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High-performance Management

Practices, Working Hours andWorkLife Balance

Michael White, Stephen Hill, Patrick McGovern,

Colin Mills and Deborah Smeaton

Abstract

The effects of selected high-performance practices and working hours on

worklife balance are analysed with data from national surveys of British

employees in 1992 and 2000. Alongside long hours, which are a constant source

of negative job-to-home spillover, certain high-performance practices have

become more strongly related to negative spillover during this period. Surpris-

ingly, dual-earner couples are not especially liable to spillover if anything,less so than single-earner couples. Additionally, the presence of young children

has become less important over time. Overall, the results suggest a conflict

between high-performance practices and work-life balance policies.

1. Introduction

By working faithfully eight hours a day, you may eventually get to be boss and

work twelve hours a day.Robert Frost (18751963), US poet (attrib.)

Robert Frosts acerbic observation on the costs of success at work has a par-

ticular resonance in an age when the concept of worklife balance is never

far from the public discourse. National newspapers, for instance, frequently

carry stories about the damage that workers do to their families by work-

ing long hours (e.g. Guardian, 21 November 2000: 21; Financial Times, 13

September 2001: 16; Sunday Times, 20 January 2002: 8). The conventional

wisdom in these accounts is that much of the problem is due to Britains long

hours culture, for it is widely known that full-time workers in Britain work

the longest hours in the European Union. British men work an average of

British Journal of Industrial Relations

41:2 June 2003 00071080 pp. 175195

Michael White and Deborah Smeaton are at the Policy Studies Institute; Stephen Hill is at RoyalHolloway, University of London; Patrick McGovern is at the London School of Economics andPolitical Science; and Colin Mills is at Nuffield College, Oxford.

Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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3.5 hours per week more than those in the second highest country (Greece),

while British women work 0.8 hour per week longer than the second highest

(Sweden) (Social Trends 2001).

Politicians have been quick to propose solutions, and so the concept of

worklife balance has emerged as a potentially important focus of workplaceregulation. In a 1998 Green Paper (DTI 1998), the Department for Trade and

Industry linked the regulation of working time to family policy and the

National Childcare Strategy, and this was followed in 2000 by the New

Labour governments WorkLife Balance Campaign, which seeks to persuade

employers of the business benefits of practices that enhance the worklife

balance. The notion of worklife balance encompasses the family-friendly

perspective of the earlier Green Paper, but is wider, seeking to help all

employed people, irrespective of marital or parental status, to achieve a better

fit between their professional and private lives. Possible solutions include

some combination of family-friendly employer policies, such as flexible

working hours, homeworking and state assisted nursery places. The underly-

ing assumption is that worklife balance can be achieved without threaten-

ing the economic success of either party, possibly even promoting it for both.

However, this assumption is not self-evident. There may, for example, be

other practices that employers regard as important for their own success

which may exacerbate the worklife balance problem irrespective of the posi-

tive contribution of family-friendly policies.

It is with this possibility in mind that we examine the effects of certain

human resource management or work organization practices associated with

various models of high-performance or high-commitment management

(e.g. Huselid 1995; MacDuffie 1995; Wood and de Menezes 1998; Appelbaum

et al. 2000). Given the lack of consensus about this terminology, in this paper

we adopt the convention of referring to these as high-performance practices.

We are aware that there is considerable debate about their performance

effects, but it is reasonable to assume that many employers adopt them

in order to improve performance. Furthermore, there is evidence (e.g.Appelbaum et al. 2000: 22930; Appelbaum and Berg 2001: 279; see also

discussion in next section) to indicate that these best practice models of

human resource management/work organization commonly serve to obtain

greater discretionary effort from employees. It is therefore plausible to expect

that these will make demands of individuals that will have repercussions that

fall beyond the workplace. We test this proposition by examining the impact

of working hours and selected high-performance practices on negative job-

to-home spillover (Bond et al. 1998; Maume and Houston 2001). In doing so,

we draw together three previously separate literatures, predominantly fromthe United States those on the time squeeze, the workfamily spillover,

and high-performance work systems with the explicit aim of opening up

a new area of research. To our knowledge, the possible spillover effects

of these so-called high-performance practices have not been investigated

previously.

176 British Journal of Industrial Relations

Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2003.

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2. Long hours, time-pressed families and high-performance management

Much of the intellectual energy behind the debate on worklife balance

comes from the United States, notably through Juliet Schors (1991) influen-

tial study The Overworked American (see also Hochschild 1997). Using evi-dence from a range of secondary sources, Schor challenges the widespread

assumption that average hours of work are continuing to fall in advanced

industrial economies, much as they have done over the past century. Instead,

she claims that US employees are working an additional 163 hours on average

that is, about an extra months work per annum (see also Leete and Schor

1994). Since the increase in hours is three times greater among women than

among men, she claims that dual-earner couples are more likely to experi-

ence a time squeeze (Schor 1991: 17). Indeed, several other US studies report

substantial increases in the combined hours of such couples (Bluestone and

Rose 1997: 66; Clarkberg and Moen 2001: 1117), though still others dispute

Schors claim of a general increase in hours, for example by arguing that there

has been a growing tendency for hours to be over-estimated by employees

(Coleman and Pencavel 1993; Robinson and Bostrom 1994). In contrast with

the United States, average working hours do not appear to have increased

during the 1990s for British workers. Rather, the dispersion of hours has

increased, with more people working either very long or very short hours

(Green 2001: 5861).

