NEMA and IEEE standards." SUBSTANTIATION: Centrifugal fire pump motors are often exposed to hi moisture environments, i e basements, ump

, . • • °

rooms, etc., and remmn ~dle for long periods of time. "~l~e t motors are typically open, drip-proof design and are not run for long enough during periodic testing to enable the motor to dry out if excess moisture does in fact exist in the winding insulation. These conditions usually lead to premature motor failures. Due to the need for these motors to be able to go from an idle condition to full load immediately, the motor windings must be in perfect condition. Until recently there has only been a manual method for determin-

ing the electrical condition of motor windings, and that was to hand megger test the motor. There is now new technology available to provide this type of testing continuously and automatically to ensure the integrity of the winding insulation. The in-line automatic tester provides continuous testing of the motor windings and feeder cables the entire time period the motor is in idle condition. This allows the user to be aware of any type of insulation breakdown immediately-- before the motor fails. Most motor failures occur during start-up or shortly thereafter and could have been prevented if the winding insulation was checked prior to motor start-up. This type of predictive maintenance equipment eliminates the

need for manual testing which is costly andtime-consuming. There is also a safety factor involved due to the fact that once the automatic insulation tester and motor has been installed it eliminated any ~hands on" testing for the personnel. In the case of medium and/or high voltage motors, this safety feature is very important. Further, the equipment provides a cost savings to the user by d e t e c t i n g windingbreakdown in its early stages. A motor blow-out canbe prevented by cleaning, baking and reinsulating the motor before the failure occurs. This type of early detection can result in repair savings of up to fifty percent (50%) of a rewind cost. Minimum safe standards for motor insulation levels have been

established by NEMA and IEEE Standards 43-1974. It has been oven that motors which do not meet these standards should not operated and, therefore, cannot safelyperform their required

duties when necessary. This type of situation is obviously not acceptable to a critical motor such as a fire pump motor and any means available to prevent this condition should be utilized by the user.


COMMrrrEE ACWION: Reject.

COMMrITEE STATEMENT: Maintenance of fire pumps associated equipment is now under the scope of NFPA 25. Several methods exist which can be used to detect/determine such problems. Further documentation concerning failure of electric fire p u m p motors would be necessary before further consideration could be given to such a provision.

(Log # 90) 20-131 - (7-4.6.1): Reject SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to:

7-4.6.1 Power Available Visible Indicator. Avisible indicator shall be connected to the power supply conductors on the line side of the contactor (load side of the circuit breaker). This visible indicator shall demonstrate that operating voltage is available to the controb let. If the visible indicator is a pilot lamp, it shall be accessible for replacement. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial; clarification. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Reject. COMM1TFEE STATEMENT: Pump controllers can currently detect single phase loss. The proposed wording would give no additional benefit.

(Log # 91) 20-132 - (7-4.6.2): Accept S U B ~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Replace "starter" with "contactor" to read:

7-4.6.2 Phase Reversal. Phase reversal on the line side of the motor contactor shall be indicated by a visible indicator. SUBSTANTIATION: Starter is inappropriate. COMMITTEE AC~ON: Accept.

(Log # 154) 20-133- (7-4.6.2, 7-4.7(c) 7-8.2.7,): Reject SUBMrrrER: R. Schneider, Lancaster, SC RECOMMENDATION: Delete 7-4.6.2 entirely.

2. Delete 7-4.7(c). 3. Delete last sentence of 7-8.2.7.

SUBSTANTIATION: Phase reversal after acceptance tests are unlikely. When such does occur the 'Tlx" is under the supervision of the utility. IfFPC is on same supply as remainder of the plant load all 30 motors will run backward.

Present state of the art of phase reversal relays will make them also respond to phase loss and voltage drops (asymmetry). This causes nuisance starting of alternate source diesel as well as false alarms. C o M M r r r E E ACTION: Reject. CoMMrITEE STATEMENT: Experience shows that this particular feature is important. In some cases, the pump is the only Sphase electrical device on the premise. It is possible that while utility repairs are being done (e.g. after a t ra~c accident or a storm) on overhead wires the wires could be reversed, thus causing the problem well after the initial acceptance test.

(Log # 92) 20-154- (7-4.7(b) and (c)): Reject SUBM1TrEI~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to read:

(b)* Loss of supply power on the load side of the circuit breaker, in an phase. This alarm circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source.

(c) Phase reversafon the load side of the circuit breaker. This alarm circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source or from the pump motor power, reduced to not more than 1 ~ volts. SUBSTANTIATION: The appropriate location is the load side of the circuit breaker (multiple contactor controllers). COMMrITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: When a transfer switch is located between the contactor and the circuit breaker, it is more important to monitor the condition at the contactor.

148

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

20-1~5 - (7-5.2.1, A-7-5.2.1, Figure A-7-5.2.1 (b)): Accept SUBMrITER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Retain the wording of the first paragraph of 7-5.2.1. Revise items (a) and (b) as follows:

(a) For all pump installations (including jockey pumps) each controller shall have its own individual pressure sensing line.

(b) The pressure sensing line connection for each pump (including jockey pumps) shall be made between that pumps discharge check valve and discharge control valve. This line shall be corrosion resistant metallic pipe or tube and fittings (brass, copper or series 300 stainless s teel)of 1/2 in. nominal size. There shall be two check valves installed in the pressure sensing line at least 5 ft apart with a

3/32 in. hole drilled in the clapper to serve as dampening. (See Figures A-7-5.2.1 (a) and A-7-5.2.1 (b) for clarification.) Exception to (b): If water is dean, ground-face unions with

noncorrosive diaphragms drilled with 3/32 in. or'dices shall be permitted in place of the check valves. A-7-5.2.1(New) Installation of the pressure sensing line in between

the discharge check valve and the control valve is necessary to facilitate isolation of the jockey pump controller (and sensing line) for maintenance without havingto drain the entire system.

Renumber current Figure A-715.2.1 as figure A-7-5.2.1 (a). Add new Figure A-7-5.2.1(b) as follows:

W,..r ( ~ : ~ s u p p l y )

F ire pump con~r

Fire pump

Jockey pump

Jockey pump contr

Fire protect ion sy stem

Figure A-7-5.2.1(b) Piping Connection for Pressu~ S e n s ~ Line

SUBSTANTIATION: Field experience has shown that there are questions over the correct placement, of pressure, sensing lines, to jockey pumps. Also, several requtrements were m the appendix and neededto be moved into the body of the standards. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(LOg # 208) 20.136 - (7-5.2.1(b) Exception (New)): Reject SUBMrrrER: Kenneth E. Isman, National Fire Sprinkler Assoda- t.ion RECOMMENDATION: Add an exception to 7-5.2.1 (b) as follows:

Exception: The pressure sensing line connection for jockey pumps shall be permitted to be any place in the system on the discharge side of the main fire pump. SUBSTANTIATION: It is standard industry practice to install the pressure sensing connection to a jockey pump in the discharge from the main fire pump. Forcing the jockey pump sensing connection to be in the discharge of the jockey pump itself (which this paragraph can currently be interpreted as saying)causes thejockey pump to shut off prematurely, leading to excess cycling of the pump. See also our proposals on A-2-19.3 and A-7-5.2.1.

COMMIT1T~ ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: It is the Committee s intent to require that thejockey pump sensing line be installed in between the discharge check valve and the discharge control valve. If the jockey pump is installed correctly, there sfiould be no problems with cycling of the pump.

(LOg # 141) 20-137- (7-5.2.1(c) and 9-5.2.1(c)): Accept SUBMITIT.R: Walter A. Damon, Schirmer Engineering Corpora- tion RECOMMENDATION: Add new paragraph (c) as follows:

(c) There shall b e n o shut-offvalve in the pressure sensing line.

SUBSTANTIATION: As written, since 7-5.2.1 and 9-5.2.1 do no_.~t prohibit a shut-off valve, contractors have installed such a device. With the valve closed, the pressure switch will not sense a drop in system pressure and the pump will not start automatically on pressure loss. COMMrFFEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 93) 20-138 - (7-5.2.2): Accept in Prindple susmTrZR: James L. Boyer, Firetroi, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Replace "relay" with circuit in two places so that last two (2) sentences read:

"...The equipment shall be a circuit of the drop-out type. The circuit shall be actuated from a normally closedcontact on the fire

g rotection equipmenL" UBSTANTIATION: Allow other than relays (i.e.~ solid state

devices) to perform this function. C O M P A C T I O N : Accept in Principle. Replace the last two sentences of current 7-5.2.2 with:

"Starting of the motor shall be initiated by the opening of a normally dosed contact on the fire protection equipment." COMMrFrEE STATEMENT: The substitute language is more performance oriented than the submitted language. The restriction on "relay-type only" has been removed.

(Log # 40) 20.139 - (7-5.2.4): Accept in Principle S U B ~ : M.J. DeLerno, Bet',c/n, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete from title: "Operating in Parallel." SUBSTANTIATION: Superfluous, and possibly confusing. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise this section as follows, change comment 7-5.2.4 to:

"7-5.2.4(a) Sequence starting of pumps operating in parallel." Continue with verbatim text of current standard.

149

NFPA 20 - - A93 T C R

7-5.2.4(b) Sequence Starting of Pumps Operating in Series. The controller for each pump requiring another pump to supply suction pressure shall incorporate a timing device to prevent the higher pressure pump motor from starting before the lower pressure pump. It shall also cause immediate starting of the lower pressure pump. The higher pressure pump shall start within 10 seconds. Failure of the lower pressure pump shall not prevent subsequent starting of the higher pressure pump.

Exception: If the higher pressure pump is dedicated to the service of a high zone, then starting may be prevented until proper pressure is sensed at the suction of the higher pressure pump. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee has elected to include a separate set of conditions for operation of pumps in series. Since the sequencing is different when compared to pumps in parallel, the standard should reflect this.

(Log # 50) 20.140 - (7-5.2.5): Accept S L I B ~ : M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Rewrite first sentence to:

"External control circuits shall be arranged so that failure of any external circuit (open or short circuit) shall not prevent operation of pump(s) from all other internal or external means."

Second sentence to remain. SUBSTANTIATION: Less confusing. COMMrFTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 94) 20.141 - (7-5.2.6): Accept SUBMITrER: James L.Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "wired" to "arranged" so that article reads:

7-5.2.6 Sole Supply Pumps. For sprinkler or standpipe systems where an automatically controlled pumping unit constitutes the sole supply, the controller shall be arranged for manual shutdown. The controller shall also be arranged for manual shutdown where required by the authority having jurisdiction. SUBSTANTIATION: None. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 95) 20-142 - (7-5.3.2(c)): Accept SUBMITIT~: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add "or lever" between "handle" and "in" to read:

"...if the operator releases the handle or lever in any but the full running position." SUBSTANTIATION: Editorially consistent with 7-5.3.2(a) and 7-5.3.2(b). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(LOg # 96) 20.143- (7-5.4(1)): Reject S U B ~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change word "reset" to "stop" to read:

"1. Manual - operation of stop pushbutton on outside of controller..." SUBSTANTIATION: Obsolete "reset" is archaic; current appropriate is % ~ COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMI'I'I'EE STATEMENT: The labeling of the push button should be at the discretion of the listing agency.

(Log # 97) 20-144- (7-5.4(2)): Accept SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, F'wetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "set up" to "arranged" to read:

~2. Automatic shutdown after automatic start (optional) - if controller is arranged for automatic shutdown..." SUBSTANTIATION: Editorially consistent with submitted revised % 5 . 2 . 6 .

COMMrITEE Ac'rION: Accept.

(Log # 98) 20.145 - (7-6.1): Accept S U B ~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMEND~ATION: Change word "accepted" to "used" to read:

"7-6.1" Control Equipment. Where equipment rated in excess of 600 volts is used, the control equipment...-- SUBSTANTIATION: Acceptance should not be presumed; this is a ¢ ~ e r a l standard.

MMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 99) 20-146 - (7-6.2): Reject SuBMrITFAR: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to include voltmeter:

"7-6.2 Provisions for Testing. An ammeter...in each phase. An indicating voltmeter, deriving its source of power of not more than 125 volts from a transformer(s) connected to the high voltage supply, shall also be provided with a suitable selector switch arranged for reading each phase voltage." SUBSTANTIATION: Voltage and voltage readings are as significant as current and current readings. COMMrITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrr rEE STATEMENT: The additional costs associated with this equipment are not justified for the benefit derived.

20. 147 - (7-6.6): Accept (LOg # 100) SUBMIT1T..R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMFAqDATION: Change "pilot lamp" to "visible indicator" and reword:

7-6.6 Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller. For these controllers, specifications differ fi-om 7-4.6. A visible indicator shall be provided to indicate that power is available. The current supply for the visible indicator shall come from the secondary of the control circuit transformer(s) through resistors, if found necessary, or from a small capacity step-down transformer which shall reduce the control transformer secondary voltage to that required for the visible indicator. If the visible indicator is a pilot lamp,i t shall be accessible for replacement. SUBSTANTIATION: Allow visible indicator to be other than pilot lamp (i.e. LED). COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 101) 20 . i48- (7-6.7): Reject SuBMrr rER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "accidental" to "incidental" to read:

"...to protect personnel from incidental contact with high voltage." SUI~TANTIATION: Editorial; better word choice. COMMITrF.,E ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee prefers the current wording. Incidental contact with this equipment would indeed be accidental.

(Log # 102) 20. 149 - (7-6.8 Exception No. 2): Reject SUBMITIT.R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "is not required" to "may not be operable" to read:

%.for a locked rotor condition as specified in 7-4.4(1) may not be operable." SUBSTANTIATION: The overcurrent protection remains, but it may not be operable or functional. COMMIT1T~ ACTION: Reject. COMMITrFAg STATEMENT: Proposed language is not appropriate for a standard.

150

N F P A 20 n A93 T C R

(Log # 103) 20-150 - (7-7): Accept s u B M r r r E R : James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Remove ", complying with the provisions of this section," to read:

~%7* Limited Service Controllers. Limited service controllers consisting of automatic controllers..." SUBSTANTIATION: It is the purpose of this standard to have controllers "complying" with appropriate sections. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept.

20- 151 - (7-8.1): Accept SUBMITrF~: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise this section as follows, including deletion of current 7-8.1.1.

7-8.1 General. 7-8.1.1 Where required by the authority having jurisdiction or to

meet the requirements of 6-$[.3.1. where an on site electrical power transfer device is used for power source selection, such switch shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph as well as paragraphs 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3. SUBSTANTIATION: This will clarify the conditions in which the transfer switch provisions are to be utilized. The change is primarily editorial in nature. COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept

COMMYITEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMrrIT_,E STATEMENT: The NFPA 20/70 Task Force Report incorporated the essence of this change. The CorrLmittee has made a distinction on the requirements for integral and ~eparately supplied transfer switches. See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-155 and 20-157.

(Log # 51) 20-153 - (7-8.1.1): Accept SUBMITI"F.,R: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete "7-1" from text. SUBSTANTIATION: Only %1.1.4 applies to transfer switches, and it is so worded as to still apply without reference thereto. (7-1.1.1 is covered under 7-8.2.2, and 7-1.1.2 cannot apply because of %8.2.12). COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept

(Log # 104) 20- 154- (7-8.1.3): Accept S U B M I T I T ~ James L.Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to read:

7-8.1.3 No remote device(s) shall be installed which will prevent automatic operation of the transfer switch. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial; define "proper" operation. COMMYrIT~ ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 194) 20-152 - (7-8.1 through 7-8.2.18): Accept in Principle S U B ~ Carrol Burtner, NEMA RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

1. Replace existing 7-8.1 with the following new text (existing 7-8.1.2 and 7-8.1.3 remain):

7-8.1 Where required by the authority having jurisdiction or to meet the requirement of 0-2.3.1 where, an on-site electrical switching device is used for power source selecuon, such switch shall comply with the provisions of this section, as well as Sections 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3, and shall be as shown in Arrangements I or II of figure 7-8.

