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Body, Affect, and LanguageLuis Chiozzaa

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To cite this article: Luis Chiozza (1999) Body, Affect, and Language, Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal forPsychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 1:1, 111-123, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.1999.10773251

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Body, Affect, and Language

Luis Chiozza (Buenos Aires)

So little is known about the psychology of emotional processesthat the tentative remarks I am about to make on the subjectmay claim a very lenient judgement [Freud, 1926, p. 169].

The Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects*

Quota of Affect and Affective Value

Freud developed his ideas on affects in various of hisworks, yet he never gathered them all into a systematicconception. Perhaps it was his difficulty in producinga unified theory in this regard that gave rise to thecontroversy continuing among the psychoanalytic au­thors. Papers by Brierley (1951), Rapaport (1962),Rangell (1967), Sandler (1972), Green (1973), and Li­mentani (1977) show different readings of the Freud­ian texts and their bearing upon theory and clinicalpractice. l

Luis Chiozza M.D., is a full member of the International Psychoana­lytic Association.

*The text of this section is based in part on an earlier paper (Chiozza,Barbero, Casali, and Salzman, 1993).

1 In his Appendix to Freud's article on "The Neuro-psychoses ofDefence," Strachey (Freud, 1894, pp. 62-66) points to the fact that innumerous passages in several works, Freud seems not to distinguish be­tween the terms affect, emotion, and feeling. However, his use of differentterms seems to allude to shades of meaning that distinguished them. Ety­mologically, the term afecto in Spanish (affect) derives from Latin afficere,"to influence, or act upon someone" or "to affect" (Bhinquez Fraile,1960). An affect is thus basically something that affects the ego. When anaffect, owing to a miscue of the innervation key by which it is discharged,cannot be recognized as such, it is often perceived by consciousness as asomatic disorder, deprived of its emotional meaning (Chiozza, 1975). TheSpanish word emocion (emotion) comes frorn the French term emouvoir,which means "to move" (in Spanish, conmover), "to cause emotion"(Sp. emocionar) (Corominas, 1961). As in English, it is formed by theroot motion, the noun for move and the particle e, which according toSkeat (1882) means away or much. Hence, as Pribram and Melges (1969)points out, the term emotion can allude to being away from the movementwhich implies an action on the outer world, or can refer to an affectivemovement which, as a neurovegetative commotion, reverberates the ego.The Spanish term sentimiento (feeling) derives from the Latin sentire,which condenses the following meanings: "sensation," "to perceivethrough the senses," and "to realize," "to think, to give an opinion"(Bhinquez Fraile, 1960; Corominas, 1961). We think that the narrowest

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Freud stated in various places that the representa­tive agency of the drive is formed by two elements:(1) the representation or idea, and (2) the quantitativefactor or drive energy that cathects the representation,and which he calls "quota of affect" or "accretionof excitation," which, according to Strachey, Freudconsidered equivalent (1894, p. 61). Thus, affect ap­pears as a quantity, that is, as something that is suscep­tible to increase, decrease, displacement, or discharge.However, in an article he wrote in French (Freud,1893, pp. 170-172), he used the term valeur affectif(affective value was nevertheless translated by Stra­chey as "quota of affect"), whose terms involve anidea of meaning that goes beyond mere quantity.

The Unconscious Affects

Freud (1915b, pp. 156-157; 1915c, p. 178) states thatthe genuine aim of repression is to suppress affect anddescribes the differences between unconscious affectsor emotions and unconscious representations or ideas.For an unconscious idea to reach consciousness, itis necessary for an actual unconscious cathexis to betransferred onto preconcious verbal or visual mnemictraces, whilst affects are actual processes of dischargethe ultimate manifestations of which are perceived assensations and feelings. Freud said that we cannotspeak of unconscious affects in a sense analogous tothe one we use when we refer to unconscious repre­sentations. Unlike the unconscious idea, which contin­ues to exist as a "real" formation, "all thatcorresponds in that system to unconscious affects is apotential beginning which is prevented from devel­oping." This potential disposition is what Freud calls"development of affect" (Freud, 1915c, pp. 178-179)or "unconscious dispositional affective structure"(Chiozza, 1976b, p. 219).

sense of sentimiento refers to the affects, which, tempered by the thoughtprocesses, reach consciousness where they can be named (Chiozza, 1976a).

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Affect thus seems to arise as a disposition or po­tential in the unconscious and as an actuality2 in con­sciousness, insofar as it has the characteristics of thesomatic sensation (Freud, 1917, p. 122; Chiozza,Aizemberg, and Busch, 1990, pp. 31-32). Affect asactuality is an action, a process of discharge that in­cludes: (1) certain innervations or motor discharges(secretory and vasomotor innervation); (2) certain sen­sations which are of two kinds, perception of actionsthat have taken place and direct sensations of pleasureand unpleasure which lend the affect their prevalenttone (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 395) with different shadesand nuances.

The Innervation Keys of Affects

Affects are a certain kind of processes of discharge:From a physical point of view, they are motor or secre­tory acts carried out in the body itself, unlike a specific,effective action that develops in the' 'external" world.Freud considered that the key to the innervation ofaffects was located in the ideas in the Ucs. (Freud,1900, p. 582).3 The word innervation seems to have anambiguous meaning. Although it is used in medicine torefer to the anatomical distribution of the nerves inthe organism or in some particular region of the body,Strachey (Freud, 1893) interprets that Freud uses itmore often to denote the transmission of energy to asystem of nerves, specifically to a system of efferentnerves to indicate a process that tends toward the dis­charge of energy. Freud (1900) used the term key toindicate, besides, that the discharge is effected ac­cording to a certain schema or configuration.

