14 Renegotiating

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272 SCIENCE FOR POLICY

Re-negotiating the Role ofExternal Cost Calculations in theBelgian Nuclear and Sustainable

Energy DebateMATTHIEU CRAYE, ERIC LAES, AND JEROEN VAN DER SLUIJS

In Belgium, as in most industrialized countries, debate about theplace of nuclear power production in a sustainable energy mix hasresulted in enduring and intractable conflict between actors holdingantagonistic positions. External cost calculations can be seen as partof attempts to provide an objective input in order to rationalizedecision making regarding sustainable energy. In this respect, themost thorough body of work took place within the EuropeanCommission (EC) supported ExternE project.

However, in the Belgian nuclear debate, external cost data only played a very limited role, generally not extending beyond citing

the ExternE results (by those in favour of nuclear power), with criticsretorting by pointing out uncertainties (for example, costs of radioactive waste management for future generations) and/orunincluded externalities (for example, limited liabilities for ownersof Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).

Their controversial character of external cost and data, until now,their limited use in policy making processes can be linked to anumber of interrelated factors: the complexity of the policy issueand the plural positions, values, and stakes that are into play; theproposed role for external cost data in decision making; the value-laden character of the approach itself.

To explore if, and how, external cost data can contribute in amore effective way to policy making, the Belgian nuclear researchcentre (SCK-CEN) organized a workshop, in collaboration with

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RE-NEGOTIATING THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL COST CALCULATIONS 273

the European Commissions Joint Research Centre and UtrechtUniversity. Crucial assumptions and choices made in the calculation

chain were discussed and qualified in a structured way, using theconcept ofpedigree of knowledge. Participants in the workshopincluded policy makers, stakeholders, and experts from variousdisciplines. The focus of the discussion was on assumptions relatedto the scenario used for evaluating the impacts of a severe nuclearaccident, to the estimation of the related health impacts, and totheir economic and monetary valuation. Special attention was paidto the value-laden character of these assumptions.

This chapter starts with a concise description of the Belgiannuclear debate and the problems with external cost approaches, inpolicy debates, as covered by the scientific literature subsequently, we present the reasoning behind the structuring of the mentioned workshop around a discussion on assumptions and choices in theenternal cost calvcatim chair. Based on the workshop experience,lessons are drawn for enchancing the role of economic valuationstudies in energy policy as covered by the scientific literature, thischapter describes how, through learning from the workshopexperience, essential elements can be discerned for enhancing therole of policy-related science as ExternE. These elements are notlimited to what is generally referred to as better communication of science but entail a true re-negotiation of the role that such sciencecan play in policy processes.

BELGIUMS NUCLEARHISTORY: FROM SOCIAL PACT

TO PHASE O UTToday about 55 per cent of Belgiums electricity demand is coveredby its seven NPPs. They were all put into operation during 197585, as a result of a post-war social pact between the important socio-economic actors and the State. This pact aimed at a growing economicoutput in order to maximise welfare. In view of this goal, the crucialimportance of the security of energy supply at a reasonable, competitiveprice was recognized. The deal included the decision to invest innuclear power generation and encouraged direct state interventionin the energy sector.

Notwithstanding the existence of such a pact, the Belgian nuclearsector has also been subject toincreasing disagreements. Startingfrom a siting conflict in the early 1970s, over the years, as in many


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other countries, a nuclear controversy developed. More actors weredrawn into the controversy and the scope of the arguments expanded

towards a more general debate about the desirability of economicgrowth at all costs and general principles of democratic decisionmaking. This resulted, starting from the late 1980s, in a stalemateregarding most high-profile nuclear issues, such as the decision on aneighth nuclear reactor and the siting of a low-level waste repository.

From 1990 onwards, the policy-making context changed,mainly by the combined forces of an increasing prominence of environmental issues on the political agenda (for example climatechange) and the liberalization of European energy markets. Whilethese developments mostly took place in the context of supra-national institutions and international negotiations, at the nationallevel, the Belgian government decided in 2003 on a nuclear phase-out scenario. The phase-out scenario implies that the Belgian NPPs will be taken out of service in the period 201525 (after 40 years of operation). However, criticism of this phase-out law never disappeared,and, with the prospect of a new national government to be installedafter the 2007 elections, it is doubtful whether it will ever beimplemented as foreseen.