2. Replace existing 7-8.2 through 7-8.2.18 with the following new 7-8.2, 7-8.2.1, 7-8.2.2, and Figure 7-8: (Shown on next page.)

7-8.2 Fire Pump Controller and Transfer Switch Arrangements 7-8.2.1 Arrangement I. When the power transfer switch, see Figure

7-8.1 (Arrangement I) consists of a self-contained power switching assembly, such assembly shall be housed in a barriered compartment of the fire pump controller or in a separate enclosure attached to the controller and marked "Fire Pump Automatic Transfer Switch."

Exception: When the alternate source is provided by a second utility power source, the transfer switch emergency side shall be provided with an Isolation Switch complying with 7-8.2.8 and 7-4.2 and a C~rcuit Breaker complying with 7-4.3 and 7-4.4.

7-8.2.2 Arrangement II. When the power transfer switch is not attached to the Fire Pump Controller, the following equipment shall be provided in the pump room: See Figure 7-8 (Arrangement II).

(a) A transfer smtch complying with 6-7 and 7-8. (b) A disconnecting means (or service disconnect when required)

ahead of the normal input terminals of the transfer switch. When the alternate source is supplied by a second utility, the transfer switch overcurrent protection shall be sized not to open at the locked rotor current of the fire pump motor.

(c) An isolating switch ahead of the alternate source input terminals of the transfer switch, and meeting the following require- menu:

(i) The isolating switch shall be supervised to indicate when it is open.

(ii) Supervision shall consist of an audible and visual signal in the pump room and at a point of constant attendance.

3. Renumber existing 7-8.2 through 7-8.2.18 to 7-8.3 through 7-8.3.18. SUBSTANTIATION: Confusion exists on the installation of fire pump controllers and automatic transfer switches (whether or not combined fire pump controller/automatic transfer switch). This proposal clarifies installation of fire pump controllers and transfer switches.

20- 155 - (%8.2, 7-8.2.1): Accept SUBMITrF~: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Delete current section 7-8.2.1 in its entirety and revise this section as follows:

7-8.2* Fire Pump Controller and Transfer Switch Arrangements. 7-8.2.1 Arrangement I (Listed Combination Fire Pump Controller

and Power Transfer Switch). 7-8.2.1.1 Where the power transfer switch consist.,; of a self-

contained power switching assembly, such assembly shall be housed in a barriered compartment of the fire pump controller or in a separate enclosure attached to the controller and marked "Fire Pump Automatic Transfer Switch."

7-8.2.1.2 Where the alternate source is provided by a second utility mp~.thwer source, the transfer switch emergency side shall be provided

an isolation switch complying with 7-8.2.9 and 7-4.2 and a circuit breaker complying with 7-4.3 and 7-4.4. SUBSTANTIATION: Given that the desigu/instal]ation require- menu for integral transfer switches are different for separately supplied switches, this proposal will note that distinction. These new paragraphs now establish requirements for the controller/transfer switch provisions which are dependent upon the secondary source of power. Also, see Committee Action on Proposal 2(q57. COMMITIT~ ACTION: Accept

(Log # 1 O5) 20- 156 - (%8.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMIT1T, R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "power" to "automatic" and ~adjacenC to ~attached" to read:

7-8.2.1 When the automatic transfer switch consists of a self- contained power switching assembly, such assembly shall be housed in a barriered compartment of the fire pump controller or in a separate enclosure attached to the controller and ro.arked "Fire Pump Automatic Transfer Switch. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial; attached is more appropriate than cad~)~ce n t.

MITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Accept "attached", reject ~power." COMMrrIT_~ STATEMENT: The Committee has adopted the term ~power" transfer switch throughout tile Standard.

151

NFPA 20 ~ A93 TCR

FIRE PUI~ CONTROLLER AND TRANSF[R SVITCH ARRANGCM[NT$

ARRANG£M£NT ARRANGEMENT ~!

Ner~Q( Source

SEt" F'IG 6-3 .2

NOrMGt SOurCe

SEE riG 6-3.2

Alternate [ At'terna'te S£:£ PAR.~I~..,~O~6-7 6 Source (~/ SEt" P A R ~ ~ e

~ 7-8.2.1 . gxCept:on

_ .

T_ f . - e ' P ~ Con~raUee al l~Pt ~Pt ' lLI tStrCI "

Sm,tCh

T , , •, ,,± F'lrf ~ Co~l~ollfe

Figure 7-8

Proposal 20-152, Log #194

152

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

26- 157- (7-8.2.2): Accept S U B ~ : Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Delete current 7-8.2.2 in its entirety and revise this section as follows:

7-8.2.2 Arrangement II (Individually Listed Fire Pump Gontroller and Power Transfer Switch). The following additional equipment shall be provided in the pump room:

(a) A power fire pump controller transfer switch complying with 6-7 andT-8, and a fire pump controller.

(b) A disconnecting means (or service disconnect when required) ahead of the normal input terminals of the transfer switch. Where the alternate source is supplied by a second utility, the transfer switch overcurrent protection shall be selected or set to indefinitely carry the locked rotor current of the fire pump motor.

(c) An isolating switch ahead of the alternate source input terminals of the transfer switch, and meeting the following requirements:

1. The isolating switch shall be supervised to indicate when it is open.

2. The disconnecting means shall be supervised closed by one of the following methods:

i. Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal service. ii. Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an

audible signal at a constantly attended point. iii. Locking the disconnecting means closed. iv. Sealing of disconnect means and approved weekly recorded


Renumber the remaining sections. Delete in its entirety, paragraph 7-8.2.15 (as published in the errata). SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is the companion to Proposal 20-155 concerning the integral transfer switch configuration. Specific requirements are now established for separately supplied listed transfer switches. In order to allow for adequate protection of this equipment as well as to allow for routine maintenance of the equipment, criteria has been established for the disconnecting means as well as the isolating switch. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 39) 20-158 - (7-8.2.3): Reject SUBMITIER~ Bill Wottlin, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers RECOMMENDATION: Continue second sentence as follows, "...system which may include fire pumps,jockey, foam pumps, etc." SUBSTANTIATION: The existing paragraph requires muItiple transfer switches for multiple pumps. See informational 1 line for a project showing 5 transfer switches. This is an unnecessarily expensive solution. Nothing requires this particular installation to have emergency power but because it is available it was used. The cost of fire pump controllers for this installation approached 30

percen t of iiae total job. It would be more appropriate to size 1 switch to serve only those loads connected to fire protection. The reverse logic of this proposal would say that each pump should have it's own dedicated engine generator. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Proposal 20-159 (Log #153). The Committee intends for each pump to have its own, dedicated transfer switch. This transfer switch is not permitted to serve other loads such as jockey pumps, foam pumps or any other ancillary equipment.

(Log # 153) 20-159 - (7-8.2.3): Accept in Principle S U B M I T ~ : R. Schnelder, Lancaster, SC RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"A maximum of one transfer switch shall be dedicated to one fire

~U~'I'ANTIATION: Transfer switches wired upstream of the alternate source terms of the dedicated transfer switch:

a. Do not comply with 7-8.2.11. b. when connected to a 2nd utility may be incompatible with the

FPG. c. Are often mis-interpreted to be outside the scope of NFPA 20.

COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise to read: '~ach fire pump shall have its own dedicated transfer switch(s) where a transfer switch is required." COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The Committee has elected to use similar, but slightly different language over that proposed. The revised wording will clarify the need to have one transfer switch for one fire pump.

(Log # 158) 20-160 - (7-8.2.3): Reject S U B ~ : Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add a second sentence as follows:

"When the jockey pump and pump room anxiliar~es are connected to the f'we pump feeder drcuit, a dedicated transfer switch for the feeder shall be permitted." SUBSTANTIATION: When the jockey pump and pump room auxiliaries are connected as shown in Figure 6-3.2 a single transfer switch should be permitted to avoid unnecessary expense. COMMrlTEE ACTION: R~ect. COMMYITEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-161 (Log #179).

(Log # 179) 20-161 - (7-8.2.3 Exception (New)): Reject SUBMITrER: ManuelJ. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add an Exception to read:

Exception: A jockey pump supplying the same hydraulic system shall be permitted to be connected to this transfer switch. SUBSTANTIATION: There are some instances where it may be desirable (and also provide additional reliability) to have the jockey pump capable of being fed from two power sources, but not economically justifiable if supplied by another automatic transfer switch. COMMI'ITEE AGTION: Reject. COMMrlTEE STATEMENT: The Committee does not want the transfer switch to be used for any other equipment induding the jockey pump.

(Log # 28) 20-162 - (7-8.2.4): Reject SUBMITrER: R. Schneider, Lancaster, SC RECOMMENDATION: Add to the existing paragraph:

"and be rated at least 115 percent of the rated full load current of the motor." SUBSTANTIATION: Should be no different than 7-4.2.2 (I.S.) and 7-4.3.3.1 (C.B.) unless T.S. is 100 percent rated. COMMITI'EE ACTION: R~ect. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: This was corrected by an errata issued in July of 1990.

(Log # 106) 20- 163 - (7-8.2.6): Accept SUBMrlTER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to read:

7-8.2.6 The automatic transfer switch shall be ele,=~rically operated and mechanically held. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarify that this requirement applies to self- contained and separately mounted power transfer switches. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 155) 20-164- (7-8.2.6): Reject SUBMITrER: Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add the following to the beginning of the first sentence:

"Where required to service the fire pump controtier, ..." SUBSTANTIATION: When the automatic transfer switch is located upstream of the fire pump controller this isolating switch serves no purpose since the fire pump controller can be isolated for service using the isolating switch in the controller. COMMrITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: As a safety measure, an isolating switch on the input side of the transfer switch is needed.

(Log # 215) 20- 165 - (7-8.2.7): Accept SUBMrlq'ER: James s. Nasby, Lake Bluff, IL RECOMMENDATION: Change "90 percent" to '~5 percent." SUBSTANTIATION: The 90 percent limit will cause the transfer during motor starting. See paragraph 6-3.1.4. This prevents wasting the stored fuel of to an alternate source generator when the normal source is within required limits. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept.

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NFPA 20 ~ A93 T C R

(Log # 107) 20- 166 - (7-8.2.8 and 7-8.2.8(a)): Reject SUBMITIT, R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to read:

7-8.2.8 Isolating switches complying with 7.4.2 and located within the automatic transfer switch enclosure or compartment shall be provided, . . . . one each ahead of the normal power and alternate po'ower terrmnals of the transfer smtch. The fire pump controller ~solating switch may be considered the normal power isolating switch when the transfer switch is located in a barriered compartment of the fire

ump controller. P(a) The isolating switches shall be supervised to indicate when they are open. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Clarify that there must be a means to isolate the transfer switch from both the normal and emergency power sources. COMMITTEE ACTION:Reject. COMM]TrEE STATEMENT: The Committee Action on Proposal 20-157 has established the need to and methods of supervision for this isolating mechanism. The information proposed in the new 7-8.2.1 and 7.8.2.2 contains the requirements.

(Log # 140) 20-107 - (7-8.2.8): Reject SUBMrrIT, R: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add as third sentence:

"rransfer may also be inhibited to allow normal source transients to subside." SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph 7.8.2.14(a) provides the feature requested for E-G standby but not for two utility sources. Also this feature will allow starting voltage dips to between 85 and 90 percent of normal without transfer to standby source. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-165 (Log #215).

(Log # 108) 20-168 - (7.8.2.8(c)): Reject SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMM]ENDATION: Reword to:

(c) The respective isolating switches must be suitable for the available short circuit current of the normal and alternate sources. SUBSTANTIATION: To agree with submitted revised 7.8.2.8 and 7-8.2.8(a). COMMITYEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee rejected the changes to 7-8.2.8 and 7.8.2.8(a). See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-166 (Log #107).

(Log # 109) 20-169- (7-8.2.9): Reject SUBMITIT, R: JamesL. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to:

7-8.2.9 the automatic transfer switch shall be provided with under voltage sensing devices to monitor all underground conductors of the normal power source. When normal source voltage in any phase at the load terminals of the circuit breaker in the fire pump controller falls below 90 percent of motor rated voltage, the transfer switch shall automatically transfer to the alternate source. When the voltage of all phases returns to 95 percent of motor rated voltage, the transfer switch will return transfer the fire pump controller to the normal source. Phase reversal [see 7-4.7(c)] o f the normal power source shall be considered to be a normal power source failure and shall initiate transfer. SUBSTANTIATION: Retransfer is not defined. COMM1TYEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The present text allows but does not mandate retransfer. The Committee elects to allow this as an option. In some cases it may be desirable to stay on the second source.

(Log# I10) 20-170 - (7.8.2.10 and Exception): Accept SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "line (s)" to "conductor(s)" in article and exception to read:

"7-8.2.10 Voltage and frequency-sensing devices shall be provided to monitor at least one ungrounded conductor of the alternate power source. Transfer to the..."

"Exception: Where the alternate source is provided...shall monitor all ungrounded conductors in lieu of a frequency-sensing device." SUBSTANTIATION: Conductors is more appropriate than lines. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 52) 20-171 - (7-8.2.12): Accept in Principle SUBMrITER: M.I. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete first part of sentence (subjunctive clause) up to comma. SUBSTANTIATION: The prohibition is equally applicable when the second source is a pubhc utility. Prior to NFPA 20-1987, text read as proposed. A study of TCR and TCD action for NFPA 20-1987 falls to reveal reason for change. CoMMrlTEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITIT.,E STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-174 (Log #139).

(Log# 111) 20- 172 - (7.8.2.12): Reject SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "retransfer" to "return transfer" to read:

~7-8.2.12 Means shall be provided to delay return transfer from alternate source of power..," SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies ambiguous "retransfer." COMMITIT.,E ACTION: Reject. COMMITIT_.E STATEMENT: The Committee is not convinced that the present language is ambiguous.

(Log# 112) 20-173 - (7-8.2.14): Reject SL~MITIT.R: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword to:

7.8.2.14 Where the alternate power source is provided by an on-site generator, the transfer switch alternate source circuit shall not have integral short circuit or overcurrent protection. SUlgSTANTIATION: Make it clear that the alternate source circuit does not have overcurrent protection, but that the normal source overcurrent protection must remain. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITI~E STATEMENT: The Committee Action on Proposal 20-174 (Log #139) removed reference to the "on-site generation" capability.

(Log # 139) 20-174- (7.8.2.14): Accept SUBMrITER: M.j. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete the phrase "Where the alternate source isprovided by on-site power generation". SUBSTANTIATION: This change, in NFPA 20-1987 assumed that the circuit breaker of 7.8.2.13 is a part of the transfer switch, which is not correct. The ~integral" overcurrent protection is equally as undesirable for the two-utility supply to the ATS. COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 113) 20- 175 - (7-8.2.15): Reject SUBM1TrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "emergency" to "alternate source" and reword to:

7-8.2.15 When the alternate source is provided by a second utility power source, the transfer switch alternate source circuit shall be provided with an isolating switch complying with 7-8.2.8 and 7-4.2 and a circuit breaker other than the f'we pump controller circuit breaker, complying with 7-4.3 and 7-4.4. SUBSTANTIATION: Make it clear that a separate circuit breaker is required for a second utility source; alternate source is consistent wording. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE ffrATEMEa'Cr: There is no need for the supple- mented overcurrent protection being asked for in this paragraph. Current controller designs can accommodate this protection" with in the controller cabinet.