A Universal Innate Hysterical Attack

The interpretation of hysterical phenomena and theircomparison with affects led Freud (1916-1917) to anew approach. Strange as it may seem, most of theauthors who have taken an interest in the psychoana-

2 Actuality derives from the word actual which means: (a) Existingand not merely potential or possible. (b) Being, existing, or acting at thepresent moment; current. (c) Based on fact (American Heritage Dictionary,1973). We use this term in the sense of "real and existing." It is worthremembering Freud's statement, quoting Stricker, to the effect that"Dreams do not consist solely of illusions. If, for instance, one is afraidof robbers in a dream, the robbers, it is true, are imaginary-but the fearis real" (Freud, 1900, p. 74).

3 In The Interpretation ofDreams, Freud (p. 582) stated the following:"This presupposes a quite specific assumption as to the nature of thegeneration of affect. It is viewed as a motor or secretory function, the keyto whose innervation lies in the ideas in the Dcs."

Luis Chiozza

lytic theory of affects-not Brierley (1951) and Rapa­port (1962), though-have overlooked this essentialFreudian contribution to the simultaneous understand­ing of affects and hysteria. Freud stated that the hyster­ical attack, which is a reminiscence of an individualevent belonging to infancy, is comparable to an affect,which has been acquired more recently. Normal affect,on the other hand, is equivalent to the expression ofa typical, universal hysteria which has become heredi­tary (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 395). Therefore, the affectsseem to be equivalent to innate and universal hysteri­cal attacks (Freud, 1926, p. 133), that is, they are remi­niscences, mnemic symbols which, instead ofcorresponding to a present situation, constitute a "wayof remembering" a past event which is not conscious(Chiozza, 1976b, p. 220). This archaic event is a motoroccurrence that belongs to phylogeny and that was"expedient" at that time since it was appropriate tothe aim. The affects are the normal archetypes of hys­terical attacks (Freud, 1926, p. 133).

The Expedient4 Motor Act and the Efficient Action

In order to explain the hysterical attack it is necessaryto search in the person's history-infantile ontog­eny-the situation in which the relevant movementsformed part of an expedient infantile action (Freud,1926, p. 133). The vegetative motor act called affectis, in the present conditions in which it takes place,as "inexpedient" as a hysterical attack. If, when aperson gets angry, "he blushes, his blood pressureincreases and more blood circulates in his muscles,that is because what is an argument today was in aremote time in the past, a physical fight for whichthose bodily changes had meaning" (Chiozza, 1986,p. 79). Unlike an efficient specific action, which iscarried out in the external world to satisfy a need, anaffect is an inefficient action since, like a hystericalsymptom, it is discharged on the organism itself andall it can achieve is that excitation ceases momentarilyat the expense of recreating it in another erotogenicpart of the body (Chiozza, 1976b, p. 218). The factthat the affects are universal explains the fact that theyare overlooked by consciousness as symptoms.

In the paper quoted before (Chiozza, Aizemberg,and Busch, 1990) a distinction was made between theefficient and specific actions and the expedient ones.

4 Expedient is the term used by Strachey, but perhaps it is more pre­cise, in the frame of the ideas dealt with in this paper, to use the termjustified instead, and therefore, unjustified instead of inexpedient.

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It was stated that the efficient actions are those thatsucceed in putting an end to excitations arising fromthe drive sources. Insofar as each drive source is quali­tatively different, it is implicitly understood that theseactions must be specific, and that is why Freud in "AProject for a Scientific Psychology" (1950) calls themspecific actions. On the other hand, expedient actionsare those whose direction toward an aim or purposecan be understood regardless of their efficiency.

As regards the origin of affects, Freud stated thatwhen a specific, effective action leading to an externalalteration cannot be carried out, then the affects ariseas a path of discharge tending toward an "internal"alteration and they function as a regulating valve(1950, pp. 318-319). The less efficient the action is,the greater is the remnant of excitation that is dis­charged as affect; the greater the efficacy of the actupon the external world, the smaller is the develop­ment of affect (Chiozza, 1976b). Action and affectthus form a complementary series.

When a drive recathects a mnemic trace of theexperience of satisfaction, unconscious desire isformed. Desire is experienced as a "wish for" and it isaccompanied by bodily sensations; hence, each desireshould have its own innervation key and it should bequalitatively specific. When desire is realized, then itbecomes an efficient action that follows the patternsof the innervatory key corresponding to that specificaction and it ends in the satisfaction of the need that"sustained" the wish. "A part" of this wish is alwaysdischarged at the same time as a fulfillment and iswhat we call an affect, that is, a discharge on thebody itself, which follows a phylogenetic pattern, themnemic trace of a motor event that was part of anact expedient in prehistory and inexpedient at present.When an effective discharge succeeds, the affectiveremnant becomes part of the action and thus forms afully meaningful act (Chiozza, 1983).

Later, in Freud's "A Project for a Scientific Psy­chology" (1950), affective discharge acquires a sec­ondary function in drawing the attention of theauxiliary object (adult caregiver) and thus serves thepurposes of the individual's understanding with oth­ers. Thus, affects are in a sense and for the purposesof communication, an efficient action.

The Quality of Affect

As stated above, affects, emotions, or feelings are anunconscious way of repeating a past phylogeneticevent which, as an unconscious memory, remains out-

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side the bounds of consciousness. Now we can askourselves: What does the potential for that which wecall growth or progress in a subject's emotional lifedepend on? In the study of ischemic cardiopathies(Chiozza et aI., 1982), attention was drawn to the factthat, in some individuals, certain affects remain as un­conscious dispositions which were never actual, whichmeans that an individual can either anticipate some­thing (in Spanish, pre-sentir, which literally means tofeel in advance), which we call protoaffects, or other­wise, fully develop such affects so that they become"new" emotions to that person. Emotional growth ina person shall thus depend not only on the chances oftempering some passions, but also on what uncon­scious affective dispositions are to be actualized in hislife, and allowed to "unfold" to take on their fullshape.