A major argument of opponents of the phase out law is of aneconomic nature. They have found support in a recent study (Energy 2030, 2007) that indicates that nuclear energy is indispensible tokeep the acceptable economic cost of respecting Belgiums engagementsto reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To this type of argument,opponents of nuclear energy traditionally reply that the market priceof nuclear energy has never reflected its true cost to society.

However, proponents of the nuclear sector point to the calculationsof the external costs of several energy sources, showing that thenuclear option is by large the most optimal economic choice.

EXTERNALCOST CALCULATIONS: COMMUNICATEDPRECISION CONTESTEDThe concept of externalities is central both to markets andeconomics. Externalities of a traded product are defined as impactsborne by other agents (human agents, the environment) than thoseinvolved in the trade interaction. External costs are the calculatedcosts of those impacts. They are not included in the market price of

the traded good or not compensated by its producers and/or traders. While throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the dominant


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analytical approach to the environmental appraisal of electricity supply options was provided by comparative risk assessment (Stirling

1997), the end of the 1980s saw the rise of neo-classicalenvironmental economics research on the external costs of electricity provision, with major studies being commissioned by influentialbodies such as the European Commission (EC), the US Departmentof Energy (USDOE), the German electricity industry, and numerousother industry, state, national, and non-governmental bodies (USOTA 1994).

In response to the general theoretical difficulties experienced inattempting to quantify the external costs of electricity production(see below), the EC together with the USDOE in 1991 launched a joint research project to identify the appropriate methodology forthis type of work. After the first phase of the project that establishedan operational accounting framework for the assessment of externalcosts of energy production (named ExternE in Europe, see theproject website www.externe.info, EC 1995, EC 1999), the ECcontinued an independent programme of follow-up activities.

The ExternE network is still actively engaged in updating themethodology, applying the accounting framework to previously unincluded types of externalities (e.g. energy security), extending thenetwork to new EU member states and broadening ExternEs scopeof application (costbenefit analysis of European environmentalpolicy measures, green national accounting, etc.). All in all, it is fairto say that ExternE represents the largest and most thorough body of work in the field of energy/environment economics, and as suchhas become a recognized brand in policy-making circles.

Application of the ExternE methodology to the Belgian energy system resulted in the following general findings (Torfs et al. 2005): Both wind and nuclear power show very limited external costs

(< 1 Euro/MWhe); however, for both technologies publicperception (visual impacts for wind, risk perception for nuclear)

were not taken into account; Photovoltaic power has a low external cost (< 5 Euro/MWhe); Gas technologies have an intermediate external cost 1030

Euro/MWhe); Oil and coal technologies fall within the high range of external

costs (30150 Euro/MWhe). While the communicated precision of these results suggest that

the determination and application of external cost calculations isclear and unproblematic, it has proven to be not too difficult for


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specialized stakeholders and energy systems experts to criticize theseresults. As such, it has been argued there were unincluded externalities

(for example, limited liabilities for owners of NPPs). Critics alsopointed to major uncertainties in relation to the estimation of costsof the impacts of a severe nuclear accident and of radioactive wastemanagement for future generations.

Confronted by a debate in which such external cost data are usedin a snapshot way, creating confusion about their status and meaning,the Belgian nuclear research centre SCK-CEN, through its programmefor integrating social aspects in nuclear research (PISA), becameinterested in studying why these data were controversial in the firstplace, as well as the conditions under which such approaches couldplay a more relevant role in the discussions and decision making onenergy policy.

A TECHNICAL DEBATE ON EXTERNALCOSTS AS ASUBSTITUTE FOR SOCIO -POLITICAL DEBATE

Based on more academically oriented criticism of the external costapproach, on an empirical reconstruction of positions taken in thenuclear debate, and on analyses of how policy related science oftenintensify controversies, a number of inter-related factors can bediscerned to explain the problems with external cost data in thepolicy context: the complexity of the policy issue of sustainable energy the plural positions, values, and stakes that are into play the proposed role for external cost data in decision-making,

suggesting an unmediated relation between a scientific assessmentof external costs and price-correcting measures.From a constructivist point of view, robust scientific results, in

conditions of complexity, can only be arrived at, through processesof reduction and simplification of the issue, involving negotiationabout the issues essential characteristics. Callon (1998) describeshow the existence and magnitude of externalities necessarily dependson a particular framing of the interaction under consideration. Stirling(1997) clearly shows how framing and bracketing is performedin practice in the case of externalities of energy systems. While it isalready often difficult to obtain consensus about the particular detailsof such bracketing (system boundaries, externalities to include ornot, etc.), another more fundamental problem arises as the external