For our purposes, Schors estimates are less relevant than her attempt to

explain them by examining both employer policies and employee motives. On

the employers side, Schor points to their desire to extract increasing returns

from labour, which many now see as a fixed cost; to the growing proportion

of white-collar employees, where there is no tradition of premium overtime

payments; and to an increase in the bargaining power of employers relative

to that of labour, through either a reduction in job security, a declining union

presence or both. Employees for their part choose demanding jobs to fulfil

material ambitions in a consumer society that has developed powerful formsof advertising and credit purchase systems. According to Schor, many

workers are obliged to accept high work demands simply to service their

personal debt. The last point resonates with the British experience, where

consumer debt and house prices (hence mortgage commitments) have

reached unprecedented levels: outstanding loans secured on dwellings rose by

37 per cent between 1995 and 2000, a period in which the Retail Price Index

rose by 11 per cent (Consumer Trends 2001, Tables S8 and S9; Guardian, 30

November 2001: 27).

Schors discussion does not review employer practices that exert pressureto work longer hours, but it is natural to inquire what these might be. Specifi-

cally, it seems plausible that high-commitment or high-performance man-

agement practices will have a negative impact on the private lives of workers,

to the extent that they are designed to evince greater discretionary effort in

pursuit of the organizations goals. Yet much, though not all, of the related

High-performance Management Practices 177


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literature, regardless of whether it is termed high-commitment management

(e.g. Walton 1987; Wood 1996), high-performance work organization

(HPWO) (e.g. MacDuffie 1995; Becker and Huselid 1998; Wood 1999a) or

high-performance work systems (e.g. Appelbaum et al. 2000; Appelbaum and

Berg 2001), claims that it is good for both employers and employees. Employ-ers, it is argued, gain through improved quality, productivity and financial

returns (Huselid 1995; Ichniowski et al. 1997; Appelbaum et al. 2000), while

employees benefit from higher wages and job satisfaction (Huselid 1995;

Appelbaum et al. 2000).

How is this achieved? Proponents of high-performance work systems claim

that they are characterized by a common desire to raise employee skills, moti-

vation and empowerment (Appelbaum and Berg 2001: 2756), although these

may be realized in various ways. The practices, which typically involve a com-

bination of work organization and human resource management (HRM)

policies, are designed to provide greater participation in decision making, the

opportunity to learn new skills and the financial incentive to offer greater dis-

cretionary effort in the service of the employers goals. Generally, the prac-

tices include some form of teamworking, quality circles, training and career

development, appraisals and performance-related pay.

It is not necessary, for the purposes of this paper, for us to reach a con-

clusion about the strength of the evidence concerning the contribution of

such practices to organizational performance. More importantly (from the

present viewpoint), the evidence on its benefits for employees is mixed at best.

With regard to the bundles of practices associated with HPWO, an analysis

of the British workplace employee relations (WERS, 1998) survey by Ramsay

et al. (2000) finds that they are associated with job strain and lower pay

satisfaction, while Godards survey of Canadian employees reports that high

levels of adoption are linked with low job satisfaction and self-esteem, pos-

sibly because the work is considered to be more stressful (Godard 2001: 797).

In relation to individual practices, there is both qualitative and quantitative

evidence to challenge claims that employees gain from their introduction.Case studies by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic report that

autonomous working groups, which require high levels of individual partici-

pation, are associated with feelings of constant pressure and stress (Parker

and Slaughter 1988; Barker 1993; Graham 1995; Danford 1998). Using data

from a nationally representative survey of employees, Gallie and colleagues

found that a composite variable reflecting appraisals, target setting and merit

pay was associated with greater work pressure for non-manual employees,

while a second composite variable partly based on performance related pay

was associated with higher work pressure for both manual and non-manualemployees (Gallie et al. 1998: 7780).

However, Osterman (1995) reports that organizations in the United States

that adopt high-performance practices also adopt flexible working time and

career-break practices, thereby giving employees more scope to adapt work

demands to family or non-work aims. Thus, the employers most active in pur-

suing high-performance may also strive for practices that offset or balance



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their adverse effects outside work. By contrast, Wood (1999b) reports, on the

basis of an analysis of Ostermans data, that the extent to which an integrated

family-friendly management approach is practised is unrelated to high-

commitment management in the United States, a result that he has found to

be similar in the UK (Wood, personal communication, 2002). A recentnational survey of British employers finds that family-friendly policies are

little more than an aspiration for the majority (Hogarth et al. 2001,passim).

In summary, the idea that both employers and employees can only benefit

from high-performance practices has already been challenged by a wide range

of evidence. Our aim is to extend this line of investigation with a particular

focus on the relatively unexplored area of worklife balance.