Following Freud's ideas, it was stated (Chiozza,1986, pp. 70-80) that affect has the characteristics ofboth "somatic" and "psychic" phenomena. On theone hand, it is a "real" somatic discharge and on theother hand, it is a reminiscence, a ' 'psychical' ,memory.

Every qualitatively differentiated affect can berecognized as such precisely because it has a definite"figure." Every different emotion is a vegetativemovement that arises from a nervous excitation that isrealized in a typical manner and it is phylogeneticallydetermined by an unconscious mnemic trace, by aninnate sensory and motor record, which correspondsto what Freud called an innervatory key (Freud, 1900,p. 582; Chiozza, 1976b, p. 219).

Deformation of the Innervatory Key of an Affect

The innervatory key of an affect is an unconsciousidea that determines the specific quality of each of thedifferent vegetative motor discharges that typify thevarious affects. When an affect keeps the coherenceof its key intact, it is possible to recognize it as adefinite emotion.

Unlike the neuroses and the psychoses, where thecoherence of affect is maintained, I have argued else­where (Chiozza, 1975, p. 250) that in somatic diseasethere is a "pathosomatic decomposition" (or dissem­bling) of an affect. When an emotion that becomesintolerable for consciousness is repressed, the impor­tance or investment can be displaced within the sameinnervatory key, so that some of the elements of thekey receive a more intense charge to the detriment ofothers. When the process of discharge takes place on

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the basis of this "deformed" key, consciousness doesnot record an affect, but rather perceives a "distur­bance," a phenomenon it classifies as "somatic," pre­cisely because the psychic quality, the affectivemeaning of that phenomenon, remains unconscious(Chiozza, 1975).

On the Relationship between Affect and Language

Freud (1926) stated that affects are typical and univer­sal. However, as Bateson (1972, pp. 398-399) pointsout, human language has thousands of words to nameobjects and very few for affects. Thus, the vast rich­ness of human affective states, as far as variety andnuances are concerned, goes relatively unnoticed, be­cause although one can make affects conscious with­out the mediation of the word, the lack of terms toallude to the variety and nuances of the various affectsprevents us from referring to them clearly in the pro­cesses of communication or thought.

Following Freud, we have typified several kindsof affects (Chiozza, 1972, p. 195). When there is afull discharge, then we refer to it as a primary affect,equivalent to what is commonly known as a passion.The tempering of emotions through the thought pro­cess, or of mental working through, leads to a second­ary affect, what is normally referred to as feeling. Wehave also argued (Chiozza, Aizemberg, and Busch,1990, pp. 179-180) that there is a third level of affectthat is reached when affect is spoken or designatedwithout emotion, as is the case in logical thought.

Among the emotions there are some that are typi­cal and widely recognizable, such as envy, hate, bitter­ness, disgust, shame, yearning, nostalgia, etc., and alsodifferent affective nuances for whose designation lan­guage proves to be insufficient (Bateson, 1972). Psy­choanalytic research of the somatic disorders has ledto the discovery of affects, which are usually not rec­ognized or named as such. Due to the lack of simplewords to designate them, it was necessary to resort toexpressions such as "the feeling of ignominy" (Chi­ozza et aI., 1982, p. 294) and the "feeling of proprie­torship" (Chiozza and Obstfeld, 1990, pp. 148-149),the "feeling of crumbling to pieces" and of "breakingthe rules" (Chiozza et aI., 1991, pp. 148-149), or toidiomatic expressions such as "the feeling of havingbeen skinned alive" or that of "being scaled'" (Chi­ozza et al. 1991, pp. 33-34).

Luis Chiozza

Forms of Classification of the Various Affects

Most of the studies in general medicine on the physiol­ogy of affects refer either to the relation between thenervous system and the motor, secretory, vascular, andother changes that take place during an emotional dis­charge, or to the connections between emotions andstress. We have not found in the medical research pa­pers5 we consulted a way of understanding the specificschemata of the different affects. Nevertheless, theclassical works on the expression of emotions by Dar­win (1872a) and Dumas (1933a), or in the field ofethology (Lorenz, 1965; Morris, 1967) allow us toidentify typical physical signs that are part of the spe­cific and particular expression of certain affects.

Dumas (1933b, pp. 278-280) establishes a differ­ence between two basic affective tones: the agreeableand the disagreeable, corresponding to sensations ofpleasure and unpleasure, which according to Freud(1916-1917, p. 395) give the affect its keynote.

In Chiozza (1978, pp. 357-362) it was stated thatthe essential participation of vasomotor activity in theoccurrence we call emotion allows us to understandthat the heart-a vessel that has been modified until itfinally acquired great functional complexity-shouldlend itself to symbolize feelings at large and, specifi­cally, the process by which the affects take on an in­cipient schema ("anticipation"). We also pointed outthat heart rhythm, the most typical phenomenon of theheart, ascribes to itself, as if it were a metronome orpacemaker, the representation of the affective tonethat qualifies every instant being experienced by anindividual, so that the heart is to time what the eye isto space.

Darwin (1872b, p. 61) and Dumas (1933, p. 440)asserted that most physiologists and psychologistshave classified emotions into two large groups: (1)those that arouse excitation, among which Darwin in­cludes happiness and rage first and foremost; and (2)those that depress, among which Darwin includes sad­ness and fear.

