130 Godina NBS Ko Je Ko U Finansijskom Sektoru

7/21/2019 130 Godina NBS Ko Je Ko U Finansijskom Sektoru

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WHO’S WHO IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 3

04 Jorgovanka Tabaković, NBS NBS ogledalo države pred narodom,

reeksija naroda pred svetomThe NBS as a reection of the state beforethe people and a reection of the nationbefore the world

12 Prof. dr Nebojša Savić

Sačuvana stabilnost bankarskog sektora Banking sector stability preserved

16 130 godina od osnivanja NBS 130 years of the National Bank of Serbia

34 Prof. dr Zoran Jeremić Bankarstvo u Srbiji u periodu 2000-2013. Banking in Serbia during the 2000-2103

period.

52 Petar Arsić i Dušan Tomić, KPMG Trendovi razvoja bankarske regulative uEvropi

Development trends of banking regulation inEurope

58 Nada Suđić, Deloitte Jak privatni sektor uslov ekonomskog rasta Economic growth requires a strong private

sector

60 Nikola Uzelac “Prvih deset godina je najteže”“The rst ten years are the hardest”

66 Draginja Đurić, Banca Intesa Dolazak stranih banaka, glavni pokretač

rasta tržištaArrival of foreign banks, main driver ofmarket growth

70 Klaudio Ćezario, UniCredit banka Ključna uloga u oporavku Key role in recovery

74 Goran Pitić, Societe Generale Srbija Nema više lakog prota No more easy prot

78 Zoran Vojnović, Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank Aktivan partner oporavka privrede Active partner in economic recovery

82 Marinos Vathis, Vojvođanska banka Značajna uloga u nansijskom rastu

Major role in nancing growth

86 Valerij Ovsjanikov, Sberbanka Srbija Pažljivo pratimo situaciju na tržištu

Closely monitoring market situations 90 Slavko Carić, Erste banka Srbija Moramo da pokrenemo novi investicioni

ciklus We must launch a new investment cycle

94 Georgios Papanastasiou, Alpha banka Očuvali smo poverenje klijenata We've preserved client condence

98 Neoklis Neokleus, Piraeus banka Kvalitet ostaje primarni cilj Piraeus banke Quality remains Piraeus Bank primary goal

102 AIK banka Cilj - kreiranje najjače domaće privatne banke

Aim - to create the strongest domesticprivate bank

104 Eurobank a.d. Beograd Odgovoran partner Responsible partner

107 JUBMES banka a. d. Beograd Pristupačnost i inovativnost u poslovanju

Accessibility and innovation in business

110 Vladimir Zečar, VTB banka Beograd Bankarstvo će biti znatno konzervativnije Banking will be much more conservative

114 Andrea Simončeli, Generali osiguranje Takmičari moraju poštovati ista pravila

Competitors must respect the same rules

118 Kristof Cetl, GRAWE osiguranje Nastavljamo trend dobrih rezultata We’re continuing the trend of good results

122 Obrad Sikimić, Diners ClubInternational Beograd Rast bezgotovinskog plaćanja Cashless payments growing

126 NBG Leasing sa vama u proteklih 10 godinaNBG Leasing – with you over the last10 years

130 Goran Muftić, Bisnode Srbija Pouzdana poslovna informacija

Reliable business information

134 TRASSET – inovativna bankarska rešenja TRASSET – Innovative Banking Solutions

138 Boško Živković Kriza je snažno pogodila preduzeća The crisis has strongly impacted businesses

142 Nikola Fabris Za ovakvu krizu teško je biti potpuno

spreman It’s difcult to prepare for such a crisis

146 Prof. dr Hasan Hanić, Beogradskabankarska akademija

Dramatična promena nansijskog sistema Dramatic nancial system changes

150 Đorđe Đukić Bankarski sektor je likvidan i uzdržan The Banking sector is liquid and restrained

154 Dario Skanapieko, EIB Razduživanje pritiska Jugoistočnu Evropu Deleveraging puts pressure on SEE countries

157 Mateo Patrone, EBRD Bankarskom sektoru potrebna konsolidacija Banking sector needs consolidation

164 Ko je ko u nansijskom sektoru Who's who in the nancial sector



KO JE KO U FINANSIJSKOM SEKTORU4

Jorgovanka Tabaković,Governor o NBS

Te NBS as a

reflection othe state beorethe people anda reflectiono the peoplebeore theworld“Study the past i you would define the uture,” saidConucius. I would amend that to – “only occasion-ally reflect on the past to remind ourselves o whatwe have learned and experienced, look around to ac-knowledge what we have achieved and constantly o-cus on the challenges that lie ahead.” Tis is the recipeor success.For a hundred and thirty years the National Bank oSerbia (NBS) has stood proudly on a pedestal as themost important financial institution in the country.Longer than any lietime, our institution has resistedmany challenges and adversities which the Serbianbanking system has experienced. When the stories

told by generations o our employees were no longerheard, this monumental building stood as a witnessto time and a keeper o traditional values. Te recordso the diligence and expertise o its employees hasremained… And a name worthy o respect has beenbuilt up; a name that inspires trust.o be the governor o a central bank is a great hon-our to be bestowed on any economist who loves andworks or their own country... o be the governor othe National Bank o Serbia is a privilege and a hugecommitment to the group o my illustrious prede-

Jorgovanka Tabaković,guverner NBS

NBS ogledalodržave prednarodom,refleksijanaroda predsvetom„Proučavajmo prošlost da bismo definisali buduć-nost”, govorio je Konfučije. A ja bih dodala: Samopovremeno pogledati u prošlost da se prisetimo na-učenog i iskušenog, osvrnuti se oko sebe da uočimopostignuto i konstantno se usmeravati na budućeizazove, recept je za uspeh.Sto trideset godina Narodna banka Srbije ponosnostoji na pijedestalu najvažnije finansijske institucijeu zemlji. Više od bilo kog životnog veka naša insti-tucija odoleva mnogobrojnim izazovima i neprili-kama koje je bankarski sistem Srbije proživljavao.Onda kada su generacije zaposlenih prestajale dapripovedaju svoje priče, ostajala je monumentalnagrađevina kao svedok vremena i čuvar starih vred-nosti... Ostajali su zapisi o marljivosti i stručnostinjenog kadra... I izgrađeno ime koje izaziva pošto- vanje... I uliva poverenje.Biti guverner centralne banke velika je čast ukazana jednom ekonomisti koji voli svoju zemlju i radi za

nju ... Biti guverner Narodne banke Srbije privilegija je i ogromna obaveza pred plejadom velikih imenamojih prethodnika koji su svojim radom, stručno-šću i zalaganjem utrli put svojim naslednicima, ali idali u nasleđe dalji razvoj monetarnog i finansijskogsistema Srbije. Aleksa Spasić, Đorđe Vajfert, Dra-goslav Avramović... ličnosti su koje nas neprestanopodsećaju na ispravnosti zadataka i ciljeva s kojimasmo došli u ovu instituciju... I ne sme biti drugačije, jer je NBS ogledalo države pred narodom, refleksijanaroda pred svetom.







cessors who, through their work, expertise and ded-ication, paved the way or their successors, as wellas leaving behind the advancing development o themonetary and financial system o Serbia as their leg-acy. Aleksa Spasić, Đorđe Vajert, Dragoslav Avram-ović... Tese are the individuals who are a constant

reminder o the righteousness o the tasks and aimswe envisaged when we came to this institution. Andthat’s how it should remain, since the NBS is a reflec-tion o the state beore its people and a reflection othe people beore the world.Nevertheless, being the governor o the National Banko Serbia at the time o probably the biggest turmoiland crisis elt by economies worldwide is a great call-ing and responsibility to preserve the banking system,regain credibility and rebuild the international repu-tation o a high-quality institution that carries out itsmission proessionally.

During the 130 years o its existence, the NBS hasgone through various stages o monetary system

vulnerability. A long period o rather painul hyper-inflation is still deeply ingrained in the minds o thepeople. Te negative legacy o past times has been ex-acerbated by the turbulent present times, making theuture challenges that lie ahead or the NBS employeesdifferent to those experienced by other central banksin the world, as well as bringing the valuable experi-ence necessary or careul management o monetarypolicy. Just as Churchill once said, “Te era o pro-crastination, o hal-measures, o soothing and ba-fling expedients, o delays, is coming to its close. In itsplace we are entering a period o consequences.”In the last year and a hal there were numerous in-stances when the NBS shone through with its ex-pertise, efficiency and success in reaching set goals.Te results become even more meaningul when weconsider the act that our efforts to improve mone-tary and financial conditions have been taking placeduring the time o the biggest global economic crisis.Te period behind us was riddled with challenges.Almost seven years afer the global economic crisis

erupted, central banking and global financial trendshave changed compared to the previous period. Mon-etary policy regulators have to deal with extraordinarycircumstances that require the implementation o su-perior instruments. Unortunately, there isn’t a singlecountry that has not been subjected to negative exter-nal influences. Furthermore, today’s environment ostrong co-dependency between financial trends hasofen led to the activities o emerging economies, justlike ours, becoming merely reactionary to the movesmade by central bankers in developed countries to

Ipak, biti guverner Narodne banke Srbije u vreme verovatno najvećih turbulencija i krize svetskih eko-nomija veliki je poziv i odgovornost da se bankarskisistem očuva, povrati poljuljani kredibilitet i obnovimeđunarodni renome visokostručne institucije kojakvalitetno obavlja svoju misiju.

Tokom svojih 130 godina postojanja NBS je prola-zila kroz različite faze ugroženosti monetarnog si-stema. Dug period bolne hiperinflacije još uvek jeduboko u sećanjima ljudi. Negativni legat prošlih vremena upotpunjen turbulentnostima današnjice,čini buduće izazove zaposlenih u NBS specifičnijimu odnosu na ostale centralne banke sveta, ali donosii dragoceno iksustvo za pažljivo vođenje monetar-ne politike. I kako je to svojevremeno Čerčil rekao:„Period odugovlačenja, polovičnih mera, umiru- jućih i zbunjujućih rešenja, kao i period odlaganjaprivodi se kraju. Sada ulazimo u period posledica.”

Nebrojeno puta u poslednjih godinu i po dana NBSse istakla svojom stručnošću, efikasnošću i uspehomu ispunjavanju postavljenih ciljeva. Rezultati još višedobijaju na značaju sa činjenicom da se naša borbaza poboljšanje monetarnih i finansijskih uslova odvija u ambijentu najveće svetske ekonomske krize.Period iza nas bio je pun izazova. Gotovo sedam go-dina nakon izbijanja svetske ekonomske krize cen-tralno bankarstvo i svetski finansijski tokovi nisuisti kao što su bili u prethodnom periodu. Nosiocimonetarnih politika susreću se sa vanrednim okol-nostima koje iziskuju i upotrebu vanrednog instru-mentarijuma. I, nažalost, nijedna država nije ostrvoizolovano od negativnih spoljnih uticaja. Štaviše,današnji ambijent snažne međuzavisnosti finansij-skih tokova uslovio je da često aktivnosti ekonomijau razvoju, poput naše, moraju biti u određenoj merireakcija na poteze centralnih bankara visokorazvi- jenih zemalja. Ono što ipak raduje jeste činjenicada smo i u takvoj konstelaciji odnosa na globalnojfinansijskoj sceni ostvarili zavidne rezultate.Učeći na prethodnom iskustvu, jer Usus magister egregius, možemo ustanoviti i da nam je kriza, iako

uz snažan ceh, otvorila oči za dalje usmeravanjenaših aktivnosti. Postali smo svesni potrebe napu-štanja tradicionalnih premisa o jednom cilju mo-netarne politike i jednom instrumentu za njegovopostizanje. Široko upotrebljen režim cenovne stabil-nosti mora biti upotpunjen značajnijom borbom zazdrav finansijski sistem, težnjom za jačanje njegovesupervizije i regulacije. Štaviše, postali smo sve-sni neophodnosti pronalaženja optimalnog nivoakoherentnosti monetarnih i makroprudencijalnihmera. Dodatno, iskustvo ekonomske krize je poka-




a certain degree. What is positive is the act that, insuch a constellation o relations on the global financialscene, we have managed to achieve impressive results.By learning rom our past experiences, consider-ing Usus magister egregius, we can say that, despitepaying a high price, the crisis has opened our eyes

to what the uture direction o our activities shouldbe. We have become aware o the need to abandontraditional premises regarding the monetary policyo having a single goal and a single tool to achieve it.A widely implemented regime o price stability needsto be supplemented with stronger efforts to achieve ahealthy financial system, while striving to strengthenits supervision and regulation. Moreover, we have be-come aware o the necessity to find an optimal level ocoherence between monetary and macro-prudentialmeasures. Additionally, the experience gained romthe economic crisis has demonstrated that financial

institutions need to orm their capital reserves pre- ventatively during avourable periods o economic cy-cles, since only in this way will we be able to efficientlyreduce systemic risk, i.e. improve the resistance o theentire system to sudden shocks.So, what was achieved in the past period?By diligently working on identiying the causes ohigh volatility o prices and mitigating their negativeeffects, we have managed to bring the inflation downto our targeted range. Te act that the inflation ratein November last year was the lowest in the last 40years speaks or itsel. However, unlike earlier instanc-es when short-term success in reducing the inflationrate was accompanied by a rapid jump, the last eightmonths demonstrated to us that we are on the righttrack to maintaining the accomplished price stabilityin the long-term. We are even more satisfied with theact that inflation expectations or the financial sectorhave been stabilised and anchored at a desired level,since that is a goal we also want to reach in order toregain trust in efficiency and the success o monetarypolicy decision makers, as well as rebuilding the cred-ibility o the National Bank o Serbia.

Te newly-created environment o global turmoil onfinancial markets has largely changed the previous views o economic theorists and monetary policy de-cision makers. In the most recent period it became

very apparent that central banks in transitional coun-tries paid a lot o attention to maintaining a balancedexchange rate, despite being ocused, albeit declar-atively, on preserving the price stability. Despite thetraditional notion o inflation targeting entailing analmost totally flexible exchange rate, with very eworeign currency interventions, under specific condi-

zalo da finansijske institucije svoje kapitalne rezervemoraju formirati preventivno, u povoljnim perio-dima ekonomskih ciklusa, jer na taj način efikasnosmanjuju sistemski rizik, odnosno jačaju otpornostcelokupnog sistema na iznenadne šokove.Šta je to postignuto u prethodnom periodu?

Predano radeći na identifikaciji uzročnika visoke volatilnosti cena i umanjenju njihovih negativnihefekata, uspeli smo da inflaciju dovedemo u ciljaneokvire. Podatak iz novembra prošle godine o najni-žoj inflaciji u poslednjih 40 godina istorijski je sampo sebi. Međutim, za razliku od ranijih epizoda kada je kratkoročni uspeh u snižavanju inflacije bio pra-ćen rapidnim povratkom na visoke nivoe, posled-njih osam meseci ukazuje da smo na pravom putuda postignutu stabilnost cena održimo u srednjemi dugom roku. Još više raduje činjenica da su infla-ciona očekivanja finansijskog sektora stabilizovana

i usidrena na željenom nivou, jer to je cilj koji ho-ćemo da postignemo, kako bismo vratili poverenjeu efikasnost i uspeh nosilaca monetarne politike iponovo izgradili kredibilitet Narodne banke Srbije.Novonastali ambijent globalnih turbulencija na fi-nansijskim tržištima umnogome je izmenio ranijestavove ekonomskih teoretičara i nosilaca monetar-ne politike. U proteklom periodu postalo je jasno dacentralne banke zemalja u tranziciji, iako deklarativ-no fokusirane na održanje cenovne stabilnosti, zna-čajnu pažnju posvećuju ravnoteži deviznog kursa. Ipored tradicionalnog shvatanja prema kojem režiminflacionog targetiranja podrazumeva gotovo pot-puno fleksibilan devizni kurs, uz minimalan nivodeviznih intervencija, u specifičnim uslovima i u vi-sokoevroizovanoj ekonomiji poput naše, veliki deoprivrede i stanovništva zavisi od kretanja deviznogkursa. Nagle i česte promene kursa podižu neizve-snost u poslovanju privrednih subjekata, a iskustvaznačajnih deprecijacija ukazuju na mogućnost da seslabljenje dinara u značajnoj meri prelije na cene.Pretnja negativnih efekata ovakvih dešavanja po fi-nansijsku stabilnost stoga opravdava naše prisustvo

na deviznom tržištu.Otvorenost srpske privrede neminovno je izlažedešavanjima na svetskim tržištima. Rane aze ra-zvoja domaće ekonomije dovode do toga da uticajglobalnih kapitalnih tokova bude prilično izražen.U tekućoj godini, kao i u prethodnim, iskusili smoda se nestabilnost sa svetskih tržišta može preliti ina domaće i dovesti do fluktuacija kursa nacionalne

valute. Pojačana percepcija likvidnosnog rizika glo-balnih investitora je u dva navrata – sredinom prošlei početkom tekuće godine dovela do njihovog naglog




tions and in a highly ‘euroized’ economy like ours, amajor segment o businesses and the population de-pend on exchange rate fluctuations. Sudden and re-quent fluctuations in exchange rates are only adding touncertainty in doing business, while past experienceswith substantial depreciations point out to the pos-

sibility o any depreciation o the Dinar significantlyspilling over onto prices. Te threat o negative effectsrom these trends on the financial stability, thus, justi-fies our presence on the oreign currency market.Te openness o the Serbian economy inevitably ex-poses it to developments on world markets. Te earlystages o the development o the domestic economyhave led to the impact o global capital flows beingairly pronounced. In the current and previous years,we have seen that instability in the world can spill overonto the domestic market and lead to fluctuations inthe exchange rate o the national currency. A more

pronounced perception o liquidity risk among glob-al investors on two occasions – in the middle o lastyear and at the beginning o this – has resulted in theirabrupt withdrawal rom emerging countries and thedepreciation o local currencies. However, in such cir-cumstances the NBS has demonstrated that a well-ad-

justed monetary policy can mitigate the consequenc-es or the domestic economy and national currency.With its timely interventions on the interbank oreigncurrency market, the NBS has succeeded in partial-ly absorbing the large depreciation pressures arisingrom the sudden withdrawal o oreign investors romdinar assets. Te depreciation o the dinar was at thesame reerence level as regional countries (Hungari-an orint, Romanian leu and others), but much lessthan in other emerging countries like urkey and theBRICS countries, which experienced historical orperennial lows and saw depreciation, in certain peri-ods, reach 20%. We have demonstrated our objectiv-ity and unbiased orientation towards accomplishingmacroeconomic stability through investing effortsin offsetting the depreciation o the dinar by sellingoreign currency, as well as buying oreign currency

on the market to disable excessive appreciation oour currency during periods o appreciation. In thelast period we also conducted additional activities toachieve stability on the domestic oreign currencymarket. Moreover, awareness o domestic banks’ ac-tivities has been significantly raised, thus giving thesignal that there would be no place or speculationsthat could divert the exchange rate in an unavourabledirection or our economy.Te achieved stability o prices and oreign curren-cy trends in the ollowing period should reach their

povlačenja iz zemalja u razvoju i deprecijacija lokal-nih valuta. Međutim i u ovakvim okolnostima, NBS

je pokazala da dobro odmerena monetarna politikamože umanjiti posledice po domaću ekonomiju inacionalnu valutu. Narodna banka Srbije je blago-

vremenim intervencijama na međubankarskom de-

viznom tržištu uspela da delimično amortizuje velikedeprecijacijske pritiske koji su nastali usled naglogpovlačenja stranih investitora iz dinarske aktive. Sla-bljenje dinara bilo je na nivou reerentnih valuta uregionu (mađarska orinta, rumunski lej i dr.), a znat-no manje od valuta drugih zemalja u razvoju, poputurske i zemalja BRICS-a, koje su dostigle istorijskeili višegodišnje minimume i čije je slabljenje u poje-dinim periodima dostizalo i 20%. Svoju objektivnosti nepristrasnu orijentisanost ka postizanju makroe-konomske stabilnosti pokazali smo i nastojanjem dane samo u deprecijacijskim azama prodajom deviza

ublažimo slabljenje dinara, već i u periodima apre-cijacije kupovinom strane valute na tržištu onemo-gućimo prekomerno jačanje naše valute. U prethod-nom periodu sproveli smo i dodatne aktivnosti radipostizanja stabilnosti na domaćem deviznom tržištu.Značajno je podignuta inormisanost o aktivnostimadomaćih banaka, čime je dat signal da se neće do-zvoljavati spekulacije koje bi devizni kurs mogle dausmere u za privredu neželjenom smeru.Postignuta stabilnost cena i deviznih kretanja u na-rednom periodu bi trebalo da svoj pun efekat nađe usmanjenju premije rizika inkorporirane u kamatnestope na kredite privredi i stanovništvu. Postepenose otvara prostor za relaksaciju monetarne politikesmanjenjem referentne stope, što će dovesti do sma-njenja opšteg nivoa kamatnih stopa i manjeg optere-ćenja privrede. Ovim Narodna banka Srbije u svomdomenu doprinosi izgradnji zdravog okruženjapogodnog za investicije. Međutim, centralna bankanije institucija koja samostalnim radom može dovesti do popravljanja makroekonomskog ambijenta.Samo usklađena aktivnost svih ekonomskih politikadržave može dovesti do pokretanja privrede. Struk-

turne reforme, podizanje stabilnosti finansijskogsistema, geopolitička stabilnost, fiskalna ravnoteža– neophodni su uslovi za povratak poverenja dugo-ročno orijentisanih investitora i zdravih investicija uproizvodnju. U suprotnom, moramo biti svesni dačak i efikasna centralna banka samo „kupuje vre-me“ i odlaže izvesno. Svesna rizika koji su još uvekprisutni u međunarodnom okruženju, kao i poste-penosti uvođenja programa fiskalne konsolidacije,NBS stoga oprezno odmerava svoje poteze u daljojrelaksaciji monetarne politike.




ull effect through a reduction in the risk premiumincorporated into interest rates on corporate andretail loans. Opportunities to relax monetary poli-cy through the reduction o the benchmark rate areslowly opening up, which will result in a reduction ooverall interest rates and ewer burdens on the econ-

omy. Te National Bank o Serbia contributes to thisby creating a healthy environment conducive to in-

vesting. However, a central bank is not an institutionthat can improve the macroeconomic environmentby itsel. Only the coordinated activities o all o thestate’s economic policies can move the economy or-ward. Structural reorms, improving the stability othe financial system, geopolitical stability and a fiscalbalance are all prerequisites or the investors, whoplan long-term to regain their trust and or healthyinvestments to be made in manuacturing. Otherwisewe must be aware o the act that even an efficient cen-

tral bank will only be buying time and delaying theinevitable. With an awareness o the risks that are stillnot ound in the international environment, as wellas o the gradual introduction o the fiscal consolida-tion programme, the NBS will very careully weigh itsmoves regarding the urther relaxation o monetarypolicy.Te stabilisation o prices and exchange rates aregradually but undoubtedly leading to the realisationo a long-term goal o the NBS, which is raising thelevel o “dinarization”. In the previous period both thecentral bank and the government carried out variousactivities, all within the scope o their jurisdiction,in order to ace the mentioned problem. Adopting adecision which enables international financial institu-tions to grant loans in dinars rom assets generatedrom the issuing o long-term bonds on the domesticmarket, as well as the Serbian government endorsinga bylaw about subsidising interest rates on corporateloans indexed in dinars with the aim o stimulatingcredit activity among domestic companies, are justsome o the measures mentioned. Nevertheless, re-ducing the “euroization” level o the domestic econ-

omy is a challenge that we are going to work hard onover a longer period o time.A dominant share o banking in the Serbian financialsector emphasises the importance o the security obanks to the country’s overall financial stability. In themodern business environment and open economythe spill over rom global markets to transitional ones,caused by turbulences, cannot be avoided. Still, withits highly capitalised banks, a dominant share o corecapital and exceptional liquidity o the banking sector,Serbia can boast o a very stable financial system. On

Stabilizacija cena i deviznog kursa još uvek poste-peno, ali u pravom smeru, vodi i ostvarenju dugo-ročnog cilja NBS, podizanju stepena dinarizacije. Uproteklom periodu i centralna banka i Vlada su uokviru svojih mandata preduzele različite aktivnostiza suočavanje sa navedenim problemom. Usvajanjeodluke kojom se omogućava međunarodnim finan-sijskim institucijama da odobravaju dinarske kre-dite iz sredstava koja potiču od emisije dugoročnihhartija od vrednosti na domaćem tržištu i nedavnodoneta Uredba Vlade RS o subvencionisanju kama-ta na dinarske kredite privredi sa ciljem pospešiva-nja kreditne aktivnosti domaćih preduzeća, samosu neke od njih. Ipak, smanjenje stepena evroizo- vanosti domaće ekonomije izazov je kojem ćemo udužem periodu morati da posvetimo dosta pažnje.

Dominantno učešće bankarskog u ukupnom finan-sijskom sektoru Srbije apostrofira važnost sigurno-sti banaka za opštu finansijsku stabilnost u zemlji.U modernim uslovima poslovanja i otvorenim eko-nomijama prelivanje turbulencija sa globalnih natržišta u tranziciji se ne može izbeći. Ipak, Srbija ses obzirom na visoku kapitalizovanost banaka, pre-ovlađujuće učešće osnovnog kapitala i izuzetnu li-kvidnost bankarskog sektora, može pohvaliti veomastabilnim finansijskim sistemom. Svesni osnovnihrizika bankarskog sektora, postali smo još aktivniji




top o being aware o the basic banking sector risks,we have become even more active in implementingmeasures aimed at reducing a high share o non-per-orming loans (NPLs) in total loans granted. Just asbeore, and thanks to our supervisory unction, weare going to strive to increase the transparency o the

banking sector’s activities, i.e. disable any unjustifiedincrease in the costs o corporate and retail lending.Although it has been criticised as a limiting actorin the past, a prudent approach to bank supervision,based on relatively high equity demands or risk cov-erage, has proven to be one o the key contributingactors to maintaining the stability o regional bank-ing systems. Te act that banks in Serbia have or themost part quantitatively met a good portion o therequirements that are about to be introduced to theEU through the Basel III standards represents to usunequivocal validation that all the efforts we have ex-

erted so ar will have a positive long-term impact onthe stability o the banking sector.Without alse modesty and while being careul not tobecome captivated by the acknowledgments and com-pliments we have received, we are proud o the goodreputation that the NBS has in international financialcircles. In its last ew reports the IMF stated that themonetary policy exercised by the NBS was adequate.At international discussions, panels and orums NBSrepresentatives have been held in high esteem anddeemed as the leaders o other domestic institutions,thanks to the quality o their presentations.I we took a time machine rom the very oundationo our institutions to the present day, we would in-evitably notice that with the growing complexity oeconomic relations the range o the National Bank oSerbia’s competences also grew. raditional activitieso preserving monetary and fiscal stability have beensupplemented with the supervision o financial in-stitutions and financial education o both businessesand the population. Te transparency o the centralbank’s operations has been raised to a rational level, inorder to improve communication between the banks

and the public, and with the end goal o directing alleconomic actors towards strengthening macroeco-nomic and financial stability.It gives me great pleasure to say that the NBS hasbeen cooperating, in almost all segments, with othercentral banks and international financial institutions,while investing joint efforts in adopting the best inter-national practices in central banking.Being engaged in the aorementioned activities doesnot side-track the National Bank o Serbia rom beingin the service o its population. In the previous period

u preduzimanju mera za smanjenje visokog učešćaproblematičnih u ukupnim kreditima (NPL), kaozajedničke rezultante domaćih i međunarodnih či-nilaca. Kao i do sada, svojom kontrolnom funkci- jom nastojaćemo i da povećamo transparentnost uaktivnostima bankarskog sektora, odnosno onemo-

gućimo neopravdano povećanje troškova zaduživa-nja privrede i stanovništva.U prethodnom periodu često kritikovan kao ogra-ničavajući faktor, konzervativni pristup supervizijibanaka, zasnovan na relativno visokim kapitalnimzahtevima za pokriće rizika, pokazao se kao jedanod ključnih doprinosa očuvanju stabilnosti ban-karskih sistema u regionu. Činjenica da banke uSrbiji u značajnoj meri kvantitativno već ispunja- vaju dobar deo zahteva koji se tek uvode Bazel IIIstandardima u Evropskoj uniji, za nas predstavljanedvosmislenu potvrdu da će svi napori koje smo

uložili imati dugoročne pozitivne efekte na stabil-nost bankarskog sektora.Bez neiskrene skromnosti, ali i ne dozvoljavajućizanesenost priznanjima i komplimentima, može-mo s ponosom istaći dobar renome NBS u među-narodnim finansijskim krugovima. U nekolikoposlednjih izveštaja MMF-a, monetarna politikakoju sprovodi NBS je ocenjena kao adekvatna. Nameđunarodnim diskusijama, panelima, forumi-ma, predstavnici NBS su kvalitetom svojih izlaga-nja stekli status uzora i predvodnika svih drugihdomaćih institucija.Uputimo li se vremeplovom od samog osnivanjanaše institucije ka sadašnjosti, neizbežno ćemoprimetiti kako je sa usložnjavanjem ekonom-skih odnosa rasla i paleta nadležnosti Narodnebanke Srbije. Tradicionalne funkcije očuvanjamonetarne i finansijske stabilnosti dopunjene sunadležnostima supervizije finansijskih institucija i finansijske edukacije privrede i stanovništva.Transparentnost funkcionisanja centralne bankepodignuta je u racionalnim okvirima kako bi sepospešila komunikacija sa bankama i javnošću, a

sa krajnjim ciljem usmeravanja svih ekonomskihčinilaca u pravcu jačanja makroekonomske i fi-nansijske stabilnosti.Zadovoljstvo mi je da istaknem i da u gotovo svimsferama delovanja NBS postoji aktivna saradnja sadrugim centralnim bankama i međunarodnim fi-nansijskim institucijama, pri čemu se zajedničkimnaporima usvajaju tekovine najbolje međunarod-ne prakse u centralnom bankarstvu.Rad u službi svog stanovništva Narodna bankane iscrpljuje obavljanjem pobrojanih aktivnosti.




we invested a lot o effort into resolving many issuesthat our citizens were acing. With understanding orthe problems aced by people who took out loans inSwiss Francs, we made an official recommendationto banks with the aim o benefiting both sides. Wedemonstrated our resolve to deal with practical and

concrete problems by publishing data regarding inter-est rates on current account overdrafs, thus increas-ing both the competitiveness and transparency o thedomestic banking sector.Te National Bank o Serbia has always been, and willalways be, the driving orce behind humanitarian pro-

jects and collaboration with institutions and organiza-tions engaged in helping endangered people.However, the NBS is not only orientated towards ex-ternal events. We are also aware o the act that we canonly be efficient as a whole and in the last ew monthswe have done our best to work on improving our-

selves. By organizing seminars with eminent lecturersrom international universities presenting the resultso their research to our employees, the NBS has cre-ated an opportunity or its staff to gain additional in-sight and knowledge about the macro-economy andfinancial markets. Tis and other similar activities,along with the rational utilisation o financial resourc-es, are the right way to raise the level o expertise andresearch activities at the NBS, which in turn improvesour international reputation.Te period ahead is awash with new challenges andthe success o the NBS in realising its plans to ur-ther improve the macro-economic environment willdepend on many international and domestic actors.It remains to be seen whether many changes and ad-

justments in the activities o central banks and theapplication o unconventional measures during thecrisis were only a short-term change in the approachor a general change in the way we think and perceivemonetary theories. What is rather obvious is that‘everything flows’ (Panta Rei) and that, in a new en-

vironment, collaboration between all central bankson implementing preventative measures has become

a necessity.With awareness or the seriousness o current and u-ture challenges, responsibilities towards the citizensand its long tradition, in the coming period the Na-tional Bank o Serbia will lead a prudent monetarypolicy aimed at providing avourable conditions inorder to oster sustainable economic growth. We willstrive to jointly create the conditions we are going tobe proud o once the next jubilee comes.Because nothing begins without people and nothingends without institutions...

U proteklom periodu uložen je veliki trud za re-šavanje mnogih pitanja građana. Razumevajućiprobleme stanovništva zaduženog u švajcarskimfrancima, doneta je preporuka bankama sa ci-ljem balansiranja koristi obema ugovornim stra-nama. Svoju usmerenost na rešavanje praktičnih

i konkretnih problema pokazali smo i objavlji- vanjem podataka o kamatnim stopama na pre-koračenje po tekućim računima, povećavajućitako konkurentnost i transparentnost domaćegbankarskog sektora.Nebrojeno puta Narodna banka Srbije bila je i bićei dalje pokretač i humanitarnih aktivnosti i sarad-nje sa institucijama i organizacijama za pomoćugroženom stanovništvu.Međutim, nije NBS orijentisana samo na ekster-ne događaje. Svesni činjenice da samo kao celinamožemo biti efikasni i u proteklim mesecima dali

smo sve od sebe da radimo na sopstvenom usavr-šavanju. NBS organizacijom seminara na kojimaeminentni predavači sa međunarodnih univerzi-teta zaposlenima prezentuju rezultate svojih istra-živanja, pruža priliku svojim zaposlenima da sedodatno upute i stručno usmere ka oblastima ma-kroekonomije i finansijskih tržišta. Ovakve i sličneaktivnosti, ali uz racionalno korišćenje finansij-skih resursa, pravi su put za podizanje stručnosti iistraživačke delatnosti u NBS, čime će naš među-narodni ugled u još većoj meri biti poboljšan.Period koji je pred nama prepun je novih izazova,a uspešnost NBS u sprovođenju planiranog daljeguređenja makroekonomskog ambijenta zavisiće odbrojnih međunarodnih i domaćih činilaca. Da li subrojne promene i prilagođavanja u aktivnostimacentralnih banaka i upotreba nekonvencionalnihmera u doba krize bile samo kratkoročna prome-na pristupa ili opšta izmena načina razmišljanjai monetarnih teorija, pitanja su na koja ćemo tekdobiti odgovore. Evidentno je ipak da je „voda do-sta izmenjena“ (Panta Rei) i da u novom ambijen-tu međusobna saradnja svih centralnih banaka na

preventivnim aktivnostima postaje neophodnost.Svesna ozbiljnosti trenutnih i budućih izazova iodgovornosti pred građanima i dugom tradicijom,Narodna banka Srbije će i u narednom periodu voditi opreznu monetarnu politiku usmerenu naobezbeđivanje povoljnih uslova za omogućavanjeodrživog privrednog rasta. Težićemo da zajedničkistvorimo uslove na koje ćemo sa ponosom gledatiprilikom proslave sledećeg jubileja.Jer, ništa ne počinje bez ljudi i ništa se ne završavabez institucija.




Nebojša Savić Ph.D., President othe NBS Board o Governors andProessor at the FEFA

Bankingsectorstabilitypreserved

he only acceptable solution or Serbia is

one that will not mean a new burden ontaxpayers. Every solution in which the state

will not cover NPLs is acceptable, because thestate has not generated those problematic loans.Banks are individually responsible or NPLs, saysProessor Nebojša Savić, chairman o the Board oGovernors o the National Bank o Serbia

What has characterised the development of

the nancial sector in Serbia since the year

2000?

It is traditional or the Serbian financial system to bedominated by banks and because o that it is ofensaid that the Serbian financial system is bank-cen-tric. In 2000 Serbia aced an underdeveloped bank-ing and financial system. At that time Serbia hada much greater number o banks in relation totoday’s figure, with the pronounced dominance odomestic banks. Tat system was characterised bylow capitalisation and modest balance sheet sumso banks, which was significantly lower than GDP.Tat was an unambiguous indicator o an underdeveloped banking sector, and thus financial market,

in Serbia. At that time banks did not even perorman important unction that they now perorm,which is the unction o salary payments.Te development o our financial system aferthe year 2000 was characterised by the consol-idation o the banking system, both through theclosure o a number o banks and the takeover oothers, etc. As such, today Serbia has less than 30banks, but even that figure is still too high. An-other important characteristic is that a significantstrengthening o banks’ equity structure occurred,

Prof. dr Nebojša Savić,predsednik Saveta guvernera NBSi profesor FEFA

Sačuvanastabilnostbankarskog

sektoraZa Srbiju je jedino prihvatljivo rešenjeono koje neće značiti novo opterećenjeporeskih obveznika. Prihvatljivo je sva-

ko rešenje u kome država neće pokrivati NPL jer ih država nije ni generisala. Odgovornost zaNPL je pojedinačno na bankama, kaže Neboj-ša Savić, predsednik Saveta guvernera Narodnebanke Srbije

Šta je karakterisalo razvoj nansijskogsektora u Srbiji nakon 2000. godine?radicija finansijskog sistema Srbije je da u nje-mu dominiraju banke i zbog toga se često kažeda je srpski finansijski sistem bankocentričan.Srbija je 2000. godinu dočekala sa slabo ra-zvijenim bankarskim i finansijskim sistemom.ada je u Srbiji postojao višestruko veći brojbanaka u odnosu na današnji broj, sa izrazitomdominacijom domaćih banaka. aj sistem sukarakterisale i niska kapitalizovanost i skrom-na bilansna suma banaka, koja je bila znatnoniža od GDP. o je bio nedvosmisleni indika-

tor nedovoljno razvijenog bankarskog, pa timei finansijskog tržišta Srbije. Banke tada nisu niobavljale važnu funkciju koju danas obavljaju, ato je platni promet.Razvoj našeg finansijskog sistema posle 2000.godine karakterisalo je ukrupnjavanje ban-karskog sistema, što kroz gašenje jedne grupebanaka, što kroz preuzimanje druge grupe ba-naka, itd. ako da danas Srbija ima manje od30 banaka, ali je taj broj i dalje prevelik. Druga

važna karakteristika jeste da je došlo do značaj-




which contributed to the improvement o regula-tions. Te third important actor was the arrivalo oreign banks on our market, mainly throughtakeovers o existing banks. Tis process was ol-lowed by the strengthening o the corporatizationo banks, the strengthening o their commercialunctions and improving technologies or man-aging banking operations. In the context o thisprocess came an improvement in the banking andfinancial system compared to 2000, but the systemwas still relatively underdeveloped compared withthe countries o Central Europe, and especially in

comparison with EU countries.

How did the global economic crisis of

2008 impact on Serbia’s nancial sector,

especially banking?

Te economic crisis had a strong impact on thedomestic banking system, just as it impacted moreintensely on the global banking system. Te essenceo the crisis in the world was the act that key prin-ciples o good banking operation practices wereloosened, on the one side this was due to the loose

nog jačanja kapitalne strukture banaka, čemu je doprinelo unapređivanje regulative. reća važna stvar je bio dolazak stranih banaka nanaše tržište, uglavnom preuzimanjem posto-

jećih banaka. o je bio proces koji je pratilo jačanje korporativizacije banaka, jačanje njihovih komercijalnih funkcija i unapređenje teh-nologije upravljanja bankarskim poslovanjem.U sklopu tih procesa došlo je do unapređenjabankarskog i finansijskog sistema u odnosu na2000. godinu, ali je i dalje taj sistem relativnonedovoljno razvijen u poređenju sa zemljama

centralne Evrope, a pogotovo u poređenju sazemljama EU.

Kako je svetska ekonomska kriza iz 2008.godine pogodila nansijski sektor, presvega bankarski?Ekonomska kriza je snažno delovala na doma-ći bankarski sistem, kao što je još intenzivnijedelovala na globalni bankarski sistem. Suštinakrize u svetu je bila u tome da su ključni princi-pi dobre prakse bankarskog poslovanja labavili




monetary policy o the U.S. Federal Reserve, whileon the other side was the commercial banks thatrode that wave and relaxed their criteria or the ap-proval o credit. On the basis o this, a credit bubbleemerged and real estate prices became inflated.One part o this practice was also transerred toSerbia and we had a practice o some banks ap-proving consumer loans when oreseeable risksexisted. Te essence was in the act that therewas not enough credit potential rom domesticsources in Serbia, while on the world marketthere were available unds and so banks thatwere able ended up drawing so-called cross-bor-der loans rom their parent banks. Tat was thebasic system o financing our development rom

2005 to 2008. However, this came to a halt withthe outbreak o the crisis and these channels ofinancing then reduced.

Was the Serbian banking sector prepared for

the impact of the nancial crisis and what

are the reasons for its stability?

At the time the crisis broke, banks in Serbia hadhigh capitalisation, above 20%, which ensuredthey could traverse the crisis without jeopardisingfinancial stability. Tis was essentially due to the

i to, s jedne strane, zahvaljujući veoma labavojmonetarnoj politici FED-a, i s druge strane,komercijalnih banaka koje su na tom talasuobarale kriterijume odobravanja kredita. Na tojosnovi je došlo do kreditnog balona i naduva-

vanja cena nekretnina.Jedan deo te prakse se preneo i u Srbiju, pasmo imali praksu nekih banaka da se odobra-

vaju krediti klijentima kod kojih su postojalipredvidljivi rizici. Suština je bila u tome da uSrbiji nije bilo dovoljno kreditnog potencijalaiz domaćih izvora, a na svetskim tržištima supostojala slobodna sredstva, pa su banke kojesu bile u mogućnosti povlačile iz svojih maticatakozvane prekogranične kredite. o je u osnovi

bio sistem finansiranja našeg razvoja od 2005.do 2008. Međutim, sa izbijanjem krize, dolazido zaustavljanja, a onda i do smanjivanja ovogkanala finansiranja.

Da li je bankarski sektor Srbije biospreman za udar nansijske krize i koji surazlozi njegove stabilnosti?U trenutku izbijanja krize, banke u Srbiji suimale visoku kapitalizovanost, preko 20 odsto,što je obezbedilo da se kroz krizu prođe bez




act that our regulations were conservative, butwere also a guarantee o stability.

What kind of phase is the Serbian banking

sector in now and can credit growth be

expected again soon?

Te Serbian banking system shares the ate o theglobal financial system. In the world prooundchanges have occurred and continue to occur inthis area. We should not orget that Serbia tradi-tionally has modest domestic savings and, regard-less o how much it has, this is predominantlyshort term. Tis is the price that has to be paid orthe experience o hyperinflation and crisis. Whenyou do not have high quality domestic sources ofinancing, you have to rely on oreign unds, whichare more expensive. oday there is great cautionaround the world in terms o lending. Major risks

influence the business policies o banks that utilisethe unds o others and must worry about how tosettle obligations towards depositors.In order or the lending activities o domesticbanks to increase, the key is to have good qualityclients. oday in the Serbian banking sector thereis actually a battle going on or good clients andthey can receive loans at reduced interest rates.Serbia’s problem is that there are not enough goodclients with good businesses

What is the experience of other countries

when it comes to resolving NPLs? What

solutions are available to banks and

monetary authorities?

Te only acceptable solution for Serbia is onethat will not mean a new burden on taxpayers.Every solution in which the state will not cov-er NPLs is acceptable, because the state has notgenerated those problematic loans. Banks areindividually responsible for NPLs. Some bankswere conservative and did not enter into majorrisks and now they have lower levels of NPLs.

Te practice of other banks was to take on evenhigher risks, of course with the payment of high-er interest, and this resulted in the emergenceof NPLs, which is basically a problem of thosebanks. Te NBS confronted this problem in De-cember 2012 by improving the regulatory frame-work for resolving NPLs and permitting theirsale. However, only a small number of bankshave taken advantage of that option to date, butthose that have done so have improved the qual-ity of their balance sheets.

ugrožavanja finansijske stabilnosti. U suštini,ovo je proisteklo iz činjenice da je naša regu-lativa bila konzervativna, ali je bila garant sta-bilnosti.

U kakvoj fazi se danas nalazi bankarski

sektor Srbije, da li se može uskoroočekivati ponovo rast kreditne aktivnosti?Srpski bankarski sistem deli sudbinu globalnogfinansijskog sistema. U svetu su se dogodile idogađaju se duboke promene u ovoj sferi. Netreba zaboraviti da Srbija tradicionalno imaskromnu domaću štednju, a i toliko koliko jeima, ona je dominantno kratkoročna. o je cenakoja se plaća zbog iskustava sa hiperinflacija-ma i krizama. Kada nemate kvalitetne domaćeizvore finansiranja, morate se oslanjati na stra-na sredstva, što je skuplje. Danas postoji velika

opreznost širom sveta u pogledu kreditiranja.Veliki rizici utiču i na poslovne politike banakakoje, raspolažući tuđim sredstvima, moraju dabrinu kako će izmirivati svoje obaveze premasvojim deponentima.Da bi se kreditna aktivnost domaćih banaka po-

većala, ključ je da imate kvalitetne klijente. Da-nas se u srpskom bankarskom sektoru u stvari

vodi bitka za dobre klijente i oni mogu dobitikredite sa nižim kamatnim stopama. ProblemSrbije je u tome što nema dovoljno kvalitetnihklijenata sa dobrim biznisima.

Kakva je praksa drugih zemalja urešavanju NPL? Koja rešenja su naraspolaganju bankama i monetarnim vlastima?Za Srbiju je prihvatljivo jedino rešenje kojeneće značiti novo opterećenje poreskih ob-

veznika. Prihvatljivo je svako rešenje u komedržava neće pokrivati NPL, jer ih država i nijegenerisala. Odgovornost za NPL je pojedinačnona bankama. Neke banke su bile konzervativ-

ne i nisu ulazile u prevelike rizike i one imajumanje nivoe NPL. Praksa nekih drugih banaka je bila ulaženje u veće rizike, naravno uz napla-ćivanje i viših kamata, pa su iz toga proisteklinenaplativi krediti, u osnovi problem tih bana-ka. NBS je, suočena sa ovim problemom, još udecembru 2012. unapredila regulatorni okvir zarešavanje NPL, omogućavajući njihovu proda-

ju, ali je mali broj banka to do sada koristio, aone koje su to iskoristile poboljšale su kvalitetsvojih bilansa.




130 years othe NationalBank oSerbia

At No. 2 Knez Mihailova Street, at the inter-section with today’s Kralja Petra Street, inthe house o the Kumanudi brothers, the

Privileged National Bank o the Kingdom o Serbiabegan operating on 2nd July 1884. In this way, the

young Serbian state, which was officially recognisedinternationally at the Berlin Congress o 1878, re-ceived an important characteristic o statehood andentered the circle o modern European countrieswith a central issuing bank.Te first initiative or the establishment o the Na-tional Bank was launched back in 1854 and over theyears led to the view that a central bank should beestablished with private capital, but under stronggovernment control.In 1882 the Serbian government signed a contractwith the French General Union Bank or the financ-ing o the construction o the railroad and the au-thorities responded to the suggestion that the bankreceive a license to operate in Serbia and, amongother things, become the issuing bank. Tis bank in-

vested in speculative activities and quickly collapsed,which was a strong indicator that any bank thatwould issue money must be established with domes-tic equity. Pressure exerted by domestic traders andbusinessmen contributed to such public attitudes.On 20th December 1882 the Serbian Parliamentadopted the National Bank Act in order to upgrade

trade and crafsmanship in the Kingdom o Serbiawith cheaper capital and well-organized lending andalready on 6th January 1883 the Act was confirmedby the signature o King Milan Obrenović.Te dilemma o Finance Minister Čedomilj Mija-tovic was whether there would be sufficient capitaland interested shareholders at all to register 20,000shares, valued at 500 dinars per share.However, the interest o Serbian traders in the shareso the National Bank at the May Conerence, heldon 20th May 1883, was huge. Consequently, a total

130 godinaod osnivanjaNarodnebanke Srbije

UKnez Mihailovoj ulici broj 2, gde KnezMihailova seče današnju Ulicu kralja Pe-tra, u kući braće Kumanudi, 2. jula 1884.

godine sa radom je počela Privilegovana narodnabanka Kraljevine Srbije. Na ovaj način je mlada

srpska država, koja je zvanično međunarodno pri-znata na Berlinskom kongresu 1878. godine, dobi-la važno obeležje državnosti i ušla u krug moder-nih evropskih država sa centralnom emisionombankom.

Još 1854. godine pokrenute su prve inicijative zaosnivanje Narodne banke, a tokom godina došlose do stava da Narodna banka treba da bude osnovana privatnim kapitalom, ali pod jakom kontro-

lom države.Srpska vlada je 1882. godine potpisala ugovor sarancuskom bankom Generalna unija o finansiranjuizgradnje železničke pruge, a pred vlastima se našaoi predlog da ova banka dobije dozvolu za rad u Srbi-

ji i između ostalog da postane emisiona banka. Ovabanka je ulagala u špekulativne poslove, pa je brzopropala, što je bio jak argument da banka koja ćeemitovati novac mora da bude osnovana domaćimkapitalom. akvom stavu javnosti doprineli su i pri-tisci domaćih trgovaca i privrednika.




o 38,051 shares were registered, which was almosttwice the amount stipulated by law, so the number oshares had to be reduced. Ultimately, the initial capi-tal o 2.5 million dinars in gold and 2,496,625 dinarswas raised, as 27 registered shares were not paid.Te Constituent Assembly was held rom 26th to 29th

February 1884 and it was then that the first governor- Aleksa Spasić – was appointed. He had previouslyserved as Minister o Finance.

FOLLOWING BELGIUM’S EXAMPLE

Serbia, which was establishing an issuing bank orthe first time, had neither the experience nor the staffto independently implement this idea in practice.Te organization o the National Bank ollowed theexample o one o the most modern national bankso the time – the National Bank o Belgium.It has been decided to invite a oreign expert to Serbia

who knows about the organization o a central bank,because in our country there is no person with thenecessary knowledge and experience. For this pur-pose the government decided to address the countrythat o all countries until then was the least prone toreckless and risky industrial and trading ventures,where the material prosperity o the nation had de-

veloped on the most secure and best organized basis,and it is Belgium – this was how Jevrem Gudović,Minister o the National Economy, addressed theshareholders at the General Meeting o shareholderso the National Bank o Serbia.Charles Boshman, Accounting Director o the Na-tional Bank o Belgium, came rom Belgium and,

judging by the correspondence o the governor othe National Bank o Belgium and the Serbian Min-istry o Finance and then the National Bank o Ser-bia itsel, he was an extremely capable and importantadministrator.He set up internal regulations and the organizationo the National Bank o Serbia and, upon the requesto Governor Spasić, stayed until 1885, until the firstbalance o the newly established bank was made.

It was thanks to the assistance o the National Banko Belgium that the first banknote was printed, be-cause the National Bank o Serbia had access to aplate or printing spare notes o 100 rancs, whichwas used to print the o 100 dinar note redeemablein gold.Te organization o the National Bank o Serbia waslargely established ollowing the model o the NationalBank o Belgium and the NBS had a governor, deputygovernor, central board, board o directors, superviso-ry board, shareholders assembly and executive board.

Već 20. decembra 1882. godine Skupština Srbijedonela je Zakon o Narodnoj banci, “u cilju da se jevtinijim kapitalima i dobro uređenim kreditomtrgovina i radinost u Kraljevini Srbiji unaprede”, a 6. januara je Zakon potvrđen potpisom kralja MilanaObrenovića.

Dilema tadašnjeg ministra finansija Čedomilja Mi- jatovića bila je da li će uopšte biti dovoljno kapitalai zainteresovanih akcionara da se upiše 20.000 akcija

vrednosti od po 500 dinara po akciji.Međutim, interesovanje srpskih trgovaca za akcijeNarodne banke na Majskoj konerenciji, održanoj20. maja 1883. godine, bilo je ogromno. Nakon toga

je ukupno upisana 38.051 akcija, što je skoro dvaputa više nego što je planirano zakonom, pa je brojakcija morao biti redukovan. Na kraju je prikupljenosnivački kapital od 2,5 miliona dinara u zlatu, od-nosno 2.496.625 dinara, jer 27 akcija koje su upisanenisu i uplaćene.Osnivačka skupština je održana od 26. do 29. febru-ara 1884. godine i na njoj je izabran i prvi guver-ner - Aleksa Spasić, koji je do tada bio ministar bezportfelja.

PO UGLEDU NA BELGIJU

Srbija koja je prvi put osnivala emisionu bankunije imala ni iskustva ni kadrova koji bi mogli sa-mostalno sprovesti ovu zamisao u delo. Prilikomorganizacije Narodne banke ugledali su se na tada

jednu od najmodernijih narodnih banaka - Belgij-sku narodnu banku.„Odlučeno je da se u Srbiju pozove strani stručnjakkoji dobro poznaje organizaciju jedne centralne ban-ke budući da u našoj zemlji nema čoveka sa potreb-nim znanjem i iskustvom. Vlada je odlučila da se utu svrhu obrati zemlji koja je od svih zemalja do tadanajmanje bila sklona nepromišljenim i riskantnimindustrijskim i trgovačkim špekulacijama i u kojoj sematerijalno blagostanje nacije razvilo na najuređeni-

jim i najsigurnijim osnovama, a to je Belgija.”




Te governor o the country’s central bank was incharge o executing the decisions o the sharehold-ers assembly, central board and board o directors,which he chaired. Governors were proposed by thenational economy minister and appointed by de-cree o the King.

Te Shareholders Assembly was the highest bodyo the bank and gathered at least once a year. It wasthen that the final bank account was adopted, whilethis body also decided on profit distribution, aswell as deciding about the members o the manage-ment and supervisory boards.Te Board of Directors was responsible for thefunctioning of the National Bank, from decisionmaking to the determination of interest rates, staffemployment and layoffs. By 1920 the Board con-sisted of 12 members, who set aside a deposit of40 shares of the National Bank during their term

of office.Te Supervisory Board was responsible or controlo the bank and its members had to lay down a de-posit o 15 shares o the bank.Te Central Board included members o the Steer-ing and Supervisory Boards and its principal juris-diction were questions regarding money issues.Although the bank was established with private eq-uity, it was under the direct supervision o the state.Furthermore, the governor was actually appointedby the state i.e. the king, upon the proposal o theminister, and there was also a position o govern-ment commissioner, who had the right to attendmeetings o the Board o Directors and sharehold-ers. Additionally, some decisions could be madeonly with the consent o the government, whichmost commonly related to issuing money.

DINAR AS THE NATIONAL CURRENCY

Until liberation rom the urks and gaining inde-pendence, real chaos reigned in payments in Serbianlands. Tere were as many as 43 oreign coins in cir-culation, European and urkish, and payments were

made in the gold, silver and copper coins. Becauseo so many different metal coins o different purity,there were a lot o fiscal tariffs that hindered trade.Tis situation lasted until 1868, when it was decid-ed to mint domestic, Serbian money, initially coppercoins displaying the image o Prince Mihailo.As early as 1873 the law on minting silver coins waspassed and the dinar became the basic unit. Terewere disputes over the name o the Serbian currency,but the initiative o Čedomilj Mijatović prevailed andthe Serbian currency was named afer the money

Ovako se Jevrem Gudović, ministar narodne privre-de, obratio akcionarima na Generalnoj skupštini ak-cionara Narodne banke Srbije.Iz Belgije je stigao Šarl Bošman, direktor računovod-stva Narodne banke Belgije i sudeći prema prepisciguvernera Narodne banke Belgije i srpskog ministar-

stva finansija, a zatim i Narodne banke Srbije, izuzet-no sposoban i značajan službenik.On je postavio unutrašnje propise i organizaciju Na-rodne banke Srbije, a na molbu guvernera Spasićaostao je do 1885. godine, dok nije urađen prvi bilansnovoosnovane banke.Zahvaljujući pomoći Narodne banke Belgije štampa-na je i prva novčanica, jer je Narodnoj banci Srbijestavljena na raspolaganje ploča za štampanje rezerv-ne novčanice od 100 ranaka, na kojoj je odštampananovčanica od 100 dinara plativih u zlatu.Organizacija Narodne banke Srbije u velikoj meri

je uspostavljena po ugledu na Belgijsku narodnubanku, pa je NBS imala guvernera, viceguvernera,Glavni odbor, Upravni odbor, Nadzorni odbor, Zborakcionara i Eskontni odbor.Guverner Narodne banke je bio zadužen za izvr-šavanje odluka Zbora akcionara, Glavnog i Uprav-nog odbora, kojima je predsedavao. Guvernera jepredlagao ministar narodne privrede, a ukazompostavljao kralj.Zbor akcionara je bio najviši organ banke i održavaose najmanje jednom godišnje. Na njemu je usvajanzavršni račun banke, a na ovom telu donosile su se iodluke o raspodeli dobiti, kao i o članovima Uprav-nog i Nadzornog odbora.Upravni odbor je bio zadužen za unkcionisanjeNarodne banke i donošenje odluka, od određivanjakamatnih stopa, do prijema i otpuštanja službenika.Do 1920. godine Upravni odbor je činilo 12 članova,koji su polagali depozit od 40 akcija Narodne banketokom trajanja mandata.Nadzorni odbor je bio zadužen za kontrolu radabanke, a i njegovi članovi su morali da polože depo-zit od 15 akcija banke.

U Glavnom odboru nalazili su se članovi Upravnogi Nadzornog odbora i njegova glavna nadležnost bilasu pitanja u vezi sa emisijom novca.Iako je banka osnovana privatnim kapitalom, bila

je pod direktnim nadzorom države. Osim što je guvernera aktički postavljala država, odnosno kralj napredlog ministra, postojala je i unkcija vladinog ko-mesara koji je imao pravo da prisustvuje sednicamaUpravnog odbora i zborovima akcionara. Dodatno,neke odluke mogle su biti donete samo uz saglasnost

vlade, a to se najčešće odnosilo na emitovanje novca.




that had been minted in Serbia centuries previouslyby Despot Stean Lazarevic. Standards o weight andfineness o coins were adapted to the regulations othe Latin Monetary Union and the monetary systemo Serbia was ully equipped with the dinar as theonly valid means o payment. Shortly aferwards, in1878, a law was introduced regulating the minting o

gold coins.Te establishment o the National Bank o Serbiacreated the possibility to print paper notes or bank-notes, but the population was accustomed to silverand strongly resisted the paper money. A particular-ly aggravating actor was that the National Bank hadissued only 100-dinar banknotes redeemable in gold,which was a huge denomination or that time andsignificantly slowed down the circulation o cash.Tose were the main reasons why the National Bankrecorded a loss in its first year o operations. TeBank wanted to print smaller denominations o 50and 10 dinars, but met with the resistance rom thestate, which wanted to retain that right or itsel. Acompromise was ound with the Act o 1885, accord-ing to which the National Bank was allowed to printbanknotes o 10 dinars, but with silver backing, withwhich a bimetallic system actually entered into orce,with coverage in gold and silver.Acceptance o the rules o the Latin Union meant ac-cepting coverage or paper banknotes with preciousmetals. So Serbia made obligated banknotes to bebacked by at least 40 per cent in gold, with the gold

up to a quarter o the value o a banknote being re-placeable with silver.As a new institution which had introduced a novel-ty like paper money, the National Bank had to gaincredibility. Tis was possible only through the re-quirement that each banknote’s replacement or goldhad to be filled. Certainly, this had to take into ac-count the amount o banknotes issued.Te real test or the credibility o the National Bankwas a customs war with Austria-Hungary in 1906,when 73.97 per cent o the banknotes were covered

DINAR KAO NACIONALNA VALUTA

Do oslobođenja od uraka i sticanja nezavisnosti,na teritoriji Srbije vladao je pravi haos u plaćanji-ma. U opticaju su se nalazile čak 43 strane monete,evropske i turske, a plaćalo se zlatnim, srebrnim ibakarnim novcem. Zbog toliko mnogo različitogmetalnog novca različite čistoće, postojalo je mnogo

novčanih taria koje su otežavale trgovinu.akva je situacija vladala sve do 1868. godine, kada

je odlučeno da se kuje domaći, srpski novac, najprebakrenjaci sa likom kneza Mihaila.Već 1873. godine donosi se Zakon o kovanju srebr-ne monete, a osnovna jedinica je dinar. Oko nazivasrpske valute su se vodili sporovi, ali je prevladalainicijativa Čedomilja Mijatovića da srpska valuta do-bije ime po novcu koji je kovao u Srbiji još despotStean Lazarević. Standardi o težini i finoći kovanicaprilagođeni su propisima Latinske novčane unije, anovčani sistem u Srbiji je potpuno uređen sa dina-rom kao jedinim važećim platnim sredstvom. Ubrzopotom, 1878. godine, zakonom se uređuje i kovanjezlatnog novca.Formiranjem Narodne banke stvara se mogućnostštampanja papirnih novčanica, odnosno banknota,ali je stanovništvo naviklo na srebrnjake imalo velikeotpore prema papirnom novcu. Posebno otežavajućaokolnost je bilo to što je Narodna banka emitovalasamo novčanicu od 100 dinara plativu u zlatu, što jebio veoma krupan apoen za to doba. o je znatnousporavalo novčani opticaj. Ovo su bili i glavni razlo-

zi zašto je Narodna banka u prvoj godini poslovanjazabeležila gubitak. Želeći da štampa i manje apoeneod 50 i 10 dinara, Narodna banka je naišla na otpordržave koja je želela da zadrži za sebe to pravo. Za-konom iz 1885. godine nađen je kompromis, gde jeNarodnoj banci dozvoljeno da štampa banknote od10 dinara, ali sa pokrićem u srebru, čime je u stvarina snagu stupio bimetalni sistem, u kome je postoja-lo pokriće u zlatu i srebru.Prihvatanje pravila Latinske unije značilo je i pridr-žavanje pokrića papirnih banknota plemenitim me-




with metal. During the First Balkan War o 1912 cov-erage accounted or 85.51 per cent, while in the firstyear o World War I it was as much as 115.63 percent.Although the Privileged Bank was an issuing insti-tution, its primary task was lending to the economy

and the state, though it also approved loans to creditbureaus and banks.Even beore the official opening o the NationalBank, the state had become its debtor thanks to aloan o 304,216 dinars in gold. Participation o gov-ernment debt in the total outstanding bills amountedto 38.91 per cent in 1884 and two years later this fig-ure jumped to 50 per cent. Tis was partly cause d bythe low speed o circulation o money and with theaccelerating o circulation this share decreased. Testate continually borrowed rom the National Bankand rom abroad, due to budget deficits.

It significantly loaded gold reserves and the valueo the dinar and in 1904 the relationship betweenthe state and the National Bank was regulated andFinance Minister Lazar Paču, speaking in the parlia-mentary debate on the law, deended the argumentthat the National Bank could not be a source o rev-enue or the state, but could only indirectly contrib-ute by strengthening the economy and the properdistribution o loans, with which it could influencethe growth o the real national income. With thislaw, borrowing rom the state treasury at the Nation-al Bank was defined as temporary and short term.Government borrowing o 10 million dinars wasintroduced, with all previous debts being combinedinto one. Tis solution turned out to be an excellentone, because by 1907 the state had already overcomeall its debts to the central bank.

THE NBS IN THE STORM OF THE GREAT WAR

Te last decade o the 19th century and first decadeo the 20th was marked by the rapid industrialisationand economic development o Serbian society, withthe wings or that development being provided by the

grand operations o the National Bank. Te share-holders o the National Bank had a yield based oninterest o six per cent, as well as a dividend. Te stateparticipated in the profit o the bank with 20 per cent.Given that the National Bank operated profitably, itbrought the average annual return rom eight to 12per cent, which was extreme or the circumstances.However, the National Bank did not realise profits byincreasing interest rates, because interest rates weregenerally lower than the rise in prices and the dis-count rate had not changed or 38 years.

talima. ako se Srbija obavezala da će banknote bitipokrivene najmanje sa 40 odsto u zlatu, s tim što sezlato do četvrtine vrednosti banknote moglo zame-niti srebrom.Kao nova institucija koja je uvodila novost kao što jepapirni novac, Narodna banka je morala steći kre-

dibilitet. o je bilo moguće jedino tako što je svakizahtev da se banknote zamene za zlato morao biti is-punjen. Naravno, zbog toga se moralo voditi i računao količini izdatih banknota.Pravi test za kredibilitet Narodne banke bio je ca-rinski rat sa Austrougarskom 1906. godine, kada je73,97 odsto banknota bilo pokriveno metalom. o-kom Prvog balkanskog rata 1912. godine pokriće jeiznosilo 85,51 odsto, a u prvoj godini Prvog svetskograta čak 115,63 odsto.Iako je Privilegovana banka bila emisiona ustanova,ipak je njen prvenstveni zadatak bilo kreditiranje.

Osnovna delatnost je bilo kreditiranje privrede i dr-žave, ali odobravala je kredite i kreditnim zavodimai bankama.Država je i pre zvaničnog otvaranja Narodne bankepostala njen dužnik, pozajmicom od 304.216 dinarau zlatu. Učešće državnog duga u ukupnom opticajunovčanica iznosilo je 38,91 odsto 1884. godine, dabi dve godine kasnije taj udeo skočio na polovinu.ome je delom uzrok bila i mala brzina opticaja nov-ca, te se ubrzavanjem opticaja taj udeo smanjivao.Država se zbog budžetskih deficita stalno zaduživalai kod Narodne banke i u inostranstvu.o je značajno opterećivalo zlatne rezerve i vrednostdinara, pa je 1904. godine regulisan odnos države iNarodne banke, a tadašnji ministar finansija LazarPaču je na skupštinskoj raspravi zakon branio argu-mentacijom da Narodna banka ne može biti izvorprihoda za državu, već samo posredno, jačanjem pri-

vrede i pravilnom raspodelom kredita, može uticatina rast pravih državnih prihoda. im zakonom jezaduživanje državne kase kod Narodne banke odre-đeno kao privremeno i kratkoročno. Uvelo se zadu-živanje države za 10 miliona dinara, a svi prethodni

dugovi su spojeni u jedan. Rešenje se pokazalo kaoodlično, jer već 1907. godine država više ništa nijedugovala središnjoj banci.

