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1Introduction to Environmentand Society

J u l e s P r e t t y , A n d r e w B a l l , T e d B e n t o n ,J u l i a G u i v a n t , D a v i d R . L e e , D a v i d O r r ,

M a x P f e f f e r a n d H u g h W a rd

PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABILITY

It is only in recent decades that the concepts asso-ciated with sustainability have come into morecommon use. Environmental concerns began todevelop in the 1960s, and were particularly driven

by Rachel Carsons book Silent Spring and thepublicity surrounding it (Carson, 1963). Likeother popular and scientific studies at the time, itfocused on the environmental harm caused by oneeconomic sector, in this case agriculture. In the1970s, the Club of Rome identified the problemsthat societies would face when environmentalresources were overused, depleted or harmed, andpointed towards the need for different types ofpolicies to maintain and generate economicgrowth. In the 1980s, the World Commission onEnvironment and Development, chaired by GroHarlem Brundtland, published Our CommonFuture, the first serious attempt to link poverty tonatural resource management and the state of theenvironment. Sustainable development wasdefined as meeting the needs of the present with-out compromising the ability of future generationsto meet their own needs. The concept impliedboth limits to growth, and the idea of different pat-terns of growth, as well as introducing questionsof intergenerational justice (WCED, 1987).

In 1992, the UN Conference on Environmentand Development was held in Rio de Janeiro, tak-ing forward many themes prefigured at the UNConference on the Human Environment held inStockholm in 1972. The main agreement was

Agenda 21, a forty-one chapter document settingout priorities and practices for all economic andsocial sectors, and how these should relate to theenvironment. The principles of sustainable formsof development that encouraged minimizing harmto the environment and human health were agreed.However, progress has not been good, as Agenda

21 was not a binding treaty on national govern-ments, and all are free to choose whether theyadopt or ignore such principles (Pretty andKoohafkan, 2002). The Rio Summit was followedby some international successes, including thesigning of the Convention on Biodiversity in 1995,the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and the StockholmConvention on Persistent Organic Pollutants in2001. The ten years after the Rio World Summit onSustainable Development was then held inJohannesburg in 2002, again raising the profile ofsustainability, but also failing to tie governmentsto clear actions and timetables.

Over time, the concept of sustainability has

grown from an initial focus on environmentalaspects to include first economic and then broadersocial and political dimensions.

Environmental or ecological the core con-cerns are to reduce negative environmental andhealth externalities, to enhance and use localecosystem resources, and preserve biodiversity.More recent concerns include broader recognitionof the potential for positive environmental exter-nalities from some economic sectors (includingcarbon capture in soils and flood protection).

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Economic economic perspectives recognizethat many environmental services are not priced bymarkets and that, because of this, it may be eco-nomically rational to use the environment in unsus-

tainable ways and to undersupply environmentalpublic goods. In response to this, some seek toassign value to environmental goods and services,and also to include a longer time frame in eco-nomic analysis. They also highlight subsidies thatpromote the depletion of resources or unfair com-petition with other production systems.

Social and political there are many concernsabout the equity of technological change. At thelocal level, sustainability is associated with partici-pation, group action and promotion of local insti-tutions and culture (Ostrom, 1990; Pretty andWard, 2001; Grafton and Knowles, 2004). At thehigher level, the concern is for enabling policies

that target preservation of nature and its vitalgoods and services. Many believe that liberaldemocracies are more likely to give rise to suchpolicies than are autocracies, as part of generallybetter governance (United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, 2003), but the empirical evidence forthis is ambiguous (Midlarsky, 1998; Barrett andGraddy, 2000; Fredriksson et al., 2005). Partlybecause of this some argue that the liberal demo-cratic state needs to be transcended by adding inrepresentation of other species, other generationsand other nations (Eckersley, 2004) and by enhanc-ing the potential for open deliberation aboutthe issues, to bring together the knowledge that

different groups and communities have and toreduce the corrosive impact of narrow self-interest(cf. Saward, 1993; Dryzek, 1996).

SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON ENVIRONMENTAND SOCIETY

An important feature of this Handbook centres onhow social organization constrains humans rela-tionships with nature, but also how social organi-zations are shaped by nature. Perhaps the mostdistinctive feature of such an approach is that itrejects the notion that any form of social organiza-tion or structured human action is ideal or givenby nature. While much human action is con-strained by social structures (e.g. market behav-iour), it is assumed that those structures aresocially constructed and subject to change. Thisstance implies that human behaviour in relation tonature can be redirected if social structureschange. Furthermore, changes in nature mayforce changes in social structure which in turnlead to changes in human behaviour.

Social scientists have long striven to developan understanding of the relationship between the

natural environment and society, but until the1970s treatment by sociologists of this relation-ship remained more implicit than explicit. Atthis time, sociologists began to consider the

naturesociety nexus, and contemporary environ-mental sociology became a reaction to growingsocial activism for environmental protection. Thisactivism reflected discontent with the dominantpro-technology and pro-growth economic policiesfollowing World War II. During the Cold War era,these policies might have tended to be either moremarket- or state-centred, but regardless of ideo-logical orientation economic growth driven bytechnological innovation was the overarchingapproach to economic development. This domi-nant worldview held that human domination ofnature was unproblematic from a practical stand-point and was morally justified as well. But this

point of view came to be challenged on both prac-tical and moral grounds (Catton and Dunlap, 1978;Buttel, 1987; Beck, 1992a,b; Seippel, 2002).