Dumas (1933c, p. 442) identified four basic emo­tions: happiness, sadness, fear, and rage, and he de­scribed (as mentioned above) an active and a passiveexpression for each one of these. He held that emo­tions have an active part, translated into reactions ofexcitation (typical of the sympathetic nervous system:tachycardia, hypertension, hypertonicity, horripila-

5 In the Index Medicus (Lindberg, 1989-1991), we consulted the se­ries of publications it quoted by looking up emotions and specific emotions,such as anger, rage, anxiety, grief, boredom, fear, guilt, shame, hate, jeal­ousy, etc.

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tion, etc.) and a passive part, typified by reactions ofdepression (corresponding to the action of the para­sympathetic nervous system: bradychardia, hypoten­sion, hypotonicity, etc.).

We consider that each of these basic emotionsincludes a set of emotions that are akin and related toone another. These affects share some physical signsof a common innervatory key and have other differentones, which confer a special nuance upon their schemaand meaning. Thus, for example, rage, wrath, fury,exasperation, vexation, anger, irritation, rancor, en­mity, and bitterness are different emotions that arepart of the same affective group.

Freud (1915a, pp. 133-134) stated that mentallife is governed by three basic polarities: One of themis loving-hating, which in turn has a relation with theforces of attraction and repulsion at work in the uni­verse. Both concepts, that which is related with thepsychic "world" and the one that refers to the physi­cal world, allude to two types of relationships: One isgoverned by the positive sign, which promotes at­traction and proximity: the other is typified by thenegative, which produces repulsion and detachment.We believe that sadness and happiness are mainly vi­cissitudes of love; on the other hand, rage and fear arevicissitudes of hate.

According to Freud (1915a), hating is an earlierobject relation than love: It is born from the initialprimal repulsion by the narcissistic ego toward theexternal world with its emission of stimuli. He said:

Conversely, if the object is a source of unpleasurablefeelings, there is an urge which endeavours to in­crease the distance between the object and the egoand to repeat in relation to the object the originalattempt at flight from the external world with its emis­sion of stimuli. We feel the' 'repulsion" of the object,and hate it; this hate can afterwards be intensified tothe point of aggressive inclination against the ob­ject-an intention to destroy it [po 137].

We can thus infer that from the basic tendencyof hate-rejection-antipathy, two different affectivegroups arise: One is connected to an expedient motoract of flight (fear), and the other group is relatedto an expedient motor act aimed at attacking theobject (rage).

Freud (1915a) stated that "If the object be­comes a source of pleasurable feelings, a motor urgeis set up which seeks to bring the object closer tothe ego and to incorporate it into the ego. We thenspeak of the 'attraction' exercised by the pleasure-

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gIVIng object and say that we 'love' that object"(p. 137). Therefore, in general terms we can saythat in the same way that the proximity of thebeloved object arouses emotions akin to happiness,the loss of the object triggers affects that belongwith the group governed by sadness.

The Category of Pathos

Within the order of affects, in the sphere of pathos,we find another mode of referring to these two formsof bond: sympathy and antipathy.

The word sympathy-from the Greek syn (with)and pathos (passion)-means: (1) A relationship oran affinity between people or things in which what­ever affects one correspondingly affects the other.(2) Mutual understanding or affection arising fromthis relationship or affinity. (3) The act or power ofsharing the feelings of another. Antipathy means: (a)A strong feeling of aversion or repugnance. (b) Anobject of aversion (American Heritage Dictionary,1973). Words such as love, attraction, liking aresynonyms of sympathy, and the words hate, repul­sion, dislike are synonyms of antipathy (Sainz deRobles, 1979).

Weizsaecker (1947, pp. 106-109) held that, to­gether with the ontic categories, there are five pathiccategories: wanting, capacity, duty, permission, andobligation, which, being related to one another, makeup a kind of pentagonal structure, that Weizsaeckercalled "pathic," which provides a frame to all of hu­man life. Each one of these categories is an affectivestate, and when we refer to them, we usually use theword feeling. Ontic is everything that belongs to thecategory of present being, everything that exists is on­tic. Pathic is what belongs to the category of pathos,that is, feelings, or suffering, that which we want, wecan, we should, we may, or must be, precisely because,nevertheless, we are not.

From this point of view we can say that theactuality of suffering consists in a latent dispositionto be that which we still have not yet become.Affects, universal and innate hysterical attacks, notonly commemorate a phylogenetic event typified bysuffering a lack, but also prolong up to the presenttime a lack that bears witness to the degree of failureof an efficient action. This failure is resignified witha secondary efficiency thanks to the fact that theaffect acquires a new meaning as an act of communi­cation.

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On the Relationship between SomaticSensation and Affect

The Perception of a Physical World

There is a first "surface" of consciousness throughwhich the objects of the so-called surrounding worldare perceived-the image of such world being built,in Von Uexkull's view (1934), according to the per­ceptive needs of each biological organism. It is oftensaid that this surface is externally oriented, but theidea of "exterior" is an idea to which, I believe, it isnot advisable to definitively adhere.

It is more reasonable to speak of a "first" surfacesince, according to Freud, consciousness is shaped onthe basis of perception, especially aural perception,yet also visual perception (Freud, 1923, p. 23), to theextent that for an unconscious idea to become con­scious it must be transferred onto the mnemic trace ofeither of these modalities of perception. So much sothat, as Mark Solms points out in note 13 of his (1996)paper, when attention is drawn to the affects or thethought processes, it carries out an "unnatural contor­tion," a sort of counterperistaltic movement. We havethousands of words to name objects, but very few thatmake a distinction among affects.