NBS U VIHORU VELIKOG RATA

Poslednju deceniju 19. i prvu deceniju 20. veka označio je ubrzani industrijski i ekonomski razvoj srpskog dru-štva, a krila tom razvoju dalo je i odlično poslovanje Na-rodne banke. Akcionari Narodne banke imali su prinospo osnovu kamate od šest odsto, kao i od dividende. Udobiti banke učestvovala je i država sa 20 odsto.




All this ended with the arrival o the wars. Duringthe First Balkan War o 1912 the National Bank wasallowed to pay or up to a quarter o gold-redeemablebanknotes in silver. Tis lasted until the beginning o1914, when the situation stabilised.However, not long aferwards war was once again

at Serbia’s doorstep. A day beore the Austria-Hun-garian ultimatum was handed to the Serbian gov-ernment on 12th July, the National Bank relocated allits gold and silver reserves to Kruševac, at the ini-tiative o Finance Minister Paču. Te Bank operat-ed rom Kruševac until September 1915, when thedecision was made to move to Bitola as a responseto the invasion o the Austro-Hungarian Army. Teattack o Bulgaria accelerated the withdrawal and thecomposition rom Niš passed through Vranje just aew hours beore the railroad tracks were cut by theBulgarians eventually arriving in Tessaloniki. Te

Capital Bank spent almost three months on the rail-way in Tessaloniki, when it was decided that theNational Bank o Serbia would be temporarily re-located to Marseille in the south o France. At thattime about 57 million rancs in gold were transerredto the treasury o the Bank o France in Marseille,while the total reserves o the National Bank o Ser-bia amounted to 813 million rancs. Te dinar alsohad the backing o about 200 million rancs in goldrom loans issued by France and England during thefirst two years o the war.Te bank was active during the war, but its peror-mance afer leaving Belgrade was very limited. Lend-ing to the economy completely disappeared, whileon the other hand, due to financing the army, allbusiness was conducted with the state.During the war the National Bank would put bank-notes into circulation only i they had gold backing.At the end o 1914 the coverage o banknotes by goldwas 115.63 per cent. Te total backing o the curren-cy amounted to 297.3 million dinars, while a total o340.6 million dinars was in circulation.Nevertheless, the devaluation o the dinar in the oc-

cupied territory was a powerul means o impover-ishment and oppression o the Serbian population.Te Bulgarians rejected the use o banknotes andnickel coins in the part o the territory they con-trolled, while the value o the silver dinar dropped to65 per cent o the value o the lev, which ensured themoney held by the local population lost two-thirdso its value. In the parts o the territory occupied byAustria-Hungary the value o the dinar ell by a halcompared to the krona. However, the actual situa-tion was different rom directions and in some parts

S obzirom na to da je Narodna banka poslovala pro-fitabilno, donosila je prosečan godišnji prinos odosam do 12 odsto, što je bilo izuzetno za tadašnjeprilike. Međutim, zaradu Narodna banka nije ostva-rivala povećanjem kamata, jer su kamatne stope popravilu bile niže od rasta cena, a eskontna stopa nije

menjana 38 godina.Sve ovo prekinula su ratna dešavanja. Početkom Pr-

vog balkanskog rata 1912. godine Narodnoj banci jedozvoljeno da novčanice plative u zlatu do jedne če-tvrtine isplati u srebru. o je trajalo do početka 1914.godine kada se situacija stabilizovala.Međutim, nije dugo prošlo kada je rat ponovo zaku-cao na vrata. Dan pre predaje austrougarskog ulti-matuma srpskoj vladi 12. jula, na inicijativu Laze Pa-čua, ministra finansija, Narodna banka prebacuje svezlato i srebro u Kruševac. Banka je unkcionisala izKruševca do septembra 1915. godine, kada se donosi

odluka da se preseli za Bitolj zbog nadiranja austrou-garske vojske. Napad Bugarske ubrzava povlačenje, akompozicija iz Niša prolazi kroz Vranje samo neko-liko sati pre nego što prugu presecaju Bugari i stiže uSolun. Imovina banke je skoro tri meseca stajala naželezničkoj pruzi u Solunu, kada je doneta odluka dase Narodna banka Srbije preseli u južnu Francusku,u Marselj. ada je u trezore Banke Francuske u Mar-selju prebačeno oko 57 miliona ranaka u zlatu, doksu ukupne rezerve Narodne banke Srbije iznosile 813miliona ranaka. akođe, dinar je imao i pokriće uoko 200 miliona ranaka u zlatu od zajmova uzetihod Francuske i Engleske tokom prve dve godine rata.Za vreme rata banka je bila aktivna, ali njeno po-slovanje je nakon napuštanja Beograda bilo veomaograničeno. Kreditiranje privrede je potpuno zamr-lo, a s druge strane zbog finansiranja vojske celokup-no poslovanje se odvijalo sa državom.Narodna banka je tokom rata puštala u opticaj nov-čanice samo ako su imale podlogu u zlatu. Na kraju1914. godine pokrivenost novčanica zlatom iznosi-la je čak 115,63 odsto. Ukupna podloga je iznosila297,3 miliona dinara, a ukupno se u opticaju nalazilo

340,6 miliona dinara.Uprkos tome, obezvređivanje dinara na okupiranojteritoriji bilo je moćno sredstvo osiromašenja i tla-čenja srpskog stanovništva. Bugari su na delu teri-torije koju su kontrolisali izbacili iz upotrebe dinar-ske novčanice i kovanice od nikla, dok su vrednostsrebrnog dinara spustili na 65 odsto vrednosti leva,čime je lokalnom stanovništvu obezvređen novacza dve trećine. U delovima teritorije koju je okupi-rala Austrougarska, vrednost dinara je oborena napolovinu prema kruni. Međutim, aktička situacija




o Serbia in 1916 the dinar could be exchanged or a value exceeding that o the krona. Although it is pos-sible to suggest many reasons or such exchange ratefluctuations, the most probable is that the Serbiandinar had a strong base, while the Austro-Hungarianmonarchy degraded their currency by relentlessly is-

suing notes without coverage in metal or oreign cur-rency in an attempt to finance war expenditures. Onthe other hand, some Austrian sources indicated thatthe population o Serbia believed in the existence othe Kingdom o Serbia and the return o power and

valued the dinar accordingly. Tis meant that by theend o the war the currency o the country under oc-cupation was stronger on the Swiss stock exchangethan the currency o its occupiers.

BANK BETWEEN THE WARS

Te Privileged National Bank o the Kingdom o Ser-

bia returned rom France to Serbia in 1919, in orderto become the central bank covering the whole terri-tory o the newly ormed Kingdom o Serbs, Croatsand Slovenes.Te international situation in the entire period be-tween the two world wars was turbulent. Manycountries were not satisfied with the terms o thereaty o Versailles and the reconstruction o a dev-astated Europe and its financial markets lasted orthe next ew years. However, as early as 1922 the riseo ascism took place in Italy, in 1929 the Great De-pression started in the United States and overflowedinto Europe, partially causing the rise to power othe Nazi Party in Germany, which had been hit byhistorical hyperinflation and unemployment duringthat period. For the fledgling Kingdom o Yugosla-

via, the challenge was to create a unified state andstrengthen institutions.Part o this was adapting the National Bank, so withthe law o 1920 it changed its name to the NationalBank o the Kingdom o Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,to be named as such ormally with 1921 amend-ments to the law. Afer nine years, due to a change

in the name o the state, the bank altered its nameagain, this time becoming the National Bank o theKingdom o Yugoslavia.Te errestrial Currency Act o 1920 set strength-ening as the main task o the National Bank. Tedual silver-gold system was abolished and a legalMetal Moneta was established, the obligation oexchanging banknotes in metal legal tender wasabolished. From 1st February 1920 the PrivilegedNational Bank o the Kingdom o Serbia ceased tounction and the National Bank o the Kingdom o

je bila drugačija od direktiva i dinar je tokom 1916.godine u razmeni u nekim delovima Srbije vredeoi više od krune. Iako je moguće navesti mnogo ra-zloga za takvo kretanje kursa, najverovatniji je tajšto je srpski dinar imao jaku podlogu, dok je Au-strougarska monarhija nemilice emitovala novac

bez pokrića u metalu ili devizama, pokušavajućida finansira ratne izdatke i tako ga obezvređivala.S druge strane, neki austrijski izvori ukazuju da jestanovništvo Srbije verovalo u opstanak KraljevineSrbije i povratak vlasti, pa je tako vrednovalo i di-nar. ako je na kraju rata na švajcarskim berzama

valuta zemlje koja je okupirana bila jača od valuteokupatora.

Banka između dva rata

Privilegovana narodna banka Kraljevine Srbije vra-tila se iz Francuske u Srbiju 1919. godine, da bi u

novoj državi, Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca,zauzela ulogu centralne banke na celoj teritoriji.

Međunarodna situacija u periodu između dva ratabila je turbulentna. Mnoge zemlje nisu bile zado-

voljne uslovima Versajskog mira, a obnova razru-šene Evrope i finansijskih tržišta trajala je narednihnekoliko godina. Međutim, već 1922. godine na

vlast u Italiji dolazi ašizam, 1929. godine izbija Ve-lika kriza u SAD i preliva se na Evropu, što uzrokujedelom i dolazak na vlast nacista u Nemačkoj kojuprethodno pogađaju istorijska hiperinflacija i neza-poslenost. Za Kraljevinu SHS izazov je bilo stvara-

nje jedinstvene države i učvršćivanje institucija.Deo toga je bilo prilagođavanje Narodne banke, pa je zakonom iz 1920. godine promenjeno ime u Na-rodnu banku Kraljevstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca,da bi izmenama zakona 1921. godine dobila imeNarodna banka Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.Nakon devet godina, zbog promene imena države,menja se ponovo i ime u Narodna banka KraljevineJugoslavije.Zakonom iz 1920. godine kao glavni zadatak Na-rodnoj banci se postavlja jačanje „zemaljske valute”.




Serbs, Croats and Slovenes began its operations.Te Privileged Bank and the Kingdom o Serbiatranserred gold and oreign currency reservesworth 831,610,160 dinars to the new bank.A great need or money suraced afer the war, in or-der to restore the country and the economy, and the

government aced the choice o whether to come outto meet the economy by issuing as much money asdemanded, or just to be a cash register or money incirculation and avoid the right to devalue by issuingadditional amounts.Te National Bank opted or another unction, whichpractically meant abandoning the goal proclaimed atits establishment o upgrading trade and crafsman-ship in the Kingdom o Serbia with cheaper capitaland well-organized lending and turned instead tomaintaining the value o the dinar.Tis was not surprising, as in those years inflationary

budget financing was introduced by issuing money.As such, during the 1920s alone the money supplyincreased by 4.7 times.

GEORGE WEIFERT

During all these years o operations o the NationalBank o Serbia, the key role was played by GeorgeWeifert. One o the greatest industrialists and rich-est individuals in the country, Weiert was one othe ounders o the Privileged National Bank o theKingdom o Serbia and was involved rom its es-tablishment in 1889. He served as deputy governorand governor rom 1890 to 1902 and rom 1912 to1926, afer which he was appointed a lielong hon-orary governor.Weiert led the bank during the most difficult peri-ods o the Balkan Wars and World War I, while themost amous governor o the National Bank is alsoremembered or preserving the value o the Serbi-an currency in the most difficult circumstances anddeveloping lending operations in Serbia afer inde-pendence.During this period, when the country had a signi-

icantly enlarged territory, population and economy,there was a need to print its own banknotes. Con-struction o the printing works began in 1927 inopčider, according to the design o architect JosephNajman. Te acility was constructed according to aFrench model and was completed in 1929. It official-ly opened in 1930.Printing plates to issue the first banknotes of 10and 100 dinars were donated to the Institute forthe production of banknotes from the Bank ofFrance, while watermarked paper was imported

Ukida se dvojni srebrno-zlatni sistem i uspostavljametalna zakonska moneta. Obustavljena je obavezazamene novčanica u metalnu zakonsku monetu. Od1. ebruara 1920. godine prestaje sa radom Privile-govana narodna banka Kraljevine Srbije i počinjesa radom Narodna banka Kraljevstva SHS. U novu

banku Privilegovana banka i Kraljevina Srbija pre-nele su zlato i devize vredne 831.610.160 dinara.Nakon rata javljale su se velike potrebe za novcemradi obnove zemlje i privrede i vlasti su se našlepred izborom da li da izlaze u susret privredi emito-

vanjem novca kolika god je tražnja, ili da bude samoblagajna za novac u opticaju i da nema pravo da gaobezvređuje emitovanjem dodatnih iznosa.Narodna banka se odlučila za drugu unkciju, što jepraktično značilo da je odustala od cilja koji je pro-klamovan pri osnivanju, „da se jevtinijim kapitali-ma i dobro uređenim kreditom trgovina i radinost

u Krajevini Srbiji unaprede” i okrenula se održanju vrednosti dinara.o i ne čudi, jer je tih godina uvedeno inflator-no finansiranje budžeta emisijama novca. ako je samo tokom 1920. godine povećana novčanamasa za 4,7 puta.

đorđe vajfert

Sve ove godine u unkcionisanju Narodne bankeSrbije ključnu ulogu igrao je Đorđe Vajert. Jedanod najvećih industrijalaca i najbogatijih ljudi u ze-mlji bio je jedan od osnivača Privilegovane narodnebanke Kraljevine Srbije, od osnivanja do 1889. bio je

viceguverner, a guverner od 1890. do 1902. i od 1912.do 1926. godine. Nakon toga je proglašen za doživot-nog počasnog guvernera.Vajert je, dakle, predvodio banku u najtežim perio-dima balkanskih ratova i Prvog svetskog rata, a naj-čuveniji guverner Narodne banke ostao je upamćenpo očuvanju vrednosti srpske valute u najtežim okol-nostima i razvoju kreditnih poslova u Srbiji nakonosamostaljenja.U ovom periodu, sa znatno uvećanima teritorijom,

brojem stanovnika i privredom, javila se i potrebaza sopstvenom štamparijom novčanica. Izgradnja je počela 1927. godine u opčideru, prema projektuarhitekte Jozea Najmana. Gradnja objekta, koji je zauzor imao rancusku štampariju, završena je 1929.godine, a 1930. godine svečano je otvoren.Ploče za izradu prvih novčanica od 10 i 100 dinaraZavodu za izradu novčanica ustupila je Banka Fran-cuske, a iz ove zemlje je uvezen i papir sa vodenimžigom. Pogon za izradu kovanog novca izgrađen je1937. godine.




DRUGI SVETSKI RAT

Nemačka je 6. aprila 1941. godine bombardovalaBeograd, 17. aprila je kapitulirala jugoslovenska

vojska, a već 29. maja je nemački poverenik za privredu u Srbiji doneo Uredbu o likvidaciji Narodne

banke Kraljevine Jugoslavije, budući da je teritorijaJugoslavije okupirana od strane Nemačke, Bugar-ske, Italije, Mađarske i Albanije, uz ormiranje Ne-zavisne Države Hrvatske, dok je u Srbiji postavljenamarionetska vlada.Krajem marta 1941. godine Narodna banka jeu rezervama imala 63,5 tona zlata. Samo dan prenapada na Jugoslaviju, Narodna banka je 5. aprilasve zlato (više od jedne tone) na čuvanju u Banci zameđunarodne obračune u Bazelu, kao i depozite ušvajcarskim bankama u vrednosti od osam milionadolara, konvertovala u američke dolare i deponova-la na svoj račun kod Federalnih rezervi u Njujorku.U zemlji se u trenutku okupacije našlo 11 tona re-zervi u zlatu.Ukupne devizne rezerve iznosile su 38,8 milionaameričkih dolara, uz izvesna potraživanja i u engle-skim untama, švajcarskim rancima, kanadskimdolarima i švedskim krunama.Umesto Narodne banke Kraljevine Jugoslavije,osnovana je posebna emisiona banka u svakojzoni okupirane teritorije, pa je tako u Srbiji osnovana Srpska narodna banka, koja je bila pod kon-

trolom nemačkog opunomoćenika za privredu.Iz opticaja se povlačio kraljevski dinar, a puštaonovi, okupacioni dinar. Kurs novog dinara bio je20 dinara za jednu rajhsmarku i 50 dinara za jedanamerički dolar.Za to vreme Narodna banka je, zajedno sa VladomKraljevine Jugoslavije, izbegla u London, odakle jenastavila rad. S obzirom na to da je guverner MilanRadosavljević ostao u Beogradu, u Londonu je zaguvernera imenovan trgovac Dobrivoje Lazarević.okom izbeglištva vlada je stalno pokušavala da

Old building of the NBS

Te cornerstone o one o the most beautiulbuildings in Belgrade, the home o the NationalBank o Serbia, was laid in April 1887 in today’sKralja Petra Street, then Dubrovačka Street. Inter-estingly, the building o the central bank was con-structed on the site o the house o amous writerBranislav Nušić.As he wrote in his autobiography, “I was born in alittle old house near the Belgrade Cathedral. Tathouse was later wiped rom the earth and todayon that spot is being raised the great palace o theNational Bank, so that today the bank’s vaults areexactly where the room in which I was born waslocated.”Tis palace, built in the neo-Renaissance acade-mic style and nowadays a cultural monumentprotected by the state, is the work o architect

Konstantin Jovanović, the son o the amousAnastas Jovanović, the ather o Serbian photo-graphy. Jovanović lived and worked in Vienna,but he also lef his mark on Belgrade with otherbuildings: Te Spasić endowment and the bu-ilding that ormerly housed the Ruski sar ta-

vern, both in Knez Mihailova Street. He receivedrecognition in the orm o the the Order o St.Sava o the III order or the palace o the Nati-onal Bank.Te building was purpose-built or the purposeso the National Bank, which took up residence in1890. Following World War I and the expansion

o the territory o the new state and the responsi-bilities o this institution, another part was addedin the same style between 1922 and 1925.oday the building has a subterranean vault, ba-sement, ground floor, two storeys and an attic.Jovanovic also conceived and designed the inter-ior, decorations, urniture, doors, windows andother details, while the painting o the walls andfloors was entrusted to painter and sculptor PaškoVučetić, who was assisted by his apprentice MošaPijade. Te açade o the building was the work othe amous maestro Petraš.Te old part o the building includes the cere-

monial reception hall, where the most importantmeetings o the NBS leadership are held. Te hallgained its current appearance during the period othe building’s extension.Sculptor Đorđe Jovanović’s bronze bust “Serbia”was placed on the gallery o the grand hall, abovethe white marble staircase, in 1901. It is identicalto the work “Monument to the Kosovo heroes” inKruševac and was bought by the National Bankafer being displayed at the World Exhibition inParis in 1900.




from that country. A production plant for mintingcoins was built in 1937.

WORLD WAR II

German orces bombed Belgrade on 6th April 1941and the Yugoslav Army ormally capitulated on 17th

April. As early as 29th May that same year the Ger-man commissioner or the Serbian economy issued adecree on the liquidation o the National Bank o theKingdom o Yugoslavia, since Yugoslav territory wasnow occupied by Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungaryand Albania, with the ormation o the IndependentCroatian state underway and Serbia being run by anewly established puppet government.At the end o March 1941 the National Bank had 63.5tons o gold in reserves. Just a day beore the attack onYugoslavia, on 5th April, the National Bank took all oits gold (more than one tonne) kept in the Bank or

International Settlements in Basel, as well as depositsin other Swiss banks amounting to a value o eight mil-lion dollars, and exchanged it into U.S. dollars beoredepositing this sum onto its account at the Federal Re-serve in New York. Some 11 tone o gold reserves wereound in the country at the time o the occupation.otal foreign exchange reserves amounted to 38.8million U.S. dollars, with certain claims in UKsterling, Swiss francs, Canadian dollars and Swed-ish crowns.Instead o the National Bank o the Kingdom o Yu-goslavia, a special issuing bank was established ineach zone o the occupied territory, so in Serbia theSerbian National Bank was ounded and controlledby the German commissioner or the economy. TeRoyal Dinar was withdrawn rom circulation and thenew occupational dinar was issued. Te new dinarexchange was 20 dinars or one Reichsmark and 50dinars or one U.S. dollar.During that time the National Bank, together withthe Government o the Kingdom o Yugoslavia,fled to London, where it continued to work. WithGovernor Milan Radosavljević having remained in

Belgrade, trader Dobrivoje Lazarević was appointedgovernor o the bank in exile in London.

During exile the government strove constantly tounblock and spend unds deposited in nationalbanks throughout the world. As such, they exertedconstant efforts to unblock the 11.2 million dollarsthat the National Bank had deposited in the CentralBank o Brazil and transer that money to the gov-ernment account at the Federal Reserve, althoughthis was not in accordance with the provisions o theNational Bank Act.

Stara zgrada NBS

Kamen temeljac jedne od najlepših zgrada uBeogradu, doma Narodne banke Srbije, postavljen je u aprilu 1887. godine u današnjoj Uli-ci kralja Petra, a ondašnjoj Dubrovačkoj ulici.

Interesantno je da je zgrada Narodne bankeizgrađena na mestu gde se nalazila kuća piscaBranislava Nušića.ako je on u svojoj Autobiografiji napisao„Rodio sam se u jednoj staroj kućici, u blizinibeogradske Saborne crkve. a kućica je docni- je zbrisana sa zemlje i namesto nje sad se diže velika palata Narodne banke, tako da su danasbančini trezori tačno tamo gde je bila soba u kojoj sam se ja rodio “.Ova palata izgrađena u stilu neorenesansnogakademizma, inače spomenik kulture pod zašti-

tom države, delo je arhitekte Konstantina Jova-novića, sina čuvenog Anastasa Jovanovića rodo-načelnika srpske fotografije. Jovanović je živeoi radio u Beču, ali je u Beogradu ostavio tragai drugim zdanjima: Spasićevom zadužbinom izgradom u kojoj se nalazila kafana “Ruski car”,obe u Knez Mihailovoj ulici. Za palatu Narodnebanke dobio je priznanje - Orden svetog Save IIIreda.Zgrada je zidana namenski za Narodnu ban-ku koja se uselila 1890. godine, a nakon Prvogsvetskog rata i proširenja teritorija nove države inadležnosti ove institucije dograđen je još jedandeo u istom stilu 1922. do 1925. godine.Zgrada danas poseduje podzemni trezor, sute-ren, prizemlje, dva sprata i potkrovlje.Jovanović je osmislio i uređenje unutrašnjosti,štuko dekoracije, nameštaj, vrata i prozore iostale detalje, dok je za oslikavanje zidova i po-dova bio zadužen slikar i vajar Paško Vučetić,kome je, kao njegov đak, pomagao Moša Pijade.Fasadu zgrade radio je poznati majstor Petraš.U starom delu zgrade nalazi se svečana sala, u

kojoj se održavaju najvažniji sastanci rukovod-stva NBS. Svoj sadašnji izgled sala je dobila uperiodu dogradnje zgrade.Na galeriji svečanog hola, iznad stepeništa odbelog mermera, postavljena je 1901. godinebronzana bista „Srbija“ vajara Đorđa Jovanovi-ća, identična delu „Spomenik kosovskim juna-cima“ u Kruševcu, koju je Narodna banka otku-pila nakon što je bila izložena 1900. godine naSvetskoj izložbi u Parizu.




Accordingly, the government in exile passed a lawwith which it would be able to take over the unds othe National Bank, but the National Committee orthe Liberation o Yugoslavia (NKOJ), established atthe Second AVNOJ, demanded that the British gov-ernment block the assets o the National Bank by the

end o the war.Reserves and deposits were blocked and long aferthe end o the war the Federal Republic o Yugo-slavia had to prove that it was the rightul ownero the unds.Te National Bank in London, in cooperation withthe Serbian government in exile, prepared notesworth a total o 10.35 billion dinars to be introducedinto circulation afer the war. Given that these bank-notes displayed an image o the king, they were de-stroyed, while notes showing portraits o partisanswere printed in Moscow at the same time.

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONAL BANK

Te restoration o the National Bank began in late1944 and early 1945, and on 27th November 1945 theNational Bank o the Kingdom o Yugoslavia in exilewas shut down.With the new socialist system, significant chang-es began or the National Bank. Te Act o 1946changed the status o the central bank and renamedit the National Bank o the Federal Republic o Yu-goslavia, but also recognised continuity with theNational Bank in exile. Tat same year saw the be-ginning o a merger with the NB FNRY bank, withwhich banking capital was concentrated in order toprepare or a planned economy and nationalisation.As eary as the end o 1944 it was decided that thedinar would remain the currency o the so-calledDemocratic Federal Yugoslavia, although there wereother proposals. Te most important reason the di-nar maintained continuity in oreign trade, alongwith easier proo o the rights, was the restitution ogold reserves and reserves taken abroad prior to theoutbreak o the war.

Te largest part o the reserves were unblocked in1948, ollowing negotiations with the U.S., but onlyafer American citizens had been compensated orthe nationalisation o Yugoslavia.Until 1961 the National Bank o Yugoslavia was thecountry’s issuing bank and credit bank. Te largestpart o the lending industry went through it and in1952 it was the only bank in Yugoslavia, controllingall payments and lending. Only local savings bankscontinued to operate as independent organizations.From 1955 new banks were established and there

odblokira i troši deponovana sredstva kod naci-onalnih banaka po svetu. ako su godinama po-kušavali da odblokiraju 11,2 miliona dolara koje

je Narodna banka deponovala u Centralnoj banciBrazila i da se taj novac prebaci na račun vlade kodFederalnih rezervi, iako to nije bilo u skladu sa Za-

konom o Narodnoj banci.Zato je vlada u izbeglištvu donela zakon kojimbi mogla da preuzme sredstva Narodne banke,ali je Nacionalni komitet oslobođenja Jugoslavije(NKOJ), osnovan na Drugom AVNOJ-u, zahtevaood britanske vlade da blokira imovinu Narodnebanke do kraja rata.Rezerve i depoziti ostali su blokirani i dugo poslerata je Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavijamorala da dokazuje da njoj pripadaju ta sredstva.Narodna banka u Londonu je u saradnji sa srpskom

vladom u emigraciji pripremila novčanice u vred-

nosti 10,35 milijardi dinara, kako bi ih pustila uopticaj nakon završetka rata. Pošto je na tim novča-

nicama bio lik kralja, one su uništene, a uporedo suu Moskvi štampane novčanice sa likom partizana.

OBNOVA NARODNE BANKE

Krajem 1944. godine i početkom 1945. počinje ob-nova Narodne banke, a 27. novembra 1945. likvi-dirana je Narodna banka Kraljevine Jugoslavije uizgnanstvu.Sa novim socijalističkim sistemom nastupile su iznačajne promene za Narodnu banku. Zakonom iz1946. godine promenjen je status centralne banke

i preimenovana je u Narodnu banku FederativneRepublike Jugoslavije, ali je i priznat kontinuitet saNarodnom bankom u emigraciji. Iste godine za-početo je prisajedinjenje banaka NB FNRJ, čime jebankarski kapital koncentrisan, kako bi se pripre-mili za plansku privredu i nacionalizaciju.Još krajem 1944. godine odlučeno je da novčana

jedinica Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije osta-ne dinar, mada je bilo i drugih predloga. Najvažni-

ji razlog zašto je zadržan dinar jeste kontinuitet uspoljnotrgovinskom poslovanju i lakše dokazivanje




was a transer to a decentralised banking system,although large companies were still financed by theNational Bank.Te reorms o 1965 also included the National Bank.Te conclusion was reached that the influence o stateauthorities on the operations o banks should be re-

duced and the National Bank o Yugoslavia shouldbecome the bank o banks, also financed by all com-mercial banks. Moreover, that year also saw paymentscompletely relocated rom the National Bank to SocialAccounting (SDK). Social control was introduced intobanks, beginning with bigger banks, afer first centrali-sation and then decentralisation o the banking system.In 1971 the National Bank o Yugoslavia became asystem o national banks o the republics and auton-omous provinces o Yugoslavia, controlled by theGovernor and the Board o Governors rom repub-lican national banks. Te national banks o the re-

publics and provinces were established by a specialunit o the ederal law and they made independentdecisions regarding lending activities.With the changes to the Constitution in 1974, thebanking sector became a self-governing institu-tion controlled by companies, with social and po-litical organisations withdrawing from the man-agement of banks.Te series o changes continued in the law in 1989,which entitled the NBY to greater autonomy towardsthe executive authority, although the governors onational banks in the NBY Council o Governorswere elected by the Republican Assembly.Te National Bank o Yugoslavia ound itsel in adifficult position when in 1983, upon the request ooreign creditors, it became the guarantor or the or-eign loans o banks and companies.On the other hand, the Bank did not have much im-pact on credit policy, which was being taken overincreasingly by the Republican National Banks, so ithad to guarantee loans it did not draw and was alsoweighed down by exchange losses, which urtherhampered its operations.

Financial indiscipline, bills without coverage, de-lays in repayments o loans and payments to sup-pliers acted as issuing money, but beyond monetarycontrol, which led to major inflation in 1989. AnteMarkovic, as the then President o the Federal Gov-ernment, presented reorms aimed at fixing the Di-nar exchange rate to the Deutschmark and allowingthe convertibility o the currency, as well as balanc-ing the budget through the management o a firmmonetary policy and wage reeze until mid-1990.Te denomination o the Dinar was perormed rom

prava i povraćaj zlata i rezervi iznetih pre rata uinostranstvo.Najveći deo rezervi je deblokiran 1948. godine, poslepregovora sa SAD, ali tek nakon što su američki gra-đani obeštećeni zbog nacionalizacije u Jugoslaviji.Narodna banka Jugoslavije je do 1961. godine bila i

emisiona i kreditna banka. Najveći deo kreditiranjaprivrede išao je preko nje, a 1952. ostaje jedina ban-ka u Jugoslaviji i preko nje su išli sav platni prometi kreditiranje. Jedino su mesne štedionice nastavileda posluju kao samostalne organizacije.Od 1955. godine osnivaju se nove banke i prelazise na decentralizovaniji bankarski sistem, mada je krupna preduzeća i dalje kreditirala Narodnabanka.Reorma 1965. godine je zahvatila i Narodnu ban-ku. Došlo se do zaključka da treba smanjiti uticajdržavnih organa na rad banaka, a NBJ je postala

banka banaka, odnosno kreditirala je sve poslovnebanke. akođe, ove godine je i platni promet potpu-no izmešten iz Narodne banke u Službu društvenog

knjigovodstva (SDK). U banke je uvedeno društve-no upravljanje, a počinje i ukrupnjavanje banaka,nakon najpre centralizacije, pa zatim decentraliza-cije bankarskog sistema.Od 1971. godine NBJ postaje sistem narodnih ba-naka republika i autonomnih pokrajina SFRJ i njo-me su upravljali guverner i Savet guvernera repu-bličkih narodnih banaka. Narodne banke republikai pokrajina se osnivaju posebnim zakonom ederal-nih jedinica i u delu kreditiranja privrede samostal-no odlučuju.

Promenom Ustava iz 1974. godine i bankarski sek-tor postaje samoupravan i kontrolu nad njim pre-uzimaju preduzeća, dok se iz upravljanja banakapovlače društveno-političke organizacije.Serija promena nastavljena je zakonom iz 1989. go-dine, koji je NBJ davao veću samostalnost premaizvršnoj vlasti, mada su i dalje guvernere narodnihbanaka, koji su bili u Savetu guvernera NBJ, biralerepubličke skupštine.Narodna banka Jugoslavije našla se u teškoj pozi-ciji kada je od 1983. godine, na zahtev inostranih




10,000 dinars to one dinar and an exchange rate oseven dinars to one Deutschmark was determined.Soon the dinar could be exchanged in banks abroadand the IMF evaluated that requirements under Ar-ticle VIII o the convertibility o the currency hadbeen ulfilled. However, targets set regarding the

amount o money were increased several times dur-ing the year, with the primary emissions proving tobe higher than planned.Meanwhile, the republics o Croatia and Sloveniawere working on secession rom Yugoslavia and thelaw on the National Bank was violated, first by theRepublic o Slovenia entering the monetary system,and then on a massive scale by Serbia, with armedconflicts started and both Slovenia and Croatia sep-arating and introducing their own currencies at theend o 1991. Large amounts o dinars were returnedrom the republics to the territory o the dinar, lead-

ing to a rise in prices that saw inflation hit 235.2 percent in 1991. Tat same year, the mass o money incirculation grew by 253.5 per cent.Payment operations in the country were allingapart, trade was disrupted and all economic indica-tors were becoming dramatically worse.

HYPERINFLATION

Te outbreak o civil war and the imposing o sanc-tions by the UN Security Council in 1992 destroyedthe economy and that year GDP ell to the 1971level. A year later, in 1993, the Federal Republic oYugoslavia was hit by the biggest hyperinflation inits history. Te dinar was almost completely replacedin payment transactions by the Deutschmark andalmost nothing could be bought or dinars. Frommonth to month primary emissions and prices ledthe race, so that in the last quarter o 1993 the moneysupply increased by almost 58 billion per cent, whileinflation was 725 million per cent and dinar place-ments with banks increased by 167 million per cent.However, the real quantity o money in circulation inDeutschmarks was dramatically reduced, due to the

plummeting value o the dinar. As such, at the begin-ning o 1993 there were 2.2 billion Deutschmarks incirculation, while at the end o that same year therewere only 50 million Deutschmarks.Te Monetary Reconstruction Programme wasenacted in December 1993 and entered into orceon 24th January 1994. Tis programme was intend-ed to devote monetary policy to reducing inflation,stop financing the budget deficit rom primary is-sued money and run the policy o a single digitexchange rate.

poverilaca, postala garant za inokredite banaka ipreduzeća.S druge strane, Narodna banka SFRJ nije imalamnogo uticaja na kreditnu politiku, koju su sve višepreuzimale republičke narodne banke, pa je takomorala garantovati za kredite koje nije uzimala, a

takođe su na NBJ prevaljene i kursne razlike, što joj je dodatno otežavalo poslovanje.Finansijska nedisciplina, menice bez pokrića,kašnjenja u otplati kredita i plaćanja prema do-bavljačima delovalo je kao emisija novca, ali vanmonetarne kontrole, što je dovelo do velike infla-cije 1989. godine. Ante Marković kao predsednikSavezne vlade predstavlja reorme koje imaju za ciljda fiksiraju kurs dinara za nemačku marku i omo-guće konvertibilnost valute, kao i da uravnotežebudžet kroz vođenje čvrste monetarne politike i za-mrzavanje plata do sredine 1990. godine. Izvršena

je i denominacija dinara sa 10.000 na jedan dinar.Određen je devizni kurs sedam dinara za jednu ne-mačku marku.Ubrzo se dinar mogao menjati u bankama u ino-stranstvu, a MMF je procenio da su ispunjeni uslo-

vi iz člana VIII o konvertibilnosti valute. Ipak, po-stavljeni ciljevi o visini novčane mase više puta utoku godine su pomerani naviše, zbog toga što jeprimarna emisija bila veća od planirane.U međuvremenu republike Hrvatska i Slovenijarade na otcepljenju od SFRJ, krši se zakon o Narod-noj banci upadima u monetarni sistem od stranerepublika, prvo Slovenije pa potom u masivnijemobimu Srbije, počinju oružani sukobi i Slovenija iHrvatska se krajem 1991. godine otcepljuju i uvodesopstvene valute. Velike količine dinara vraćaju seiz ovih republika na teritoriju gde je dinar u opti-caju, dovodeći do rasta cena, pa je inflacija 1991.godine iznosila 235,2 odsto. Novčana masa u 1991.godini povećana je za 253,5 odsto.U državi se raspada platni promet, prekida se tr-govina, svi ekonomski pokazatelji se dramatičnopogoršavaju.

HIPERINFLACIJA

Izbijanje građanskog rata i uvođenje sankcija Save-ta bezbednosti UN 1992. godine razaraju privredu,a bruto društveni proizvod iz 1992. pada na nivo iz1971. godine. Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju 1993.godine pogađa najveća hiperinflacija u dotadašnjojistoriji. U plaćanjima dinar skoro sasvim zamenju-

je nemačka marka i za dinare skoro da i nema štada se kupi. Iz meseca u mesec primarna emisija icene vodile su trku, tako da je u poslednjem kvarta-




New building of the NBS

In 2006 most departments and staff o the Natio-nal Bank o Serbia relocated to the new building inNemanjina Street on Slavija Square, 15 years aferthe building's construction began. An initiative tobuild a new building or the then National Bank oYugoslavia was launched back in 1976 by the Co-uncil o Governors, as the building in Kralja PetraStreet was no longer able to meet all the needs o

the central bank o such a big country. Te locati-on o the new building was determined by the ur-ban development plan o 1980 and afer nine yearsthe investment programme was also adopted.Construction began in 1992 and included aro-und 60 companies. However, due to the collapseo the state, wars and sanctions, the constructiono this monumental 44,000m2 building lasted al-most 15 years.Construction o this “smart” building with a glassaçade that dominates Slavija Square cost $134million. Tis modern NBS building has our un-derground levels, which house the treasury room,

an area with a diesel generator, a printers, storagearea and parking garage. Tere are also 11 floorsabove ground.Te building belongs to the “smart” category be-cause it has automated temperature control. At6am the system starts automatically and heats thespace to a temperature o 19 degrees Celsius. Withthe arrival o staff, motion detectors activate andthe temperature is raised to 22 degrees. I someo-ne opens a window, cooling or heating is automa-tically turned off in that room.

Nova zgrada NBS

Većina službi i zaposlenih Narodne banke Srbije2006. godine preselila se u novu zgradu u Ne-manjinoj ulici na rgu Slavija, petnaest godinaod početka gradnje. Još 1976. godine pokrenuta je ideja u Savetu guvernera da se izgradi novozdanje za tada Narodnu banku SFRJ, jer zgra-da u Kralja Petra nije mogla da odgovori svimpotrebama centralne banke tako velike zemlje.Urbanističkim planom 1980. godine određena je lokacija nove zgrade, a nakon devet godina jei usvojen investicioni program. Gradnja počinje1992. godine i u njoj učestvuje oko 60 firmi, alizbog raspada države, ratova, sankcija, gradnjaovog monumentalnog zdanja od 44.000 kvadra-ta trajala je skoro 15 godina.Izgradnja ove „pametne” zgrade sa staklenomfasadom koja dominira Slavijom, koštala je 134miliona dolara. Ovo moderno zdanje NBS imačetiri podzemna nivoa, u kojima se nalazi tre-

zorski prostor, prostorija sa dizel-agregatom,štamparija, skladišta, parking i 11 nadzemnihetaža.Zgrada spada u kategoriju „pametnih” jerima automatizovano upravljanje temperaturom.U 6 sati ujutru sistem se sam pokreće i zagrevaprostor na 19 stepeni Celzijusovih. Dolaskomzaposlenih aktiviraju se detektori prisustva itemperatura se podiže na 22 stepena. Ukolikoneko otvori prozor, hlađenje ili grejanje se auto-matski gasi u toj prostoriji.




lu 1993. godine novčana masa uvećana za skoro 58milijardi procenata, a inflacija je iznosila 725 mi-liona procenata, dok su dinarski plasmani banakapovećani za 167 miliona procenata. Međutim, real-na količina novca u opticaju izražena u nemačkimmarkama se dramatično smanjivala, zbog gubljenja

vrednosti dinara. ako je na početku 1993. godineu opticaju bilo 2,2 milijarde maraka, a na kraju go-dine svega 50 miliona maraka.Program monetarne rekonstrukcije donet je u de-cembru 1993. godine, a stupio je na snagu 24. janu-ara 1994. godine. Ovim programom je predviđenoda se monetarna politika posveti smanjenju inflaci-

je, da se prekine finansiranje budžetskog deficita izprimarne emisije i da se vodi politika jedinstvenogdeviznog kursa.Skoro momentalno je zaustavljeno divljanje cenai deviznog kursa, a jedan konvertibilni dinar je iz-

jednačen sa jednom markom. Ako bi se kao po-četak perioda uzeo 24. januar, u 1994. godini nijebilo inflacije.vorac ovog programa bio je Dragoslav Avramović,koji je u martu 1994. godine postao i guverner NBJi na tom mestu ostao do maja 1996. godine.Za uspeh ovog programa ima više objašnjenja, alinajvažnija su da su mere imale poverenje građanai da je zaustavljen psihološki aktor, odnosno oče-kivanja koja su gurala cene naviše. Važnu ulogu jeimala i odluka da se novac štampa samo na osnovupokrića u devizama. Ipak, u drugoj polovini 1994.godine, Narodna banka je popustila pred pritiscima

velikih sistema, koji su do tada unkcionisali samozahvaljujući primarnoj emisiji. Odobreni su kredi-ti koji je trebalo da se iskoriste za proizvodnju, alisu otišli na potrošnju, odnosno na plate. o se većpokazalo u 1995. godini, kroz rast deviznog kursa.okom druge polovine devedesetih godina NBJ seokusirala na stabilnost cena i deviznog kursa, ali jezbog velike nelikvidnosti banaka često posezala zaprimarnom emisijom.

POSLE 2000.

Nakon bombardovanja 1999. godine, u oktobru2000. godine, posle saveznih izbora, na vlast dolazidemokratska opozicija, a međunarodna zajednicaukida sankcije SR Jugoslaviji.Ekonomska situacija u zemlji bila je loša. Prosečnaplata iznosila je nešto više od 100 nemačkih mara-ka, spoljni dug je iznosio 132 odsto BDP-a, a gubiciu privredi i finansijskom sektoru procenjeni su naoko 10 milijardi dolara.Za Narodnu banku nastupio je period obuzdavanja

Rampaging prices and exchange rates stopped al-most immediately and one convertible dinar wasequal to one Deutschmark. I 24 th January is takenas the beginning o the period, there was no infla-tion in 1994.Te creator o this programme was Dragoslav

Avramović, who became NBY Governor in March1994 and remained in that post until May 1996.Tere were several explanations offered or the suc-cess o this programme, but the most important wasthat citizens had gained confidence in the measuresand the negative psychological actor had ceased,i.e. expectations were pushing prices up. Te De-cision to print money only with the coverage ooreign currency also played an important role.However, in the second hal o 1994 the NationalBank gave in to pressure rom large systems thathad previously unctioned only because o primary

issue money. Loans earmarked or production wereapproved, but the unds ended up covering run-ning costs or wages. Tis could already be seen in1995, through the rise o the exchange rate.During the second hal o the 1990s the NBY o-cused on price and exchange rate stability, but o-ten resorted to primary issue due to high liquidityproblems.

POST-2000

Afer the bombing o 1999 and ederal elections oOctober 2000, the democratic opposition came topower and the international community broughtan end to sanctions imposed on the Federal Repub-lic o Yugoslavia.Te economic situation in the country was dire.Te average monthly salary was just over 100Deutschmarks, external debt amounted to 132per cent of GDP and the losses of the economyand the financial sector were estimated at around$10 billion.For the National Bank, this marked the start ofthe period of curbing inflation and fighting for

the stability of the dinar exchange rate. In thefirst few months this was managed by issuingmoney solely on the basis of coverage in foreigncurrencies, which meant the complete abolitionof primary issue. In 2001 the target was to reduceinflation from 113 per cent in 2000 to 35 percent. A reduction to 40 per cent was achieved,which was mostly influenced by the liberalisa-tion of prices that many companies used in orderto raise prices that had been limited by the stateto the economic level.




inflacije i borbe za stabilnost kursa dinara. U prvimmesecima to je uspelo emisijom novca samo naosnovu pokrića u devizama, što je značilo potpu-no ukidanje primarne emisije. U 2001. godini cilj

je bio smanjenje inflacije sa 113 odsto u 2000. na 35odsto, a ostvareno je 40 odsto, na šta je najviše uti-

cala liberalizacija cena, koju su mnoga preduzećaiskoristila tako što su cene, do tada ograničene odstrane države, podigli na ekonomski nivo.Narodna banka je snažno intervenisala na devi-znom tržištu kako bi održala stabilnost kursa i po-

vratila poverenje u domaću valutu. Posledica toga je izrazita realna apresijacija dinara prema nemač-koj marki, od 30 odsto, uz nominalnu depresijacijuod četiri odsto.akođe, u međuvremenu na teritoriji Crne Goreuvedena je nemačka marka kao zakonsko sredstvoplaćanja, pa je i plaćanja između ove dve republike

trebalo uvesti u legalne okvire. Osim toga, monetaEvropske monetarne unije postala je evro, pa je tre-balo organizovati i proces zamene valuta. U okvirutoga NBJ je uvezla 326,5 miliona evra i tokom 1. i2. januara 2002. godine snabdela banke potrebnimkoličinama nove monete. Do maja Narodna bankaJugoslavije promenila je oko 4,2 milijarde evra.Prema Zakonu o deviznom poslovanju, poslovnebanke mogle su samostalno i slobodno da ormira-

ju devizne kurseve, a prvi put od 1931. godine, 15.maja 2002. godine, Srbija je ispunila član VIII sta-tuta MMF-a i dinar je postao konvertibilna valuta.okom 2002. godine započet je veliki posao uređe-nja bankarskog sektora SR Jugoslavije. Bankarskisektor je karakterisao visok nivo nenaplativih kredi-ta, nizak nivo rezervi, nesolventnost banaka sa višeod polovine ukupne aktive, nelikvidnost banaka inizak nivo kapitala. Narodna banka je sa Svetskombankom utvrdila da bi troškovi restrukturiranjabankarskog sektora iznosili 21 milijardu maraka.Refinansiranje zajmova Svetske banke, Međuna-rodne banke za obnovu i razvoj, Londonskog i Pari-skog kluba poverilaca koštalo je 6,4 milijarde, stara

devizna štednja 7,5 milijardi i sanacija bankarskogsektora 7,2 milijarde nemačkih maraka.S obzirom na to da država nije raspolagala tolikimnovcem, opredelila se za likvidaciju četiri velikebanke: Beogradske banke, Beobanke, Jugobanke iInvestbanke, uz još 18 manjih banaka. Na ovaj na-čin nije ostala nijedna velika domaća banka, a natržište je ušlo šest banaka sa stranim kapitalom.Nakon proglašenja državne zajednice Srbija iCrna Gora, Narodna banka Jugoslavije menjaime u Narodnu banku Srbije, čime se samo uskla-

Te National Bank intervened heavily in the oreignexchange market, in order to maintain exchange ratestability and restore confidence in the domestic cur-rency. Tis resulted in the real appreciation o theDeutschmark o 30 per cent, with nominal deprecia-tion o our per cent.

Also, in the meantime, the Deutschmark was intro-duced as legal tender on the territory o Montenegro,so payments between the two republics had to be in-troduced into the legal ramework. In addition, theEuro became the currency o the European Mone-tary Union and it was necessary to organize the pro-cess o replacing currencies. For this reason, the Na-tional Bank o Yugoslavia imported €326.5 millionand during 1st and 2nd January 2002 the bank provid-ed the necessary quantities o the new currency. ByMay that year the National Bank o Yugoslavia hadexchanged around €4.2 billion.

As stipulated by the Foreign Exchange Act, bankswere able to form exchange rates independentlyand freely, and for the first time since 1931, on15th May 2002, Serbia fulfilled Article VIII of theStatute of the IMF and the dinar became convert-ible currency.During 2002 the huge task of regulating the coun-try’s banking sector began. At the time the bankingsector was characterised by a high level of NPLs,low levels of reserves, insolvency with more thanhalf of total assets, illiquidity of banks and a lowlevel of equity. Te National Bank, along with theWorld Bank, determined that the cost of restruc-turing the banking sector amounted to 21 billionDeutschmarks. Te refinancing of loans from theWorld Bank, the International Bank for Recon-struction and Development, the London Club andParis Club of creditors cost 6.4 billion; frozen sav-ings totalled 7.5 billion and the banking sector’s re-habilitation cost 7.2 billion marks. Given that thestate did not have much money, it opted for theliquidation of four major banks – the Bank of Bel-grade, Beobanka, Jugobank and Investbank, along

with another 18 smaller banks. Tis meant thatthere were no longer any large domestic banks, sosix banks with foreign capital entered the market.Afer the proclamation o the ormation o the StateUnion o Serbia and Montenegro, the National Banko Yugoslavia changed its name to become the Na-tional Bank o Serbia, which merely ormalised theactual state in which the NBY was already essential-ly the Central Bank o Serbia.According to the 2003 Law on the National Bankof Serbia, the main objective of the central bank




đuje sa praksom u kojoj je NBJ već bila centralnabanka Srbije.Prema Zakonu o Narodnoj banci Srbije, iz 2003.godine, osnovni cilj centralne banke je postizanjei održavanje stabilnosti cena. Ne dovodeći u pita-nje ostvarivanje osnovnih ciljeva, Narodna bankaSrbije podržava sprovođenje ekonomske politikeVlade Republike Srbije. Pored toga, banka spro-

vodi monetarnu i deviznu politiku, upravlja de- viznim rezervama, utvrđuje i sprovodi aktivnostii mere radi očuvanja i jačanja stabilnosti finan-sijskog sistema, izdaje novčanice i kovani novac ikontroliše platni promet.Na osnovu Memoranduma o novom okviru mone-tarne politike, usvojenog u avgustu 2006. godine,Narodna banka Srbije postepeno uvodi režim ci-ljanja inflacije. Pod režimom ciljanja inflacije pod-

razumeva se održavanje stabilnosti cena u okviruutvrđenog inflatornog koridora, korišćenjem ree-rentne kamatne stope kao osnovnog instrumenta.Na sednici održanoj 22. decembra 2008. godine,Monetarni odbor Narodne banke Srbije usvojio

je memorandum Narodne banke Srbije o ciljanju(targetiranju) inflacije kao monetarnoj strategiji,kojim se definiše ormalna primena režima infla-cionog targetiranja od 1. januara 2009. godine. Naovaj način cilj monetarne politike više nije nekinivo deviznog kursa, već rast potrošačkih cena.

is to achieve and maintain price stability. Withoutquestioning the fulfilling of its basic objectives,the National Bank of Serbia supported the imple-mentation of the economic policy of the Govern-ment of the Republic of Serbia. In addition, thebank conducted monetary and foreign exchangepolicies, managed foreign currency reserves, es-tablished and implemented activities and meas-ures aimed at preserving and strengthening thestability of the financial system, issued banknotesand coins and controlled payments.Based on the Memorandum on the new mone-tary policy framework, adopted in August 2006,the National Bank of Serbia gradually introducedinflation targeting. Te inflation targeting regimeimplied the maintenance of price stability with-in the established inflation corridor, using the

benchmark interest rate as the main instrument.At the session held on 22nd December 2008, theMonetary Board of the National Bank of Serbiaadopted the Memorandum of the National Bankof Serbia on targeting inflation as a monetarystrategy, which defined the formal implementa-tion of the inflation targeting regime as of 1st Jan-uary 2009. In this way the goal of monetary policyis no longer at the level of the exchange rate, butrather the rise of consumer prices.Te National Bank set goals with the intention of

GUVERNERI NARODNE BANKE SRBIJE OD 2000.

Od 2000. godine do danas na čelu Narodne banke nalazilo se pet guvernera. Odmah nakon demokratskihpromena, 28. novembra 2000. guverner tada još Narodne banke Jugoslavije postao je Mlađan Dinkić,kao član ekspertske nevladine organizacije G17 plus. On je na tom mestu ostao do 22. jula 2003, s tim što je od 3. februara 2003. godine bio na čelu Narodne banke Srbije.

Na mestu prvog čoveka Narodne banke Srbije Dinkića je nasledila Kori Udovički. Ona je od 1993. do2001. godine bila zaposlena u Međunarodnom monetarnom fondu, da bi se u Srbiju vratila kao savetnikministra finansija, a kasnije postala i ministar energetike. Na čelu Narodne banke Srbije ostala je do 25.februara 2004. godine.

Najduže je guverner Narodne banke Srbije od 2000. godine bio Radovan Jelašić, koji je tu funkciju vršiood 25. februara 2004. do 28. jula 2010. godine. Prethodno je od decembra 2000. do jula 2003. godine bio viceguverner, a pre toga je bio zaposlen prvo u Dojče banci, a zatim u konsultantskoj kući Mekinzi.

Dejan Šoškić je na mesto guvernera NBS došao 29. jula 2010. godine i na toj poziciji je ostao do 6. avgusta2012. godine. Pre nego što je postao guverner, bio je predsednik Saveta guvernera Narodne banke Srbije.

Aktuelni guverner Narodne banke Srbije je Jorgovanka Tabaković, koja je na toj poziciji od 6. avgusta2012. godine. Od marta 1998. godine do oktobra 2000. godine bila je ministar za ekonomsku i vlasničkutransformaciju u Vladi Republike Srbije. Od 1993. do 2000. godine birana je u tri saziva Narodne skup-štine Republike Srbije za narodnog poslanika, kao i od 2007. godine do izbora za guvernera.




inflation remaining within the range of 2 to 4 percent in the medium term, which would be closerto the eurozone’s level of inflation.Te goal of the National Bank of Serbia for the2012-2016 period is for annual inflation to bemeasured according to the consumer price rise offour plus or minus 1.5 per cent.At the end of 2013 the inter-year inflation reachedan historic low of 2.2 per cent.

Narodna banka postavlja ciljeve sa namerom dainflacija u srednjem roku bude u rasponu od dvado četiri odsto, čime bi se približili nivou inflacijeu evrozoni. Od 2012. do 2016. godine cilj Narod-ne banke Srbije je da godišnja inflacija, merenarastom potrošačkih cena, iznosi četiri plus minus1,5 odsto.Na kraju 2013. godine međugodišnja inflacija našlase na istorijskom minimumu od 2,2 odsto.

GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF SERBIA FROM 2000

From the year 2000 to date the National Bank has been led by five governors. Immediately afer the democraticchanges, on 28th November 2000, Mlađan Dinkić, then a member o the expert NGO G17, became governor o theNational Bank o Yugoslavia. He remained in office until 22nd July 2003, while on 3rd February 2003 he also becamethe head o the National Bank o Serbia.

Dinkić was replaced as the head o the National Bank o Serbia by Kori Udovicki. She had been employed by theInternational Monetary Fund rom 1993 to 2001 and returned to Serbia as an advisor to the Minister o Finance,later becoming Minister o Energy. She held the post o NBS governor until 25th February 2004.

Radovan Jelašić was the longest-serving governor o the National Bank o Serbia in the post-2000 era. He was governor rom 25th February 2004 until 28th July 2010. Having previously served as deputy governor rom December2000 until July 2003, prior to that he had been employed at Deutsche Bank and then consulting house McKinsey.

Dejan Šoškić was appointed NBS governor on 29th July 2010 and held the position until 6th August 2012. Šoškićis a proessor at the Belgrade Faculty o Economics and prior to becoming governor had been the Chairman o theBoard o Governors o the National Bank o Serbia.

Te current governor o the National Bank o Serbia, Jorgovanka Tabaković, has held the position since 6th August2012. abaković served as minister or economic and ownership transormation in the Republic o Serbia romMarch 1998 to October 2000. Previously, rom 1993 to 2000, she served three terms as an MP in the Serbian Nati-onal Assembly, beore returning to parliament in 2007 until her appointment as governor.

LITERATURA:

Narodna banka: 1884 - 2004./ autori: Veroljub Dugalić,

Andrej Mitrović, Dragana Gnjatović, Gordana Hofman,

Ile Kovačević; Jugoslovenski pregled, 2004.

Narodna banka Srbije - Nacionalna evropska insitucija/

Narodna banka Srbije - Zavod za izradu novčanica i ko-

vanog novca, 2011.

Misija g. Bošmana 1884/85 - Početak rada NBS/ Narodnabanka Srbije (www.nbs.rs), 2009.

Srpski novac od XIII do XXI veka - Izbor iz numizmatičke

zbirke Narodne banke Srbije/ Narodna banka Srbije, Ma-

tica Srpska, 2012. - Autor projekta: prof. dr Dušan Nikolić

Memorandum Narodne banke Srbije o ciljanju (targetira-

nju) inflacije kao monetarnoj strategiji/ Narodna banka

Srbije (www.nbs.rs), 2008.

Memorandum Narodne banke Srbije o ciljanim stopama

inflacije do 2016. godine/ Narodna banka Srbije/ Narod-

na banka Srbije (www.nbs.rs), 2013.

REFERENCES:

National Bank: 1884 – 2004 Authors: Veroljub Dugalic,

Andrej Mitrovic, Dragana Gnjatović, Gordana Hofman, Ile

Kovačević; Yugoslav Survey, 2004.

National Bank of Serbia - National European Institution/

National Bank of Serbia – Institute for Minting Money, 2011

Mission of Mr Boshman 1884/85 – NBS Launch of Operation/

National Bank of Serbia ( www.nbs.rs ), 2009Serbian Money from the 13th to the 21st centuries – Selection

from Numismatic Collection of Te National Bank of Serbia

/ National Bank of Serbia, Matica Srpska, 2012 – Project

Author: Prof Du š an Nikolić Ph.D.

National Bank of Serbia Memorandum on argeting Infla-

tion as Monetary Strategy/National Bank of Serbia ( www.

nbs.rs ), 2008

National Bank of Serbia Memorandum on argeting Infla-

tion Rates until 2016/ National Bank of Serbia / National

Bank of Serbia ( www.nbs.rs ), 2013




Banking inSerbia duringthe 2000-2013periodZoran Jeremić, Ph.D.1*

Acountry’s banking sector is an indicator otrends in the sphere o economic develop-ment, but also a reflection o trends in the

sphere o overall social relations. In Serbia bankingbegan to impact significantly on economic develop-ment afer the Berlin Congress o 1862, when Ser-bia became an internationally recognised state, aferwhich the development o banking in a more organ-ized and institutionalised manner ollowed, with theestablishment o financial institutes, district savingsbanks, credit cooperatives, private domestic and or-eign banks, and then the Privileged National Banko the Kingdom o Serbia. Tis was ollowed by theadoption o the Law on Public Exchanges o 1886and establishment o the Belgrade Stock Exchangein 1894, with which banking was joined by the be-ginning o the institutional development o the stockexchange trading business as the second importantsegment o the financial system market.With the ormation o the National Bank o Serbia in1884, the basic institution or the development o thefinancial system was established, which could be said

to have also been a significant state-building institu-tion in Serbia, due to its continuity and relatively highlevel o competence in the operations it perormed in

various historical periods . As such, it is also very im-portant or studying the development o the state andthe whole o society.

1* Te author is a professor at Singidunum University’s Facultyof Business and at the Faculty of Finance, Economy andAdministration - FEFA. He has served as managing directorof two banks undergoing the process of rehabilitation and hasbeen general manager of the Belgrade Stock Exchange.

Bankarstvou Srbiji uperiodu2000-2013.Pro. dr Zoran Jeremić1*

Bankarstvo jedne zemlje je pokazatelj kre-tanja u seri privrednog razvoja, ali je iodraz kretanja u seri ukupnih društvenih

odnosa. U Srbiji bankarstvo počinje značajnijeda utiče na privredni razvoj od Berlinskog kon-gresa 1862, kada je Srbija postala međunarodnopriznata država, nakon čega je usledio i razvojbankarstva na organizovaniji i institucionalizo- van način, osnivanjem novčanih zavoda, okru-žnih štedionica, kreditnih zadruga, privatnihdomaćih i stranih banaka, a zatim i Privilego- vane narodne banke Kraljevine Srbije. Usledilo je donošenje Zakona o javnim berzama 1886. iosnivanje Beogradske berze 1894. godine, čime je pored bankarstva započet i institucionalni ra-

zvoj berzanskog poslovanja kao drugog značaj-nog segmenta tržišnog finansijskog sistema.Osnivanjem Narodne banke Srbije 1884. godi-ne uspostavljena je bazična institucija za razvojfinansijskog sistema, za koju bi se moglo reći ida je bila i značajna državotvorna institucija uSrbiji, zbog svog kontinuiteta i relativno viso-

1 *Autor je profesor na Poslovnom fakultetu UniverzitetaSingidunum i na Fakultetu za finansije, ekonomiju iadministraciju – FEFA. Bio je generalni direktor dve banke upostupku sanacije i generalni direktor Beogradske berze.



WHO’S WHO IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR35

Following the Berlin Congress, the policies and inter-ests o European countries led to the establishment ooreign banks in the Kingdom o Serbia, which had asignificant impact on the economic development oSerbia. Primarily French, German and English capi-tal was working, while Belgium dominated in terms

o the transer o knowledge. Afer a break o 60 years,alongside certain modalities, the interest o oreignbanks was once again expressed ollowing the open-ing up o the country afer the year 2000.Te banking sector was awaited by social changesollowing the all o the Berlin Wall, with regulationsthat were ormally based on banking directives o theEuropean Union and banks that have the legal ormo joint stock companies. Te problem was that theshareholders were public companies whose sole mo-tive was to draw as much credit as possible and not toachieve a return on equity, while the relatively good

regulations were only on paper and were not actual-ly enorced. In the 1990s several banks entered thathad ownership in the world’s major cities, but theyhad to be closed due to the imposing o sanctions.Tere is no doubt that the banking sector could havebecome the driving orce behind positioning Serbiaas the regional centre o the global financial sectorand the Balkan headquarters o global companiesi the country had gone through the reorm processand peaceul resolved its conflicts, which is also con-firmed by the act that in the late 1980s major glob-al banks expressed an open interest in taking overdomestic banking groups – recognising in them anexcellent opportunity or uture positioning on thisnew market.Historical events have ensured that the banking,which had great chances at the historic crossroadso the entry into a market economy and multipartysystem, was transormed during the 1990s into aninstrument o redistribution and a symbol o thedisintegration o the system. Banking in the ’90s wasentirely a reflection o the chaotic adventurous poli-cies, which were characterised the monetary sphere

by record hyperinflation, but also the prolieration onewly established banks, o which there were over ahundred, which had a speculative character at theirbasis because they were used as a mechanism or therapid acquisition o wealth based on loans rom pri-mary issuance and exchange rate differences. Tatwas a new phase o speculative banking, usury andpyramid schemes, o which there were already exam-ples in the history o Serbian banking. Unortunate-ly, not even banking afer the year 2000 managed toavoid the bad examples that were expressed during

kog nivoa kompetentnosti u poslovima koje jeobavljala u raznim istorijskim periodima. Stoga je ona veoma značajna i za proučavanje razvojadržave i celokupnog društva.Nakon Berlinskog kongresa, politika i interesievropskih država doveli su do osnivanja stranih

banaka u Kraljevini Srbiji, što je imalo znača- jan uticaj na privredni razvoj Srbije. Radilo seprevashodno o rancuskom, nemačkom i engle-skom kapitalu, dok je u pogledu prenošenja zna-nja dominirala Belgija. Nakon pauze od šezdesetgodina, uz izvesne modalitete, interes stranihbanaka ponovo je iskazan nakon otvaranja ze-mlje posle dvehiljadite.Bankarski sektor dočekao je društvene prome-ne nakon pada Berlinskog zida sa regulativomkoja je ormalno bila zasnovana na bankarskimdirektivama Evropske unije i bankama koje su

imale pravnu ormu akcionarskih društava. Pro-blem je bio što su akcionari bile društvene firmečiji je jedini motiv bio da povuku što više kreditaa ne da ostvare prinos na kapital, a relativno do-bra regulativa bila je samo slovo na papiru, jerse nije primenjivala. U devedesete se ušlo sa vla-sništvom više banaka u glavnim svetskim centri-ma, ali su one zbog ulaska u sankcije morale bitiugašene. Nema sumnje da je bankarski sektormogao postati motor pozicioniranja Srbije kaoregionalnog centra globalnog finansijskog sekto-ra i sedište globalnih kompanija za Balkan, da jezemlja pošla putem reormi i mirnog rešavanjakonflikta, što potvrđuje i činjenica da su velikesvetske banke krajem osamdesetih iskazivaleotvoreni interes za preuzimanje domaćih ban-karskih grupacija, videći u njima odličnu prilikuza buduće pozicioniranje na novom tržištu.Istorijska dešavanja učinila su da se bankarstvood velike šanse na istorijskom razmeđu ulaskau tržišnu privredu i višepartijski sistem, deve-desetih preobrati u instrument preraspodele isimbol raspada privrednog sistema. Bankarstvo

devedesetih godina bilo je u punoj meri upravo odraz haotične avanturističke politike kojase u monetarnoj seri karakterisala rekordnomhiperinflacijom, ali i bujanjem novoosnovanihbanaka, kojih je bilo više od stotinu, a koje suu osnovi imale špekulativni karakter jer su kori-šćene kao mehanizam za brzo sticanje bogatstvana bazi kredita iz primarne emisije i kursnih ra-zlika. Bila je to nova etapa špekulativnog ban-karstva, zelenašenja i piramidalnih šema, što je već imalo primere u istoriji srpskog bankarstva.




the economic crisis. It was again demonstrated thatbanking is a reflection o social conditions, becausethis time the losses o bank crashes were expressedthrough the partocratic state that distorted the corpo-rate governance o banks with state capital.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFORM OF THEBANKING SECTOR AFTER THE YEAR 2000

Tus, the banking sector was largely destroyed in the‘90s, as was the case with the overall economy o thecountry. Confidence in banks was completely lost,the savings o citizens were outside o legal flows,while the recoverability o loans was very low, so itwas clear that deep reorm operations afer the year2000 were essential. What happened was, however,previously unprecedented in world economic his-tory. In early 2002 the decision was made to beingbankruptcy proceedings or our major banks, with

which about two-thirds o total banking assets were“cut” in one move. A number o smaller banks andtwo larger banks were retained. As the quality o theirloan portolios and the economic financial positiono the “surviving” banks did not differ significantlyrom the banks that had been shut down, the conclu-sion arose that the decisions were largely subjective innature, where political motives, connections and lob-bying played a significant role. Although it seems thateven in proessional circles the prevailing belie is thatbankrupting the banks was a good move, the act re-mains that we have now entered the second decade othe commencement o the implementation o bank-ruptcy and that the bankruptcy o those banks is stillongoing and the completion o this process, and thetotal direct and indirect costs, cannot even be approx-imately estimated, as well as a host o other questionsthat arise, supports the notion that this precedent oeconomic history was perhaps not as good a move asit seemed to its creators.One o the arguments that he did not support thiskind o decision is that the country was practically lefwithout a banking sector, as the banks that were re-

tained according to some vague criteria were small interms o assets and financial potential, so they couldnot support any significant undertakings. All balancesheet categories o the banking sector had an almostnegligible share o GDP. It was only in 2006 that thebanking sector, ollowing the intensive growth o bal-ance sheet categories, attained dimensions that couldbe compared to the least-developed banking sectorsin the region.In banking there is the “too big to ail” rule, due tonumerous negative effects on a large number o busi-

Ni bankarstvo nakon dvehiljadite nije, nažalost,uspelo da izbegne loše primere koji su se ispoljilitokom ekonomske krize. Opet se pokazalo da jebankarstvo odraz društvenih prilika, jer se ovogputa ceh bankarskih krahova ispostavio krozpartokratsku državu koja je deormisala korpo-

rativno upravljanje u bankama sa državnim ka-pitalom.