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approach as such is itself only one of possible ways to approach thecomplex issue of sustainable energy. In contrast to its presentation

as objective and neutral, it is far from that as it imposes certaininteractions and the way to approach them as the normal ones.Indeed, in the early 1990s, the relevance of recognizing, assessing,

and internalizing external costs was quickly enlisted in the emergingpolitical discourse on sustainability as a means to transform the fuzzyconcept of sustainability into an objectively measurable quantity (Stirling 1999). One of the key elements of this programme was toget the prices right and to ensure that environmental externalities were accounted for in market mechanisms. As such, the suddensurge of public authorities support for research into external costs was in line with the rise of ecological modernization as a policy paradigm in rich industrialized countries, which can be understoodas an attempt to reform capitalism in an ecological direction, withoutundermining the basic axioms of the system (Hajer 1995).

However, this way of promoting external costs as the key approachto support energy policy making completely discards (elements of)some of the competing argumentation frames in the debate onsustainable energy, and the place of the nuclear energy in this respect.

Based on interviews with representatives of key stakeholderorganizations, Laes et al. (2004) made an ideal-typical reconstructionof the major argumentations schemes in the Belgian nuclear debateat the time when the phase-out scenario was not yet translatedinto law (in the fall of 2002). The three perspectives were labelledthe management, controllist and reformist perspective, and arebased on structural dimensions, that is, their communicated imagesof self and others, valid forms of communication, main problemfocus, and main principal references.

From the description of the frames, it is clear that the externalcost framework shares its basic values with the managementperspective, that is an outspoken belief in market mechanisms. Itcan also be meaningful within the controllist perspective, whichseeks to reconcile several social goals and aims for more transparency and open debate, including about costs. Its relationship with thereformist perspective is, however, problematic. The latter sees thecurrent energy system and the importance of nuclear energy production,not as the result of an economically sound process that now shouldbe corrected for some forgotten environmental impacts, but as

the result of social processes dominated by political and economic


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power, leading to valid technology options (for example, renewableenergy options) and rational behaviour (for example, energy saving)

being discouraged.To summarize, while the complexity and plurality of perspectivesmake it difficult to arrive at one consensual framing, the proposedrole for external cost results expresses a strong preference for oneparticular value-laden approach to the problem of sustainability. Butas other competing frames are not taken seriously, the conflict aboutvalues, positions, stakes, and interests do not disappear but tend toenter the scientific-technical debate (Craye 2006).

All the more, because of the suggested direct link betweenscientific input and policy measures. Very schematically, whilemanagers and controllists will cite external cost results, reformists willbe inclined to contest them. The conditions are there for disputes onthe scientific facts (the external costs) serving as a substitute for policy disputes (Sarewitz 2004): the policy-related scientific assessmentshave become ade factolocus for socio-political contestation.

ROLE OF EXTERNALCOSTS IN GOVERNANCE PROCESSESFOR SUSTAINABLEENERGY

To explore the question of whether there could be a more effectiverole for external cost data in the debate on a sustainable energy system and on the place of the nuclear in this, the Belgian nuclearresearch centre (SCK-CEN) organized a workshop, in collaboration with the European Commissions Joint Research Centre and UtrechtUniversity (SCK report). While largely confirming the above analysisof the underlying reasons for the controversial character of externalcost results, the process and the results of the workshop suggestthat their role could enhanced through a re-negotiation of therelation between external cost calculations and the governancecontext. Essential in opening the space for such re-negotiationappeared to be: organizing and structuring discussions between experts, stakeholders,

and policy makers as a reasoned debate discussing explicitly the particular framing of the issue of

sustainable energy through the approach of external costs assessing and qualifying the potential value-ladenness of key

assumptions in external cost calculations and their importanceas sources of uncertainty and disagreement:


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CONDITIONS FOR A REASONED DEBATE BETWEEN EXPERTS,STAKEHOLDERS, AND POLICY MAKERS

Whereas traditional communication of policy-relevant science largely occurs through a one-way presentation and delivery of researchreports, in its turn often provoking one-way critical reactions, the workshop showed the potential of direct and interactive discussionbetween experts, stakeholders, and policy makers.