3. High-performance management, working hours and work spillover:

some hypotheses

In developing our hypotheses, we have replaced the policy-related concept of

worklife balance by one of negative job-to-home spillover (Bond et al. 1998;

Maume and Houston 2001). This was necessary for two reasons. First, we

wished to give a more focused, if narrower, indicator of worklife balance

which captured the effects on the employees domestic life. Second, given our

focus on high-performance practices, we wished to capture the spillovereffects of work demands as a whole rather than simply assess the effects in

terms of the division of hours between work and non-work activity. The

survey measures that we have constructed to represent negative job-to-home

spillover (described in detail in Section 4) emphasize the consequences of the

job for family relations.

We use the term work demands to indicate those aspects of employment

that have the potential to create negative job-to-home spillover. Work

demands include hours worked, work intensity (the pace of work, and pro-

portion of working hours spent in work activity), and work pressures of anyother kind (e.g. peaks in work load). Additional work hours subtract from

home time, while high work intensity or work pressure may result in fatigue,

anxiety or other adverse psycho-physiological consequences that can affect

the quality of home and family life.

The discussion in the preceding section indicates that two sets of hypoth-

eses need to be considered with regard to negative job-to-home spillover. The

first relates to employer practices, while the second relates to an employees

personal and family circumstances, as discussed earlier in relation to the work

of Schor and others.

Hypotheses concerning Employer Practices

There are two general hypotheses that relate to employer practices: (i) prac-

tices that increase work demands increase negative work-to-home spillover;



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(ii) practices that increase employee choice or flexibility over work demands

reduce negative job-to-home spillover.

We divide practices that increase work demands into two main types.

1. The setting of working hours by employers tends to raise work demandsabove the optimal choice level for employees (Clarkberg and Moen

2001: 11256). Thus, actual hours worked will be positively related to

negative job-to-home spillover.

2. We hypothesize that three types of high-performance practices will

generate more work demands and hence more negative spillover from

work to home: performance appraisal practices; work organization

practices that emphasize group or team collaborations, hence poten-

tially increasing concertive control (Barker 1993: 408); and incentive

or performance-related pay practices. Note that, rather than consider-ing high-performance practices in a general way, we focus on types of

practice in which the literature reviewed above points to serious impli-

cations for work demands. We expect negative spillover to be reduced

where there are practices that increase employee choice and flexibility

over work demands. Such practices might include those that allow

choice over starting and finishing times, flexible hours systems and indi-

viduals control over their own hours of work. (For parents with young

children, career-break schemes, term-time working contracts and

various forms of childcare assistance would also be relevant. These arenot considered within the scope of the present paper.)

Hypotheses concerning Individual Circumstances

A range of personal circumstances may generate or increase negative

spillover. More specifically, financial pressures, or lack of resources, may lead

to longer hours and have negative consequences for domestic life. Also, a

variety of family circumstances may add to financial pressures; for example,

young children impose higher childcare costs, while single-earner families

tend to have lower incomes than dual-earner families. On the other hand,

single-earner families (and also single people) will tend to have additional

time available for household and family activities. In general, the literature

reviewed above suggests that on balance dual-earner families are more prone

to a spillover problem, and this is the hypothesis we adopt.

4. Data sources and measures

The data used in this paper were taken from two representative surveys of

the employed and self-employed in Great Britain, with samples restricted to

those aged between 20 and 60 inclusive. Working in Britain 2000 (WIB2000)

was conducted between June 2000 and January 2001 and produced a sample

of 2466 employed people with a response rate of 65 per cent. Employment



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in Britain (EIB1992) was conducted in 1992 and generated a sample of 3855

employed people with a response rate of 72 per cent. The employee sub-

samples were 2132 in WIB2000 and 3458 in EIB1992. Both WIB and EIB

were multi-stage household surveys using postal address files as the sampling

frame and a Kish grid method to select individuals randomly within eachsampled household. Primary sampling units were postal sectors, with 167

selected (by a stratified random sampling method) for WIB and 150 for EIB.

In both WIB2000 and EIB1992, interviews were face-to-face, of approxi-

mately one hour in duration, with an additional self-completion question-

naire. In EIB there were two different versions of the self-completion

questionnaire, each of which was administered to a random one-half of the

total sample. The dependent variable in the present analysis was obtained in

a half-sample, so that the available sample size was reduced. After sample

losses arising from other missing data, the samples available for analysis were

1474 employees for 1992 and 1915 employees for the year 2000.

To make the two surveys more representative, each was weighted in the

same way by data from the population estimates of the Labour Force Surveys

of 1992 and 2000, respectively. The weighting variables were sex, age, socio-

economic group and part-time or full-time employment status. All analyses

reported here incorporated these weights, which were combined with the

weights required to correct for Kish sampling.

The Dependent Variable: Negative Job-to-Home Spillover

The concept of negative job-to-home spillover is measured in a manner

similar to that of Maume and Houston (2001: 177), in that it seeks to capture

the effects of work on time for partner/family as well as time for family

responsibilities. In addition, our version asks directly about the effects of the

employees jobs on their partners or families. This three-item index variable

is worded as follows:

How often would you say the following statements are true of yourself?1. After work I have too little time to carry out my family responsibilities

as I would like.

2. My job prevents me from giving the time I would like to my

partner/family.