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(Log # 114) 20-176- (7-8.2.16): Reject StrBMrrrgR: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "on-site power generation" to "an on-site generator ~ to read:

~7-8.2.16 Where the alternate source is provided by an on-site generator the following shall be provided.'... ~ SUBSTANTIATION: On-site generator is consistent wording. CoMMrlTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrlTEE STATEMENT: The existing text is broader in scope than that which is proposed. A generator or other source may be used to satisfy this criteria.

(Log # 12) 20-177 - (7-8.3.15): Accept in Principle SUBMITIT, R: Lee A. Henningsen, F'tretrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add a second sentence as follows:

q n place of a circuit breaker complying with 7-4.3 and 7-4.4, fuses or a circuit breaker complying with 7-8.3.12 may be provided." SUBSTANTIATION: Existing 7-8.3.13 does not specify short drcuit protection other than a fire pump circuit breaker. This is too restrictive for separately mounted transfer switch assemblies. The above proposed option gives the transfer switch assembly supplier more than one choice in selecting overcurrent protection. COMMITrE~ACTION: Accept in Principle. No change needed to this p ra h. C o l ~ P ~ J ~ STATEMENT: The revisions made to paragraph 7-8.2.2 has spedfied the requirements for separately supplied transfer switches. This includes requirements for disconnecting means and over current protection. See Committee Action on Proposal 20-157.

(Log # 213) 20-181 - (8-2.4.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITIT.R: Wm. F. Stelter, Lake Bluff, IL RECOMMENDATION: Re-write paragraph as follows:

8-2.4.2 Overspeed Shutdown Device. Engines shall be provided with an overspeed shutdown device. It shall be arranged to shut down the engine at a speed approximately 20 percent above rated engine speed, and for manualreset. A means shallL be provided to indicate the position of this device to the automatic engine controller so that the controller will continue to show an overspeed trouble signal until the device is manually reset to normal operating

ANTIATI ON: It has been demonstrated in the field that on some fire pump engine wiring designs, the fire pump controller can be reset after an overspeed condition without resetting the engine overspeed device. Consequently, on the next start demand (which could be weeks later or during a fire) the controller will go into an immediate overspeed condition. If the position of the overspeed shutdown device is always available at the controller, this problem can be eliminated. COMMITIZEACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise to read:

8-2.4.20verspeed Shutdown Device. Engines shall be provided with an overspeed shutdown device. It shall be arranged to shutdown the engine at a speed approximately 20 percent above rated engine speed, and for manual reset. A means shall be providedto indicate an overspeed trouble signal to the automatic engine controller such that the controller cannot be reset until the overspeed shutdown device is manually reset to normal operating PcOSition.

OMMITYEE STATEMENT: The revised wording will insure that the device is to be manually reset prior to engine restart. This wording should satisfy the intent of the submitter.

(Log # 56) 20-178 - (Chapter 8 Title, 8-1.1,8-1.2, and 8-4.5): Reject SUBMrIq'ER: John D. Jensen, Idaho Falls, ID RECOMMENDATION: 1. Change title to "Propane, LNG, or Diesel Engine Drive"

2. Remove "diesel" from 8-1.1, 8-1.2 and 8-4.5. SUBSTANTIATION: Continued environmental concerns with emissions from diesel engines make the alternative fuels of propane and LNG highly desirable alternates to diesel fuel. COMMITIT~ ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Reliability of propane and LNG engines is an unknown quantity at this time. In addition, extensive changes to this chapter wouldbe needed concerning fuel source, tanks, lines and other safety requirements which are not addressed.

(Log # 24) 20- 179 - (8-2.3.1): Accept in Principle SUBMIT1T.R: Edward D. Leedy, Industrial Risk Insurers RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Engines shall be connected to horizontal shaft pumps by means of a flexible coupling listed for this service." SUBSTANTIATION: Since unit purchase was ruled out by the Standards Council, couplings not suitable for fire pump service are being used. Field experience has shown that some of these couplings have failed, rendering the fire pump useless. The pump, the driver, and the controller are required to be listed, therefore the flexible coupling connecting the pump and the driver should also be required to be listed. COMMITIT~ACTION: Acceptin Principle. COMMITIT~ STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-46 (Log #23) in Chapter 3.

(Log # 22) 20- 180 - (8-2.4.1): Accept SUBMIT1T~ Edward D. Leedy, Industrial Risk Insurers RECOMMENDATION: Delete the third (3rd) sentence. "Ifa manual control throttle is provided, it shall not permit reduction of engine speed below the governor's set and secured point." SUBSTANTIATION: Experience has shown that when an engine is equipped with a manual throttle, many times it is left in the idle position. When it is started automatically, the engine will not have sufficient speed to drive the fire pump at its rated gpm and psi. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Accept. - - -

(Log # 18) 20-182- (8-2.7.2(a) Note (New)): Reject SUBMITIT, R: Loren Keitner, National Fire Suppression, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add Note:

NOTE: Automatic electric solenoid valve shall be de-energized to open and shall be powered by the AC service to the controller battery charger.

SUBSTANTIATION: The automatic electric solenoid valve, as now furnished, is an energized to open 24 or 12 Volt D.C. If it fails, either by loss of power or burns out, it fails closed. It could be made fail safe by using a de-energized to open AC service valve. If the power fails or if the solenoid shouldburn out, it would fail open. We have had solenoid valves fail because a 12 voll: DC was furnished

in place of a 24 volt DC required. We, also, have had pumps in an area where an explosion occurred severing the lin~ between the controller and the engine. This caused the solenoid to close at the worse possible time. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The recommendation offers no more reliability than the current text. The details of operating this solenoid and powering it open with the battery charger would have to be addressed.

20-183 - (9-1): Accept SUBMITIT.~: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

9-1 Application. This chapter provides requirements for minimum performance of diesel engine controllers, both automatic and nonautomatic for diesel engine driven fire pumps. Accessory devices including alarm monitoring and signal means are included when necessary to ensure minimum performance of the aforementioned equipment. SUBSTANTIATION: This revision is made to ensure that the performance of the pump is enhanced through reliability relating to the controller. Also, see Committee Action on Proposal 20-62. COMMITIq~ ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 115) 20-184 - (9-2.2): Reject S U B ~ James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change second sentence to read:

"Controllers shall be installed so that current carryingparts are 12 inches (305 mm) or more above thepump room floor.-- SUBSTANTIATION: Make it clear that the current carrying parts, not necessarily the bottom of the controller enclo:mre, must be 12 inches above floor when installed.

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N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes the existing text is adequate.

20-185 - (9-2.3): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

9-2.3 Working clearances around controllers shall comply with NFPA 70, Article 110. SUBSTANTIATION: This revision is presented since the clearance issue is now appropriately handled by NFPA 70. Also, see Commit- tee Action on Proposal 20-62. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 134) 20-186 - (9-3.3.1): Reject SUBMITrER: Steven L. Williams, CNOBG/A.E RECOMMENDATION: Delete "the downward vertical."

Replace with "a source vertically above the controller enclosure." SUBSTANTIATION: The current wording is not clear. Since the fire codes can be hard to understand, we should make every effort to clarify the wording. COMMITI~E ACTION: Reject. COMMITI~E STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-108 (Log #132).

20-187- (9-3.3.2): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

"Grounding. The enclosure(s) shall be grounded in accordance with NFPA 70, Article 250." SUBSTANTIATION: This revision is presented since the grounding issue is more appropriately handled by NFPA 70. Also, see Commit- tee Action on Proposal 20-62. COMMIT~E ACTION: Accept

(Log # 116) 20- 188 - (9-3:6): Accept SUBMITI'ER: James L Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change "Wiring" to Wield Connection" so that article reads:

9-3.6 Field Connection Diagrams and Instructions. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies that a diagram necessary for field installation and connection must be available to the installer. Wording agrees with 9-3.6.1 and 9-3.6. COMMITI~E ACTION: Accept

(Log# 117) 20- 189 - (9-3.7): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change first sentence to read:

"9-3.7 Marking. Each operating component of the controller shall be marked to plainl~ indicate an identification referenced on the schematic diagram.' SUBSTANTIATION: Permits other than numbers (i.e., alpha characters) as identification; requires the same identification on component and on schematic diagram. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise the recommendation to read:

"...on the field connection diagram." COMMITrEE STATEMENT: Field connection diagram is being used in other portions of the Standard.

20- 190 - (9-4.1): Accept SUBMrITER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Delete this paragraph in its entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: It is very unlikely that a surge due to lightning would ever reach a diesel engine pump controller. The Committee does not believe this paragraph is meaningful for such a remote occurrence. COMMITI~E ACTION: Accept

(Log # 214) 20-191 - (9-4.1 Exception (New)): Reject SuBMrITER: James S. Nasby, Lake Bluff, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add the following Exception to 9-4.1:

Exception: These voltage surge arresters shall not be mandatory if the controller can withstand a 6 kilo-volt impulse. SUBSTANTIATION: The existing wording is a design rather than a performance requirement. Safety and reliability problems are not addressed.

Specifically: - for equipment having a higher voltage surge withstand than the

rest of power system, it is more reliable (and safer) NOT to shunt surge energy into the equipment,

- upstream impedances on high fault services are low and often unknown,

- the degradation ofarresters after sufficient surge energy absorption is eliminated, - follow-on current flow (in degraded or hot arresters) is elinli-

nated, - 10.0 Kv is the max. value cited in IEEE C62.41 and C62.45 for

service entrance e~uipment. This is well above typical 6.0 Kv "spark- over of clearances .

- IEEE C62.41 (Guide for Surge Voltages in Low-Voltage A.C. Power Circuits) is based on measured system surge voltages and wave forms.

- IEEE C62.45 provides procedures on surge withstand testing. - IEEE C62.1 (1989 revision tide - Standard for Gapped Silicon-

Carbide Surge Arresters for A.C. Power Circuits) provides testing methods for arresters, but not their performance (surge clamping) requirements. The same is true for IEEE C62.11 (Standard for Metal-Oxide Surge Arresters for A.C. Power Circuits) which covers Zinc-oxide an-esters which normally do not have gaps. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITI~E STATEMENT: A Committee Proposal was developed which eliminated paragraph 9-4.1. See Proposal 20-190.

(Log# 118) 20- 192 - (9-4.2.3): Reject SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add phrase "any of" between "by" and "the" near the end of the article to read:

"...to indicate trouble caused by any of the following conditions." SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies that these are independent alarm initiators. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee prefers the current language which is adequate to cover the situation.

(Log # 135) 20-193 - (9-4.2.5): Accept SUBM]TrER: Steven L. Williams, CNOBG/A.E RECOMMENDATION: Delete "A-2-17" in two places.

Replace with "A-2-18" in same two places. SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph is incorrect, needs correcting. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept

20- 194- (9-5.2.1): Accept $UBMITI"ER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Retain the wording of the first paragraph of 9-5.2.1. Revise items (a) and (b) as follows:


(b) The pressure sensing line connection for each pump (including jockey pum~ps)s), shall be made between that pumps discharge check valve and discharge control valve. This line shall be corrosion resistant metallic pipe or tube and fittings (brass, copper or series 300 stainless steel) of 1/2 in. nominal size. There shall be two check valves installed in the pressure sensing line at least 5 ft apart with a 3/32 in. hole drilled in the clapper to serve as dampering. (See Figures A-7-5.2.1 (a) and A-7-5.2.1 (b) for clarification.)

Exception to (b): If water is clean, ground-face unions with noncorrosive diaphragms drilled with 3/32 in. orifices shall be

g ermitted in place of the check valves. UBSTANTIATION: Field experience has shown that there are

questions over the correct placement of pressure sensing lines to jockey pumps. Also, several requirements were in the appendix and neededto be moved into the body of the standards. COMMITI~E ACTION: Accept

1 5 6

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(Log # 119) 20-195 - (9-5.2.1): Reject SUBMITTE~ James L Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add ", engine" to last sentence to read:

%.testing of the operation of the controller, engine, and pumping unit." SUBSTANTIATION: A prime d e m e n t here is to prove engine

eoMration. MITrF~ ACTION: Reject.

COMMI'ITEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes it is summarily understood that the engine is tested as a part of the pumping unit.

(Log # 120) 20- 196 - (9-5.2.2): Accept in Prindple SUBMITrER: James L.Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change third and fourth sentences to read:

~I'he equipment shall be a circuit of the drop-out type. This circuit shall be actuated from a normally closed contact on the fire

~ rotection equipment." UBSTANTIATION: Permits other than relays (i.e., solid state

devices) to actuate the control equipment. COMMrrrF~ACI"ION: Accept in Principle. Replace the third and fourth sentences of 9.5.2.2 with the following:

"Starting of the motor shall be initiated by the opening of a normally closed contact on the fire protection equipment." C O M M r r r F ~ STA'rRM]LN~: The substitute language is more performance oriented than the submitted language. The restriction on "relay-type only" has been removed.

(Log # 121) 20-197 - (9.5.2.6): Reject S U B ~ : James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change article to read:

9-5.2.6 Sole Supply Pumps. For sprinkler or standpipe systems where an automatically controlled pumping unit constitutes the sole supply, manual shutdown shall be providedwhere required by the auifiority having jurisdiction. SUBSTANTIATION: Removes "codification" of manual shutdown on sole suA~ply pumps. COMMrrTEE ACTION: Reject. C O M M r r r E E STATEMENT: The Committee wishes to allow the "manual shut down only" condition to also be determined by the A.HJ. when appropriate.

(Log # 122) 20-198 - (9-5.4.1(b)): Reject SUBMITrER: James L. Boyer, Hretrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add word %tandby ~ to last paragraph of article to read:

~ ' h e controller shall then return to the full automatic standby condition." SUIKVFANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Proposed wording is no better than the current text which is the preference of the Committee.

(Log # 123) 20-199 - (9-5.4.2(b)): Accept SUBMITI3ER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change phrase "the controller" to word "it" so that first sentence reads:

"(b) When the engine emergency overspeed devices operates, it shall cause the engine to shut down and lock out the engine." SUBSTANTIATION: The overspeed device must act to shut down and lock out the engine withoutbenefit of a controller. COMMITI3EE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 55) 20- 200 - (9.5.4.2(c)): Reject SUBMITIT.~: Richard Coates, Group Fire Adviser, British Petroleum RECOMMENDATION: Delete all after "low oil pressure" and insert:

"when started for any emergency purpose, however a manual override shall be provided.

For all non-emergency engine startups the engine shall shut down automatically on registering high water temperature or low oil

~ ressure." UBSTANTIATION: Diesel engine in BP chemic:M plant fire main

system overheated during test, alarm failed to open'ate in control room and engine blew up occasioning $20,000 damage because the pump was not fitted with auto shutdown. Not only direct loss but serious lack of fire cover during down time of pump. Appreciate need for no automatic shutdown in fire condition but

not m non-fire situations. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The standard requires people to be present during operation of the pump. In addition, the controller does not know if it has operated the pump inadvertently, intention- ally for a test or automatically because of operatiou of a fire protection system.