Until then, in the context of the Belgian nuclear debate, use of external cost data had been limited to defending ExternE results(by those in favour of nuclear power), with critics retorting by pointing out uncertainties, flaws, and arbitrariness in the calculations.Participants in the workshop were positively surprised by thepossibilities created to go beyond this black/white treatment of external cost results as hard evidence or as bad science.

Space was opened up to express and assess with nuance the merits,deficiencies, and limits of the approach as such and of the choicesmade in the calculation chain. Specific workshop preparations helpedto assure such reasoned exchange of arguments. Workshop participants were selected with the particular concern to take into account theplurality of scientific and socio-political perspectives on the problem.The workshop protocol planned that, for each discussion, anintroduction was provided by at least two expertsa first onedefending the external cost approach and/or particular assumptionsmade in it and a second one who was acritical judge. Then, thediscussion was explicitly extended to the views and reactions of thestakeholders and policy makers in the panel.

The workshop moderator, and a number of researchers,specifically trained in deliberative procedures and/or uncertainty assessment, had to guarantee an informed and fair debate took place.To this end, the moderator presented some guidelines (included inthe protocol). He also had at his disposal a catalogue of possiblequestions in order to (re)focus the discussion if necessary. Thesemodel questions were based on insights on the structure of argumentations (Toulmin 1958), the content of actors frames of meaning (Grin 1997), and the different types of scientific debateand controversy when uncertainty is salient (von Schomberg 1997).They were intended to make the process more reflexive (Crayeet al. 2005), both in terms of content, that is opening up the

problem definition and the scope of argumentation, and in terms


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of process, that is placing the participants in new roles and rules of interaction. In this particular setting, the traditional and often

institutionalized division between the scientist as a provider of facts versus policy makers and the public as defenders of values was challenged.

To provide a solid structure for the discussion, a so-called pedigreescheme (van der Sluijs 2005, see paragraph below) was used.

ASSESSING THE SALIENTSOURCES OF UNCERTAINTIES INEXTERNALCOST CALCULATIONS: DISAGREEMENTS ONCHOICES AND ASSUMPTIONS

Confronted with open divergence of views on the robustness of external cost data, it is increasingly considered necessary to take the

communication of related uncertainties seriously. All too often, suchcommunication of uncertainties is limited to downstream results of the calculations which are commented upon through technicalquantitative means (Craye 2006).

However, the above description of the problems with the use of external cost data in the policy context made clear that the uncertainty to focus on was not the type that could be described by ranges of error and probability distributions. Neither is it the uncertainty,that can be seen as a provisional deficiency of external cost calculationsthat can best be solved through an increased research effort, separatefrom the policy context.

The workshop followed the logic that the relevant uncertaintiesto consider in relation to external costs, as expressed through the existenceof different scientific opinions and/or divergent interpretations anduse of results in the socio-political debate, are those who find theirsource in different value-laden choices, assumptions, and framingsentering into the (long) chain of calculations leading to an estimationof externalities.

The resulting uncertainty is of a deeper nature and is related to what has been described in the literature as ignorance [not only wehave no basis to estimate probabilities, but we dont know what canbe the impacts (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990)], indeterminacy [causalchains are open and influenced by non-predictable behaviouralsystems, but also all knowledge is to a certain degree conditionaland contingent upon framings, choices and assumptions (Wynne1992)], and ambiguity [(precise meanings of the issue are not agreed,or unclear (Wynne 2001)].


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A procedure was developed to select key assumptions in a processinvolving all workshop participants. During the workshop, these

assumptions were discussed and qualified using a scheme based onthe concept of pedigree of knowledge. As a pilot, it was decided tofocus specifically on the externalities of a potential large-scale nuclearaccident in a Belgian NPP.

After going through the ExternE research reports and gatheringinformation on points of disagreement and controversy, preparatory interviews with ExternE experts and stakeholders were held, allowingto list in a structured way the main steps in the calculation chain,as well as the crucial assumptions in each of these steps. In this way,a list of 30 assumptions was arrived at, and, through an internetsurvey, held weeks before the workshop and involving all workshopparticipants, a final list of six assumptions was selected.

As a result, the focus of the discussions was on assumptions relatedto the scenario used for evaluating the impacts of a severe nuclearaccident, to the estimation of the related health impacts, and totheir economic and monetary valuation. Special attention was paidto the value-laden character of these assumptions. See Box 14.1.

Box 14.1: Assumptions assessed and qualified through aset of pedigree criteria during the workshop organized

by the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre

1. External costs of a potential large-scale accident in a BelgianNPP can be determined on the basis of a calculation for ahypothetical NPP located in the middle of Western Europe.