It is from perception that the notions of space,matter, and reality are born, and these pertain to theorganization of knowledge that we call "physicaL" Italso gives rise to the notion of "present," not in thesense of "now" but in the sense of here, "beforeme," which the etymology of the word present re­veals. Roughly speaking, it is shaped by means of thewindows of the five senses: somatic sensation, taste,smell, hearing, and vision.

Strictly speaking, we could limit the entrance"surface" that gives rise to consciousness (from aperceptive nucleus, as Freud intended) to the two distal"senses": vision and hearing. I believe it is excessive,and when faced with the choice, I prefer to accept aswell (although I am aware that this is rather arbitrary)a less "delineated" type of consciousness that is alsorealized through the traces of olfactory, gustatory, andtactile perceptions. But what about other varieties ofsomatic sensation? It is clear that we never find, 'pure" perceptions or sensations, but the question isof further importance, for if we define as "physicalworld" that which is built upon the data of perception,then we cannot define perception by the fact that it isoriented toward the physical world.

We can of course ask ourselves: Why is it that thepain caused by an injection, or seeing a glaring light are

Luis Chiozza

"sensations," and smelling a flower, tasting an apple,seeing an armchair, or realizing that on the skin of myback a triangle has been drawn with a pencil, are "per­ceptions"? I think we speak ofperceptions when we canrecognize objects and that, on the other hand, we speakof sensations when we experience an actuality that is be­yond our capacity to build an image of an object.

The Sensations "Linked to the Body"

There is another surface (I shall deliberately avoid usingsecond and internal) through which not only pleasur­able-unpleasurable sensations reach us, but also hun­ger, the excitation of desire, anxiety, shame, and alsothe sensation I have upon perceiving, i.e., the sensationthat I am perceiving. These are sensations "linked tothe body," but it is not here a question of the (physical)body I perceive (for example, my hands when I findthem pale, or the blush on my cheeks in the mirror), butthe (psychical, mental, animated, or living) "body"with which I perceive (for example, the movements ofmy hand when I look for my lighter in my pocket).

The main question seems to lie in this instance inthe fact that the "object" from which the sensationarises (for example, the heat of my ears blushing, or theposition of my legs on the chair) is a part of myself. (Itseems more correct to use for this type of perception theword self-perceptive rather than the word internal.)

I could say, for example, that I perceive in theworld the pin that is pricking me, but that I feel theprick that is happening to me. This prick is mine as a"somatic" sensation of the psychically animatedbody, before being that of the body as a physicallyperceptible object. It is something actual, but not somuch in the sense of "real," the way the word actuallyis used, as in the sense that it acts and it acts now (inthe same sense as Freud used the word when he spokeof actual neuroses). It is mine, besides, but only sec­ondarily, because it belongs to the "territory" towhich we refer by the name of body scheme. Thisscheme-which is a "projection of a surface" thanksto the encounter or interface between perception andsensation-is a secondary construction that had to belearned, as shown by games such as "what a nice littlehand I have."6,7

6 In Spanish, there is a singing game mothers play with their babies:"What a nice little hand I have, what a nice little hand God gave me,"which the parent sings once and again, having placed the baby's hand infront of it, for the baby to see the front and back of its hand and come torealize it is the same hand. Sonletimes, the mother herself shows her babyher own hand. This is similar to when we say to a baby "Show mommyyour little hand."

7 This point is related to the question of primary narcissism. I believeinfants need to learn that the hand they see (perception) and the hand

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Affect as Sensation and the Perception ofAffect

I believe we refer to affects with this word because"our affects" affect us in an actual way, and we callthem "feelings" because we feel them as sensationswhich, basically, penetrate our consciousness throughthe same' 'surface" as the sensations of pleasure-un­pleasure. Only afterwards do we learn how to recog­nize affects in others (as in ourselves), by perceivingin them the concomitant physical signs (such as, forexample, blushing as a sign of shame).

As Solms states (1996, note 33), the consciousrecord of a somatic sensation is organized as a com­plex perception referred to the body scheme, andtherefore the affects refer to internal organs vaguelyrepresented in the perception-oriented "surface,"which gives rise to a physical image of the world. Inconnection to this point, Solms also says: "the patientconfuses his internal (psychic) perceptions with exter­nal (physical) objects. This confusion between the twoclasses of perception reaches its most extreme formin the 'organ speech' of the schizophrenic, in whichinternally generated feelings are confused with the in­ternal organs of the body." However, the term speechused by Freud alludes to an expressive or symbolicalexercise, which is beyond confusion, as far as organspeech is concerned.

The "Somatic" Quality of Sensation

Attempting to interpret the unconscious meaning ofthe different illnesses that affect the body forces meto pay attention to the fact that the essential thing aboutsomatic sensation is, precisely, that it is not perception(that is why I am not convinced of speaking of "inter-

they can feel (self-perceptive sensation) are the same hand. If by primarynarcissism we understand the investment of the ego by the id, the myth ofNarcissus does not seem to represent primary narcissism, since Narcissus(who dies of hunger and thirst) falls in love with his face in the mirror ofthe pond, just the way the others see him, i.e., he loves himself with thelove of the object. Or, better said, as the myth of Narcissus relates, the iddoes not directly invest the ego, but rather invests it via the object (thoughnot in the manner of secondary narcissism, which arises when the lostobject is introjected in the ego). If we regard it this way, the body ofprimary narcissism would not then be the body' 'of perception," but aboveall, the body "of sensation" which derives fronl the drive source as quali­tative organ-pleasure (Organ/ust). I am aware that Freud distinguishedbetween autoerotism and the narcissism that is at work when "the egohas established itself," yet I think that, anyway, it is not possible to sustainthe idea of a "disintegrated" autoerotism, since there are prenatal proto­imagoes of the ego. In The Ego and the Id, Freud holds that the id containswithin itself innumerable phylogenetic existences of the ego. It thereforeseems more likely to suppose that primary narcissism-insofar as it is adirect investment of the id, which does not invest the objects of percep­tion-is shaped as a sensation from the drive source.