(Log# 124) 20- 201 - (9-5.4.2(d)): Accept SUBMrrEgR: James L. Boyer, Firetrol, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add word "overspeed" between words "engine" and "shutdown" to read:

( d ) The controller shall not be capable of being reset until the engine overspeed shutdown device ts manually re~,et. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial consistent. COMMrFIT~ ACTION: Accept.

m _ _

(Log # 149) 20- 202 - (Chapter 10): Reject SUBM1TIT.R: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Remove Chapter 10 from current NFPA 20 or require that steam turbine drives be listed for t~tre pump service. SUBSTANTIATION: Pumps, engines, electric motor-s, controllers and transfer switches require listing for fire pump service as should steam turbines. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITIT~ STATEMENT: Although these units are infrequently used, the established criteria has worked well without requiring the steam drive units to be listed.

(Log # 54) 20- 203 - (Chapter 11 Tide, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5): Accept in Principle SUBMITIER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

1. Change tide of Chapter 11 to "Chapter 11 - Acceptance Testing and Performance."

2. Delete Sections 11-3, 1i-4, and 11-5. 3. Add a new Section 11-3 to read: 11-5 Manuals, Special tools, and Spare Parts. 11-3.1 A minimum of two sets of instruction mmmals for all major

components of the fire pump system shall be supplied by the manufacturer of each major component. The m ~ u a l shall contain:

(a) A detailed explanation of the operation oft~he component. (b) Insu-uctions for routine maintenance. (c) Detailed instructions concerning repairs. (d) Parts list and parts identification. (e) Schematic electrical drawings of controller, transfer switch, and

alarm panels. 11-3.2 Any special tools and testing devices required for routine

maintenance shall be available for inspection by the authority having jurisdiction at time of field acceptance test.

11-3.3 Consideration shall be given to stocking spare parts for critical items not readily available. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 25 covers inspection testing, and maintenance of fire pump systems. Primary scope responsibility for these matters rests with that Committee. COMM1TIT~ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise the proposal as follows:

1. Chapter 11. Acceptance Testing, Performance and Mainte- nance.

2. Accept Item 2 as is. 3. Accept Item 3 in principle. Change 11-3.1 to only require 1 set

of manuals. 4. Add a new 11-4 to read: 11-4. Fire pumps shall be inspected, tested and maintained in

accordance with NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water Based Fire Protection Sys~_~ms.

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COMMITFEE STATEMENT: The Committee has modified the proposal to:

1. Continue to recognize maintenance. 2. Require 1 set of instruction manuals. 3. Make a reference to NFPA 25 concerning ongoing maintenance

of the pumping unit. These changes enhance the intent of this proposal.

(Log # 19) 20- 204 - (11-2.1.1 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: James w. Nolan, Des Plaines, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add new Paragraph 11-2.1.1 as follows:

"All electric wiring to the Fire Pump motor(s), including Contro! (multiple pumps) interwiring, emergency power supply, and Jockey Pump, shall be completed and checked by the Electrical Contractor prior to the initial start up and acceptance test." SUBSTANTIATION: The Standardneeds to emphasize that the sophisticated motors, reduced voltage controls, automatic transfer switches, and sequence starting commonly app|ied to todays Fire Pumping equipment must be wired and checked out well before the final field acceptance testI COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITFEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-3 (Log #21).

(Log # 31 ) 20- 205 - (11-2.7.3): Reject SUBMITTER: James W. Nolan, Des Plalnes, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add a last sentence "Pressure switch settings shall be locked and sealed following the acceptance test." SUBSTANTIATION: ff the start pressure is set too low on a High Rise building Fire Pump control the unit will not start automatically when a hose valve or sprinkler system is activated on the top floors. The column of water in the Standpipe will maintain a static pressure in the system above the start pressure setting in the controller. COMMrITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITFEE STATEMENT: The Committee is not aware of a practical method to accomplish this provision.

20- 206 - (11-2.7.5 (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Add new paragraph a follows:

11-2.7.5 The selection and setting of the overcurrent protection within the fire pump disconnecting means (if provided) shall be confirmed to be in accordance with this standard. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 20 has been substantially amended to ensure that the overcurrent protection is correcdy designed for the particular circumstances. Since this is such an important part of the system performance, it should be verified during the acceptance test of the assembly. COMMITFEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 195) 20- 207 - (11-2.7.5 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Carrol Burtner, NEMA RECOMMENDATION: Add new 11-2.7.5 as follows:

11-2.7.5 The size of the overcurrent protection within the Fire Pump Disconnecting Means (if provided) shall be confirmed to be in accordance with the placard supplied in the pump room. SUBSTANTIATION: To coordinate with NEMA proposal on 6-3. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITFEE STATEMENT: The Committee developed a similar proposal concerning this issue. See Committee Action on Proposal 20-206.

(Log # 13) 20- 208 - (11-2.8.1 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Wm. F. Stelter, Master Control Systems, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Accept in principle by adding a new:

11-2.8.1 ff the alternate source is a generator set, installation acceptance shall be in accordance with NFPA 110, Emergency and Standby Power Systems, for Level I systems.

Renumber present 11-2.8.1 to 11-2.8.2. SUBSTANTIATION: Many generator systems serving Fire Pumps do not comply with NFPA 110. The original intent in developing NFPA 110 was to up grade generator systems servicing Fire Pumps. Now that the standard exists, it should be referenced by NFPA 20.

COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise to read: 11-2.8.1 If the alternate source is a generator set required by

6-2.3.1, installation acceptance shall be in accordance with NFPA 110, Emergency and Standby Power Systems. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The changes stipulate the situation under which the generator would be required. The Committee does not believe it is within their scope to stipulate a particular system level, only to make a general reference to NFPA 110.

(Log # 174) 20- 209 - (11-3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: FrankL. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete this section. SUBSTANTIATION: This section is now covered by NFPA 25 Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems. COMMITFEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This was accomplished with the section on Proposal 20-203 (Log #54).

(Log# 175) 20- 210 - (12-1.1 and 12-1.2): Accept SUBMITTERa Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

1. 12-1.1 NFPA Publications - Add: NFPA 25 1992, Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Mainte-

nance of Fire Protection Systems. 2. 12-1.2 Other Codes and Standards -Add: ANSI/AWWA E101-88, Standard for Vertical Turbine Pumps - Line

shaft and Submersible Types. SUBSTANTIATION: ANSI/AWWA E101-88 would add continuity to Chapter 4, COMMITFEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 216) 20- 211 - (12-1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: James s. Nasby, Lake Bluff, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add missing references:

ANSI/IEEE C62.1-1989 IEEE Standard for Gapped Silicon-Carbide Surge Attesters for A.C. Power Circuits.

ANSI/IEEE C62.11-1987, IEEE Standard for Metal-Oxide Surge Arresters for A.C~ Power Circuits.

NOTE: 62.11 Arresters are normally zinc-oxide without gaps. SUBSTANTIATION: These standards are stated requirements in

araglaph 7-4.1 and 9-4.1. OMMITFEEACTION: Accept. NOTE: Other referenced

publications will be added to this paragraph when they appear in the body of the text.

(Log # 188) 20- 212 - (A-1-7.7.8): Accept SUBMITTER: James W. Nolan, Des Plaines, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete this paragraph entirely. SUBSTANTIATION: There are situations where a horizontal split case pump is available but a can pump is a better installation due to

aCe requirements or type of water source. MMIT'I'EE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 1) 2O- 213 - (Figures A-2-9.5, A-2-14.2.1 (a), A-2-14.2.1 (b), A-2-19.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee Fire Safety Symbols RECOMMENDATION: Revise symbol for check vale to look as follows:

158

N F P A 20 - - A 9 3 T C R

SUBSTANTIATION: Symbol currently used in NFPA 20 is not consistent with symbol as used in industry, by American Waterwork Assn, and in NFPA 99, Standard for Health Care Facilities. COMMrr l~E ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 2) 20- 214 - (Figure A-2-9.5): Accept SUBMrrrER: Technical Committee Fire Safety Symbols RECOMMENDATION: Revise symbol for fire pump test header to look as follows:

(Log # 206) 20- 218 - (A-2-14.1.2 NOTE 3): Reject SUBMITIT_.R: RalphJ. Pinto, Pinto Association RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

NOTE 3: Distance not less than 5 pipe diameter of suction pipe for top and bottom suction connections distance not less 10 dia. of suction pipe for side connection. SUBSTANTIATION: This Note 3 should be inserted in Paragraph 2-9.6 in bold letters. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-217 (Log #202).

I re e ncLin

SUBSTANTIATION: Symbol currently used in NFPA 20 can be confused with fire dept connection. Technical Committee on Fire Safety Symbols has reviewed subject, and will use the ones proposed in the next edition of its document. COMMITIT~ ACTION: Accept.

(LOg # 37) 20- 215 - (Figure A-2-9.5): Accept SUBM1TIT.R: Robert F. Summers, Crawford Sprinkler Co. RECOMMENDATION: Correct schematic diagram showing hose header line connected to the bypass line in both diagrams. SUBSTANTIATION: Inspectors could see these lines as connected. COMMI'ITEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 152) 20- 216 - (A-2-9.9): Accept SUBMrITER: Kenneth E. Isman, National Fire Sprinkler Associa- tion RECOMMENDATION: Revise section to read as follows:

A-2-9.9 Due to the pressure losses across backflow prevention devices, and the desire to maintain acceptable pressure on the suction, side. of a pump, it is recommended that backflow prevention dewces be mstalled on the discharge side of the pump. It is more efficient to lose the pressure after the pump has boosted it, rather than before the pump. SUBSTANTIATION: To clarify the intent of this section. When this section was placed in the 1990 edition there was no explanation as to why, or what the problems are with backflow preventers in the suction piping. As evidenced by the 6 people who submitted comments on this section in the Fall 1989 TCD, no one knew what the problem was, each assumed a different intent by the Committee. As the Committee itself stated in dealing with Log #24, "rhe Committee agrees that some water departments may force the installation of such devices on the suction line." This forces a conflict between the water and fire authorities. Clarification of the recommendation would help settle the conflict. C O M M I T ~ E ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 202) 20-217- (A-2-14.1.2 NOTE 3): Reject SUBMITIT.R: Charles M. Sauta, Midstate Hudson Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

NOTE 3: Distance not less than 5 pipe diameters of suction pipe for top and bottom suction connecuons. Distance not less than 10 diameters of suction pipe for side connections (not recommended). SUBSTANTIATION: This Note 3 should be inserted in Paragraph 2-9.6 in bold lettersl COMMITIT, E ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposal is too design specific. In addition, the Committee Action on Proposal 20-29 (Log #26) has stipulated requirements for position of fittings.

(Log # 15) 20- 219 - (A-2-14.2.1): Reject SUBMrI'rER: Bruce C. Carpenter, Phoenix, AZ RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Metering devices shall discharge to a drain." SUBSTANTIATION: Circulation of pump disch2~ge water throughout flow meter and discharge into the suction line ahead of the pump (closed loop) does not adequately test the pump suction supply or the flow meter. Measurement of volume of water discharge from the pump is the only way to verify the accuracy of a flow meter. Without verified accuracy the flow meter cannot be relied on for future testing, i.e. Annual Test. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: The Committee can not stipulate requirements in the Appendix. The current language is correct. In addition, a meter may be used only to verify basic operation of the pump and not the suction supply. NFPA 95 does not permit the suction supply to be tested with a meter unless that meter goes to an atmospheric pressure drain. The current text of NFPA 20, para- graph2-14.1 • 2 requires this provision as well.

(Log # 36) 20- 220 - (Figure A-2-14.2.1(b)): Accept SUBMITIT~: Robert F. Summers, Crawford Sprinkler Co. RECOMMENDATION: Please remove the line shown in this dialaRTam__ SUBSTANTIATION: Inspectors could see this lilae and ask for it to be installed. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 207) 20- 221 - (Figure A-2-19.3): Accept in Principle SUBM1TIT.R: Kenneth E. Isman, National Fire Sprinkler Associa- tion RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-2-19.3 to show acceptable arrangement of pressure sensing lines for both fi~re pump and jockey pump. Show the pressure sensing line of the jockey pump connected in the main fire pump discharge. SUBSTANTIATION: There is currendy a dispute over correct connection of the pressure sensing line for a jockey pump and interpreting Section 7-5.2.1 (b). See also our proposed changes for that section and its appendix. COMMITFEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Add a note to the figure to read as follows:

NOTE 3: Pressure sensing lines also need to be installed in accordance with 7-5.2.1. See Figures A-7-5.2.1 (a) and A-7-5.2.1 (b). Add this same note to figures A-2-9.5 and A-2-14.2.1 of the current

Standard. COMMITIT, E STATEMENT: This cross reference should clarify the intent of the standard concerning pressure sensing lines. Also see the Committee Action on Proposal 20-136 (Log #208), Proposal 20-235 (Log #209) and Proposal 20-135.

(Log # 189) 20- 222 - (A-2-19.4): Reject SUBM1TTER: James w. Nolan, Des Plaines, IL RECOMMENDATION: Delete this paragraph entirely. SUBSTANTIATION: A centrifugal type pressure maintenance pump is not suited to many low capacity - high wessure applications i.e. high rise buildings - 5 gpm at 700' head is a nmch better application for a regenerative turbine design - cost and lower B.H.P. requirements. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Reject.

159

NFPA 20 m A93 T C R

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee is showing a [ preference but not excluding other types such as multi-stage pumps. [

(Log # 60) 20- 223 - (A-5-2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMrlTER: Y. R. Red-dy, Reddy-Buffaloes Pump CO., Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Remove Horizontal Splitcase Pump 120 Percent Shutoff head from Fig. A-$-2.1 on Page A-42.

Reword the top curve "Pump Head" and remove reference to any type of pump. S UBSTA)W~. ,. TION: On Page 20-15, Paragraph $-2.1 entitled Characteristics", it call for shut off head shall not exceed 140

percent of rated head for any type pump (See Figure A-3-2.1). If this the case, then the above revisions are necessary.

COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle, COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This was corrected by an errata issued in March, 1990.

(Log # 190) 20- 224 - (Figure A-~-2.1): Accept in Principle SUBM1TIT.~: James w. Nolan, Des Plalnes, IL RECOMMENDATION: Curve as shown implies that horizontal split case pumps have a 120 percent shut off head - change curve to show all pumps with 140percent shut off. g"UllSTJkNTIATION: Chapter $, horizontal pumps changed shut off head to 140 percent a few years ago - the curve as shown is no longer correct . COMMITIT~ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 29-22S (Log #60).

(Log # 191) 20- 225 - (A-4-2.2.2): Accept SUBM1TIT.~: James w. lqolan, Des Plalnes, IL RECOMMENDATION: Revise paragraph to read:

"The velocities in the approach channel or intake pipe should not exceed approximately 2 feet per second and the velocity in the wet pit should not exceed approximately one foot per second." SUBSTANTIATION: Two feet per second as a maximum main channel or intake pipe is consistent with most sump design studies and the hydraulic institute standards. COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 185) 20- 226 - (A-5-2.1 (New)): Reject SUBMN'rER: James W. Nolan, Des Plaines, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

A-5-2.1 Balanced Mechanical Shaft Seals may be installed in pumps

~ iped in series. U'BSTANTIATION: From an engineering standpoint the pump

manufacturers should be allowed to make the decision for the selection of the Shaft Seal method used for series applications. For many applications Balanced Mechanical Seal is the most efficient sealing method vs. S.S. Sleeves and Super Seal packing. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee is not aware of any listed pumps with this type of seal. If a pump becomes listed with this type of mechanical seal, there is nothing in NFPA 20 w h i c h would prohibit its use.