2. In a large-scale accident scenario for a Belgian NPP allradionuclide dispersion routes other than the atmospheric releaseroute are negligible.

3. A linear correlation exists between exposure to ionizing radiationand health effects, even for very small radiation doses.

4. All health impacts other than the radiological ones caused by exposure to ionizing radiation can be neglected when assessing theconsequences of a large-scale nuclear accident in a Belgian NPP.

5. The risk-aversion factor for accidents of the low probability/high consequences type cannot be determined in a reliable way,and, therefore, does not have to be reported.

6. The cost indicators adopted in the ExternE methodology (costof countermeasures, direct economic damage, short- and long-

term health impacts) are sufficiently representative for the totalcosts of a potential large-scale nuclear accident in a Belgian NPP.


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To evaluate and qualify these assumptions a scheme was used (seeTable 14.1), developed by Van der Sluijs and Kloprogge (Kloprogge

et al. 2005). Based on a literature study, and on the concept of pedigree, as introduced by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990), they discerned a set of criteria to discuss and qualify the potential value-ladenness and the influence of assumptions on the end results of anassessment. Value laden here is not to be exclusively understood aspolitically and/or ethically controversial. It refers to the fact thatmaking an assumption involves going through a choice process.

The criteria used to discuss the assumptions were: Influence of situational limitations: The degree to which the

choice for the assumption can be influenced by situationallimitations, such as limited availability of data, money, time,software, tools, hardware, and human resources.

Plausibility: The degree, mostly based on an (intuitive)assessment, through which the approximation created by theassumption is in accordance with reality.

Choice space: The degree to which alternatives were available tochoose from when making the assumption

Agreement among peers: The degree to which the choice of peersis likely to coincide with the analysts choice.

Agreement among stakeholders: The degree to which the choiceof stakeholders is likely to coincide with the analysts choice

Sensitivity to the view and interests of the analyst: The degree to which the choice for the assumption may be influenced,consciously or unconsciously, by the view and interests of theanalyst making the assumption.

Influence on results: In order to be able to pinpoint importantvalue-laden assumptions in a calculation chain it is not only important to assess the potential value-ladenness of the assumptions,but also to analyse the influence on outcomes of interest of the assessment.The qualitative discussion of each assumption was closed by

giving a score for the assumption for each of the criteria, as indicatedby the pedigree matrix. The scoring was organized as an inter-subjective process of negotiation that enables one to summarize themain points of discussion for each criterion, to explain why differentparticipants suggested different scores, and to clarify any ambiguity in the descriptions of the criteria. The pedigree process allowed

one to qualify the robustness of the assumptions, as assessed by theparticipants, as well as to discern options for possibly making


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Table14.1:PedigreeSchemeUsed toAssessAssumptionduringtheWorkshop O

rganized bytheBelgianNuclear

Research Centre

Score

Influenceof

Plausibility

Choicespace

Agreement

Agreement

Sensivityto

Influenceon

situational

amongpeers

among

viewsand

results

limitations

stakeholders

interestsof

analyst

4

Nosuch

VeryplausibleNoalternatives

Complete

Complete

Nosensitive

Littleorno

limitations

available

agreement

agreement

influence

3

Hardly

Plausible

VerylimitednumberHigh degree

High degree

Hardly

Localimpact in

influenced

ofalternatives

ofagreement

ofagreement

sensitive

thecalculations

2

Moderately

Acceptable

Smallnumberof

Competing

Competing

Moderately

Important

influenced

alternatives

schools

perspectives

sensitive

impact ina

majorstep in

thecalculation

1

Importantly

Hardly

Averagenumber

Lowdegree

Lowdegree

Highly

Moderate

influence

plausible

ofalternatives

(embryonicstage)ofagreement

sensitive

impact onend

result

0

Completely

Fictiveor

Veryamplechoice

Lowdegree

controversial

Veryhighly

Important

influenced

speculative

ofalternatives

(controversial)

sensitive

impact onend

result


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alternative assumptions to improve the external cost calculation ormake them more meaningful.

Overall the scores given were low, reflecting the stakeholder andexpert panels scepticism about the assumptions made: generally these were considered not very plausible, subject to disagreement, and toa large extent inspired by contextual factors.