KARAKTERISTIKE REFORMI BANKARSKOG

SEKTORA NAKON 2000. GODINE

Bankarski sektor je, dakle, tokom devedesetihgodina u velikoj meri devastiran, kao što je tobio slučaj i sa ukupnom ekonomijom zemlje.Poverenje u banke bilo je potpuno izgubljeno,štednja građana nalazila se van legalnih tokova,a naplativost kredita bila je veoma niska, pa jebilo jasno da je dubok reormski zahvat nakon

dvehiljadite neophodan. Ono što se desilo ipak je bio u svetskoj ekonomskoj istoriji nezabele-žen presedan. Početkom 2002. godine doneta je odluka o stečaju četiri velike banke, čime je jednim potezom biti „skraćeno” oko dve trećineukupne bankarske aktive. Zadržan je jedan brojmanjih i dve veće banke. Pošto se kvalitet njihovih kreditnih portolija i ekonomsko-finansijskapozicija „preživelih” banaka nisu bitno razliko- vali od ugašenih banaka, nameće se zaključak dasu odluke u značajnoj meri bile subjektivne pri-rode, gde su politički motivi, veze i lobiranja od-igrali značajnu ulogu. Mada se čini da i u struč-nim krugovima preovlađuje uverenje da je stečajbanaka bio dobar potez, činjenica da se ušlo udrugu deceniju od započinjanja sprovođenja ste-čajeva, a da stečajevi banaka i dalje traju i da sezavršetak ovog procesa i ukupni direktni i indi-rektni troškovi ne mogu ni približno proceniti,kao i niz drugih pitanja koja se nameću, govoreu prilog tome da ovaj presedan u ekonomskojistoriji možda ipak nije bio tako dobar kako senjegovim tvorcima činilo.

Jedan od argumenata koji nije išao u koristovakve odluke je to što je aktički zemlja ostalabez bankarskog sektora, jer su banke koje su ponejasnim kriterijumima zadržane bile male poaktivi i finansijskom potencijalu, pa nisu mogleispratiti nijedan značajniji posao. Sve bilansnekategorije bankarskog sektora imale su gotovozanemarljivo učešće u BDP. Tek 2006. godinebankarski sektor je, nakon intenzivnog rasta bi-lansnih kategorija, dosegao gabarit koji se mo-gao porediti sa najmanje razvijenim bankarskim




nesses and the overall environment, so in theory andin practice various models are applied in order to pre-

vent the systemic risk o large banks going bankrupt.All o these arguments are more pronounced in Ser-bia, due to weak institutions, lengthy legal process-es, corruption in the management o the enormousassets and claims o banks undergoing bankruptcy, aswell as a number o additional reasons. In resolving

sektorima regiona.U bankarstvu postoji pravilo „previše veliki dabi bankrotirao” zbog mnogobrojnih negativ-nih eekata na veliki broj privrednih subjekata iukupno okruženje, pa su u teoriji i praksi pri-menjivani različiti modeli sa ciljem da se zbogsistemskog rizika spreče bankrotstva većih ba-naka. Svi ti argumenti u Srbiji su još izraženiji

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

štednja / Savings

kapital / Equity

Krediti privr. i stan. / Loans

Aktiva / Assets

Bilansne kategorije banaka (u mlrd.EUR) / Balance sheets categories (in EUR bill)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

aktiva/BDP

krediti/BDP

štednja/BDP

kapital/BDP

assets/GDP

loans/GDP

savings/GDP

equity/GDP

Učšć b g u BDP-u (%) / B g/GDP

Izvor:www.nbs, obrade autora Source: www.nbs.rs, edited by author




the banking crises o some country, and there havebeen many such crises in the world, there exists anentire arsenal o measures that can be applied – romwithdrawing bad assets in a specialised institutionthat will manage them, through a combination omerging and “cleansing” balance sheets and their

substitution with long-term bonds, in order orsound banking assets to later be sold to a strategicpartner. None o these instruments have been ap-plied, so the correctness o a determination or theirapplication is a precedent that should yet be receivedwith caution. On the other hand, many companiesthat had no market prospects have been artificiallyheld in the status o “restructuring” or more than adecade, although in a market system they should beshut down, because unlike major banks they do notcause a domino effect.

ENTRY OF FOREIGN BANKS

INTO THE MARKET

Afer the year 2000 the last incomplete market wasenough o a lure or the Serbian banking sector tocome into the ocus o regional investors, especiallyafer the closure o our major banks and circum-stances under which the banking market almostdried up because the remaining banks had only sym-bolic potential and were not competitive. Tere were

various entry strategies. Te most interested, but alsomost courageous, got the first chance to enter themarket via “greenfield” licenses. It turned out thatthey correctly estimated the relationship betweenpotential return and risk, because they were well re-warded not only in terms o high returns, but also interms o good positioning and winning a significantmarket share. Increased interest was also based onthe act that large capital inflows and rapid economicgrowth was expected. Te household retail sector wasnot overburdened with debt, while companies couldnot get loans and guarantees or any significant work,due to the low potential o the remaining banks. Foryears the human resources o banks had been created

and educated both at home and abroad, with repre-sentative offices and the ownership o banks in theworld’s largest centres, according to which Serbia wasunique and well-known among Western bankers.With the liquidation o banks human resources wereavailable in ull measure, which also enabled oreignbanks to rapidly and successully enter the market,initially through greenfield investments (the thresh-old was only €5 million), and then through the pur-chase o existing banks.A second group o banks decided to enter the mar-

zbog slabih institucija, dugih sudskih procesa,korupcije pri upravljanju enormnom imovinomi potraživanjima banaka u stečaju, kao i nizudodatnih razloga. U rešavanju kriza bankar-stva neke zemlje, a takvih kriza bilo je u svetumnogo, postoji čitav arsenal mera koje se mogu

primenjivati, od izvlačenja loše aktive u speci- jalizovanu instituciju koja će njome upravljati,preko kombinacije spajanja i „čišćenja” bilansai njihove supstitucije dugoročnim obveznicama,da bi se zdrava bankarska aktiva potom prodalastrateškom partneru. Ništa od ovih instrumena-ta nije primenjeno, pa ispravnost opredeljenjaza primenjeni presedan ipak treba primiti sa re-zervom. S druge strane, mnoga preduzeća kojanisu imala nikakvu tržišnu perspektivu veštačkise već više od decenije održavaju u statusu „re-strukturiranja”, mada bi ona u tržišnom sistemu

trebalo da budu ugašena, jer za razliku od veli-kih banaka ne izazivaju domino eekat.

Ulazak stranih Banaka na tržištePoslednje nepopunjeno tržište nakon dvehiljadi-te godine bilo je dovoljan mamac da bankarskisektor Srbije uđe u okus svih regionalnih inve-stitora, naročito nakon gašanja četiri velike ban-ke i okolnosti da je bankarska ponuda gotovopotpuno presahla, jer su preostale banke imalesimboličan potencijal i nisu bile konkurentne.Strategija ulaska bila je različita. Najzaintereso- vaniji, ali i najhrabriji, dobili su prvi šansu dauđu na tržište kroz „greenfield“ licence. Poka-zalo se da su dobro procenili odnos potencijal-nih prinosa i rizika, jer su bili dobro nagrađenine samo visokim prinosima, već i dobrim pozi-cioniranjem i osvajanjem značajnijeg tržišnogudela. Pojačano interesovanje se temeljilo i načinjenici da su se očekivali veliki dotok kapitalai brz privredni rast. Sektor stanovništva nije biokreditno zadužen, a preduzeća nisu mogla dobitikredite i garancije za iole značajniji posao, zbog

malog potencijala preostalih banaka. Kadrovskiresursi u bankama godinama su stvarani i obra-zovani u zemlji i inostranstvu, sa predstavništvi-ma i vlasništvima banaka u najvećim svetskimcentrima, po čemu je Srbija bila jedinstvena ipoznata među zapadnim bankarima. Stečajembanaka kadrovski resursi su bili dostupni u pu-noj meri, što je takođe omogućilo brz i uspešanulazak na tržište stranim bankama, prvo krozgrinfild licence (cenzus je bio samo pet milionaevra), a zatim kroz kupovinu postojećih banaka.




ket with a delay and under the positive influence othe success o those who entered first. Teir only op-tion was the purchase o existing banks, so the com-petition or their acquisition commenced. A thirdgroup o banks in the process o market consolida-tion could be defined as domestic private, joint stock

banks. Tey took advantage o the period o growtho the share market and the high interest o oreigninvestors to raise the value o their own shares andraise capital by issuing new shares. Teir main disad-

vantage is the lack o access to affordable sources ounding rom abroad, as well as lacking the knowhowto develop new products, which oreign bank receiverom their headquarters abroad.Te privatisation o banks has also continued throughone specific model. According to the agreement withthe Paris and London Club o creditors, around 70%o the debt was written off and the government con-

ducted a debt swap or part o the capital o banks.With this the state returned its ownership share obanks through the backdoor. One o the drawbackso this model is that the management o these bankswas much like the management o other public com-panies. Tis also eventually led to the collapse o thismanagement model where the (partocratic) state hada direct or indirect influence.Te entry o oreign banks into the domestic mar-ket began with the issuing o “greenfield” licenses,or which the initial requirement was to have sym-bolic capital amounting to only €5 million. Such alow threshold was not as irrational as many pointedout, because extremely risky countries should attractcredible oreign banks. Tis “breaking o barriers”initiated urther capital inflows and the return o sav-ings to the banking sector, thus opening a new phaseo buying banks and growing all balance sheet cate-gories.Interest in buying banks dissipated with the emer-gence o the economic crisis. Te great appetite ooreign banks to take over the last vacant market, incombination with the general stock exchange eupho-

ria that reigned everywhere prior to the crisis, con-tributed to the spectacular growth o bank shares onthe BSE. A speculative bubble ormed because stockprices had no coverage in the undamental indica-tors. When the world bubble burst, a fiasco ollowedon the domestic market, where the most expensivecosts were paid by numerous small shareholders whoentered when the ormation o speculative bubbleson the market had already started. Te economiccrisis brought a halt to the process o consolidationo banks, due to the large number o uncompetitive

Druga grupa banaka odlučila se za ulazak natržište sa zadrškom i pod pozitivnim uticajemuspeha onih koje su ušle prve. One su imale kao jedinu opciju kupovinu postojećih banaka, pa jenadmetanje za njihove akvizicije otpočelo. Kaotreća grupa banaka u procesu konsolidacije trži-

šta mogle bi se uzeti domaće privatne, akcionar-ske banke. One su iskoristile period rasta tržištaakcija i visoko interesovanje stranih investitoraza podizanje vrednosti sopstvenih akcija i pri-kupljanje kapitala emisijom novih akcija. Njihovosnovni hendikep je nemogućnost pristupa povoljnim izvorima sredstava iz inostranstva, kaoi „know how“ za razvoj i nove proizvode, kojistrane banke dobijaju iz centrala.Privatizacija banaka nastavljena je takođe jed-nim specifičnim modelom. Sporazumom saPariskim i Londonskim klubom poverilaca otpi-

sano je oko 70 odsto duga, a država je izvršila za-menu duga za odgovarajući deo kapitala banaka.Time se država na mala vrata vratila u vlasništvodela banaka. Jedna od loših strana ovog modela je to što je upravljanje ovim bankama slično kaoi upravljanje ostalim javnim preduzećima. To jena kraju i dovelo do kraha ovog modela upravljanja tamo gde je (partokratska) država imaladirektnog ili indirektnog upliva.Ulazak stranih banaka na domaće tržište zapo-čeo je davanjem „grinfild” licenci, pri čemu je upočetku trebalo imati simboličan iznos kapitalaod samo pet miliona evra. Ovako nizak cenzusipak nije bio nelogičan, kako su to mnogi isticali, jer je u ekstremno rizičnu zemlju trebalo privućikredibilne strane banke. To „probijanje barijere” je iniciralo dalji priliv kapitala i vraćanje šted-nje u bankarski sektor, pa je otvorena nova etapakupovine banaka i rast svih bilansnih kategorija.Pojavom ekonomske krize interes za kupovinubanaka je nestao. Veliki apetit stranih banaka dazauzmu poslednje nepopunjeno tržište u kom-binaciji sa opštom berzanskom euorijom koja

je svuda vladala pre krize, doprineo je antastič-nom rastu akcija banaka na Beogradskoj berzi.Formirao se špekulativni mehur, jer cene akcijanisu imale nikakvo pokriće u undamentalnimpokazateljima. Kada se svetski mehur raspukao,usledio je fijasko i na domaćem tržištu u kojemsu najskuplji ceh platili brojni mali akcionarikoji su na tržište ulazili kada je već krenulo or-miranje špekulativnog mehura. Ekonomska kri-za prekinula je proces konsolidacije banaka, jer je postojao veliki broj nekonkurentnih banaka sa




banks with small market shares, or which it becameclear that they could not withstand the competitionon the market.Although the growth o balance sheet categories upuntil the emergence o the economic crisis was ex-tremely high, the credit expansion did not prompt

accelerated development o industrial production orseveral reasons. First, the base was low, so the expan-sion was high in terms o percentages, but the bank-ing sector actually remained underdeveloped, thus itonly led to a deepening o the financial system andnot to a credit boom. Another reason was hasty lib-eralisation combined with appreciation o the dinar,which led to too many loans going to finance importsand trade, which contributed to the country’s de-in-dustrialisation.Te ownership structure o banks by country oorigin at the end o 2013 was dispersed and largely

corresponded to established overall economic coop-eration and participation o other oreign companieson the domestic market. Te initial breakout affectedItalian banks, while the Austrians reduced their mar-ket share in the crisis and one major Russian bankappeared on the scene. Te parent banks o Greekplayers stabilised their business, because Greecemanaged to return to the international financial mar-ket in 2014.

malim tržišnim učešćem, za koje je postalo jasnoda ne mogu izdržati tržišnu utakmicu.Iako je rast bilansnih kategorija do pojave eko-nomske krize bio izrazito visok, kreditna ek-spanzija nije delovala na ubrzani razvoj indu-strijske proizvodnje i to iz nekoliko razloga.

Prvo, baza je bila niska, pa je ekspanzija bilaprocentualno visoka, ali je zapravo bankarskisektor i dalje ostao nerazvijen, te je samo dola-zilo do produbljavanja finansijskog sistema, a nedo kreditnog buma. Drugi razlog je prebrza libe-ralizacija u kombinaciji sa apresijacijom dinara,koja je dovodila do toga da krediti previše odlazeu finansiranje uvoza i trgovine, što je doprinelodezindustrijalizaciji zemlje.Vlasnička struktura banaka po zemljama po-rekla krajem 2013. godine je disperzovana i u velikoj meri odgovara uspostavljenoj ukupnoj

privrednoj saradnji i zastupljenosti drugih stra-nih kompanija na domaćem tržištu. U prvi plansu izbile italijanske banke, austrijske su u krizismanjile tržišno učešće, a pojavila se i jedna zna-čajna ruska banka. Matice grčkih banaka stabi-lizuju svoje poslovanje, jer je Grčka uspela da se vrati u 2014. godini na međunarodno finansijskotržište.

Domaće

Domestic

25%

GR

15%

ITA25%

FR

8%

AUS

17%

Ostale

Other

10%

Kapital banaka po zemljama porekla / Ownership by country of origin, 31.12.2013.

Izvor / Source: NBS




enD of the exPansive moDel, enterinG

THE RECESSION

During the period o expansion until 2008, bankscompeted to capture the best long-term market po-sition and then reinvested profit, undertook recapi-talisation and approved cross-border loans, in orderto take the greatest possible share o the market.Tereore, in this milieu financial leverage and thedebt o individual companies constantly grew, be-cause they relied on the uture growth o operatingincome. With the high oreign exchange inflows onthe basis o cross-border loans, proceeds rom priva-tisation and “hot money”, the problem o sterilisationemerged and exerted pressure on currency apprecia-tion. Whether they liked it or not, banks profited rompoor a macroeconomic policy where expansionarypublic spending corrected growth rates through repooperations o the central bank to reduce inflationarypressures. Other troubles emerged in tandem withthis – the huge influx o oreign currency also moti-

vated high interest rates on loans in dinars, while thedinar strengthened through the costs o sterilisationo oreign currency inflows. In this way, during thisperiod the permanent redistribution o income romthe economy and population to towards banks’ pro-its occurred. Banks subsidised such policies, whichproved to be a good actor when the economic crisisemerged, because they awaited it with strengthenedcapital.Te last quarter o 2008, however, was marked bya sudden change in banking trends until then. Te

kraj eksPanzivnoG moDela, Ulazak URECESIONI

U periodu ekspanzije do 2008. godine banke suse takmičile u zauzimanju što bolje dugoročnetržišne pozicije, pa su reinvestirale profit, vrši-le dokapitalizaciju i odobravale prekograničnekredite, da bi zauzele što veći deo tržišta. Stogasu u tom miljeu stalno rasli finansijski leveridžii zaduženost pojedinih kompanija, jer se raču-nalo na budući rast poslovnih prihoda. Visokimdeviznim prilivima po osnovu prekograničnihkredita, prihoda od privatizacije i “vrućeg nov-ca” pojavio se problem sterilizacije koji je usloviopritisak na apresijaciju dinara. Banke su, htele toili ne, profitirale od loše makroekonomske poli-tike, gde se ekspanzivna javna potrošnja korigo- vala rastom kamatnih stopa kroz repo operacijecentralne banke da bi se smanjili inflatorni priti-sci. Uporedo je išla i druga nevolja – veliki prilivdeviza motivisan i visokim kamatnim stopama

na dinarske plasmane, jačao je dinar kroz tro-škove sterilizacije priliva deviza. Na taj način seu tom periodu vršila stalna redistribucija dohot-ka od privrede i stanovništva ka profitu banaka.Banke su ovakvom politikom bile subvencioni-sane, što se pokazalo kao dobra okolnost kada sepojavila ekonomska kriza, jer su je dočekale saojačanim kapitalom.Poslednji kvartal 2008. godine označio je, me-đutim, naglu promenu dotadašnjih trendova ubankarstvu. Odobravanje „prekograničnih” kre-

2,0

-0,1-1,0

2,3

8,8

-0,5

-4,7

11,2

AustrijaAustria

FranceFrancuska

GreeceGrčka

ItalijaItaly

ROA ROE

P u p p p (%) / Pb d b u g




KARAKTERISTIKE BANKARSKOG SEKTORA SRBIJE

Pre i Posle svetske ekonomske krize

DO ULASKA U KRIZU

• Visoke stope rasta svih ključnih bilansnih kategorija.

• Visok devizni priliv kroz dokapitalizacije u devizama i priliv

deviznih kredita.

• Visoka kamatna stopa na REPO kao osnovni mehanizam

neutralisanja rasta u skalnom sektoru.

• Motiv zauzimanja što većeg dela tržišta i mera NBS da se

plasmani stanovništvu vežu za kapital, kao ključni motivi za

priliv deviznih sredstava.

• Rast zaduženosti kroz ”cross border” kredite.

• Subvencioniranje uvoznika i dužnika kroz apresiran kurs

dinara.

m p u d

• Unos deviza i pretvaranje u dinare - pritisak na apresijaciju

kursa i zarada na kursnim razlikama- kupovina HOV NBS i

zarada na kamati i kursnim razlikama.

• Visok priliv ”vrućeg novca”

ng pd

• Ekstremno visoki troškovi sterilisanja deviza, apresijacija

dinara

• Bankarski sektor koji nije okrenut „core biznisu” već mu je

„glavni klijent” centralna banka i država

• Proti banaka bili su nesrazmerno visoki u odnosu na realni

sektor

• Ekstremno visoka adekvatnost kapitala: (što je, međutim,

bio i pokazatelj anomalija u kreiranju prota, ali je u krizi,

ovako kreirana visoka kapitalizacija bila odličan amortizer

gubitaka).

NAKON ULASKA U KRIZU

• Promena tržišne strategije; umesto zauzimanja što većegtržišnog učešća, cilj postaje očuvanje solventnosti i

likvidnosti,

• Kriza likvidnosti na svetskom tržištu reektuje se na

smanjen devizni priliv po svim osnovama i smanjenje apetita

za rizik

• Visok repo stok HOV kao jak amortizer udara na likvidnost,

strah od odobravanja kredita privredi.

• Strah od rizika nagle i nekontrolisane depresijacije dinara

• Smanjenje i povlačenje cross border kredita.

P

• Zatečena visoka kapitalizovanost amortizuje udare na

likvidnost i rast nenaplativih potraživanja.

• Relativno niska zaduženost građana,

• Oprezna politika zaduživanja koju je vodila NBS

np

• Stimulansi za priliv kapitala kroz unos deviza i pretvaranje

u dinare, sada se kreću u suprotnom pravcu i nastaje odliv

sredstava po osnovu pritiska na razduživanje

• Bekstvo od kreditiranja privrede i stanovništva i okretanje

ka državi.

• Relativno visoka referentna kamatna stopa za period

recesije da bi se ispunio postavljeni cilj uticaja na smanjenje

inacije. Da li je proklamovani cilj potrebno preispitati?

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SERBIAN BANKING

SECTOR BEFORE AND AFTER THE GLOBAL

ECONOMIC CRISIS

UNTIL ENTERING THE CRISIS

• High growth rates of all key balance sheet categories.

• High foreign currency inows through recapitalisation in

foreign currencies and inows of foreign currency loans.• High interest rates on REPO as the main mechanism to

neutralise growth in the scal sector.

• Motive of taking the maximum possible market share and

NBS measures to tie household lending to capital as the key

motive for the inow of foreign funds.

• Growth of indebtedness through cross-border loans.

• Subsidising importers and borrowers through appreciation

of the dinar exchange rate..

m g p ug gcurrencies

• Inux of foreign currency and conversion into dinars -

pressure on the appreciation of the exchange rate and

earnings from exchange rate differences - buying NBS

securities and earnings on interest and exchange rate

differences.

• High inux of “hot money”

ng qu

• Extremely high costs of sterilisation of foreign currencies

and appreciation of the dinar.

• Banking sector not focused on „core business“, but rather

with the central bank and the state as the „main client“.

• Banks’ prots were disproportionately high compared to the

real sector.

• Extremely high capital adequacy (which, however, was an

indicator of an anomaly in the creation of prot, but in a

crisis this kind of created high capitalisation was a great

shock absorber for losses).

AFTER ENTERING THE CRISIS

• Changing market strategy; instead of taking the maximumpossible market share, the objective became preserving

solvency and liquidity

• The liquidity crisis on the global market is reected in

reduced foreign currency inows in all respects and a loss of

appetite for risk

• High stock repurchases of bonds as strong shock absorbers

on liquidity, fear of approving loans to the economy.

• Fear of the risk of sudden and uncontrolled depreciation of

the dinar.

• Reduction and withdrawal of cross-border loans.

fub u

• Caught in high capitalisation depreciated shocks on liquidity

and the growth of NPLs.

• Relatively low indebtedness of citizens.

• Prudent lending policy pursued by the NBS.

• Unfavourable circumstances

ng qu

• Incentives for capital inows through the entry of foreign

currencies and conversion into dinars are now moving in the

opposite direction and resulting in the outow of funds on

the basis of pressure on deleveraging

• Avoidance of lending to the economy and population, while

turning towards the state.

• Relatively high benchmark interest rate for the period of

recession in order to full the set objective of inuencing a

reduction on ination. Is it necessary to review the stated

goal?




approval o cross-border loans was discontinuedabruptly, while borrowers were caught in the trap oexcessive leverage that had been justified during thestate o rapid growth, but that became a millstonearound the neck during crisis. Instead o inflowsthrough cross-border loans, the reinvestment o pro-

its and recapitalisation, now a tendency emerged towithdraw loans and realised profits. Credit invest-ments not only slowed growth rom 2008, but alsoled to a reduction in the level o indebtedness o com-panies, as matured loans were repaid and returnedto parent banks, which, o course, like the transer oprofits, does not represent any kind o unauthorisedremoval o money rom the country, as it is ofen pre-sented in public, but has strong recessionary effects.Te problem is that there are ewer creditworthycustomers, while urther credit contraction leads toan acceleration o the recessionary spiral. As such,

the decision was orced to re-introduce subsidisingloans rom the government during 2014, in order tocut the recessionary spiral. However, the mistakeso previous subsidies should not be repeated, whenthe state gave subsidies on the one side, while on theother entire industrial branches were brought to thebrink o bankruptcy with the postponement o theexecution o their obligations. Te successul balancesheet statements o banks rom 30th September 2008represented the last period characterised by the highprofits o banks. Te period o the banking bonan-za and high expansion was over and we began en-tering the stage o recessionary developments. TeNational Bank positively influenced the stability othe banking sector with some o its ormer measures,primarily through the regulation o conditions thatstrengthened the equity base o banks and the insist-ence on high levels o reserves. In this way banks wereencouraged to not share dividends, but rather to con-firm the permanent character o their interest in themarket through reinvestment.

issUe of Dinar aPPreciation anD hiGh

INTEREST RATES

When it comes to interest rates and the exchange rate,as the undeniable key levers o economic policy, Serbiais also in a very specific and contradictory position inthis respect: high level o existing inflation requires arestrictive monetary policy, while the recession impliesan expansionary policy and money that is as cheap aspossible. Te position o the National Bank o Serbia isparticularly unpleasant, with its primary goal o spe-cifically fighting inflation. Te causes o inflation arebeyond monetary policy in the fiscal policy, excessive

dita prekinuto je naglo, a korisnici kredita uhva-ćeni su u zamku previsokog leveridža, koji jeimao opravdanje u stanju brzog rasta, ali koji jeu krizi postao kamen oko vrata. Umesto prilivakroz prekogranične kredite, reinvestiranje pro-fita i dokapitalizacije, sada se pojavila težnja ka

povlačenju kredita i ostvarenih profita. Kreditniplasmani ne samo da usporavaju rast od 2008.godine, već dolazi i do smanjenja nivoa zaduže-nosti preduzeća, jer se dospeli krediti naplaćujui vraćaju bankama maticama, što naravno, kaoni transer profita, ne predstavlja nikakvo nedo-zvoljeno iznošenje novca iz zemlje, kako se točesto u javnosti predstavljalo, ali ima jake recesi-one eekte. Problem je što je sve manje kreditnosposobnih klijenata, a kreditna kontrakcija daljedovodi do ubrzanja recesione spirale. Stoga jeodluka da se tokom 2014. godine ponovo uvede

subvencionisanje kredita od strane države da bise presekla recesiona spirala - iznuđena. Ne bise, međutim, smele ponoviti greške prethodnogsubvencionisanja, kada je država sa jedne stranedavala subvencije, a sa druge strane dovela naivicu bankrotstva čitave industrijske grane odla-ganjem izvršenja svojih obaveza.Bilansi uspeha banaka zaključno sa 30. septem-brom 2008. godine predstavljali su poslednjiperiod karakterističan po visokim profitimabanaka. Period bankarske bonance i visoke ek-spanzije je završen, a otpočela je etapa ulaska urecesiona dešavanja. Narodna banka pozitivno je uticala nekim svojim dotadašnjim meramana stabilnost bankarskog sektora, prevashodnokroz propisivanje uslova koji su jačali kapitalnubazu banaka i insistiranjem na visokom nivourezervacija. Na taj način banke su stimulisane dane dele dividende, već da reinvestiranjem potvr-de trajni karakter svojih interesa na tržištu.

ProBlemi aPresijacije Dinara i visokihkamatnih stoPa

Kada se radi o kamatnim stopama i deviznomkursu kao nesumnjivo ključnim polugama eko-nomske politike, Srbija se i tu nalazi u specifič-noj i kontradiktornoj poziciji: visok nivo zate-čene inflacije zahteva restriktivnu monetarnupolitiku, a recesija podrazumeva ekspanzivnupolitiku i što jefiniji novac. Posebno je neugod-na pozicija Narodne banke Srbije, kojoj je kaoprimarni cilj određena borba protiv inflacije.Uzroci inflacije su van monetarne politike, u fi-skalnoj politici, prevelikoj javnoj potrošnji i ne-




public spending and a lack o competitiveness, so its re-duction is applied using monetary instruments, whichimplies restrictiveness and a high benchmark interestrate, could lead to negative effects. Furthermore, sincethe state is rapidly becoming indebted, high repo rateson the basis o dinar loans and inflows o oreign ex-

change on the basis o oreign currency borrowingslead to pressure on appreciation. As such, a review othe given unction o the central bank should not beavoided, although other models would also have theirdrawbacks in the existing contradictory circumstances.Te problem with the oreign currency exchange rateis that it is a major component o the recoverability oloans, thus any significant depreciation would lead toa drastic deterioration in the banking sector, but alsoin the external liquidity o all borrowers – rom com-panies and citizens to the state and local communities(except or net exporters who are not over-indebted).

In practice this gives rise to wide resistance to the de-preciation o the dinar. On the other hand, countriesthat have set increasing exports as an imperative typ-ically resort to depreciation o the domestic currency,while in Serbia during the post-2000 period apprecia-tion was mainly present. Along with improving macro-economic conditions, it is necessary to at least preventthe appreciation o the dinar in the medium and longterm, because without that it will not be possible tochange the economic structure in the direction o therequired rate o growth in manuacturing and exports.Interest rates o banks have been extremely high inSerbia or years, while banks are subject to criticismand pressure to lower them. It’s tough to have a com-petitive economy i an exporter has to pay a muchhigher cost or financing in relation to its competitorsrom abroad, and also has appreciation o the localcurrency, which reduces the exporter’s income. Teonly way to reduce the level o interest rates, howev-er, is to improve the overall business environment. Inaddition to actors such as inflation and oreign cur-rency risk on indexed loans, it is also very importantto eliminate a number o systemic causes, such as the

inefficiency o collecting receivables in the context obankruptcy legislation, judicial efficiency and the e-ficiency o mortgage payments. Tereore, when thepublic seeks the same rate rom “oreign banks” as intheir own countries, it would be more useul to workon social consensus or the effective regulation andoperating o their own state, as is the case in thosecountries, so interest rates will also all as a kind o in-dicator o that condition. Carrying out reorms, thus,is the only route to reducing interest rates.

konkurentnosti, pa njeno smanjenje primenommonetarnog instrumentarija, koji podrazumevarestriktivnost i visoku reerentnu kamatnu sto-pu, može proizvesti negativne eekte. Tim prešto se država ubrzano zadužuje, pa visoke repostope po osnovu dinarskog zaduženja i priliv

deviza po osnovu deviznog zaduženja dovodedo pritiska na apresijaciju. Stoga preispitivanjezadatih unkcija centralnoj banci ne bi trebaloizbegavati, mada bi i drugi modeli u postojećimprotivrečnim okolnostima mogli imati svoje ne-dostatke.Problem kod deviznog kursa je to što je on glav-na komponenta naplativosti kredita, pa bi svakaznačajnija depresijacija dovodila do drastičnogpogoršanja u bankarstvu, ali i u eksternoj likvid-nosti svih dužnika, od preduzeća i građana, dodržave i lokalnih zajednica (sem neto izvoznika i

to onih koji nisu prezaduženi). To u praksi rađaširok otpor depresijaciji dinara. S druge strane,zemlje koje kao imperativ imaju povećanje izvo-za, po pravilu pribegavaju depresijaciji domaće valute, dok je u Srbiji u periodu nakon 2000.uglavnom bila prisutna apresijacija. Uporedosa poboljšanjem makroekonomskih uslova, po-trebno je da se na srednji i dugi rok bar sprečiapresijacija dinara, jer bez toga neće biti mogućapromena privredne strukture u pravcu potrebnebrzine rasta proizvodnje i izvoza.Kamatne stope banaka godinama su u Srbiji izu-zetno visoke, a banke su predmet kritika i priti-saka da se one snize. Teško je imati konkurentnuprivredu ako izvoznik u odnosu na svog konku-renta iz inostranstva mora da plati znatno višitrošak za finansiranje posla, a uz to ima i apresi-ranu domaću valutu koja mu umanjuje prihode.Jedini način da se visina kamatnih stopa smanji jeste, međutim, poboljšanje ukupnog ambijentaposlovanja. Pored aktora kao što su inflacija idevizni rizik kod indeksiranih kredita, veoma jebitno otklanjati niz sistemskih uzroka, kao što je

neefikasnost naplate potraživanja u okviru ste-čajnog zakonodavstva, efikasnost sudstva, efika-snost naplate hipoteka. Stoga kada se u javnostiod „stranih banaka” traže iste kamatne stopekao u njihovim zemljama, korisnije bi bilo raditina društvenom konsenzusu za efikasno uređenjei unkcionisanje sopstvene države, kao što je utim zemljama, pa će se i kamate kao svojevrsniindikator tog stanja, smanjiti. Sprovođenje re-ormi je, dakle, jedini put smanjenja kamatnihstopa.




ProfitaBility of the serBian BankinG

sector: is there sUfficient comPetition

IN BANKING?

Te period o rapid growth and relatively high profitso the banking sector in Serbia ended with the emer-gence o the economic crisis. Its arrival led to a changein the market strategies o banks: the aim o growingthe market share was replaced with the preservationo liquidity and solvency, in which the problem oloan collectability came to the ore. Even afer en-tering the major economic crisis the banking sectorstill expressed aggregate gains, which constantly de-creased, only or losses to become greater than gainsor the first time in 2013. Apart rom that, the shut-down o more banks in which the state had a director indirect influence over management occurred, orwhich a high price was paid rom the budget.Banks’ returns on average assets and average equi-ty o the Serbian banking sector are low afer 2008,especially i we consider the risks that are expressed

through extremely high and growing NPLs. Onlya ew banks realised profits in excess o 10%, withabout a third o banks managing to continuously turna profit, while the others are on the verge o record-ing, or are struggling with, losses. A more realisticpicture o the profitability o banks in Serbia can beobtained by comparing returns in the region.Returns on equity o the banking sector in the regionshow that Serbia was below average in 2012. As thebanking sector expressed a negative financial resultor the first time in 2013, that position has worsened

ProfitaBilnost BankarskoG sektorasrBije: ima li Dovoljno konkUrencijeU BankarstvU?Period ubrzanog rasta i relativno visokih profitabankarskog sektora u Srbiji završio se pojavomekonomske krize. Njenim nastankom dolazi dopromene tržišne strategije banaka: cilj zauzima-nja tržišnog učešća zamenjuje očuvanje likvid-nosti i solventnosti, a u prvi plan izbija problemnaplativosti kredita. Bankarski sektor je i nakonulaska u veliku ekonomsku krizu iskazivao agre-giranu dobit, koja se stalno smanjivala, da bi u2013. godini gubici prvi put bili veći od dobiti.Osim toga, došlo je i do gašenja više banaka ukojima je država imala direktan ili inderektanuticaj na upravljanje, za šta je plaćen visok cehiz budžeta.Prinosi banaka na prosečnu aktivu i prosečankapital bankarskog sektora u Srbiji su nakon2008. godine niski, pogotovo ako se imaju u

vidu rizici koji su izraženi u izuzetno visokoj,rastućoj nenaplativosti kredita. Samo nekolikobanaka ostvaruje profite iznad 10%, oko trećinebanaka uspeva da permanentno iskazuje profit,dok su ostale na granici, ili se bore sa gubicima.Realnija slika o profitabilnosti banaka u Srbijimože se steći poređenjem prinosa u regionu.Prinosi na kapital bankarskog sektora u regi-onu pokazuju da je Srbija bila ispod proseka u2012. godini. Kako je bankarski sektor u 2013.godini prvi put iskazao negativan finansijski re-

-8

-3

7

12

17

22

LetonijaLatvia

Mađarska RumunijaHungary Romania

Crna Gora Albanija Makedonija BiH Srbija Bugarska Hrvatska Litvanija Poljska TurskaMontenegro Albania Macedonia B-H Serbia Bulgaria Croatia Lithuania Poland Turkey

2012. Prosek / Average

P p p / equ u b u

Izvor: NBS i podaci centralnih banaka / Source: NBS and statistics of central banks




urther. In public, however, there is still a strong per-ception o the high profitability o the banking sector,which is largely derived rom the high interest rateson loans, so one can also ofen hear about potentiallydangerous recipes rom the arsenal o administrativerestrictions on interest rates.

Te central question, however, is whether there is su-ficient competition in the banking industry, becausei there is not then interest rates may be the result othe cartelization o the market. Tis would mean thatit is a case o an oligopoly structure that creates extraprofit, as is the case in some other sectors where thereis insufficient competition. I, however, there is suffi-cient competition on the market, then high interestrates are actually a result o the macro-economic andbusiness system o the environment, o high inflation,the costs o monetary regulation and an inefficient

judiciary and bankruptcy legislation. Te HHI index

concentration on the market indicates a low concen-tration or all balance sheet items. Te top bank onthe market still has a relatively low share, which goesup to 15% o assets in certain balance sheet positionsand is ar rom the height o the share on regionalmarkets. Te top five banks only have about 45 percent. Te top 10 have around 70%, while the remain-ing 23 banks share the remaining 30% o the market.All o these indicators show that Serbia has a much

zultat, taj položaj se dalje pogoršao. U javnosti,međutim, i dalje postoji snažna percepcije o vi-sokoj profitabilnosti bankarskog sektora, koja seuglavnom izvodi iz visokih kamatnih stopa nakredite, pa se često čuju i potencijalno opasnirecepti iz arsenala administrativnog ograničenja

kamatnih stopa. Centralno pitanje jeste, među-tim, ima li dovoljno konkurencije u bankarstvu, jer ako nema, onda kamatne stope mogu biti re-zultat kartelizacije tržišta. To bi značilo da je rečo oligopolskoj strukturi koja kreira ekstraprofite,kao što je to slučaj i u nekim drugim sektorimagde ne postoji dovoljna konkurencija. Ukoliko,pak, na tržištu postoji dovoljna konkurencija,onda su visoke kamatne stope zapravo rezultantamakroekonomskog i privrednosistemskog okru-ženja, od visoke inflacije, troškova monetarneregulacije pa do neefikasnog sudstva i stečajnog

zakonodavstva. HHI indeks koncentracije na tr-žištu pokazuje nisku koncentraciju po svim bi-lansnim pozicijama. Prva banka na tržištu ima idalje relativno nizak udeo koji ide do 15% aktiveu pojedinim bilansnim pozicijama i daleko je od visine učešća na regionalnim tržištima. Prvihpet banaka imaju tek oko 45 procenata. Prvih 10imaju oko 70%, a 23 preostale banke dele preo-stalih 30% tržišta. Svi ovi pokazatelji govore da

Pokazatelji za Bankarske sektore iz reGiona (31.12.2012.)

REGION BANKING SECTOR INDICATORS (31.12.2012.)

Srbija

Serbia

h

Croatia

Bugarska

Bulgaria

Rumunija

Romania

mđ

Hungary

BIH

B-h

Crna Gora

Montenegro

Albanija

Albania

Makedonija

Macedonia

a (mdeUr)

Assets (MlrdEUR)25,1* 53,1 42,1 91,4 108,0 11,4 2,8 8,6 5,7

rast/pad

growt/decline0* -2,2% 7,3% 0,5% -3,6% 2% -0,1% 6,6% 10,8%

/GDP

/GDP85% 120% 106% 70% 108% 86% 86% 87,0% 77%

Broj banaka

No of banks32 31 31 39 35 12 11 16 16

u .

in foregn ownership74% 90% 77% 90% 89% 92% 81% 92,20% 92%

Pokazatelji ProfitaBilnosti / ProfitaBility inDicators

RoA 0,90% 0,90% 0,70% -0,60% -0,40% 0,90% -2,00% 0,33% 0,40%

RoE 2,9% (4,65*) 4,80% 5,30% -5,40% -3,80% 7,00% -18,30% 3,8% 3,8%

CAR 16,40% 20,60% 16,70% 14,60% 15,70% 16,40% 14,7% 16,2% 17,10%

%nPl 19,90% 13,80% 16,60% 18,20% 13,70% 13,50% 17,60% 22,50% 10,90%

*bez Agrobanke I Razvojne banke Vojvodine

Izvor: podaci centralnih banaka, Izveštaji o nansijskoj stabilnosti




higher degree o competition on the market thanin other countries in the region. Moreover, due tothe increasing competitiveness o the entire sectorand the reduction o its costs built into the interestrate, there is a requirement or urther concentra-tion through increasing banks with a higher marketshare and reducing the number o non-competitivebanks and their takeover by those that are strongerand more competitive. Reaching a 2% market sharein assets has been shown as a turning point or sus-tainable competitiveness on the market, although noteven the size o a bank, or its ownership structure,can guarantee competitiveness. Te optimal cost obanking inrastructure would be at the level o 20banks, which would lead to a reduction in costs andan increase in returns on equity.

nPls as a key ProBlem of the reGion

Te main problem o the banking sector in the region

is the growth o non-perorming loans coupled withthe stagnation o lending activity, both in the corpo-rate area, as well as in retail lending, in which Serbiaunortunately leads the way. Since there is no signi-icant economic recovery, solvency and liquidity aremaintained due to continued good capital adequacywhich, however, is slowly melting away.Almost all countries in the region have either stag-nation or slight alls in lending activity and total as-sets. Te number o solvent, creditworthy clients isdecreasing ever urther, so banks avoid lending to

je u Srbiji znatno veći stepen konkurencije natržištu nego u ostalim zemljama regiona. Štavi-še, zbog podizanja konkurentnosti celog sektorai smanjenja njegovih troškova koji se ugrađujuu kamate, potrebna je dalja koncentracija krozpovećanje banaka sa višim tržišnim učešćem ismanjenje broja nekonkurentnih banaka, kao injihovo preuzimanje od strane snažnijih i kon-kurentnijih. Kao prelomna tačka za održivu kon-kurentnost na tržištu pokazuje se dostizanje 2%tržišnog učešća u aktivi, mada ni veličina ban-ke, pa ni vlasnička struktura ipak ne garantujukonkurentnost. Optimalni trošak bankarske in-rastrukture bio bi na nivou dvadesetak banaka,što bi dovelo do smanjenja troškova i povećanjaprinosa na kapital.

nenaPlativi kreDiti kao kljUčniProBlem reGiona

Osnovni problem bankarskih sektora u regionu je rast nenaplativih kredita uz stagnaciju kredit-ne aktivnosti kako u korporativnom delu, takoi u kreditiranju stanovništva, u čemu Srbija na-žalost prednjači. Budući da značajnijeg privred-nog oporavka nema, solventnost i likvidnostse održavaju zbog još uvek dobre adekvatnostikapitala, koji se, međutim, lagano topi. Skorosve zemlje regiona imaju ili stagnaciju ili blagipad kreditne aktivnosti i ukupne aktive. Brojsolventnih, kreditno sposobnih klijenata je sve

0,85

1,2

1,06

0,7

1,08

0,862

0,86 0,87

0,77

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Srbija Hrvatska Bugarska Rumunija Mađarska BIH Crna Gora Albanija MakedonijaSerbia Croatia Bulgaria Romania Hungary B-H Montenegro Albania Macedonia

mlrd. EUR aktivaassets

aktiva/GDP(%)assets/GDP(%)

a p GDP / a GDP




the economy, which urther influences recessionarytrends. Banks’ placements are ocused on governmentbonds, with which banks reduce the risk o their loanportolio and improve their capital adequacy, but theeffects o this change in the structure o the borrowerare unavourable because the real economy cannot

recover without a credit stimulus. Te NPL ratio inthe region is still at a very high level, averaging about16%. For most countries it cannot be concluded withcertainty that the trend o deterioration has stopped,unlike the countries o Central Europe, where nega-tive flows have halted and stabilised at about 5 to 6%.Te banking sectors in the EU member countries(Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia) have assets that ex-ceed the GDP, indicating greater saturation on thebanking sector compared to other countries in theregion, where this ratio is around 80%. Macedonia’shas the lowest banking sector participation according

to GDP (77%) and that is partly the reason or theaster growth o this sector, as there is space availa-ble on the banking market. On the other hand, themost developed banking sector in relation to GDP isin Croatia (120%), where there is also the greatest de-gree o concentration o banks on the market, meas-ured according to the competitiveness index and theparticipation o the largest banks in the market.

Poor corPorate Governance

Te impact o the ownership structure on the man-agement o banks has proved to be extremely impor-tant in the case o Serbia. Te success o a bank is sig-nificantly dependent on a number o actors: sourceso capital, home country o the parent bank, whetherthe state’s the dominant shareholder, whether share-holders include international financial institution,the extent o dispersion o ownership. Te opera-tional results o banks, thus, depend directly on thequality o corporate governance, which in turn is pri-marily dependent on the ownership structure. In thisrespect, it is evident that the worst results in Serbiahave always been realised when the state has played a

dominant role in the ownership structure.Private joint stock banks can also be problematic,particularly i their ownership structure lacks seri-ous institutional investors, as is the case in developedeconomies. In this case, however, the damages opoor positioning on the market are actually paid bythe parent bank, which is orced to carry out recapi-talisation, rather than being compensated by the state

via the budget. In the range o different ownershipstructures, the best results are achieved by Europeanbanks with good local management, excellent mon-

manji, pa banke izbegavaju kreditiranje privre-de, što dodatno utiče na recesione tokove. Pla-smani banaka usmereni su na državne hartije od vrednosti, čime banke smanjuju rizike kreditnogportolija i poboljšavaju adekvatnost kapitala, alisu eekti ovakve promene strukture korisnika

kredita nepovoljni, jer se realni sektor ne možeoporaviti bez kreditnih stimulansa. NPL raciou regionu još uvek je na vrlo visokom nivou, uproseku oko 16%. Za većinu zemalja ne može sesa sigurnošću konstatovati da je trend pogorša-nja zaustavljen, za razliku od zemalja centralneEvrope gde su negativni tokovi presečeni i stabi-lizovani na oko 5% do 6%.Bankarski sektori u zemljama koje su u EU (Ma-đarska, Bugarska I Hrvatska) imaju aktivu koja je veća od iznosa GDP-a, što pokazuje veću satu-riranost bankarskog sektora u odnosu na ostale

zemlje u regionu, gde se ovaj odnos kreće oko80%. Najniže učešće bankarskog sektora premaGDP ima Makedonija (77%) pa je delimično i torazlog bržeg rasta ovog sektora, jer je bankarskotržište nepopunjeno. S druge strane, najrazvije-niji bankarski sektor u odnosu na GDP je u Hr- vatskoj (120%) u kojoj postoji i najveći stepenkoncentracije banaka na tržištu meren indek-som konkurentnosti i učešćem najvećih banakana tržištu.

loše korPorativno UPravljanjeUticaj vlasničke strukture na upravljanje ban-kom pokazao se kao izuzetno važan na prime-ru Srbije. Uspeh banke značajno zavisi od nizaaktora: porekla kapitala, zemlje u kojoj je ma-tična banka, da li je država u vlasništvu kaodominantni akcionar, da li ima međunarodnufinansijsku instituciju kao akcionara, kakva jedisperzija vlasništva. Rezultati poslovanja bana-ka direktno, dakle, zavise od kvaliteta korpora-tivnog upravljanja, a ono zavisi u prvom redu od vlasničke strukture. U tom pogledu evidentno

je da je vlasnička struktura u kojoj država imadominantnu ulogu u Srbiji do sada uvek davalanajlošije rezultate. Privatne akcionarske banketakođe mogu biti problematične, pogotovo akonemaju u vlasničkoj strukturi ozbiljne instituci-onalne investitore kao što je to slučaj u razvije-nim ekonomijama. Ceh lošeg snalaženja na trži-štu u tom slučaju ipak plaća matična banka, koja je prinuđena da vrši dokapitalizacije, a ne drža- va preko budžeta. U lepezi različitih vlasničkihstruktura, najbolje rezultate daju evropske banke




itoring o bank perormance and high quality riskmanagement.

the sUccesses of Post-2000 BankinG

REFORMS

Applying the precedent o initiating liquidation meant

that almost two-thirds o banking assets had, in addi-

tion to an of pronounced positive side, a number o

negative consequences. Until 2005 Serbia was actually

without a serious banking sector that could be com-

pared to even the region’s weakest countries econom-

ically, because the share o banking assets in GDP was

very low, with dwar-like banks that could not provide

sufficient support to the economy. Moreover, the debt

to equity swap carried out as part o the reorm model

led to a high share o state ownership in the remaining

domestic banks, with an ownership model that could be

characterised as a quasi-shareholders, with a great in-

fluence o the “partocratic” state, which later resulted inthe collapse o many banks during the economic crisis.

On the other hand, the positive effects that have oc-curred in the banking sector during the past decadeshould not be negated. Tis sector is the best organisedand closest to operating according to European stand-ards, especially when compared to other sectors thatared much worse during that period o the reorm andprivatisation process. Te most significant successes othe banking afer the year 2000 could be shortlisted asollows:

sa dobrim lokalnim menadžmentom, odličnimmonitoringom perormansi banke i kvalitetnimupravljanjem rizicima.

UsPesi Bankarske reforme nakon2000. GODINE

Primenjeni presedan gašenja gotovo dve trećinebankarske aktive imao je, pored često isticanihpozitivnih strana, i brojne negativne posledice.Srbija je zapravo sve do 2005. godine bila bezozbiljnijeg bankarskog sektora, koji bi se mogaouporediti čak i sa ekonomski najslabijim zemlja-ma regiona, jer je udeo bankarske aktive u GDPbio je izuzetno nizak, sa patuljastim bankamakoje nisu mogle dati dovoljnu podršku privredi.Takođe, sprovedeni debt to equity kao deo mo-dela reormi doveo je do visokog učešća državeu vlasništvu preostalih domaćih banaka sa vla-

sničkim modelom koji bi se mogao okarakteri-sati kao kvaziakcionarski, sa velikim uplivompartokratske države, što je kasnije rezultiralokrahom više banaka tokom ekonomske krize.S druge strane, ne treba negirati pozitivne eektekoji su u bankarskom sektoru nastali u proteklojdeceniji. On je najuređeniji i najbliži poslovanjupo evropskim standardima, pogotovo ako seuporedi sa drugim sektorima koji su u posma-tranom periodu prošli mnogo lošije u postupkureormi i privatizacije. Kao najznačajniji uspesi

0,10,3

0,5

1,0

1,7

2,4

3,9

5,45,2

6,05,7

6,25,9

0,40,8

1,1

1,4

2,3

3,4

4,94,8

6,0

7,1

7,6

8,28,4

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Krediti stanovništvu štednja stanovništvaRetail loans Retail savings

r šd d šu (d eUr) / r d g (B eUr)




• restoration o confidence in the banking sector, aprerequisite or which was the resolving old oreigncurrency savings

• adoption and consistent implementation o Europe-an regulations and Basel standards

• inflow o capital and long-term sources o financing

abroad• prevention o the influx o “dirty money” in the own-

ership o banks (which was not done during the privatisation o enterprises)

• efficient transer o the salary payment system romthe SDK to banks

• establishment and operation o the credit bureauOne irreutable result o the reorms was certainly re-solving the issue o so-called “old oreign currency sav-ings” through the issuance o government bonds, withwhich trading on the Belgrade Stock Exchange – BSEwas also successully launched. Tis was ollowed by

the gradual return o oreign currency savings to thebanking sector, so that by the end o 2013 it exceeded

bankarstva nakon 2000. mogli bi se navesti:• vraćanje poverenja u bankarski sektor, čemu je

preduslov bio rešavanje stare devizne štednje• usvajanje i dosledna primena evropske regula-

tive i standarda Bazela• priliv kapitala i dugoročnih izvora finansiranja

iz inostranstva• sprečavanje upliva „prljavog novca” u vlasni-

štvo banaka (što nije urađeno u privatizacijipreduzeća)

• efikasan transer platnog prometa sa SDK nabanke

• osnivanje i rad kreditnog biroaNesporan rezultat reormi je svakako rešavanjepitanja takozvane stare devizne štednje kroz iz-davanje državnih obveznica kojima je uspešnozapočeto i trgovanje na Beogradskoj berzi. Na-kon toga, devizna štednja se postepeno vraćala

u bankarski sektor, tako da krajem 2013. godineprevazilazi osam milijardi evra. Dinarska šted-

BILANSNE KATEGORIJE BANAKA (d rsD d eUr), b p b b 2000-2013. gd

BALANCE SHEET CATEGORIES OF BANKS (in RSD bln. and EUR bln),

ub p d ub b 2000-2013

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

a / Assets 704 291 316 367 510 775 1169 1561 1776 2160 2533,5 2650 2880 2846

Krediti

p .

Retail/

commercial

lending

347 116 170 227 331 503 585 814 1.093 1.270 1.603 1.718 1.879 1.786

kapital / equ 24 46 64 86 99 125 216 328 420 447 497,8 546 591 595

šd / sg 4 22 49 73 113 193 266 392 425 578 745 79 5 928 968

u milijardama EUR / u milijardama EUR

kurs EUR 58,68 59,71 61,52 68,31 78,89 85,50 79,00 79,24 88,60 95,89 105,50 104,64 113,72 114,64

a / Assets 12,0 4,9 5,1 5,4 6,5 9,1 14,8 19,7 20,0 22,5 24,0 25,3 25,3 24,8

kd p

stan.

Retail/

commercial

lending

5,9 1,9 2,8 3,3 4,2 5,9 7,4 10,3 12,3 13,2 15,2 16,4 16,5 15,6

kapital / equ 0,41 0,77 1,04 1,26 1,25 1,46 2,73 4,14 4,74 4,66 4,72 5,22 5,20 5,19

šd / sg 0,07 0,37 0,80 1,07 1,43 2,26 3,37 4,95 4,80 6,03 7,06 7,60 8,16 8,44

Broj zaposl.

No. employees26.075 22.804 18.914 22.319 23.463 25.680 28.092 30.246 32.342 31.182 29.887 29228 28394 26380

Broj banaka

No. banks86 49 50 47 43 40 37 35 34 34 33 33 32 30

Učešće aktive u BDP (u %, mlrd EUR)

izvor: www.nbs.rs, obrade autora Source: www.nbs.rs, edited by author




€8 billion. Dinar savings, however, have never account-ed or more than 3% o total savings. Endeavouringto give primacy to the dinar cannot yield results un-til there is balance in the economic undamentals andprice and exchange rate stability lasting at least a ewyears have been established, in order to restore con-

fidence in the dinar. Troughout the entire observedperiod, the retail sector was the net creditor o both theeconomy and the state. Te only exception was 2008, atthe peak o the momentum o credit expansion.In addition to restoring savings in banks, the creators o

banking reorms can certainly be credited with the act

that, in contrast to the privatisation o companies, dubi-

ous capital and incompetent owners were unable to pen-

etrate management structures. Te process o reducing

the number o total banks through mergers, sales and re-

voking the licenses o quasi-banks (o which there were

in excess o 100), was ully justified and ofen required

great courage, because some o these dwar speculativebanks were bastions o non-transparent operating and

actually represented para-banking institutions, whose

liquidation caused no systemic effects, unlike the major

banks. Other significant successes o the reorms also in-

clude the painless transer o the salary payment system

to banks, as well as the positive step o developing the

Credit Bureau at the right time. When the high capitali-

sation o banks is added to that, which was a strong ab-

sorber o the crisis and was partly related to the excellent

decision to link the expansion o loans to households to

the amount o capital, it proved to be enough to ensure

a positive balance o the banking sector, especially com-

pared to other sectors. Te current ownership structure

is well diversified in terms o the countries o origin o

oreign banks and corresponds with the overall level o

economic cooperation with those countries.

Te banking sector, thereore, is still not ully consol-idated. Te problem is that under the conditions othe existing recession there is no interest in increas-ing market share through acquisitions, nor the entryo new players on the banking market. Te bankingsector essentially has the same problems as the overall

economy o the country: there is no real basis or itsdevelopment on a sound basis, due to the weakening othe real sector, low exports, high public spending, butalso due to the consequences o the global economiccrisis, which had a significant impact.Viewed as a whole, the commercial banking sector rep-resents the better part o the economy and could repre-sent an important instrument or the country’s utureeconomic development and integration. Te conditionor this is the carrying out o reorms that have beenpostponed or years.

nja, međutim, nikada nije imala više od 3% uče-šća u ukupnoj štednji. Nastojanje da se dinaruda primat ne može dati rezultate sve dok se neuravnoteže ekonomski undamenti i uspostavistabilnost cena i kursa, koja bi trajala bar neko-liko godina, kako bi se vratilo poverenje u dinar.

Tokom celog posmatranog perioda, sektor sta-novništva bio je neto kreditor privrede i države.Izuzetak je bila samo 2008. godina, na vrhuncuzamaha kreditne ekspanzije.U zasluge kreatora bankarskih reormi, pored vraćanja štednje u banke, svakako spada to što,za razliku od privatizacije privrede, sumnjiv kapi-tal i nekompetentni vlasnici nisu mogli da imajupristup upravljanju. Proces smanjenja ukupnogbroja banaka kroz spajanje, prodaju i oduzima-nje licence kvazibankama (taj broj je premašivao100) imao je puno opravdanje, a za to je bila po-

trebna često i velika hrabrost, jer su neke od ovihpatuljastih špekulativnih banaka bile bastioninetransparentnog poslovanja i predstavljali suparabankarske institucije, čije gašenje, za razlikuod velikih banaka, nije izazvalo nikakve sistem-ske posledice. U značajne uspehe reorme spada ibezbolan prelazak platnog prometa u banke, kaoi dobar potez sa pravovremenim razvojem Kre-ditnog biroa. Kada se tome doda i visoka kapita-lizovanost banaka koja je bila jak amortizer krize,što je jednim delom vezano i za odličnu odlukuo vezivanju ekspanzije kredita stanovništvu za visinu kapitala, to je ipak dovoljno za pozitivansaldo bankarskog sektora, pogotovo u poređenjusa ostalim sektorima. Postojeća vlasnička struktu-ra dobro je diversifikovana po zemljama poreklastranih banaka i korespondira sa ukupnim nivo-om privredne saradnje sa tim zemljama.Bankarski sektor, dakle, još uvek nije u potpuno-sti konsolidovan. Problem je što u postojećim re-cesionim uslovima ne postoji interes za poveća-nje tržišnog udela kroz akvizicije, niti za ulazakna bankarsko tržište novih banaka. Bankarski

sektor u suštini ima iste probleme kao i ukupnaekonomija zemlje: nema realne podloge za nje-gov razvoj na zdravim osnovama zbog slabljenjarealnog sektora, malog izvoza, visoke javne po-trošnje, ali i posledica velike svetske ekonomskekrize, koja je na to bitno uticala.U celini gledano, bankarstvo u Srbiji predstavljabolji deo ekonomije i može predstavljati zna-čajan instrument budućeg privrednog razvoja iekonomskih integracija. Uslov za to je sprovođe-nje reormi, koje se godinama odlažu.




Developmenttrends obankingregulations inEuropePetar Arsić and Dušan omićKPMG LLC, Belgrade

Six years afer the outbreak o the global econom-ic and financial crisis, as well as the crisis in theeuroarea which has ollowed, banking operations

have been coloured by uncertainty. Numerous changeshave been made, or are expected, in the area o import-ant regulations determining the operations o banks. Inaddition, there are also changes in terms o relations oregulatory bodies responsible or supervising bankingoperations, the most important o which is certainlythe ormation o the European Banking Union and theestablishment o the Unified Supervision Mechanism.Being aware o the type o changes it reers to, it is not

appropriate to speak about adapting the behaviour obanks, but about its essential change. Te new circum-stances require banks to revise the way they operate(their business model), business culture, attitude to riskand so on. Bearing in mind that economies around theworld are recovering slowly and unevenly, banks willbe aced with great challenges. Te ability to change inthe given circumstances will be the major determinanto survival in a cruel game rom which some banks willcome out as winners, whereas others will disappear.

rendovirazvojabankarskeregulative uEvropiPetar Arsić i Dušan omićKPMG d.o.o. Beograd

Šest godina nakon izbijanja svetske ekonomskei finansijske krize, kao i krize u evrozoni koja

je ubzo usledila za njom, bankarsko poslovanje obojeno je neizvesnošću. Brojne izmene suizvršene ili se očekuju u domenu važnih propisakojima se reguliše poslovanje banaka. akođe,prisutne su i promene po pitanju međusobnih od-nosa regulatornih tela zaduženih za nadzor ban-karskog poslovanja, od kojih je svakako najvažnijeormiranje Evropske bankarske unije i usposta-

vljanje Mehanizma jedinstvenog nadzora.Imajući u vidu o kakvim izmenama je reč, nije pri-

mereno govoriti o prilagođavanju ponašanja ba-naka, već o njihovoj suštinskoj promeni. Naime,novonastale okolnosti zahtevaju da banke preispi-taju način poslovanja (biznis model), kulturu po-slovanja, odnos prema rizicima i drugo. Imajućiu vidu da se ekonomije širom sveta polako i ne-ravnomerno oporavljaju, pred banke će biti posta-

vljeni veliki izazovi. Sposobnost menjanja u datimokolnostima predstavljaće glavnu determinantuopstanka u surovoj igri iz koje će neke banke izaćikao pobednici, a druge nestati.




THE NEED FOR CLEARER, SIMPLER AND

MORE STABLE REGULATIONS

Te financial sector, in comparison with the resto the economy, has always had more compositeregulations. However, over time the SE regulationshave become increasingly complex, which is bestshown in the genesis o the legislation in the parto adequacy o banks’ capital in the last two anda hal decades - rom Basel I in distant 1988 un-til Basel III, which has been applied in phases inEU through CRD4 package o regulations since 1st January 2014. Moreover, some corrections to BaselIII may be defined as the silent arrival o Basel IV.Te standards are slowly coming to Serbia throughStrategy o Introduction o Basel III, which wasadopted by the NBS late last year.However, numerous representatives o the proes-sional community justifiably ask whether the regu-lation is developing appropriately, related to the de-

velopments o recent years. An active discussion thattakes place on this topic mainly covers the ollowingaspects: complexity, (non-) continuity, compliance

(comparability), accuracy (clarity), the cost side.Te complexity o the regulations, which is ofenthe subject o criticism, directly influences theoperations o individual participants and impliesthe existence o a particular capacity or the aorementioned to be tracked properly. In doing so, weshould keep in mind that this applies to banks aswell as the supervisory bodies (auditors, supervi-sors) that also ofen have a limited internal capac-ity. It can be concluded rom certain documentsthat simpler regulations are being sought.

POTREBA ZA JASNIJIM, JEDNOSTAVNIJIM I

STALNIJIM PROPISIMA

Finansijski sektor u poređenju sa ostatkom eko-nomije oduvek je imao složenije propise. Među-tim, vremenom propisi su postajali sve složenijio čemu najbolje svedoči geneza propisa u deluadekvatnosti kapitala banaka u poslednje dve ipo decenije - od Bazela 1 iz davne 1988. godinepa sve do Bazela III koji se od 1. januara 2014.godine fazno primenjuje u EU kroz CRD4 pa-ket propisa. Štaviše, pojedine korekcije Bazela 3mogu se okarakterisati kao tihi dolazak Bazela4. Ovi standardi polako dolaze u Srbiju krozStrategiju za uvođenje Bazela 3, koju je NBSusvojila krajem prethodne godine.Ipak, brojni predstavnici stručne javnostiopravdano postavljaju pitanje da li se regulati-

va razvija na odgovarajući način, a sve u sklopudešavanja u proteklim godinama. Živa diskusijakoja se odvija na ovu temu uglavnom pokrivasledeće aspekte: složenost, (ne)stalnost, uskla-đenost (uporedivost), preciznost (jasnoća), tro-

škovna strana.Složenost ili kompleksnost propisa (koja je čestopredmet kritika) direktno utiče na poslovanjepojedinačnih učesnika i podrazumeva postoja-nje određenih kapaciteta kako bi ista mogla dase isprati na odgovarajući način. Pri tome, trebaimati u vidu da se ovo odnosi na banke ali i nanadzorna tela (revizija, supervizori) koja tako-đe često imaju ograničene interne kapacitete. Izpojedinih dokumenata može se zaključiti da seteži jednostavnijim propisima.