20- 227 - (A-6-1.1, A-6-3.1.1, Figure A-6.3.2): Accept SUBM1TIT.a~ Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: 1. Delete text of current A-6-3.1.1.

2. Add new Figure A-6-3.2. (Shown on next page.) 3. Add new A-6-3.1.1. A-6-3.1.1 Under premise fire conditions, service and feeder

connections are susceptible to failure from collapsing structural and other members within the premise as well as from fre . Under fire conditions generated by overcurrent within these conductors, the characteristics of 6-3.1.1 minimize the possibility of fire spread.

Typical methods of routing power from the source to motor are shown in Figure A-6-3.2. Other configurations may also be acceptable. SUBSTANTIATION: The Appendix wording has been revised to allow for recognition of the need to protect conductors from physical damage as well as from fire exposure damage. Minimizing the possibility of ignition from the conductor itself (for example, in an overcurrent condition) is also now discussed.

The new figures show the methods described by revised paragraph 6-3.2. They are deemed appropriate for the Appendix as the Standard permits alternatives to those two arrangements. COMMITTEE AC'TION: Accept.

20- 228 - (A-6.3.2, A-6-3.3, A-6-3.4(New), A-7-1.1.2): Accept SUBMrI'IT.R: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Renumber text of current A-6-3.3 as A-6-3.2 and add the following:

"The Committee considered the potential arrangement of providing fire pump power from the secondary side of the transformer which supplies other electrical loads of the facility. The Committee recognizes that it is possible to supply the fire pump power ahead of other plant loads and to protect the fire pump power circuit by proper electrical coordination. However, the Committee is concerned that while responding to an emergency, fire fighters may seek to disconnect electrical power to the facility by opening the transformer primary disconnect which in this case would isolate power to the fire pump as well. In addition, the Committee is concerned that the designed electrical coordination may be compromised by ongoing additional electrical loads to the facility power distribution system. Therefore, if electrical service is supplied to the facility at voltage higher than utilization voltage, the Committee feels that a separate transformer to provide power to the fire pump is appropriate.

A-6-3.4 (New) Appropriate sections may include but not be limited to 430-22 (a), 430-24(a), 430-25(a) or 430-25 (b). A-7-1.1.2 A short circuit study should be made to establish the

available short circuit current at the controller in accordance with IEEE 141, Electric Power Distribution for Industrial Plants, IEEE 241, Electric systems for Commercial Buildings, or other acceptable methods. SUBSTANTIATION: These appendix notes are intended to explain the philosophical position of the Committee with respect to:

1. Disconnecting means. 2. Overcurrent protection, and 3. Short circuit capability of the pump controller. In order to reduce the possibility of the disconnecting means being

inadvertently opened during a fire emergency, the Committee has taken steps to prevent this from occurring. Recognizing that additional eqmpment may be needed to allow for correct operation of the pump, the Appendix material has been revised to recommend that separate equipment (i.e. transformers) be provided for the fire PTump

he other appendix items are offered as references for establishing conductor sizing and short circuit current. COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log # 150) 20- 229 - (A-6-3.1.1): Reject S U B ~ : Lawrence A. Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add to the present A-6.5.1.1:

Whe National Electrical Code has an exception permitting service conductors to be routed inside a building if encased in 2 in. of concrete. No equivalency is permitted however. Note that the equivalency to 2 in. of concrete appears in NFPA 20 for feeder conductors, not service conductors." SUBSTANTIATION: To clear the misconception that service conductors may be routed inside a building if encased with a material having the equivalent fire resistance of 2 in. of concrete. COMMITIT~ ACTION: Reject. COMMrITEE STATEMENT: See the Action on Committee Proposal 20-67.

160

N F P A 20 ~ A93 T C R

Typ ica l p o w e r supp ly ar rangements f r o m source to m o t o r

A r rangemen t A

Service at f i re p u m p m o t o r u t i l i za t i on vol tage

Service conduc to rs NEC 220

T o f i re p u m p aux loads (op t i ona l )

Arran ement B

To o ther service swi tches and p lan t loads

Service at h igher than f i re p u m p m o t o r u t i l i za t i on vol tage

Service conduc to rs NEC 2 3 0

C o n n e c t i o n per NEC 4 5 0 - 3 (a)13)

To f i re p u m p aux loads (op t iona l )

F i re p u m p con t ro l l e r

Fi re p u m p con t ro l l e r

* C i r c u i t breakers or fus ib le swi tches may be used

Figure A-6-3.2 (a) F'wtn'e A-6-3.2(b)

161

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(Log # 192) 20- 230 - (Table A-6-3.5(a) (New)): Reject SUBMITrER: James W. Nolan, Des Plaines, 1L RECOMMENDATION: Add a new table of suggested line sizes in Appendix A.

Table A-6-3.5(a) Line Size

°FLC H.P. 460 Volt (amps) #230 Volt #460 Volt

20 27 4 8 25 34 3 8 30 40 3 8 40 52 1 6 5O 65 2/0 4 60 77 3/0 3 75 96 250 1

100 124 350 2/0 125 156 *2-250 MCM 3/0 150 180 *2/300" 4 / 0 200 240 *2-500" *350 MCM

Notes: °1. #2. "3.

FLCz Table 430-150 NFPA 70. Sizing based on 75°C rated copper conductors. Where dual conductors are shown, all conductors (6) are assumed to be contained within a single conduit.

COMMYITEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-233 (Log #20).

(Log # 20) 20- 233 - (A-7-1.1.1(a) (New) and A-7-1.1.1(b) (New)): Accept SUBMITI'ER: ManuelJ. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Add an A-7-1.1.1 (a) to read:

7-1.1.1 (a) the controller shall be suitable for the available short circuit

current at line terminals of controller and shall be marked "Suitable for use on a circuit capable of delivering not more than _ _ amperes r.m.s, symmetrical at volts a.c."

NOTE: The blank spaces shown shall have appropriate numbers filled in for each installation.

"Suitable for use means that the controller and transfer switch have been protype tested and have demonstrated by these tests their short circuit withstandability and interrupting capacity at the stated magnitude of short circuit current and voltage available at their line terminals (see ANSI/UL509 and ANSI/UL1008)." Add an A-7-1.1.1 (b) to read: "After the controller and transfer switch have been subjected to a

high fault current, they may not be suitable for further use without inspection and/or repair. Refer to national Electrical manufacturers Association Publication ICS 2.2-1983 Maintenance of Motor Controllers After a Fault Condition." SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 20 Committee voted favorably on this proposal which was neither modified in TCR nor revised by Standards Council. Appears to have been an editorial or printing error. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept. This was corrected by an errata dated July, 1990.

SUBSTANTIATION: Electrical Contractors - and ~ are frequently confused by section 7-4.4, Locked Rotor Overcurrent Protection, when specifying wire size. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This information is readily available in the N.E.C. This item is related to design rather than installation. There are many combinations available which are dependent upon wire type, size and temperature.

(Log # 61) 20- 231 - (A-6-4.1 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITIXR: ThomasJ. Brown, Factory Mutual RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

"When power supply transformers are large it may be advisable to provide a separate transformer for the fire pump, so a lower interrupting capacity drcuit breaker may be used in the f i repump controller. For a 75 hp motor provide at least a 75 kva transformer; for 125 hp at least 125 kva. SUBSTANTIATION: This would give guidance for sizing transformers for fire pump circuits, which does not now exist in either NFPA 20 or NFPA 70. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Comnuttee addressed the issue of a separately supplied transformer in Proposal 20-227. This should satisfy the intent of the submitter.

(Log # 176) 20- 234 - (Figure A-7-5.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Show Jockey Pump sensitivity line separate from Fire Pump. SUBSTANTIATION: Installing contractors find this sketch confusing and mistakenly locate jockey pump sensitivity line on wrong side of fire pump control valve. C O M M IT~EA C TIO N : Accept in Principle. COMMITIqgE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-135 and Proposal 20-235 (Log #209).

(Log # 209) 20- 255 - (Figure A-7-5.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITIXR: Kenneth E. Isman, National Fire Sprinkler Associa- tion RECOMMENDATION: Fix Figure A-7-5.2.1. SUBSTANTIATION: It isn't clear from the figure or the title if this diagram is supposed to apply to main fire pumps and jockey pumps indlvid" " "ually or together as a unit. See also our proposals on 7-5.2.1 (h) and A-2-19.3. COMMYITEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Change title to "Piping Connection for Each Automatic Pressure Switch (for Fire and Jockey Pumps)". COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: This change along with Committee Proposal 20-135 will clarify the intent of the figure.

(Log # 162) 20- 232 - (A-7-1.1.1 (New)): Reject SUBMITI'ER: Lawrence A~ Bey, Onan Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

'q'he withstand rating of a fire pump controller may exceed the interrupting rating of the circuit breaker within the controller. If subjected to short circuit current at or near its withstand rating, the fire pump controller may be damaged beyond repair and may not function as intended." SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification of the difference between the withstand rating of a controller and the interrupting rating of the circuit breaker in the controller. C O M ~ E ACTION: Reject.

20- 236 - (A-7-8 (New)): Accept SuBMrrTER: Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Include new A-7-8 as follows: A-7-8 Typical fire pump controller and transfer switch arrange-

ments are as shown in Figure A-7-8. SUBSTANTIATION: These figures are intended to demonstrate the intent of the revised paragraphs 7-8.2, 7-8.2.1 and 7-8.2.2 concerning transfer switches. COMMrlTEE ACTION: Accept.

162

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

Typ ica l f i re pump con t ro l l e r and t ransfer swi tch arrangements

Ar rangement I

Normal source

7-8.2.1

A l te rna te See 6 -7 ,6 source

/ To o ther emergenc~ loads

Ar rangement I I

Norma l SOU rce

I sac 6-7 6 ~°'t'r;:'t"

\ -- emergency

~ ) Trans fer loads

swi tch

" C i r c u i t breakers or fus ib le switches may be used

163

N F P A 2 0 m A 9 3 T C R

(LOg # 66) 20- 237 - (Figure A-7-8.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITrF.,R: ManuelJ. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Change caption to read:

"Figure A-7-8.2 One Method of Automatic Switch Installation When Alternate Power Source is an On-site Generator." SUBSTANTIATION: This is a resubmittal o f Public Comment #20-121 of NFPA 20-1990 which was accepted by Committee but which washed out because Proposal #20-153 of NFPA 20-1990 (to which this public comment referred) was re turned to Committee for fur ther study. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The action taken on Committee Proposal 20-236 has addressed two types of transfer switch arrangements for emergency generator sources. This should satisfy the intent o f the submitter.

(LOg # 157) 20- 238 - (Figure A-7-8.2(b) (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMrrl 'ER: Lawrence A. Bey, Onan RECOMMENDATION: Add Figure 1 from NFPA 20 F.I. 80-7 as A-7-8.2(b) Alternate Method of Automatic Transfer Switch Installation for Two Power Sources. SUBSTANTIATION: The Figure 1 is from a previous formal interpretation of NFPA 20, and if included in the appendix would clear up the misconception documented in the Trian.gLe " published for the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, i.e. that the present A-7-8.2 is the only acceptable a r rangement of components in a two- source system.

NOTE: Support ing material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMM1TrEEACTION: Accept in Part in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The action taken on Proposal 20-236 has offered two u'ansfer switch configurations - one for integral transfer switch configuration and one for separately supplied transfer switch configurations. This should satisfy the intent o f the submitter.

(Log # 53) 20- 239 - (A-8-2.4.9): Reject SUBMITrER: M.J. DeLerno, Berwyn, IL RECOMMENDATION: Revise to:

"...will cause direct connection of the starting battery to the engine starting motor." SUBSTANTIATION: Better phraseology. Existing text is ambiguous. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITYEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes that the current text is adequate.

(Log # 16) 20- 240 - (A-11-2.6.2): Reject SUBMrrTER: Bruce G. Carpenter, Phoenix, AZ RECOMMENDATION: Revise 2nd paragraph as follows:

"Where flow meter is used in a closed loop according to Manufacturer 's instructions. Additional outlets such as hydrants hose valves, etc., shall be available to de termine accuracy of meter ing device."

(This shall be moved f rom the Appendix A to the acceptance operation and maintenance section). SUBSTANTIATION: Circulation of pump discharge water throughout flow meter and discharge into the suction line ahead of the pump (closed loop) does not adequately test the pump suction supply or the flow meter. Measurement of volume of water discharge from the pump is the only way to verify the accuracy of a flow meter. Without verified accuracy the f lowmete r cannot be relied on for future testing., i.e. Annual Test. COMMITYEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITYEE STATEMENT: The language in current 2-14.1.1 requires an ar rangement to evaluate the water supply. The Committee agrees with the substantiation but is o f the opinion that the current text covers this situation.

(Log# 14) 20- 241 - (A-11-2.6.3): Reject SUBMITrER: J. w. Nolan/R. Crawford, Des Haines, IL RECOMMENDATION:, Consider a revision to Chapter 11, Paragraph A-11-2.6.3 Test Procedure.

"Peerless Pump's increasing activity testing small In Line listed fire pumps in the factory with their uncal ibra tedjob motors p rompt this proposal. Without certified motor efficiency, KW input cannot give accurate horsepower. We also know that field tests normally measure volts and amps, not KW. The present HP (KW) correction should be removed and replaced by the following:

For 3 phase induction motors: A 1 = Average of amps measured in each phase A½ = Test amps corrected to pump rated RPM and motor rated

voltage V 1 = Motor nameplate rated voltage

(N 1 & N 2 = RPM as now defined)

A 2 = N~/N] 3 X (V 1 ) (A 1 ) V 2

Finally, compare A 2 to motor nameplate rated amps at V 2 considering the motor service factor to judge field test pertormance. An example follows:

30 HP, 230 V motor Rated RPM = 3525 Rated amp @ 230V = 77 SF = 1.15

At maximum pump load (minimum RPM) A~= 79.3

= 238 ~"1 = 3520

A 2 = 35253 X (238)(79.3) = 82.4Amps 3520 230

77 x 1.15 = 88.55 amps max at rated voltage.

Motor is opera t ingbelow maximum amps permitted. SUBSTANTIATION: 'I~.W input cannot give accurate horsepower." "...field test normally measure volts and amps, not KW." COMMrrl"EE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The proposal appears specific to one manufacturers product only. The proposal does not indicate that established and current practices of evaluating the horsepower have created problems in the field.

(Log # 150) 20- 242- (A-11-4(d) 2): Reject SUBMITrER: Frank L. Moore, Moore Equipment Company, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"The jockey pump start point should be 15 psi less than the jockey pump stop point." SUBSTANTIATION: Mercoids switches typically used in controllers can not physically be set closer than 12 psi. COMMITrEE ACTION: R~ect. C O M M r r r E E STATEMENT: Switches, o ther than mercoid types, can be set at these increments without creating a problem.

(Log # 136) 20- 243 - (Appendix B): Accept SUBMITrER: Steven L. Williams, CNOBG/A.E RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraphs B-l, B-2, B-3 and B-7. SUBSTANTIATION: Since Appendix B is a partial guide. These paragraphs should be deleted because they conflict with the NFPA 20 such as suction lift and foot valves are not allowed. Including this material in the code could confuse or mislead someone to think these items are acceptable. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

20- 244 - (B-5): Accept S U B ~ : Steven L. Williams, CNOBG/A.E RECOMMENDATION: Delete "footvalve."