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nal perception" or of "two classes of perception").Perhaps, it would be clearer if, in referring to thatessential aspect of sensations, we definitely stoppedcalling them "somatic." Naturally, that is only possi­ble if, far from reducing them to the mere intensity ofa "quantum," or to the increase or decrease of theexcitation in the unit of time, we kept its specific quali­tative aspect that makes a distinction between the sen­sations of disgust, those of envy, and those of fear orof shame, which led Freud to postulate in his Interpre­tation of Dreams (1900, p. 582) the existence of aspecific and unconscious "key of innervation" foreach affect.

On the other hand, even if we stop calling thesensation "somatic," there is still the fact that, inorder to refer to the specific quality of each sensation,we cannot do without representations of the body. Itis no coincidence that, when we differentiate an oralunconscious phantasy from an anal one, for example,we name them and distinguish them with terms thatallude to bodily structures and functions. I thereforewish to underscore that affect, whose actuality de­pends on bodily sensations, is not only quantity, butalso quality, and that, besides, it does not determine aparticular process of motor or secretory discharge, butrather, it is that particular process, regarded from theangle of its meaning.8

It seems that when we speak of the quality ofenvy, or shame, we have departed from the realm of, 'pure" sensation and entered into the field of affect,which as Solms (1996) states, is formed in a "mixed"way by integrating the elements of the pleasure-un­pleasure series and the memory of scenes from the pastand with those coming from the "physical" perceptualrecord of the body organs. Clarifying this issue leadsus to point out that the Freud of the second hypothesisleads us to carefully reflect on the various formula­tions of the Freudian concept of drive.

8 As stated in the section on "The Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects,"an affect is equivalent to a universal and innate hysterical attack, andhysteria can be regarded as an affect acquired more recently. Solms (1996)mentions this Freudian statement when he deals with the' 'somatic corre­lates" of affect. Since the expression "somatic correlate" is equivalent tothat of "somatic concomitant," and both are characteristic of parallelism,according to the second hypothesis (which sees in such correlates the trulypsychical, i.e., the unconscious) it is better to refer to them as representa­tions of the unconscious meaning of affect as a monument commemoratinga motor act which was expedient in phylogeny, i.e., which had a meaningat that time. I believe that the fact that affect is meaning, because of itsvery origin, or better said, significance (i.e., the importance of meaning)Damasio's idea (Solms, 1996, note 49) is enriched by the idea that affect"is the subjective point of reference of external perceptive experiences"and it is an essential contribution for further research into the question ofcountertransference.

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The Quality of the Drive

I believe we cannot consider drive to be the psychicalrepresentative of an "endosomatic" physical excita­tion, as Green holds (following Freud) in his introduc­tion to the seminar on Organsprache (Chiozza andGreen, 1989), because that is again parallelism, evenif he does call it "dualism of the reunion." Yet, forthe same reasons, neither can it be a border conceptlying between the psychical and the somatic. Is it im­plied in that phrase that the drive is a concept and thepsychical and the somatic are not? If the psychicaland the somatic are what Kant called "the thing initself," we have fallen back into psychophysical paral­lelism; if they are concepts (which should be madeexplicit by saying that the concept of drive is a borderconcept between the concept of the psychical and theconcept of the somatic), it does not seem to be a properformulation to reduce the theoretical size of the con­cept of drive arising from the second hypothesis to ageographical metaphor, which is neither explanatorynor enlightening.

It follows from the second hypothesis that thetruly psychical is not defined by consciousness, but bymeaning, or in other words, by its belonging to a seriesthat has an aim. The drives are thus tendencies withan aim, and Freud said many times that by examiningthe aims it is possible to infer their source, which isqualitatively differentiated in terms of erotogeniczones (i.e., of bodily functions teleologically ori­ented).

I believe then that the essential thing about sensa­tion is not at its point of "arrival" (whether centralor neurological), which refers it to a certain zone ofthe bodily scheme or to the vague representation ofan "internal" organ in terms of physical space. I be­lieve the essential thing consists in the fact that thedrives or pleasure (Organlust) are qualitative "rightfrom their (unconscious) source," which we representin two ways: as a qualitative and unconscious psychi­cal aim (which the brain or the hypothalamus needn'tconvert into quality), and as a function physiologicallyand teleologically understandable or interpretable asthe effect of a physical cause. In other words, it is notthe point of arrival but the "entrance surface" thatmakes them different.

A Third ((Surface"

So far, there are two surfaces, yet the things that arepresent (here) can be absent, in the sense that we know

Luis Chiozza

about the specific absence, and the actual things (pres­ent now) can be latent, i.e., potential, in the sense thatwe notice that they are not occurring.

There is therefore another surface through whicha representation of an object perceived (witnessed9

) atsome time in the past "enters," thus creating the newsof its specific absence, and at the same time creatingthe notion of past that is implicit in memories, and thenotion of future, implicit in desire and fear.