The only real exception to this was the assumption that thereexists a linear correlation between exposure to ionizing radiationand health effects, even for very small radiation doses. This was theleast contested assumption of the workshop. Three experts agreedthat the so-called linear no-threshold hypothesis (LNT) constitutesthe best scientific basis to regulate the risks of ionizing radiationand that the LNT assumption could be qualified as a precautionary approach to managing radiation risks. This statement was qualifiedto some extent as a result of the discussion with stakeholders. There was a suggestion, however, that perhaps different dose-effect curvesshould be used for different fractions of the population.

Clear suggestions for improvements in the external cost calculations were made in relation to the assumptions regarding the NPP locationthat was used as basis for the calculation, and regarding the neglectof other than atmospheric release routes for the dispersion of radionuclides in case of an accident.

The main criticism of the first assumption was that, because of the specific location of the Belgian NPPsnear major cities withimportant industrial activitiesthe results obtained by using ahypothetical location in the middle of Western Europe would(seriously) underestimate the externalities of a potential accidentfor the Belgian context. Therefore, the critics among the stakeholdergroup argued that a study of the potential consequences of a severeaccident (a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)Level 3) forthe specific case of a Belgian NPP would likely bring much moreinsights into the nature and extent of the resulting externalities.The ExternE experts present at the workshop agreed in principle tothis objection.

In relation to the second assumption, a PSA expert present atthe workshop explained that contamination of ground and river water by radionuclides in the case of a severe nuclear reactor accidentcannot be entirely excluded. Such contamination could be causedby a failure of the NPPs pressure vessel and a possible melting of

the reactor core through the bottom of the reactor building, resulting


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in steam explosions. This accident sequence is considered to be highly improbable, but would nevertheless result in a long-term ecosystem

pollution, which is not included as an externality in the ExternEapproach (only impacts on human health count). This view wasnot really challenged in the discussion.

A second category of assumptions was formed by those that wereheavily criticized and for which, only to a certain extent, proposals were made for how external cost calculations could be improved toovercome this criticism. The assumption that the used cost indicators(cost of countermeasures, direct economic damage, short- and long-term health impacts) are representative for the total costs of apotential large-scale nuclear accident in a Belgian NPP...has to bementioned here.

Mainly, representatives of environmental Non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) pointed out that an entire catalogue of economic impacts were not included in the ExternE methodology:direct and indirect costs of lost production in industries adjacent tothe NPP, forward ripple effects in the entire European economy (for example, caused by an evacuation of the Antwerp harbour),costs of stigmatization of a region contaminated by nuclear fallout,economic impacts on the nuclear sector worldwide (for example,costs of cancelling new nuclear programmes, enhanced safety measures in existing plants, etc.), and so on. The discussion on thisassumption led to most of the participants seeing a continued greatpotential for public contestation of it.

Some assumptions were clearly seen as problematic although it was not clear how to overcome the related problems through other ways of calculation. This category of assumptions included the neglectof all health impacts, other than the radiological ones, caused by exposure to ionizing radiation when assessing the consequences of alarge-scale nuclear accident in a Belgian NPP. This was criticized by a radiation protection expert on the basis of the experience after theChernobyl reactor accident in 1986. Follow-up studies show asignificant increase in the population suffering from post-traumaticstress symptoms, anxiety, estrangement, dislocation, etc. However,according to this expert it is difficult (if not impossible) to relate thesepsychological impacts unequivocally to a nuclear accident as suchor rather to the risk management interventions of (Soviet) authorities.Therefore, he concluded that non-radiological (psychosomatic) health

impacts of a potential reactor accident could prove to be a major


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albeit hardly quantifiablefactor. The overall average pedigree scoreattributed by the workshop participants to this assumption shows

that this expert qualification was largely shared. Also belonging to this category of assumptions is the acceptability of not reporting a risk-aversion factor for accidents of the low probability/high consequences type. The ExternE experts presentat the workshop admitted that within the ExternE network, a betterconceptualization of the risk aversion factor for potential severenuclear accidents was not considered to be a priority issue. Withinthe ExternE network the prevailing opinion was that since risk aversionis a highly contextual factor that varies enormously from individualto individual, no robust theoretical framework could be advancedto determine the exact extent of the externality resulting from risk aversive attitudes. Participants in the workshop found this to beone of the weakest links in the calculation chain since it is not upto researchers to implicitly decide that individuals or segments of society should not have different degrees of aversion for differentcategories of risk.