(Log # 137)

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NFPA 20 -- A93 TCR

SUBSTANTIATION: Since Appendix B is a partial guide, foot valve should be deleted because it is not allowed in the code. Including this in the code could mislead someone to think this is acceptable. COMMITrEE ACWION: Accept.

(Log # 69) 20- 245 - (B-12): Accept SUBMrrTER: RonaldF. Zane, Darling Duro RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

"For vertical in-line pumps: lift motor on top pull out design and remove obstruction from impel ler / SUBSTANTIATION: Top pull out design differs from both horizontal split case and vertical shaft turbine type pumps. COMMrrrEEACTION: Accept. Editorially chanl~e to: "For close coupled, vertical in-line..." to be consistent with action taken in Chapter 3.

(Log# I~8) 20- 246 - (B-23): Accept SUBMrI'rER: Steven L. Williams, GNOBG/A.E RECOMMENDATION: Delete "Prime the pump before restarting. For horizontal split-case pump: Stop pump and open umbrella cock to make sure pump and suction pipe are completely filled with water." SUBSTANTIATION: Since Appendix B is a partial guide. These sentences should be deleted because they conflict with NFPA 20 since priming is not allowed. Including this material could mislead someone to think that priming is acceptable. COMMr]WEE ACTION: Accept.

20-247- (]3-37 (New)): Accept SUBMrYrElh Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Add a new B-37 as follows:

B-37 Warning. Chapters 6 and 7 of this standard include electrical requirements that discourage the installation of disconnect means in the power supply to electric motor driven fire pumps. This is intended to ensure the availability of power to the fire pumps. When equipment connected to those circuits is serviced or maintained, the-employee may have unusual exposure to electrical and other hazards. It may be necessary to require special safe work

cti.'ces and special safeguards or personal protective clothing, or

SU]gSTANTIATION: OSHA has recently issued standards to protect employees from hazards when working on or near systems where normal safeguards may be removed to permit service or maintenance. The primary hazards are related to unexpected start-up, mechanical motion, and to exposed energized parts. The safeguard preferred by OSHA is to disconnect and lockout/ragout the energy supply to the equipment

Because NFPA 2Odiscourages the installation of disconnect means, the Committee believes that the user should be warned that special PcoreCautions may be necessary.

M M r r r E g ACTION: Accept.

The following draft ofNFPA 26-199~, Chapters 6 and 7 incorporates the Committee Actions on the Proposals which make up the Technical Committee Report and which appear on the preceeding pages. The draft is presented only as an aid to the reviewer.

Ghapter 6 Electric Drive for Pumps

6-1 General. This chapter outlines the minimum requirements of electrical power to motors drivlng fire pumps and the minimum performance requirements of all intermediate equipment between the service(s) and the pump, including the motor(s) but excepting the fire pump controller, its accessories, and power transfer switch (see (11apter 7). All electrical equipment shall, as a minimum, comply with NFPA 70, NationalEle~trical Code.

6-2 Power Source(s). Power shall be supplied to the fire pump by one or more of the following sources:

6-2.1 Utility Service. Where power is supplied by ,, public utility service connection, the service shall be located and arranged to minimize the possibility of damage by fire from within the premises and exposing hazards.

6-2.2* Single Power Station. Where power is supplied from a single private power station, the station shall be of noncombustible construction, located and protected to minimize the possibility of damage by fire.

6-2.3* Other Sources.

6.2.$.1 Where reliable power cannot be obtained J~rom a private power station or utility service, it shall be from two or more of either of the above in combination, or one or more of the above in combination with an emergency generator (see 6-2.3.2), all as approved by the authority having jurisdiction. The power sources shall be arranged so that a fire at one source will not cause an interruption at the other source(s).

6.2.5.2 Emergency Generator. Where power is supplied by an emergency generator, the generator shall be locat,~d and protected in accordance with 6-2.1 and Section 6-7.

6-$ Power Supply Lines.

6.$.1 C'n'cuit Conductot~.

6-$.1.1" Service entrance conductors or fire pump feeder conductors shall be physically routed outside the building(s) and shall be installed as service entrance conductors in compli;mce with Article 230-6 of NFPA 70.

E~utiOn No. I: Where service torrance conductors or fire pump feeder aors must be routed through the building(s), th 0 ..;hall be installed

under, or enclosed within, not leas than 2 i,~ (51 ram) o/concrete or brick in accordance with Article 230-6 of NFPA 70.

tion No. Z" Where flre pu. mp feeder conductors are routed through the ng(s) they shall be permitted to be listed el~trical circuit protective

systems with a minimum o f l hourfire resistance. The installation shall compO with the restKctions provided for in the listing.

6-$.1.1 All pump room wiring shall be in rigid, inl~rmediate, or [ liquidtight flexible metal conduit or Type MI cabl,.-.

6-8.1.8 The voltage at the motor shall not drop mvre than 5 percent below the voltage rating of the motor(s) when the pump(s) are being driven at peak power input and rated speed.

6-8.1.4 The voltage at the controller inlet terminals shall not drop more than 15 percent below normal (controller rated voltage) under motor starting conditions.

I Exception: Fore',mrrgen~runmedtanicalstarting(se~7-5.3.2) this shall not app 9.

65.2* Power SupplyArrangements from Normal Source to Pump Motor. The power supply from the source to the motor shall conform with Arrangement "A" or Arrangement "B" as follows:

6-$.2.1 Arrangement A (when service voltage is utilization voltage). There shall be no disconnecting means or power supply protective device(s) between the power supply and the fire pump controller

Exception: Wherep~rnitted by the authori~ havingjuff~dictior~ a disconnecting raeans and power supp~ protective device(s) shall be permitted to be installed between the power supp~ and the flre pump controller. The disconnecting means and the power supp 0 protective d~olce(s) shall compty with the following:

(a) The overcurrentprote~tive d~ic~(s) shall be sd~to~ or sa to i n d ~ n i t ~ carry the sum of the locked rotor current of the frfe pump motor(s) and the j o ~ pump and the fuU ~o~ cu, ,~gs) o/ t ~ auo~iaud f r~ pump ac~.,so,~ equipment when c~,m~ted to this po~.r suppl.

(b) The disconnecting means shall be lochable in the "ON" position.

(c) A ~lacard shall be ~t~nall~ installal on the disconnecting means stating Wire Pump Disconnecting Means." The letters shall be at least 1 in. (25.4 turn) in height

(d) A placanl shall be placed adjacent to the flre p u ~ controller stating the location of this disconnecting means and the location of the ke 3 (if the disconnecting means is locked).

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N F P A 20 - - A 9 3 T C R

(e) The disconnecting means shall be supenKsed closed b 3 one of the following methods:

1. Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal service.

2. Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended poina

3. Locking the disconnecting means closed.

4. Sealing of disconnect means and approved weekO recorded inspections when disconnect means are located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner.

6-3.2.2 Arrangement B. Where a transformer services a fire pump, there shall not be any disconnecting means or power supply protective device(s) between the transformer and the fire pump controller.

(a) The transformer primary protective device shall be sized in accordance with NFPA 70, Article 450-3(a).

(b) The transformer primary disconnecting means shall be lockable in the "ON" position.

(c) A placard shall be externally installed on the transformer

~v~ imary disconnecting means stating "Fire Pump Disconnecting eans." The letters shall be at least 1 in. (25.4 mm) in height.

The required size, type, and /or setting of the overcurrent protective device(s) shall be recorded on the disconnecting means.

(d) Aplacard shall be placed adjacent to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnecting means and the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked).

(e) The disconnecting means shall be supervised dosed by one of the following methods:

1. Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal service.

2. Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended point.

3. Locking the disconnecting means closed.

4. Sealing of disconnect means and approved weekly recorded inspections when disconnect means are located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner.

Exception to 6-3.2.1 and 6-3.2.2: I f a power tramfer switch is connected ahead of the fire pump controller, a disconnecting means and power suppl 3 protective device(s) shall be provided with the disconnecting means width sight of the flre pump controller. The power suppO protective device(s) shall be selected or set to indefiniteO carry the sum oJ the locked rotor current of the fire pump motor and the full loads of the jockey pump and accessory equipment

6-3.3 Power Supply Protecting Devices. A means for disconnecting the plant circuits from the plant power supply shall be provided. This disconnecting means shall be accessible in the event of a fire in the property protected or in exposing property. It shall not disconnect the power supply to the fire pump feeder circuit.

6-3.3.1 When power supply protective devices (fuses or circuit breakers) are installed in the power supply circuits at private power stations and utility service connections ahead of the f i repump feeder circuits, such devices shall not open at the sum of the locked rotor currents of the fire pump motor(s) and the maximum plant load. !

6-3.4* Capacity of Lines. Conductors between thepower service and the fire pump motor shall be sized per NFPA 70, Artide 430 as appropriate to the installation.

6-4 Installation of Transformers. Transformers shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 70, NationalElectrical Code.

6-5 Motors.

6-5.1 General.

6-5.1.1 Al l motors shall be specifically listed for fire pump service.

Table 6-5.1.1 Horsepower, Locked Rotor Current Motor Designation

Motor Designation Locked Rotor Current (NEC, Locked-Rotor

Three-Phase Indicating Code Rated 460 Volts Letter)

Horsepower (Amps) "A" to and in eluding

5 46 J 7 1/2 64 H

10 81 H 15 116 G 2O 145 G 25 183 G 30 217 G 40 290 G 50 362 G 60 435 G 75 543 G

100 725 G 125 908 G 150 1085 G 200 1450 G 250 1825 G 300 2200 G 350 2550 G 400 2900 G 450 3250 G 500 3625 G

NOTE: The locked rotor currents for 460-volt motors are aPv~lPurOXimately six times the full load current. The corresponding

es of locked rotor current for motors rated at other voltages shall be determined by multiplication of the values shown by the ratio of 460 volts to the rated voltage.

Code letters of motors for all other voltages shall conform with those shown for 460 volts.

6-5.1.2 All motors shall comply with NEMA standard MG-I and be marked as complying with NEMA Design B standards.

6-5.1.3 All motors shall be rated for continuous duty and shall be applied only at voltages of+ 10 percent of the motor nameplate vo lt~.ge.

6-5.1.4 Electric motor induced transients must be coordinated with subsection 7-4.3.3 to prevent nuisance tripping of motor controller protective devices.

6-5.2 Current Limits.

6-5.2.1 The motor capacity shall be such that the maximum motor current shall not exceed the motor rated full load current multiplied by the service factor. The maximum service factor at which a motor can be used is 1.15. These service factors shall be in accordance with NEMA Standard MG-1.

Exception: General purpose (open and drip proo)9 motors shall not have a service faetor larger than 1.15. Total 0 enclosed, fan cooled (Ti~C) and totall 3 enclosed nonventilated (TEN~ motors shall not have a service factor in excess of 1.0. These service factors shall be in accordance with NEMA Standard MG-1.

6-5.2.2 Motors used at altitudes above 3300 ft (1000 m) shall be operated or derated according to NEMA Standard MG-1, Part 14.

6-5.3 Marking.

6-5.3.1 Marking of motor terminals shall be in accordance with NEMA Standard MG-1, Part 2.

6-5.$.2 A nameplate shall be provided in accordance with NFPA 70, National Elearical Code, Section 430-'7.

6-5.3.3 A motor terminal connecting diagram for multiple lead motors shall be furnished.

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N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

6-6 Motor Application.

6-6.1 Where unusual moisture or abrasive dust conditions are anticipated, motors shall be a special type or especially insulated to withstand such conditions.

6-6.2 Where subject to possible splash of water, motors shall be totally enclosed.

6-6.$ Totally enclosed, fan-cooled motors shall be sealed at the joints and have conduit fittings arranged to prevent the entrance of water.

6-6.4 Current-carrying parts of electric motors shall be at least 12 in. (305 ram) above the floor.

6-7 On-Site Power Generator Systems.

6-7.1 Where on-site generator systems are used to supply power to fire pump motors to meet the requirements of 6-2.3.1, they shall be of sufficient capacity to allow normal starting and running of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other loads connected to the generator.

6-7.2 Automatic shedding of loads not required for fire protection is permitted immediately prior to starting o f the fire pump(s). This load shedding shall not delay starting of the fire pump(s) by more than 10 seconds.

6-7.$ Automatic sequencing of the fire pumps is permitted in accordance with 7-~.2.4.

6-7,4 Transfer of power shall take place within the pump room.

6-7.5 Conductors between the transfer switch and the generator source shall comply wlth 6-3.1 and 6-$.4.

6-7.6 Protective devices in the on-site power source circuits at the enerator shall allow instantaneous pickup of the full pump room ad.

Chapter 7 Electric Drive Controllers and Accessories

7-1 Application. This chapter provides requirements for minimum performance of electric controllers, both automatic and nonautomatic, and electric power transfer equipment for electric motors driving fire pumps. Accessory devices including alarm monitoring and signaling means are included when necessary to ensure the minimum performance of the aforementioned equip- menu

%1.1 General.

%1.1.1 All controllers shall be specifically listed for electric motor driven fire pump service.

%1.1.2* The controller and transfer switch shall be suitable for the available short circuit current at line terminals of controller and transfer switch and shall be marked "Suitable for use on a circuit capable of delivering not more than . . a m p e r e s r.m.s. symmetrical at volts a.c."

NOTE: The blank spaces shown shall have appropriate numbers f'dled in for each installation.

7-1.1.3 All controllers shall be suitable for use as service equipment when so used, and completely assembled, wired, and tested by the manufacturer before shipment from the factory.

7-1.1.4 All controllers shall be marked "Electric Fire Pump Controller" and shall show plainly the name of the manufacturer, the identifying designation, and the complete electrical rating. Where multip}e pumps are provided, one or more servingdifferent areas or portions of the facility, an appropriate si~ipa shal lbe conspicuously attached to each controller indicating the area, zone, or portion of the system served by that pump or pump controller.

7-1.1.5 It shall be the responsibility of the pump manufacturer or its designated representative to make necessary arrangements for the services of a manufacturer's representative when needed for service and adjustment of the equipment during the installation, testing, and warranty periods.

7-2 Location.

7-2.1" Controllers shall be located as close as is practical to the motors they control and shall be within sight of the motors.

7-2.2 Controllers shall be so located or so protected that they will not be injured by water escaping from pumps or pump connections. Current-carrying parts of controllers shall be not less than 12 in. (305 ram) above the floor level.

I 7-2.$ Working clearances around controllers shall comply with NFPA 70, Article 110.

7-3 Construction.

%$.1 Equipment. All equipment shall be suitable for use in locations subject to a moderate degree of moisture such as a damp basement.

7-3.2 Mounting. All equipment shall be mounted i~ a substantial manner on a single noncombustible supporting structure.

7-3.$ Enclosures.

7-3.$.1 The structure or panel shall be securelymounted in an enclosure(s) that will protect the equipment agaimt mechanical injury and water dripping on the enclosure from the downward v e . ~ .

7-3.$.2 Grounding. The enclosure(s) shall be grounded in accordance with NFPA 70, Article 250.

7-3.4 Connections and Wiring.

7-3.4.1 All bushars and connections shall be readily accessible for maintenance work after installation of the controller. This shall be arranged so that disconnection of the external circuit conductors will not be required.

7-3.4.2 Test Provisions. Provisions shall be made within the controller to permit the use of test instruments for measuring all line voltages and currents without disconnecting any conductors within the controller.

7-3.4.$ Bnsbars and other wiring elements of the controller shall be designed on a continuous duty basis.

E.x~tion: Condudors that are in a drcuit on~ during the motor starting period may be designed ac~ordingO.