(Non-) permanence or variability o regulationsis also one o the aggravating conditions whichbanks ace. Currently there is a high level o reg-ulatory uncertainty. Although the direction inwhich we should continue is generally amiliar,there are many open issues that significantly ham-per the banking business. Locally some o the openissues are the uture treatment o large exposures(strictness o conditions through the use o CE1capital and lower limits o large exposures to 5%),

a number o changes brought about by Basel III(LCR, NSFR indicators and leverage ratio) whichare still not ully defined, the implications o IFRS9 on the provision and use o required reserves orestimated losses and others.Te precision or clarity o regulations is one o theelements that are considered in detail. Practice hasproved that relatively complex individual indica-tors are naturally less reliable and accurate thansome relatively simple indicators, due to whichsupervisors are increasingly turning in this di-

Izvor / Source: KPMG International

(Ne)stalnost odnosno promenljivost propisa je ta-kođe jedna od otežavajućih okolnosti sa kojima sebanke susreću. renutno postoji velika doza regula-torne neizvesnosti. Premda je pravac u kome trebada se ide opštepoznat, postoje brojna otvorena pi-tanja koja znatno otežavaju poslovanje banaka. Lo-kalno neka od tih otvorenih pitanja su budući tret-man velikih izloženosti (zaoštravanje uslova krozkorišćenje CE1 kapitala i spuštanje limita velikihizloženosti na 5%), brojne novine koje donosi Bazel

3 (LCR, NSFR pokazatelji i leveridž racio) za koje još uvek nije sve do kraja definisano, implikacijeIFRS 9 na rezervisanja i korišćenje potrebne rezer-

ve za procenjene gubitke i drugo.Preciznost ili jasnoća propisa je jedan od elemenatakoji se detaljno razmatra. Praksa je pokazala da suse pojedini pokazatelji relativno složeniji po svojojprirodi pokazali kao manje pouzdani i precizni odnekih relativno jednostavnijih pokazatelja, zbog čegase supervizori sve više okreću u tom smeru. akođe,prisutna je želja da se propisi, pokazatelji i mere u




rection. Likewise, there is a desire or regulations,indicators and measures to be adjusted as muchas possible to each other in order to acilitate mon-itoring and supervision. Te discretionary rightso banks and supervisors are decreased to allow

greater comparability o the data, while retainingsensitivity to risks as much as possible.Conorming to new regulations requires signifi-cant costs (investments) in terms o hiring and /or training personnel and the purchase / develop-ment o the appropriate technical and I solutions.Complexity ofen rightly requires the engagemento external consultants who have know-how in thesubject area.

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF

REGULATION AND CENTRALISATION

In a speech given recently (early June 2014) byMr Jaime Caruana, General Manager o the Bankor International Settlements, the view that globalbusiness requires internationally adopted regula-tions was once again highlighted. Consequently,regulatory bodies around the world are orced, be-side the role o “good host” governing operationsat the national level, to also take on the role o par-ticipants in coordinated international activities inthe field o adoption and harmonisation o regu-lations in various fields with the aim o achieving

greater stability and resilience o the financial sys-tem.Te persistance o this idea is best reflected in theconcept o the Unified Supervision Mechanismand, more broadly, rom the view o the Europe-an Banking Union. Te European Banking Un-ion include member states o the Eurozone andother Member States with the primary objectiveo achieving greater stability and resilience o thebanking system in Europe, considering the previ-ous crisis experience.

što većoj meri međusobno usklade kako bi se olak-šalo praćenje i nadzor. Smanjuju se diskreciona pra-

va banaka i supervizora kako bi se omogućila većauporedivost podataka, uz koliko je moguće zadrža-

vanje osetljivosti na rizike.

Prilagođavanje novoj regulativi iziskuje značajnetroškove (ulaganja) u pogledu angažovanja i/ili obu-ke kadrova i kupovine/razvoja odgovarajućih teh-ničkih i inormacionih rešenja. Često kompleksnostopravdano zahteva i angažovanje eksternih konsul-tanata koji poseduju ekspertizu za datu oblast.

Međunarodni karakter regulative i

CENTRALIZACIJA

U govoru koji je nedavno (početkom juna 2014.godine) održao gospodin Jaime Caruana, generalnidirektor Banke za međunarodna poravnanja, još jed-nom istaknut je stav da globalno poslovanje iziskujemeđunarodno prihvaćene propise. Shodno tome,regulatorna tela širom sveta prisiljena su da poreduloge „dobrih domaćina“ koji uređuju poslovanjena nacionalnom nivou, preuzmu ulogu i učesnika ukoordiniranoj međunarodnoj aktivnosti u domenudonošenja i usklađivanja propisa u različitim oblasti-ma sa ciljem postizanja veće stabilnosti i otpornostifinansijskog sistema.Aktuelnost ove ideje najbolje se ogleda u konceptuMehanizma jedinstvenog nadzora i šire posmatra-

no Evropske bankarske unije. Evropsku bankarskuuniju čine države članice evrozone i ostale članice saosnovnim ciljem postizanja veće stabilnosti i otpor-nosti bankarskog sistema u Evropi, a sve imajući u

vidu prethodno iskustvo sa krizom.Mehanizam podrazumeva dominantu uloguEvropske centralne banke (ECB) u domenu nad-zora poslovanja 124 najveće bankarske grupacije ubankarskoj uniji sa udelom od 85% u ukupnoj ak-tivi, počevši od novembra 2014. godine. ECB bićeuključena u nadzor i preostalih 6,000 banaka u

Stvarni diverzitet ili oportunitetno

ponašanje

Postavlja se pitanje da li diverzitet pondera ri-zika sa kojim su se supervizori susreli, a koji suproizvod različitih internih modela predsta-

vljaju realnu sliku ili su više posledica čišćenjapodataka, različite postavke i tehnike obračunai slično čime su pojedine banke postigle znatnoniže pondere rizika nego neke druge banke zagotovo isti posao i poslovno okruženje.

Actual diversity and opportunistic

behaviour

Te question is raised as to whether the diversi-ty o risk weights which supervisors ace, are theproduct o different internal models representing

a realistic picture or are more a consequence ocleaning data, different settings and techniqu-es o accounting and similar, with which somebanks have achieved significantly lower riskweights than some other banks or virtually thesame job and the business environment.




Tis mechanism involves the dominant role ofthe European Central Bank (ECB) in terms ofsupervision of the 124 largest banking groups inEU banking, with a share of 85% in total assets,at the beginning of November 2014. Te ECBwill be included in monitoring the remaining

6,000 banks in the banking union; however, theresponsibility for their supervision (at least fornow) is retained by national supervisors. Com-prehensive assessments of the afore mentioned124 banking groups are currently being con-ducted (and will continue until October 2014).

COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT

of banks by the eCb

Comprehensive assessment can be divided intothree parts: assessment of asset quality (AQR =asset quality review), stress tests and the lack of

capital. Tese results will be published separate-ly, but there is a possibility that banks will be un-der pressure to make their results public whenthey are confirmed.Asset Quality Review or AQR is done throughindirect and direct control with a detailed checkof the quality of the balance sheet assets andoff-balance sheet items at different types of risk,but using a methodology that has been devel-oped specifically for this purpose and which ismore conservative than the applicable account-ing rules, which are mostly based on IFRS. est-ing is performed in the portfolio of non-per-forming loans (by harmonised definitions), theadequacy of the valuation of assets and collater-al, the amount of provisions and the adequacyof the used risk weights. Stress tests are tests ofresilience to future shocks (e.g. changes in theconditions for debt securities of certain states),compared to 8% CE1 capital. In doing so, thedefinition of capital aligns with the observedtime horizon (not the definition that applies toearly 2014 and used for the purposes of checking

the quality of assets). Estimation of missing cap-ital should lead to securing a sufficient and highquality capital base primarily through privatesources (reliance on the state ultimately along-side rigorous criteria).

iMpaCt on the banking

Market in serbia

Tese changes in the direction of centralisationare aimed at achieving greater long-term stabil-ity in the banking system. However, viewed in

bankarskoj uniji, međutim odgovornost za njihovnadzor (bar za sada) zadržavaju nacionalni super-

vizori. renutno je u toku (i trajaće sve do oktobra2014. godine) sveobuhvatna procena pomenute124 bankarske grupacije.

SVEOBUHVATNA PROCENAbanaka od strane eCb

Sveobuhvatna procena se može podeliti u tri dela:procena kvaliteta aktive (AQR = asset quality review), stres testovi i nedostatak kapitala. Rezultatiprocene neće biti pojedinačno objavljeni, ali postojimogućnost da banke koje budu saznale svoje rezul-tate budu pod pritiskom da iste objave.Provera kvaliteta aktive ili AQR vrši se kroz posred-ne i neposredne kontrole sa detaljnom proveromkvaliteta bilansne aktive i vanbilansnih stavki porazličitim tipovima rizika, ali pomoću metodologi-

je koja je posebno razvijena za ove potrebe i koja jekonzervativnija od važećih računovodstvenih propi-sa koji se uglavnom baziraju na IFRS. estira se port-olio loših plasmana (po usklađenim definicijama),adekvatnost vrednovanja aktive i sredstava obezbe-đenja, visina rezervisanja i adekvatnost korišćenihpondera rizika. Stres testovima se testira otpornostna buduće šokove (npr. promena uslova za dužnič-ke hartije od vrednosti pojedinih država) u odnosuna 8% CE1 kapitala. Pritom, definicija kapitala seusklađuje sa posmatranim vremenskim horizontom(ne definiciji koja se primenjuje sa početkom 2014.godine i koja se koristi za potrebe provere kvalitetaaktive). Procena nedostajućeg kapitala trebe da vodiobezbeđenju dovoljne i kvalitetne kapitalne baze pri-marno kroz privatne izvore (oslanjanje na državu ukrajnjoj instanci uz rigorozne kriterijume).

utiCaj na bankarsko tržište u srbiji

Navedene promene u pravcu centralizacije usme-rene su dugoročno na postizanje veće stabilnostiu bankarskom sistemu. Međutim, posmatrano nakratak rok postoji neizvesnost iz razloga što još

uvek nije sigurno kakve će biti posledice sveobu-hvatne procene i kakav će biti stav ECB po razli-čitim pitanjima (premda se očekuje da stav budeintenzivan i rigorozan).Grupacije koje su predmet sveobuhvatne procene ikoje će od novembra biti pod nadzorom ECB imaju značajno tržišno učešće u Srbiji sa preko 60%ukupne aktive. U pitanju su sledeće banke: BancaIntesa, UniCredit, Erste, Raiffeisen, Findomestic,Credit Agricole, Societe Generale, Alpha, Eurobank,Vojvođanska, Piraeus i NLB.




the short term, there is uncertainty because it isstill not certain what the consequences of a com-prehensive assessment would be and what theattitude of the ECB will be on a variety of issues(although the attitude is expected is intense andrigorous).

Groups that are subjected to a comprehensiveassessment, and which will be under the super-

vision of the ECB as of November, have a sig-nificant market share in Serbia, with over 60%of total assets. Te following banks are at issue:Banca Intesa, UniCredit, Erste, Raiffeisen, Find-omestic, Credit Agricole, Societe Generale, Al-pha, Eurobank, Vojvodjanska, Piraeus and NLB.It is difficult to assess the extent to which the re-sults of conducting a comprehensive assessmentwill impact on the parent companies of the aforementioned banks and lead to changes in their

business models, culture and business risk, causetheir capitalisation and increase of reserves, re-organize and change the internal methodology.Greater or less focus on internal problems thatthe parent companies of local banks may facecould largely change the interests of individualmarkets and the withdrawal of the same, whichcan certainly have an impact on the Serbian mar-ket through further consolidation of the sector.

neCessity of Changing the business

MODEL

Regulation by nature is inferior in comparisonwith the dynamic business environment. Also,the fact that the changes occurring moment bymoment lead to the best regulation becomingless efficient and good at the moment of the be-ginning of the application merely because thereis a change in participants’ behaviour to whichit refers. Consequently, there is a reasonable di-lemma as to what extent an approach based onthe rules can contribute to achieving the desiredgoals. At best one can say it is limited. Nowa-

days, much attention is paid to the developmentof management, anticipation and risk culture asa solution which should be supplemented basedon the approach to regulation, in order to achievethe desired goals. A large number of publicationsin the world deal with these matters. However, itshould be noted that the attention paid to theseissues is not only externally induced, but ratheralso comes from within, largely as a necessarycondition for the achievement of success and /or survival of banks.

eško je proceniti u kojoj će meri rezultati izvrše-ne sveobuhvatne procene uticati na matične kom-panije pomenutih banaka i dovesti do promenenjihovih poslovnih modela, kulture poslovanja irizika, usloviti njihovu dokapitalizuju i povećanjarezervisanja, reorganizaciju i promenu internihmetodologija. Veći ili manji okus na interne pro-bleme sa kojima će se matične kompanije lokalnihbanaka suočiti može u velikoj meri opredeliti i in-teresovanja za pojedina tržišta i povlačenje sa istih,što svakako može imati uticaj i na srpsko tržištakroz dalju konsolidaciju sektora.

NEOPHODNOST PROMENE

POSLOVNOG MODELA

Regulativa po prirodi stvari zaostaje za dinamičnimposlovnim okruženjem. akođe, činjenica da se pro-mene dešavaju iz minuta u minut dovodi do toga dai najbolja regulativa postaje manje efikasna i dobratrenutkom početka primene upravo iz razloga štodolazi do promene ponašanja učesnika na koje seista odnosi. Shodno navedenom, opravdana je dile-ma u kojoj meri pristup baziran na propisima može

doprineti postizanju željenih ciljeva. U najbolju rukumože se reći da je ona ograničena. Danas se velikapažnja posvećuje razvoju upravljanja, anticipacije ikulture rizika kao rešenja kojima bi trebalo dopunitipristup baziran na propisima, a u cilju ostvarivanjaželjenih ciljeva. Veliki broj publikacija u svetu bavise navedenim temama. Ipak, treba istaći da pažnjakoja se posvećuje ovim temama nije isključivo ek-sterno indukovana već ona dolazi i iznutra u velikojmeri kao neophodan uslov za ostvarivanje uspeha i/ili opstanak banaka.

Olakšavajuće okolnosti u Srbiji – Jednostav-

nije poslovanje sa mnogo kapitala i likvidnih

sredstava

Većina banaka u Srbiji ima solidnu kapitalnuosnovu i visok nivo likvidnosti, što donekle

stvari trenutno olakšava. Bankarsko poslovanjegotovo potpuno predstavlja tradicionalni vidbankarstva bez sukjuritizacije, upotrebe deri- vata i slično. akođe, interni modeli se zasadne koriste u velikoj meri za obračun minimal-nih kapitalnih zahteva. Shodno tome, promenekoje se očekuju u domenu promene ponderarizika, ograničavanja sloboda koje banke imajuprilikom obračuna kroz postavljanje određenihlimita ne bi trebalo da imaju izražene posledicena poslovanje banaka u Srbiji.




Nada Suđić, Partner, Deloitte

Economic

growthrequires astrong privatesector

In 2013 the Serbian banking sector was charac-terised by satisfactory liquidity and a satisfactorylevel of capitalisation, coupled with an indicator

of capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector of20.9%, which represents an increase over the previous year (19.9%) and a concentration index thatremained at a relatively moderate level.However, low economic growth, reduced quality ofdomestic demand for credit, illiquidity in the realsector, as well as a limited offer due to the tighteningof credit conditions, resulted in the stagnation of thebanking sector’s lending activity.

At the end of 2013, Non-Performing Loans (NPLs)constituted 21.4% of total (gross) loans, which isseen in the international context as being above theregional average, but also the coverage of NPLs withtotal reserves for losses are among the highest in theregion. Te high level of NPLs and the tendency ofgrowth of credit losses, coupled with a rise in thecosts of domestic and foreign sources of financing,indicate significant problems when it comes to re-storing the profitability of the banking sector in Ser-bia in the coming period.

Nada Suđić, partner, Deloitte

Jak privatni

sektor uslovekonomskograsta

Bankarski sektor Srbije u 2013. godini karakteri-šu zadovoljavajuća likvidnost, zadovoljavajućistepen kapitalizacije, uz pokazatelj adekvatno-

sti kapitala bankarskog sektora od 20,9%, što pred-stavlja rast u odnosu na prethodnu godinu (19,9%) iindeks koncentracije koji je ostao na relativno ume-renom nivou.Međutim, nizak ekonomski rast, smanjenje kvalitet-ne domaće tražnje za kreditima, nelikvidnost realnogsektora, kao i ograničena ponuda, usled pooštravanjauslova kreditiranja, uticali su na stagnaciju kreditneaktivnosti bankarskog sektora. Na kraju 2013. godi-

ne problematični krediti (NPL) čine 21,4% ukupnih(bruto) kredita, što je posmatrano u međunarodnomkontekstu iznad proseka regiona, ali je istovremenopokriće problematičnih kredita ukupnim rezervamaza potencijalne gubitke među najvišim u regionu.Visok nivo nekvalitetne aktive i tendencija rasta kre-ditnih gubitaka, zajedno sa poskupljenjem domaćihi inostranih izvora finansiranja, ukazuju na značajneprobleme kada je u pitanju oporavak profitabilnostibankarskog sektora Srbije u narednom periodu.Jedan od preduslova ekonomskog rasta je i postoja-




One of the prerequisites for economic growth is theexistence of a strong private sector and developedentrepreneurship, which are free to identify profita-ble opportunities for growth, finance them and cre-ate additional value. In the absence of the aforemen-tioned, stagnation and a reduction in the lending

activity of the banking sector follows.Te EBRD’s latest BEPS (Banking Environment Per-formance Survey) research indicates that limitingfactors on the level of lending activities in Serbia aremainly on the demand side, not the supply side. Inthis sense, the main limiting factor in the SME sectoris an identified absence of quality, creditworthy busi-nesses in this segment of the economy.Due to limited information used to form the basisfor determining creditworthiness and the relativelysmall levels of loans in comparison to the costs nec-essary for their administration, the SME sector is

confronted by high interest rates and high demandfor loan collateral. Companies in this segment of theeconomy still have limited access to finance, as wellas weak possibilities of contributing significantly tothe economic growth of the economy as a whole.Te results of the BEPS research for large enterpris-es identify, as in the previous case, the low qualityof domestic demand as the main limiting factor inlending activity.Reductions in banking sector lending activity, on theone hand, and the illiquidity of the real sector, on theother, led to an increase in the share of NPLs in totalloans of the banking sector in Serbia. As such, in the2009-2013 period this percentage had a growth ten-dency and increased from 15.7% to 21.4%. Althoughthe coverage of problematic loans by total reserves isat a significant level and indicates the banking sector’sstable ability to absorb potential credit risks, a ques-tion arises as to how to solve the growing problem ofexposure in the future period, as well as the impact ofthe significant level of NPLs on meeting the demandfor finances, especially in the case of riskier segmentsof the economy (e.g. small and micro enterprises and

entrepreneurs).More recent experience shows that insolvency, andthe inability of a small number of companies withlarge credit exposure to make debt repayment obli-gations, could have a significant impact on the creditrisk of the banking sector. In that sense, managingcredit risk by banks should also include taking an ac-tive crisis management role in such companies (e.g.through representatives on boards of directors) andmonitoring operations in order to consider the possi-bilities and take the steps necessary for their recovery.

nje jakog privatnog sektora i razvijenog preduzet-ništva, koji su sposobni da identifikuju profitabilnemogućnosti za rast, finansiraju ih i kreiraju dodatnu

vrednost. U odsustvu prethodnog, dolazi do stagna-cije i smanjenja kreditne aktivnosti bankarskog sek-tora. Poslednja istraživanja EBRD-a (BEPS – Ban-

king Environment Performance Survey) ukazuju dasu za nivo kreditne aktivnosti u Srbiji ograničavajućifaktori uglavnom na strani tražnje, a ne na strani po-nude. U tom smislu u sektoru malih i srednjih pre-duzeća (SME) kao osnovni ograničavajući faktor jeidentifikovan nedostatak kvalitetnih, kreditno spo-sobnih entiteta u ovom segmentu privrede. Usled li-mitiranih informacija na bazi kojih bi se utvrdila nji-hova kreditna sposobnost i relativno manjih iznosakredita posmatrano u odnosu na troškove neophod-ne za njihovo administriranje, SME sektor je suočensa visokim kamatnim stopama i velikim zahtevima

u vezi sa sredstvima obezbeđenja kredita. Preduzećau ovom segmentu privrede i dalje imaju ograničenpristup sredstvima finansiranja, i malu mogućnostznačajnijeg doprinosa ekonomskom rastu celokup-ne privrede. Rezultati BEPS-a za velika preduzeća,kao i u prethodnom slučaju, kao glavni ograničava-

jući faktor kreditne aktivnosti identifikuju kvalitetdomaće tražnje.Smanjenje kreditne aktivnosti bankarskog sektora sa

jedne strane, i nelikvidnost realnog sektora sa drugestrane, uticali su na povećanje učešća problematičnihkredita u ukupnim kreditima bankarskog sektora Sr-bije. ako ovaj procenat u periodu od 2009. do 2013.godine ima tendenciju rasta i povećao se sa 15,7%na 21,4%. Iako je pokriće problematičnih kreditaukupnim rezervama na značajnom nivou, i ukazujena stabilnu sposobnost bankarskog sektora da apsor-buje potencijalne kreditne rizike, postavlja se pitanjerešavanja rastućih problematičnih izloženosti u bu-dućem periodu, kao i uticaja značajnog nivoa NPLna zadovoljavanje tražnje za sredstvima finansiranja,a naročito u slučaju rizičnijih segmenata privrede(npr. mala i mikro preduzeća i preduzetnici). Skori-

ja iskustva pokazuju da nelikvidnost i nesposobnostizmirenja kreditnih obaveza manjeg broja preduzećasa velikim kreditnim izloženostima, mogu imati zna-čajan uticaj na kreditni rizik bankarskog sektora. Utom smislu upravljanje kreditnim rizikom od stranebanaka trebalo bi da uključi i preuzimanje aktivneuloge u kriznom menadžmentu ovakvim entitetima(npr. kroz predstavnike u upravnom odboru) i mo-nitoringu njihovog poslovanja, u cilju sagledavanjamogućnosti, i preduzimanja koraka neophodnih zanjihov oporavak.




Insurance in Serbia in the last ewdecades

“HE FIRSEN YEARSARE HEHARDES”By: Nikola Uzelac

J

ust a quick glance at the table below, whichincludes only the basic data and growth rateso the Serbian insurance sector in the last

ten years, is sufficient to note that very dynamicgrowth ended in 2008. As such, this review willacknowledge that distinction in its contents. Anhistorical approach in the concise presentation opast events implies a somewhat stronger emphasison the last ew years and on orecasting the uture.

BASIC TENDENCY – (NEW) BEGINNING

Approaching EU membership and maintainingan open stance to almost all other countries is thekey determination o Serbia’s social and economic

trends in the 21

st

century, at least to dae (and overthe course o the ollowing ew years). Te firstsign that insurance was an integral part o thesetrends became apparent soon afer the politicalchanges o 2000, when lie insurance salesmen ap-peared in major Serbian towns offering insurancepackages directly on behal o insurance compa-nies registered in the EU. A ew years later, theSerbian insurance sector experienced a U-turn inthe orm o institutional concretisation. In short,a new and more solid legal ramework or insur-

Osiguranje u Srbijiu proteklih deceniju-dve

“PRVIHDESEGODINA JENAJEŽE” Autor: Nikola Uzelac

V

eć letimičan pogled na prikazanu tabe-lu, koja pokazuje samo osnovne podat-ke i stope rasta sektora osiguranja Srbije

tokom desetogodišnjeg razdoblja, dovoljan jeda se primeti da se vrlo dinamično poboljšanjezavršava zaključno sa 2008. godinom. Stoga će isadržaj pregleda koji sledi da uvažava tu razdel-nicu. Istorijski pristup u sažetom predstavljanjuonoga što se dešavalo podrazumeva i nešto većinaglasak na poslednje godine, kao i na ono što će verovatno da usledi.

OsnOvni tOk – (nOvi) pOčetakPribližavanje Evropskoj uniji, uz široku otvo-

renost prema skoro svima ostalima, ključna jeodrednica društveno-ekonomskih kretanja u Sr-biji u 21. veku – barem u njegovom dosadašnjemdelu (i barem tokom narednih nekoliko godina).Prvi znaci da je i osiguranje deo ovog osnov-nog toka usledili su vrlo brzo nakon promenau 2000. godini, kada su se u većim gradovima uSrbiji pojavili prodavci životnog osiguranja kojisu taj posao obavljali direktno za račun društa- va za osiguranje registrovanih u zemljama EU.Nekoliko godina kasnije usledilo je i ono što je




ance activities was established in Serbia (modelledon that o the previously mentioned developedcountries), with the National Bank o Serbia asthe supervisory authority. Insurance companieswere sent an unequivocal message that this sec-tor would have clear-cut rules, which was elt in

particular by those ‘insurance companies’ thatsaw their operating licences revoked soon afer.Te insureds gained a strong ally in protection otheir interests. Tis was really the crucial event (orrather a sequence o activities) or boosting or re-storing trust in insurance. Furthermore, this wasalso very demanding work because we had to start virtually rom scratch.ighter discipline was also exercised in re-in-surance activities, while the trust in voluntarypension insurance became stronger ollowingits separation rom other types o insurance and

transorming into a special segment based onstrictly controlled unds. Special attention was giv-en to developing sales channels. For the first timewe had banks that were given licences to engagein insurance brokerage and it became mandatoryor everyone intending to become an independentinsurance broker or agent to possess a certain levelo knowledge about the insurance business.Favourable economic trends additionally spurredthe arrival o more renowned regional, Europeanand global insurance companies, which urtherenriched the insurance offer. Simultaneously, the

prekretnica za osiguranje u Srbiji, a to je insti-tucionalna konkretizacija. Ukratko, tada je us-postavljen novi i čvršći pravni okvir za delatnostosiguranja u Srbiji (i to po ugledu na pomenutirazvijeni svet), a sa Narodnom bankom Srbijekao nadzornim organom. Osiguravačima je po-

slata nedvosmislena poruka da će jasna pravilaigre da važe i u ovoj delatnosti - što su naročitoosetila ona “osiguravajuća” društva koja su ubr-zo izgubila dozvolu za rad - dok su osiguranicidobili jakog saveznika u zaštiti vlastitih intere-sa. Ovo je zaista bio odlučujući događaj (ili, bo-lje rečeno, niz aktivnosti) za jačanje - odnosno vraćanje - poverenja u osiguranje. I ne samo to:radilo se o veoma zahtevnom poslu i zbog togašto se kretalo gotovo “od nule”.Jačanje discipline bilo je primetno i u poslovimareosiguranja, a poverenje u dobrovoljno pen-

zijsko osiguranje osnaženo je njegovim izdva- janjem u posebnu celinu zasnovanu na strogokontrolisanim ondovima. Posebna pažnja po-svećena je i razvoju kanala prodaje. Pojavile su seprve banke sa odobrenjem za obavljanje poslovaposredovanja u osiguranju, a uvedeno je i obave-zno posedovanje odgovarajućeg nivoa znanja oosiguranju kao uslov za sve one koji nameravajusamostalno da se bave posredovanjem ili zastu-panjem u osiguranju.Povoljna ekonomska kretanja dodatno su pod-stakla dolazak više osiguravača poznatih u regio-

Tabela 1: OSNOVNI PODACI O SEKTORU OSIGURANJA SRBIJE (iznosi u milijardama dinara)

TABLE 1: BASIC DATA ABOUT SERBIAN INSURANCE SECTOR (amounts expressed in billion Dinars)

KATEGORIJA / CATEGORY

GODINA / YEAR STOPA RASTA / GROWTH RATE

2004. 2008. 2013. 2008/2004 2013/2008 2013/2004

Bruto obračunata premija

osiguranja

Gross written premium

22,6 52,2 64,0 130,5% 22,7% 182,9%

Ukupna aktiva osiguravača

i reosiguravača

Total assets of insurers andreinsurers

34,4 84,8 147,8 146,5% 74,2% 329,6%

Ukupan kapital osiguravača

i reosiguravača

Total capital of insurers and

reinsurers

16,8 25,3 35,0 50,7% 38,1% 108,2%

RSD / EUR 78,885 88,601 114,6421 12,3% 29,4% 45,3%

Izvor podataka: Narodna banka Srbije i Agencija za privredne registre Republike Srbije (internet adrese)

Source: National Bank of Serbia and the Serbian Business Registers Agency (websites)




creditworthiness and awareness o benefits stem-ming rom insurance also grew, so that the peoplewho were at the centre o all o this – the insureds– were in a win-win situation. In the space o justa ew years, this all served to raise the total insur-ance premium to almost €600 million in Dinar

countervalue (or €80 per capita), while the shareo the insurance premium ad in the national GDPwas close to 2%.

BASIC TENDENCY – THE PLOT

And just when it was expected that progress madeby the insurance sector in Serbia would advanceeven faster (taking into the account the good resultsfrom the early 1990s, when the number of life insur-ance policyholders was running into the millions),in 2008 the world was confronted by serious finan-cial challenges. Tese challenges had a very negative

impact on the economy and the financial sector inSerbia, with their consequences being felt years later.Speaking from the perspective of insurance, it was

very difficult to cope with the sudden and major de-cline in the value of investments in shares, followedby growing unease in terms of the security of invest-ments in bank deposits (lack of ratings). Moreover,nominal incomes of businesses and citizens alikealso reduced or grew slowly, meaning that the nomi-nal incomes of insurers were exactly the same. Terewere also increasing difficulties in collecting receiv-ables in insurance claims, pressure grew to lower in-surance prices and increase insurance broker/agentcommissions, as there was a risk of false insuranceclaims. Additionally, an overall price hike in Serbiaimpacted on the expesnes of insurance manage-ment, as did the fact that the number of insuranceemployees engaged in other activities (not in sales,underwriting and claims) was on par with the ex-pected growth.Overcoming these rather serious difficulties entaileda lot of skill, restraint and patience from everyone in-

volved. Still, all of that would not have been enough

if the operations of the Serbian insurance sector hadnot been raised, thanks to development of the supervisory function, to the level that entailed solid shockresistance. Despite everything, stability and trust inthe insurance sector was maintained, albeit at a price–long-standing, very low nominal profitability.Te period from 2009 to date has also been markedby working hard on overcoming hardship causedor aggravated by the global financial crisis. Te su-pervisory authority worked on shaping and imple-menting the Law on Obligatory Vehicle Insurance

nalnim, evropskim i svetskim razmerama – što jeznatno obogatilo ponudu. Istovremeno, platežnasposobnost i svest o koristi od osiguranja takođesu napredovali, tako da su i oni koji su u svemuovome najvažniji - osiguranici - bili na dobitku.Sve to je u vrlo kratkom razdoblju od nekoliko go-

dina podiglo premiju osiguranja na dinarsku pro-tivvrednost od bezmalo 600 miliona evra (odno-sno 80 evra po stanovniku), dok se učešće premijeosiguranja u bruto domaćem proizvodu približilonivou od 2%.

OSNOVNI TOK - ZAPLET

I kada se očekivalo da će osiguranje u Srbiji jošbrže da napreduje (a prema dostignućima sa po-četka devedesetih godina prošlog veka – kadase npr. broj osiguranika u životnom osiguranjumerio milionima), 2008. godine došlo je do ve-

oma ozbiljnih globalnih finansijskih izazova.Oni su dosta loše uticali na ekonomiju Srbije injen finansijski sektor, sa posledicama koje ćese osećati i u narednim godinama. Gledano izugla osiguranja, posebno je bilo teško nositi sesa naglim i velikim padom vrednosti ulaganja uakcije, a zatim i sa porastom neizvesnosti u po-gledu sigurnosti ulaganja u depozite kod banaka(nepostojanje rejtinga). Takođe, manji ili sporo-rastući nominalni prihodi firmi i građana značilisu i iste takve nominalne prihode osiguravača, veće poteškoće pri naplati potraživanja za pre-miju osiguranja, rast pritiska na sniženje cenaosiguranja i povećanje posredničkih provizija,kao i veći rizik od prevara pri prijavi šteta. Poredtoga, na troškove sprovođenja osiguranja uticao je visok opšti rast cena u Srbiji, a i činjenica da jebroj ljudi zaposlenih u osiguravajućim društvi-ma na poslovima izvan osnovnih funkcija (pro-daja, preuzimanja rizika i štete) bio usklađen saočekivanjima o ubrzanom rastu.Prevazilaženje ovih nemalih poteškoća zahteva-lo je puno umešnosti, odmerenosti i strpljenja

svih zainteresovanih strana. Ipak, ništa od togane bi bilo dovoljno da prethodno, jačanjem nad-zorne funkcije, poslovanje sektora osiguranjaSrbije nije dovedeno na nivo koji podrazumevaugrađenu znatnu otpornost na velike udare. Sto-ga je, uprkos svemu, ipak očuvana stabilnost de-latnosti osiguranja, kao i poverenje u nju – madapo cenu već više godina veoma niske nominalneprofitabilnosti.No, razdoblje od 2009. godine naovamo nije biloispunjeno samo borbom za prevazilaženje ne-




(passed in 2009), as well as the overall protection ofthe users of financial services (for instance, throughmediation in insurance claims and field control ofthe speed at which vehicle insurance claims weredealt with). opics that were current in the EU werealso raised, such as new solvency rules (Solvency II),

risk management in insurance companies as a wholeand information risks. At the same time, new com-petition from abroad (including the leading globalinsurance companies) appeared on the market –having obviously not been deterred by the afore-mentioned threats.

BASIC TENDENCY – DENOUEMENT, NEW

BEGINNING OR...?

Although it is clear that the Serbian insurance sec-tor has been functioning normally all this time andthat the aforementioned serious challenges have

been kept under control for the most part, it is obvious that a lot still needs to done. Of course, noteverything depends on the people engaged in insur-ance. We could be justified in saying that the over-all development of the Serbian insurance sector isprimarily conditioned by overall economic trends,which are not even close to a strongly needed hike.Still, if we focus on the insurance sector alone, wecan note that there are several important areas thatare able to provide a solid basis for the future, con-sidering the latest events or previous happenings, es-pecially if the state supports them and doesn’t standin their way, or even jeopardise them with its meas-ures.Life insurance has the potential to become the firstarea in which positive historical tendencies couldbecome even more apparent. Over the last ten yearsthe growth of premiums was in double digits on av-erage, while in the last two periods it was almost 20%(with a 22% share in overall premium). At the sametime, the number of insureds grew to over 500,000which is close to 30% in relation to the total work-force.

Easier and better understanding, coupled with thegreater benefits and availability of life insurancecontracts, are solutions that could spur on or protectthese trends even more. It is up to insurance com-panies to provide easier and better understandingwhen it comes to designing products (simplicity)and selling them (“translating” insurance terms intothe language of the common man). In terms of lifeinsurance benefits, they are somewhat reduced bya drop in the yields on the investments of insurers,as this also reduces the share distributed among

volja prouzrokovanih ili podstaknutih svetskomfinansijskom krizom. Nadzorni organ radio je naoblikovanju i sprovođenju Zakona o obaveznomosiguranju u saobraćaju (donetim u 2009. godi-ni), kao i zaštiti korisnika finansijskih usluga širegledano (npr. kroz medijaciju u vezi sa odštet-

nim zahtevima osiguranika i terenskom prove-rom brzine rešavanja šteta obaveznog osiguranjaod auto-odgovornosti). Otvorene su i teme kojesu u fokusu u EU, poput novih pravila u vezi sasolventnošću („Solvency II“), upravljanjem ri-zikom na nivou društva za osiguranje kao celi-ne, te sa informatičkim rizicima. Istovremeno,na tržištu su se pojavili novi konkurenti iz ino-stranstva (pa i iz grupe vodećih u svetu), na kojegore pomenute pretnje očigledno nisu delovaleobespokojavajuće.

OsnOvni tOk – rasplet, nOvi pOčetakILI...?

Iako je jasno da sektor osiguranja Srbije sve ovo vreme normalno obavlja svoju ulogu, te da supomenuti ozbiljni izazovi načelno pod kontro-lom, jasno je i to da još mnogo toga ostaje da seuradi. Naravno, ne zavisi baš sve samo od ljudikoji se bave osiguranjem. Može čak sa pravom dase kaže da je dalji sveukupni razvoj osiguranja uSrbiji prvenstveno uslovljen opštim ekonomskimkretanjima, a koja još uvek nisu blizu prelaska napreko potrebni skokoviti rast. Ipak, sužavajućipogled samo na sektor osiguranja, primetno jeda postoji najmanje nekoliko važnih oblasti kodkojih ono što se dešava u poslednje vreme ili ne-što duže može da obezbedi čvrstu osnovu za boljubudućnost - a naročito ako bude potpomognutoili neometano merama države – ili da je ugrozi.Životno osiguranje možda je i prva oblast kodkoje će pozitivan istorijski tok verovatno još više da dođe do izražaja nego do sada. Tokomposlednjih deset godina beležen je najčešće dvo-cifren rast premije, a u poslednja dva razdoblja

bezmalo 20% (uz učešće u ukupnoj premiji od22%). Istovremeno, broj osiguranika prešao je500.000, što u odnosu na ukupan broj zaposlenihiznosi oko 30%.Lakša i bolja razumljivost, a veća korisnost i do-stupnost ugovora o životnom osiguranju, rešenjasu koja ovome trendu mogu da daju još veći za-majac, ili da ga zaštite. Za lakšu i bolju razumljivost ponude odgovorna su osiguravajuća društva,kako pri osmišljavanju proizvoda (jednostavnost)– tako i pri prodaji istih („prevođenjem“ pojmova




insurance policyholders. On the other hand, thebenefits could grow thanks to tax incentives, muchlike those that exist in some EU countries, or theycan reflect the format that has been used in volun-tary pension insurance in Serbia for quite some timenow. Te availability of life insurance could be im-

proved by more banks getting on board with sellinginsurance, more developed technological solutions,relevant bylaws relating to online sales and especial-ly through an increase in the number of insurancesales staff (which can be supported by relevant la-bour regulation allowing people to engage in sellinginsurance in addition to their regular jobs).Although the share of motor vehicle insurance in theoverall insurance premium in Serbia is around 30%,European characteristics or best European practicesare not prevalent in this type of insurance. Despitethis area being highly regulated, primarily thanks to

the lex specialis passed in 2009, there are many courtcases associated with vehicle insurance claims; theirgrowth is absolute and relative and usually last foryears. Significantly less than a half of each premiumdinar goes towards claims, while the sales figures donot depend greatly on the quality of the service ren-dered to insureds. In terms of sales channels, techni-cal check points (PCs) for vehicles have been top-ping the sales list for quite some time (they accountfor ¾ to 4/5 of total sales), while the real reason forthis predominance is of an administrative nature –specifically mandatory checks on vehicle roadwor-thiness being a prerequisite for initially registering a

vehicle. In addition to this, PCs have a very speciallegal treatment, since their insurance activities arenot considered to be those of insurance agents andtheir real number far exceeds that which would besufficient for the technical inspection of close to 2.2million vehicles.Tis problem should be solved through simplifica-tion of the entire process – from selling insurancepolicies to settling claims. Te reliability of the sys-tem would be ensured through a more dedicated ap-

proach to the things that are most imporant to boththe insureds and the society – the speed and suffi-ciency of payment claims and sufficient provisionfor claims, as well as the liquidity and solvency of in-surance companies (preventing them from settlingtheir existing financial obligations from income gen-erated by new accounts). Suspecting the existance ofcartel agreements between brokers and/or insurersshould also be scrutinised more. Last but not least,providing timely and comprehensive informationto the general public regarding the aformentioned

osiguranja na jezik svakodnevnog života). Vezanoza korisnost životnih osiguranja, nju u izvesnojmeri smanjuje pad prinosa na ulaganja osigura- vača, jer je time manji i njihov deo koji se raspo-ređuje na imaoce polisa životnog osiguranja. Sadruge strane, ona bi mogla da se uveća poreskim

olakšicama po modelu preuzetom iz neke od ze-malja EU, ili na primer na način koji već duže vreme važi za dobrovoljno penzijsko osiguranje uSrbiji. Dostupnost životnog osiguranja bi se una-predila još većom uključenošću banaka u prodajuosiguranja, razvijenijim tehnološkim i pratećimpravnim rešenjima vezanim za prodaju puteminterneta, a naročito povećanjem broja prodava-ca (čemu može da doprinese i takvo radno pravokoje omogućuje bavljenje ovim poslom i uz nekodrugo zanimanje).Iako već dugo učestvuje sa oko 30% u ukupnoj

premiji osiguranja Srbije, auto-odgovornost je vrsta osiguranja u kojoj izgleda da ne preovlađuju„evropska“ svojstava, ili barem ne najbolja evrop-ska praksa. Naime, oblast je visoko regulisana,prvenstveno već pomenutim posebnim zakonomiz 2009. godine - a sudski postupci su brojni, rastuapsolutno i relativno i uglavnom traju godinama.Znatno manje od polovine svakog dinara premijedaje se za štete - a obim prodaje ne zavisi mnogood kvaliteta usluge osiguranicima. Kada govori-mo o kanalima prodaje, servis za proveru tehnič-ke ispravnosti vozila već duže vreme je ubedljivona vrhu liste (približno 3/4 -4/5 ukupne prodaje) - a stvarni izvor te prevage je administrativneprirode: obavezna provera tehničke ispravnosti vozila kao uslov za godišnje produženje važno-sti registracije vozila. Pored toga, tehnički servisisu posebni i po pravnom položaju, jer se poslovikoje u vezi sa osiguranjem obavljaju ne smatra- ju zastupanjem u osiguranju – a njihov stvarnibroj višestruko prevazilazi onaj koji je dovoljanza tehničku proveru oko 2,2 miliona vozila.I ovde bi rešenje trebalo da ide u pravcu pojedno-

stavljenja celog procesa, od prodaje polise – doisplate štete. Pouzdanost sistema obezbeđivala bise većom posvećenošću onome što je najvažni- je za osiguranike i društvo: brzini i dovoljnostiisplata po odštetnim zahtevima, dovoljnosti re-zervacija za štete, kao i likvidnosti i solventnostiosiguravača (uz sprečavanje plaćanja postojećihobaveza iz priliva po novim poslovima). Sumnjeu kartelske sporazume posrednika i/ili osigura- vača bi takodje trebalo da budu predmet većepažnje. Konačno, blagovremeno i potpuno oba-




aspects, especially in terms of executing accompany-ing measures of the supervisory authority, would bemore than welcome.As for other types of insurance, there are severalissues that need to be addressed. In terms of man-datory accident insurance, it would be advisable to

eliminate the long-standing stagnation of rathermodest insurance amounts (for instance, in the caseof the death of an employee). In regard to voluntaryhealth insurance, in practice the legal frameworkshould offer the same chances for both insurers andthe state health fund. In terms of agricultural insur-ance, the huge damage inflicted by bad weather in2013 will probably stabilise as substantial premiumgrowth in the long term. Here insurance compa-nies should also contribute by being focused moreon the risks that are not considered basic (i.e. fire,hail and thunderstrike). Another issue is insurance

against the risk of natural disasters, considering therecent unprecedented floods in Serbia which causeddamage worth billions of euros. Large-scale long-term preventative measures are likely to be instigat-ed, as well as making insurance a more commonlyaccepted factor for mitigating the effects of suchadverse events.In terms of relations between competitors, and thedynamic o described changes, the state’s stance isimportant regarding its ownership share in leadinginsurance companies. Te succesul sale o a majority share (as announced), or at least a successulorganizational adaptation o this insurer, would bea very good sign or the overall insurance sectorin Serbia. Te result o the aormentioned processdepends on the ambitions o existing competitors,as well as those that might become so. Te end olast year and this year have already seen a majorchange in the ownership o insurance companies,both in Serbia and in neighbouring countries. Itwould come as no surprise i a similar thing hap-pened by year’s end or in the years to come.

CONCLUCION – DEVELOPMENT AS THE KEY

BENCHMARK

In short, many positive things have occurred in theSerbian insurance sector or both insureds and thesociety as a whole. Te most important aspect oany measure or activity is a clear, well-explained,publicly known, ex ante and ex post response tothe ollowing questions: What does insurance development entail? What do insureds and societystand to gain in the short-, mid- and long-term?More security, lower prices, better services etc.?

veštavanje javnosti po svim ovim osnovama, po-sebno o izvršenju pratećih mera nadzornog orga-na, isto je veoma dobrodošlo.Što se tiče ostalih vrsta osiguranja, izdvaja senekoliko pitanja. Kod obaveznog osiguranja odposledica nesrećnog slučaja bilo bi dobro da se

prekine višegodišnja stagnacija ionako ne baš vi-sokih suma osiguranja (npr. za slučaj smrti zapo-slenog). Za dobrovoljno zdravstveno osiguranje,pravni okvir bi trebalo u praksi da pruža podjed-nake šanse za osiguravače i za državni zdravstveniond. U osiguranju poljoprivrede, velike štete odnevremena u 2013. godini najverovatnije će na-kon dužeg razdoblja da ustale visoke stope rastapremije. Osiguravajuća društva bi tome takođetrebalo da doprinesu, i to tako što bi se više usred-sredila na rizike koji ne spadaju u grupu osnov-nih (požar, grad i udar groma). Posebno pitanje

je osiguranje od katastroalnih rizika, imajućiu vidu nedavnu poplavu nezabeleženu u istorijiSrbije - čije se štete u ovom trenutku iskazuju umilijardama evra. One će verovatno da podstaknupreduzimanje preventivnih mera širokih razmerai na dugoročnoj osnovi – ali i da utiču na boljeprihvatanje osiguranja kao činioca ublažavanjaposledica neželjenih događaja.Za konkurentske odnose, a i za dinamiku opisa-nih promena, bitno je i određenje države u pogle-du njenog vlasništva nad vodećim osiguravajućimdruštvom. Uspešna prodaja većinskog udela (što je najavljeno), ili barem uspešno organizacionoprilagođavanje ovog osiguravača, bio bi veomadobar znak za osiguranje u Srbiji, u celini gleda-no. Ishod navedenog procesa zavisi i od ambici- ja postojećih konkurenata, kao i od onih koji bimožda mogli to da postanu. Do većih promena vlasništva nad osiguravajućim društvima već jedošlo krajem prošle i tokom ove godine – kako uSrbiji, tako i u susedstvu. Ne bi bilo iznenađujućeako bi se nešto slično desilo u preostalom delu ovegodine ili narednih godina.

Zaključak – raZvOj kaO ključnOMERILO

U najkraćem: mnogo toga dobroga za osiguranikei društvo u celini urađeno je u sektoru osiguranjaSrbije. Ono što je najvažnije za bilo koju narednumeru ili aktivnost je jasan, obrazložen, javnostipoznat, ex ante i ex post odgovor na pitanja: Štaovo znači za razvoj osiguranja? Šta dobijaju osi-guranici, a šta društvo – na kratki, srednji i dugirok - veću sigurnost, nižu cenu, bolju uslugu...?




Draginja Đurić, President o theBanca Intesa Executive Board

Arrival o

oreign banks,main driver omarket growth

In which way, in your opinion, has the Serbian

banking system changed in the last 10 years?

When it comes to the last ten years, we can con-clude with certainty that this is the period when themost significant changes occurred in the domesticbanking system, as well as that the last decade hasseen the achieving o the most dynamic growth anddevelopment. However, likewise, the end o the dec-ade was marked by the global financial crisis, whichbrought new challenges that we are now conront-ing and that we are currently striving to overcome.At the beginning o the last decade the domesticbanking system began to „catch up“ with developedEuropean markets: the restructuring o the bankingsector, ollowed by the privatisation process, createdthe key preconditions or building a stable, compet-itive and orderly system.It was actually the arrival o oreign banks thatproved to be the main driver o market growth,through improved offers that encouraged lendingand, more importantly, the re-establishment o citi-

zens’ confidence maniested in a significant increasein domestic savings. Alongside that, with the arrivalo oreign investors, domestic banking practices wereintegrated into the highest international standards ocorporate governance, which ensured a higher levelo competitiveness and operational efficiency.Tis kind o dynamic growth dictated the needto build stronger regulatory rameworks in orderto systemically regulate the market and create thebasis or competition and client confidence andbetter consumer protection, ensuring the trans-

Draginja Đurić, predsednikIzvršnog odbora Banca Intesa

Dolazak

stranih banaka,glavni pokretačrasta tržišta

Na koji način se, prema vašem mišljenju,

promenio bankarski sistem u Srbiji u

poslednjih deset godina?

Kada govorimo o poslednjih deset godina, sasigurnošću možemo zaključiti da je to peri-od u kome su se desile najznačajnije promeneu domaćem bankarskom sistemu, kao i da sutokom protekle decenije ostvareni najdina-mičniji rast i razvoj. Međutim, isto tako, samkraj ove dekade obeležila je svetska finansijskakriza, koja je donela nove izazove sa kojima sesuočavamo i koje upravo nastojimo da preva-ziđemo. Domaći bankarski sistem na početkuprethodne decenije počinje da „hvata korak”sa razvijenijim evropskim tržištima: restruktu-riranje bankarskog sektora praćeno procesomprivatizacije stvorilo je ključne pretpostavke zaizgradnju stabilnog, konkurentnog i uređenogsistema. Upravo je dolazak stranih banaka bioglavni pokretač rasta tržišta kroz poboljšanuponudu koja je podstakla kreditnu aktivnost, i

što je još važnije, kroz ponovno uspostavljenopoverenje građana ispoljeno kroz značajan rastdomaće štednje. Uz to, dolaskom inostranihinvestitora u domaću bankarsku praksu, inte-grisani su najviši međunarodni standardi kor-porativnog upravljanja, koji su obezbedili većistepen konkurentnosti i efikasnosti poslovanja.Ovako dinamičan razvoj nalagao je potrebuizgradnje čvršćeg regulatornog okvira kako bise sistemski uredilo tržište i kreirale osnove za

jačanje konkurencije i poverenja klijenata, bo-




parency o operations and greater system stability.In that sense, great progress has been made in thearea o improving legal solutions and harmonis-ing with the European Union, while the controlunction o the National Bank o Serbia has been

strengthened. All this has directly contributed, re-gardless o the negative consequences o the crisis,to us now having a ar more stable and healthiersystem that works or the benefit o citizens andbusinesses, i.e., society as a whole.

How has the global economic crisis changed

banking in general, including in our country?

In the global context, the world financial and eco-nomic crisis has revealed systemic weaknesses andshortcomings in regulatory rameworks and super-

lju zaštitu potrošača i obezbeđenje transparent-nosti poslovanja, te veću stabilnost sistema. Utom smislu, ostvaren je veliki napredak u delupoboljšanja zakonskih rešenja i usklađivanja sapropisima Evropske unije, ojačana je kontrolna

funkcija Narodne banke Srbije. Sve ovo je di-rektno doprinelo da, bez obzira na negativneposledice krize, mi danas imamo daleko stabil-niji i zdraviji sistem koji deluje u korist građanai privrede, odnosno, celokupnog društva.

Kako je svetska ekonomska kriza promenila

bankarstvo uopšte, pa i kod nas?

U globalnom kontekstu, svetska finansijska iekonomska kriza otkrila je sistemske slabosti inedostatke regulatornog okvira i supervizije,




vision that led, coupled with the lack o accounta-bility o the leading banking groups, to the collapseo financial markets worldwide. As a result, sevenyears afer the outbreak o the crisis, reorms are stillcontinuing with the aim o increasing stability andrestoring confidence in the international financial

market by improving regulations and the supervi-sion o institutions. Now we are acing more strin-gent requirements in terms o capital and liquidity,increased risk control and demands or the greatertransparency o operations.I we ocus on our banking sector, it is clear that itdid not initially share this problem, because it didnot possess toxic assets, on the one hand, while onthe other it operated within an orderly regulatoryramework and under the restrictive measures othe prudential policies o the National Bank o Ser-bia. Tanks to that, the banking sector possessed

high capital adequacy and strong reserve liquidity,with which system stability was maintained afer theinitial impact o the crisis. However, in its secondcycle the crisis had a greater impact on banks, pri-marily through disturbing the liquidity o the econ-omy as a result o the recession in export marketsand a decline in domestic demand, due to which wehave been conronted in recent years by the prob-lem o increasing levels o non-perorming loansand a visible lack o high quality demand and, thus,risk management has become a priority in the oper-ations o all banks.

What did risk management look like prior to

the crisis and how does it looks today, in the

wake of the nancial crisis?

Clearly the negative effects o the global crisis orcedbanks to completely re-examine their approach torisk management. Tis process led to substantialchanges, reflected primarily in new relations to-wards the unction o risk management, in the moreefficient resolving o non-perorming loan problemsand increased caution in the sense o issuing new

loans. Te risk management unction is now ullyintegrated into all key business processes in banks.Likewise, the tougher economic situation caused asignificant reduction in the quality o demand andthe level o growth o non-perorming loans, whichled to the managing o problematic loans becomingthe current priority o all domestic banks. Tese arealso the reasons why banks have become markedlymore selective in terms o lending and more cautiousin assessing the level o risk they are able to take on.Apart rom being more conservative than beore the

koji su uz odsustvo odgovornosti vodećih ban-karskih grupacija, doveli do kolapsa finansijskihtržišta širom sveta. Kao posledica, sedam godinanakon izbijanja krize, reforme i dalje traju, kakobi se unapređenjem regulative i nadzora pove-ćala stabilnost institucija i povratilo poverenje

na međunarodnom finansijskom tržištu. Sada sesuočavamo sa strožim zahtevima u pogledu ka-pitala i likvidnosti, pojačana je kontrola rizika izahteva se veća transparentnost poslovanja. Akofokus preusmerimo na naš bankarski sektor, ja-sno je da na samom početku on nije delio ovajproblem budući da sa jedne strane nije posedovao toksičnu aktivu, a da je, sa druge, poslovao uuređenom regulatornom okviru i uz restriktivnemere prudencijalne politike NBS-a. Zahvaljuju-ći tome, bankarski sektor je posedovao visokuadekvatnost kapitala i snažne rezerve likvidno-

sti kojima je i očuvana stabilnost sistema nakonprvog udara krize. Ipak, u svom drugom ciklu-su, kriza je imala veći uticaj na banke, pre svegakroz narušenu likvidnost privrede usled recesijena izvoznim tržištima i pada domaće tražnje,zbog čega se poslednjih godina suočavamo saproblemom rastućeg nivoa nenaplativih kreditai vidljivim nedostatkom kvalitetne tražnje, pa jeupravljanje rizicima postalo prioritet poslovanjasvih banaka.

Kako je izgledalo upravljanje rizikom pre

krize, a kako to izgleda danas, nakon

fnansijske krize?

Jasno je da su negativni efekti globalne krizeprimorali banke da u potpunosti preispitajupristup upravljanju rizicima. Ovaj proces doveo

je do suštinskih promena reflektovanih pre sve-ga u novom odnosu prema funkciji upravljanjarizicima, u efikasnijem rešavanju problema ne-naplativih kredita, kao i u povećanom oprezuu pogledu novih plasmana. Funkcija upravlja-nja rizicima sada je u potpunosti integrisana u

sve ključne poslovne procese u bankama. Istotako, otežana ekonomska situacija uzrokovala je znatno smanjenje kvalitetne tražnje i rast nivoa nenaplativih kredita, što je dovelo do togada je trenutni prioritet svih domaćih banakaupravljanje problematičnim plasmanima. Ovosu ujedno i razlozi zašto su banke postale znat-no selektivnije u pogledu kreditiranja i opre-znije u procenjivanju nivoa rizika koji mogu dapreuzmu. Osim što su konzervativniji nego uperiodu pre krize, limiti su sada i dobro opera-




crisis, limits are now well operationalised and in-cluded in daily management and decision-making.Viewed as a whole, banks today are ully aware thatrisk management is a concern o the entire organi-zation and that this aspect o the business has strate-gic, i not crucial, implications or their financial andmarket results.

cionalizovani, odnosno uključeni u svakodnev-no upravljanje i odlučivanje. Ukupno gledano,banke su danas u potpunosti svesne da je upra-

vljanje rizicima briga celokupne organizacije ida ovaj aspekt poslovanja ima strateške, ako nei presudne implikacije na njihove finansijske itržišne rezultate.




Claudio Cesario, CEO oUniCredit Bank Serbia

Key role inrecovery

In your opinion, how have the Serbian bankingsystem and relations between banks andclients changed in the last 10 years?Tere is no banking system in the region that hassustained as many changes as the one in Serbia.Afer 2000, when the banking system in the coun-try was reestablished, the most important task orall players on the market was to regain trust in it.It took years to rebuid the confidence and restorepartnership relations between the client and thebank. Ten the approval o loans restarted, whilesavings started to return to banks.It is important to point out that the changes whichoccured in Serbia in the past decade have allowedthe banking system to become one o the most im-portant pillars o the local economy. Once it wasset on a sound basis, and in line with changes inthe society, banks began changing their attitudetowards clients.

What are the main challenges to managingbanking operations and how much have theychanged during the crisis years?

Te

acquisition o new and retaining o existing cli-ents still represent the major challenges which banksare acing today, while business innovation, alterna-tive sales channels and new products have becomeimperative or maintaining successul business.However, the financial crisis has significantlychanged the priorities o the banking sector, whichis now paying much more attention to the adequatemanagement o liquidity and better loan place-ments, through more careul risk management. Tecrisis also imposed the issue o strong cost control

Klaudio Ćezario, predsednikIzvršnog odbora UniCredit bankeSrbija

Ključna ulogau oporavku

Na koji način su se, prema vašem mišljenju,promenili bankarski sistem u Srbiji i odnosbanke i klijenta u poslednjih deset godina?Nijedan bankarski sistem u okruženju nije pretr-peo tolike promene kao ovaj u Srbiji.Nakon 2000, kada je došlo do ponovnog uspo-stavljanja bankarskog sistema u zemlji, najvažnijizadatak svih igrača na tržištu je bio vraćanje poverenja u njega. Bile su potrebne godine da se onoponovo izgradi i uspostavi partnerski odnos klijenta i banke. Krediti su ponovo počeli da se odo-bravaju, a štednja da se vraća u banke.Promene koje su se dogodile u Srbiji u prethod-noj deceniji, omogućile su bankarskom sistemu dapostane jedan od najznačajnijih oslonaca lokalneekonomije. Kada je postavljen na zdrave temelje, au skladu sa promenama u društvu, banke su poče-le da menjaju svoj odnos prema klijentima.

Koji su glavni izazovi za upravljanje bankom ikoliko su se oni promenili u godinama krize?Akvizicija novih i zadržavanje starih klijenata, idanas su najveći izazovi sa kojima se banke suo-

čavaju, dok su inovacije u poslovanju, alternativnikanali prodaje i novi proizvodi postali imperativza održavanje uspešnog poslovanja.Međutim, finansijska kriza je značajno prome-nila prioritete bankarskog sektora, koji sada višepažnje posvećuje adekvatnom upravljanju likvid-nošću i boljem obezbeđivanju plasmana kroz pa-žljivo upravljanje rizicima. Kao što je to bio slučaj iu drugim industrijama, kriza je i u bankarstvu na-metnula pitanje snažne kontrole troškova i načinanjihove optimizacije uz zadržavanje investicija u




in line with other industries and cost optimisationwithout reducing the level o investments, especiallyin the new technologies which, together with moretrained people, allow banks to improve service qual-ity and „keep pace“ with the demands o the market.In the new banking reality it is necessary to haveawareness and control o all relevant parameters

and their uture impact or each transaction.What will the banking business look like in thefuture?Modernisation and accelerated technological developments have actually paved the way or the u-ture o banking. As a result, customers even today,through various electronic banking channels, havethe privilege to effect all banking transactions ina short time, without going to the branch. On theother hand, huge attention is paid to adapting the

nove tehnologije na istom nivou. Sve ovo, u kom-binaciji sa stručnim kadrovima, omogućava ban-kama da kontinuirano unapređuju kvalitet uslugai na taj način „drže korak“ sa tržištem.U novoj bankarskoj realnosti, pri svakoj transak-ciji je neophodno imati svest i kontrolu nad svimrelevantnim pokazateljima i njihovom uticaju na

budućnost.Kako će bankarski posao izgledati ubudućnosti?Modernizacija i ubrzani tehnološki razvoj suzapravo trasirali put bankarstva budućnosti.Zahvaljujući tome, klijenti već danas, putemrazličitih kanala elektronskog bankarstva, imaju privilegiju da za kratko vreme, bez odlaska uekspozituru, obave sve bankarske transakcije. Sadruge strane, dosta se radi na prilagođavanju en-




interior o branches to clients’ needs, both in termso the design and service model, in order to allowthe client to perorm all transactions in one place.

What is the role of banks in the economicrecovery of Serbia?Te importance o the stability o the banking sec-tor on the economy o a country is indisputable. It isnot only an indispensable part when it comes to theunctioning o the economy, but it also plays one othe key roles in its recovery.In a situation when the State and banks join together

to encourage the recovery o the economy, whetherwe are talking about government Subsidized LoanProgrammes or joint initiatives aimed at undingopportunities and increasing economic activity,their importance is even more evident. It is a mereact that in the past years banks have already provedthemselves to be strong and committed partners othe economy through the financing o strategicallyimportant state projects.In addition to regular inancing, in order to im-prove the situation in the economy - and here

terijera ekspozitura potrebama klijenata, kako usmislu dizajna, tako i servisnog modela sa ciljemda se klijentu omogući da sve transakcije obavina jednom mestu.

Kakva je uloga banaka u privrednomoporavku Srbije?Nesporan je značaj koji stabilnost bankarskogsektora ima za privredu jedne zemlje. On nesamo da je neizostavna karika u unkcionisanjuprivrede, već ima i jednu od ključnih uloga u nje-nom oporavku.

Još kada se država i banke udruže kako bi zajednič-kim snagama podstakle oporavak privrede, bilo dase radi o Vladinom Programu subvencija ili prego- vorima sa institucijama u vezi sa mogućnostima fi-nansiranja i povećanja privredne aktivnosti, njihovznačaj još više dolazi do izražaja. Činjenica je da suse banke prethodnih godina, finansirajući strateški važne državne projekte, već dokazale kao snažan iposvećen partner lokalne privrede.Pored standardnih načina finansiranja, ono štobanke, u cilju unapređenja stanja privrede, tako-




we are talking about an unexploited segment inSerbia - banks can also oer consulting servic-es with regard to complex transactions or thecreation o new inancial products which actualreduce business risk.

What does the implementation of the Basel IIIstandards bring to our banking system?Generally speaking, Basel standards elevate riskmanagement to a higher level by anticipating acomprehensive and integrated management o allrisks. In addition, Basel III puts special emphasison liquidity risk. Besides the act that this involvesthe use o a large number o complex quantitativemethods and models, it also reminds us o some very simple rules, such as the leverage ratio.

What will the establishment of a Banking

Union in the eurozone mean for our bankingsystem?Founding o a banking union is a key step towardscreating equal conditions or all market playersand finding a solution to the crisis in the Euro-zone. Quick and timely creation o a unique sys-tem or managing turmoil in the banking sectorand ostering relations between EU member statesand non-member countries with which they havefinancial relations, is vital. However, it is necessaryor the banking union to be regulated in all as-pects, which means that there is a single supervi-sory, single resolution and single set o rules. Teknowledge and implementation o best practicesrom different international experiences can beeasily replicated in other countries i the “rules othe game” are the same, with real benefits or cus-tomers who can gain aster access to the productsand services necessary or their business.

What needs to be done in order to squeeze theeuro from our nancial system?From a macroeconomic point of view, strong

and stable economic growth in the comingyears, coupled with stable inflation and a sig-nificant reduction of the unemployment rate,would lead to a reduction in interest rates andcontribute in a more sustainable way to the sta-bilisation of the currency and increasing the lev-el of confidence in it.Tis is a clear mid-term target that can also beachieved through specific initiatives that can speedup this process, especially in terms o utilisation othe dinar versus the euro.

đe mogu da ponude, a radi se o segmentu koji jeu Srbiji prilično neiskorišćen, jesu konsultantskeusluge prilikom zaključivanja složenih transakcija ili kreiranje novih finansijskih proizvoda kojiumanjuju rizik poslovanja.