IMPLICIT FRAMING IMPOSED BY EXTERNALCOSTS

The reasoned exchange of arguments and the expression of a lot of nuance during the detailed discussion of the assumptions was helpeda lot by the fact that, preceding the pedigree assessment, the implicitframing imposed by the overall aproach of valuation and monetarization,had already been debated. In this way, a forum was given to themore fundamental critique of the external cost approach.

This critique, that is, that reasoning in terms of external costsestablishes particular meanings of the issue of sustainable energy, was confirmed in the workshop discussions. Through a presentationbyt ExternE research, it was made explicit that the project fits in apolicy framework that attaches crucial if not exclusive importanceto market-based instruments to achieve sustainable growth. Basedon costbenefit type of assessments and correct prices, optimalallocation of resources can be achieved. In this framework, it isbelieved external cost results can play a determining role by providingthe basis for the adequate taxation of certain energy sources. Thisview is one of weak sustainability, that is, in which material welfarecan be exchanged against taking risk with the environment and

vice versa.


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Critics wanted to see it explicitly recognized that the externalcost approach:

only partially deals with the issue of sustainable energy, as, evenif it aims for price corrections, it leaves untouched otherfundamental mechanisms of importance for sustainability suchas the role of growth in economy and society

reduces citizenship, also with its socio-political dimensions, toconsumer behaviour (expression of individual preferences throughthe willingness-to-pay approach)

reduces the nature of public goods to consumer goods, thereby overlooking the ethical concerns with nature conservation

takes a decisionist position towards time, neglecting the historicalcontext which led to current possibly unsustainable patterns as

well as valuing future impacts according to todays preferences.The workshop showed that, to play a more relevant role, the

presentation of external cost data should openly refer to its basicvalues in which it finds its foundation and not be communicated asif it was the normal, neutral, and naturally privileged approach. Ontop of this, it should be made clear that other equally valid views of sustainable energy exist, and that this should be recognized throughproviding the policy debate with insights obtained through otherapproaches.

Critical aspects that are not considered or neglected by theExternE approach but that should be addressed in policy relevantresearch and in policy debates include: concerns of distributional justice institutional factors influencing the relation between the organization

of an economy and its ecological performance assessment of visions of sustainable energy systems as well as

different political visions of future organization of society, asexternal costs implicitly promote a status quo (through the

willingness-to-pay approach which is very much dependent oncurrent income structures and distribution); collective decisionsfor which there is co-responsibility in society, not just the sumof individual preferences

uncertainty about societal values in the future, as external costsimplies that these remain stable

sustainability criteria for innovative technologies.Finally, it was seen to be of utmost importance that together with

the results of external cost studies, the limitations are communicated.


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The inherent problem of demarcation in all external cost studiesmakes the results critically conditional on system boundaries set. But

all too often, a view is conveyed as if external cost results allow tomake manageable all the complexities and uncertainties of thesustainable energy issue. It is presented as if one can unequivocally define what the optimal choices are to ensure sustainable developmentand thus to be sure of what sustainable development is.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Based on an analysis of the underlying reasons for the limited roleof external cost studies in the Belgian debate and decision makingon sustainable energy options, and of the nuclear option in particular,it can be argued that traditional patterns of one-way communicationin the sciencepolicy interface should be at least complemented, if not abandoned.

Through a workshop, conditions were explored that could enhancethe relevance of external cost results in governance processes dealing with the sustainable energy issue. The underlying fundamentalcritique of the approach can only be dealt with adequately througha re-negotiation of the place and role of external cost data in thesustainable energy debate. The assumed ideal relation between externalcost results and policy measures has to be openly discussed and debated,allowing to surface the implicit meanings and value-laden assumptionsbehind the uncritical presentation of such direct link. Possibilities forsuch re-negotiation can be created through direct interaction betweeninvolved stakeholders, relevant experts, and policy makers in a setting

that allows experimenting with the socio-institutional roles normallytaken up in the sciencepolicysociety interface. In this respect,the workshop showed the potential of the approach of pedigreeassessment, to assess assumptions made in external cost studies. By using pedigree assesment the following results can be achieved: qualifying assumptions when they are communicated to the

policy sphere evaluating how assumptions relate to different perspectives and

frameworks, as held by involved actors generating suggestions for improvements in the calculation chain

to deal with disagreements and divergence over assumptions as well as suggestions for communicating this type of policy relevant

science. conveying a more adequate image of policy-relevant science.


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REFERENCESCallon, M. (1998), An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic

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