7-3,4.4 A fire pump controller shall not be used ~; a junction box to supply other equipment. Electrical supply conductors for pressure maintenance 0ockey or make-up) pump(s) shall rLot be connected to the fire pump controller.

%$.5 Protection of A ~ a r y Circuits. Circuits that are necessary for proper operation of the controller shall not have overcurrent protective devices connected in them.

7-3.6 External Operation. All switching equipmewt for manual use in connecting or disconnecting, or starting or stopping the motor shall be (S~NFPA 70, NatimudElevtrical Code.) externally operable.

7-3.7 W'lring Diagrams and Instructions.

7-3.7.1 A wiring diagram shall be provided and permanently attached to the inside of the controller enclosure.

7-$.7.2 All the field wiring terminals shall be plainly marked to correspond with the wiring diagram furnished.

. 7-3.7.$ Complete instructions covering the operation of the controller shall be provided and conspicuously mounted on the controller.

7-$.8 Marking. Each motor control device and each switch and circuit breaker shall be marked to plainly indicate the name of the manufacturer, the designated identifying number, and the electrical rating in volts, horsepower, amperes, frequency, phases, etc., as may be appropriate. The markings shall be so located as to be visible after installation.

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N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

7-4 Components.

7-4.1" Voltage Surge Arrester. A voltage surge arrester complying with ANSI (362.1 or (362.11 shall be installed from each line terminal, or from each load terminal, of the isolating switch to ground (see 7-5.2). The surge arrester shall be rated to suppress voltage surges above line voltage.

Exception No. 1: These voltage surge attesters shall not be mandatory for controllers rated in excess of 600 volts (see Section 7-6).

Exception No. 2: These voltage surge arresters shall not be mandatory i f the controller can withstand without damage a I 0 k V impulse in accordance with ANSI/IEEE 62.41.

7-4.2 Isolating Switch.

7-4.2.1 The isolating switch shall be a manually operable motor circuit switch or a molded case switch having a horsepower rating

[ equal to or greater than the motor horsepower.

E~ception No. I: A molded case switch having an ampere rating not less than 115 percent of the motor rated ful l load current (see I~PA 70, National ElsctKcal Code) and also suitabls for interrupting the motor locked rotor current, shall be permltted.

Exception No. 2: A molded case isolating switch may have selffFrotecting instantaneous short circuit overcurrent protection provided that this switch shall not ~dp unless the circuit breaker in the same controller trips.

7-4.2.2 The isolating switch shall be externally operable.

7-4.2.$ The ampere rating of the isolating switch shall be at least 115 percent of the nameplate current rating of the motor.

7-4.2.4 The followinl~ warningshall appear on or immediately adjacent to the isolating switch:

WARNING---DO NOT OPEN OR CLOSE THIS SWITCH WHILE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER (DISCONNECTING MEANS) IS IN CLOSED POSITION.

Exception: When the isolating switch and the circuit breaker are so interlocked that the isolating switch can neither be opened nor closed while the circuit breaker is closed, the warning label may be replaced with an instruction label that directs the order of operation. This label may be part of the labet of T-3.7.3.

7-4.2.5 The isolating switch operating handle shall be provided with a spring latch that shall be so arranged that it requires the use of the other hand to hold the latch released in order to permit opening or closing of the switch.

Exception: Where the isolating switch and the circuit breaker are ~o interlocked that the isolating switch can neither be opened nor closed while the circuit breaker is closed, this latch is not required.

7-4.3 Circuit Breaker (Disconnecting Means).

7-4.3.1 The motor branch circuit shall beprotected by a circuit breaker ( se~ 2~IM 70, National Electrical Cod6 Article 100), which shall be connected directly to the load side of the isolating switch and shall have one pole for each ungrounded circuit conductor.

Exception: When the motor branch drcuit is transferred to an alternate on- site power generator and is protected by an overcurrent device at the gemn,ator (see 6-7.6), the drcuit breaker within the fire pump controller may be bypassed when that motor branch circuit is so connected.

7-4.$.2 The circuit breaker shall have the following mechanical characteristics:

(a) It shall be externally operable (see 7-3.6).

(b) It shall trip free of the handle.

(c) A nameplate with the legend CIRCUIT BREAKER-- DISCON- NECTING MEANS in letters not less than 3/8 in. (10 rnm) high shall be located on the outside of the controller enclosure adjacent

] to the means for operating the circuit breaker.

7-4.3.3* The circuit breaker shall have the following electrical characteristics:

(a) Have a continuous current rating not less than 115 percent of the rated full load current of the motor.

(b) Have overcurrent sensing elements of the nonthermal type.

(c) Provide instantaneous short circuit overcurrent protection.

(d)* Have an adequate interrupting rating to provide the suitability rating [see 7-1.1.2] of the controller.

(e) The circuit breaker shall permit normal and emergency run mechanical starting of the motor without tripping. (See 6-5.1.4.)

(f) The instantaneous trip setting shall be not more than 20 times the full load current.

Exc~ptlor~" Current limiters, when integral parts of the circuit breaker, may be used to obtain the required interrupting rating providing all of the following requirements are met.

(a) The breaker shall accept current llmiters of only one rating.

(b) The current limiters shall hold 3OO percent of ful l load motor current for a minimum of 30 m i n u S .

(c) The current ~miters, when installed in the breaker, shall not open at locked rotor currenL

(d) A spare set of currera limiters of c~rrea rating shall be kept readi 0 available in a compartment or rack within the controller endosur~

NOTE= Current limiters are melting link-type devices that, when used as an integral part of a circuit breaker, limit the current during a short circuit to within the interrupting rapacity of the circuit breaker.

7-4.4 Locked Rotor Overcurrent Protection. The only other overcurrent protective device that shall be required and permitted between the isolating switch and the fire pump motor shall be Iorated within the fire pump controller and shall possess the following characteristics:

(a) For a squirrel-cage or wound-rotor induction motor, the device shall be:

I. Of the time delay type having a tripping time between 8 and 20 seconds at locked~ rotor current (this is approximately 600 percent of rated full load current for a squirrel-cage induction motor).

2. Calibrated and set at a minimum of 300 percent of motor full load current.

(b) For a direct current motor, the device shall be:

1. Of the instantaneous type.

2. Calibrated and set at a minimum of 400 percent of motor full load current.

(c) There shall be visual means or markings dearly indicated on the device that proper settings have been made.

(d) It shall be possible to reset the device for operation immediately after tripping, with the tripping characteristics thereafter remaining unchanged.

(e) Tripping shall be accomplished by opening the circuit breaker, which shall be of the external manual reset type.

7-4.5 Motor Contactor.

7-4.5.1 The motor contactor shall be of the magnetic type with a contactor in each ungrounded conductor.

7-4.5.2 For electrical operation of reduced voltage controllers, timed automatic acceleration of the motor shall be provided. The period of motor acceleration shall not exceed 10 seconds.

7-4.5.$ Starting resistors shall be designed to permit one 5-second starting operauon in each 80 seconds for a period of not less than 1 hour.

7-4.5.4 Starting reactors and autotransformers shall be designed to permit one 15-second starting operation in each 240 seconds for a period of not less than 1 hour.

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N F P A 20 ~ A 9 3 T C R

Exception: Designs in accordance with the requirements of NEMA Industrial Control and Systems Standards (Part ICS2-214) for medium du o service are acceptable for controllers over 200 hp.

7-4.5.5 The operating coil for the main contactor shall be supplied directly from the main power voltage and not through a transformer (for controllers of 600 volts or less).

7-4.5.6 No undervoltage, phase loss, frequency sensitive, or other sensor(s) shall be installed that prohibit actuation of the motor

[ contactor automatically or manually.

7-4.6* Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller.

7-4.6.1 Power Available Visible Indicator. A visible indicator shall be connected to a pair of power supply conductors directly on the line side of the motor starter (load side of the circuit breaker). This visible indicator shall demonstrate that operating voltage is available to the contactor coil. If the visible indicator is a pilot lamp, it shall be accessible for replacement.

7-4.6.2 Phase Reversal. Phase reversal on the line side of the motor I contactor shall be indicated by avisible indicator.

7-4.7 Alarm and Signal Devices Remote from Controller. When the pump room is not constantly attended, audible or visual alarms powered by a source, not exceeding 125 volts, shall be provided at a point of constant attendance. These alarms shall indicate the following:

(a) Controller has operated into a motor running condition. This alarm circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source, or from the pump motor power, reduced to not more than 125 volts.

(b)* Loss of line power on line side of motor starter, in any phase. This alarm circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source. The phase voltage providing starting coil excitation shall be monitored to indicate loss of availability of such excitation.

(c) Phase reversal on line side of motor starter. This alarm circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source, or from the pump motor power, reduced to not more than 125 volts.

7-4.8 Controller Alarm Contacts for Remote Indication. Controllers shall be equipped with contacts (open or closed) to operate circuits for the conditions covered in 7-4.7.

7-5 Starting and Control.

7-5.1" Automatic and Nonautomatic.

7-5.1.1 An automatic controller shall be operable also as a nonautomatic controller.

7-5.1.2 A nonautomatic controller shall be actuated by manually initiated electrical means and by manually initiated mechanical m e a n s .

7-5.2 Automatic Controller.

7-5.2.1" Water Pressure Control. There shall be provided a pressure-actuated switch having independent high and low calibrated adjusmaents in the controller circuit. There shall be no pressure snubber or restrictive orifice employed within the pressure switch. This switch shall be responsive to water pressure in the fire protection system. The pressure sensing element of the switch shall be capable of withstanding a momentary surge pressure of 400 psi (27.6 bars) without losing its accuracy. Suitable provision shall be made for relieving pressure to the pressure-actuated switch, to allow testing of the operation of the controller and the pumping unit. [ See

[ FigureA-7-5.2.1(a) and (b).]


(b) The pressure sensing line connection for each pump (including jockey pumps) shall be made between that pumps discharge check valve and discharge control valve. This line shall be corrosion resistant metallic pipe or tube and the fittings (brass, copper, or series 300 stainless steel) of 1/2 in. nominal size. There shall be two check valves installed in the pressure sensing line at least 5 ft apart with a 3/32 in. hole drilled in the clapper to serve as dampening. [See Figures A-7-5.2.1 (a) and A-7-5.2.1 (b) for clarification.]

Exception. to (b)'. I,rf water, is clean, ground-face unions with noncorrosive dzaphragms drdled unth 3/32 m. orifices shall be permtt ed t n place of the check valves.

(c) There shall be no shutoffvalve in the pressure sensing line.

7-5.2.2 Fire Protection Equil~ment Control. When the pump supplies special water control equipment (deluge walves, dry pipe valves, etc.), it may be desirable to start the motor l~fore the pressure-actuated switch(es) would do so. Under such conditions the controller shall be equipped to start the motor upon operation of the fire protection equipment. Starting of the mop,or shall be initiated by the opening of a normally closed contact on the fire protection equipment.

7-5.2.3 Manual Electric Control at Remote Station. When additional control stations for causing nonautomatic continuous operation of the pumping unit, independent of the pressure- actuated switch, are provided at locations remote from the controller, such stations shall not be operable to stop the motor.

7-5.2.4 Sequence Starting of Pumps.

7-5.2.4.1 Pumps Operating in Parallel. The controller for each unit of multiple pump units shall incorporate a sequential timing device to prevent any one motor from starting simultaneously with any other motor. If water requirements call for more than one pumping unit to operate, the units shall start at intervals of 5 to 10 seconds. Failure of a leading motor to start shall not prevent subsequent pumping units from starting.

7-5.2.4.2 Puml~s Operating in Series. The controller for each pump requiring anomer pump to supply suction pressure shall incorporate a timing, device to prevent thehigher pressure pump motor from startang before the lower pressure pump. It shall Mso cause immediate starting of the lower pressure pump. The higher pressure pump shall start within 10 seconds. Failure of the lower pressure pump shall not prevent subsequent starting of the higher pressure pump.

Exception: I f the higher pressure pump is dedicated to the service of a high zone, then starting may be prevented until proper pressure is sensed at the suction of the higher pressure pump.

7-5.2.5 External Circuits Connected to Controllers. External control circuits shall be arranged so that failure of any external circuit (open or short circuit) shall not prevent operation of pump(s) from all other internal or external means. Breakage, disconnecting, shorting of the wires, or loss of power to these circuits may cause continuous running of the fire pump but shall not prevent the controller(s) from startin~ the fire pump(s) due to causes other than these external circmts.

7-5.2.6 Sole Supply Pumps. For sprinkler or standpipe systems where an automatically controlled pumping unit constitutes the sole supply, the controller shall be arranged for manual shutdown. Manual shutdown shall also be provided where required by the authority having jurisdiction.

7-5.3 Nonautomatic Controller.

7-5.3.1 Manual Electric Control at Controller. There shall be a manually operated switch on the control panel so arranged that, when the motor is started manually, its operation cannot be affected by the pressure-actuated switch. The arrangement shall also provide that the unit will remain in operation until manu~dly shut down.

7-5.3.2 Emergency Run Mechanical Control at Con~'oller.

(a) The controller shall be equipped with an emergency run handle or lever that operates to close the motor-circuit switching mechanism mechanically. This handle or lever shall provide for nonautomatic continuous running operation of the motor(s) independent of any electric control &'rcuits, magnets, or equivalent devices and independent of the pressure-activated control switch. Means shall be incorporated for mechanically latching or holding of the handle or lever for manual operation in the actuated position. The mechanical latching shall not be automatic, but at the option of the operator.

(b) The handle or lever shall be arranged to move in one direction only from "off" to final position.

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N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

(c) The motor starter shall return automatically to the "off" [ position in case the operator releases the starter handle or lever in

any but the full running position.

7-5.4 Methods of Stopping. Shutdown shall be accomplished by the following methods:

(a) Manual - - operation of reset pushbutton on outside of controller enclosure that, in the case of automatic controllers, shall return the controller to full automatic position.

(b) Automatic shutdown after automatic start (optional) - - if ] controller is arranged for automatic shutdown after starting causes

have returned to normal, a running period timer set for at /east 10 minutes running time shall be used.

7-6 Controllers Rated in Excess of 600 Volts.

7-6.1" Control Equipment. Where equipment rated in excess of 600 volts is used, the control equipment shal/comply with the requirements of Section 7-1 through 7-5.4.

Exception: 7-6.2 through 7-6.8 below detail respects in which controllers of voltages in excess of 600 volts do not comply with the referenced sections.

7-6.2 Provisions for Testing. The provisions of 7-5.4.2 shall not apply. An ammeter shall be provided on the controller with a suitable transfer switch arranged for reading the current in each phase. An indicating voltmeter shall also be provided on the controller with scale calibrated to the high voltage supply and deriving its source of power from the control transformer secondary.

7-6.3 Disconnecting Under Load. Provision shall be made to prevent opening the isolating switch under load.

7-6.4 Pressure-Actuated Switch Location. Special precautions shall be taken in locating the pressure-actuated switch called for in 7-5.2.1 to prevent any water leakage from coming in contact with high- voltage components.

7-6.5 Low-Voltage Control Circuit. The low-voltage control circuit shall be supplied from the high-voltage source through a step-down control circuit transformer protected by suitable high-voltage fuses. Its current supply shall be interrupted when the isolating switch is in the open position.

7-6.6 Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller. For these controllers, specifications differ from those in 7-4.6. A visible indicator shall be provided to indicate that power is available. The current supply for the visible indicator shall come from the secondary of the control circuit transformer(s) through resistors, if found necessary, or from a small capacity step-down transformer, which shall reduce the control l~ansformer secondary voltage to that required for the visible indicator. If the visible indicator is a pilot lamp, it shall be accessible for replacement.