Šta donosi implementacija Bazel IIIstandarda u naš bankarski sistem?Generalno gledano, Bazelski standardi podižuupravljanje rizicima na jedan viši nivo predvi-đajući sveobuhvatno i integrisano upravljanjesvim rizicima. Dodatno, Bazel III stavlja posebannaglasak na rizik likvidnosti. Pored toga što pod-razumeva upotrebu velikog broja kompleksnihkvantitativnih metoda i modela, ujedno nas pod-seća i na neka vrlo jednostavna pravila kao što je,na primer, koeficijent zaduženosti.

Šta će za naš bankarski sistem značitiformiranje bankarske unije u evrozoni?Stvaranje bankarske unije je ključni korak kakreiranju ravnopravnih uslova za sve učesni-ke na tržištu i pronalaženje rešenja za krizu uevrozoni. Brzo i pravovremeno stvaranje jedin-stvenog sistema za upravljanje potresima u ban-karskom sektoru i negovanje odnosa zemaljačlanica Evropske unije i zemalja nečlanica sa kojima su one inansijski povezane, od izuzetnog je značaja. Međutim, potrebno je da bankarskaunija bude uređena u svim svojim segmentima,što znači da je neophodno da postoji jedinstvennadzor, jedinstvena rezolucija, jedinstven setpravila. Znanje i primeri najbolje prakse iz dru-gačijih međunarodnih iskustava mogu se vrlolako primeniti u različitim zemljama ukolikosu „pravila igre” ista, uz očigledne prednosti zaklijente kojima se na ovaj način obezbeđuje bržipristup proizvodima i uslugama koji su im ne-ophodni za poslovanje.

Šta je potrebno uraditi da dinar istisne evroiz našeg nansijskog sistema?Sa makroekonomskog stanovišta, snažan i stabilanprivredni rast u narednim godinama, praćen sta-bilnom stopom inflacije i značajnim smanjenjemnezaposlenosti, mogli bi da dovedu do smanjenjakamatnih stopa i da na održiv način doprinesustabilizaciji domaće valute i rastu poverenja u nju.Jasno je da srednjoročni ciljevi mogu da buduostvareni kroz posebne inicijative usmerene naubrzanje ovog procesa, naročito kada je u pitanjukorišćenje dinara u odnosu na evro.




In your opinion, in which way has the Serbian


Te banking system has not changed signifi-cantly, but conditions or doing business havechanged. Quickly afer our country’s return tointernational financial institutions, ollowing the

democratic changes o 2001, oreign banks sawthe potential o the Serbian market, which, aferlong sanctions, was hungry or credit. At thattime, the orientation o the Serbian market to-wards banking was also extremely low, particu-larly ollowing the closure o the country’s ourlargest state-owned banks.More than ten years ago the Serbian banking sec-tor was the country’s most regulated sector, withclear and transparent regulatory and supervisorybodies o the National Bank o Serbia, which did its job in accordance with the law, ollowing modernbanking tendencies. Prior to entering the crisis,the banking sector was characterised by high rateso all key balance sheet categories, high oreignexchange inflows through recapitalization in or-eign currencies and the inflow o oreign curren-cy loans, as well as high interest rates on REPO asthe primary mechanism or neutralising growth inthe fiscal sector. At that time banks also had greatmotivation to take a greater share o the marketand we also witnessed the growth o indebtednessthrough cross-border loans.

From 2001 until recently the banking sectoralso had unstable growth alongside difficulties,but because o the crisis more than hal o thebanks were operating negatively at the end o2013. Tat was the first time since 2004 that thebanking sector as a whole finished a year witha minus. Although banks in Serbia finished lastyear with losses o nearly two billion dinars, orabout €18 million, the banking system remainsstable and highly liquid, reliable and sae, but atthe same time it is burdened with the debts o


promenio bankarski sistem u Srbiji u poslednjih

deset godina?

Bankarski sistem se nije promenio u značajnoj meri,ali su se promenili uslovi poslovanja. Ubrzo po po-

vratku naše zemlje u međunarodne finansijske orga-

nizacije, nakon demokratskih promena 2001, stranebanke su uvidele potencijal na srpskom tržištu, koje

je, posle dugih sankcija, bilo željno kredita. U to vre-me, i bankarizacija srpskog tržišta je bila na izuzetnoniskom nivou, pogotovo posle zatvaranja četiri naj-

veće državne banke. Bankarski sektor je pre deset i više godina bio najuređeniji sektor, sa jasnom i trans-parentnom regulativom i kontrolnim organom - Na-rodnom bankom Srbije, koja je radila svoj posao uskladu sa zakonskom regulativom, prateći tendencijemodernog bankarstva. Pre ulaska u krizu, bankarskisektor su karakterisale visoke stope svih ključnih bi-lansnih kategorija, visok devizni priliv kroz dokapi-talizacije u devizama i priliv deviznih kredita, kao i

visoka kamatna stopa na REPO kao osnovni meha-nizam neutralisanja rasta u fiskalnom sektoru. Bankesu u to vreme imale i veliki motiv da zauzmu što većideo tržišta, a bili smo svedoci i rasta zaduženosti krozcross-border kredite.Od 2001. godine donedavno, bankarski sektor je i po-red teškoća imao najstabilniji rast, ali je, zbog krize,

više od polovine banaka na kraju 2013. poslovalo ne-gativno. Bilo je to prvi put da bankarski sektor u celini

gledano, od 2004. godine, završi godinu sa minusom.Iako su banke u Srbiji prošlu godinu završile sa gu-bitkom od blizu dve milijarde dinara ili oko 18 mili-ona evra, bankarski sistem je i dalje stabilan i visokolikvidan, pouzdan i siguran, ali je u isto vreme opte-rećen dugovanjima privrede. Bankari su svesni da, zarazliku od tržišta pre deset godina, kada su i građani iprivreda bili željni kredita, više nema lakog profita nasrpskom tržištu, a i kvalitetnih klijenata je sve manje.Pre nekoliko godina, u Srbiji je poslovalo gotovo 40poslovnih banaka, a danas ih ima 29. Suočavamo se sa

Goran Pitić, predsednik Upravnogodbora Societe Generale Srbija

Nema višelakog profita

Goran Pitić, Chairman o theManagement Board o SocieteGenerale Serbia

No more easyprofit







the economy. Bankers are well aware that, in con-trast to the market a decade ago, when citizensand businesses were eager or loans, there are nomore easy profits on the Serbian market and thequality o clients is increasingly lower.A ew years ago almost 40 commercial banks were

operating in Serbia, while today there are 29. Weare acing the beginning o the consolidation othe banking sector and the first example was pre-cisely Societe Generale Bank’s acquisition o theportolio o clients o KBC Bank. Tis is just thestart, because the Serbian market is the most rag-mented in the region and it is right to expect thatsome banks to withdraw rom the market, whilesome will simply take over other banks. In thelong term it is unrealistic to expect banks to “cure”themselves o the consequences o the crisis, butrather it is necessary or the government to adopt

some more energetic measures.

What are the main challenges to managing

banks and how much have they changed in

the years of the crisis? How has the global

economic crisis changed banking generally,

including here in our country?

Te main problem that banks ace today is the ab-sence o high quality clients, as well as an illiquidmarket that does not enable quick marketability(converting property into liquid assets) o finan-cial instruments, real estate sales and assets takenas collateral. Exchange rate fluctuations, as wellas the benchmark interest rate (LIBOR, EURI-BOR) additionally influence the level o credit riskbanks are exposed to. Interest rates on depositsare lowered and the amount o oreign currencysavings o non-residents is reducing. Likewise, theabsence o significant sources o liquid unds onmarkets where the parent banks o oreign playersoperate has contributed to an inability to obtainsignificant source o unding rom parent com-panies, which was one o the main generators o

growth prior to the crisis.A large number o banks on a market like Serbia’shampers operations and is one o the main chal-lenges aced by every bank that wants to grow, butalso to overcome the competition. An unusuallyhigh proportion o NPLs in total loans, whichhas ramifications or a bank’s capital, the qualityo the loan portolio and a distorted market shareo the banks, are the burning problems acingthe Serbian economy. Issues related to NPLs andtheir resolving is o essential importance, bearing

početkom konsolidacije bankarskog sektora, a prva je„nogu povukla“ upravo Sosijete ženeral banka, akvizi-cijom portfelja klijenata KBC banke. To je samo poče-tak, jer je srpsko tržište najfragmentisanije u regionui sa pravom treba očekivati da se neke banke povukusa ovog tržišta, a neke će prosto preuzeti druge ban-

ke. Dugoročno, nerealno je očekivati i da banke same„leče“ posledice krize, već je neophodno da Vlada do-nese neke energičnije mere.

Koji su glavni izazovi za upravljanje bankama

i koliko su se oni promenili u godinama krize?

Kako je svetska ekonomska kriza promenila

bankarstvo uopšte, pa i kod nas?

Osnovni problem sa kojim se banke danas suočavaju je nepostojanje kvalitetnih klijenata, kao i nelikvidnotržište koje ne omogućava brzu utrživost (pretvaranjeimovine u likvidna sredstva) finansijskih instrume-

nata, prodaju nekretnina i sredstava uzetih u zalogu.Oscilacija kurseva, kao i repernih kamatnih stopa(LIBOR, EURIBOR) dodatno utiče na nivo kredit-nog rizika kome je izložena banka. Smanjenje kamat-nih stopa na depozite, smanjuje iznos devizne štednjenerezidenata. Takođe, nepostojanje značajnih izvoralikvidnih sredstava na tržištima na kojima poslujumatice stranih banaka, uticalo je na nemogućnostpribavljanja značajnih izvora finansijskih sredstavaod matične kompanije, koji su u periodima pre krizebili jedan od osnovnih generatora rasta.Veliki broj banaka na tržištu kao što je srpsko, otežavaposlovanje i jedan je od osnovnih izazova sa kojim sesuočava svaka banka koja želi da raste, ali i da potisnekonkurenciju. Neuobičajeno visok udeo NPL kre-dita u ukupnim kreditima, što ostavlja posledice nakapital banaka, kvalitet kreditnog portfelja i naruše-no tržišno učešće banaka, gorući su problemi srpskeprivrede. Pitanja u vezi sa NPL kreditima i njihovorešavanje, esencijalno su važna, imajući u vidu daNPL krediti imaju negativne efekte na performansebanaka u smislu likvidnosti i profitabilnosti. Jasno jeda banke treba da se fokusiraju na sektore koji imaju

dobre performanse, kao i na kvalitetne klijente.

Kakva je uloga banaka u privrednom oporavku

Srbije?

Imajući u vidu da je bankarski sistem najveći i naj-značajniji u finansijskom sistemu Srbije i da ima naj-

veći uticaj na finansijsku stabilnost, njegov uticaj naoporavak privrede je izuzetno važan. Značajni izvorinovčanih sredstava su na raspolaganju banaka, kojebi višak likvidnih sredstava koje trenutno ulažu u tre-zorske zapise, mogle da iskoriste za povećanje kredit-




in mind that NPLs have a negative impact on theperormance o banks in terms o liquidity andprofitability. It is clear that banks need to ocus onsectors that have good perormances, as well as onhigh-quality clients.

What kind of role do banks have in theeconomic recovery of Serbia?

Considering that the banking system is the largestand most important part o the financial system oSerbia, and that it has the greatest impact on finan-cial stability, its influence on economic recoveryis exceptionally important. Significant sources ounding are available to banks, which could use theexcess liquidity currently invested in treasury billsto increase lending activity, which could ultimatelylead to an increase in production, exports and thecountry’s GDP.

In order to encourage banks to turn increasingly tolending to the economy, the state plans to grant €60million in subsidised loans, which should cover theincreased exposure o banks to credit risk. Moreo- ver, competition among banks could also lead to areduction in prices o sources o financing or com-panies and lessen their financial debt, thereby lead-ing to a reduction in the volume o overdue loans.

To what extent and in what way have

relations between banks and clients changed

in the last 10 years?

Societe Generale Serbia positioned itsel as a bankorientated towards clients long ago. We careullybuild relations with them, wanting those relationsto last years to mutual satisaction, while our em-ployees invest knowledge, effort and energy inorder to go out o the way to meet all the speci-ic needs o our clients at any time. We orm ouroffer in accordance with this. Our tradition oquality partnership relations dates back a centuryand a hal. Societe Generale Serbia is part o theSociete Generale Group, which this year marks the

major milestone o 150 years o doing business onthe international financial market. As a remind-er, Societe Generale was ounded with the aim osupporting the development o trade and industryin France, serving the development o the econo-my and helping social progress. Its ounders had aclear vision or the development o the economy othe time and were deeply aware o the importanceo supporting entrepreneurship, which was justcoming to the ore at that time. We are also guidedby this philosophy today.

ne aktivnosti, koja u krajnjoj instanci može da dovededo povećanja proizvodnje, izvoza i BDP-a zemlje. Dabi podstakla banke da se pojačano okrenu krediti-ranju privrede, država planira da odobri 60 milionaevra subvencionisanih kredita, koji bi trebalo da po-kriju povećanu izloženost banaka kreditnom riziku.Takođe, konkurencija među bankama može da dove-de i do smanjenja cene izvora finansiranja privrednihdruštava, njihove manje finansijske zaduženosti, asamim tim i do smanjenja obima kredita u kašnjenju.

Koliko i na koji način se promenio odnos banke

i klijenta u poslednjih deset godina?

Sosijete ženeral Srbija odavno se pozicionirala kaobanka orijentisana ka klijentima. Pažljivo gradimoodnose sa njima, želimo da te veze traju godinama,na obostrano zadovoljstvo, a naši zaposleni ulažuznanje, trud i energiju kako bi u svakom trenutkuizašli u susret svim specifičnim potrebama naših kli-

jenata. U skladu sa tim, mi i krojimo ponudu. Tradi-

cija kvalitetnog partnerskog odnosa duga je vek i po.Sosijete ženeral Srbija deo je Societe Generale grupe,koja ove godine obeležava veliki jubilej – 150 godinaposlovanja na međunarodnom finansijskom tržištu.Da podsetim, Societe Generale osnovana je sa ciljemda podrži razvoj trgovine i industrije u Francuskoj, dasluži razvoju ekonomije i pomogne društveni napre-dak. Njeni osnivači imali su jasnu viziju razvoja ta-dašnje ekonomije i bili su duboko svesni značaja kojiima podrška preduzetništvu, koje je u to vreme bilo uzamajcu. Tom filozofijom se i mi rukovodimo danas.




Zoran Vojnović, Chairman o theExecutive Board o Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a.d. Belgrade

Activepartner ineconomicrecovery

In your opinion, how has the Serbian banking

system changed in the last 10 years?

In view o the economic and political developments inthe country and worldwide, as well as the needs o thedomestic market, significant changes in the bankingsector have occurred in the last decade. Te entry ooreign banks into the Serbian market has contributedlargely to those changes, as a major generator o eco-nomic growth. Tanks to the entry o oreign banksand substantial unding rom their parent banks, Ser-bia has received around eight billion euros throughcapital and credit lines.Important reorms have been implemented and the

banking sector has stabilised in the last ten years. Tenumber o banks active on the market has declinedrom more than 80 in the early 2000s to the current 29.New technologies have been introduced and notice-able improvements achieved, particularly in respecto risk management. Tanks to the strict regulationso the National Bank o Serbia, banks in Serbia werewell-capitalised and able to endure the downturn ineconomic activity and their clients’ deteriorating fi-nancial perormance in the ace o the global econom-ic crisis in 2008.

Zoran Vojnović, predsednikIzvršnog odbora Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a. d. Beograd

Aktivanpartneroporavkaprivrede


promenio bankarski sistem u Srbiji u poslednjih

deset godina?

U skladu sa ekonomskim i političkim kretanjima uzemlji i svetu i potrebama domaćeg tržišta, tokomprotekle decenije došlo je do bitnih promena u ban-karskom sektoru. Veliku ulogu u tim promenamaimao je dolazak stranih banaka na tržište Srbije, koji je predstavljao značajan generator privrednog rasta.Zahvaljujući dolasku stranih banaka i značajnimfinansijskim sredstvima koje su dobijale od svojihmatičnih banaka, u Srbiju je ušlo oko osam milijardievra kroz kapital i kreditne linije.

okom proteklih deset godina izvršene su značaj-ne reorme i stabilizacija bankarskog sektora. Brojbanaka koje su aktivne na tržištu se smanjio sa višeod 80, početkom dvehiljaditih, na 29, koliko ih imadanas. Uvedene su nove tehnologije i došlo je doznatnih poboljšanja, posebno u oblasti upravljanjarizikom. Zbog striktnih pravila Narodne banke Srbi- je, banke u Srbiji su svetsku ekonomsku krizu 2008.godine dočekale visoko kapitalizovane i spremne dapodnesu teret pada privredne aktivnosti i pogoršanjafinansijskih perormansi svojih klijenata.




What are the major challenges for the Serbian

banking system?

Due to the stagnation o economic activity in thecountry, in the last couple o years the banking systemin Serbia has been conronted with decreasing creditactivity and increasing NPL levels. In order to be ableto change this trend and boost credit growth, it is nec-essary to conduct systemic reorms or economic re-covery, which will have a positive impact on corporate

sector liquidity.Credit activity decreases have caused bank revenuesto decline and that, coupled with extremely high pro- visioning levels or bad placements, resulted in rec-ognised bank losses in 2013. Since increases in bankrevenues cannot be expected in the near uture, banksneed to optimise their costs, business network andnumber o employees.A restrictive approach o parent banks in the euro-zone regarding urther lending possibilities to theirsubsidiaries in Serbia compelled banks to turn to

Koji su glavni izazovi za bankarski sistem u

Srbiji?

Usled stagnacije privredne aktivnosti u zemlji, ban-karski sistem u Srbiji se poslednjih godina suočava sapadom kreditne aktivnosti i povećanjem nivoa nena-plativih kredita. U cilju prevazilaženja ovakvog sta-nja i podsticanja kreditnog rasta, neophodno je spro- vođenje sistematskih reormi za oporavak privrede,što će pozitivno uticati i na likvidnost preduzeća.

Pad kreditne aktivnosti je uzrokovao i pad prihodabanaka, što je, zajedno sa izuzetno velikim poveća-njem rezervacija za loše plasmane, dovelo do toga dasu pojedine banke iskazale gubitke u 2013. godini.S obzirom na to da se u neposrednoj budućnosti nemože očekivati da će prihodi banaka ponovo rasti,neophodno je da banke optimizuju troškove, mrežui broj zaposlenih.Restriktivni pristup matičnih banaka iz evrozo-ne u pogledu daljeg odobravanja kreditnih linijabankama ćerkama u Srbiji, prinudio je banke da se




HYPO ALPE-ADRIA-BANK AD BEOGRADHypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a. d. Beograd uspešno posluje u Srbiji od 2002. godine, gde kao jedna od vodećih banaka dobrim poslovnim rezultatima značajno doprinosi stabilnosti bankarskog sektora.

Zahvaljujući strategiji proširenja poslovne mreže, otvorene su nove ekspoziture i filijale i povećan jebroj bankomata, čime su usluge banke postale još dostupnije građanima širom zemlje. Poslovnu mre-žu Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a. d. Beograd čini 50 poslovnica u 29 gradova Srbije.Dodatni pokazatelj proesionalnog odnosa prema klijentima predstavlja i projekat „Standardizacijakvaliteta pružanja usluga“, čija je realizacija, na nivou cele Hypo grupacije, započeta 2012. i nastavlje-na tokom 2013. godine. akođe, tokom 2013. godine, implementiran je i novi inormacioni sistem,čime su poboljšani brzina i kvalitet usluga prema klijentima.Realizacija društveno odgovornih projekata je jedan od važnih elemenata poslovanja Hypo Alpe-Adria banke u Srbiji, što je značajno doprinelo razvoju zajednice u kojoj banka posluje – obrazovanjumladih i talenata, kulture, pomoći obolelim osobama i sličnim oblastima.




domestic deposits as a substantial source o undingin the period ollowing the crisis. A drop in creditactivity since 2013 has reduced banks’ needs or de-posit collection. However, banks will need to inten-siy collection o domestic deposits with each creditactivity growth.

What is the role of banks in the economic

recovery of Serbia?

Banks must play an active role in the process o eco-nomic recovery in Serbia. On the one hand, it is im-portant to recognise and support sound companiesthat are acing current liquidity problems due to theoverall stagnation o economic activity. On the otherhand, in the case o clients that are currently unable tomeet their liabilities, a more effective bankruptcy pro-cedure should ensure the release o blocked propertyand its more rational utilisation.

It is vital that banks support the sector o microcompanies and SMEs, which so ar have not re-ceived adequate bank assistance. Tis profitablesector with low levels o indebtedness has ofen hadno access to bank loans and it could be just the sec-tor to create and lead a new generation o successulSerbian enterprises.

okrenu domaćim depozitima kao značajnom izvo-ru finansijskih sredstava, u periodu posle krize. Padkreditne aktivnosti od 2013. doveo je do smanjenjapotrebe banaka da prikupljaju depozite. Međutim,svaki novi rast kreditne aktivnosti dovešće do oži- vljavanja potrebe banaka da intenziviraju prikuplja-

nje domaćih depozita.

Kakva je uloga banaka u privrednom

oporavku Srbije?

U procesu oporavka privrede u Srbiji, banke morajubiti aktivan partner. Sa jedne strane, važno je da seprepoznaju zdrava preduzeća koja trenutno imajuprobleme sa likvidnošću zbog opšte stagnacije privredne aktivnosti i da im se pomogne u oporavku.Sa druge strane, kod klijenata koji trajno nisu u sta-nju da plaćaju svoje obaveze, kroz efikasniji processtečaja, treba uticati na to da se i blokirana imovina

oslobodi i upotrebi racionalnije.Posebno je važno da banke podrže sektor mikro,malih i srednjih preduzeća, koja do sada nisu imalaadekvatnu podršku banaka. Ovaj profitabilni i malozadužen sektor često nije imao pristupa bankarskimkreditima, a mogao bi da bude zametak i nosilacnove generacije uspešnih srpskih preduzeća.

HYPO ALPE-ADRIA-BANK AD BEOGRADHypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a.d. Beograd has been successully doing business in Serbia since 2002. Beingone o the leading banks with good business results, it is a significant actor in the stability o the bank-ing sector in Serbia.In line with its business network expansion strategy, new branches and sub-branches have been openedand the number o AMs increased, making thus the bank’s services more accessible or citizens

throughout the country. Te business network o Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a.d. Beograd comprises 50branches and sub-branches in 29 towns in Serbia.Another indicator o the bank’s proessional relations with its clients was the project “Service QualityProgram“, which was introduced in 2012 at the Hypo Group level, and continued in 2013. Likewise, anew inormation system was implemented in 2013 with a view to improve the speed and quality o theservices rendered to clients.Corporate social responsibility projects are an essential element o the business operations o HypoAlpe-Adria-Bank in Serbia that significantly contribute to the development o the community in whichthe bank operates, especially in relation to education o youth and talented individuals, culture, supportor the sick, and similar projects.




Marinos Vathis, CEO oVojvođanska Bank

Major rolein financinggrowth

In your opinion, how did the Serbian banking

system change during the last 10 years?

Since 2004, the controlling stakes in 17 banks inSerbia were sold to multinational players. Foreignbanks entered the Serbian market and broughtwith them rom different markets know-how,rules and procedures. Tey worked on how toreplicate on this market their lessons learnt andthe hands-on experience they have. Tereore, Iwould say that this led to a more proessional andsophisticated banking sector, since local bankshad to adjust and work on fine tuning. In the lastew years the Serbian banking system changedtowards becoming contemporary with all oth-er banking systems in Europe. In comparison tothe region, the Serbian banking sector is less con-centrated, with still too many banks operating onsuch a small market. Consolidation needs to hap-pen; some banks will merge, while perhaps somewill leave the market or will be acquired. Still, aswas the case 10 years ago, all banks are offering

standard banking services, with no major changeor innovation having happened. Te opportunityor the market in the uture is to offer innovativebanking products and services.

What are the biggest challenges to bank

management and how have they changed

during the crisis?

Te biggest challenge is to manage growth cau-tiously and conservatively in a downward marketand a strained economy. Another significant chal-

Marinos Vathis, PredsednikIzvršnog odbora Vojvođanske banke

Značajnauloga ufinansijskomrastu

Po vašem mišljenju, koliko se bankarski

sistem u Srbiji promenio u poslednjih deset

godina?

Od 2004. godine većinsko vlasništvo u 17 ba-naka u Srbiji je prodato multinacionalnim gru-pacijama. Strane banke su ušle na srpsko tržištei donele sa sobom znanje sa različitih tržišta,uključujući i njihova pravila i procedure. Radi-li su na tome da primene na ovom tržištu na-učene lekcije i direktna iskustva koja su stekli.Rekao bih da je to dovelo do proesionalnijeg isoisticiranijeg bankarskog sektora budući da sulokalne banke morale da se prilagode i podesesvoje poslovanje. U poslednjih nekoliko godina,bankarski sistem u Srbiji se promenio u toj merida sada ide u korak sa ostalim bankarskim si-stemima u Evropi. U odnosu na region, srpskibankarski sektor je manje koncentrisan, i daljepostoji previše banaka koje posluju na tako ma-lom tržištu. Konsolidacija je neminovna. Nekebanke će se spojiti, neke će možda napustiti trži-

šte, a neke će biti prodate. Ipak, baš kao i pre 10godina, sve banke nude standardne bankarskeusluge i nije došlo do većih promena ili inova-cija. ržišna prilika leži u ponudi inovativnihbankarskih proizvoda i usluga u budućnosti.

Koji su najveći izazovi u vođenju banke ikoliko su se ovi izazovi promenili tokomkrize?Najveći izazov leži u opreznom i konzervativ-nom rukovođenju rastom na tržištu koje ide




lenge is to motivate employees in times o majorrestructuring, which has a direct negative impacton the number o employees. In an economyand on a market that is not growing, or is grow-ing very slowly, one o the most prudent thingsto do is lower costs wherever possible. It is veryimportant to manage cost control with a prudentpolicy and clear long-term strategy or growthand urther development. Another challenge isto control costs without having a negative impacton the ootprint and quality o service provided to

nizbrdo i u privredi koja je pod opterećenjem.Još jedan značajan izazov predstavlja motivi-sanje zaposlenih u periodu kada prolazite krozznačajno restruktuiranje koje ima direktan i ne-gativan uticaj na broj zaposlenih. U privredi ina tržištu, koje se ne razvija ili se razvija veomasporo, jedna od naopreznijih stvari koje može-te da uradite jeste da smanjite troškove kada jeto god moguće. Veoma je važno da kontrolišetetroškove, da vodite opreznu politiku i da imate jasnu i dugoročnu strategiju za rast i dalji ra-




clients. Afer years o restructuring, VojvođanskaBank gained a positive trend o business opera-tions which has also continued in 2014 and posi-tioned us among the top five most profitable banksin Serbia in 2013.


recovery of Serbia?

Banks have a major role to play in the economicrecovery o Serbia, as a primary source o financ-ing and reuelling or small and medium-sizedenterprises and large companies in the corpo-rate sector. Te most important role is to providemuch needed capital to the Serbian economy, pri-marily to the private sector, in order to supporttheir business growth, development and expan-sion, as well as to reduce the negative effects o the

zvoj. Izazov predstavlja kontrolisanje rashodabez negativnog eekta na osnovno poslovanje ikvalitet usluga koje pružate klijentima. Nakon višegodišnjeg restrukturiranja, Vojvođanskabanka je dostigla pozitivan trend u poslovanjukoji se nastavlja i u 2014, a što je svrstalo u pet

naproitabilnijih banaka u Srbiji u 2013.Koja je uloga banaka u ekonomskom

oporavku Srbije?

Banke igraju veliku ulogu u ekonomskom opo-ravku Srbije budući da su primarni izvor inan-siranja i inansijske podrške malim i srednjimpreduzećima, kao i velikim kompanijama u kor-porativnom sektoru. Najvažnija uloga banaka jeste da obezbede preko potrebna sredstva zasrpsku privredu, pre svega u privatnom sektoru,




crisis. Access to finance is a chronic problem orSerbia’s private sector, especially or start-ups andSMEs, thus banks are still the dominant provid-er o financing here. Te Serbian banking sectorrelies on continued support rom the governmentand regulators through a continuous open dialog

about key issues acing the financial sector andconstraining banks when it comes to playing theirkey role and urther credit activity.

What does the formation of a banking

union in the eurozone mean for our bankingsystem?

Te creation o a banking union is one o the big-gest steps towards European financial integrationsince the introduction o the euro. It means therewill be more centralised supervision, regulationand control, though this does not imply any ma-

jor differences to the banking sector in Serbia. Ourbanking sector is highly regulated and controlled,with the aim o preserving financial security orSerbian clients. In general, Serbian banks havecoped reasonably well with the crisis, having beenboth well capitalised and highly liquid, and with to-tal capital adequacy o over 21%, which is 2.5 timeshigher than the EU minimum, in accordance withBasel III. Tis centralised control actually bringsthe banking sector back to where it was many yearsago, when control was in the hands o governments.

What could be done in order for the Serbian

dinar to push the euro out of our nancialsystem?

Te Serbian dinar can get the euro out o our fi-nancial system i it satisfies the ollowing two is-sues: the exchange rate and interest rates. We haveseen stabilisation o the exchange rate and we arewitnessing tendencies o alling interest rates –and this will have to continue in the uture. Great-er use o the dinar in the Serbian financial systemwould certainly contribute to reducing the risk o

exchange rate fluctuation, on the one hand, whileleading to a more efficient monetary policy on theother. In my view, there are ew prerequisites orsuccessul dinarisation: macroeconomic stability,low inflation, a stable financial system, urther development o the treasury bonds market issued indinars and better protection o potential oreignexchange risks. Furthermore, I expect the increaseo loans in dinars, bearing in mind the new pro-gramme o subsidised loans in dinars that was re-cently launched.

da podrže rast poslovanja, razvoj i širenje, kao ida smanje negativan uticaj krize. Pristup inan-siranju je hronični problem srpskog privatnogsektora, posebno u slučaju novoosnovanih, ma-lih i srednjih preduzeća, tako da su banke i daljedominantan pružalac izvora inansiranja. Ban-

karski sektor Srbije računa na nastavak podrškeVlade i regulatora kroz stalni i otvoreni dijalogo ključnim pitanjima sa kojima se suočava i-nansijski sektor i ograničavajućim aktorimakoji sprečavaju banke da odigraju ključnu ulogui povećaju svoju kreditnu aktivnost.

Kakav značaj bankarska unija u evrozoniima za naš bankarski sistem?Stvaranje bankarske unije je jedan od najvećihkoraka ka evropskoj inansijskoj integraciji oduvođenja evra. o podrazumeva centralizo-

vaniji nadzor, regulisanje i kontrolu koji nećeimati značajnog uticaja na bankarski sektor uSrbiji. Naš bankarski sektor je veoma regul isani kontrolisan, a sve u cilju brige o sigurnostiklijenata u Srbiji. U prinicipu, srpske banke suse prilično dobro izborile sa krizom, ostale su visoko kapitalizovane i likvidne, sa ukupnomadekvatnosti kapitala od preko 21% što je 2,5puta više od minimuma u EU po Bazelu III.Ovako centralizovana kontrola, u stvari vraćabankarski sektor na ono mesto na kojem je biopre mnogo godina, kada je kontrola bila u ru-kama vlade.

Šta treba da se uradi da bi dinar “izbacio”evro iz našeg nansijskog sistema?Srpski dinar može da “izbaci” evro iz našeg i-nansijskog sistema ukoliko su ispunjena dvauslova – kurs i kamate. Svedoci smo stabilizacijekursa i tendencije ka smanjenju kamata i to ćemorati da se nastavi i ubuduće. Veća upotrebadinara u srpskom inansijskom sistemu će, sa jedne strane, deinitivno doprineti smanjenju

rizika od luktuacije kursa, a sa druge strane dovesti do eikasnije monetarne politike. Gledištasam da postoji nekoliko preduslova za uspešnudinarizaciju - makroekonomska stabilnost,niska inlacija, stabilan inansijski sistem, da-lje razvijanje instrumenata kao što su državneobveznice izdate u dinarima i bolja zaštita odpotencijalnog kursnog rizika. Štaviše, očekujemporast odobrenih dinarskih kredita uzevši u ob-zir nedavno pokrenuti novi program subvenci-onisanog kreditiranja u dinarima.




Valeriy Ovsyannikov,President of Sberbank Serbia

Closely

monitoringmarketsituations

In your opinion, how has the Serbian banking

system changed in the last 10 years?

Te last decade has marked by significant changesin Serbia, with the necessary preconditions creat-ed for the development of modern banking, whileover the past ten years the banking sector in Ser-bia has also managed, in addition to the process ofconsolidation and restructuring it went through,to resist the negative effects of the global economiccrisis and experience a total transformation in theway of doing business with clients. Tere has beena change in the strategic orientation of banks fromliberal access to credit towards higher qualityplacements. In the last ten years banks have builtup a good criteria to protect both them and cus-

tomers from uncontrolled borrowing. oday cli-ents have more protection, more transparent cri-teria for borrowing and a coordinated tariff policy.In the coming years in Serbia we can expect con-solidation of the banking system. A poor macro-economic environment poses a problem for thebanking sector, the poor state of the economy,which is still in the process of transition, the tradeand current account deficit, the budget deficit andinflation. Te economy is still in a very bad sit-uation and citizens do not have a lot of space to

Valerij Ovsjanikov, predsednikIzvršnog odbora Sberbanke Srbija

Pažljivo

pratimosituaciju natržištu

N k nn , p š šln,promenio bankarski sistem u Srbiji u


Poslednju deceniju su obeležile značajne prome-ne u Srbiji, stvoreni su preduslovi neophodni zarazvoj savremenog bankarstva i tokom proteklihdeset godina bankarski sektor u Srbiji je, poredprocesa konsolidacije i restrukturiranja kroz koji je prošao, uspeo da se odupre negativnim efektimasvetske ekonomske krize i doživi potpunu prome-nu u načinu poslovanja sa klijentima. Promenilase strateška opredeljenost banaka od liberalnogpristupa kreditiranju prema kvalitetnim plasma-nima. Banke su prethodnih deset godina izgradi-le dobre kriterijume koji štite i njih i klijente od

nekontrolisanog zaduživanja. Klijenti danas imaju veću zaštitu, transparentne kriterijume po kojimase zadužuju, usklađenu tarifnu politiku.U narednim godinama u Srbiji se može očekivatiukrupnjavanje bankarskog sistema. Za bankarskisektor problem predstavlja loše makroekonomskookruženje, odnosno loše stanje privrede koja je idalje u procesu tranzicije, trgovinski deficit i de-ficit platnog bilansa, budžetski deficit i inflacija.Privreda je i dalje u dosta lošoj situaciji, a građaninemaju mnogo prostora za zaduživanje, ali srpsko




borrow, but the Serbian market has great potentialfor the development of the banking business, par-ticularly in terms of personal and SME banking.

How will the banking business look in the

future?

Te use and adaptation of banks and clients tomodern technology will be crucial in the near fu-ture. For example, the number of internet usersis increasing rapidly and products like e-bankingand mobile banking bring many benefits to clients.echnological advancement has opened up manynew channels of communication, but also thepossibility for clients to manage their own fi-nances, without going to the bank. Te use of

e-banking and SMS services is constantly on therise and banks are already actively working onestablishing high quality and highly secure mo-bile banking applications.Te enormous growth of social networks will fun-damentally change the conditions and rules of thegame which banks operate in today. Te contin-uation of this practice and increase the numberof internet users, coupled with the developmentof social networks, will enable banks to access asingle customer with a package of products specif-

tržište ima veliki potencijal za razvoj bankarskogposlovanja, pogotovu u poslovanju sa stanovni-štvom, mikro i malim preduzećima.

Kk nkk p zgl n?Adaptacija banaka i klijenata na moderne tehno-logije i njihova upotreba biće krucijalne u bližojbudućnosti. Primera radi, broj internet-korisnikase rapidno povećava i proizvodi kao što su elek-tronsko bankarstvo, mobilno bankarstvo donosemnoge pogodnosti klijentima.Tehnološki napredak je otvorio mnoge nove ka-nale komunikacije, ali i mogućnost da klijentisami upravljaju svojim sredstvima, bez odlaska

u banku. Upotreba e-bankinga i SMS servisa je ukonstantnom porastu, a banke već aktivno radena uspostavljanju kvalitetnih i sigurnih mobilebanking aplikacija.Enormni razvoj društvenih mreža će suštinskipromeniti uslove i pravila igre po kojima da-našnje banke posluju. Nastavak ovakve prak-se i povećanje broja korisnika interneta, kao irazvoj društvenih mreža, omogućiće bankamada pristupe pojedinačnom klijentu sa paketomproizvoda posebno prilagođenim njegovim po-




ically tailored to their needs and banking servic-es will become fully adapted to the profile of theindividual user. wo-way communication is developing that enables banks to get quick feedbackfrom customers and respond immediately.Te further improvement of applications will ena-ble banks to provide the client with a range of ba-sic services in a secure environment and therebylead to branches engaging in more complex trans-actions, such as providing housing loans and thelike. Over time, these kinds of services will alsomigrate to the internet, as the further develop-ment of services allows bank employees to main-tain contact with clients, for example through video call applications. A large number of oper-

ational processes within banks will be automated.In the end, this process will enable banks to signif-icantly reduce the cost of maintaining a networkof branches and that money will serve to raise thequality of their services further.

What are the main challenges for the Serbian

banking system?

Banking operations also depend on the macroe-conomic environment in which they operate andwhich, directly or indirectly, impacts all custom-

trebama i bankarske usluge će postati potpunoprilagođene profilu individualnog korisnika. Ra-zvija se dvosmerna komunikacija koja omoguća- va bankama da dobiju brzu povratnu informacijuod klijenata i odmah reaguju.Dalje usavršavanje aplikacija omogućiće banka-ma da u bezbednom okruženju klijentu obez-bede čitav niz osnovnih usluga i dovesti do togada će se filijale baviti kompleksnijim transakci- jama, kao što su davanje stambenih kredita i sl.Vremenom će i ove usluge migrirati na internet, jer će dalji razvoj servisa omogućiti bankarskimslužbenicima da sa klijentima budu u kontaktuna primer preko aplikacija za video-pozive. Veli-ki broj operativnih procesa unutar banaka će se

odvijati automatizovano. Na kraju, ovaj proces ćebankama omogućiti da znatno smanje troškoveodržavanja mreže filijala i tim novcem dodatnopodignu kvalitet svojih usluga.

K gln zz z nkk Srbiji?

Poslovanje banaka zavisi i od makroekonomskogokruženja u kome rade i koje direktno ili indirekt-no utiče na sve klijente, privredu i stanovništvo.Sada problem bankarskog sektora nije u likvidno-




ers, the economy and the population. At presentliquidity is not the problem of the banking sector,as was the case previously. Tere are sufficientfunds and that is not a limiting factor for lending.Te limiting factor is a lack of creditworthy clients.Te region’s economic recovery remains weak and

is threatened by numerous risks, so GDP growthwill depend greatly on the growth of investments,accelerating reforms, stable growth in exports andstrengthened competitiveness. It is essential toensure macroeconomic stability, especially whenit comes to fiscal discipline, reducing the budgetdeficit and public debt, and there are also othermeasures, such as EU accession, attracting for-eign investment, increasing exports. Te financialsector will continue to face a number of pressures.Te modest economic recovery to date has notmanaged to help the banking sector reduce the

high level of NPLs, which are on the rise.

Regardless of the continuation of the negativetrend when it comes to the level of problematicloans, most banks in Serbia are able to deal withthe problem, due to their high level of capitali-sation. However, the level of risky loans repre-sents one of the major challenges banks will facein the future. Finding a solution to this problemis a long process. Tanks to a comprehensive setof measures and good risk management, we havesucceeded in keeping control of the level of prob-

lematic loans and maintaining a high quality loanportfolio. Te process itself will not reduce thelevel of competition among the major participantsin the market competition, on the contrary, theywill continue to develop innovative products andservices in order to increase their market share.Accordingly, clients, personal clients, entrepre-neurs and corporate clients, will all receive ben-efits in the form of lower prices. Sberbank Serbiaclosely monitors the situation on the market andresponds flexibly to any changes.

sti, kao što je to bio slučaj ranije. Sredstava imadovoljno i to nije ograničavajući faktor za krediti-ranje. Ograničavajući faktor je nedostatak kredit-no sposobnih klijenata.Ekonomski oporavak regiona i dalje je slab iprete mu brojni rizici, pa će rast bruto domaćeg

proizvoda umnogome zavisiti od rasta investi-cija, ubrzanja reformi, stabilnog rasta izvoza i jačanja konkurentnosti. Neophodno je obez-bediti makroekonomsku stabilnost, pogotovokad je u pitanju fiskalna disciplina, odnosnosmanjenje budžetskog deficita i javnog duga, atu su i druge mere kao što je približavanje EU,privlačenje stranih investicija, povećanje izvo-za. Finansijski sektor nastaviće da se suočavasa brojnim pritiscima. Skroman privredni opo-ravak do sada nije uspeo da pomogne bankar-skom sektoru da smanji visok nivo nenaplativih

kredita, koji su u porastu.

Bez obzira na to što se negativan trend, kada jenivo problematičnih kredita u pitanju, nastavlja, većina banaka u Srbiji je, zahvaljujući visokomnivou kapitalizacije, u stanju da se izbori s timproblemom. Međutim, nivo rizičnih plasmanapredstavlja jedan od glavnih izazova sa kojima ćese banke i u narednom periodu suočavati. Prona-laženje rešenja za ovaj problem predstavlja dugproces. Zahvaljujući sveobuhvatnom setu merai dobrom upravljanju rizicima, mi smo uspeli

da zadržimo nivo problematičnih kredita podkontrolom i da održimo visok kvalitet kreditnogportfolija. Proces sam po sebi neće smanjiti nivokonkurencije među većim učesnicima tržišneutakmice, naprotiv, oni će, kako bi povećali svojetržišno učešće, nastaviti da razvijaju inovativneproizvode i usluge. U skladu sa tim, klijenti će,kako fizička lica, tako i preduzetnici i privreda,imati korist izraženu kroz niže cene. SberbankaSrbije pažljivo prati situaciju na tržištu i fleksibil-no reaguje na sve promene.

THE FINANCIAL SECTOR WILLCONTINUE TO FACE A NUMBEROF PRESSURES. THE MODESTECONOMIC RECOVERY TO DATEHAS NOT MANAGED TO HELPTHE BANKING SECTOR REDUCETHE HIGH LEVEL OF NPLS,WHICH ARE ON THE RISE

FiNaNsijsKi seKtor Nastavićeda se suočava sa brojNimPRITISCIMA. SKROMANPRIVREDNI OPORAVAK DOSADA NIJE USPEO DA POMOGNEBANKARSKOM SEKTORU DASMANJI VISOK NIVO NENAPLATIVIHKREDITA, KOJI SU U PORASTU




Slavko Carić, Chairman of theExecutive Board of Erste Bank Serbia

We must

launch a newinvestmentcycleIn your opinion, in which way has the Serbian


Many European and international standards havebeen introduced to the business, because bankswith parent companies abroad did not only bringcapital, but also know-how.

What are the main challenges to managing

banks and how much have they changed

during the years of the crisis?

Aligning the interests of clients, employees and sha-reholders is certainly a challenge on a daily basis.In the years of crisis it became tougher and moreimportant to find an optimal relationship betweensales and risk management. Te banks that provedto be successful are those whose business model ap-proaches this thoroughly.


future?

Mobile banking will certainly continue to developand we will also reach the integration of services. Inthis respect, banks will fight with other companiesfor the banking services market.

What are the biggest challenges confronting

the banking system in Serbia?

Currently those are the high level of NPLs andan economy of unsure standing. As a country,we must launch a new investment cycle. Sourcesof funding exist. Tese are primarily domesticbanks, but also international financial instituti-ons and mandatory reserves.It is necessary, however, to secure several precon-ditions, such as a stable price policy, a stable orpredictable exchange rate and investments in in-

Slavko Carić, predsednikIzvršnog odbora Erste banke Srbija

Moramo da

pokrenemonoviinvesticioniciklus




Uvedeni su mnogi evropski i svetski stand-ardi u poslovanju, jer banke sa maticama uinostranstvu nisu donele samo kapital, već iknow-how.

Koji su glavni izazovi za upravljanje

bankom i koliko su se oni promenili u

godinama krize?

Usaglašavanje interesa klijenata, zaposlenih iakcionara je svakako izazov na dnevnom niv-ou. U godinama krize je postalo teže i bitni-

je pronaći optimalan odnos između prodajei upravljanja rizicima. Pokazalo se da je us-pešna ona banka čiji poslovni model ovomepristupa temeljno.

Kako će bankarski posao izgledati u

budućnosti?

Mobilno bankarstvo će se sigurno i dalje raz- vijati, a dolaziće i do integracije usluga. Bankeće se, u tom pogledu, boriti sa drugim kom-panijama za tržište bankarskih usluga.

Koji su glavni izazovi za bankarski sistem

u Srbiji?

renutno su to visok stepen NPL-a i ekonom-ija na labavim nogama. Mi kao država mora-mo da pokrenemo novi investicioni ciklus.Izvori finansiranja postoje. o su pre svega




frastructure. It is also very important to systemi-cally resolve the NPL issue, with a consensus be-

tween the Serbian Government, the National Bankof Serbia and the Association of Serbian Banks onthe establishment of banks for bad loans. With thiscommercial banks would be released from the bal-last and thereby an additional advantage of liquidi-ty to finance investment would be created.Furthermore, it is essential to partially or fully priva-tise and corporatize all key public enterprises, sim-plify bureaucratic procedures and introduce e-go-

vernment. Such a programme would initiate positivetrends at multiple levels of the Serbian economy.

domaće banke, ali i međunarodne finansijskeinstitucije i obavezne rezerve.

Potrebno je, međutim, da obezbedimo ne-koliko preduslova, poput stabilne politikecena, stabilnog ili predvidljivog kursa i in-

vesticija u infrastrukturu. Veoma je važnoi da sistemski bude rešeno pitanje NPL-a,konsenzusom između Vlade, Narodnebanke Srbije i Udruženja banaka Srbije,formiranjem banke za loše plasmane. imebi se poslovne banke oslobodile balasta itime bi stvorenu dodatnu likvidnost iskoris-tile za finansiranje investicija.




Te most important thing is for us to enable theSME sector to develop. In EU countries and theU.S. it is precisely the SME sector that is the mainemployer. Tat’s why it is very important to reform

public enterprises, because they are a motor for thedevelopment of SMEs, through the purchase of thegoods and services provided by SMEs. Under theauspices of a new investment cycle, financing SMEswould certainly be one of the focuses of banks.

What was risk management like prior to the

crisis and how does it looks today, after the

nancial crisis?

Prior to the crisis, banks determined their operationsin relation to the expectations for economic growth

Dodatno, neophodno je delimično ili potpu-no privatizovati i korporatizovati sva ključna

javna preduzeća, pojednostaviti birokratskeprocedure, uvesti e-upravu. Ovakav program

bi pokrenuo pozitivne trendove na više nivoaekonomije Srbije.Najvažnije je da omogućimo sektoru malih isrednjih preduzeća da se razvije. U zemljamaEU i SAD upravo je sektor malih i srednjihpreduzeća glavni poslodavac. Zato je veoma

važno reformisati javna preduzeća, jer su onazamajac razvoja MSP, kroz kupovinu dobara iusluga koje MSP obezbeđuju. U okviru novoginvesticionog ciklusa, finansiranje MSP bi sig-urno bio jedan od fokusa banaka.




at the time. When they broke the market, the certa-inty of loan placements came to the fore. Now we areactually witnessing the repairing of the damage.

What role do banks have in the economic

recovery of Serbia?

A big one, but it needs to be bigger. Trough thelaunch of an investment cycle, the role of banks willcome fully to the fore.

What needs to be done for the Dinar to

squeeze the Euro out of our nancial system?

Although we are celebrating the 140 anniversaryof the existence of the Serbian dinar, we still needto ask ourselves whether we really want the dinarto squeeze the euro, given the perspective of Serbiaas a member of the European Union, initially, andthen the eurozone. Squeezing out the euro could

deplete us. We need to have either a stable currencyor use a shared currency.

To what extent and in which ways have

relations between banks and clients changed

in the last 10 years?

Tere is no doubt that the client is now muchmore in focus, but there is still a lot of work aheadof us in this direction. Likewise, there is no doubtthe quality of services is at a much higher leveland that the offer of products is more diverse andmore competitive than before. However, with re-gard to this question I would draw your attentionto some aspects that the bank I head considers asbeing particularly important, and which we alsopublished in this year’s annual report on corpora-te social responsibility.In terms of accountability towards clients, the con-cepts of financial inclusion and financial literacyare some of the most current issues in the bankingsector, especially in developing countries. Further-more, entrepreneurship and self-employment havebeen identified as being crucial for innovation and

growth in a thriving economy.For example, contributing to the development ofentrepreneurship is reflected primarily in the stra-tegy for start-up companies and the Superstep lineof credit for young entrepreneurs, which is asso-ciated with mentoring programmes designed fornewcomers to business. Support for the develop-ment of social entrepreneurship and microcreditsare also important steps forward. Tis approachto customer relations differs markedly from someold practices.

Kako je izgledalo upravljanje rizikom pre

krize, a kako to izgleda danas, nakon

fnansijske krize?

Pre krize banke su svoje poslovanje određivaleu odnosu na tadašnja očekivanja vezana zaekonomski rast. Kada su se tržišta slomila, u

prvi plan je izašla sigurnost plasmana. Sada,zapravo, svedočimo saniranju štete.

Kakva je uloga banaka u privrednom opora-

vku Srbije?

Velika je, ali treba da bude i veća. Kroz pokretan- je investicionog ciklusa uloga banaka će doći dopunog izražaja.Šta je potrebno uraditi da dinar istisne evro iznašeg finansijskog sistema?Iako obeležavamo 140 godina postojanja di-nara, treba ipak i da se zapitamo da li zaista

želimo da dinar istisne evro, imajući u viduperspektivu Srbije kao članice najpre Evropskeunije, a zatim i evrozone. Istiskivanje evra binas moglo iscrpeti. reba da imamo ili stabilnu

valutu, ili da koristimo zajedničku.

Koliko i na koji način se promenio odnos

banke i klijenta u poslednjih deset godina?

Nema sumnje da je klijent sada mnogo više ufokusu, ali i dalje nam predstoji mnogo pos-la u tom pravcu. akođe, nesumnjivo je kval-itet usluge na znatno višem nivou, da je pon-uda proizvoda raznovrsnija i konkurentnijanego ranije. Međutim, u vezi sa ovim pitanjemskrenuo bih pažnju na neke aspekte koje ban-ka na čijem sam čelu smatra posebno važnim, akoje objavljujemo i u ovogodišnjem Izveštaju odruštveno odgovornom poslovanju.U pogledu odgovornosti prema klijentima, kon-cepti finansijske inkluzije i finansijskog opis-menjavanja su neka od najaktuelnijih pitanjau bankarskom sektoru, posebno u zemljama urazvoju. Dalje, preduzetništvo i samozapošlja-

vanje prepoznati su kao ključ za inovacije i rastu uspešnim ekonomijama.Na primer, doprinos razvoju preduzetništ-

va ogleda se pre svega u strategiji za start uppreduzeća i Superstep liniji kredita za mladepreduzetnike, koja je povezana sa mentorskimprogramom namenjenim početnicima u bizn-isu. Podrška razvoju socijalnog preduzetništvai mikrokreditiranja su takođe značajni iskoraci.Ovakav pristup odnosima s klijentima se znat-no razlikuje od nekih starih praksi.




Georgios Papanastasiou,Chairman of the Executive Boardof Alpha Bank

We'vepreserved clientconfidenceHow did the global economic crisis change

banking generally, including in our country?

Te global economic crisis has revealed two majorweaknesses in the banking sector: the lack o systemic

control and the tendency o the largest banks to ne-glect risks or the sake o profit. Tese weaknesseswere major contributors to the “financial earthquake”that occurred across the world. Tis is why the chang-es, which occurred as a result o the crisis, are most

visible in these areas.States are now seeking to strengthen control o thebanking sector by improving regulatory rules in or-der to minimise the possibility o a reoccurrence othe problem.At the same time, banks are returning to a moreconservative way o doing business. Te growingtrend in the ratio o non-perorming loans, whichwe now see in Serbia, prompted banks to becomemuch more cautious. Tis is primarily related tolending conditions, clients’ creditworthiness, as wellas required collaterals and guarantees that shouldensure the repayment o loans.Caution, as a sign o change, has become a visiblebehavioural characteristic o banking service users.Faced with volatility in the business environment,deciding whether to pursue a loan is much moredifficult now than it was beore the crisis; both or

individuals and businesses in Serbia, and even i theyare creditworthy.

What are the main challenges confronting the

banking system in Serbia?

Most banks in Serbia have managed to overcome thechallenges that arose immediately afer the crisis. Tefirst and most important step was maintaining clients’trust. In addition, the domestic banking sector has soar managed to maintain more than a satisactory lev-el o liquidity and stability.

Georgios Papanastasiou,predsednik Izvršnog odboraAlpha banke

Očuvali smopoverenjeklijenata

Kako je svetska ekonomska kriza

promenila bankarstvo uopšte, pa i kod

nas?

Svetska ekonomska kriza razotkrila je dve najve-

će slabosti bankarskog sektora - manjak sistemskekontrole i sklonost najvećih banaka da u cilju ostva-renja većeg profita zanemare izloženost rizicima,što je dovelo do „finansijskog zemljotresa“ širomsveta. Zbog toga su i promene, nastale kao posledi-ca izbijanja krize, najvidljivije u tim oblastima.Države nastoje da unapređenjem regulative pojača- ju kontrolu bankarskog sektora, kako bi mogućnostponavljanja problema svele na minimum.Istovremeno, banke se vraćaju konzervativnijemnačinu poslovanja. Trend rasta pokazatelja nena-plativih kredita, koji sada vidimo u Srbiji, uticao je da banke postanu znatno opreznije. To se, presvega, odnosi na uslove za odobravanje plasmana,procene kreditne sposobnosti klijenata, kao i na za-htevane kolaterale i garancije, koji služe kao obez-beđenje za otplatu kredita.Opreznost je, za razliku od vremena pre krize, sveprisutnija karakteristika korisnika bankarskih uslu-ga. Suočeni sa promenljivošću poslovnog okruže-nja, i građani i privredni subjekti u Srbiji, čak i kadsu kreditno sposobni, mnogo se teže odlučuju da sezaduže nego pre krize.

Koji su glavni izazovi za bankarski sistem u

Srbiji?

Većina banaka u Srbiji je uspela da prebrodi izazove koji su nastali neposredno posle krize – prvi inajvažniji korak bilo je očuvanje poverenja klijena-ta. Osim toga, domaći bankarski sektor je do sadauspeo da održi i više nego zadovoljavajući stepenlikvidnosti i stabilnosti.Ipak, izazovi koji su pred nama, nisu ništa manji odprethodno navedenih.




Georgios Papanastasiou,President of the ExecutiveBoard of Alpha Bank Srbija a.d.Mr. Georgios Papanastasiou joined Alpha Bank team

at the beginning of 2009, from the position of General

Manager in Stopanska Banka, member of NBG group

in FYROM. In April, 2009, he became the Member of

the Executive Board of Alpha Bank Srbija, and in May

he has taken over the duties of the President of the

Executive Board of Alpha Bank Srbija. Mr. Papanasta-

siou has started his career in the banking sector in

1987 at The Bank of Nova Scotia as a credit assis-

tant; after that, in 1991, he joined ABN AMRO Bank

where he served as Relationship Manager and Area

Commercial Manager. Since 2000, Mr. Papanasta-

siou continued his career in Stopanska Banka, where

he held several managing functions before he was

appointed General Manager in 2005.He holds A B.Sc

in Economics from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

and an MBA from Bentley College, USA.

Georgios Papanastasiou,predsednik Izvršnog odbora AlphaBank Srbija a.d.Gospodin Georgios Papanastasiou se početkom 2009. godine

priključio timu Alpha Bank, sa pozicije generalnog direktora u

Stopanskoj banci, članici NBG grupacije u BJR Makedoniji. Tokom

aprila 2009. godine postaje član Izvršnog odbora Alpha Bank

Srbija, a u maju iste godine preuzima dužnost predsednika Izvr -

šnog odbora Alpha Bank Srbija. Gospodin Papanastasiou je svoju

bankarsku karijeru započeo 1987. godine kao kreditni savetnik u

okviru The Bank of Nova Scotia u Solunu, da bi se zatim, od 1991.

godine, priključio timu ABN AMRO Bank, u kojoj je prvobitno bio

odgovoran kao službenik za saradnju sa klijentima, da bi zatim

prešao na funkciju direktora Solunske lijale. Od 2000. godine,

gospodin Papanastasiou je svoju karijeru nastavio u Stopanskoj

banci, u kojoj je bio nosilac nekoliko rukovodećih funkcija, a od

2005. godine bio je na poziciji generalnog direktora ove banke.

Diplomirao je ekonomiju na Aristotel univerzitetu u Solunu i magi-

strirao je poslovno upravljanje (MBA) na Bentley koledžu u Sjedi-

njenim Američkim Državama.




However, the challenges that now conront us are noless important than those that are now behind us.Currently or the banking sectors in Serbia and theregion the most important issue is finding a solutionto non-perorming loans. Both companies and in-dividuals who did not properly assess their capacityor borrowing in periods o economic expansion arenow, during a shif in the phase o the economic cycle,aced with a reduced capacity, or even an inability, tomeet their loan repayment obligations. Te act thatevery ourth company in the country (28.07 per centaccording to the Association o Serbian Banks) hasdebt repayment difficulties is a serious warning.Another important issue that banks in Serbia are nowacing is decline in lending activity. Te financial crisisled to a decline in the purchasing power o individ-uals and also market demand. Tis has led to many

business problems in companies battling the crisis,which has in turn led to problems in the repayment oexisting loans and approval o new loans. Moreover,significant employment losses, continuing market un-certainty and a drop in average earnings have resultedin a reduction o loan applications, especially or longand medium-term loans, such as mortgages and carloans. Even interest in credit cards is reported to havedeclined. All o these acts suggest that individuals aremore likely to opt or a loan as a last resort or in orderto ulfil their basic needs.

Trenutno je za bankarski sistem u Srbiji, kao i u re-gionu, najznačajnije rešenje problema nenaplativihpotraživanja. I pravna i fizička lica, koja nisu dobroprocenila svoje kapacitete za zaduživanje u periodi-ma ekonomske ekspanzije, suočavaju se sada, kada je došlo do smene faza u ekonomskom ciklusu, sateškoćama i smanjenim kapacitetom da otplatesvoje kreditne obaveze. Činjenica da svako četvrtopravno lice u Srbiji (28,07 odsto, prema podacimaUdruženja banaka Srbije) ima teškoće u otplati kre-dita, predstavlja ozbiljno upozorenje.Drugo značajno pitanje sa kojim se suočavaju ban-ke u Srbiji je pad kreditne aktivnosti.Finansijska kriza dovela je do pada kupovne moćigrađana, ujedno i do pada tražnje, što je mnogimkompanijama donelo probleme u poslovanju, kojiposledično dovode do problema u otplati posto-

jećih i uzimanju novih kredita. Takođe, gubitak velikog broja radnih mesta u poslednjih nekolikogodina, nesigurnost postojećih, kao i pad prosečnezarade, imali su za posledicu i smanjenje kreditnihzahteva građana, pre svega za dugoročne i sred-njoročne pozajmice, kao što su stambeni kreditii kupovina automobila na kredit. Podaci kažu daopada čak i interesovanje za kreditne kartice – štosve zajedno ukazuje na to da se građani sve češćeodlučuju na pozajmice samo u krajnjoj nuždi i zanamirivanje osnovnih potreba.




Finally, the third and most complex challenge is theneed to find a balance between state requirements andregulations, the needs o businesses and individuals,and the actual operating capacities o banks. Partner-ship and cooperation between the government andthe banks, as well as other actors o society, will be

required in order to successully ace this challenge.

What was risk management like prior to the

crisis and how does it look today, after the

fnancial crisis?

Te huge financial difficulties that have troubledsome o the world’s largest banking groups, as well assome banks rom Serbia, have shown that prior to thecrisis risk assessment was not given enough attention.Nowadays, it is one o the priorities in the banking busi-ness and, in order to simply describe the very complexarea o financial risk management, it is now character-

ized by more conservative and stricter evaluation criteria.


recovery of Serbia?

Te Serbian banking sector, with its accomplishmentsin the recent past and the support it has given to firmsand also the economic initiatives o the Serbian Gov-ernment, has shown that it is a serious partner o theSerbian economy. In the uture, the role o banks inthe economic recovery o Serbia will depend largelyon the economic policies the state will create – mostprecisely in the areas that banks will be allowed toprovide with help. Serious reorms that tackle thecauses o the economic crisis in Serbia are needed inorder or the Serbian economy to return to growthand development.Gradual bank lending activity increases can be ex-pected afer the announced budget balance, as wellas an increase in investments and private domes-tic demand. Tese will be the main drivers o eco-nomic growth. O course, the primary prerequisiteswill be to provide legal certainty and moderniseexisting legislation, as well as intensiying work on

efficiently implementing regulations. All o thesecould urther boost the attracting o oreign directinvestment and the supply o resh capital to Serbia.I believe that banking support will be most importantin the area o micro businesses and SMEs, which arealso the healthiest part o the economy. In the uturethey could become the leaders o economic develop-ment. An important role in achieving this goal willbe played by the banks by providing adequate creditsupport or new investments and the expansion oproduction capacities.

Konačno, kao treći, a ujedno i najkompleksniji,izazov javlja se potreba da se uravnoteži odnosizmeđu zahteva države i propisa koje ona donosi,potreba privrede i građana i realnih mogućnostibanaka. Za uspešno suočavanje s ovim izazovima,biće neophodna partnerska saradnja, pre svega,

države i banaka, ali i drugih faktora u društvu.

Kako je izgledalo upravljanje rizicima

pre krize, a kako to izgleda danas, nakon

fnansijske krize?

Ogromne finansijske teškoće, u kojima su se našleneke od najvećih svetskih bankarskih grupacija,ali i pojedini primeri iz Srbije, pokazali su da sepre krize proceni rizika očigledno nije poklanjalodovoljno pažnje.Sada je upravo to jedan od prioriteta u poslovanjubanaka, a kompleksnu oblast upravljanja finan-

sijskim rizicima sada karakterišu konzervativnijipristup i pooštravanje kriterijuma procene.


oporavku Srbije?

Svojim dosadašnjim radom i podrškom koju je davao privredi, ali i ekonomskim inicijativama Vlade,bankarski sektor Srbije je pokazao da je ozbiljan part-ner srpske ekonomije. U budućnosti, uloga banaka uprivrednom oporavku Srbije zavisiće u velikoj meriod ekonomskih mera koje kreira država, tačnije odprostora koji će bankama biti dat da bi pomogle. Zapovratak srpske privrede na pravac rasta i razvoja,neophodne su ozbiljne reorme koje će se uhvatitiukoštac sa uzrocima ekonomske krize u Srbiji.Postepeni rast kreditnih aktivnosti banaka možese očekivati uz najavljeno popravljanje budžetskogbilansa, povećanje investicija i privatne domaćetražnje kao glavnih pokretača ekonomskog rasta.Naravno, primarni preduslov jeste obezbeđivanjepravne sigurnosti, promene i modernizacija po-stojećeg zakonodavstva, kao i intenziviranje radana efikasnijoj primeni propisa. To bi dodatno mo-

glo da podstakne privlačenje stranih direktnih investicija i ulazak svežeg kapitala u Srbiju.Verujem da će bankarska podrška biti najznačaj-nija u segmentu mikro, malih i srednjih predu-zeća, a koja su ujedno i najzdraviji deo privre-de. U narednom periodu ona bi mogla da budunosioci privrednog razvoja. U ostvarivanju togcilja, značajnu ulogu mogu da odigraju banke,obezbeđivanjem odgovarajuće kreditne podrškeza realizaciju novih investicija i proširenje proi-zvodnih kapaciteta.




Neoclis Neocleous, GeneralManager and Chairman o theExecutive Board o Piraeus Bank

QualityremainsPiraeus Bankprimary goalWhat are the main challenges to managing a

bank and how have they changed during the

crisis?During the five years o crisis Piraeus Bank hasmaintained its core business, recorded suitablegrowth, clients base and their trust. oday inSerbia the bank has a business network o 42branches, 600 employees, developed PiraeusLeasing and Piraeus Rent sectors, tens o tho-usands o clients, around €600 million in loanplacements, including cross-border loans bo-oked with Piraeus Bank London, and depositsworth about €300 million.Now, afer five years o crisis, we are developingthe bank urther and have a five-year growth plan,which we started implementing this year. Altho-ugh the crisis impacted on our business, we arestill operating with success and are pleased withour achievements. I there had not been a crisis,our results would have been even better.

How has the world economic crisis changed

banking generally, in local market as well?

Te Serbian Economy is acing the consequenceso the global economy crisis and needs to take ur-

gent economic measures in order to accelerate gro-wth. Te outlook or this year is slightly better than2013, but still modest.Te Serbian banking sector is competitive, with alarge number o banks operating on the market,hence it is realistic to expect consolidation in theuture.Te consolidation process has already begun and iscurrently reflected in internal reorganization, whichshould improve business effectiveness, reduce costsand, most importantly, provide better service.