3. My partner/family gets a bit fed up with the pressure of my job.

The response scale was Almost always, Often, Sometimes, Rarely, Never.

Item 2 from the 1992 survey was reversed in 2000 to read My job allows me

to give the time I would like to my partner/family. This does not affect themeaning of the scale. The three items are highly inter-correlated and have a

reliability (Cronbach alpha) of 0.85 in 1992 and 0.75 in 2000. They also form

a distinct and significant factor in a principal components factor analysis

involving other variables relating to work demands. The scoring and

scaling of the items to produce the dependent variable are discussed in

Section 5.



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The items are assumed to be applicable to single people as well as to those

with spouses or partners. We checked this assumption by item non-response

analysis, which showed (by age group) 24 per cent non-response in 1992 for

those with no spouses or partners and no children, and 12 per cent non-

response in 2000. It is also worth noting that, even when people live apartfrom their families, they generally maintain family contacts. In the 1992

survey 48 per cent of those without spouses, partners and children said that

they saw relatives at least once a week, and 72 per cent at least once a month.

Only 2 per cent of this group stated that they never saw relatives.

Explanatory Variables Representing the Hypothesized Influences

(a) Working hours

This was defined as the weekly hours worked during the most recent pay

period, inclusive of paid overtime but exclusive of unpaid meal breaks and

unpaid overtime.

(b) Employers high-performance practices

Our selection of items focuses on those types of practice that are linked in

the research literature with high work demands, as reviewed earlier.

Appraisal systems are often represented, in human resource management,

as relating to personal development and motivation. Although our own inter-

pretation is more in terms of control, the items reflect the HRM background.

As well as establishing whether the individual takes part in an appraisal

system, the surveys asked whether appraisals helped to plan training; whether

appraisals affected promotion; whether appraisals affected pay; and whether

appraisals influenced how hard the individual works.

Group-working practices are here represented by four items: whether or not

the individual works in a group; whether co-workers influence how hard the

individual works; whether the person takes part in a work improvement

group or quality circle; and whether pay depends in part on the performanceof the work group.

Evidently, the last item above can also be construed as an element of

performance-related pay (PRP). Other items representing this element were:

whether part of the pay depended on the individuals own performance;

whether part of the pay depended upon the performance of the workplace

or organization; whether the organization had a profit-sharing or share

scheme; whether pay incentives influenced how hard the individual worked;

and whether pay increases were given to those people who worked hard and

performed well (merit pay).We used factor analysis and item analysis to assess whether it would be

more efficient to retain the separate items or construct composite variables.

In the case of the appraisal variables, construction of a composite variable

was supported; since each item had a uniqueness of less than 0.5, they col-

lectively constituted a distinct and significant factor, and had a Cronbach

alpha greater than 0.7 in each survey. Accordingly, we constructed a



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summative scale (labelled appraisal intensity) from the five appraisal items,

scoring each item as binary (hence the scale takes values 05). However, on

the same criteria, construction of scales for the other two sets of items was

not supported. These have therefore been retained as separate items in the

analyses, each being represented as a dummy variable.Factor analysis was also used to examine the validity of separating these

items from other HPWO type practices. It might be, for example, that these

items considered separately increase negative job-to-home spillover, yet the

wider HPWO systems (of which they form part) do not have these conse-

quences or may even have benign consequences. The preliminary question,

however, is whether such wider systems exist at a detectable level in the data.

In an exploratory factor analysis, we were unable to find any general factor;

the majority of the 26 HRM or work organization items available in both

surveys had uniqueness greater than 0.8. Indeed, there were only three inter-

pretable factors, one loading on the appraisal scale (see above), another

loading somewhat less strongly on a subset of pay items, and the third

loading on two items concerning managementemployee communications.

Thus, there was nothing to suggest that our selection of variables had artifi-

cially detached items from their natural groupings or had ignored an under-

lying structure.

(c) Employer practices: flexibility and choice in working time

In our analysis the practices expected to reduce job-to-home spillover are:

availability of personal choice from a range of pre-specified starting and

finishing times; participation in a flexible hours system; and personal discre-

tion (on a day-to-day basis) over ones own starting and finishing times. The

surveys treat these as mutually exclusive situations, and each is represented

by a dummy variable. The implicit base category is having to work standard

hours that are set by the employer.

(d) Individual circumstances: financial pressure and home timeThe respondent was coded as working under financial pressure if giving, as

the single most important reason for working, need money for basic essen-

tials such as food, rent, mortgage. Other variables relating to financial pres-

sures were: having an employed partner; having a non-employed partner;

having a youngest child aged under 3, 34, 511, or 1215. (These age bands

reflect public educational arrangements in Britain, where in most areas

nursery classes begin at age 3, primary school at age 4 or 5 and secondary

school at age 11 or 12.) Dual-earner couples should (other things being equal)

experience less financial pressure, while single-earner couples should experi-ence more financial pressure. Children of dependent age increase financial

pressure, and the lower the age of the youngest child, the greater will be the

potential childcare costs.

The employment status of the spouse or partner, as well as having a finan-

cial interpretation, has implications for home time, as discussed earlier in

connection with the US literature. Dual-earner couples are expected to face



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a time squeeze on home time resulting from their high combined working

hours.