7-6.7 Protection of Personnel from High Voltage. Necessary provisions shall be made, including such interlocks as may be needed, to protect personnel from accidental contact with high voltage.

7-6.8 When the contactor also performs the functions of a circuit breaker, it shall comply with the requirements of 7-4.5, 7-4.4, and 7-5.3.2.

Exception No. I: In addition to the overcurrent devices providingprotection according to 7-4.3 and 7-4. 4, current-limiting fuses shall be mounted in the controller enclosure, connected between the isolating means and the contactor, and shall not open under locked rotor current of the motor and shall open the circuit safely under the short-circuit current available at the fases.

Exception No. 2: When the contactor is latched-in according to 7-5.3.2, the overcurrent ffrotection for a locked rotor condition as specified in 7-4.4(a) is not requirea.

Exception No. 3: The fuses referred to in 7-4.3.3(d) shall be high voltage current lirai~ag motor starting types.

I 7-7" Limited Service Controllers. Limited service controllers consisting of automatic controllers for across-the-line starting of squirrel-cage motors of 30 hp or less, 600 volts or less, may be installed where such use is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. The provisions of gections 7-1 through 7-5 shall apply.

Exception No. 1: In lieu of 7-4.3.3(b) and 7-4.4, the locked rotor overcurrent protection nmy be achieved by u~ing an inverse time nonadjustable circuit breaker having a standard rating between 150 percent and 250 percent of the motor full-load currenL

Exception No. 2: Each controller shall be marked "Limited Service Controller" and shall show plainly the name of the manufacturer, the identifying designa~ya, and the complete electrical rating.

NOTE: See 7-4.2.1.

Exception No. 3: The controller shall have a short-circuit current rating not less than 1 O, 000 amperes.

Exception No. 4: The manually operated isolating switch specified in 7-4.2 is not r~uired.

7-8" Power Transfer forAhernate Power Supply.

7-8.1 General.

7-8.1.1 Where required by the authority having jurisdiction or to meet the requirements of 6-2.5.1 where an on-site electrical power transfer device is used for power source selection, such switch shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph as well as Sections 7-1, %2, and %3.

7.8.1.2 Manual transfer switches shall not be used with automatic fire pump controllers.

I 7-8.1.$ No remote device(s) shall be installed thatwill prevent automatic operation of the transfer switch.

7.8.2* F'n,e Pump Controller and Transfer Switch Arrangements.

7-8.2.1 Arrangement I (Listed Combination Fire Pump Controller and Power Tr/msfer Switch).

7.8.2.1.1 Where the power transfer switch consists of a self- contained power switching assembly, such assembly shall be housed in a barriered compartment of the fire pump controller or in a separate enclosure attached to the controller and marked Wire Pump Automatic Transfer Switch."

7-8.2.1.2 Where the alternate source is provided by a second utility PwiOWer source, the transfer switch emergency side shall be provided

th an isolation switch complying with 7.8.2.7 and 7-4.2 and a circuit breaker complying with 7-4.3 and 7-4.4.

7.8.2.2 Arrangement II (Individually Listed Fire Pump Controller and Power Transfer Switch). The following additional equipment shall be provided in the pump room:

(a) A power fire pump controller transfer switch complying with Sections 6-7 and 7:8 a n d a fire pump controller.

(b) A disconnecting means (or service disconnect where required) ahead of the normal input terminals of the transfer switch. Where the alternate source is supplied by a second utility, the transfer switch overcurrent protection shall be selected or set to indefinitely carry the locked rotor current of the fire pump motor.

(c) An isolating switch ahead of the alternate source input terminals of the transfer switch and meeting the following requirements:

1. The isolating switch shall be supervised to indicate when it is open.

2. The disconnecting means shall be supervised closed by one of the following methods:

i. Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal service. ii. Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an

audible signalat a constantly attended point. iii. Locking the disconnecting means closed. iv. Sealing of disconnect means and approved weekly recorded


7-8.2.3 Each fire pump shall have its own dedicated transfer switch(s) where a transfer switch(s) is required.

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N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

7-8.2.4 The transfer switch shall be suitable for the available short- circuit currents at the transfer switch normal and alternate input terminals.

7-8.2.5 The automatic transfer switch shall be electrically operated and mechanically held.

7-8.2.6 The automatic transfer switch shall have a horsepower rating at least equal to the motor horsepower or, when rated in amperes, shall have an ampere rating not less than 115 percent of the motor full-load current and also suitable for switching the motor locked rotor current.

7-8.2.7 A means for safe manual (nonelectrical) operation of the automatic transfer switch shall be provided. This manual means need not be externally operable.

7-8.2.8 An isolating switch, complying with 7-4.2, located within the automatic transfer switch enclosure or compartment, shall be provided ahead of the alternate input terminals of the transfer switch.

(a) The isolating switch shall be supervised to indicate when it is open .

(b) Supervision shall operate an audible and visual signal in the pump room and at a remote point when required.

(c) The isolating switch shall be suitable for the available short- circuit current of the alternate source.

7.8.2.9 The automatic transfer switch shall be provided with undervoltage sensing devices to monitor all ungrounded lines of the normal power source. When the voltage on any phase at the load terminals of the circuit breaker within the fire pump controller falls below 85 percent of motor rated voltage, the transfer switch shall automatically initiate transfer to the alternate source. When the voltage on all phases of the normal source returns to within acceptable limits, the fire pump controller may be retransferred to the normal source. Phase reversal of the normal source power [see 7-4.7(c)] shall cause a simulated normal source power fail'ure upon sensing phase reversal.

Exception: When the autmnatic tra~fer switch is dec~call~ upstreara of the fire pump controller circuit breaker, voltage may be sensed at the input to the #ransfer ~itch in lieu of at the load terminals of the flre pump controller dr~uit brsa~.

7-8.2.10 Voltage- and frequency-sensing devices shall be provided to monitor at least one ungrounded conductor of the alternate power source. Transfer to the alternate source shall be inhibited until there is adequate voltage and frequency to serve the fire pump load.

Exception: Where the attemate source is provided b 3 a second utilit 3 power source, undervoltage sensing devices shall monitor all ungrounded conductors in lieu of a frequency-sensing device.

7-8.2.11 Two visible indicators shall be provided to externally indicate the power source to which the fire pump controller is connected.

7-8.2.12 Means shall be provided to delay retransfer from the alternate source of power to the normal source until the normal source is stabilize&This time delay shall be automatically bypassed if the alternate source fails.

7-8.2.15 Means shall be provided to prevent higher than normal inrush currents when transferring the fire pump motor from one source to the other.

7-8.2.14 The transfer switch shall not have integral short-circuit or overcurrent protection.

78.2.15 The following shall be provided:

(a) A device to delay starting of the alternate source generator to prevent nuisance starting in the event of momentary ddips and interruptions of the normal source.

(b) A circuit loop to the alternate source generator whereby either the opening or closing of the circuit will start the alternate source generator (when commanded by the transfer switch). (S~ 7-8.2.9.)

(c) A means to prevent sending of the signal for starting of the alternate source generator when commanded by the transfer switch, if the isolation switch on the alternate source side of the transfer switch is open.

7.8.2.16 The fire pump controller and transfer switch (see 7-8.2.1 and 7-8.2.2) shall each have a cautionary marking to indicate that the isolation switch for both the controller and trarhsfer switch is opened before servicing the controller, transfer switch, or motor.

7-8.2.17 A momentary test switch, externally operable, shall be rovided on the enclosure that will simulate a normal power source

lure.

Appendix Material for Chapters 6 and 7

A-6-2.2 A private generating plant located on the premises served by the fire pump is considered as a power station, if it is in a separate power house or cut off from the main buildings. It may be used as one of the two sources of current supply. Where two sources are used with automatic transfer switches, refer to NFPA 70, National Elecbiced Cod~ Article 700.

A-6-2.$ A reliable source possesses the following characteristics: (a) Infrequent power disruptions from environmental or man-

made conditions. (b) A separate service connection or connection ~Lo the supply side

of the service disconnect (c) Service and feeder conductors either buried under 2 inches of

concrete or encased in 2 inches of concrete or brick within a building.

A.8-$.1.I Under premise fire conditions, service and feeder connections are susceptible to failure from collapsing structural and other members within the premise as well as from fire. Under fire conditions generated by overcurrent within these conductors, the characteristics of 6-3.1.1 minimize the possibility of fire spread.

Typical methods of routing power from the souro.- to motor are shown in Figures A-6-$.2(a) and (b). Other configurations may also be acceptable.

A-6-$.2 Where the alternate power is f rom an on-site generator, the alternate service equipment need not be located in the fire pump room.

The Committee considered the potential arrangement of providing fire pumppower from the secondary side of the transformer, which supplies other electrical loads of the facility. The Committee recognizes that it is possible to supply the fire pump power ahead of other plant loads and to protect the fire pump pow:er circuit by proper electrical coordination. However, the Committee is concerned that while responding to an emergency, fire fighters may seek to disconne_cteleclrtcal" "power to the facility by opening the transformerprimary disconnect, which in this case would isolate power to the fire pump as well. In addition, the Committee is concerned that the designed electrical coordination may be compromised by ongoing additional electrical loads to the facility power distribution system. Therefore, if electrical :tervice is supplied to the facility at voltage higher than utilization volt;age, the Commit- tee feels that a separate transformer to provide power to the fire pump is approprtate.

A.8-$.4 Appropriate sections may include but not be limited to 430-22(a), 430-24(a), 430-25(a), or 430-25(b).

A-7-I.I.2 Suitab/efor usemeans that the controller and transfer switch have been prototype tested and have demonstrated by these tests their short-circuit wlthstandability and interrupting capacity at the stated magnitude of short-circuit current and voltage available at their line terminals (see ANSI/UL 509 and ANSI/UL 1008).

A short-circuit study should be made to establish the available short-circuit current at the controller in accordance with IEEE 141, Elec#ric Pouarr Dist~butlon for Industrial P/an~ IEEE 241, El~c~ic s3stems for CommercialBuilding~ or other acceptable methods.

After the controller and transfer switch have been subjected to a high fault current, they may not be suitable for fur,ther use without inspection and /o r repair. Refer to National Electrical Manufactur- ers Association Publication IGS 2.2-1985, Maintenance of Motor Contro//~ After a Fau/t C, ondit/o,t

171

Typ ica l p o w e r supp ly a r rangements f r o m source to m o t o r

A r rangemen t A

Service at f i re p u m p m o t o r I ,°n


Arran, amens B

Service at h igher than f i re p u m p m o t o r u t i l i za t i on vol tage

Service conduc to rs NEC 230

)

To o the r service swi tches and p lan t loads

C o n n e c t i o n per NEC 4 5 0 - 3 (a)(_3)


F i re p u m p con t ro l l e r

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

Fire p u m p con t ro l l e r

* C i r cu i t breakers o r fus ib le swi tches may be used

F'tgure A-6-3.2 (a)

172

F'~qn'e A-6-3.2 (b)

N F P A 20 - - A93 T C R

A-7-2.1 If the controller must be located outside of the pump room, a glazed opening should be provided in the pump room wall for observation of the motor and pump during starting. Thepressure control pipe line should be protected against ~eeztng andmechani- cal injury.

A-7-S.7.$ Pump operators should be familiar with instructions provided for controllers and should observe in detail all of their recommendations.

A-7-4.1 Operation of the surge arrester should not cause either the isolating switch or the circuit breaker to open.

A-7-4.$.$ Attention should be given to the type of service grounding to establish circuit breaker interrupting rating based upon grounding type employed.

A-7-4.$.S(d) The interrupting rating may be less than the suitability rating when other devices within the controller assist in the current interrupting process.

A-7-4.6 The pilot lamp for alarm and signal service should have operating voltage less than the rated voltage of the lamp to ensure long operating life. When necessary, a suitable resistor or potential transformer should be used to reduce the voltage for operating the lamp.

A-7-4.7(b) To supervise the power source for the alarm circuit, the controller may be arranged to start upon failure of the alarm circuit power.

A-7-5.1 The following definitions are from NFPA 70, Na6ona/

Automatic. Automatic means self-acting, operating by its own mechanism when actuated by some impersonal influence, as for example, a change in current strength, pressure, temperature, or mechanical configuration.

Nommtomatic. Nonautomatic means that the implied action requires personal intervention for its control. As applied to an electric controller, nonautomatic control does not necessarily imply a manual controller, but only that personal interve,~tion is necessary.

A-T-5.2.1 Installation of the pressure sensing line in between the discharge check valve and the control valve is n e c e x ~ / t o facilitate isolation of the jockey pump controller (and sensing line) for maintenance without havingto drain the entire system. (S~Figur~ A-7-5.2.1(a) and A-7-5.2.1(b).)

A-7-6.1 Voltages in excess of 600 volts are not recommended for fire pump service. Where it is impracticable to use a low voltage, higher voltages may be accepted.

A-7-7 The authority having jurisdiction may permit the use of a limited service controller for special situations where such use is acceptable to said authority.

A-7.8 Typical fire pump controller and transfer switch arrangements are as shown in Figure A-7-8.

A-7-&2 The compartmentalization or separation is to prevent propagation of a fault in one comparunent to the source in the other compartment.

173

NFPA 20 - - A93 TCR

If water pulsar;on causss erratic operation of the pressure switch or the recorder, a supplemental a.r chamber or pulut ion damper may be needed.

"-~_~ q q

11] : : = = o- IndiCating Him • ~o.,ro,..,'. l/J] ; l l / / ~ I{ I c o . ~ , o . ""~ ~ ~ s. , ,oo. II J C

o, , . . . , . . F I I L , _ ~ " I ~ I J I ~ I I . . z _ I I L _ ~ - " IF'I' i.~i.,,., c . . I /X~ / I,,.- . . . . . . ~ ~d

'I," Plug

"'A . . . . 8"

T o . Conmmetlon at "A " or "6" If water is cillm. F o u n d - f ~ unk)nl vmth noncorrosive diap~raml drilled |or a/.j( orifiClS may be uss4 ,n p |ge of the check valves

Not less thl~ i / f brass pipe with brass fittings or equivalent

( ntrot plnel

W E -PresSure

switch

h ,, 'I," Plug

lrqiu~ k,TJ;,2,1(a) Piping connection for each automatic pressure switch (for f'ue u d j o c k e y pumps).

For SI Units: 1 in. = 25.4 nun; I it = 0.3048 m.

NOTE: Solenoid drain valve used for engine driven fire pumps may be at "A," "B," or "inside of controller enclosure."

I ,,r. ~__ ----] pump - - . - - - ~ - - - - cont r

f

[ ~ r Jockey pump

Jockey pump cont r

I I I

Fire protect ion system

Figure A-7~.2.1(b) Piping connection for pressure sensing line.

174

N F P A 20 - - A 9 3 T C R

Typ ica l f i re p u m p con t ro l l e r and t r l n l f e r I w i t c h arrangements

A r rangemen t I A r rangemen t I I

Normal Iou rce .

I See 7-8 .2 .1

n

A l t e r n l t e See 6 - 7 . 6 source

T o o the r emergency leeds

Normal sou rce

A l t l r n l t l I sou rce I See 6 - 7 . 6

07. F -o ~ ' - t , 2 ) , s I 1

-~.2.6 ' .% 6" ~.E:: r, Transfer lw i t©h •

* C i r cu i t breakers or fus ib le swi tches may be u led

S N 7 -8 .2 .2

Figure A-7-8.

1 7 5

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