Neoklis Neokleus, generalnidirektor i predsednik Izvršnogodbora Piraeus banke

Kvalitet ostajeprimarni ciljPiraeus banke

Koji su glavni izazovi za upravljanje

bankom i koliko su se oni promenili u

godinama krize?

okom pet godina finansijske krize Piraeusbanka ne samo da je zadržala obim poslovanja

već je zabeležila i prikladan rast, uvećanje bazeklijenata i njihovog poverenja. Danas, Bankaima poslovnu mrežu koju čine 42 filijale, 600zaposlenih, razvijen sektor Piraeus Leasinga iRenta, desetine hiljada klijenata, kreditni port-olio od preko 600 miliona evra, uključujućiprekogranične kredite londonske filijale Pirae-us banke i depozite u vrednosti od preko 300miliona evra.Nakon pet godina krize, mi i dalje razvijamoBanku, imamo petogodišnji plan rasta sa kojimsmo započeli tekuću godinu. Iako je kriza uti-cala na naše poslovanje, mi uspešno poslujemoi zadovoljni smo postignutim rezultatima. Danije bilo krize, naši rezultati bi bili još bolji.

Kako je svetska ekonomska kriza

promenila bankarstvo uopšte, pa i kod

nas?

Srpska ekonomija se suočava sa posledicamaglobalne ekonomske krize, te su neophodne

hitne ekonomske mere kako bi se ubrzao rast.Po mnogim pokazateljima, 2014. će biti neštobolja nego prethodna godina, ali su izgledi idalje skromni.Srpski bankarski sektor je konkurentan, sa ve-likim brojem banaka, te je realno očekivati nje-govu konsolidaciju u budućnosti.Proces konsolidacije je već započeo i primetno

je da banke predano rade na unutrašnjoj re-organizaciji koja treba da doprinese poboljša-nju operativnosti, smanjenju troškova i, što je







Te objective o all competitors operating on thelocal market is to provide a compact service thatwill make the difference between institutions in theuture,as opposed to pricing policy, which has beenthe case so ar.

What are the main challenges facing the Serbi-

an banking sector?

Te main challenge or the Serbian banking sectoris the high level o non-perorming loans. Almostevery third corporate loan is currently non-peror-ming. Tis doesn’t mean that we are in jeopardy, asbanks have enough capital to cover potential losses.

Te result o such a situation is stagnation in borro-wing and too much potential money or investmentending up trapped in banks’ balance sheets.All partners exercise caution when it comes to newplacements. While the banking sector is trying toreduce the number o NPLs, we are witnessing in-creased caution among citizens when it comes toborrowing, as well as caution among companieswhen it comes to new investments.Te priority o Piraeus Bank is to solve the issue oover indebted clients, as provisions or risky place-

najvažnije, još boljoj usluzi. Cilj je kompaktnausluga koja će ubuduće praviti razliku izmeđubanaka, umesto cenovne politike što je bio slu-čaj do sada.


u Srbiji?

Najveći izazov domaćem bankarskom sektoru jeste visok nivo nenaplativih kredita. Uprkosčinjenici da je skoro svaki treći kredit privre-di problematičan, ne znači da bankama pretiopasnost budući da imaju dovoljno kapitalaza pokrivanje eventualnih gubitaka. Rezultat

ovakvog stanja je stagnacija u kreditnom za-duživanju i suviše potencijalnog novca za inve-sticije zarobljenog u bilansima banaka.Obazrivost po pitanju novih plasmana prisut-na je kod svih partnera. Dok bankarski sektornastoji da smanji broj nenaplativih kredita,primetna je pojačana obazrivost građana uzaduživanju, kao i oprez preduzeća u pogledunovih ulaganja.Prioritet Piraeus banke jeste rešavanje pro-blema prezaduženih klijenata, s obzirom na




ments limit the possibility o investing in projectsthat have potential. We exert maximum effort tofind the most acceptable solution through part-nership, either through the restructuring or resc-heduling o obligations.

What is the role of banks in Serbia’s econom-ic recovery?

o recognise and support good business projects.At Piraeus Bank we are interested in investmentsin inrastructure, agriculture, energy and SMEs.We have great ambitions to participate in the de-

velopment o the SME sector and our plan is toincrease crediting with avourable conditions andoffer new banking services.In this regard, our SME platorm was upgraded re-cently. We made a wide range o products availableto our clients, covering their business needs, fle-

xibility and competitive rates concerning loan in-terest rates, ees and commissions, other productsand, o course, deposits.It is important to underline that we were the firstbank on the market to provide e-banking servicesto corporate clients or the payment o electronicinvoices. However, we have not exhausted our e-orts or urther improvement.

To what extent and in which ways have

relations between banks and clients

changed in the last 10 years?

Te new digital era, and the continuously chan-ging behaviour o customers, requires that banksadjust the way they operate. ransactions can beperormed through alternative channels, mostlyinternet and mobile. Customers in our country getmore and more amiliar with online and mobiletechnology every day. It is just a matter o timeuntil the majority o simple transactions, such asutility payments or money transers, will be rea-lised through a computer screen and/or a mobilephone, simply because it is much more convenient

that way.Te emphasis has shifed rom a bank branchbeing a transactional point to it becoming anadvisory point. At Piraeus Bank we are aimingto gradually transorm our branches into advi-sory points where our customers can receiveproper advice, expert opinions and personalattention, as well as having a one-stop-shoppossibility and, ultimately, the eeling that theirimportance is recognised.

to da rezervacije za rizične plasmane limiti-raju mogućnost investiranja u projekte kojiimaju potencijal. Ulažemo maksimalne na-pore da kroz partnerstvo pronađemo najpri-hvatljivije rešenje, ili kroz restrukturiranje ilireprogram obaveza.


oporavku Srbije?

Uloga je prepoznavanje i puna podrška do-brim poslovnim projektima. Piraeus banka jezainteresovana za investicije u oblastima in-rastrukture, poljoprivrede, energetike i malai srednja preduzeća. Imamo velike ambicije zaučešće u razvoju sektora male privrede. Našplan je da u ovom domenu povećamo kredi-tiranje sa povoljnim uslovima i nastavimo sastalnim usavršavanjem ponude.

U tom smislu Banka je nedavno unapredilaplatormu za MSP. Klijentima smo stavili naraspolaganje široku lepezu proizvoda koji po-krivaju njihove poslovne potrebe, fleksibilnosti konkurentne tarie u pogledu kamatnih stopai provizija za kredite, ostalih proizvoda i, na-ravno, za depozite.Važno je istaći da smo pravnim licima prviomogućili e-banking za plaćanje elektronskihaktura. Ovim naši napori za daljim usavršava-njem nisu završeni.

Koliko i na koji način se promenio odnos

banke i klijenta u poslednjih deset

godina?

Nova digitalna era i stalno promenljive po-trebe klijenata zahtevaju od banke da prilago-di način poslovanja svojih filijala. ransakcijese mogu jednostavno obavljati putem alterna-tivnih kanala, interneta i mobilnih teleona.Klijenti svakodnevno napreduju u savladavan-

ju online i mobilnih tehnologija. Pitanje je vre-mena kada će se većina jednostavnih transak-

cija realizovati elektronskim putem, pre svegazbog komora korisnika.Akcenat je pomeren sa ilijale kao transak-cione tačke na njenu savetodavnu unkciju.Piraeus banka teži postepenoj transormacijiilijala ka savetodavnom centru koji je ospos-obljen da pruži ekspertsko mišljenje i person-alizovanu uslugu, da se posao završi jednimdolaskom u ilijalu i da pritom klijent prepoz-na svoj značaj za Banku.




AIK banka a.d. Niš

Aim - to

create thestrongestdomesticprivate bank

AIK Banka AD Niš is a domestic bank thathas been present on the financial market formore than two decades. Founded in 1976 as

an internal bank of Agroindustrijski Combine Niš, it joined the open market in 1993. Te bank achieveda milestone in operations in 1995, following changesin the ownership structure to a joint-stock company.Tat year the shares of the bank became the propertyof individual and institutional domestic and foreignshareholders, while today its shares are among themost liquid traded on the Belgrade Stock Exchange.AIK Bank is at the very top of the domestic bankingmarket according to all major financial parameters. In2013 the Bank realised total profits of 1.23 billion di-nars, which led to the strengthening of capital adequa-cy and shareholder value. A significant share of liquidassets in total assets has ensured a high level of secu-

rity, which customers rewarded with confidence andthe continued holding of savings deposits with AIK.AIK Bank’s basic comparative advantages are precise-ly its excellent basic financial performance indicatorswhich, in addition to providing security to all custom-ers of the bank, leave plenty of room for developmentand the further expansion of additionally diversifiedsources of funding.Retaining flexibility in operations, sales managementand establishing high standards of risk managementremain the main principles upon which the business

AIK banka a.d. Niš

Cilj - kreiranje

najjačedomaćeprivatnebanke

AIK banka A.D. Niš je domaća banka prisutnana finansijskom tržištu više od dve decenije.Osnovana je 1976. godine kao interna banka

Agroindustrijskog kombinata Niš, a na otvoreno tr-žište je izašla 1993. godine. Prekretnica u poslovanjuBanke bila je 1995. godine, usled promene vlasničkestrukture u akcionarsko društvo. e godine akcijeBanke su postale vlasništvo pojedinačnih i institu-cionalnih domaćih i stranih akcionara, a danas sumeđu najlikvidnijim hartijama od vrednosti kojimase trguje na Beogradskoj berzi.AIK banka je u samom vrhu domaćeg bankarskogtržišta po svim ključnim finansijskim parametrima.U 2013. godini, Banka je ostvarila ukupnu dobit od1,23 milijarde dinara, što je vodilo jačanju kapitalneadekvatnosti i vrednosti za akcionare. Značajno uče-šće likvidnih sredstava u ukupnoj aktivi je obezbe-

dilo visoki stepen sigurnosti, što su klijenti nagradilipoverenjem i zadržavanjem štednih uloga u Banci.Osnovna komparativna prednost AIK banke suupravo odlični bazični finansijski pokazatelji poslovanja, koji pored toga što pružaju sigurnost svim klijentima Banke, ostavljaju dovoljno prostora za razvoji dalju ekspanziju dodatnih diversifikovanih izvorafinansiranja.Zadržavanje fleksibilnosti u poslovanju, upravljanjeprodajom i uspostavljanje visokih standarda upravljanja rizicima ostaju glavni principi na kojima se




system is built. All this is done with the aim of creat-ing the strongest domestic private bank, with superiorquality services, flexible access to markets and clients,as well as the positive perception of all internal and ex-ternal stakeholders.Chairman of the Management Board of AIK Bank isMiodrag Kostić, while the Executive Board is headedby Vladimir Čupić.

gradi sistem poslovanja. Sve to sa ciljem kreiranjanajjače domaće privatne banke superiornog kvalitetausluga, sa fleksibilnim pristupom tržištu i klijentimai pozitivnom percepcijom za sve interne i eksternestejkholdere.Predsednik Upravnog odbora AIK banke jeMiodrag Kostić, a na čelu Izvršnog odbora jeVladimir Čupić.




Eurobank a.d. Belgrade

Responsible

partnerEurobank has been doing business in Serbia suc-cessfully since March 2003 and is one of the leadingforeign investors in the country and systemic bankson the market, as well as being a reliable partner toits clients, regulators, the local community and soci-ety in general.

For more than a decade of doing business in Serbia,Eurobank, together with its related companies, of-fers a wide range of standard and innovative bank-ing products and services via its business networkof 100 branches and corporate business centreswith more than 1,500 employees servicing 500,000accounts of businesses and individuals. Eurobankhas proven its strategic determination to do busi-ness on the Serbian market with its ownership ofa modern office building in central Belgrade, theEurobank Centre, as well as 16,000 square metresof office space across the country, in the most at-tractive locations.Considering the unfavourable economic environ-ment and numerous challenges in the previousyears, Eurobank has achieved excellent business re-sults and managed to maintain profitability duringthe crisis, while additionally strengthening its posi-tion in terms of capital and liquidity. Moreover, thebank’s client deposits are constantly on the rise.Since its establishment in Serbia, the bank has main-tained successful cooperation with international fi-nancial institutions and finances part of its lending

from these sources. It is precisely thanks to its strongposition and cooperation with international finan-cial institutions that Eurobank won the award for thebest partnership in the emerging countries for 2013,awarded by the International Finance Corporation,which is a member of the World Bank Group. As themost active bank in this field, Eurobank has earnedthis prestigious award as a result of activities to sup-port the import/export activities of Serbian compa-nies. Additionally, Eurobank has been rewarded byCommerzbank for its exceptional results in the area

Eurobank a.d. Beograd

Odgovoran

partnerEurobank a.d. Beograd sa uspehom u Srbijiposluje od marta 2003. godine, među vodećim je stranim investitorima u zemlji i predstavljasistemsku banku na tržištu, koja je pouzdanpartner svojim klijentima, regulatorima, lokal-noj zajednici i društvu uopšte. okom više od

decenije poslovanja u Srbiji, Eurobank, zajednosa svojim povezanim kompanijama, nudi širokspektar standardnih i inovativnih bankarskihproizvoda i usluga preko poslovne mreže od100 ekspozitura i centara za rad sa privredom,u kojima više od 1.500 zaposlenih servisira500.000 računa fizičkih i pravnih lica. Svojestrateško opredeljenje ka tržištu Srbije, Euro-bank je pokazala i vlasništvom nad modernomposlovnom zgradom u srcu Beograda „Euro-bank centrom“, kao i 16.000 kvadratnih metaraposlovnog prostora širom zemlje, na najatrak-tivnijim lokacijama.Imajući na umu nepovoljno ekonomsko okruže-nje i brojne izazove u proteklim godinama, Euro-bank je ostvarila izuzetne rezultate u poslovanju,uspevajući da zadrži profitabilnost tokom čitavekrize i dodatno ojača poziciju u pogledu kapitalai likvidnosti. akođe, depoziti klijenata Banke suu konstantnom porastu. Banka od svog osniva-nja u Srbiji održava uspešnu saradnju sa među-narodnim finansijskim institucijama i deo svojihplasmana finansira iz ovih izvora. Upravo zahva-

ljujući snažnoj poziciji i saradnji sa međunarod-nim finansijskim institucijama, Banka je osvojilanagradu za najbolje partnerstvo u zemljama urazvoju za 2013. godinu, dodeljenu od Interna-cionalne finansijske korporacije, članice Svetskebanke. Kao najaktivnija banka na ovom polju,Eurobank je aktivnostima usmerenim ka podr-žavanju uvozno-izvoznih aktivnosti preduzeća izSrbije zaslužila ovu prestižnu nagradu. akođe,Eurobank je nagrađena od strane Commerzbankza izvanredne rezultate na polju unapređenja




of improving service segments related to paymenttransactions and financial transfers, as well as Mas-terCard’s Data Integrity Award.Te achieving of financial results and gaining of oneof the leading positions in the banking sector havedeveloped simultaneously with care for employeesand continuous improvement of relations with allstakeholders – clients, shareholders and the socialcommunity as a whole.Always guided by a desire to include CSR activitiesas an integral part of its identity, in 2013 Eurobankwon the prestigious VIRUS Award for its contribu-tion to the local community, in the form of the “BigHeart” project. Tis project achieved significant re-sults in 2013, with 21 playgrounds in kindergartensacross Serbia having so far been renovated within

the framework of this project, thanks to the morethan 22,000 beneficiaries of the “Big Heart” Master-Card affinity card. Eurobank, the Serbian Academyof Science and Arts (SANU) and the Inclusive Soci-ety Development Centre Society (CRID) have joint-ly implemented the “Art for All” project with an aimof adapting SANU’s gallery space to meet the needsof persons with disabilities, which is the first projectof its kind in this part of Europe.Eurobank is continuing its long-standing efforts toimplement different initiatives and programmes in

segmenta usluga platnog prometa i finansijskihtransfera, kao i Data Integrity Award, dodeljenod MasterCard.Ostvareni finansijski rezultati i jedna od vodećihpozicija u bankarskom sektoru razvijali su se pa-ralelno sa brigom o zaposlenima i kontinuiranimunapređenjem odnosa prema svim stejkholde-rima - klijentima, akcionarima i ukupnoj dru-štvenoj zajednici. Uvek težeći da korporativnudruštvenu odgovornost postavi za integralni deoidentiteta, Eurobank je u 2013. godini nagrađenanajznačajnijom nagradom VIRUS za doprinoslokalnoj zajednici, za projekt „Veliko srce“. Pro- jekat „Veliko srce“ zabeležio je značajne rezultatetokom 2013. godine i u okviru njega je do sadaobnovljeno 21 igralište u vrtićima širom Srbije,

zahvaljujući više od 22.000 klijenata koji koristeVeliko srce MasterCard. Eurobank, Srpska aka-demija nauka i umetnosti (SANU) i Centar zarazvoj inkluzivnog društva (CRID) realizovali suprojekat „Umetnost za SVE“, sa ciljem prilagođa- vanja galerijskog prostora Akademije osobamasa invaliditetom, što predstavlja prvi projekat ove vrste u ovom delu Evrope.Eurobank nastavlja sa dugoročnim naporimakako bi realizovala različite inicijative i progra-me u ključnim oblastima kao što su: socijalna




key areas, such as social inclusion, education, envi-ronmental protection, culture and healthcare. Tebank invested more than €4 million in the previousperiod via its comprehensive CSR programme “Weinvest in European values”.Eurobank is the first financial institution in Serbia towin the “CSR Champion” certificate for responsiblebusiness, which was awarded by the National Alli-ance for Local Economic Development (NALED) inOctober 2012. Te aim of this programme is to setstandards for corporate social responsibility in Ser-

bia, recognise and promote best practice examplesand thus encourage others to embrace responsiblebusiness practices.Furthermore, Eurobank is also the winner of themost prestigious acknowledgments in the CSRsegment, such as the national VIRUS Award andthe Best of Serbia Award of the Serbian Chamberof Commerce and the Association of EconomicJournalists. Te Bank has also won the My ChoiceAward in the category of social inclusion and envi-ronmental protection.

inkluzija, obrazovanje, zaštita životne sredine,kultura i zdravstvo. Kroz sveobuhvatni programkorporativne društvene odgovornosti, pod nazi- vom „Investiramo u evropske vrednosti“, Banka je uložila više od četiri miliona evra u prethod-nom periodu.Eurobank je prva finansijska institucija u Srbi- ji koja je oktobra 2012. godine dobila sertifikat„Šampion društvene odgovornosti“ za odgovor-no poslovanje, od Nacionalne alijanse za lokal-ni ekonomski razvoj. Cilj ovog programa je da

postavi standarde korporativne odgovornostiu Srbiji, prepozna i promoviše primere najboljeprakse i na taj način podstakne druge da usvojeodgovorno poslovanje.Pored toga, Eurobank je i nosilac najprestižnijihpriznanja u oblasti društveno odgovornog poslovanja, poput nacionalne nagrade „Virtus“, Najbo-lje iz Srbije“, Privredne komore Srbije i Udruže-nja ekonomskih novinara. Banka je nagrađena inagradom „Moj izbor“ u kategoriji socijalne in-kluzije i zaštite životne sredine.




JUBMES Bank a.d. Belgrade

Accessibility

andinnovation inbusinessJUBMES Bank a.d. Belgrade has a tradition ofbanking operations and providing banking servic-es that dates back more than 30 years. Founded in

1979 as a specialised financial institution for refi-nancing medium- and long-term export transac-tions and insuring export against non-commercialrisks, it is the legal successor of the Fund for the In-surance and Finance of Export ransactions, whichwas founded in 1967.As a national export credit agency, the bank was au-thorised to organize and encourage the participationof Yugoslavian enterprises in the implementation ofprojects abroad which included the financing of in-ternational and regional development finance insti-tutions (World Bank, Inter-American DevelopmentBank, African Development Bank, European Bankfor reconstruction and Development, InternationalFinance Corporation and others).During 1997 the bank was transformed into acommercial bank and, in accordance with the law,received a permit to perform all banking and fi-nancial services, according to which is performs alltypes of deposit and credit services for registeredcompanies and individuals in local and foreign cur-rencies, payment system operations in the countryand abroad, issuing guarantees, sureties and other

forms of guarantees, the purchase and sale of secu-rities and other banking operations.oday the bank operates as a modern market ori-entated and competitively profiled financial institu-tion of a universal character, which has a businessstrategy focused on contemporary forms of bank-ing operations with a high degree of adaptabilityand efficiency in relation to the demands of themarket and clients.Te bank offers a wide range of comprehensivefinancial services and high-quality standardised

JUBMES banka a. d. Beograd

Pristupačnost

i inovativnostu poslovanju

JUBMES banka a. d. Beograd ima tradiciju ban-karskog poslovanja i pružanja bankarskih usluga više od 30 godina. Osnovana je 1979. godine, kao

specijalizovana finansijska institucija za refinansi-ranje srednjoročnih i dugoročnih izvoznih poslova i osiguranja izvoza od nekomercijalnih rizika ipravni je sledbenik Fonda za osiguranje i krediti-ranje izvoznih poslova, osnovanog 1967. godine.Kao nacionalna izvozno-kreditna agencija, Banka je bila ovlašćena da organizuje i podstiče učešće jugoslovenskih preduzeća u realizaciji projekata uinostranstvu, u čijem su finansiranju učestvovalemeđunarodne i regionalne razvojne finansijskeinstitucije (Svetska banka, Interamerička banka zarazvoj, Afrička banka za razvoj, Evropska bankaza obnovu i razvoj, Međunarodna finansijska kor-poracija i druge).okom 1997. godine Banka je transformisana ukomercijalnu banku i u skladu sa zakonom, imadozvolu za obavljanje svih bankarskih i finansij-skih usluga, te obavlja sve vrste depozitnih i kre-ditnih poslova za pravna i fizička lica u domaćoji stranoj valuti, poslove platnog prometa u zemljii inostranstvu, izdavanje garancija, avala i drugihoblika jemstava, kupoprodaje vrednosnih papira idrugih bankarskih poslova.

Danas Banka posluje kao moderna tržišno pozici-onirana i konkurentski profilisana finansijska in-stitucija univerzalnog karaktera, koja je svojom po-slovnom strategijom usmerena na savremene oblikebankarskog poslovanja uz visok stepen adaptilnostii efikasnosti u odnosu na zahteve tržišta i klijenata.Širok spektar celovitih finansijskih usluga, odno-sno visokokvalitetnih standardizovanih proizvo-da, Banka nudi na celoj teritoriji države, putemtradicionalnih, mobilnih i direktnih distributiv-nih kanala.




products throughout the country, through tradi-tional, mobile and direct distribution channels.One of the main pillars of the bank’s business strat-egy is its accessibility and innovation in business,with employees orientated towards customers andunique and efficient processes and technologies.Responding to the challenges of a dynamic and in-creasingly competitive financial market, JUBMEScontinuously improves its offer in the field ofe-banking, as well as updating its modern prod-ucts and investment banking services, paying spe-cial attention to the development of products andservices tailored to the needs of the target groupof corporate clients and, in particular, products offinancial support for export operations. Namely,thanks to its history, this bank is particularly spe-

cialised in the business of supporting exports andenjoys a high business rating abroad, which is sup-ported by established correspondent relations withleading international banks. Additionally, JUBMESalso specialises in providing expert technical assis-tance in the area of collecting commercial claims ofdomestic creditors from foreign debtors.Such an orientation simultaneously implies a highlevel of development and the implementation ofmodern systems of control of procedures andrisk management, profiled personnel, as well as

Jedan od glavnih oslonaca poslovne strategijeBanke je njena pristupačnost i inovativnost u po-slovanju, sa zaposlenima orijentisanim prema klijentima, te jedinstvenim i efikasnim procesima itehnologijama.Odgovarajući na izazove dinamičnog i sve kon-kurentnijeg finansijskog tržišta, Banka kontinu-irano unapređuje svoju ponudu u oblasti elek-tronskog bankarstva, kao i savremenih proizvodai usluga investicionog bankarstva, pri čemu seposebna pažnja posvećuje razvoju proizvodai usluga prilagođenih potrebama ciljne grupekorporativnih klijenata, a naročito proizvodafinansijske podrške izvoznim poslovima. Nai-me, zahvaljujući svojoj istoriji, Banka je naročitospecijalizovana za poslove podrške izvozu i ima

visok poslovni rejting u inostranstvu, čemu uprilog govore i uspostavljeni korespondentskiodnosi sa vodećim svetskim bankama. Poredtoga, Banka je specijalizovana i za pružanje ek-spertsko-tehničke pomoći u domenu naplate ko-mercijalnih potraživanja domaćih poverilaca odinostranih dužnika.Ovakva orijentacija podrazumeva, istovremeno, visok stepen razvoja i implementacije savremenihsistema i procedura kontrole i upravljanja rizici-ma, profilisane kadrove, kao i primenu savreme-




the application of contemporary information andtelecommunication systems to support businessoperations.Te bank continuously records growth in the vol-ume of activity, measured by the amount of totalassets, with which all indicators of the bank’s opera-tions are in compliance with the Law on Banks andOther Financial Institutions.Te bank’s aim in the coming period is to be astrong and reliable Serbian bank, equally attrac-tive to shareholders, customers and employees.JUBMES bases its future on real possibilities, itsown strengths and the expert knowledge of em-ployees.With awareness that business success is measuredequally with activities in the area of corporate so-

cial responsibility, in March 2008 the bank joinedthe UN Global Compact with the aim of promotingthe CSR concept.JUBMES Bank demonstrates social responsibilitythrough several segments of activity - care for em-ployees and investing in their training and devel-opment, transparent operations and availability toclients, as well as active involvement in improvingthe quality of life of the social community in whichit operates, supporting various projects of humani-tarian, cultural and sporting institutions.

nog informaciono-telekomunikacionog sistemapodrške poslovnim operacijama.Banka kontinuirano beleži rast obima poslovneaktivnosti, meren iznosom bilansne sume, pričemu su svi pokazatelji poslovanja Banke usklađe-ni sa Zakonom o bankama i drugim finansijskimorganizacijama.Cilj poslovanja Banke u narednom periodu je dabude snažna i pouzdana srpska banka, podjedna-ko privlačna akcionarima, klijentima i zaposleni-ma. Svoju budućnost Banka temelji na realnimmogućnostima, vlastitim snagama i stručnomznanju zaposlenih.Svesna da se uspeh u poslovanju meri jednako iaktivnostima u segmentu društvene odgovorno-sti, s ciljem promovisanja koncepta korporativne

odgovornosti prema društvu, Banka je, martameseca 2008. godine, pristupila Globalnom do-govoru UN.Banka iskazuje društvenu odgovornost kroz ne-koliko segmenata delovanja - brigom za zaposle-ne i ulaganjem u njihovo osposobljavanje i razvoj,transparentnim poslovanjem i dostupnošću klijentima, kao i aktivnim angažovanjem na unapre-đenju kvaliteta života društvene zajednice u kojojposluje, podržavajući različite projekte humani-tarnih, kulturnih i sportskih institucija.




Vlaimir Zečar, Chairmanof the Executive Board ofVB Bank a. d. Belgrade

Banking willbe much moreconservative

In your opinion, in which way has the

Serbian banking system changed in the last

ten years?

Te biggest change was experienced by the Ser-bian banking system in the first half of the year2000, with the entry of foreign capital. Tat led tonumerous changes and the improvement of riskmanagement systems, as well as increasing the ca-pital of the banking system, which led to a signifi-cant increase in lending activity in the period upuntil 2008/2009.

From 2009 the Serbian banking sector was influ-enced by the consequences of the global econo-mic crisis, which has led to a situation in recentyears where banks are facing significant growthin non-performing loans. Te good thing is

Vlaimir Zečar, predsednikIzvršnog odbora VB banke a.d.Beograd

Bankarstvoće biti znatnokonzervativnije




Najveću promenu bankarski sistem Republi-ke Srbije doživeo je u prvoj polovini 2000. go-dine, ulaskom stranog kapitala. o je dovelo domnogobrojnih promena i unapređenja sistemaupravljanja rizicima, kao i uvećanja kapitalabankarskog sistema, što je vodilo ka značajnompovećanju kreditne aktivnosti u periodu do2008/2009. godine.

Od 2009. godine na bankarski sektor RepublikeSrbije uticale su posledice globalne ekonomskekrize, što je dovelo do situacije da se poslednjihgodina banke suočavaju sa značajnim rastomloših plasmana. Dobra stvar je što domaće ban-

VTB BANK AD BELGRADE,A MEMBER OF VTB GROUP,OFFICIALLY STARTED ITSOPERATIONS IN SERBIA IN

SEPTEMBER 2013, AFTER THETAKEOVER OF MOSKOVSKABANK AD BELGRADE

VTB BANKA AD BEOGRAD,ČLANICA VTB GRUPE, SAZVANIČNIM POSLOVANJEMU SRBIJI ZAPOČELA JE U

SEPTEMBRU 2013. GODINE,NAKON PREUZIMANJAMOSKOVSKE BANKE AD BEOGRAD




that domestic banks enjoy the support of parentbanks, which see the Serbian market as being im-portant for their business in the future and, assuch, allow an easier passage through the crisisperiod. Another factor that should be pointedout is that in the previous period the Serbianbanking system also reached greater concentra-tion of assets in banks with foreign capital, com-

pared with the previous period.


future?

Based on experience from previous years, and inthe context of the current crisis, I think bankingwill be much more conservative. Having saidthat, I expect many banks to focus much more onfollowing and financing transactions, as opposedto the previous period when the emphasis was onthe allocation of funding for working capital.

ke uživaju u podršci matičnih banaka, koje videtržište Republike Srbije kao bitno za njihovo po-slovanje u budućnosti i samim tim omogućavajulakši prolazak kroz krizni period. Ono što bi joštrebalo istaći jeste da je u prethodnom periodu ubankarskom sistemu došlo i do veće koncentracijeaktive na banke sa stranim kapitalom, u poređenjusa prethodnim periodom.

Kako će bankarski posao izgledati u

budućnosti?

Na osnovu iskustva iz prethodnih godina, a ukontekstu aktuelne krize, mislim da će ban-karstvo biti znatno konzervativnije. Kada tokažem, očekujem da će se banke mnogo višefokusirati na praćenje, odnosno kreditiranjetransakcija, za razliku od prethodnog periodau kome je akcenat bio na odobravanju sredsta-

va za obrtni kapital.




What are the main challenges for the

banking system in Serbia?

In the next few years the focus will be on mo-nitoring and restructuring NPLs, with a view tothe recovery of the operations of businesses andreturning operating conditions to normal, thro-

ugh the reduction of so-called price risks. Bankswill also turn towards the optimisation of theirown costs in order to improve profitability for thesector itself in the medium term (for example, byclosing unprofitable branches etc.).


recovery of Serbia?Te role of banks in Serbia’s economic recoveryis very important. Tere is no doubt that wit-hout credit activity the monetary mass reduces,and that directly pressures economic growth

downwards.Tere is a current demand for funds from creditand that is not in dispute. Te problem is on theside of price and other conditions that the ban-king system can offer considering the dramatic


u Srbiji?

U narednih nekoliko godina fokus će biti napraćenju i restrukturiranju loših plasmana,a sve u cilju oporavka poslovanja preduzeća i

vraćanja na normalne uslove poslovanja, od-

nosno smanjenje tzv. cene rizika. Banke će seokrenuti i optimalizaciji sopstvenih troškovau cilju poboljšanja profitabilnosti u srednjemroku samog sektora (npr. zatvaranje neprofita-bilnih filijala itd).


oporavku Srbije?

Uloga banaka u privrednom oporavku Srbije je veoma značajna. Nesporno je da se bez kredit-ne aktivnosti smanjuje monetarna masa, a todirektno pritiska nadole privredni rast.

Potražnja za kreditnim sredstvima je aktuelnai ona nikako nije sporna. Problem se nalazi nastrani cene i drugih uslova koje bankarski si-stem može da ponudi s obzirom na dramatičanrast loših plasmana tokom proteklih nekoli-

Vladimir Zečar se od septembra 2013. godine nalazi na poziciji predsednika Izvršnog odboraVTB banke a. d. Beograd. Prethodno iskustvo obuhvata period od pet godina na istoj pozicijiu Moskovskoj banci a. d. Beograd, prvoj ruskoj banci u Srbiji, kao i prvoj grinfild investiciji uposlednjih sedam godina u bankarskom sistemu Srbije, u čijem osnivanju uzima aktivno učešće.Na poziciji direktora Sektora poslovanja sa privredom u Piraeus banci nalazio se pet godina

(2003-2008), a u to vreme je bio i član Višeg kreditnog odbora banke. Prva radna iskustva stičeu Jugoimportu gde je radio na poziciji zamenika finansijskog direktora u periodu od 1997. do2003.Pored toga što je bio predsednik Upravnog odbora PMC Inženjering d.o.o. u periodu 2002-2003. bio je i član Upravnog odbora Kopaonik osiguranja a.d, a u periodu 2004-2005. članUpravnog odbora Ekonomija a. d.Diplomirao je biznis i finansije na fakultetu Queen Mary and Westfield College londonskoguniverziteta. Deo studija provodi na milanskom Bokoniju, usavršavajući se na Fakultetu zainternacionalnu ekonomiju i menadžment, smer - novac, bankarstvo i finansije.

KOMBINACIJOM EVROPSKIhSTANDARDA, ISKUSNIHdOMAćIh STRUČNJAKA IRUSKOG KAPITALA, VTB BANKAAd BEOGRAd PREdSTAVLJA SE

dOMAćEM TRžIšTU SAVREMENIMPRISTUPOM BANKARSKOMPOSLOVANJU

WITH A COMBINATION OFEUROPEAN STANDARDS,EXPERIENCED LOCAL EXPERTSAND RUSSIAN CAPITAL, VTBBANK A.D. BELGRADE PRESENTS

THE DOMESTIC MARKET WITH AMODERN APPROACH TO BANKINGOPERATIONS.




increase in NPLs over the past few years. Whatis essential is to enable the banking sector to re-structure NPLs with companies that can recoverwith a minimum burden on the capital of thebanking sector, which would enable banks to la-unch a new lending cycle.

ko godina. Ono što je neophodno, to je da seomogući bankarskom sektoru da restrukturiraloše plasmane kod preduzeća koja mogu da seoporave sa što manjim teretom po kapital ban-karskog sektora, što bi omogućilo da banke za-počnu novi ciklus kreditiranja.

Vladimir Zečar has held the position of Chairman of the Executive Board of VTB Bank a.d. Belgradesince September 2013. His previous experience includes a five-year period in the same position atthe Bank of Moscow a.d. Belgrade, the first Russian bank in Serbia, as well as the first greenfield investment in the Serbian banking system in the last seven years, the establishment of which it takes anactive part in.He spent five years (2003-2008) as head of the corporate banking sector at Piraeus Bank and during

that time was a member of the bank’s Higher Loan Board. He gained his first working experience atYugoimport, where he held the position of deputy financial director in the period from 1997 to 2003.In addition to being chairman of the management board of PMC Inženjering (Engineering) d.o.o.,in the 2002-2003 period he was also a member of the management board of Kopaonik osiguranje(insurance) a.d. and in the 2004-2005 period he was a member of the management board of companyEkonomija a.d.He graduated in business and finance at the Queen Mary University of London and Westfield CollegeUniversity of London. He spent part of his studies at Milan’s Bocconi, perfecting his training at theFaculty for International Economics and Management, department of money, banking and finance.




To what extent has the awareness of Serbian

citizens changed so that they recognise

the need for insurance, or do we still only

remember it during crises?

Insurance premium in Serbian market is lessthan 2% o GDP among the lowest in the Re-gion. Each Serbian customer spent or insurancepolicies an average o 110 euro in 2013. Tis isbecause o lack o insurance culture. Tree yearsago I said that with one ” espresso” per day youcould buy an insurance policy to protect valueo your house. Nobody paid attention and now, afer recent catastrophic flood, people is des-perate. Only 3% o Serbian houses are protectedagainst natural catastrophes. It is a pity we re-mind importance o insurance only afer somesad event occurs.

What are the effects of the recent economic

crisis on the activities of insurance

companies?

Only motor vehicle liability insurance is a compulsoryinsurance, so whatever is not compulsory can be re-moved rom the amily budget. Te Non-Lie markethad 0.7% growth in 2013 and that speaks or itsel.Large companies, individuals, everybody tries to savemoney by reducing coverage or cutting policies. Telie insurance market seems to be less affected, due tothe aggressive products launched by major companies.

Koliko se u Srbiji menja svest građana da im jeosiguranje potrebno, ili se još uvek toga setimo

u kriznim situacijama?

Premija osiguranja na srpskom tržištu učestvuje samanje od dva odsto u BDP-u i među najnižim jeu regionu. Svaki klijent u Srbiji potrošio je u 2013.godini u proseku 110 evra na polise osiguranja. o je posledica nedostatka kulture osiguranja. Pre trigodine sam rekao da se po ceni jedne espreso kaednevno može kupiti polisa osiguranja kojom bi sezaštitila vrednost sopstvene kuće. Niko nije obratiopažnju na to, a sada, nakon nedavnih katastroalnihpoplava, ljudi su očajni. Samo tri odsto kuća u Srbiji je osigurano od prirodnih katastroa. Šteta je što naznačaj osiguranja podsećamo tek kada se neki tužnidogađaji već dogode.

Koliko je kriza poslednjih godina uticala na rad

osiguravajućih kuća?Auto-odgovornost je jedino obavezno osiguranje,pa sve što nije obavezno može biti izbrisano iz po-rodičnog budžeta. ržište neživotnog osiguranja je poraslo za 0,7% u 2013. godini, što dovoljnogovori samo za sebe. Velike kompanije, pojedinci,svi pokušavaju da uštede novac tako što smanjujupokrića ili broj polisa osiguranja. Čini se da je tr-žište životnog osiguranja manje pogođeno, zahva-ljujući agresivnim proizvodima koje su lansirale vodeće kompanije.

Andrea Simončeli, predsedniki generalni direktor Generaliosiguranja

akmičarimorajupoštovati istapravila

Andrea Simoncelli, President andCEO o Generali Insurance

Competitorsmust respectthe samerules




Is Generali Osiguranje Srbija satisfed withoperations in Serbia?

Yes, even though we were expecting a highergrowth rate. Generali Group’s recent acquisition oull control o Delta – Generali, with the rebrand-ing process to Generali Osiguranie Serbia having just started, confirms willingness o Generali’sshareholdersto invest in Serbia and contribute toits uture development.

What novelties will the new insurance law

introduce and how will the liberalisation of

reinusance market affect the performance of

local companies?

Te Draf Insurance law will introduce importantchanges to our business, bringing the Serbian in-

surance market even closer to the European one.Te new regulations confirm market reedom, butrequire stricter methods to establish claim reservesand this will make the difference among compa-nies. A market the size o Serbia’s cannot afford tohave 25 companies, most o them undercapitalisedor without proper reserved. I am not opposed tocompetition, but competitors must respect thesame rules. Let’s have an extensive audit o com-pany reserves and liquidity ratio in order to assesswho is a reliable insurer and who is not.

Da li je Generali osiguranje zadovoljno svojim

poslovanjem u Srbiji?

Da, iako smo očekivali veću stopu rasta. Nedavnimpreuzimanjem potpune kontrole u Delta Generali- ju od strane Generali grupe, započeo je rebrendingproces kompanije u Generali osiguranje Srbija, štopotvrđuje spremnost akcionara Generali grupe dainvestiraju u Srbiju i da doprinesu njenom budu-ćem razvoju.

Koje je novine donela izmena zakona o

osiguranju i kako će liberalizacija na tržištureosiguranja uticati na poslovanje domaćihkompanija?

Nacrt zakona o osiguranju uvodi značajne prome-ne u naš biznis, približavajući još više srpsko tržište

osiguranja evropskom. Nove regulative potvrđujuslobodu tržišta, ali zahtevaju i strože metode za us-postavljanje rezervacije šteta, što će napraviti razli-ku među kompanijama. Veličina srpskog tržišta nemože priuštiti da ima 25 kompanija od kojih većinanije dovoljno kapitalizovana, ili nema pravilnu re-zervaciju. Nisam protiv konkurencije, ali takmičarimoraju poštovati ista pravila. Hajde da sprovedemotemeljnu reviziju kompanijskih rezervi i pokazateljalikvidnosti, kako bismo procenili koja je osiguravaju-ća kompanija pouzdana, a koja nije.




The overall insurance market in 2013

registered a fall, but the insurance market

resisted the crisis for the longest. Generali

Srbija still manages to maintain a good

result. In what way?

Customer service is the key success actor. Gener-ali has achieved the highest speed in paying claimson the Serbian market. Tis proves our reservesare liquid and fit or purpose to pay claims. Cus-tomers have started recognising the importance oour assets and company solvability, even thoughwe are not the cheapest on the market.

Ukupno tržište osiguranja u 2013. godini jezabeležilo pad, ali je ipak najduže odolevalokrizi. Generali još uspeva da održi dobarrezultat. Na koji način?Usluga koja se pruža klijentima je ključni aktoruspeha. Generali postiže najbržu isplatu odštet-nih zahteva na srpskom tržištu. o dokazuje dasu naše rezerve likvidne i spremne u svrhu isplateodštetnih zahteva. Klijenti počinju da prepoznaju važnost naših novčanih sredstava i sposobnostkompanije da bude solventna, i pored toga što ni-smo najjefiniji na tržištu.




How has the crisis and citizens’

reduced standard of living impacted

on the life insurance sector?

Every time there is a contraction o disposable in-come, all products not linked to ood suffer. Tecrisis impacts on our industry, but spending on

insurance is so low in Serbia that we are probablyless affected than other businesses.

What amounts do people in Serbia assign

for private health and pension insurance

and is there a potential for growth for these

sectors?

Private health is underwritten by 30,000 people, or0.4% o the Serbian population, with an annual pre-mium o 470 million dinars, or 0.9% o the insur-ance market. Tere are 185,000 Voluntary PensionFund members, or 8% o Serbian employees. Tese

numbers show how big the potential or growth isin these two lines o business. We cannot expectdrastic changes unless an appropriate fiscal incen-tive is implemented. I am not seeking tax relie, but just or a premium paid by an employer or individ-ual to be considered as a cost and not as a benefit.

Can we expect consolidation in the

insurance market?

I hope so. As I said, the Serbian market is movingtowards Europe and in European Countries weaced market consolidation where the strongestand healthiest insurance companies survive inthe interest o customers. Look what happenedduring the recent floods: hundreds o millions indamages. Which company in Serbia can affordto pay such an amount in claims? Probably nomore than two or three out o the 25 present onthe market. I once said that competition increas-es with ewer competitors that are financiallystronger. Tat is not contradictory.

What are your expectations on the insurance

market in 2014?

I am not optimistic about the second hal o2014. Te Lie market will continue to grow indouble digits, but surrenders (customers whostop paying their annual premium) are also in-creasing, while the Non-Lie market continues tobe flat. Next year I am expecting better growth,since insurance awareness is finally increasingand people are starting to recognise that insur-ance policies are not a cost but an investment.

Kako kriza i smanjeni standard građana utičuna sektor životnog osiguranja?Svaki put kada postoji smanjenje raspoloživog pri-hoda, trpe svi proizvodi koji nisu u vezi sa ishra-nom. Kriza utiče na našu industriju, ali troškoviosiguranja su toliko niski u Srbiji da je naš sektor

verovatno manje pogođen od drugih.

Koliko se danas u Srbiji izdvaja na privatno

zdravstveno i privatno penzijsko osiguranje

i da li postoji potencijal rasta ovih sektora

osiguranja?

Privatnim zdravstvenim osiguranjem je zaštićeno30.000 ljudi ili 0,4% populacije u Srbiji, sa godi-šnjom premijom od 470 miliona dinara, što čini0,9% tržišta osiguranja. Dobrovoljni penzijskiondovi imaju 185.000 članova ili 8% zaposlenihu Srbiji. Ove brojke pokazuju koliko je velik po-

tencijal za rast u ove dve oblasti poslovanja. Nemožemo očekivati drastične promene ukoliko sene primene adekvatni fiskalni podsticaji. Ne tra-žim poreske olakšice, već samo da se premija kojuplaća poslodavac ili pojedinac posmatra kao tro-šak a ne kao benefit.

Da li se može očekivati konsolidacija natržištu osiguranja?Nadam se. Kao što sam rekao, srpsko tržište sekreće ka Evropi, a u evropskim zemljama smo sesuočili sa konsolidacijom tržišta, gde najsnažnije inajzdravije osiguravajuće kompanije preživljavaju uinteresu klijenata. Pogledajte šta se dogodilo tokomnedavnih poplava. Šteta od nekoliko stotina milio-na. Koja kompanija u Srbiji može sebi da priušti daisplati toliki broj zahteva, verovatno ne više od dveili tri od ukupno 25 koliko ih je prisutno na tržištu.Jednom sam rekao da konkurencija raste sa manjeučesnika na tržištu, ali onih koji su finansijski sna-žniji. Ovo nije kontradiktornost.

Šta očekujete na tržištu osiguranja u 2014.godini?

Nisam optimista kada je u pitanju druga polovina2014. godine. ržište životnih osiguranja će nasta- vit da beleži dvocireni rast, ali rašće i broj klije-nata koji će prestati da plaćaju premiju. S drugestrane, tržište neživotnog osiguranja će stagnira-ti. Sledeće godine očekujem veći rast jer se svesto osiguranju konačno povećava i ljudi počinju dashvataju da polise osiguranja ne predstavljaju tro-šak već investiciju.




Christoph Czettl,CEO o GRAWE Insurance, Serbia

We’re

continuingthe trend ogood results

How is awareness of the need for insurancechanging among the citizens of Serbia?

The results of the research we conduct in De-cember each year with the Institute Ipsos Stra-tegic Marketing on a representative sample ofthe population aged between 30 and 65, rep-resenting a sample relating to nearly 3.6 mil-lion people, shows that the situation in termsof the presence of types of insurance has notchanged significantly in the last few years, butthat life insurance has the greatest potential,followed by insurance against accidents andproperty insurance.Te data clearly shows that the awareness o cit-izens is still orientated towards restoring theculture o insurance in our society and the ac-ceptance o innovations and advanced insuranceprogrammes, as the percentage growth in popu-larity o lie insurance totalled 38% in 2013, whilein 2012 it was 29% and around 30% in recentyears. Moreover, the latest results o this studyshowed that 21% o the population aged between30 and 65 is interested in lie insurance, while the

same percentage o the population stated theirneed or more inormation about this product.Fewer citizens are interested in insurance againstaccident and property insurance, while an evensmaller percentage recorded interest in voluntaryhealth insurance.Beside this, Grawe was positioned by respondentsas a company that records growth in the percentageo citizens that would place their trust in an insur-ance company on the market, which also highlightsthe act that more and more people are considering

Kristof Cetl, generalni direktorGRAWE osiguranja u Srbiji

Nastavljamo

trend dobrihrezultata

Koliko se u Srbiji menja svest građana da im je osiguranje potrebno?

Rezultati istraživanja, koje sprovodimo sa Insti-tutom Ipsos Strategic Marketing u decembru sva-ke godine na reprezentativnom uzorku koji činipopulacijа između 30 i 65 godina života, odno-sno koji se odnosi na skoro 3,6 miliona građana,pokazuju da se situacija po pitanju zastuplјenosti vrsta osiguranja ne menja značajno poslednjihnekoliko godina, ali da najveći potencijal imaosiguranje života, zatim osiguranje od nezgode iosiguranje imovine.Podatak koji jasno pokazuje da je svest građanaipak orijentisana na vraćanje kulture osiguranjau naše društvo i prihvatanje inovacija i napred-nih programa osiguranja jeste rast procenta po-pularnosti koje beleži osiguranje života u 2013.godini, a koji iznosi 38 odsto, dok je u 2012. tajprocenat iznosio 29 odsto i oko 30 odsto u pret-hodnim godinama. akođe, poslednji rezultatiovog istraživanja pokazali su da je za osiguranježivota zainteresovano 21 odsto pripadnika po-pulacije između 30 i 65 godina života, dok se isti

procenat građana izjasnio da im je potrebno višeinormacija o ovom proizvodu. Za osiguranje odposledica nesrećnog slučaja i osiguranje imovinezainteresovano je manje građana, dok još manjiprocenat beleži zаintеrеsоvаnоst zа dobrovolјnozdravstveno osiguranje.Pored toga, GRAWE je u odgovorima ispitanikaistaknuto kao društvo koje beleži rast procentagrađana koji bi poklonili poverenje nekom osi-guravajućem društvu na tržištu, što takođe uka-zuje na činjenicu da sve više građana razmišlja o




the need or insurance and protection o their lovedones and their property.

How satised is Grawe with its insuranceoperations in Serbia?

Grawe was the first insurance company with or-eign capital on the market o the Republic o Ser-bia and afer 17 years o operations it has enviableresults and more than 45,000 active lie insurancecontracts. Tis is an indicator o the number osatisfied clients and amilies who have placed theirtrust in Grawe insurance, which is extremely sat-isying or those o us who make up the Grawe in-surance team and provide insurance services to our

potrebi za osiguranjem i zaštitom svojih najbližihi svoje imovine.

Koliko je GRAWE osiguranje zadovoljnosvojim poslovanjem u Srbiji?

GRAWE je prvo osiguravajuće društvo sa stranimkapitalom na tržištu Republike Srbije i posle 17godina poslovanja ima zavidne rezultate i više od45.000 aktivnih ugovora o osiguranju života. o je pokazatelj broja zadovoljnih klijenta, odnosnoporodica koje su poklonile poverenje GRAWEosiguranju, pa smo stoga i mi koji činimo timGRAWE osiguranja i pružamo usluge u osigura-nju našim klijentima - izuzetno zadovoljni. Briga




clients. aking care o clients and their best interestsis one o the main tasks o Grawe insurance.In 2013 financial strength was retained regardlesso the environment and behaviour o the market,

and I would also emphasise that we have achievedremarkable success in lie insurance programmes,particularly the Grawe Invest programme, which ismore than competitive on the financial market, giv-en that the savings component means it offers high-er yields or citizens who are investing their reeunds rather than any banking product. I wouldalso note the advantage that customers already rec-ognise, and that is a system gain or all Grawe lieinsurance programmes and reserves o unds orprofit o 6% a year in advance.

o klijentima i o njihovim najboljim interesima je jedan od osnovnih zadataka GRAWE osiguranja.U 2013. godini održana je finansijska snaga bezobzira na okruženje i ponašanje tržišta, a nagla-

sio bih i da smo postigli izuzetan uspeh progra-mima osiguranja života, posebno programomGRAWE Invest, koji je više nego konkurentanna finansijskom tržištu, budući da zbog štednekomponente nudi građanima, koji ulažu svoja slobodna sredstva, veći prinos nego bilo kojibankarski proizvod. Istakao bih i prednost kojuklijenti već prepoznaju, a to je sistem dobiti kodsvih programa osiguranja života GRAWE osigu-ranja i rezervisanje sredstava za dobit u visini odšest odsto godinu dana unapred.




We will also continue the trend o good business re-sults o Grawe insurance in 2014 and the plan is alsoto expand our offer o products and recruit new staff.

How has the crisis and the lowered standards

of citizens impacted on the life insurance

sector?Tere is a high degree o correlation between incomelevels and the level o development o lie insuranceall over the world, including Serbia. It is certain thatthe development o the economy in our country andincreasing incomes among citizens will bring a sig-nificant development in the field o lie insurance.

What do you expect from the insurance marketin 2014?

In the previous period there was great interestamong national institutions in the measured pro-

posed by insurers who deal in lie insurance and theapplying o instruments that would stimulate the development o the insurance sector, and the financialmarket, because lie insurance can, primarily, be theengine or the economic development o the country.We are satisfied with results to date, because we re-ceived support and we expect the first steps aimed atstimulating investment in long-term savings. More-over, insurance companies that are engaged in lieinsurance represent institutional investors with major investment capacities that the state should use inthe best way as the highest quality long-term sourceso domestic unding. Tis would allow the financingo development, primarily in inrastructure projects,and then the creation o new jobs.One of the factors that would significantly impacton the sector’s growth and development is that of taxincentives (for citizens who pay life insurance premi-ums), which insurance companies have been advocat-ing for several years, and more flexible legal provisionswhen it comes to certain types of work engagementsthat are present in developed European countries, so Ibelieve the first steps will be taken in 2014.

O course, we have high expectations o institu-tions that are not direct proponents o the law,such as the National Bank o Serbia, which hasan extremely important role in the realisation othese ideas, as the supervising body. We expectthat in 2014 the defining and implementing omeasures that will stimulate the developmento lie insurance will bear ruit, because the development o the insurance sector implies thedevelopment o financial markets, and thus theentire economy.

rend dobrih poslovnih rezultata GRAWE osi-guranja nastavićemo i u 2014. godini, a u planu je i širenje ponude proizvoda i zapošljavanje novih kadrova.

Kako kriza i smanjeni standard građana

utiču na sektor životnog osiguranja?Postoji visok stepen korelacije između nivoa do-hotka stanovništva i stepena razvoja osiguranjaživota, svuda u svetu, pa tako i u Srbiji. Sigurno je da će razvojem privrede u našoj zemlji i pove-ćanjem dohotka stanovništva doći do značajnijegrazvoja i u oblasti osiguranja života.

Šta očekujete na tržištu osiguranja u 2014.godini?

U prethodnom periodu, interesovanje državnihinstitucija za predloge mera osiguravača koji se

bave osiguranjem života i primenu instrumenatakoji bi stimulisali razvoj sektora osiguranja, od-nosno finansijskog tržišta, bilo je veliko jer osi-guranje života, pre svega, može da bude motorrazvoja ekonomije zemlje.Zadovoljni smo dosadašnjim rezultatom jer smodobili podršku i očekujemo prve korake u ciljupodsticaja ulaganja u dugoročnu štednju. a-kođe, društva za osiguranje koja se bave život-nim osiguranjem predstavljaju institucionalneinvestitore sa velikim kapacitetima investiranja,koje država treba da iskoristi na najbolji načinkao najkvalitetnije dugoročne izvore domaćihsredstava. ime bi bilo omogućeno finansiranjerazvoja, pre svega, inrastrukturnih projekata, azatim i otvaranje novih radnih mesta.Jedan od aktora koji bi značajno uticali na rasti razvoj sektora jesu poreske olakšice (građa-nima koji uplaćuju premiju osiguranja života)za koje se društva za osiguranje zalažu već ne-koliko godina i leksibilnije zakonske odredbekada su u pitanju određeni oblici radnog anga-žovanja koji su prisutni u razvijenim zemljama

Evrope, pa verujem da će se prvi koraci napraviti u 2014. godini.Naravno, velika očekivanja imamo i od institu-cija koje nisu direktni predlagači zakona, poputNarodne banke Srbije, koja kao organ nadzoraima izuzetno važnu ulogu u realizaciji ovih ideja.Očekujem da će u 2014. godini definisanje i pre-duzimanje mera koje će stimulisati razvoj život-nog osiguranja uroditi plodom jer razvoj sektoraosiguranja podrazumeva i razvoj finansijskog tr-žišta, pa samim tim i celokupne ekonomije.




Obrad Sikimić, president o DinersClub International Belgrade

Cashless

paymentsgrowingHow do you assess the effects of development

of the credit card sector in the macroeconomic

environment in which we live and work?

Use o credit cards is a significantly stronger unc-tion than debit card payments, banks and other au-

thorized financial institutions, which contributes tomore efficient use or allocation o available unds tothose making transactions who are provided withthe unds necessary to maintain an essential level oliquidity. We can only imagine how much would beadded to the liquidity potential o the financial sectori all the cash kept by citizens in their drawers weretransormed into electronic money and thereby en-tered legal financial channels.Te development and strengthening o the unctiono credit cards contributes significantly to combattingthe grey economy, crime and improving collection opublic revenues, because credit card payments auto-matically implies the issuance o fiscal receipts.

In which direction will the credit card sector

further develop globally in the future?

Using innovative technology and the expansion oglobal providers enables the application o a widerange o electronic channels or initiating paymenttransactions, as well as the use o innovative paymentinstruments. Te boundary between credit cardsand other payment systems are easy to lose and the

emergence o new technologies opens up an entirelynew field o business and credit cards are graduallymoving rom plastic cards to mobile phone or cloudserver storage.As a result o this, in recent times the card market hasattracted, alongside credit card issuers, more ofennew entrants like mobile communications operatorsand internet companies such as Google. And evenretailers themselves participate more actively in thecreation o new products. Like many other compa-nies dealing in payment solutions, Diners Club also

Obrad Sikimić, predsednik DinersClub International Beograd

Kako ocenjujete efekte razvoja

kartičarstva u makroekonomskom

okruženju u kojem živimo i radimo?

Upotreba platnih kartica znatno jača funkcijuelektronskog novca koji se nalazi na računi-

ma nosilaca platnog prometa, banaka i drugihovlašćenih finansijskih institucija, što dopri-nosi efikasnijem korišćenju, odnosno alokaci-

ji slobodnih novčanih sredstava prema trans-aktorima kojima su data sredstva potrebnaradi održavanja neophodnog stepena likvid-nosti. Možemo samo pretpostaviti koliko bise uvećao likvidnosni potencijal finansijskogsektora kada bi se sav keš koji se kod građananalazi po fiokama transformisao u elektronskinovac i kao takav se našao u legalnim finansij-skim kanalima.Razvoj i jačanje funkcije platinih kartica značaj-no doprinose suzbijanju sive ekonomije, krimi-nala i boljoj naplati javnih prihoda, jer plaćanjeplatnim karticama automatski podrazumeva iizdavanje fiskalnog računa.

U kome pravcu ide dalji razvoj kartičarstva

u svetu u budućnosti?

Korišćenje inovativnih tehnologija i ekspanzijaglobalnih provajdera, omogućavaju primenu ši-rokog spektra elektronskih kanala za iniciranje

platne transakcije, kao i korišćenje inovativnihplatnih instrumenata.

Granica između kartičar-stva i drugih sistema plaćanja se lagano gubi,a pojavom novih tehnologija, otvara se potpu-no nova sfera poslovanja i platna kartica se saplastike postepeno seli u mobilni telefon ili nacloud server.Otuda su na tržištu kartica u poslednje vreme,pored izdavalaca platnih kartica, prisutni svečešće i novi učesnici, kao što su mobilni opera-teri, internet-kompanije poput Googla. I sami

Rastbezgotovinskogplaćanja




adapts to the market and consumer habits, thus wealso offer services via PayPal and are working on thedevelopment o contactless cards and contactlesspayment solutions, which has been very present late-ly and is present on the European market.

How successfully does Serbia follow the trends

of developed countries when it comes to credit

cards?

trgovci sve više aktivno učestvuju u kreiranjunovih proizvoda. Kao i mnoge druge kompanije koje se bave platnim rešenjima, i Diners Clubse prilagođava tržištu i navikama potrošača,te svoje usluge nudimo i preko PayPala, a ra-dimo i na razvoju beskontaktne kartice, odno-sno beskontaktnog rešenja za plaćanje, koje je uposlednje vreme vrlo prisutno i zastupljeno naevropskom tržištu.




Our payment cards industry is not lagging behindthe region in any respect and, in accordance withthe economic potential o the domestic market, itsucceeds in ollowing and keeping pace with othercountries worldwide. Compared to the region’s othercountries, Serbia has a well-developed network or

the acceptance o credit cards, while cash machinesinclude new eatures, such as paying household bills,prepaid and post-paid telephone accounts and thelike. Likewise, there is also a growth trend in trans-actions and exchanges at cash machines and pointso sale, as well as in terms o internet payments usingcredit cards. In Serbia, however, only about two percent o transactions are carried out via the internet.But that is not only the problem o the credit cardsector, rather the underdeveloped technological in-rastructure in Serbia.Considering that under crisis conditions Serbia re-

corded a slowdown o investments in new technolo-gy, in the company period it is expected that a betterservice will be provided or customers and retailersthrough the introduction o new technologies andthe realising o greater security o the whole systemo cashless payments. In addition to existing servicesor detecting abuse, acquiring sofware or preven-tion o misuse is also very current. In addition an-ti-skimming protection, cash machines are also beinginstalled with physical protection against unauthor-ized disclosure o PIN codes through the placing o acamera, while with the aim o ensuring more secureinternet payments, card issuers are introducing the3D secure service. Use o contactless payment tech-nology is also present in Serbia, as well as payments

via mobile phones.Te act that innovative products are accepted wellin Serbia is important or the urther development othe credit card business and the market.

To what extent does the credit card sector

succeed in adapting to the crisis and

overcoming a situation in which people spend

less in general and are also slow to change

their habits of paying in cash?

O course the credit card business is not immuneto the economic crisis and the problems aced byour clients. However, despite the crisis in Serbia, thepercentage share o card payments in the total turn-over is growing constantly. Te number o paymentcard transactions is in higher growth in relation toturnover using cards, which indicates that users arepaying with cards more ofen, but the transactionamounts are smaller. Serbia is still below the EU av-

Koliko Srbija uspeva da prati trendove

razvijenih zemalja u kartičarstvu?

Naša industrija kartičarstva ni po čemu ne za-ostaje za okruženjem i, u skladu sa ekonom-skim potencijalom domaćeg tržišta, uspevada prati i drži korak sa zemljama u svetu. U

odnosu na zemlje regiona, u Srbiji je dobrorazvijena mreža za prihvat platnih kartica, ana bankomatima postoje nove funkcije, poputplaćanja računa Infostana, prepaid i postpa-id dopuna i slično. Isto tako, beleži se trendrasta transakcija i prometa na bankomatima iprodajnim mestima, kao i kod plaćanja inter-net platnim karticama. U Srbiji se, međutim,samo oko dva odsto transakcija realizuje pre-ko interneta. Ali to nije samo problem kartiča-ra, već neizgrađenosti tehnološke infrastruk-ture u Srbiji.

Imajući u vidu da je u uslovima krize u Sr-biji zabeleženo usporavanje ulaganja u novetehnologije, u narednom periodu se očekujeda će kroz uvođenje novih tehnologija bitipružena bolja usluga korisnicima kartica itrgovcima, i ostvarena veća bezbednost ce-log sistema bezgotovinskog plaćanja. Poredpostojećih usluga detekcije zloupotreba, ak-tuelna je nabavka softvera za njihovu preven-ciju. Na bankomatima se pored antiskimingzaštite, postavljaju i fizičke zaštite od neovla-šćenog otkrivanja PIN-a putem postavljanjakamera, a u cilju bezbednijeg plaćanja puteminterneta, izdavaoci kartica uvode usluge 3Dsecure. Korišćenje beskontaktne tehnologijeu plaćanju je prisutno i u Srbiji, kao i plaćanjaputem mobilnih telefona.Za dalji razvoj kartičarskog poslovanja i tržišta, važno je to što se u Srbiji dobro prihvataju ino- vativni proizvodi.

Koliko kartičarstvo uspeva da se prilagodi

krizi i prevaziđe situaciju u kojoj građani

manje troše generalno, a uz to sporo

menjaju svoje navike plaćanja gotovinom?

Naravno da kartičarstvo nije imuno na eko-nomsku krizu i probleme sa kojima se susrećunaši klijenti. Ipak, uprkos krizi u Srbiji, proce-nat učešća plaćanja platnim karticama u ukup-nom prometu konstantno raste. Broj transak-cija platnim karticama je u većem porastu uodnosu na ostvareni promet korišćenjem kar-tica, što ukazuje da korisnici češće plaćaju kar-ticom, ali da je iznos transakcija manji. Srbija




erage in terms o the number o transactions andexchanges using credit cards, but it is one o theleaders in the region.In order to increase the use o payment cards andin response to the crisis, all card issuers introduceda variety o benefits and new services or cardhold-ers, such as discounts, gif vouchers, purchases ininstalments etc.As or cash payments, everywhere in the worldpayments in cash represents the main competi-tor o cards. In Serbia we have a specific situation,because with the crisis has come an increased useo cheques in purchases, which has seen its creditunction revived afer being banned in 2005, when

use o the so-called ‘cheque with grace period’ wasmarginalised. Tese tendencies are worrisome andcould prove to be a major limitation in achievingmonetary policy objectives.However, I believe that we should view all currentproblems as a challenge to improve our offer. Tat’swhy I want to highlight that it is necessary to investin the development o new technologies, in order orservices offered to cardholders to be as diverse andhigh quality as possible, with greater security or thewhole system o cashless payments.

je još uvek ispod EU proseka po broju transak-cija i prometu platnim karticama, ali je jednaod vodećih u regionu.U cilju povećanja korišćenje kartica u plaćanji-ma, svi izdavaoci kartica, kao odgovor na krizu,uveli su razne pogodnosti i nove servise za ko-risnike kartica poput popusta, poklon vaučera,kupovine na rate i sl.Što se tiče keš plaćanja, svuda u svetu je plaća-nje gotovinom glavni konkurent karticama. USrbiji imamo specifičnu situaciju, jer sa krizomdolazi do povećane upotrebe čeka u prometu,koji je ponovo dobio kreditnu funkciju poslenjegove zabrane 2005. godine, kada je upotreba

tzv. čeka na poček bila marginalizovana. Ovetendencije su zabrinjavajuće i mogu predstavljati bitno ograničenje u ostvarivanju ciljevamonetarne politike.Ipak, smatram da na sve aktuelne problemetreba da gledamo kao na izazov za poboljša-nje naše ponude. Zato želim da istaknem da jenužno investiranje u razvoj i nove tehnologije,kako bi usluge korisnicima kartica bile što kva-litetnije i raznovrsnije, uz veću bezbednost ce-log sistema bezgotovinskog plaćanja.