Control Variables for the AnalysisVariables were included in the analysis to control for aspects of the work-

place and of individual circumstances that could affect negative job-to-home

spillover.

A potentially important workplace variable is the exercise of arbitrary or

discretionary power by the supervisor, which has been interpreted as part of

the simple or drive system of labour control (Edwards 1979). The item used

here asked whether the supervisor treats some people better than others,

and a positive response is indicative of the abuse of discretionary power.

In Schors (1991) discussion, job insecurity is assumed to be one of the

drivers of longer working hours. Indicators of security in our analysis were

the employees job tenure in months, and its square (to capture nonlinearity);

and a single item reporting whether (as perceived by the employee) the size

of the organizations workforce had increased, decreased or remained stable

over the previous three years.

The other workplace variable included in the analysis was whether trade

unions were recognized. Individual control variables were: age and its square;

social class a seven-category version of the EricksonGoldthorpe class

schema (Erickson and Goldthorpe 1993); hours worked in a second job (0

if no second job); whether individuals had a non-financial commitment to

employment; and whether individuals used IT in their jobs. All analyses were

produced separately for men and women.

5. Analysis procedure

The analysis was devised with the aim of testing the hypotheses concerningworkplace practices, individual circumstances and negative job-to-home

spillover. For this purpose regression modelling, with its capability of esti-

mating the independent effects of each explanatory variable, provides an

appropriate framework. The main technical issue is how to scale the depen-

dent variable. Three variant forms of scaling were used to assess the sensi-

tivity of results to this choice. (i) The three items were summed to produce

an assumed interval scale, which had a range of 13 points, and this scale was

used in OLS (linear) regression models. (ii) The 13 points of the summative

variable were treated as an ordinal scale (a weaker measurement assumption),and this was used in ordered probit models. (iii) A principal components

factor analysis was conducted on the three items (each assumed to be

measured on an interval scale), and the derived factor score was used as the

dependent variable. This method weights the items in accordance with their

contributions to the assumed underlying common factor, rather than giving

them equal weight, and generates a closer approximation to a continuous



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variable than does version (i). The factor-scored dependent variable was used

under OLS regression models.

The important result from this series of variant analyses was that the

results were qualitatively the same across all three, with no substantial dif-

ference in the significance level of any explanatory variable. Thus, the analy-sis was not sensitive to the choice of scaling. Also, the customary diagnostics

showed the residuals in the OLS models to be approximately normally dis-

tributed. In the following, only the results using the variable derived from the

principal component analysis (iii) are presented. Results of the above variant

analyses, and of other results referred to subsequently but not reported in

full because of space limitations, may be obtained from the first-named

author.

The results are derived from four regression models, which were estimated

separately for the sub-samples: women in 1992, women in 2000, men in 1992,

and men in 2000. The availability of the two surveys makes it possible to

assess whether the relationships of the high-performance management prac-

tices to negative spillover were changing over this period. This could occur,

for instance, through the wider diffusion of practices or through qualitative

changes in their application.

Standard errors in all the models were computed by a robust estimator (the

HuberWhite estimator), which takes account of the complex survey design

and of heteroscedasticity. (For explanation of robust estimation, see Skinner

1989: 2358.)

6. Results

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. These

are of interest in indicating whether the prevalence of hypothesized influences

on negative spillover was changing over the period. Average hours worked

were nearly two hours higher in the sample of 2000 than in 1992, but thisshould be regarded with caution, as it is not supported by analysis of the

Labour Force Survey (see also Green 2001). We can however say with confi-

dence, based on these surveys and the LFS, that average hours of work did

not fall over the period.

Of the high-performance practices, the appraisal index remained static

across the surveys, but three of the four group-working practices showed a

clear increase, as did three of the five performance-related pay practices. This

is part of a steady diffusion of HRM practices over the period, which we

have documented elsewhere (White 2001). Among the working time practices,only one participation in a flexible hours system rose appreciably,

although overall the rigid setting of hours by employers decreased.

Turning to individual circumstances, we find that the proportion of people

working primarily from financial necessity has fallen slightly. There was a

slightly higher proportion with a dependent child in the 2000 sample, but also

more people without a spouse or partner. The proportion of dual-earner



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TABLE 1Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Explanatory Variables

2000 1992

Mean or s.d. Mean or s.d.proportion proportion

Index of jobhome 7.72 2.776 7.20 2.952negative spillover

Actual hours/week 37.79 13.692 36.39 12.440

Appraisal index 2.195 1.950 2.176 1.949

Work in group 0.582 0.460

Effort determined 0.338 0.356by co-workers

Take part in work 0.304 0.205improvement group

Group PRP 0.170 0.054

Profit sharing 0.150 0.157

Individual PRP 0.221 0.153

Workplace PRP 0.260 0.215

Effort determined 0.243 0.183by pay incentives

Merit increases 0.373 0.378

Start/finish times

Fixed by emplr* 0.537 0.601Have choice 0.133 0.113Flexible hours 0.222 0.173Own discretion 0.108 0.113

Work from financial 0.597 0.641necessity

Age of youngest childNone* 0.579 0.61502 0.109 0.09334 0.058 0.052511 0.162 0.159

1215 0.093 0.081

Marital statusNo partner* 0.296 0.247One-earner couple 0.125 0.154Two-earner couple 0.580 0.598

The sample size for the analysis in 2000 is 1915 and for the analysis in 1992 is 1474.* Indicates reference category in OLS analysis.+ This is the simple summative scale; the factor score variable is standardized with mean 0 andstandard deviation 1.

couples changed little, but single-earner couples decreased as a proportion of

the sample while the proportion of single people increased.