From the metapsychological angle (in the Freud­ian "physicalist" sense of topography, dynamic andeconomic) recollection and wish (or fear) are identi­cal; both are equivalent to the investment of a mnemictrace, but they are different insofar as they each gener­ate a different temporality. They give rise, from thepreconscious (as Freud stated, following Kant [Freud,1920, p. 28]), to the category "time" which, alongwith that of "space," do not belong to the world butrather to the human way of thinking. In other words:They derive from the activity of the precon­scious~onscious system.

SENSATION(eomatic)

MEMORIESrecollections

The Distinction between Perception and Recollection

The possibility of distinguishing between perceptionand memory is an essential concept in psychoanalytictheory. Freud had to postulate the existence of animaginary "labeling office" which, by way of a tru­ism, conferred on perceptions-not on memories-the"signs of objective reality" on the basis of perceptivequalities (Freud, 1950, p. 325).

That distinction is at the foundation of the differ­ence between identity of perception (typical of the pri-

9 In Spanish the verb used is presenciado, the passive form of theinfinitive presenciar (to witness) with the same root as present.

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mary process, of magic, and the pleasure principle)and identity of thought (typical of the secondary pro­cess, of logic, and the reality principle). This is wherethe distinction between the discharges typical of action(or of "actual" affect) that are carried out with fullinvestments, and the discharges that are typical ofthought, which involve investments with small quanti­ties, which are "experimental" rehearsals.

This is the origin of the difference between ful­fillment of need, which puts an end to the excitationspringing from the drive source, and hallucinatory ful­fillment of wish. In the latter case, for the purpose ofpostponing frustration, there is a "false" conferral (ortransfer) of the signs of perceptual quality typical ofthe perception of the sucked thumb onto the memory(representation) of the absent breast, which preciselydue to its "specific" absence cannot put a stop tothe excitation, thus the excitation springing from thesource is discharged onto the organism itself by "ov­erexciting" other erotogenic zones.

This matter was so important to Freud that it ledhim to think that nothing deprived of the so-calledsigns of perceptual quality would be capable of enter­ing consciousness. Thus, for the representations(memories and wishes) lacking such signs to be ableto enter consciousness, they had to use the signs ofwhat he once called "linguistic discharge" (Freud,1950, p. 373), i.e., those deriving from acousticmnemic traces of perceptions of words heard. He alsoused the same idea to explain repression proper, main­taining that for (secondary) repression to attain its aim,it is enough to divest such association of the perceptualtraces (of words, usually).

The Actuality of Affect

In spite of the elegance of this scheme, we must admitthat the "third" surface of consciousness is not onlypenetrated by representations of absences by associa­tion with the traces of old perceptions. We must re­member, before I continue, what Freud stated in hisarticle on the unconscious. In fact, unconscious affectsdo not exist as such in the same way that unconsciousideas (or representations) do. To be precise, they are(potential) dispositions that are only actual insofar asthey are discharge processes that manage to reach themotor sphere of the ego (Freud, 1915c, pp. 177-178).

So much so that affects do not need to associatewith the signs of linguistic discharge, they do not needthe mediation of the word, in order to become con­scious (Freud, 1923, pp. 20, 23). (Incidentally, the

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whole theory of alexithymia, or the incapacity to speakof affects, as the origin of "psychosomatic" diseaseis shattered at this point: The same applies to the the­ory of symbolic incapacity.)l0

Besides postulating the signs of perceptual qual­ity that allow us to speak of a capacity for "reality­testing," Freud mentioned only once (Freud, 1917, p.233) the idea of an analogous capacity for' 'actuality­testing." In the same way that the former is a witnessto the fact that what is remembered as a consciousrecord of an unconscious representation is also presentthere, and for this reason in fact is also a perception,the latter witnesses that what is wished or feared (re­membered) as a conscious record of a latent disposi­tion is also happening as an immediacy, at present(actually), and for this reason it is truly (actually) alsoan affect that is felt to be a sensation. This is whyFreud subscribes to Stricker's statement: "If, for in­stance, one is afraid of robbers in a dream, the robbers,it is true, are imaginary-but the fear is real."

Presence, Actuality, and Representation

We have already said that actuality (immediacy, pres­ence) derives from a sensation that penetrates con­sciousness through a surface or "window," which isa different one from that used by real perception ofpresent objects, and from the one used by a memory(which in its "pure" state is the conscious representa­tion of the absent object). We can thus maintain that

10 There is yet another question to clear up. Freud held that:(a) The main purpose of repression is to prevent a painful affect fromdeveloping. (b) Repression is exerted by withdrawing preconscious verbalrepresentations. (c) Affect does not require a preconscious verbal represen­tation in order to become conscious. If we accept these three statements,we must ask ourselves: How does repression prevent the development ofa particular affect?

Affects are actual processes of discharge that always take place withina certain state of the conscious system, so that when the consciousness­state changes, the actual affect is necessarily altered. The discharge initself cannot be impeded, but its form or quality can be altered so as toallow us to speak of the' 'substitution" of one affect (action or thought)by another. The state of the conscious system, which is often called' 'con­tents of consciousness," is sustained by means of signs of objective reality,signs of linguistic discharge, and signs of actuality, and it is these con­sciousness-states that' 'attract" affective discharge.

Thus the following can be roughly stated:(i)-In the psychoses, the defensive process alters judgment about realityin order to impede the development of a painful affect. (ii)-In the neuro­ses, repression proper substitutes the signs of linguistic discharge, thusaltering the meaning of the consciousness-state that could trigger the pain­ful affect. (iii)-In somatic illnesses, the pathophysiological mechanismdisplaces the investments of affect within the innervatory key and changesthe consciousness-state that the painful affect could have triggered, byaltering the conscious meaning of the processes endowed with signs ofactuality.