Company NBG Leasing this year celebrates a

decade o work on the Serbian market. Tefirst ten years in Serbia were marked by im-

pressive results and enviable relations with custom-ers and partners as the company positioned itselat the top o the leasing sector. Te company alsostands out rom the competition due to a very smallpercentage o repossessed leasing items as a resulto strict rules o debt collection and the quality oclients. Despite the crisis, NBG Leasing manages tomaintain a monthly collection rate o 80 per cent,while customers who are unable to regularly servicetheir obligations, as a result o emerging businessproblems, are offered a programme to refinancedebt that is tailored to their needs.Te risk management sector finds innovative solu-tions which, alongside preserving stability andprofitability in the long term, conservative creditpolicies and monitoring the needs o customers, isa recipe or continued success. All this, along withthe extremely hard work o employees who are ledby good and high quality ideas, means that despiteglobal financial problems the company is more suc-cessul every year. O course, success mainly comes

with good business moves.NBG Leasing is a long-time partner o Mercedes -Benz SCG, which rom this year is part o Switzer-land’s Emil Frey Group. NBG Leasing, together withits partners and their distributors all over Serbia, ispresent at all times when they are needed by poten-tial customers. Te goal, with an adequate financialoffer in the ramework o leasing, is to offer the bestpossible conditions on the market at a given time.Company Hyundai Auto Belgrade has made an e-ort, in cooperation with NBG Leasing, to provide

Kompanija „NBG Leasing“ ove godine pro-

slavlja deceniju rada na domaćem tržištu.Prvih deset godina u Srbiji obeležili su

zavidni rezultati i kvalitetan odnos prema klijen-tima i partnerima, što je firmu pozicioniralo usam vrh davaoca lizinga. Kompaniju od konku-rencije izdvaja i izuzetno mali procenat oduzetihpredmeta lizinga zahvaljujući striktnim pravili-ma naplate potraživanja, ali i kvalitetu klijenata.Uprkos krizi, NBG Leasing uspeva da održi me-sečnu stopu naplate od 80 odsto, a korisnicima,koji zbog novonastalih problema u poslovanjunisu u mogućnosti da redovno servisiraju obaveze, ponuđen je program refinansiranja dugovaprilagođen njihovim potrebama.Sektor za upravljanje rizikom pronalazi inovativ-na rešenja, što je uz očuvanje stabilnosti i pro-fitabilnosti na duži rok, konzervativnu kreditnupolitiku i praćenje potrebe klijenata, recept zakontinuirani uspeh. Sve ovo, uz izuzetno zalaga-nje zaposlenih, koji vođeni dobrim i kvalitetnimidejama, uprkos globalnim finansijskim proble-mima, kompaniju čine uspešnijom iz godine ugodinu. Naravno, uspeh prvenstveno dolazi sa

dobrim poslovnim potezima.NBG Leasing je dugogodišnji partner Mercedes– Benza SCG, koji je od ove godine u okvirušvajcarske kompanije Emil Frey AG, odnosnoEmil Frey Group. NBG Leasing, zajedno sa svojim partnerom i njihovim distributerima širomSrbije, u svakom trenutku je tu, kada je to po-tencijalnim kupcima potrebno. Cilj je da se od-govarajućom finansijskom ponudom u okvirulizinga ponude najbolji mogući uslovi u datomtrenutku na tržištu.

NBG Leasingsa vama uproteklih10 godina

NBG Leasing– with youover the last10 years







special financing terms or all buyers o Hyundai vehicles. Te flexibility and speed o the implemen-tation o requests to obtain a lease has been demon-strated by an ever increasing number o Hyundaicustomers.Recognising the needs o clients, NBG Leasing has

also perected operations in the segment o providing and monitoring ollow-up services - insur-ance, registration, servicing, contacts with manu-

acturers etc.NBG Leasing is also knownor its social responsibili-ty, which it has especiallydemonstrated in the cata-strophic floods that hit Ser-bia and the region in 2014.Help was sent to the affectedmunicipalities and evacu-

ated citizens, as well as as-sistance in the orm o oodand clothing... For years thecompany has been helpingthe most vulnerable socialcategories - young Romawere provided with a play-ground, the Kruševac DayCare Centre or Childrenand Youth at Risk was prac-tically helped to survive, theDrop-in centre or clothesschool supplies and sweetsetc. Moreover, we also par-ticipated in the “Battle orBabies” campaign by do-nating an incubator to theGynaecology and ObstetricsClinic in Višegradska Street.Credit or the success o thecompany primarily belongs

to director Silvana ričković, a Dalmatian lady withan energetic temperament. She graduated rom the

Faculty o Economics in Belgrade and completedher post-graduate studies at the University o She-field. She has led NBG or ten years and has also ap-plied her lie philosophy “always yoursel, never parto the crowd” to the business environment.- Te strategy o NBG Leasing is not growth at allcosts, but rather maintaining stability and profitabil-ity in the long term. Setting such objectives, on theone hand, and market developments, on the other,demand constant vigilance, rapid responses and ad-aptation, control o debt collection, preserving the

Kompanija Hyundai auto Beograd se potrudi-la da u saradnji sa NBG Leasing kompanijomobezbedi posebne uslove finansiranja za sve kup-ce Hyundai vozila. Fleksibilnost i brzina realiza-cije zahteva za dobijanje lizinga dokazana je sve većim brojem Hyundai klijenata.

Prepoznajući potrebe klijenata, NBG Leasing seusavršio i u segmentu davanja i praćenja pro-pratnih usluga – osiguranja, registracije, servisa,kontakta sa proizvođa-čima...Kompanija NBG Le-asing poznata je i posvojoj društvenoj od-govornosti, koja se na-ročito pokazala u kata-stroalnim poplavamakoje su 2014. zadesile

Srbiju i region. Ugro-ženim opštinama i eva-kuisanom stanovništvuupućena je pomoć, po-put pomoći u vidu hra-ne i odeće... Kompanijagodinama pomaže inajugroženije socijal-ne kategorije - mladimRomima je obezbedilaigralište, kruševačkomCentru za dnevni bo-ravak dece i mladih uriziku praktično opsta-nak, Svratištu odeću,školski pribor i slatki-še... akođe, učestvo- vala je i u akciji "Bitkaza bebe" donirajućiinkubator Ginekolo-ško-akušerskoj kliniciu Višegradskoj.Za uspeh kompanije pre svega je zaslužna direk-

torka Silvana ričković, Dalmatinka energičnogtemperamenta. Završila je Ekonomski akultet uBeogradu, postdiplomske studije na UniverzitetuŠefild. NBG Leasing vodi deset godina, a životnufilozofiju „uvek svoja, nikad deo mase“ prenela jei na poslovno okruženje.„Strategija NBG Leasinga nije rast po svaku cenu, već očuvanje stabilnosti i profitabilnosti na dužirok. Ovako postavljeni ciljevi s jedne strane i tr-žišna dešavanja sa druge zahtevaju stalnu bud-nost, brzo reagovanje i prilagođavanje, kontrolu




quality o the portolio and conservative credit poli-cies, alongside a clear ocus on customer satisactionand providing the best services to the market. Tetask is not easy, but or 10 years the NBG Leasingteam has ollowed a clear course and or now haswithstood numerous challenges and obstacles - says

Silvana ričković, CEO o NBG Leasing.Summing up the results o the first decade, the com-pany’s leading lady reveals that NBG Leasing has aspecific business strategy and a unique approach tothe market.- It’s impressive when afer a ew years you lookback and see that this is a company that has alreadybuilt a business reputation and good results, even inthese years o crisis. NBG Leasing has 38 employ-ees. Tose are all educated and smart young people.Considering that the turnover o staff is low, most othem have matured together with the company, inboth a business sense and a private sense. I find joyin all o their successes. I protect and nurture associ-ates who are committed to the job, connected to thecompany, ready to take on responsibility and fightor their position.In the next decade o operations, NBG Leasingaims to deepen synergies with clients and busi-ness partners, being receptive to their needs, with abusiness philosophy that considers continuity andgood positioning on the market more importantthan gaining quick and immediate profit. And, as

the most effective recipe o successul business, Mrsričković notes:- Success on a dynamic and turbulent marketis not easy to achieve. eamwork is the key thatopens the door. Te shared experience o the teamcontributes to the team identiying with the com-pany’s values and ollowing those values. Only byoffering your best in work can you expect the bestout o your counterparts, along with respect orthe personal characteristics o individuals - con-cludes Mrs ričković.

naplate potraživanja, očuvanje kvaliteta porto-lija i konzervativnu kreditnu politiku uz jasnuokusiranost na zadovoljstvo klijenata i pružanjenajbolje usluge tržištu. Zadatak nije lak, ali timNBG Leasinga već deset godina prati jasan kurs izasad odoleva brojnim izazovima i preprekama“,

poručuje Silvana ričković, predsednica Izvr-šnog odbora NBG Leasing.Sumirajući rezultate prve decenije, prva damakompanije otkriva da NBG Leasing ima speci-fičnu poslovnu strategiju i jedinstven pristuptržištu.„Imponuje kada se posle nekoliko godina osvr-nete i vidite da je to kompanija sa već izgrađe-nom poslovnom reputacijom i dobrim rezul-tatima, čak i u ovim kriznim godinama. NBGLeasing ima 38 zaposlenih. Sve su to obrazovani ipametni mladi ljudi. S obzirom na to da je fluktu-acija kadra mala, većina njih je sazrevala i u po-slovnom i u privatnom smislu, zajedno sa kom-panijom. Radujem se svakom njihovom uspehu.Čuvam i negujem saradnike koji su predani po-slu, vezani za kompaniju, spremni da preuzmuodgovornost i bore se za svoj stav.“U narednu deceniju poslovanja, NBG Leasingulazi sa ciljem da produbi sinergiju sa klijentimai poslovnim partnerima, imajući sluha za njihovepotrebe, uz poslovnu filozofiju da je važnije kon-tinuirano i kvalitetno pozicioniranje na tržištu

od sticanja brzog i trenutnog profita. A, kao naj-efikasniji recept uspešnog poslovanja, gospođaričković ističe:„Uspeh na dinamičnom i turbulentnom tržištunije lako postići. imski rad je ključ koji otvarata vrata. Zajednička iskustva u timu doprinose dase tim poistoveti sa vrednostima kompanije i date vrednosti sledi. Jedino pružanjem svog maksi-muma u poslu, možete očekivati maksimum odsvojih kolega, uz uvažavanje ličnih osobenostipojedinaca“, zaključuje gospođa ričković.




Goran Muftić, General Managero company Bisnode Serbia

Reliable

businessinormation

What services does Bisnode offer in Serbia?

Bisnode d.o.o. (Ltd.) is part o international groupBisnode AB, Europe’s largest provider o businessand prudential inormation, headquartered in

Stockholm. Bisnode AB has been present on theEuropean inormation market since 1981 and to-day employs more than 3,100 proessionals rom19 European countries. Afer just three years ooperations, Bisnode d.o.o. became the leader oSerbia’s digital inormation operations market.At Bisnode we manage business inormation. Wecollect data, conduct checks and arrange the in-ormation according to the needs o the market.We develop tools that offer a comprehensive as-sessment o market risk and, as such, we strive tosatisy our users’ needs or simple and timely in-ormation via a user-riendly tool.Our aim is to help businesses increase theirsales, minimise risks and costs and, on the basisof that, make better business decisions in theirdaily operations.Bisnode’s three major business solutions areBoniteti.rs, RsMatrix.rs and AAA certificate.

What services do companies, as your clients,

receive from you and in which ways do

they apply data about the solvency of other

companies?

Bisnode has enabled its users to use the webportals Boniteti.rs and RsMatrix.rs, a uniquedatabase packaged into two different productsthrough which users can obtain all inormationrelated to the operations o particular companies.From basic inormation on company registration, via inormation on blockages, legal proceedings,solvency evaluations and financial reporting, allthe way to connections between other registeredcompanies, liquidity, indebtedness and much

Goran Muftić, generalni direktorkompanije Bisnode Srbija

Pouzdana

poslovnainormacija

Koje usluge pruža Bisnode u Srbiji?

Bisnode d.o.o. je deo međunarodne grupeBisnode AB, najvećeg evropskog provajde-ra poslovnih i bonitetnih informacija, sa

sedištem u Stokholmu. Bisnode AB je naevropskom tržištu informacija prisutan jošod 1981. godine i zapošljava više od 3.100stručnjaka iz 19 evropskih država. Bisnoded.o.o. je za tri godine poslovanja postao li-der na srpskom tržištu poslovanja digital-nim informacijama.Mi u Bisnodu upravljamo poslovnim infor-macijama. Prikupljamo podatke, proverava-mo ih i uređujemo prema potrebama tržišta.Razvijamo alate koji pružaju sveobuhvatnuprocenu tržišnih rizika i time nastojimo dazadovoljimo potrebe korisnika za jednostav-nim i pravovremenim informacijama putemalata lakog za korišćenje.Naš cilj je da pomognemo preduzećima dapovećaju prodaju, minimalizuju rizike i tro-škove i na osnovu toga da donesu bolje po-slovne odluke u svakodnevnom poslovanju.ri glavna poslovna rešenja kompanije Bi-snode su Boniteti.rs, RsMatrix.rs, i AAAsertifikat.

Koje usluge preduzeća vaši klijenti

dobijaju od vaše kompanije i za šta

sve koriste podatke o bonitetu drugih

preduzeća?

Bosnode je svojim korisnicima omogućiokorišćenje portala Boniteti.rs i RsMatrix.rs, jedinstvenu bazu podataka upakovanu u dvarazličita proizvoda iz kojih se mogu dobiti sveinformacije vezane za poslovanje određenefirme. Od osnovnih informacija o registracijifirme, preko informacija o blokadama, suđe-




more. We offer clients everything necessary or

an overview o the complete picture o the oper-ations o a company, thereby reducing possiblerisks and in that way ensuring more secure busi-ness operations with our current clients and iden-tiying potential high quality business partners.Bisnode’s offer also includes the Certificate oPrudential Excellence AAA, which has stringentconditions that are satisfied by only two per cento the most successul companies in Serbia. Tisinternational certificate has been issued or 20years in 19 European countries. With the help

njima, bonitetnim ocenama, finansijskih izve-

štaja, do povezanosti pravnih lica, likvidnosti,zaduženosti i još mnogo toga. Nudimo klijen-tima sve što je neophodno da bi sagledali ce-lokupnu sliku poslovanja jedne firme, samimtim smanjili moguće rizike i na taj način sebiobezbedili sigurnije poslovanje sa sadašnjimklijentima i pronašli kvalitetne potencijalneposlovne partnere.Ono što Bisnode takođe ima u ponudi je Serti-fikat bonitetne izvrsnosti AAA, čije uslove zadobijanje ima samo 2% najuspešnijih kompa-




o this certificate, companies are provided withcredibility, “proving” that they are sae partnersand thereby opening themselves up to the pos-sibility o doing business beyond the borders oour country.

What is the most important information

companies are interested in regarding their

potential business partners?

Receiving the right information at the right time

nija u Srbiji. Ovaj internacionalni sertifikat seizdaje već 20 godina u 19 zemalja Evrope. Po-moću ovog sertifikata kompanije obezbeđujukredibilitet, „dokazuju“ da su sigurni partnerii da na taj način sebi otvaraju mogućnost zaposlovanje i izvan granica naše zemlje.

Koje su najznačajnije informacije koje

kompanije žele da znaju o potencijalnim

poslovnim partnerima?




can be crucial to making new business decisions.Tat’s why we, with our products, have enabledall users to receive precisely the informationthey require and that can highlight potential riskfactors for them. Considering that we offer a lotof information and that each client is seeking

different kinds of data, it is ultimately importantto everyone whether or not a company they areentering into a specific arrangement with is liq-uid or not, what the business history of certaincompanies is like, as well as the history of thecompany itself and its subsidiaries. By obtain-ing the necessary data, companies can formulatetheir business policies with respect to certain fu-ture or existing partners.

How transparent are the operations of

Serbian companies and do you have a

problem gaining fast access to informationabout companies?

Risk is always present in business lie. Tat’swhy it’s necessary to have inormation that is astransparent as possible and that can be helpulto all o our customers. With all the inormationwe offer, the transparency o inormation aboutall business entities in our country is quite highand thereore you can learn a lot about particularcompanies and make smart choices and specificstrategies. o date we have not had any problemscollecting data on the operations o companies.

Has the crisis of recent years led to a

greater role of debt collection agencies and

do companies use your services in order to

improve their liquidity?

With the expansion o the economic crisis thathas enguled the world, including our country,there has also been an increase in the number odebt collection agencies, which, unortunately,have a lot o work. Companies hire agencies in or-der to collect on their claims, but this is ofen un-

successul and these payments must be enorced.Tat’s why we have developed the liquidity mod-ule within the RsMatrix.rs product, where youcan find inormation about companies that areundergoing enorced collection procedures andfind out about the realisation o that payment. Intoday’s world it is essential to be surrounded withall possible kinds o business inormation in or-der to saeguard a company against risks and thusensure its better operations and greater success.

Prava informacija u pravo vreme može biti odkrucijalnog značaja za donošenje novih po-slovnih odluka. Zato smo mi, našim proizvo-dima, omogućili svim korisnicima da upravodobiju informacije koje su im potrebne i kojeim mogu ukazati na eventualne rizike. S obzi-

rom na to da nudimo veliki broj informacija ida svaki klijent teži za različitom vrstom po-dataka, ipak je svima najvažnije da li je firmasa kojom ulaze u određeni aranžman likvidnaili ne, kakva je istorija poslovanja određenefirme, kao i istorija same firme i njenih povezanih lica. Dobijanjem potrebnih podatakafirme kreiraju poslovnu politiku u odnosu naodređenog budućeg ili sadašnjeg partnera.

Koliko je transparentno poslovanje

srpskih preduzeća i da li imate problem

da u kratkom roku dobijete podatke okompaniji?

Rizik je uvek prisutan u poslovnom životu.Zato je potrebno da imamo što transparent-nije informacije koje svim našim korisnici-ma mogu pomoći. Uz sve informacije kojemi nudimo, transparentnost informacija kodprivrednih subjekata u našoj zemlji je prilič-no velika i samim tim možete mnogo saznatio određenoj firmi i napraviti pametan izbor iodređenu strategiju. Zasad nismo imali pro-blema prilikom prikupljanja podataka o po-slovanju kompanija.

Da li je kriza poslednjih godina dovela

do veće uloge agencija za naplatu

potraživanja i da li preduzeća koriste

vaše usluge kako bi popravila likvidnost?

Sa povećanjem ekonomske krize koja je za-hvatila svet, pa tako i nas, povećan je i brojagencija za naplatu potraživanja koje, naža-lost, imaju dosta posla. Firme angažuju agen-cije kako bi uspele da naplate svoja potraži-

vanja, često je to neuspešno, pa se naplatamora raditi prinudnim putem. Zato smo miu okviru proizvoda Matrix.rs napravili modullikvidnost u kojem možete pronaći podatke ofirmama koje su u prinudnoj naplati i o to-kovima njene realizacije. U današnje vreme jeneophodno biti okružen svim mogućim po-slovnim informacijama kako bi bi se firma sa-čuvala od rizika i samim tim sebi obezbedilabolje poslovanje i veću uspešnost.




RASSE is a leading global sofware solu-tion provider or banking and financial in-stitutions, with operations in Europe, the

Middle East, Asia, North and Central America andSoutheast Europe, as one o our most importantstrategic regions.

RASSE je vodeći globalni isporučilac so-tverskih rešenja za banke i finansijske insti-tucije, sa operacijama u Evropi, na Bliskom

istoku, u Aziji, Severnoj i Centralnoj Americi, i u Ju-goistočnoj Evropi kao jednom od naših najvažnijihstrateških regiona.

RASSE –inovativnabankarskarešenja

RASSE –InnovativeBankingSolutions




TRASSET offers ully integrated, SP solu-tions in the ields o Corporate/SME Financing,reasury Management, Asset & Wealth Man-agement, Custody and Depository activitiesworldwide.

Having more than 100 implementations indifferent financial institutions, our sofware solu-

tions manage assets worth billions o dollars. TeRASSE products fit the needs o the world’slargest as well as small, regional banks, as we aredelivering a multi-entity , multi-language, mul-

ti-time zone solution in one integrated system.

Since its establishment in 1997, RASSE hasglobal presence and are currently operating inmore than 15 countries across these regions. Ourcompany has its headquarters in Milano, Italy,with offices (among others) in Belgrade, Buda-pest, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Saudi-Arabia, LosAngeles, Mexico City.

Over a course o more than a decade, numer-ous inancial institutions worldwide have cho-sen to rely on us. Our client-centric orientationand our continuous product development andinnovation are our major contributing actorsto RASSE’s success. We believe that whattruly differentiates us is our passion for what

we do, what we offer and our dedication to

our clients.

RASSE solutions are flexible enough toadapt to any specific requirements o the finan-

cial institution, ready to be implemented afer ashort customization and parameterization peri-od. Te RASSE products are ully param-eter-driven, thus flexible, easy-to-implement,seamlessly integrated solutions. Tis flexibilityallows our clients to amend processes quickly asand when management or authorities require.

Our mission is to help our clients to cover

their activities through integrated solutions

while decreasing operative costs and increas-

ing profitability.

TRASSET nudi u potpunosti integrisana SPrešenja u oblastima korporativnog bankarstva/SMEfinansiranja, upravljanja trezorom, upravljanja imovinom i bogatstvom, kastodi i depozitarnih aktivno-sti širom sveta.

Sa više od 100 implementacija u različitim fi-nansijskim institucijama naša sofverska rešenja

upravljaju sredstvima vrednim milijarde dolara.Važno je naglasiti da RASSE proizvodi odgova-raju potrebama kako najvećih svetskih banaka takoi manjih, regionalnih banaka, s obzirom na to daisporučujemo rešenje koje podržava rad sa više ze-

malja, jezika i vremenskih zona u okviru jednog

integrisanog sistema.Od osnivanja 1997. godine, TRASSET ima globalnu

prisutnost i trenutno sprovodi operacije u više od 15zemalja širom ovih regiona. Centrala naše kompanije

je u Milanu, Italija, sa kancelarijama (između ostalih)u Beogradu, Budimpešti, Džakarti, Kuala Lumpuru,Saudijskoj Arabiji, Los Anđelesu, Meksiko Sitiju.

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Boško Živković, professor at theBelgrade Faculty of Economics

Te crisishas stronglyimpactedbusinesses

What was the Serbian banking sector faced with

after the changes of the year 2000?

Chronologically, the first important thing was to closedown the large state-owned banks. Tis act is still con-troversial today and the main reason or the closureswas that at that time the country had to come up withabout nine billion Deutschmarks to repair their balancesheets. Tey had large property available, but most othe credit was difficult to pay. In truth, part o theseloans later restored their value.Te second important act was the development o so-called new banking. Te main benefit o the entry othese banks was rapid growth in credit offers and thatmostly financed savings on imports. Tat was a big advantage in those years, because during the entire previ-ous decade the banking sector had provided very ewnew loans and the entry o new banks meant stronggrowth in demand, with nearly hal o all new loansocused on the retail sector. During the ‘90s housingloans were almost zero. Te second part o the grow-ing offer was aimed at the enterprise sector and thatgrowth continued until 2010, when a significant slow-

down began.During 2013 we could already see negative growth val-ues in the credit offer and there we uncovered a seriousproblem that we had not seen in the previous decade– that a large part o growth financed import savings.My impression is that the decade was nevertheless suc-cessul, that the tremendous growth o credit supplybrought significant changes, many people rebuilt theirhomes, the living standard increased and, o course, italso occurred that part o the population entered thezone o indebtedness. However, generally speaking, the

Boško Živković, profesorna Ekonomskom fakultetu uBeogradu

Kriza jesnažnopogodilapreduzeća

Sa čim se suočio srpski bankarski sektornakon promena 2000. godine?Hronološki, prva bitna stvar je gašenje velikih dr-žavnih banaka. a činjenica je i dan-danas kontro- verzna, a glavni razlog gašenja je to što država utom trenutku nije imala oko devet milijardi ma-raka za saniranje njihovih bilansa. One su raspo-lagale velikom imovinom, ali veći deo kredita bio je teško naplativ. Istina, deo tih kredita je kasnijedobio ponovo svoju vrednost.Druga važna činjenica je razvoj tzv. novog bankar-stva. Glavna korist od ulaska tih banaka bio je ubr-zani rast ponude kredita i to finansiran pretežnouvezenom štednjom. o je tih godina bila velikaprednost, jer prethodnu celu deceniju bankarskisektor je proizvodio veoma malo novih kredita iulazak novih banaka na tržište značio je snažanrast tražnje, jer se približno polovina novih kredi-ta usmerila na sektor stanovništva. okom deve-desetih krediti stanovništvu su bili skoro jednakinuli. Drugi deo prirasta ponude usmeren je u sek-tor preduzeća i taj rast traje sve do 2010. godine,

kada počinje značajno usporavanje.okom 2013. godine već imamo negativne vred-nosti rasta ponude kredita i tu otkrivamo ozbiljanproblem koji nismo videli u prethodnoj deceniji,a to je da je veliki deo rasta finansiran uvoznomštednjom. Moj utisak je da je ipak ta decenija bilauspešna, da je veliki rast ponude kredita doneoznačajne promene, mnogo ljudi je obnovilo svoja domaćinstva, povećan je standard, a naravnodogodilo se i da je deo stanovništva ušao u zonuzaduženosti. Međutim, generalno, sektor stanov-




housing sector is not overly indebted. Its property, evenfinancial, is higher than its liabilities.

The expansion of credit continued all the way

until the start of the crisis. How did the crisis hit

the banking sector?

Te crisis has hit the enterprise sector hard. In the firsttwo years that was not as evident as it was in 2012 and2013, when we got the serious problem o NPLs. Teynow have a relatively high value and are highly concen-trated in certain domains, such as construction and realestate, and are likely to impact on the long-term behav-iour o both banks and companies. Tat impact is al-ready evident and strongly negative, because the highshare o NPLs is a major actor that inhibits the growth

o the credit offer. In the past year we have already seena decline in loans, which urther threatens to worsenthe state o the economy and increase the share o prob-lematic loans in total loans, which in turn threatens thegrowth potential o the banking sector in Serbia.Te main problem is that a high proportion o NPLsare related to structural problems in European bank-ing. Te EU intervened strongly in the banking sys-tem and some o the banks operating in our regionwere nationalised, and under these circumstances itis difficult to expect capital inflows. We, like all the

ništva nije prezadužen. Njegova imovina, čak i fi-nansijska, veća je od obaveza.

Kreditna ekspanzija je trajala sve do krize.

Kako je kriza pogodila bankarski sektor?Kriza je snažno pogodila sektor preduzeća. Uprve dve godine to nije bilo toliko vidljivo koli-ko u 2012. i 2013. i tu imamo ozbiljan problemproblematičnih kredita. Oni sada imaju relativno visoku vrednost, visoko su koncentrisani na nekedelatnosti kao što su građevinarstvo i nekretninei verovatno će dugoročno uticati na ponašanje ibanaka i preduzeća. aj uticaj je već sada vidljivi snažno je negativan, jer je visoko učešće proble-matičnih kredita glavni faktor koji zaustavlja rast

ponude kredita. Već u prošloj godini imamo padponude kredita, što dalje preti da pogorša stanje uprivredi i poveća učešće problematičnih u ukup-nim kreditima i to ugrožava potencijal rasta ban-karskog sektora Srbije.Glavni problem je što je visoko učešće NPL po- vezano sa strukturnim problemima u evropskombankarstvu. U EU se snažno intervenisalo u ban-karskim sistemima, a neke od banaka koje posluju i u našem regionu su nacionalizovane i u timokolnostima je teško očekivati dotok kapitala. Mi




Balkan countries, have a hopeless shortage o savingsand this can have a significant impact not only thebanking sector in the next decade, but also on thecharacteristics o the economy.Tere already exist the first very serious indicatorsthat the flow o capital is taking the reverse direction,that part o the placements that parent banks rom theEU have in this region are beginning to be withdrawn.It is likely that the assessment o borrowing rom Ser-bia will be stopped at an amount o €900 million to €1billion in 2013.I the drain becomes greater it could undermine oreignexchange reserves and the country’s external liquidity.

Tis set o related problems has its source in NPLs.

What solutions for problematic loans are availa-

ble to the State and banks?

Te best solution in the long term would be economicgrowth, but the problem is that we cannot simply waitor this growth to occur. We have simultanoues growthin non-perorming loans and decline in the credit offer.Tese two processes are mutually reinorcing and leadto an increase o non-perorming loans and a urtherreduction o the supply, alongside increasing interest

smo kao i sve balkanske zemlje u beznadežnojoskudici sa štednjom i to može značajno uticatine samo na bankarstvo u narednoj deceniji, negoi na osobine privrede.Postoje već prvi vrlo ozbiljni nalazi da tok kapitalauzima reverzni smer, da se deo plasmana koje sumatične banke iz EU imale na ovim prostorima,počinje povlačiti. Verovatno će se procene o raz-duživanju iz Srbije zaustaviti na iznosu od 900 mi-liona do milijardu evra u 2013. godini.Ako bi odliv postao još masivniji, mogao bi daugrozi devizne rezerve i eksternu likvidnost ze-mlje. aj skup povezanih problema ima čvorište u

problematičnim kreditima.

Kakva su rešenja problematičnih kredita naraspolaganju državi i bankama?Na dugi rok najbolje rešenje bi bio privrednirast, ali problem je što se ne sme čekati da se tajprivredni rast dogodi. Mi imamo istovremenorast problematičnih kredita i pad ponude kre-dita. Ta dva procesa se međusobno podržavajui dovode do uvećanja problematičnih kredita idaljeg smanjivanja ponude, uz povećanje kamat-




rates, reducing investments and disruption in the bal-ance o payments.Tis connection should be cut as soon as possible. Itseems to me that this method o solving the problemdoes not work in the short term. o date about 30 bil-lion dinars o these loans write-offs have been resolved

through sales and a variety o other ways. For now thisis done through an agreement between banks and bor-rowers and that process progresses quite slowly. Temain question is whether this process can be resolvedthrough so-called bulk loans. I think that will be tough.While retaining this method it should be attempted,provided there are budgetary possibilities, to create acentralised solution that would operate with bulk loans.In most countries the good bank-bad bank model is ap-plied. Te trouble with this solution is that it is expen-sive and the state does not have a lot o money, as well asthe act that it can lead to moral hazard o committing

an unair redistribution o public unds towards privatesources. Highlighting this risk is the experience o the“auto industry bailout” carried out in the U.S. and expe-rience o massive intervention in some European coun-tries. In order to avoid the misuse o public resourcesor these purposes, all solutions should aim to break theconnection between NPLs and growth in the provisiono credit. I possibilities were created or the healthygrowth o lending, then a portion o existing NPLscould restore their value. Tis is uncertain or now, butwe dare not wait long, because, although the bankingsector is currently solvent and in good condition, thisdisease has the characteristic o expanding rapidly. Inall probability NPL growth has not stopped, althoughits growth has slowed.

To what extent did previous credit expansion con-

tribute to the risky behaviour of banks?

Everywhere, including here, when the loan offer growsrapidly, and here it grew 30-40 per cent annually, thecautiousness o banks decreases in terms o the risk ocredit deaults. Tat was clear then and is still obvioustoday. We had some o our own specificities, such as

overvaluing real estate and expectations that the pricewould continue to rise. In Serbia the standards or val-uing property were relatively unreliable. Another spe-cific actor is privatisation. In Serbia afer buying a firstenterprise a buyer could then pledge the assets o thatcompany when purchasing a second, then use the assetso the second to purchase a third company and so on.Te problem is that firms were ound under the controlo one owner that had nothing to do with each otherand managing these conglomerates was obviously notreally efficient enough to be able to service loans.

nih stopa, smanjivanje investicija i poremećaje ubilansu plaćanja.Trebalo bi što pre tu vezu preseći. Ovaj način nakoji se rešava taj problem meni se čini da ne dajerezultate na kratak rok. Do sada je rešeno oko 30milijardi dinara tih kredita otpisima, prodajom

i na razne druge načine. To se zasad radi spo-razumom između banaka i dužnika i taj proceside prilično sporo. Glavno pitanje je da li se timprocesom mogu rešiti tzv. veliki krediti. Ja mi-slim - teško.Zadržavajući ovaj metod treba pokušati, ako budebudžetskih mogućnosti, formiranje centralizova-nog rešenja koje bi operisalo sa velikim krediti-ma. U većini zemalja je primenjen model dobrabanka - loša banka. Nevolja sa tim rešenjem ješto je ono skupo, a država nema mnogo novca,kao i to što može izazvati moralni hazard da se

izvrši nepravedna preraspodela javnih fondova kaprivatnim izvorima. Na taj rizik upućuju iskustva„bejl auta“ rađenog u SAD i iskustva masivnihintervencija u nekim evropskim zemljama. Dabi se izbegla pogrešna upotreba javnih resursa uove namene, sva rešenja treba naciljati na to da seprekine veza između NPL i rasta ponude kredita.Ako bi se otvorila mogućnost za zdrav rast kredi-ta, onda bi deo sadašnjih NPL mogao da obnovisvoju vrednost. Zasad je to neizvesno, a čekati sedugo ne sme, jer iako je bankarski sektor solven-tan i u dobrom stanju, ta bolest ima osobinu da sebrzo širi. Po svoj prilici rast NPL još nije obusta- vljen, iako je rast usporen.

Koliko je prethodna ekspanzija kreditadoprinela rizičnijem ponašanju banaka?Svuda, pa i ovde, kada ponuda kredita ubrzanoraste, a kod nas je rasla 30-40 odsto godišnje,opreznost banaka kod preuzimanja kreditnogrizika se smanjuje. o je vidljivo bilo i tada, a oči-gledno je i danas.Mi smo imali i neke specifičnosti, kao što je prece-

njenost nekretnina i očekivanje da će njihova cenai dalje rasti. Kod nas su standardi procenjivanjanekretnina bili relativno nepouzdani. Druga spe-cifičnost je privatizacija. Nakon kupovine prvogpreduzeća kupac je mogao da založi imovinu togpreduzeća prilikom kupovine drugog, imovinudrugog za treće itd. Problem je što su se pod kon-trolom jednog vlasnika našle firme koje nemaju veze jedna s drugom i upravljanje tim konglome-ratima očigledno nije bilo baš efikasno da bi semogli servisirati krediti.




Nikola Fabris, professor at theBelgrade Faculty of Economics

It’s difficult toprepare forsuch a crisisWhat has characterised the development of

the nancial sector in Serbia since the year2000?

Te period from 2000 until the outbreak of the

global financial crisis was a period of extremelyrapid development of the banking sector. Duringthis period the privatisation of banks was carriedout, renowned banks arrived and the banking sys-tem began to reassert the credibility it lost duringthe 1990s. Ten came very quick growth in depos-its, bank capital, lending and other parameters ofthe banking system. We could say with certaintythat this was a period of rebuilding the bankingsystem, because during the 1990s the banking sys-tem existed only on paper. Tere were no savingsand loans were granted only to privileged individ-uals or companies. Unfortunately, this rapid bank-ing system development trend was interrupted bythe global financial crisis.

How has the global economic crisis that

began in 2008 impacted on Serbia’snancial sector, especially banking?Te global financial crisis has had a very negativeimpact on the banking sector. If first impactednegatively on the real sector and led to a deteri-oration of all parameters of economy, which then

spilled over onto the banking sector in the form ofan irregular repayment of past credit obligations.Tis led to significant growth in the share of badloans and a significant slowdown in lending activ-ity. Likewise, due to the fear of a repeat of the ‘90s,some people reacted in panic and began with-drawing deposits. Te crisis also revealed poorcredit risk management in a number of banks,thus contributing to a reduction in profitabilityof the banking system and the loss of operatinglicenses for a number of banks.

Nikola Fabris, profesor naEkonomskom fakultetu uBeogradu

Za ovakvukrizu teško jebiti potpunospreman

Šta je karakterisalo razvoj nansijskogsektora u Srbiji nakon 2000. godine?Period od 2000. godine do izbijanja globalne fi-nansijske krize je bio period izuzetno brzog ra-zvoja bankarskog sektora. U ovom periodu jesprovedena privatizacija banaka, došle su stranerenomirane banke i bankarski sistem je počeo da vraća kredibilitet izgubljen tokom devedesetih.Vrlo brzo su rasli depoziti, kapital banaka, kredit-na aktivnost i svi ostali parametri poslovanja ban-karskog sistema. Mogli bismo slobodno reći da jeovo bio i period ponovne izgradnje bankarskogsistema, jer tokom devedesetih godina bankarskisistem je postojao samo na papiru. Nije bilo šted-nje, a kredite su dobijali samo privilegovani pojedinci ili preduzeća. Nažalost, trend ovako brzograzvoja bankarskog sistema je prekinut globalnomfinansijskom krizom.

Kako je svetska ekonomska kriza iz 2008.godine pogodila nansijski sektor, pre svegabankarski?

Globalna finansijska kriza je vrlo negativno uti-cala na bankarski sektor. Ona se prvo negativnoodrazila na realni sektor i uticala je na pogoršanjesvih parametara poslovanja privrede, što se po-tom prelilo na bankarski sektor u vidu neredov-nog izmirivanja ranijih kreditnih obaveza. o jedovelo do značajnog rasta učešća loših kredita iznačajnog usporavanja kreditne aktivnosti. ako-đe, zbog straha da se ne ponove devedesete, deo




Was the Serbian banking sector ready for theimpact of the nancial crisis and what arethe reasons for its stability?One can never be fully prepared for such a“shock” crisis, because these kinds of crises oc-cur once every 80 years and are never expected.However, the majority of banks in Serbia werewell capitalised and solvency indicators weresignificantly above the legal minimum, which fa-cilitated absorption of the “shock” of the crisis.

stanovništva je reagovao panično i počeo sa povla-čenjem depozita. Kriza je otkrila i loše upravljanjekreditnim rizikom u jednom broju banaka, takoda je uticala i na smanjenje profitabilnosti bankar-skog sistema, a i na gubljenje dozvola za rad jed-nog broja banaka.

Da li je bankarski sektor Srbije bio spremanza udar nansijske krize i koji su razlozinjegove stabilnosti?




Also proving to be a competitive advantage wasthat the NBS had imposed stricter standards onbanks than accepted international standards inthe area of bank operations, which meant theyhad more reserves to overcome the consequencesof the crisis.

What phase is the Serbian banking sectorcurrently in and can credit growth beexpected again soon?

Te situation today has improved compared to the

crisis period, but it still far from the situation pri-or to the global financial crisis. Te share of badloans is still very high and, instead of loans, bankshave redirected an important part of their liquidassets to safer investments, particularly govern-ment bonds. I think it is unrealistic to expect us tohave a significant growth rate in lending until theliquidity of the economy and the general econom-ic situation are fixed. Nevertheless, the effect of thepanic has passed and deposits have returned to thebanking system.

Za ovakav „udar“ krize nikada ne možete biti upotpunosti spremni, jer su ovo krize koje se javlja- ju jednom u 80 godina i nikada ih ne očekujete.Ipak, većina banaka u Srbiji je bila dobro kapita-lizovana, indikatori solventnosti su bili značajnoiznad zakonskih minimuma, što je olakšalo ap-sorpciju „udara“ krize. akođe, pokazalo se i kaokomparativna prednost to što je NBS nametnulabankama strože standarde od međunarodnihstandarda u oblasti poslovanja banaka, pa su oneimale više rezervi da prevaziđu posledice krize.


sektor Srbije, da li se može uskoro očekivatiponovo rast kreditne aktivnosti?

Situacija se danas poboljšala u odnosu na periodkrize, ali još uvek nije ni blizu stanja pre global-ne finansijske krize. Učešće loših kredita je i daljeizuzetno viosko, a banke su značajan deo likvid-nih sredstava umesto u kredite, preusmerile u si-gurnije plasmane, pre svega u državne hartije od vrednosti. Mislim da nije realno očekivati, dok se




What is the practice in other countries when

it comes to addressing NPLs? What solutions

are available to banks and monetaryauthorities?

Te experiences are numerous and very different.Tere are existing models in which banks them-

selves took over the loans and wrote them off di-rectly. In some cases NPLs were assumed by theparent bank or factoring companies, which wereestablished with the express purpose of purchas-ing NPLs. Tere are also models where the stateassumes liability, either through the national-isation of banks or through the conversion ofpoor claims via government securities. Tere aremodels in which they are resolved systematicallythrough the creation of specific legislation for thispurpose and the provision of incentives for banksand companies to join their restructuring, such as

the London model, the Istanbul approach and thePodgorica approach, which is currently in the development phase. Basically, it is difficult to singleout an ideal model, but rather each country beginsfrom its individual specifics and should seek thebest model under the given circumstances.

How much did credit expansion prior to the

crisis contribute to the high level of NPLs

once the crisis hit?

It is obvious that prior to the crisis there was al-ready bad management of credit risks. In fact, dur-ing this period there was a low share of NPLs andbanks approved credit more easily, without givingenough attention to risk factors. Tat meant thata large number of companies and individuals re-ceived easy loans that they were able to servicesas long as the expansion lasted. As soon as theeconomy entered a recession, a large number ofthese loans became uncollectible and this directlyinfluenced the high growth of bad loans.

Would the Serbian economy have copedbetter with the crisis if it had developed

other parts of the nancial sector besidesbanking, such as insurance, the stockexchange, leasing, investment funds andpension funds?

It is quite certain that even in such a case the con-sequences of the crisis would still have been quiteevident. Tis can best be seen by looking at thesituation in the U.S. and the EU, where these seg-ments of the financial system well-developed andwhere the crisis has hit with very high intensity.

ne popravi likvidnost privrede i opšta ekonomskasituacija, da imamo značajnije stope rasta kredit-ne aktivnosti. U svakom slučaju, efekat panike jeprošao i depoziti su se vratili u bankarski sistem.

Kakva je praksa drugih zemalja u rešavanju

NPL? Koja rešenja su na raspolaganjubankama i monetarnim vlastima?

Iskustva su brojna i vrlo različita. Postoje modeli ukojima su ih preuzimale same banke i direktno ot-pisivale. U nekim slučajevima nenaplative kreditesu preuzimale matične banke ili faktoring kom-panije, koje su bile direktno osnovane sa ciljemotkupa loših kredita. Postoje i modeli u kojimaih je preuzimala država, bilo kroz nacionalizaciju banke, bilo kroz konverziju loših potraživanjapreko državnih hartija od vrednosti. Postoje i mo-deli u kojima su oni sistemski rešavani kroz kre-

iranje posebnog zakonodavstva za tu svrhu i davanja podsticaja i bankama i preduzećima da uđuu njihovo restrukturiranje, kao što su Londonskimodel, Istanbulski pristup i trenutno u fazi razvoja Podgorički pristup. U osnovi, teško je izdvojiti jedan idealan model, već svaka zemlja polazeći odsvojih individualnih specifičnosti, treba da tražimodel koji je najbolji u datim okolnostima.

Koliko je kreditna ekspanzija pre krize

doprinela visokom nivou nenaplativih kredita

nakon izbijanja krize?

Očigledno je da je pre krize bilo prisutno lošeupravljanje kreditnim rizikom. Naime, u tomperiodu je postojalo nisko učešće loših kredita ibanke su olako odobravale kredite, bez poklanja-nja dovoljno pažnje rizicima. o znači da je velikibroj preduzeća i pojedinaca olako dobijao kredite,koje su mogli da finansiraju dok traje ekspanzija.Čim je privreda ušla u recesiju, veliki broj ovakvihkredita je postao nenaplativ i direktno je uticao na visok rast loših kredita.

Da li bi se srpska privreda lakše izborila

sa krizom da su razvijeniji drugi delovi

nansijskog sektora, osim bankarskog, kaošto su osiguranje, berza, lizing, investicioni ipenzijski fondovi?

Sasvim sigurno da bi i u tom slučaju posledi-ce krize bile i te kako vidljive. To najbolje mo-žemo videti prema situaciji u SAD i EU, kojeimaju vrlo razvijene ove segmente finansijskogsistema, a kriza ih je pogodila izuzetno visokimintenzitetom.




Professor Hasan Hanić Ph.D,Dean, Belgrade Banking Academy

Dramatic

financialsystemchangesWith the proper management of

credit risks, the only proper way to

solve the problem of non-performing

loans is to create conditions for

dynamic growth of the economy and

the standard of living

How do you see the Serbian nancial systemnow, compared to the time when foreignnancial institutions came to Serbia, beforethe crisis?Te Serbian financial system has changed dramat-ically since foreign financial institutions came toSerbia. New standards and advanced business pro-cesses have been introduced. Te organizationalstructure has changed, a new organizational cul-ture has developed, the entire system of managingthe operations of the bank has changed, particu-larly those segments that relate to risk manage-ment and the use of certain marketing principleswhen making business decisions.

Do you expect a problem with the growth ofnon-performing loans (NPLs) or will bankssucceed in overcoming that without majortremors?Since the end of 2010 the number of uncollect-ible loans, approved to companies and house-holds, has grown systematically. A particularproblem is represented by problematic loans toprivate companies, which reached an almost 30%share in total loans to that sector at the end ofMarch this year, meaning that it is difficult tosecure repayment for approximately every thirdloan granted to private companies.

Prof. dr Hasan Hanić, dekan,Beogradska bankarska akademija

Dramatična

promenafinansijskogsistemaUz adekvatno upravljanje

kreditnim rizicima, jedini pravi

način za rešavanje problema

nekvalitetnih kredita jeste

stvaranje uslova za dinamični rast

privrede i standarda stanovništva

Kako vidite srpski nansijski sistemsada, u odnosu na vreme kad su stranenansijske institucije došle u Srbiju, prekrize?Od kada su u Srbiju došle strane finansijske in-stitucije, srpski finansijski sistem se dramatičnopromenio. Uvedeni su novi standardi i napred-nije poslovne procedure. Promenjena je organi-zaciona struktura, razvijena je nova organiza-ciona kultura, unapređen je i celokupni sistemposlovnog upravljanja bankom, a ponajviše onisegmenti koji se odnose na upravljanje rizicimai korišćenje određenih marketinških principaprilikom donošenja poslovnih odluka.

Da li očekujete problem sa rastomnenaplativih (NPL) kredita, ili će banke touspeti da prevaziđu bez većih potresa?Od kraja 2010. godine nenaplativi krediti, odo-breni privredi i stanovništvu, sistematski rastu.Poseban problem predstavljaju problematič-ni krediti privatnih preduzeća, čije je učešće uukupnim kreditima tog sektora krajem martaove godine dostiglo nivo od oko 30 odsto, štoće reći da je približno svaki treći kredit odobrenprivatnim preduzećima teško naplativ.Otpisi i rezervacije koje se odnose na teško na-plative kredite stvaraju velike probleme koji su u




Write-offs and reservations relating to loans thatare difficult to repay create a lot of problems thatlast year, in combination with other factors (de-cline in lending activity, reduced interest ratesetc.), led to the banking sector recording pre-taxlosses for practically the first time in around tenyears. Fortunately, the capital adequacy ratio ofour banking sector is almost twice as high as theprescribed minimum value of this ratio, so thatthe banking system as a whole remains stable.In the coming short-term period (3 to 6 months) Iexpect growth in NPLs, followed by their gradual

stagnation and relative decline. In the short term,a certain contribution to resolving this problemwill be provided by the measures of the govern-ment in the field of subsidised loans for liquidi-ty and other types of economic subsidies, as wellas measures envisaged in the reform of the pub-lic sector, especially public companies. However,alongside the proper management of credit risks,the only real way to resolve the NPL problem is tocreate the conditions for dynamic growth of theeconomy and standard of living.

kombinaciji sa ostalim faktorima (pad kreditneaktivnosti, smanjenje kamatne stope i dr.) dove-li do toga da je bankarski sektor prošle godinepraktično prvi put u poslednjih desetak godinapre plaćanja poreza zabeležio gubitak. Srećom,koeficijent adekvatnosti kapitala našeg bankar-skog sektora je gotovo dva puta veći od propisa-ne minimalne vrednosti ovog koeficijenta, takoda je bankarski sistem u celini i dalje stabilan.U narednom kratkoročnom periodu (od tri došest meseci) očekujem degresivan rast nenapla-tivih kredita, a potom stagnaciju i njihovo po-

stepeno relativno opadanje. U kratkom roku,određeni doprinos rešavanju ovog problemadaće mere Vlade na planu subvencionisanjakredita za likvidnost i druge vrste ekonomskihsubvencija, kao i mere predviđene programomreforme javnog sektora i posebno javnih pre-duzeća. Međutim, uz adekvatno upravljanjekreditnim rizicima, jedini pravi način za re-šavanje problema nekvalitetnih kredita jestestvaranje uslova za dinamični rast privrede istandarda stanovništva.




What are the main challenges of managingthe bank and how much have they changed

during the years of the crisis?In conditions of insufficient economic activity andlow living standards, which characterise the crisis,on the one hand, and the relatively large numberof banks operating in Serbia, on the other, a spe-cial challenge of managing the bank is the attract-ing of new clients and retaining of existing (good)clients. Te development and implementation ofthe concept of customer relations management(CRM) and other marketing techniques generallyrepresent a particular imperative in conditions of

falling market potential and increased competi-tion among banks.

How has the global economic crisis changedbanking in general, including in our country?Te global economic crisis has brought to the forethe problem of managing credit risk, as well asother types of risk that arise in the banking busi-ness, which is a problem adequate attention wasnot paid to prior to the crisis. As a consequence ofthat, regulations in the field of managing banking

Koji su glavni izazovi za upravljanjebankom i koliko su se oni promenili u

godinama krize?U uslovima nedovoljne privredne aktivnosti islabog standarda stanovništva, koji karakteri-šu godine krize s jedne strane i relativno veli-kog broja banaka koje posluju u Srbiji, s drugestrane, poseban izazov upravljanja bankompredstavlja privlačenje novih i zadržavanjepostojećih (dobrih) klijenata. Razvoj i imple-mentacija koncepta upravljanja odnosima saklijentima (CRM) i drugih tehnika marketinga,inače predstavlja poseban imperativ u uslovi-

ma smanjivanja tržišnog potencijala i pojačanekonkurencije banaka.

Kako je svetska ekonomska krizapromenila bankarstvo uopšte, pa i kod nas?Svetska ekonomska kriza je istakla u prvi planproblem upravljanja kreditnim rizicima, kaoi drugim vrstama rizika koji se pojavljuju ubankarskom poslovanju, problem kojem se prekrize nije posvećivala adekvatna pažnja. Sled-stveno tome, regulativa u domenu upravljanja




risk has become more stringent, and now the cen-tral bank is sending a stronger signal in the sensethat much more careful risk management repre-sents one of the basic pillars of the stability of thefinancial system.

What needs to be done to develop theinsurance system in Serbia?Due to the low level and pace of economic development, coupled with the very modest livingstandards of the population, it is difficult to takeadvantage of the relatively large potential of theinsurance market in Serbia, which is particularlylarge in the segments of life and voluntary healthinsurance. As such, the main engine of growth inthe insurance system of Serbia is dynamic eco-nomic growth, increases in employment and thereal income of the population, with which certain

incentives for the development of the insurancemarket can certainly contribute in the form of ad-equate legislation and tax incentives in the field oflife insurance, for example, as well as activities inthe domain of education and raising awareness ofthe need and importance of insurance.

From the experience of the BelgradeBanking Academy, how much does Serbiaeducate high quality personnel who canrespond to the current demands of thebanking and general nancial sector, which

is very dynamic and growing rapidly?Our faculty is the only higher education insti-tution in Serbia that is specialised in the studyof problems in banking through undergraduateand master’s studies and, from the next academ-ic year, in doctoral studies. In addition to studyprogrammes in the field of traditional banking,where students are trained to respond to the de-mands of modern banking and the generally verydynamic financial sector, the Belgrade BankingAcademy is the only college in Serbia, and prob-

ably the entire region, that implements a studyprogramme in the field of investment banking,which was developed according to high inter-national standards in cooperation with the UK’sprestigious Reading University.Tanks to the knowledge acquired at our college,our students are also employed in the world’s lead-ing financial institutions, such as Bank of Americaand others, and by the end of their studies with usthey succeed in enrolling in prestigious Europeanuniversities.

bankarskim rizicima je postala stroža, a sadai centralne banke šalju jače signale u smislustabilnosti finansijskog sistema čiji jedan odosnovnih stubova čini mnogo pažljivije upravljanje rizikom.

Šta je potrebno uraditi da bi se razviosistem osiguranja u Srbiji?Zbog niskog nivoa i tempa razvoja privrede i veoma skromnog životnog standarda stanovni-štva, teško je iskoristiti relativno veliki poten-cijal tržišta osiguranja u Srbiji, koji je posebno veliki u segmentima životnog i dobrovoljnogzdravstvenog osiguranja. Prema tome, osnov-ni pokretač razvoja sistema osiguranja u Srbiji jeste dinamičan privredni rast, porast stope za-poslenosti i realnih primanja stanovništva, pričemu razvoju tržišta osiguranja svakako mogu

da doprinesu adekvatna zakonska regulativai određeni poreski podsticaji u oblasti život-nog osiguranja, na primer, kao i aktivnosti naplanu edukacije i razvijanja svesti o potrebi iznačaju osiguranja.

Iz iskustva Beogradske bankarskeakademije – koliko mi školujemokvalitetne kadrove koji mogu da odgovoresavremenim zahtevima bankarskog iuopšte nansijskog sektora, koji je veomadinamičan i brzo se razvija.Naš fakultet predstavlja jedinu visokoškolskuustanovu u Srbiji koja je specijalizovana za izu-čavanje problematike bankarstva na osnovnimi master studijama, a od sledeće akademske go-dine i na doktorskim studijama. Pored studij-skog programa iz oblasti klasičnog bankarstva,na kome se studenti osposobljavaju da odgovo-re zahtevima savremenog bankarstva i uopšte veoma dinamičnog finansijskog sektora, Beo-gradska bankarska akademija predstavlja jedinifakultet u Srbiji, a verovatno i u čitavom regi-

onu, koji realizuje studijski programa iz obla-sti investicionog bankarstva, koji je razvijenprema visokim međunarodnim standardima, usaradnji sa prestižnim Reding univerzitetom izVelike Britanije.Zahvaljujući znanjima koja stiču na našem fa-kultetu, naši studenti se zapošljavaju i u vode-ćim svetskim finansijskim institucijama, kao štosu Bank of America i druge, a uspevaju da se,po završetku studija kod nas, upišu na prestižneevropske univerzitete.




Đorđe Đukić, proessor at theBelgrade Faculty o Economics

Te Banking

sector isliquid andrestrained

Was the Serbian banking sector ready for the

impact of the nancial crisis and what are thereasons for its stability?

Te banking sector was ready or the impact o thefinancial crisis because, just like now, it is the mostregulated part o the country’s financial system and,most importantly, the adequacy o banks’ capital in2008 was at a high level - about 22 per cent. Measuresin the field o bank supervision applied by the NBSprevented excessive household debt, which is whathappened in neighbouring countries. A large part osavings (40%) was immobilised as reserves with thecentral bank, which reduced ear among savers thatthey would not be able to withdraw their savings atwill.

At what stage is the Serbian banking sector

today and can growth in lending activities be

expected to return soon?

Viewed as a whole, the Serbian banking sector ishighly capitalised, highly liquid, but also restrainedwhen it comes to granting new loans to companiesand individuals. Unortunately, only a small numbero clients are creditworthy, because most o them are

drowning in debt. Tis is the situation in conditionswhen the stagnation o economic activity is expectedin 2014, provoked in part by the severe flooding inSerbia.Implementation o the state’s subsidised credit pro-gramme through banks in 2014-2015 will ease theoperations o creditworthy enterprises, because ex-pensive loans will be replaced with considerably morereasonable credit, at an interest rate o 5.45% or loansin dinars. However, companies that are not deemedcreditworthy do not have a chance to utilise these

Đorđe Đukić, profesor naEkonomskom fakultetu uBeogradu

Bankarskisektor jelikvidan iuzdržanDa li je bankarski sektor Srbije bio

spreman za udar nansijske krize i koji surazlozi njegove stabilnosti?

Bankarski sektor je bio spreman za udar finan-sijske krize jer je, kao i sada, najuređeniji deofinansijskog sistema zemlje, a što je najbitnije,adekvatnost kapitala banaka u 2008. je bila na

visokom nivou – oko 22 odsto. Mere iz oblastisupervizije banaka koje je primenila NBS pre-dupredile su prekomernu zaduženost stanov-ništva, što se desilo u zemljama u okruženju.Veliki deo štednje stanovništva (40%) bio jeimobilisan kod centralne banke, što je smanjilostrah kod štediša da neće moći da podignu svojuušteđevinu kada to požele.


sektor Srbije, da li se može uskoro

očekivati ponovo rast kreditne aktivnosti?

U celini posmatrano, bankarski sektor Srbije je visoko kapitalizovan, visoko likvidan, ali i uzdr-žan u odobravanju novih kredita preduzećimai stanovništvu. Nažalost, mali broj klijenata jekreditno sposoban, jer većina grca u dugovima.

Ovo je stanje u uslovima kada se u 2014. oče-kuje stagnacija privredne aktivnosti, izazvanedelom velikim poplavama u Srbiji. Realizacijadržavnog programa subvencionisanih kreditapreko banaka u 2014-2015. godini će olakšatiposlovanje preduzećima koja su kreditno spo-sobna, jer će skupe kredite zameniti znatno po-

voljnijim, po kamatnoj stopi od 5,45% za kredi-te u dinarima. Međutim, kreditno nesposobnapreduzeća nemaju šansu da koriste ove kredite.Da bi se otvorila mogućnost da veći broj malih




loans. In order to create the possibility or a largernumber o SMEs to use bank loans, the state wouldhave to resort to establishing a guarantee und, ol-lowing the example o other countries like Italy. Withthe creation o such a guarantee und, a greater num-ber o companies would qualiy to take advantage obank loans.With the high reerred interest rate o the NBS, the

highest in the region, banks will continue to use ex-cess liquidity to purchase o high-yield risk-ree secu-rities issued by the central bank and the state. Tis willhappen regardless o whether the interest rate regis-ters a decline (now at 8.5%) because the exchange rateis stable. Te restraint o banks in approving credit isnot specific to Serbia. It is also present in the euro-zone, despite the policy o an almost zero interest rateo the ECB and many years o pumping money intothe banking system. I’m not sure that the latest meas-ures to introduce negative interest rates on assets that

i srednjih preduzeća koristi kredite kod banaka,država bi morala da pribegne formiranju ga-rantnog fonda, po uzoru na neke zemlje poputItalije. Izdavanjem garancija takvog fonda većibroj preduzeća bi se kvalifikovao da koristi kre-dite kod banaka.Pri visokoj referentnoj kamatnoj stopi NBS, naj-

višoj u regionu, banke će nastaviti da višak li-

kvidnosti plasiraju u kupovinu visokoprinosnihbezrizičnih hartija koje emituju centralna bankai država. To će se desiti bez obzira na to što ka-matna stopa beleži tendenciju pada (sada iznosi8,5%) jer je devizni kurs stabilan. Uzdržanostbanaka kod odobravanja kredita nije specifič-nost Srbije. To je prisutno i u evrozoni, uprkosgotovo nultoj referentnoj kamatnoj stopi ECB-ai višegodišenjem upumpavanju novca u bankar-ski sistem. Nisam siguran da će najnovija merauvođenja negativne kamatne stope na sredstva




banks hold with the European Central Bank is moreimportant than changing the behaviour o banks.

What is the experience of other countries when

it comes to resolving NPLs? What solutions are

available to banks and monetary authorities?

Te practice in the world is amiliar with two solu-tions. First is to remove bad loans rom banks’ bal-ance sheets to a separate institution, public or private.Tat institution can unction as a so-called “clinicor banks” in state ownership, or as a und in major-ity private ownership. Te second solution is or allbad loans to be treated directly by the banks wherethey emerged, through a department or problemat-ic loans. I think the second solution is the only goodone or Serbia. Te key arguments or this are: first,placing responsibility or bad loans with bank execu-tives who brought the wrong decisions, as well as the

bank shareholders who tolerated the conducting opoor business policies. Second, the Bank’s Manage-ment Board will be punished or business ailures andit is appointed by shareholders, who will themselvesbe punished through a reduction in profits or the losso capital. Tird, it will discourage the re-emergenceo hazardous morality in the approving o new loansafer the end o the crisis, because there will be no be-lie that NPLs will be “cleansed” rom banks’ balancesheets with the financial support o the state. It willalso minimise the risk o corruption in the assigningo bank receivables to another institution. Likewise,taxpayers’ money will not be wasted rescuing badbanks, with taxpayers having already paid €800 mil-lion due to the ailure o our banks. Sixth, it createsan environment or the best banks to only be able toenter high risk situations or big profits on the basiso above-average amounts o their own equity capital,and not based on other people’s resources, such as cit-izens’ savings. Seventh, high bonuses or employeesin the NPL departments, related to the percentageo loan repayments, ensure the motivation or theirmaximum payment. Eighth, better inormation on

the market position o the client in the bank that hasapproved loans compared to other institutions. I thesolution I propose is not applied, there will again be ademonstration o the dominance o politics over eco-nomic science.

How much did credit expansion prior to the

crisis contribute to the high level of non-

performing loans after the crisis?

wice the share o non-perorming loans in totalloans at the end o the first quarter o 2014 (22.3%)

koja banke drže kod Evropske centralne bankebitinije promeniti ponašanje banaka.

Kakva je praksa drugih zemalja u rešavanju

NPL? Koja rešenja su na raspolaganju

bankama i monetarnim vlastima?

Praksa u svetu poznaje dva rešenja. Prvo, daloši plasmani budu izmešteni iz bilansa banakau posebnu instituciju, državnu ili privatnu. Tainstitucija može funkcionisati kao tzv. „bolnič-ka banka“ u državnom vlasništvu, ili kao fondu većinskom privatnom vlasništvu. Drugo reše-nje je da sve loše plasmane tretira sama banka ukojoj su nastali, kroz odeljenje za problematič-ne plasmane. Mislim da je drugo rešenje jedi-no dobro za Srbiju. Ključni argumenti za to su:prvo, lociranje odgovornosti za loše plasmanena upravu same banke koja je donosila pogre-

šne odluke, kao i akcionare banke koji su tole-risali vođenje loše poslovne politike. Drugo, zaposlovne promašaje kažnjava se uprava bankekoju su imenovali akcionari, kao i sami akcio-nari kroz smanjenje profita ili gubitak kapitala.Treće, destimuliše se ponovno prisutvo hazard-nog morala u odobravanju novih kredita nakonokončanja krize, jer neće biti verovanja da će uzfinansijsku podršku države NPL biti „očišćeni“iz bilansa banaka. Minimizuje se rizik korupcijeprilikom ustupanja potraživanja banke drugojinstituciji. Takođe, ne troši se novac poreskihobveznika za spasavanje loših banaka. Poreskiobveznici su već platili 800 miliona evra zbogpropasti četiri banke. Šesto, stvara se ambijentda najbolje banke, ulazeći u velike rizike zbog

velikih profita, to mogu činiti samo na osnovunatprosečnog iznosa sopstvenog kapitala, a nena osnovu tuđih sredstava, poput štednje gra-đana. Sedmo, visokim bonusima zaposlenih uodeljenju za problematične kredite, vezanim zaprocenat naplate kredita, obezbeđuje se motivi-sanost za njihovu maksimalnu naplatu. Osmo,

bolja informisanost o položaju klijenta na trži-štu u banci koja je odobravala kredite u odnosuna druge institucije. Ako se rešenje koje predla-žem ne primeni, ponovo će biti demonstriranadominacija politike nad ekonomskom naukom.

Koliko je kreditna ekspanzija pre krize

doprinela visokom nivou nenaplativih

kredita nakon izbijanja krize?

Dvostruko veće učešće nenaplativih kreditau ukupnim kreditima na kraju prvog kvartala




compared to the end o 2008, was largely a conse-quence o the enormous expansion o loans extend-ed by banks beore the crisis, at interest rates thatwere extremely high compared with neighbouringcountries (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia). In condi-tions o a general thirst or loans prior to the crisis,

businesses and citizens did not ask about prices andin some years credit growth amounted to over 50%.Beore the outbreak o the global crisis, there was al-most no other market in Europe where banks couldachieve such extra profits.Inflated real estate prices, which were used as collat-eral beore the crisis, created the illusion that bankswere well protected against credit risk. However,afer five years o crisis there is nobody to buy thatreal estate. Te second actor that explains the risein NPLs is the quality o bank management in termso managing credit risk. Tis must not be general-

ised, because some banks did well both beore andduring the crisis. By applying a conservative provi-sioning policy in the past, they are now not underany pressure to isolate the debtor’s property in primelocations at all costs.