We now turn to the results of the four regression models. Estimates are

shown in Table 2 for the hypothesized explanatory variables. Also shown are

the estimates relating to fairness of supervision, which (although designated

a control variable) turned out to provide information of interpretative value.

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TABLE 2Models of Negative Job-to-home Spillover

Women Men

1992 2000 1992 2000

Weekly hours 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.026(4.50)** (6.41)** (6.20)** (8.84)**

Appraisals index 0.080 0.040 0.051 0.034(scored 05) (3.45)** (2.07)* (2.36)* (1.80)+

Take part in work -0.071 0.117 0.072 0.012improvement group (0.72) (1.74)+ (0.80) (0.17)

Work in group/team 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.07)

Co-workers influence 0.152 0.072 -0.056 0.143effort (1.99)* (1.07) (0.74) (1.88)+

Have group PRP -0.131 0.247 0.016 -0.037(0.41) (2.11)* (0.10) (0.33)

Pay incentives -0.064 0.008 0.186 0.160influence effort (0.55) (0.10) (2.40)* (2.12)*

Have individual PRP -0.052 0.026 -0.260 -0.089(0.40) (0.30) (2.76)** (1.06)

Have workplace or 0.117 0.016 0.072 -0.030organizational PRP (0.87) (0.19) (0.99) (0.32)

Have profit-sharing -0.241 -0.018 -0.019 0.003or share scheme (2.16)* (0.16) (0.24) (0.03)

Pay increases based -0.013 0.043 -0.057 -0.071on effort/performance (0.16) (0.68) (0.73) (0.96)

Choose work times 0.196 0.001 0.176 -0.065from set list (1.72)+ (0.02) (1.68)+ (0.57)

Have flexible hours -0.079 -0.174 0.004 -0.080system (0.72) (2.12)* (0.05) (0.94)

Decide own starting 0.210 0.155 0.556 -0.215

and finishing times (1.55) (1.21) (5.11)** (1.99)*

Work mainly from 0.070 0.143 -0.045 0.101financial necessity (1.02) (2.53)* (0.52) (1.52)

Youngest child aged 0.440 0.308 0.246 0.05602 (3.39)** (2.59)** (2.03)* (0.58)

Youngest child aged 0.675 0.402 0.365 0.16734 (4.36)** (2.65)** (2.98)** (1.15)

Youngest child aged 0.350 0.311 0.582 0.136511 (3.11)** (2.93)** (5.58)** (1.29)

Youngest child aged 0.239 0.163 0.216 0.1521215 (1.85)+ (1.76)+ (1.76)+ (1.13)

One-earner couple 0.276 0.236 0.508 0.376(2.18)* (2.04)* (4.86)** (3.63)**

Dual-earner couple 0.183 0.070 0.386 0.100(2.13)* (1.00) (4.13)** (1.12)

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For reasons of space we do not show the results for the other control vari-ables, but they can be obtained from the first-named author.

Employers Practices: Hours Worked

The results show that negative job-to-home spillover increased with addi-

tional hours worked, to a similar degree for both women and men, and to a

similar degree in both 1992 and 2000. Indeed, actual hours worked proved

to be by far the strongest explanatory variable in this analysis: when omitted

in variant analyses, adjusted R2

values fell by nearly one-half. This relation-ship between hours and negative spillover was, of course, net of any cor-

relation with the various work control and time control practices included

in the model. The strength and stability of the relationship between hours

worked and negative job-to-home spillover testifies to the importance of

working hours practices within the workplace. Whatever changes have

occurred in the workplace during the 1990s, they have done nothing to reduce

the effects of hours worked on negative spillover.

Employers Practices: Appraisals, Group Working and

Performance-Related Pay

The results also confirm that Britains worklife balance problem is not

simply a matter of working hours. We find clear evidence that high-

performance practices are an important, if previously ignored, source of

negative spillover, even after controlling for working hours.



Table 2 (contd)

Women Men

1992 2000 1992 2000

Supervisor treats -0.166 -0.258 0.014 -0.162people the same (2.25)* (4.14)** (0.18) (2.37)*

Constant -1.71 -1.06 -0.89 -1.78(2.81)** (2.10)** (1.85)+ (3.08)

Observations 718 1001 756 914

Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.21

Dependent variable is the factor score derived from three items relating to negative job-to-homespillover (see text for further explanation). OLS regression models with robust variance estima-tor. Cell entries are the estimated coefficients, with t-statistics (absolute values) in parentheses

below.+ Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.PRP = performance-related pay. The following control variables were also included in allanalyses: hours worked in second job; age; age-squared; tenure; tenure-squared; 7 social classdummies; trade union representation dummy; 3 dummies for change of size of workplace in past3 years; use of IT in job (dummy); non-financial work commitment (dummy).