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there are signs of actuality that have a kind of relationwith the somatic sensation, which is analogous to therelation of the signs of objective reality with percep­tion and to that of the signs of linguistic dischargewith memories.

If we accept what we have stated so far, thereis a kind of conscious derivative of an unconsciousrepresentation, a wish (or fear) that corresponds to thelatent representation and that penetrates conscious­ness as a "memory," through a different surface fromthe one used by sensation and from the one used byperception.

The distinction between perception and recollec­tion is the basis for the presence-absence dichotomy.And upon the distinction between perception and sen­sation rests the presence-actuality opposition (whichalso gives rise to the polarity between here and now),and the distinction between sensation and recollectionwhich provides the grounding for the actuality-la­tency opposition.

The Distinction between Recollection and Desire

Freud used to say that it was necessary to pursue sepa­rately the effects that repression exerts on affect fromthose exerted on the ideational part of representation(Freud, 1915b, p. 152). A representation can thus bebroken down into two parts. That is, what we callaffect is a part of representation or, in other words,not only the idea that gives rise to a recollection, butalso the affect (which does not require words) can berepresented in consciousness. A memory or recollec­tion is the representation of an idea associated withthe traces of perception. An affect is experienced upondischarge directly in consciousness as an actual sensa­tion that does not require words to become conscious,though it can remain associated with memories.

But when affect is not discharged, does this meanit is not "represented" either? What is latency then?How do we get to know about it? I believe that latentaffects can be "represented" (deprived of the signsof actuality that only exist when affect is discharged)through the surface penetrated by memory, as particu­lar forms of remembering that we call "wish" and"fear."

Thus, from the metapsychological point of view,there seems to be a way of distinguishing a memoryfrom a wish (or a fear), since although both come intobeing as an investment of a mnemic trace (of percep­tion in both cases but also of sensation), wish seemsto originate with an "average" investment, since it is

Luis Chiozza

greater than the small investment required for a mem­ory. Therefore, a memory, which testifies to an ab­sence, produces the notion of past, and on the otherhand a wish, testifying to a latency, to a "potential"disposition, creates the notion of future. That is whynostalgia is formed with memories, and eager longingis formed with desire, and anxiety is formed withfears.

Putting the above in these terms seems to lead usto say that, unlike affects, desire is not characteristi­cally a process of discharge, neither does it characteris­tically associate with mnemic traces of previousperceptions, as a memory does, although both pro­cesses are part of it. Rather, what seems to be thecharacteristic "defining" feature of desire is becom­ing ,'actually" conscious on the basis of mnemictraces from previous sensations.

The Somatic Perception in Sensation

From everything stated above it is important to distin­guish between sensation and perception (and betweenactuality and presence). This requires us to raise thequestion of the so-called exteroceptive sensations,which are formed (in terms of the Freudian psychicalapparatus and in terms of neuroanatomy [Solms,1996]) by integrating functions that correspond to theperception of the physical world.

We may therefore conclude that it is indubitablycorrect to grant somatic sensations the nature of amixed secondary formation (formed by combiningsensation and perception) if at the same time we admitthe theoretical need to postulate primary sensationsthat reach consciousness via the actuality surface,whose quality springs from the erotogenic zoneswhere they originated.

Memory and Recollection

There is a final matter to be clarified, and it concernsthe difference between representation and reactualiz­ing, which is implicit in some of the subjects raised.

Italian distinguishes between two forms of amne­sia: The word scordare is used to denote the act of tear­ing a recollection from the heart, and dimenticare theact of taking it out of the mind. There is an expression inSpanish that can be translated as "recollections assaultme," which is generally used to describe something thatoccurs during a part of the process of mourning; itshows that recollections "reach" consciousness. Yet

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what is the meaning of the difference between reachingthe heart and reaching the mind?

We can admit that the unconscious record ofsomething that has happened leaves a trace that wecall mnemic; thus by memory (such as immunologicalmemory) we refer to the existence of that unconscioustrace. When the trace is reactivated by the drive thatinvests it, then it can represent in consciousness animage of the object that produced it and thus reactua­lize so as to temper it, the somatic sensation that waspart of the experience that left the trace. Because ofthe lack of sufficient terms, I would like to keep theword memory for the "mental" representation of theimage, since the word recollection is more appropriateto denote the' 'affective" reactualization (in Spanishrecuerdo literally means "to return to the heart").l1

It is important to clarify that, just as we havedistinguished a representation from a presence, we dis­tinguish a reactualization from an actuality; and thereactualization corresponds to the quality of "aver­age" investment that we attributed to desire and fearin the previous sections.

Thus, I suggest that by memories we refer to theremembrances implicit in the representations of ab­sences, and by the words recollection and anticipation(premonition, hunch) we refer to the reactualizationof latencies, which do not discharge in full quantitythe excitation which has reactivated an affective dis­position.

If we think of affect as a "mixed" formationthat integrates' 'somatic" sensations with perceptions,then we must admit that these mixed formations areabundant and that what we habitually call "recollec­tion," or "premonition" must also be shaped as amixed formation integrating reactualizations of thesensations connected to affect with the representationof the images that are connected to perception.

What we have called the ideational part of therepresentation, following Freud's ideas, is connectedto the news of an absence which becomes consciousthanks to the existence of signs of linguistic dischargewhich confer upon it its "perceptive" nature. Andwhat we call a reactualization of a disposition is, onthe other hand, connected to news of a latency whichbecomes conscious thanks to the existence of signsof "discharge" which are not linguistic, but rather"sensoaffective," and which are connected to thetempered somatic sensations which give the reactuali­zation their affective tone.

11 Recuerdo: The root cordis in Latin means heart.

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