In which way could a future nancial crisis and

a situation in which banks take on too much

risk be prevented?

Te remedy or preventing a new crisis is obligingbanks to have a greater amount o equity capital(strictly in the orm o ordinary shares), compared tototal assets, and towards risky assets that could be arti-ficially undervalued, as has been the case to date. TeBasel III regulations, which emerged as a responseto the crisis, mean that the level o equity capital canamount to 3% o total bank assets. Prior the crisis atsome o the largest banks in the world this amountedto 2 or 3% o their total assets.Te new regulation, where the required minimumcapital would be at a level o 20-30% o total bankassets, would make the financial system significantlysaer and healthier. Hazardous morality in banking

operations would be reduced, because the bulk o thelosses would all on the shoulders o shareholders andcreditors o the bank, and not at the expense o tax-payers. Te proessional arguments or this are irreu-table. However, the power o Wall Street to influenceCongress is too great, so it is not realistic to expectanything like this to appear on the agenda o the leg-islature. Tere are countries like Sweden that requirethe largest banks to have equity twice the size o theminimum requirements o Basel III in the unction oamortising losses in the uture.

2014. godine (22,3%) u odnosu na kraj 2008. ve-likim delom je posledica i enormne ekspanzijeodobrenih kredita banaka pre krize, po kamat-nim stopama koje su bile ekstremno visoke upoređenju sa zemljama u okruženju (Bugarska,Rumunija, Hrvatska). U uslovima opšte gladi za

kreditima pre krize, preduzeća i građani nisu pi-tali za cenu, a rast kredita je u nekim godinamaiznosio preko 50%. Pre izbijanja globalne krizeskoro da nije bilo tržišta u Evropi gde su bankemogle ostvariti tolike ekstraprofite. Naduvanecene nekretnina koje su korišćene kao obezbeđe-nje pre krize, stvarale su iluziju da su banke do-bro obezbeđene od kreditnog rizika. Međutim,nakon petogodišnje krize te nekretnine nemako da kupi. Drugi faktor koji objašnjava skoknenaplativih kredita je kvalitet uprava banaka upogledu upravljanja kreditnim rizikom. Ne sme

se generalizovati, jer neke banke dobro poslujui pre i tokom krize. Primenjujući konzervativnupolitiku rezervisanja u prošlosti, one sada nisupod pritiskom da otuđuju imovinu dužnika naatraktivnim lokacijama po svaku cenu.

Na koji način bi se mogla preduprediti neka

buduća nansijska kriza i situacija u kojoj

banke preuzimaju previše rizika?

Lek za sprečavanje novih kriza je obavezivanjebanaka da imaju veći iznos akcionarskog kapita-la (striktno u formi običnih akcija) u poređenjuprema ukupnoj aktivi, a ne kao do sada premarizičnoj aktivi koja je mogla biti i veštački potce-njena. Bazel III regulativa, nastala kao odgovorna krizu, znači da nivo akcionarskog kapitalamože iznositi 3% ukupne aktive banke. Pre krizekod nekih najvećih banaka u svetu iznosio je 2%ili 3% njihove ukupne aktive. Nova regulativagde bi zahtevani minimalni kapital bio na nivouod 20%-30% od ukupne aktive banaka, učiniobi finansijski sistem znatno sigurnijim i zdravi-

jim. Hazardni moral u poslovanju banaka bi bio

redukovan, jer bi najveći deo gubitaka pao nateret akcionara i kreditora banke, a ne na teretporeskih obveznika. Profesionalni argumenti zato su neoborivi. Međutim, moć Volstrita da uti-če na Kongres je suviše velika, pa nije realno dase kao takav uopšte nađe na dnevnom redu za-konodavnog tela. Postoje zemlje poput Švedskekoje zahtevaju od najvećih banaka da imaju ak-cionarski kapital dvostruko veći od minimumakoji zahteva Bazel III u funkciji amortizovanjagubitaka u budućnosti.




Dario Scanapieco, Vicepresidentof European Investment Bank

Deleveragingputs pressureon SEEcountriesHow did European nancial crisis hit nancial

sectors of emerging Europe?Deleveraging is a phenomenon that usually occursupon a loss o confidence by investors in the the mar-ket on account o political or economic considera-tions. For example, the “Argentina” scenario (1998-2002) stereotypes the consequence o a collapse inthe financial sector coupled with inappropriate eco-nomic policies which led the country into a severe,long recession. On the other hand, the Asian crisis(1997) may have resulted rom surges o capital in-flows to finance productive investments that madethe countries vulnerable to a financial panic, mainlybecause o weaknesses in their financial systems.While they held their ground relatively well in theearly part o the crisis, countries in Central East andSouth East Europe (CESEE) were negatively affectedby the financial crisis rom 2009 onwards. Growthplummeted as a result o lower or negative growthin economies in the EU, and the less reormed econ-omies, such as in the Western Balkans, experiencedoutright recessions. Tis impacted also confidencein the financial systems o the affected countries,hence, a trend o deleveraging began to occur.

EIB’s lending rose rom circa EUR 40 – 50 billionduring pre-crisis levels to a peak o almost EUR 80billion in 2009, with the additional unds channelledin support o industry, inrastructure and the finan-cial sector, mostly in avour o SME`s. Several yearsinto the crisis and ollowing a EUR 10 billion capitalinjection by the Bank’s shareholders, the Bank con-tinues to maintain a high level o lending: this hov-ers at around EUR 70 billion with emphasis on sup-porting investments in research and development,SMEs, renewable energies and climate change.

Dario Skanapieko, potpredsednikEvropske investicione banke

RazduživanjepritiskaJugoistočnuEvropu

Kako je evropska fnansijska kriza pogodila

fnansijske sektore u evropskim zemljamau razvoju?

Razduživanje je enomen koji se obično deša- va usled gubitka poverenja investitora u tržištezbog političkih ili ekonomskih prilika. Na pri-mer, “argentinski scenario” (1998-2002) je ste-reotip za posledice kolapsa finansijskog sektorauparenog sa neadekvatnom ekonomskom poli-tikom koja je odvela zemlju u tešku i dugu re-cesiju. S druge strane, azijska kriza (1997) je re-zultat ogromnog priliva kapitala za finansiranjeproduktivnih investicija, što je učinilo zemljeranjivim na finansijsku paniku, uglavnom zbogslabosti njihovih finansijskih sistema.Dok su se držale relativno dobro u ranom delukrize, zemlje u Centralnoj, Istočnoj i JugoistočnojEvropi (CIJIE) su negativno pogođene finansij-skom krizom, od 2009. godine pa nadalje. Pri-

vredni rast se urušio kao rezultat niskog ili nega-tivnog rasta u zemljama EU i manje reormisanedržave, kao na Zapadnom Balkanu, iskusile sudirektnu recesiju. Ovo je uticalo i na poverenjeu finansijske sisteme pogođenih zemalja, iz čega

je krenuo i trend razduživanja. U tom periodu,kreditiranje od strane EIB je poraslo sa pretkri-znih 40-50 milijardi evra, na 80 milijardi evra2009. godine, sa dodatnim sredstvima upućenimka podršci industriji, inrastrukturi i finansij-skom sektoru, uglavnom u korist malih i srednjihpreduzeća. Nakon nekoliko godina krize i nakoninjekcije kapitala od 10 milijardi evra od straneakcionara banke, banka je nastavila da održava

visok nivo kreditiranja koje se kreće oko 70 mi-lijardi evra, sa naglaskom na podršku investicija-




Why did deleveraging of West European in

East Europe banks occur and will it continue

in forthcoming period?

In 2008, the share o oreign-bank assets in total bankassets in CESEE was about 66% o higher (except inurkey at 15%). In Serbia that figure was 75%. Te rea-son or such high figures is that expectation or rapidincome growth in CESEE countries (and urkey) inthe beginning o the last decade directed significantoreign financing to lesser productive uses in the re-gion, in particular aimed at consumption rather thaninvestment. Te local subsidiaries o Western bankscontributed to the making o this credit-boom-gonebust in most CESEE countries by borrowing cheapunds rom their Western-based parent owners.

Such excessive growth largely financed rom abroadmade CESEE countries particularly vulnerable to asudden stop o these transers. As the financial crisisunolded and parent banks began to eel the squeezeon their capital adequacy ratios due to increased lev-els o NPLs and higher unding costs, unds beganto flow out o the local subsidiaries to parent banksto shore up the latters’ balance sheet. In the process,some banks strategically divested out o the CESEEmarket, as was the case o Belgium-based KBC Bankand French-based Crédit Agricole.

ma u istraživanje i razvoj, MSP, obnovljivu ener-giju i klimatske promene.

Zašto je došlo do razduživanja

zapadnoevropskih banaka u Istočnoj

Evropi i da li će se to nastaviti u narednom

periodu?

U 2008. godini udeo aktive stranih banaka uukupnoj aktivi banaka u CIJIE bio je oko 66odsto (osim u urskoj, gde je bilo 15 odsto). USrbiji ta cira iznosila je 75 odsto. Razlog za tako

visoke stope su očekivanja brzog rasta dohotkau ovim zemljama na početku prošle decenije,zbog čega su značajna inostrana sredstva usme-rena ka finansiranju manje produktivnih sekto-

ra u regionu, posebno u potrošnju, pre nego uinvesticije. Lokalne afilijacije zapadnih banakadoprinele su stvaranju ovog kreditnog buma u

većini CIJIE zemalja, pozajmljujući jefin novacod svojih matica sa Zapada. ako prekomeranrast, uglavnom finansiran inostranim sredstvi-ma, učinio je zemlje CIJIE posebno ranjivim naiznenadne prekide ovih transera. Kako se fi-nansijska kriza razvijala i matične banke počeleda osećaju pritisak na svoja racija adekvatnostikapitala zbog rasta NPL i viših troškova finansi-




It is important to mention that in order to stave offthe rapid deleveraging phenomenon that occurredrom 2008 onwards, the international finance insti-tutions (IFIs), including EIB, initiated the creationo the Vienna Initiative. Te main goal o this ini-tiative was to ensure that oreign banks remained

committed to the region and preserve capital andunding or the local banking sector. ogether, EIB,the World Bank Group, IMF, European Commis-sion and the EBRD also made a substantial com-mitment by providing EUR 24.5 billion or theperiod 2009-2010 or crisis related support or thefinancial sector in CESEE. By end 2010, the initialcommitment was largely exceeded as actual sup-port reached EUR 33 billion, and at that time thissofened the blow o the deleveraging process.

NPL are one of the biggest problems of

banking sector in the CESEE region, andespecially in Serbia? How did European

countries deal with that problem?

Te high level o NPLs, a drag on the economyand a threat to a lasting recovery, was institution-ally tackled at the level o the Vienna Initiative inMarch 2011 through the creation o a WorkingGroup on NPLs whose aim was to analyse theramework or dealing with NPLs o householdsand corporates.Te main stumbling blocks are o a legal, judicial, taxand regulatory nature which are holding up NPL res-olution. Te list o obstacles is long, such as, amongothers, lack o enorcement o collateral, underde-

veloped rameworks or going concern, weaknessesand inefficiencies in the legal institutional rame-work, inefficient tax systems, weak banking super-

vision and underdeveloped markets or distressedassets which limit the scope o NPL resolution.

Can you describe the role of European

Investment Bank, in development of Serbian

nancial system?

Te Bank’s support to SMEs through commercialbanks and leasing companies in Serbia amounts toEUR 1,4 billion since 2002. EIB provides long termfinancing to SMEs at considerably lower interestrates and longer maturities which are usually notavailable in the local market. All productive sectorso the real economy are targeted and the Bank’s im-pact on sustaining SMEs during difficult economictimes is real. Te EIB Group, in cooperation withthe European Commission and other IFIs, alsoprovides customised solutions to the SME and mi-

ranja, ondovi su počeli da se odlivaju iz lokal-nih afilijacija prema bankama maticama, kakobi popravili njihove bilanse. U tom procesu nekebanke su strateški dezinvestirale na CIJIE trži-štima, kao u slučaju belgijske KBC banke i ran-cuske Kredi agrikol.

Važno je pomenuti da su, kako bi se obuzdalobrzo razduživanje koje se dešava od 2008. go-dine, međunarodne finansijske institucije (MFI)uključujući EIB, inicirale stvaranje Bečke inici-

jative. Glavni cilj ove inicijative bio je da se obez-bedi da strane banke ostanu posvećene regionui sačuvaju kapital i finansiranje lokalnog ban-karskog sektora. Zajedno, EIB, Svetska banka,MMF, Evropska komisija i EBRD su obezbedili24,5 milijardi evra u periodu od 2009. do 2010.godine za podršku finansijskom sektoru CIJIE.Do kraja 2010. godine početni ond je preko-

račen i stvarna podrška dostigla je 33 milijardeevra, što je ublažilo udar procesa razduživanja.

Nenaplativi krediti su jedan od najvećih

problema bankarskih sektora u CIJIE

regionu i posebno u Srbiji. Kako su

evropske zemlje rešile taj problem?

Problemu visokog nivoa NPL, tega za privredu ipretnje oporavku, institucionalno je pristuplje-no na nivou Bečke inicijative u martu 2011. go-dine kroz stvaranje radne grupe za NPL, čiji jecilj bila analiza regulatornog okvira za rešavanjeNPL domaćinstava i privrede.Glavne prepreke u rešavanju problema su za-konske, sudske i regulatorne prirode. Lista pre-preka je dugačka, a među njima su nedostatakrealizacije sredstava obezbeđenja, nerazvijenastečajna regulativa, slabosti i neefikasnost u za-konskim institucionalnim procedurama, neefi-kasan poreski sistem, slaba supervizija banakai nerazvijena tržišta loše aktive, što ograničavarazrešenje NPL-ova.

Možete li opisati ulogu Evropske

investicione banke u razvoju srpskog

fnansijskog sistema?

Podrška EIB malim i srednjim preduzećimakroz komercijalne banke i lizing kompanije uSrbiji od 2002. godine iznosi 1,4 milijarde evra.EIB obezbeđuje dugoročno finansiranje MSP saznatno nižim kamatnim stopama i dužim ro-kovima dospeća, koji obično nisu dostupni nalokalnom tržištu. Cilj su svi produktivni sekto-ri realne ekonomije i uticaj banke na održivost




crofinance sectors through the European Fund orSouth East Europe (EFSEE), whose remit is also tostrengthen the local financial markets.Te Green or Growth Fund, Southeast Europe(GGF) has been initiated in December 2009 bythe European Investment Bank and KW withthe financial support o the European Commis-sion and European Bank or Reconstruction andDevelopment.Another EU unded initiative (where EIB is a part-ner), the Western Balkans Enterprise Development

& Innovation Facility (WB EDIF) established inDecember 2012, aims at increasing the financialresources made available to SMEs based in the re-gion, as well as technical assistance or strategicinvestments, particularly in inrastructure, energyefficiency and private sector development, to sup-port socioeconomic development and EU accessionacross the region. Te EUR 145 million o initialcapital pulled together under WB EDIF may trans-late into about EUR 300 million o finance benefit-ting SMEs based in the Western Balkan countries.

MSP tokom teških ekonomskih vremena je re-alan. EIB grupa u saradnji sa Evropskom komi-sijom i drugim međunarodnim finansijskim in-stitucijama takođe obezbeđuje rešenja za MSPi mikrofinansijski sektor kroz Evropski ond zaJugoistočnu Evropu, čiji zadatak je takođe jača-nje lokalnih finansijskih tržišta.Zeleno za rast za Jugoistočnu Evropu je ondpokrenut u decembru 2009. od strane EIB iKW, uz finansijsku podršku Evropske komisi-

je i EBRD. Druga inicijativa koju finansira EU,

gde je EIB partner, Projekat za razvoj i inovacije za preduzeća Zapadnog Balkana (WB EDIF)uspostavljen u decembru 2012. ima za cilj po-

većanje finansijskih resursa za strateške investi-cije, posebno u inrastrukturu, energetsku efi-kasnost i razvoj privatnog sektora, za podrškusocioekonomskom razvoju i pristupu EU širomcelog regiona. Početni kapital od 145 milionaevra u okviru ovog projekta može prerasti uoko 300 miliona evra finansija za MSP na Za-padnom Balkanu.




Matteo Patrone, Head of EBRDoffice in Belgrade

Banking

sector needsconsolidation

The banking sector has coped

reasonably well with the crisis

but the system has seriousvulnerabilities. NPLs, especially

in the corporate sector are

unsustainable, says Mateo Pattrone

Serbian nancial sector, particularly banks,

were characterized as a most reformed and

stabile part of Serbian economy before crisis.

What was the main reasons for such claims?

In the pre-crisis year, the financial sector was oneof the main beneficiaries of foreign direct invest-ments, and the influx of capital from abroad notonly boosted capital but also brought in new skillsand services. In addition, the sector benefittedfrom careful and prudent supervision by the Na-tional Bank of Serbia. Tese factors contributed tothe subsequent stability of the sector in the face ofthe global crisis.

How in your opinion European nancial crisis

in 2008. hit the nancial sector of Serbia and

how did the nancial sector respond?

Overall, the financial sector has responded well tothe crisis. Banks have remained well capitalisedthroughout the crisis, with the well known excep-tions of Agrobanka, RBV, Privredna and Univerzal.Firm and timely action by the central bank helpedto stem deposit outflos, and within a relativelyshort space of time the level of deposits in the sys-tem was back at pre-crisis levels. In addition, the“Vienna Initiative“, a framework for safeguardingthe financial stability of emerging Europe, helpedto ensure that foreign parent banks remained com-

Mateo Patrone, šef KancelarijeEBRD u Srbiji

BankarskomsektorupotrebnakonsolidacijaBankarski sektor se borio prilično

dobro sa krizom, ali sistem ima

ozbiljne slabosti. NPL, posebno ukorporativnom sektoru, neodrživi

su, kaže Mateo Patrone

Srpski nansijski sektor, posebno banke,često je okarakterisan kao najreformisanijii najstabilniji deo srpske privrede prekrize. Šta su bili razlozi za takve ocene?U pretkriznim godinama finansijski sektor jebio jedan od najvećih korisnika stranih direkt-nih investicija i priliv kapitala spolja ne samoda je povećavao kapital, već je donosio i nove veštine i usluge. Uz to bankarski sektor je imaoi koristi od pažljive i stroge supervizije Narodnebanke Srbije. Ovi faktori su doprineli stabilno-sti sektora uoči globalne krize.

Kako je, prema vašem mišljenju, evropskanansijska kriza 2008. godine pogodilanansijski sektor Srbije i kako jenansijski sektor odgovorio na krizu?

Ukupno, finansijski sektor je odgovorio dobrona krizu. Banke su ostale dobro kapitalizovane tokom krize uz dobro poznate izuzetke,Agrobanku, RBV, Privrednu i Univerzal ban-ku. Čvrsta i pravovremena akcija centralnebanke pomogla je da se spreče povlačenja de-pozita i tokom relativno kratkog perioda nivodepozita bio je na pretkriznom nivou. Uz to,Bečka inicijativa, okvir za očuvanje finansijskestabilnosti u evropskim zemljama u razvoju,pomogla je da matice banaka ostanu uz svoje




mitted to their subsidiaries in Serbia, thus ensur-ing confidence overall in the sector.

After more than ve years after the crisis

started, what are the main challenges for

Serbian nancial sector, especially banks?

Te banking sector has coped reasonably well withthe crisis but the system has serious vulnerabilities.NPLs, especially in the corporate sector are unsus-tainable, there is a need for consolidation, with fivebanks out of 29 have a cumulative market share of50 percent and 14 banks loss making, the level ofeurisation is untenable.

afilijacije u Srbiji, tako čuvajući poverenje ucelokupni sektor.

Nakon više od pet godina krize, šta susada najveći izazovi za nansijski sektor,pre svega za banke?Banke su se prilično dobro borile sa krizom, alisistem ima ozbiljnih slabosti. NPL-ovi, posebnou korporativnom sektoru, neodrživi su, postojipotreba za konsolidacijom za pet od 29 banakakoje imaju kumulativni tržišni udeo od 50 od-sto i 14 banaka koje su napravile gubitak. Tako-đe, nivo evroizacije je neodbranjiv.




NPL in Serbia are among highest in the

region. What are the causes for that and

what could be solutions?

Te financial crisis of 2008/09 brought forwardthe problems of the banking system accumulat-ed over the previous years- one of those was poorquality of some loans.While high level of NPLs in Serbia is comparablewith other countries in the Western Balkans, they

Nenaplativi krediti u Srbiji su međunajvišim u regionu. Šta su uzroci i štamogu biti rešenja?Finansijska kriza iz 2008/2009. godine izbaci-la je na površinu probleme koje je bankarskisistem akumulirao tokom prethodnih godina- jedan od njih je slab kvalitet nekih zajmova.Dok je visok nivo NPL uporediv sa drugim ze-mljama na Zapadnom Balkanu, oni nisu održi-




are not sustainable as they hinder the ability ofbanks to finance the real economy.

How development of other nancial

institution such as insurance, Belgrade

stock exchange or investment and pension

funds could improve the stability of nancialmarket and accessibility of nance for

companies?

Development of such institutions will help to in-crease confidence in the financial sector. Tis willplay an important role in providing long-term fi-nancing which remains a challenge, especially forthe development of small and medium enterpris-es, the backbone of Serbian economy.Non-bank financial institutions such as leasingcompanies or the microcredit sector in generalshould be developed in order to help deepen-

ing financial intermediation. Te capital marketshould grow in synergy with other regional mar-kets to achieve the critical mass needed to be-come an efficient source of long-term finance forthe real economy.

Can you describe the role of international

nance institutions, particularly EBRD, in

development of Serbian nancial system last

13 years?

We have been investing heavily in the sector andwe have been conducting intensive policy dialogueactivity. We have invested more than Eur 1 bn andwe currently have a portfolio of more than EUR600 million in both equity and financing lines inthe financial sector, and we are planning signifi-cant projects, the most relevant this year being aEUR 200 million stand by line credit line to theDeposit Insurance Agency which is responsible formanaging the Deposit Insurance Fund, in order tohelp underpin confidence in the banking sector,specifically the capacity of the Insurance Fund tomeet future unforeseen claims. Our support for

the deposit insurance system is part of a concertedIFI effort in which World Bank and the IMF aim tointroduce a bank resolution framework.In terms of policy dialogue we are working withthe authorities on a number of areas, from dinar-isation (we have made very good progress thanksto the NBS, the Ministry of finance and the Se-curities Commission in establishing the condi-tions for the issuance of a dinar bond) to NPLsresolution (with a focus on consensual financialrestructuring).

vi jer ometaju sposobnost banaka da finansiraju realnu ekonomiju.

Kako razvoj drugih nansijskih institucija,kao što su osiguranje, berza ili investicionii penzijski fondovi, mogu da unaprede

stabilnost nansijskog tržišta i dostupnostnansija kompanijama?Razvoj ovih institucija pomoći će da se povećapoverenje u finansijski sektor. To će igrati va-žnu uogu u obezbeđivanju dugoročnog finan-siranja, što ostaje izazov, posebno za razvojmalih i srednjih preduzeća, okosnice srpskeekonomije.Nebankarske finansijske institucije, kao što sulizing kompanije ili mikrokreditni sektor ge-neralno, trebalo bi da bude razvijen kako bi sepomoglo produbljivanju finansijskog posredo-

vanja. Tržište kapitala bi trebalo da raste zajed-no sa ostalim regionalnim tržištima, kako bi sedostigla kritična masa potrebna da bi ovo trži-šte postalo efikasan izvor dugoročnog finansi-ranja realne privrede.

Možete li opisati ulogu EBRD u razvojunansijskog sistema u Srbiji?EBRD je veoma mnogo investirala u finansij-ski sektor Srbije i intenzivno smo učestvovaliu dijalogu o politikama. Investirali smo višeod jedne milijarde evra i trenutno imamoportfolio do 600 miliona evra i u kapital i ufinansijske linije ka finansijskom sektoru. Ta-kođe, planiramo značajne projekte, a najzna-čajniji ove godine je 200 miliona evra „stendbaj“ kreditna linija za Agenciju za osiguranjedepozita kako bi se poduprlo poverenje u ban-karski sektor, pre svega kako bi kapacitet ga-rantnog fonda mogao da odgovori nepredvi-đenim zahtevima u budućnosti. Naša podrškasistemu osiguranja depozita je deo zajednič-kih napora međunarodnih finansijskih insti-

tucija kroz koje Svetska banka i MMF nastojeda uvedu okvir za rešavanje problema u ban-karskom sektoru.Što se tiče dijaloga o politikama, radimo sa

vlastima u više oblasti, od dinarizacije (ima-mo veoma dobar napredak, zahvaljujući NBS,Ministarstvu finansija i Komisiji za hartije od

vrednosti, u uspostavljanju uslova za emisijudinarskih obveznica) do rešavanja nenaplativihkredita (sa fokusom na dobrovoljno finansijskorestrukturiranje).










Najveći akcionari (preko 5%)

Sunoko d.o.o. Novi Sad,sa povezanim licima

50.37%

Agricultural Bank o Greece 20.35%

• Miodrag Kostić, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Vladimir Čupić, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 152.401.643.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 51.493.696.000 RSD


ALPHA BANK A.E. 100%

• Georgios Aronis, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Georgios Papanastasiou, predsednik Izvršnogodbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 82.897.295.000 RSDKapital 31.12.2013 11.560.231.000 RSD


Intesa Sanpaolo Holding InternationalS.A.

77.79%

Intesa Sanpaolo SPA 15.21%IFC 7.00%

• Massimo Malagoli, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Draginja Đurić, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 427.241.355.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 98.887.188.000 RSD

Largest shareholders (over 5%)

Intesa Sanpaolo Holding InternationalS.A.

77.79%

Intesa Sanpaolo SPA 15.21%IFC 7.00%

• Massimo Malagoli, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Draginja Đurić, Chairwoman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 427,241,355,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 98,887,188,000 RSD


ALPHA BANK A.E. 100%

• Georgios Aronis, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Georgios Papanastasiou, Chairman o theExecutive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 82,897,295,000 RSDEquity 31.12.2013 11,560,231,000 RSD


Sunoko Ltd. Novi Sad,with related parties

50.37%

Agricultural Bank o Greece 20.35%

• Miodrag Kostić, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Vladimir Čupić, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 152,401,643,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 51,493,696,000 RSD

AGROINDUSTRIJSKO KOMERCIJALNA BANKA „AIK BANKA“ AD NIŠAGROINDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL BANK „AIK BANKA“ JSC, NIŠ

ALPHA BANK SERBIA JSC, BELGRADEALPHA BANK SRBIJA AD BEOGRAD

BANCA INTESA AKCIONARSKO DRUŠTVO BEOGRADBANCA INTESA JSC BELGRADE




BANKA POŠTANSKA ŠTEDIONICA AD BEOGRADPOŠTANSKA ŠTEDIONICA BANK, JSC, BELGRADE

CRÉDIT AGRICOLE BANK SERBIA JSC, NOVI SAD

ČAČANSKA BANKA JSC, ČAČAK

CRÉDIT AGRICOLE BANKA SRBIJA, AD NOVI SAD

ČAČANSKA BANKA AD ČAČAK


JP P Saobraćaja Srbija 49.56%

Republika Srbija 47.84%

• Miloš Miščević, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Srđan Cekić, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 99.559.603.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 12.449.005.000 RSD


PC P Saobraćaja Srbija 49.56%

Te Republic o Serbia 47.84%

• Miloš Miščević, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Srđan Cekić, Chairman o the Executive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 99,559,603,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 12,449,005,000 RSD


CREDI AGRICOLE S.A. 100%

• Olivier Gavalda, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Bruno-Marie Charrier, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 61.836.391.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 8.435.867.000 RSD


CREDI AGRICOLE S.A. 100%

• Olivier Gavalda, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Bruno-Marie Charrier, Chairman o theExecutive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 61,836,391,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 8,435,867,000 RSD



European bank or reconstruction and

development London

25.00%

IFC 20.00%

• Bojan Dimitrijević, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Dragan Jovanović, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 33.816.142.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 4.990.725.000 RSD


Republic o Serbia 28.49%

European bank or reconstruction and

development London

25.00%

IFC 20.00%

• Bojan Dimitrijević, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Dragan Jovanović, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 33,816,142,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 4,990,725,000 RSD





Kompanija „Dunav osiguranje“ ADo.Beograd

58.68%

Društvo za reosiguranje Dunav READo. Beograd 13.79%

• Marko Ćulibrk, predsednik Upravniodbora

• Srđan Brajović, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 7.367.346.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 1.704.034.000 RSD


Kompanija „Dunav osiguranje“ ADo.Belgrade

58.68%

Društvo za reosiguranje Dunav READo. Belgrade 13.79%

• Marko Ćulibrk, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Srđan Brajović, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 7,367,346,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 1,704,034,000 RSD


EGB CEPS HOLDING Gmbh, Wien 74.00%

Steiermärkische Bank und SparkassenAG, Graz

26.00%

• Gernot Mittendorer, predsednik Upravnogodbora

•

Slavko Carić, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 97.942.217.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 14.359.377.000 RSD


EGB CEPS HOLDING Gmbh, Vienna 74.00%

Steiermärkische Bank und SparkassenAG, Graz

26.00%

• Gernot Mittendorer, Chairman o theManagement Board

•

Slavko Carić, Chairman o the Executive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 97,942,217,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 14,359,377,000 RSD

DUNAV BANKA JSC, BELGRADEDUNAV BANKA AD BEOGRAD

ERSTE BANK AD NOVI SADERSTE BANK JSC, NOVI SAD


EFG Eurobank Ergasias Athens 55.80%Holding BV Naritaveg 42,74%

• Antonios Hassiotis, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Filippos Karamanolis, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 158.041.420.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 46.823.418.000 RSD


EFG Eurobank Ergasias Athens 55.80%Holding BV Naritaveg 42.74%

• Antonios Hassiotis, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Filippos Karamanolis, Chairman o theExecutive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 158,041,420,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 46,823,418,000 RSD

EUROBANK AD BEOGRADEUROBANK JSC, BELGRADE





FINDOMESIC BANCA SPA 100.00%

•

Chiaffredo Salomone, predsednik Upravnogodbora• Angelo Paolo Scatigna, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 15.845.412.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 3.449.024.000 RSD


FINDOMESIC BANCA SPA 100.00%

•

Chiaffredo Salomone, Chairman o theManagement Board• Angelo Paolo Scatigna, Chairman o the

Executive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 15,845,412,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 3,449,024,000 RSD


Hypo SEE Holding AG, Klagenurt 99.99%

• Mag.Wolgang Edelmϋller, predsednikUpravnog odbora

• Zoran Vojnović, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 125.394.026.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 28.393.201.000 RSD


Hypo SEE Holding AG, Klagenurt 99.99%

• Mag.Wolgang Edelmϋller, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Zoran Vojnović, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 125,394,026,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 28,393,201,000 RSD

FINDOMESTIC BANKA AD BEOGRADFINDOMESTIC BANKA JSC, BELGRADE

HYPO ALPE-ADRIA-BANK AD BEOGRAD

HYPO ALPE-ADRIA-BANK JSC, BELGRADE



NLB banka 6.75%

Beobanka AD Beograd, u stečaju 6.62%

SFRJ 5.33%

• Zoran Vojnović, predsednik Izvršnog odbora• Zoran Lilić, predsednik Upravnog odbora,

nezavisan• Slobodan Janjić, predsednik izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 14.780.698.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 5.559.373.000 RSD

JUBMES BANKA AD BEOGRADJUBMES BANKA JSC, BELGRADE



NLB bank 6.75%

Beobanka AD Beograd, in bankruptcy 6.62%

Socialist Federal Republic o Yugoslavia 5.33%• Zoran Vojnović, Chairman o the Executive

Board• Zoran Lilić, Chairman o the Management

Board, independent• Slobodan Janjić, Chairman o the Executive

Board

Assets 31.12.2013 14,780,698,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 5,559,373,000 RSD





Jugobanka AD Beograd, u stečaju 51.28%

Fond za razvoj RS-Beograd 30.64%

Beobanka AD Beograd, u stečaju 10.01%

• Zvonko Burić, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Draško Knežević, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 1.284.619.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 1.096.842.000 RSD


Jugobanka JSC, Belgrade, in bankruptcy 51.28%

Te Development Fund o the RS 30.64%

Beobanka JSC, Belgrade, in bankruptcy 10.01%

• Zvonko Burić, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Draško Knežević, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 1,284,619,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 1,096,842,000 RSD


TELENOR DANMARK HOLDING A/S 100.00%

• ine Wollebekk, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Martin Navratil, predsednik Izvršnog odbora



TELENOR DANMARK HOLDING A/S 100.00%

• ine Wollebekk, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Martin Navratil, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard


„JUGOBANKA JUGBANKA“ AD KOSOVSKA MITROVICAJUGOBANKA JUGBANKA JSC, KOSOVSKA MITROVICA

TELENOR BANKA AD BEOGRADTELENOR BANKA JSC, BELGRADE


NOVA KBM D.D. MARIBOR 89.53%

• Mr Igor Žibrik,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Ljubinka Lovčević, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 12.634.966.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 2.668.899.000 RSD

KBM BANKA AD KRAGUJEVACKBM BANKA JSC, KRAGUJEVAC


NOVA KBM D.D. MARIBOR 89.53%

• Mr Igor Žibrik, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Ljubinka Lovčević, Chairwoman o theExecutive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 12,634,966,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 2,668,899,000 RSD






European bank or reconstructionand development

25.00%

• Siniša Mali, predsednik Upravnog odbora• Ivica Smolić, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 363.654.367.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 64.962.219.000 RSD



European bank or reconstructionand development

25.00%

• Siniša Mali, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Ivica Smolić, Chairman o the Executive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 363,654,367,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 64,962,219,000 RSD


CYPRUS POPULAR BANKPUBLIC Co Ltd

98.99%

• Georgiou Georgios, predsednik Upravnogodbora

• Elefherios Papaeracleous, predsednik IO



CYPRUS POPULAR BANKPUBLIC Co Ltd

98.99%

• Georgiou Georgios, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Elefherios Papaeracleous, Chairman o theExecutive Board


KOMERCIJALNA BANKA AD BEOGRADKOMERCIJALNA BANKA JSC, BELGRADE

MARFIN BANK JSC, BELGRADEMARFIN BANK AD BEOGRAD


NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKA 99.99%

• Archibald Kremser,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Branko Greganović, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 39.132.846.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 6.113.555.000 RSD

NLB BANKA AD BEOGRADNLB BANKA JSC, BELGRADE


NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKA 99.99%

• Archibald Kremser,Chairman o theManagement Board

• Branko Greganović, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 39,132,846,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 6,113,555,000 RSD





OP BANK 96.94%

• László Wol, predsednik Upravnog odbora• Imre Bertalan, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 31.879.382.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 9.993.301.000 RSD


OP BANK 96.94%

• László Wol, Chairman o the Management Board• Imre Bertalan, Chairman o the Executive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 31,879,382,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 9,993,301,000 RSD


OPPORTUNITY TRANSFORMATIONINVESTMENTS, INC

66,95%

EUROPEAN BANK FORRECONSTRUCTION ANDDEVELOPMENT

17,3%

NEDERLANDSE FINANCIERINGS-MAATSCHAPPIJ VOORONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN N.V.

11.54%

• Karel Rene Jacobus de Waala,predsednik UO

• Vladimir Vukotić, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 8.878.186.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 1.382.152.000 RSD


OPPORTUNITY TRANSFORMATIONINVESTMENTS, INC

66,95%

EUROPEAN BANK FORRECONSTRUCTION ANDDEVELOPMENT

17,3%

NEDERLANDSE FINANCIERINGS-MAATSCHAPPIJ VOORONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN N.V.

11.54%

• Karel Rene Jacobus de Waala, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Vladimir Vukotić, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 8,878,186,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 1,382,152,000 RSD

OTP BANKA SRBIJA AD NOVI SADOTP BANKA SRBIJA JSC, NOVI SAD

OPPORTUNITY BANKA AD NOVI SADOPPORTUNITY BANKA JSC, NOVI SAD


Piraeus Bank SA Athens 100.00%

• Ilias Milis, predsednik Upravnog odbora• Neoclis Neocleous,

predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 58.710.063.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 11.663.127.000 RSD

PIRAEUS BANK AD BEOGRADPIRAEUS BANK JSC, BELGRADE


Piraeus Bank SA Athens 100.00%

• Ilias Milis, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Neoclis Neocleous, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 58,710,063,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 11,663,127,000 RSD





ProCredit Holding AG&Co. KgaA 100.00%

• Borislav Kostadinov,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Svetlana olmačeva Dingarac, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 69.527.208.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 11.535.300.000 RSD


ProCredit Holding AG&Co. KgaA 100.00%

• Borislav Kostadinov, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Svetlana olmačeva Dingarac, Chairman o theExecutive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 69,527,208,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 11,535,300,000 RSD


Raiffeisen SEE Region Holding GmbH 100,00%

• Peter Lennkh,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Zoran Petrović, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 205.492.743.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 56.354.537.000 RSD


Raiffeisen SEE Region Holding GmbH 100,00%

• Peter Lennkh, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Zoran Petrović, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 205,492,743,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 56,354,537,000 RSD

ProCredit Bank AD BeogradProCredit Bank JSC, BELGRADE

RAIFFEISEN BANKA JSC, BELGRADERAIFFEISEN BANKA AD Beograd


Sberbank Europe AG 100.00%

• David Vadnal,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Valeriy Ovsyannikov,predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 99.422.343.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 21.572.530.000 RSD

SBERBANK SRBIJA JSC, BELGRADESBERBANK SRBIJA AD BEOGRAD


Sberbank Europe AG 100.00%

• David Vadnal, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Valeriy Ovsyannikov, Chairman o theExecutive Board

Assets 31.12.2013 99,422,343,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 21,572,530,000 RSD





Societe Generale S.A. 99.99%

• Goran Pitić,predsednik Upravnog odbora, nezavisan

• Frederic Coin, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 220.913.478.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 33.358.919.000 RSD


Societe Generale S.A. 99.99%

• Goran Pitić, Chairman o the ManagementBoard, independent

• Frederic Coin, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 220,913,478,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 33,358,919,000 RSD



• Nada Popović,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Vesna Jokanović, predsednik IO

Aktiva 31.12.2013 28.056.533.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 4.311.686.000 RSD


Republic of Serbia 99.06%

• Nada Popović, Chairwoman o theManagement Board

• Vesna Jokanović, Chairwoman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 28,056,533,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 4,311,686,000 RSD

SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE BANKA SRBIJA JSC, BELGRADESOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE BANKA SRBIJA AD BEOGRAD

SRPSKA BANKA JSC, BELGRADESRPSKA BANKA AD BEOGRAD


UNICREDI BANK AUSRIA AG 100.00%

• Erich Hampel,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Claudio Cesario, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 251.953.242.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 50.183.784.000 RSD

UNICREDIT BANK SRBIJA JSC, BELGRADEUNICREDIT BANK SRBIJA AD BEOGRAD


UNICREDI BANK AUSRIA AG 100.00%

• Erich Hampel, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Claudio Cesario, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 251,953,242,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 50,183,784,000 RSD





VB Bank 100,00%

• Vasilij Nikolajevič itov,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Vladimir Zečar, predsednik Izvršnog odbora

Aktiva 31.12.2013 10.260.889.000 RSD

Kapital 31.12.2013 768.261.000 RSD


VB Bank 100,00%

• Vasilij Nikolajevič itov, Chairman o theManagement Board

• Vladimir Zečar, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard

Assets 31.12.2013 10,260,889,000 RSD

Equity 31.12.2013 768,261,000 RSD


National bank of Greece 100.00%

• Pavlos Mylonas,predsednik Upravnog odbora

• Marinos Vathis, predsednik Izvršnog odbora



National bank of Greece 100.00%

• Pavlos Mylonas, Chairman o the ManagementBoard

• Marinos Vathis, Chairman o the ExecutiveBoard


VTB Banka AD Beograd VTB Banka JSC, BELGRADE

VOJVOĐANSKA BANKA JSC, NOVI SAD VOJVOĐANSKA BANKA AD NOVI SAD




Najveći akcionari

Adriatic Slovenica, Koper, Slovenija 96.03%

»KD Kvart« d.o.o. Ljubljana 3.70%

• Direktor: Bojana Svilar

Najveći akcionari

AMSS Beograd 42,66%

AUO-MOO DRUŠVO RAKOVICA 7,59%

PREDUZEĆE-AMSS D.O.O. Beograd 7,31%

• Direktor: Vučeta Mandić

Najveći akcionari

AXA MEDIERRANEAN HOLDINGS.A. Španija

99,99%

KINSELLAR d.o.o., Beograd 0,01%

• Direktor: Lea Markštajn Stojanović

Najveći akcionari

AXA MEDIERRANEAN HOLDINGS.A.

99.99%

KINSELLAR, d.o.o. Beograd 0.01%

• Direktor: Adamantios Chatzistylis

Largest shareholders

AXA MEDIERRANEAN HOLDINGS.A.

99.99%

KINSELLAR, d.o.o. Belgrade 0.01%

• Director: Adamantios Chatzistylis


AXA MEDIERRANEAN HOLDINGS.A. Spain

99,99%

KINSELLAR d.o.o., Belgrade 0,01%

• Director: Lea Markštajn Stojanović


AMSS Beograd 42,66%

AUO-MOO DRUŠVO RAKOVICA 7,59%

PREDUZEĆE-AMSS D.O.O. Belgrade 7,31%

• Director: Vučeta Mandić


Adriatic Slovenica, Koper, Slovenia 96.03%

»KD Kvart« d.o.o. Ljubljana 3.70%

• Director: Bojana Svilar

AD ZA NEŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE „AS OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR NON-LIFE INSURANCE „AS OSIGURANJE“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „AMS OSIGURANJE“

JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „AMS OSIGURANJE“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „AXA NEŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „AXA NON-LIFE INSURANCE“

„AXA ŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“ AD ZA OSIGURANJE BEOGRADJOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „AXA LIFE INSURANCE“ BELGRADE




Najveći akcionari

Baloise Holding, Bazel, Švajcarska 99,99%

Wol Teiss d.o.o. Beograd 0,01%

• Direktor: Vladimir Radić


Baloise Holding, Basel, Switzerland 99,99%

Wol Teiss d.o.o. Belgrade 0,01%

• Director: Vladimir Radić

Najveći akcionari

Baloise Holding, Bazel, Švajcarska 99,99%Wol Teiss d.o.o. Beograd 0,01%

• Direktor: Vladimir Medan


Baloise Holding, Basel, Switzerland 99,99%Wol Teiss d.o.o. Belgrade 0,01%

• Director: Vladimir Medan

Najveći akcionari

Fondiaria - SAI, Italija 83,32%

Privatizacioni registar 6,58%

Apatinska pivara AD 1,53%

Ostali (sa učešćem ispod 1%) 8,57%

• Direktor: Christian Otto Neu


Fondiaria - SAI, Italy 83,32%

Privatisation register 6,58%

Apatinska brwery AD 1,53%

Other (share below 1%) 8,57%

• Director: Christian Otto Neu

Najveći akcionari

Generali PPF Holding B.V. 100%

• Direktor: Andrea Simoncelli


Generali PPF Holding B.V. 100%

• Director: Andrea Simoncelli

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „BASLER“, neživotno osiguranjeJOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „BASLER“, non-life insurance

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „BASLER“, životno osiguranjeJOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „BASLER“, life insurance

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „DDOR NOVI SAD“

JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „DDOR NOVI SAD“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „DELTA GENERALI OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „DELTA GENERALI OSIGURANJE“




Najveći akcionari

Akcijski kapital 5.39%

KOMERCIJALNA BANKA AD 10.11%GP Napred 6.75%

REPUBLIKA SRBIJA 3.67%

RB Bor 2.97%

Ostali - akcionari sa učešćem ispod 5% 58.48%

Državni i društveni kapital 94.61%

• Direktor: Marko Ćulibrk


Share capital 5.39%

KOMERCIJALNA BANKA AD 10.11%GP Napred 6.75%

REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 3.67%

RB Bor 2.97%

Other - shareholders with a < 5% share 58.48%

State and social capital 94.61%

• Director: Marko Ćulibrk

Najveći akcionari

„Energoprojekt Holding“ 92,94%

Jubmes banka AD Beograd 7.03%

• Direktor: Mirjana Bogićević

Najveći akcionari

Milovan Đurović 34.27%

Uni global d.o.o., Beograd 19.98%

Globosino d.o.o. Beograd 17.52%

Hypo-Alpe-Adria Bank a.g. 6.32%


• Direktor: Milovan Đurović


Milovan Đurović 34.27%

Uni global d.o.o., Belgrade 19.98%

Globosino d.o.o. Belgrade 17.52%

Hypo-Alpe-Adria Bank a.g. 6.32%

Other - shareholders with a < 5% share 21.91%

• Director: Milovan Đurović


„Energoprojekt Holding“ 92,94%

Jubmes banka AD Belgrade 7.03%

• Director: Mirjana Bogićević

Najveći akcionari

Grazer Wechelseitige VersicherungAktiengesellschaf

99,49%

INERSECURIAS-BERIEBS-SERVICE GMBH, Graz, Austria

0.51%

• Direktor: Christoph Czettl, predsednik UO


Grazer Wechelseitige VersicherungAktiengesellschaf

99,49%

INERSECURIAS-BERIEBS-SERVICE GMBH, Graz, Austria

0.51%

• Director: Christoph Czettl, Chairman o theManagement Board

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „DUNAV“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „DUNAV“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „ENERGOPROJEKT GARANT“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „ENERGOPROJEKT GARANT“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „GLOBOS-OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „GLOBOS-OSIGURANJE“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „GRAWE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „GRAWE“




Najveći akcionari

MERKUR VERSICHERUNG

AKIENGESELLSCHAF, Austria

99.21%

Christandl Rechtsanwalt GmbH 0.79%

• Direktor: Miodrag Kvrgić


MERKUR VERSICHERUNG

AKIENGESELLSCHAF, Austria

99.21%

Christandl Rechtsanwalt GmbH 0.79%

• Director: Miodrag Kvrgić

Najveći akcionari

„Croatia osiguranje“, Zagreb 99,78%

Veljko Knežević 0,11%

Ilija Crnomarković 0,11%

• Direktor: Aleksandar Marić


„Croatia osiguranje“, Zagreb 99,78%

Veljko Knežević 0,11%

Ilija Crnomarković 0,11%

• Director: Aleksandar Marić

Najveći akcionariAkcijski kapital 92,81%

Podzavarovalnica Sava d.d. Ljubljana 99.9998%

Mitar Damjanović 0.0002%

Ostali kapital 7,19%

• Direktor: Duško Jovanović

Largest shareholdersShare capital 92,81%

Podzavarovalnica Sava d.d. Ljubljana 99.9998%

Mitar Damjanović 0.0002%

Other capital 7,19%

• Director: Duško Jovanović

Najveći akcionari

Dragan Jovović 18.76%

Milan Jovović 11.58%

Snežana Jovović 10.84%

„Auto akovo“ d.o.o. 10.74%

• Direktor: Snežana Živković


Dragan Jovović 18.76%

Milan Jovović 11.58%



• Director: Snežana Živković

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „MERKUR“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „MERKUR“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „MILENIJUM OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „MILENIJUM OSIGURANJE“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE ‘’SAVA OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE ‘’SAVA OSIGURANJE“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „TAKOVO“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „TAKOVO“




Najveći akcionari

Akcijski kapital 97.443%

riglav IN d.d., Ljubljana 99.9999%

riglav Re d.d., Ljubljana 0,0001%Društveni kapital 2.557%

• Direktor: Dragan Marković


Share capital 97.443%

riglav IN d.d., Ljubljana 99.9999%

riglav Re d.d., Ljubljana 0,0001%Social capital 2.557%

• Director: Dragan Marković

Najveći akcionari

UNIQA INERNAIONAL

BEEILIGUNGS-VERWALUNGSGMBH, Austria

99.74%

UNIQA VERSICHERUNGEN AG,Beč, Austrija

0.26%


UNIQA INERNAIONAL

BEEILIGUNGS-VERWALUNGSGMBH, Austria

99.74%

UNIQA VERSICHERUNGEN AG,Beč, Austria

0.26%

Najveći akcionari

Uniqa International Beteiligungs-Verwaltungs GmbH, Beč, Austria 91.11%

United Business Activities - UBA,Holding A.G., Bazel, Švajcarska

6.00%

Uniqa Versicherungen AG, Beč,Austrija

2.89%

• Direktor: Gerald Muller

Najveći akcionari

Uniqa International Beteiligungs-Verwaltungs GmbH, Beč, 91.11%

United Business Activities - UBA,Holding A.G., Basel, Switzerland

6.00%

Uniqa Versicherungen AG, Beč,Austria

2.89%

• Director: Gerald Muller

Najveći akcionari

Wiener Stadtische AllgemeineVersicherung AG, Beč, Austrija

99.89%

Slobodan Zečević 0.11%



• Direktor: Branko Krstonošić


Wiener Stadtische AllgemeineVersicherung AG, Vienna, Austria

99.89%

Slobodan Zečević 0.11%



• Director: Branko Krstonošić

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „TRIGLAV OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „TRIGLAV OSIGURANJE“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „UNIQA NEŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „UNIQA NEŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“ (non-life)

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „UNIQA ŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „UNIQA ŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“ (life)

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „WIENER STADTISCHE OSIGURANJE“

JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „WIENER STADTISCHE OSIGURANJE“




Najveći akcionari

Otvoreno akcionarsko društvo

„Osiguravajuće društvo gasneindustrije“, Moskva, Ruska Federacija

51,00%

JP „Srbijagas“ Novi Sad 49,00%

• Direktor: Naljotov Jevgenij Valentinovič


Open Joint Stock Company

„Osiguravajuće društvo gasneindustrije“ (Insurance company orthe gas industry), Moscow, RussianFederation

51,00%

JP „Srbijagas“ Novi Sad 49,00%

• Director: Naljotov Jevgenij Valentinovič

Najveći akcionari

American Lie Insurance Company,SAD

99.98%

International echnical and AdvisoryServices Co.

0.02%

• Direktor: Spyridon Moschogiannis


American Lie Insurance Company,USA

99.98%

International echnical and AdvisoryServices Co.

0.02%

• Director: Spyridon Moschogiannis

Najveći akcionari

Sogecap SA, Pariz, Francuska 51,00%

Societe Generale Bank AD, Beograd 49,00%

• Direktor: Gerard Rimpot


Sogecap SA, Paris, France 51,00%

Societe Generale Bank AD, Belgrade 49,00%

• Director: Gerard Rimpot

Najveći akcionari

Podzavarovalnica Sava d.d. 99.9997%

• Direktor: Gorica Drobnjak


Podzavarovalnica Sava d.d. 99.9997%

• Director: Gorica Drobnjak

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „SOGAZ“ ADO.JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „SOGAZ“ ADO.

AD ZA ŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE „METLIFE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR LIFE INSURANCE „METLIFE“

AD ZA ŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE „SOCIETE GENERALE OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR LIFE INSURANCE „SOCIETE GENERALE OSIGURANJE“

AD ZA OSIGURANJE „SAVA ŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR INSURANCE „SAVA ŽIVOTNO OSIGURANJE“ (life)




Najveći akcionari

Te Lawrence Re Ireland Limited 99.998%

2. DDOR NOVI SAD ADO 0.002%

• Direktor: Paolo Colombo


Te Lawrence Re Ireland Limited 99.998%

2. DDOR NOVI SAD ADO 0.002%

• Director: Paolo Colombo

Najveći akcionari

Delta Đenerali osiguranje ADOBeograd 99.994%

Delta Real Estate d.o.o. Beograd 0.006%

• Direktor: Boško Petrović


Delta Đenerali osiguranje ADOBelgrade 99.994%

Delta Real Estate d.o.o. Belgrade 0.006%

• Director: Boško Petrović

Najveći akcionari

Kompanija Dunav osiguranje ADO 92.65%

ADO „SAVA“, Beograd 4.44%


Državni i društveni kapital 4.58%

• Direktor: Branislav Savić


Kompanija Dunav osiguranje ADO 92.65%

ADO „SAVA“, Belgrade 4.44%

Other - shareholders with a less than5% share

2.91%

State and social capital 4.58%

• Director: Branislav Savić

Najveći akcionari

Wiener Stadtische Versicherung AGInsurance Group 99,18%

99.89%

• Direktor: Vidan Slana


Wiener Stadtische Versicherung AGInsurance Group 99,18%

99.89%

• Director: Vidan Slana

AD ZA REOSIGURANJE „DDOR NOVI SAD“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR REINSURANCE „DDOR NOVI SAD“

AD ZA REOSIGURANJE „DELTA GENERALI REOSIGURANJE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR REINSURANCE „DELTA GENERALI REOSIGURANJE“

AD ZA REOSIGURANJE „DUNAV-RE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR REINSURANCE „DUNAV-RE“

AD ZA REOSIGURANJE „WIENER-RE“JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR REINSURANCE „WIENER-RE“




Najveći akcionari

DELTA GENERALI OSIGURANJE,ADO Beograd

100.00%

• Direktor: Bojana Svilar

Dobrovoljni penzijski fond DELTA GENERALI - BASICDobrovoljni penzijski fond DELTA GENERALI INDEX

Najveći akcionari

RAIFFEISEN BANKA AD BEOGRAD 100.00%

• Direktor: Snežana Ristanović

Dobrovoljni penzijski fond RAIFFEISEN FUTURE


RAIFFEISEN BANKA AD BEOGRAD 100.00%

• Director: Snežana Ristanović

Voluntary pension fund RAIFFEISEN FUTURE

Najveći akcionari

ADza osiguranje DDOR Novi Sad

32.46%

DDOR RE AD 7.54%

Skupna prva d.d. Ljubljana 60.00%

• Izvršni direktor: Miloš Škrbić

Dobrovoljni penzijski fond DDOR-Garant EkvilibrioDobrovoljni penzijski fond DDOR-Garant Štednja


Joint stock company for insuranceDDOR Novi Sad

32.46%

DDOR RE AD 7.54%

Skupna prva d.d. Ljubljana 60.00%

• Executive director: Miloš Škrbić

Voluntary pension fund DDOR - Garant EkvilibrioVoluntary pension fund DDOR - Garant Štednja

Najveći akcionari

Kompanija „Dunav osiguranje“ADO Beograd

100.00%

• Izvršni direktor: Milan Kovač

DUNAV dobrovoljni penzijski fond


Kompanija „Dunav osiguranje“ADO Beograd

100.00%

• Executive director: Milan Kovač

DUNAV voluntary pension fund


DELTA GENERALI OSIGURANJE,ADO Beograd

100.00%

• Director: Bojana Svilar

Voluntary pension fund DELTA GENERALI - BASICVoluntary pension fund DELTA GENERALI INDEX

AD za upravljanje dobrovoljnim penzijskim fondom DELTA GENERALI BeogradJoint stock company for management of the voluntary pension fund DELTA GENERALI Belgrade

Društvo za upravljanje dobrovoljnim penzijskim fondom RAIFFEISEN FUTURE AD Beograd

Joint stock company for management of the voluntary pension fund RAIFFEISEN FUTUREAD Beograd

DDOR-GARANT Društvo za upravljanje dobrovoljnim penzijskim fondom AD BeogradDDOR-GARANT Joint stock company for voluntary pension fund management AD Beograd

Društvo za upravljanje dobrovoljnim penzijskim fondom DUNAV AD BeogradJoint stock company for management of the voluntary pension fund DUNAV AD Beograd




Agencija za osiguranje depozita je osnovanaZakonom o Agenciji za osiguranje depozita dana25. 07. 2005. godine i određena je za univerzalnogpravnog sukcesora prethodne Agencije za

osiguranje depozita, sanaciju, stečaj i likvidacijubanaka.

Sedište Agencije je u Beogradu,u ulici Knez Mihailova 2.Telefon: 011 2075 100E mail: [email protected]

Predsednik UO: prof. dr Nenad Vunjak, dekanEkonomskog fakulteta u Subotici v.d. direktora: Lidija Perović

Te Deposit Insurance Agency was establishedby the Law on the Deposit Insurance Agency on25.07.2005 and is determined as the universallegal successor of the previous Agency for Deposit

Insurance, Rehabilitation, Bankruptcy andLiquidation of banks.

Te headquarters of the agency is at KnezMihailova 2, Belgradeel: 011 2075100E-mail: [email protected]

Chairman of the Board: Nenad Vunjak Ph.D.,Dean of the Subotica Faculty of EconomicsActing Director: Lidija Perović

Adresa : Omladinskih brigada 1,VII sprat, BeogradE mail: [email protected]

Predsednik: dr Zoran Ćirović

Address : Omladinskih brigada 1, VII Floor,BelgradeE-mail: [email protected]

President: Dr Zoran Ćirović

Berza obavlja poslove organizatora tržišta u skladusa Zakonom o tržištu kapitala i upravlja, odnosnoobavlja delatnost u vezi sa funkcionisanjemregulisanog tržišta i multilateralne trgovačkeplatforme (MP).Beogradska berza počela je sa radom u januaru

1895. godine, a u aprilu 1941. godine prestaje saradom. U decembru 1995. godine osnovano jeJugoslovensko tržište kapitala, a u novembru 2001.godine pušten je u rad BELEX sistem za trgovanje.

Predsednik UO: Ivan RistićDirektor: Gordana Dostanić

Adresa: Omladinskih brigada 1,11070 Novi Beograd, SrbijaTelefon: 011.311.72.97E mail: [email protected]

www.belex.rs

Te BSE performs the duties of market operatorin accordance with the Law on Capital Marketand perform activities related to the functioningof regulated markets and multilateral tradingplatforms (MP).Te BSE started its work in January 1895 and

ceased to function as of April 1941. In December1995 the Yugoslav capital market was founded andin November 2001 the BELEX trading system wasput into operation.

Chairman of the Board: Ivan RistićDirector: Gordana Dostanić

Address: Omladinskih brigada 1,11070 New Belgrade, SerbiaTel: 011 3117297E-mail: [email protected]

www.belex.rs

Agencija za osiguranje depozita / Deposit Insurance Agency

Beogradska berza / Belgrade Stock Exchange - BSE

Komisija za hartije od vrednosti / Securities Commission




Centralni registar za hartije od vrednosti, depo ikliring hartija od vrednosti je započeo sa radomu novembru 2001. godine u vreme emitovanjaobveznica SR Jugoslavije izdatih za izmirenje

obaveza po osnovu devizne štednje građana i upočetku je bio deo Narodne banke Srbije.Zakon o tržištu hartija od vrednosti iz oktobra2003. godine definisao je CR HoV kao nezavisnoakcionarsko društvo gde najmanje 51 odsto akcijaposeduje država. Stoodstotni vlasni CR HoV jedržava.

Poslovne prostorije Centralnog registra nalaze sena rgu Nikole Pašića br. 5 u Beogradu.E mail: [email protected]

Direktor: dr Ana Jovanović

Adresa: Bulevar Nemanjića 14a, 18000 NišTel: 018/4150-199Predsednik UO: Dušan Vujović, ministar privredeDirektor fonda: Slađana Backović

www.fondzarazvoj.gov.rs

Bulevar kralja Aleksandra 86, 11000 BeogradTel: 3370-063Generalni sekretar: dr Veroljub Dugalićwww.ubs-asb.comE-mail: [email protected]

Adresa: Milentija Popovića 5-6/II, 11000 BeogradTel: 2927-900Generalni sekretar: Vladan Manićpredsednik Skupštine: Miodrag Kvrgićwww.uos.rs

Address: Milentija Popovića 5-6/II, 11000 BelgradeTel: 2927-900Secretary General: Vladan ManićAssembly President: Miodrag Kvrgićwww.uos.rs

Bulevar kralja Aleksandra 86, 11000 BeogradTel: 3370-063Secretary General: dr Veroljub Dugalićwww.ubs-asb.comE-mail: [email protected]

Address: Bulevar Nemanjića 14a, 18000 NišTel: 018/4150-199Chairman of the Board: Dušan Vujović, ministarprivredeFund Director: Slađana Backović

www.fondzarazvoj.gov.rs

Te Central Registry of Securities, Depositoryand Clearing of Securities began its operations inNovember 2001 during the period of issuing bondsof FR Yugoslavia for the settlement of obligations

on the basis of foreign currency savings and wasinitially part of the National Bank of Serbia. TeLaw on Securities Market of October 2003 definedthe Central Registry of Securities as an independent joint stock company with at least 51 per cent ofshares owned by the State. Te Central Registry ofSecurities is 100% owned by the state.

Te business premises of the Central Registry ofSecurities can be found at rg Nikole Pašića 5.E-mail: [email protected]

Director: dr Ana Jovanović

Centralni registar za hartije od vrednosti / Central Registry of Securities

FOND ZA RAZVOJ REPUBLIKE SRBIJE / THE DEVELOPMENT FUND OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

UDRUŽENJE BANAKA I DRUGIH FINANSIJSKIH ORGANIZACIJA SRBIJE ASSOCIATION OF BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF SERBIA

UDRUŽENJE OSIGURAVAČA SRBIJE / ASSOCIATION OF INSURERS OF SERBIA




Adresa: Bulevar Mihajla Pupina 6,11070 Novi BeogradTelefon: 3130-714Generalni sekretar: eodora Milenković

www.alcs.org.rs

Address: Bulevar Mihajla Pupina 6,11070 New BelgradeTel: 3130-714Secretary General: eodora Milenković

www.alcs.org.rs

Adresa: Kneza Miloša 20, 11070 BeogradTelefon: 3817-902 v.d. direktora: Maja Kosovčevićwww.nkosk.com

Address: Kneza Miloša 20, 11070 BelgradeTel: 3817-902Acting Director: Maja Kosovčevićwww.nkosk.com

Adresa: Nemanjina 17, 11000 BeogradTelefon: 011/ 333-8286Stalni predstavnik : Daehaeng Kimwww.imf.org

Address: Nemanjina 17, 11000 BelgradeTel: 011/ 333-8286Permanent representative: Daehaeng Kimwww.imf.org

Adresa: Bulevar kralja Aleksandra 86,

11000 BeogradTelefon: 011/3023-700Country Manager: ony [email protected]

Adresa: Španskih boraca 3/6, 11070 Beograd

Telefon: 011/2120-529Country Director: Mateo Patrone www.ebrd.com

Adresa: Vladimira Popovića 38-40; 11070 BeogradTelefon: 011/312-17-56Šef kancelarije: Andreas Beikos

Address: Vladimira Popovića 38-40; 11070 BelgradeTel: 011/312-17-56Head of Office: Andreas Beikos

Address: Španskih boraca 3/6, 11070 Belgrade

Tel: 011/2120-529Country Director: Mateo Patrone www.ebrd.com

Adresa: Bulevar kralja Aleksandra 86,

11000 BelgradeTel: 011/3023-700Country Manager: ony [email protected]

ALCS - ASOCIJACIJA LIZING KOMPANIJA SRBIJE

ALCS – ASSOCIATION OF LEASING COMPANIES OF SERBIA

NACIONALNA KORPORACIJA ZA OSIGURANJE STAMBENIH KREDITA (NKOSK)NATIONAL CORPORATION FOR HOUSING CREDIT INSURANCE (NKOSK)

MMF- Međunarodni monetarni fond / IMF - International Monetary Fund

Kancelarija Svetske banke / Ofce of the World Bank

EBRD- EVROPSKA BANKA ZA OBNOVU I RAZVOJ

EBRD – EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

EIB - Evropska investiciona banka / EIB – European Investment Bank







NAZIV IZDANJA / EDITION130 godina NBS - Ko je ko u finansijskom sektoru.130 years of NBS - Who’s Who in the Financial Sector

GLAVNI I ODGOVORNI UREDNIK / EDITOR IN CHIEF

Biljana StepanovićANALIZE / ANALYSESZoran JeremićKPMG, DelloiteDušan Uzelac

DIREKTOR KORPORATIVNIH KOMUNIKACIJA /CORPORATE COMMUNICATION DIRECTORJelica Lepori

DIREKTOR MARKETINGA / ADVERTISING DIRECTORSanja Radlovački

DIREKTOR PROJEKATA / PROJECT DIRECTORDušanka Stevanović

UREDNIK FOTOGRAFIJE / PHOTO EDITORDragan Milošević

DIZAJN NASLOVNE STRANE / COVER PAGE DESIGNJovana Bogdanović

UREDNIK / EDITORMiloš Obradović

GRAFIČKI UREDNIK / DTPstudio triDBojan Radulović

PREVOD / TRANSLATIONMark Pullen,Snežana Bjelotomić

LEKTURA I KOREKTURA / EDITINGJadranka Radujko

ŠTAMPA / PRESSČugura print

IZDAVAČ / PUBLISHERBusiness Info GroupBulevar despota Stefana 12Beogradwww.big.co.rsTel. +381 11 2258 891Sva prava rezervisana

ZAHVALJUJEMO SE NA PODRŠCII SARADNJI NARODNOJ BANCI SRBIJE





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130 Godina NBS Ko Je Ko U Finansijskom Sektoru

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