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In particular, appraisal systems had a clear effect on increasing negative

spillover for both men and women, and this extended across both years, albeit

with smaller coefficients, and a fall in significance to the 10 per cent level for

men, in 2000. Other theoretically significant results concerned group or team

motivational practices. There was some tendency for group-orientated prac-tices to have an increased relationship with this form of workfamily conflict

in 2000, which suggests that group-working practices are playing a larger role

in work demands. Gender differences are also evident. For men, being in a

situation where co-workers controlled work effort resulted in more negative

spillover in 2000. For women, there was a particularly large impact on

negative spillover in 2000 if they participated in a group incentive scheme.

Women were also adversely affected, in 2000, if they took part in a work

improvement group; although the coefficient was significant only at the 10

per cent level, the sign had also changed over the period. On the other hand,

women in 1992 had more negative spillover if their co-workers influenced

their work effort: this effect had become non-significant by 2000.

There were also changes over time in the impact of performance-related

payment systems on job-to-home spillover. In 1992, men receiving individu-

ally based bonuses had less negative spillover than other men, a finding con-

sistent with much of the older research showing that incentive workers were

often able to gain control over work demands (e.g. Lupton 1963; Roy 1952).

By 2000, however, this relationship had become smaller and non-significant.

A similar pattern was observed for women in respect of profit-sharing or

share-option schemes, which reduced negative spillover in 1992 but not in

2000. Finally, men who reported that pay incentives (of any kind) had an

important influence on their work effort were more likely to experience

negative spillover in both years.

Overall, ten of the estimates relating to the selected high-performance prac-

tices were significant at least at the 10 per cent level (eight at the 5 per cent

level), and with positive sign that is, they increased negative spillover, as

hypothesized. Two of the estimates were significant with negative sign, con-trary to hypothesis, but both of these occurred in 1992 with a subsequent

shift towards the expected sign by 2000. The latter point, alongside other evi-

dence, suggests that the hypothesized relationships may on balance have been

strengthening over time. In 1992 there were four significant and positive co-

efficients, while in 2000 there were six.

Employers Practices: Hours of Work and Flexible Hours

The effects of individual flexibility and discretion over hours in amelioratingnegative spillover were partly as hypothesized, but not altogether consistent.

Consistent with our hypothesis, taking part in a flexible hours system sig-

nificantly reduced negative spillover for women in 2000, while making no

difference either way to men. Contrary to our hypothesis, however, having

discretion to decide ones own working times was positively signed though

non-significant for women in both years, and was both positive and



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significant for men in 1992, suggesting that men at that time used their

discretion chiefly to impose more work demands on themselves. By 2000,

however, this was no longer the case: the relationship for men had moved

significantly in the negative direction, with discretion over hours being linked

to a reduction in negative spillover (p < 0.05). This was the largest singlechange over time observed in this set of analyses, and one that suggests an

important shift in the male perspective.

Connected with the issue of individual discretion over work-times is that

of supervisory discretion. The fairness or unfairness of the supervisor is an

important influence on negative spillover over the entire period for women

(with an increasing coefficient), and in 2000 for men. When the supervisor is

seen as fair, negative spillover is lower; when the supervisor is seen as unfair,

the reverse applies. These results suggest that supervisory equity is becoming

increasingly important as an influence on spillover between work and home.

Individual and Family Circumstances

All the variables concerning individual and family circumstances produced

significant effects on negative spillover, and some of these results were not as

hypothesized. Consistent with our hypothesis, working from financial neces-

sity was significantly linked to negative spillover for women in 2000, although

this did not hold in 1992. For male employees the sign of the coefficient was

moving in the same direction across surveys, although the change was not

statistically significant.

The general assumption in the time-squeeze literature, which we have

adopted as a hypothesis, is that dual-earner families are most adversely

affected by work demands. In the present analysis, however, those in dual-

earner couples consistently reported less negative spillover than those in

single-earner situations, although this difference was statistically significant

only for men in 2000. In other words, it was the single-earner couples that

had the highest levels of negative spillover.The analyses provided little support for the idea that negative spillover has

been exacerbated by parents child-centred values. Indeed, children were

becoming less central to negative spillover over the decade. By 2000, mens

experience of negative spillover appeared unaffected by the age of the

youngest child a marked change from 1992. It is true that womens sense

of negative spillover was much affected by having young children, but this

influence was also tending to weaken somewhat by 2000. The overall impres-

sion is that concern for time with children is playing a decreasing part in the

experience of negative job-to-home spillover.

7. Summary and conclusions

The analyses were designed to test hypotheses about the role of workplace

practices, hours of work and individual circumstances in relation to negative



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job-to-home spillover. The results show that actual hours worked are the

largest influence, with little change between 1992 and 2000; but negative

spillover is also affected by a range of workplace practices, albeit with con-

siderable differences between male and female employees. Appraisal systems,

group-based forms of work organization and individual incentives all con-tribute to the imposition of the public sphere on the private. Flexible hours

systems and personal discretion over starting and finishing times tend to

reduce the problem, especially in 2000.

Alongside individual discretion over working time, the way supervisors use

their discretion is also of increasing importance, for good or ill. With regard

to individual circumstances, external financial pressures are becoming

increasingly significant although the overall impact of children (or of child

development values) is decreasing. Surprisingly, there is no indication that

dual-earner couples are more affected by workfamily spillover than single-

earner couples: if anything, the reverse applies. Thus, two of the main

explanations in the existing literature for negative spillover on the individual

side are not supported, whereas employers workplace practices are found to

play a significant and perhaps a growing role.

In devising this analysis of worklife balance, we were guided largely by

debates in the United States concerning increasing working hours and the

time squeeze, which we juxtaposed with the literature on high-performance

management practices. The results of our analysis indicate that some of the

claims from the time-squeeze literature are not supported, while our decision

to incorporate a selection of practices associated with various high-

performance models has been vindicated. In relation to the latter, our

evidence clearly shows that employees do not always benefit from high-

performance work practices. As Ramsay and colleagues argued (Ramsay et

al. 2000: 521), advocates of high-performance management best practice

models should take care when proclaiming the unitarist assumption that

everyone gains from managerial innovation (e.g. Appelbaum et al. 2000: 228).

Ideas about dual-earner and single-earner families also seem in need ofrevision. Dual-earner families do not experience more workfamily spillover

problems than single-earner families: among men, in 2000 it was clearly

the reverse that applied. This counterintuitive finding requires us to re-

conceptualize the nature of workfamily spillover, since we can no longer

simplistically assume that it is an inverse function of the couples home time.

So, what might explain this surprising result?

One possibility is that the average earner in the single-earner couple works

longer hours to make up for only having one wage; and that it is the earners

home time, not the couples, that matters. However, neither the means nor thedispersions of hours differ appreciably between employees in the single-

earner and dual-earner situations, so this possibility must be rejected.

Another possibility is that additional resources available to dual-earner

couples enable them to offset the time squeeze by putting domestic activities

out to the market (in the form of cleaners, childminders, nurseries and out-

of-school clubs, etc.). Finally, those in dual-career households may select or



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remain in jobs that have less negative spillover precisely because both part-

ners wish to have careers. Female partners, in particular, may be less inclined

to take demanding jobs, given that they still do most of the domestic labour

(Gershuny 2000: 1657). Other interpretations are also possible (see e.g.

Clarkberg and Moen 2001: 11279). Obviously, these are issues requiringfurther research.

Policy responses to the findings will need to take account of the strength

of the forces arrayed, so to speak, against workfamily or worklife balance.

Of paramount importance is policy to regulate working hours, since these

exert the strongest influence by far on negative work-to-home spillover.

However, a further and complex policy issue arises from the various high-

performance practices that have become more prevalent over the past decade,

and are now shown to be an additional and independent source of

workfamily spillover. If these practices continue to diffuse, they will lead to

further work intensification and the creation of more severe pressures on

home life. Some individuals or couples will of course be able to develop alter-

native worklifestyles and walk away from pressurized employment, but our

findings do not encourage complacency on this score. Too many employees

are constrained in their choices by financial pressures.

Against this opposition, flexible and family-friendly practices to promote

the worklife balance look feeble by comparison. Flexible hours systems

and personal discretion over time clearly enable employees to have a more

balanced lifestyle, even if these practices are currently enjoyed by only small

proportions of the labour force (22 and 11 per cent, respectively). Men, in

particular, seem to have become increasingly willing to use such practices to

reduce spillover, which suggests that there may be a latent demand for such

policies among male employees. Yet the effects of such flexible hours polices

are small in comparison with the effects of Britains long working hours and

of steadily diffusing high-performance practices. It is also more disquieting

than comforting to note that by the year 2000 the ability of supervisors

to influence negative spillover, for better or worse, had grown; the more sowhen 43 per cent of employees felt that their supervisor did not treat all

employees fairly. When supervisors are increasingly relied upon to intervene,

it is a reasonable inference that systems of workplace regulation are failing

to cope.

A more fundamental approach would be for employers to look inside each

of their working practices, and seek an improved design that builds in safe-

guards for the worklife balance. Work teams, for example, could themselves

be charged with addressing worklife balance issues when setting output

targets for their members. This admittedly untried suggestion contrasts withthe prevalent approach, which is to embrace high-performance practices even

if they have adverse consequences, while seeking separate means of damage

limitation such as flexible hours. Practices such as appraisal systems, team-

working and performance-related pay need to be reviewed in such a way as

to respect and value the diversity of life circumstances and worklife

preferences among employees. This is an inherently difficult project, but the



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chances for substantially improving the worklife balance in its absence seem

slender.

Final version accepted 3 January 2003.

Acknowledgements

The research for this paper was financed under Grant no. L212252037 of the

ESRC Future of Work programme and by the Work Foundation (previously

the Industrial Society). The survey Working in Britain 2000 was conducted

by NFO System Three Social Research to the project teams design, under

the direction of Bruce Hayward. We are grateful to the interviewers and tothose who gave of their time for the interview. We would also like to thank

the referees and the editors of this special edition for their comments.

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