From a practical standpoint, environmentaldeterioration became visible to the untrained eye.Air and water pollution became public issues ofgreat concern (Buttel, 1997; Mertig et al., 2002).Although the scientific community had been thefoundation of technological development, criticsof various technologies began to emerge fromwithin it as well. Perhaps the most celebrated sci-entist to mount a sustained critique of the environ-mental impacts of technology was Rachel Carson.Many observers claim that the publication of her

book, Silent Spring (Carson, 1963), marked therise of contemporary environmentalism in theUSA but there is clear evidence that concern aboutenvironmental destruction had already been stir-ring throughout the industrial world (Rootes,1997; Mertig et al., 2002). The rise of the environ-mental movement in the USA, for example, ledto the enactment of a variety of unprecedentedenvironmental legislation.

Sociologists were somewhat taken by surpriseby the environmental movement, and struggled tounderstand it. Its substantive focus as well as thecomposition of its adherents appeared to be some-what different from the other social movements ofthe day. The movements adherents were initiallythought to be more middle class and perhaps moremainstream than the anti-war and civil rightsactivists of the time. Substantively, the movementseemed to be charting a new course that was notrooted in the dominant socialist or capitalistideologies. For this reason some sociologistsbegan to suspect that environmentalists wereadvocating an entirely new paradigm one thatpolitically was neither left nor right, but entirelydifferent. For this reason some initial thinkingby sociologists was that an entirely new theoreti-cal underpinning would need to be formulated

2 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY

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(Catton and Dunlap, 1978; Dunlap and Catton,1994; Dunlap, 1997).

Initially, existing social theories were largelyrejected on the assumption that they had been

deficient in considering the active part played bythe natural environment in societal developmentand had considered the impact of society onnature as inconsequential. Without a clear theoryto guide the development of an alternative sociol-ogy of the environment, early efforts moved ina variety of directions that steered environmentalsociology away from established theories ofsociety.

Environmental sociologists initially criticizedexisting social theories for their hubris in assum-ing that humans through science and technologycould dominate nature without significant impactson the natural world or society. This paradigm was

labelled human exemptionalism (Catton andDunlap, 1978; Dunlap and Catton, 1994). It wasimmediately clear that any sociology of the envi-ronment would need to focus on the relationshipbetween that natural environment and society.A more careful treatment of this issue would chal-lenge many assumptions in sociology. For exam-ple, sociology had assumed that all socialstructures could be explained by human agency.From this point of view, the physical and biologi-cal worlds were passive objects in the human con-struction of the social world (Murphy, 1994). Butenvironmentalists concerns about the destructionof nature and its consequences for society led to a

reconsideration of how nature shapes society.Some claimed that what was distinctive aboutenvironmental sociology was its emphasis on themutual constitution of nature and society(Freudenburg et al., 1995; Norgaard, 1997). Fromthis perspective, some sort of unidirectional andexclusively human construction of the life worldis impossible.

So, what shapes the relationship between soci-ety and the environment? Some early attempts toapply sociological theory to the understanding ofnaturesociety relationships drew on Marxistpolitical economy. Political economists focusedon the nature of the capitalist organization of pro-duction and how the functional demands of thissystem defined the use of nature. Some of theearly thought in this area emphasized how capital-isms requirement for the continuous expansion ofproduction into new areas would inevitably lead tothe destruction of nature (Schnaiberg, 1980;Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; Buttel, 1997). Morerecently, there has been greater emphasis on howcapitalism is constrained by the biological andphysical limits imposed by the natural world(Benton, 1989, 1998; Dickens, 1996, 1997).

The implications of the dominant system ofmarket capitalism for naturesociety relationships

are a point of considerable contention in sociology.Some would argue that the capitalist economy isfundamentally destructive of the environment andfor this reason is unsustainable in the long run.

From this point of view, environmental destruc-tion is the Achilles heel of capitalism. Thisapproach is deeply suspicious of claims thatscience and technology can always produce ade-quate substitutes for depleted natural resources(OConnor, 1998). Recently, a decidedly moreoptimistic theory of ecological modernization hascome into play. From this point of view, environ-mental destruction reflects a lack of investment inmodern technologies and this deficit can be reme-died with state policies that prohibit productionpractices wasteful or destructive of the environ-ment. Ecological modernization is not just abouttechnology, though. It is as much about bringing

ecological considerations into market decisionmaking through appropriate pricing of environ-mental services. In this theory the state plays aprominent role, with little real significanceattached to abstractions like the free market. Thestate constrains markets through policies thatestablish incentives to channel market behaviourin environmentally sound directions (Simonis,1989; Mol, 1996, 2001; Mol and Spaargaren,2000; Spaargaren et al., 2000).

These opposing viewpoints on the environmen-tal impacts of market economies point to the dis-tinctiveness of this approach to understandingnaturesociety relations. Regardless of their theo-

retical orientation, sociologists consider organiza-tional forms to be social constructs that are subjectto change. This assumption implies that humanbehaviour is not inherent or given, but moulded bythe social structures in place at any time in history.Thus, sociologists emphasize the distinctiveness ofprocesses of societal rationalization, or the elabo-ration of a historically specific logic that structuresthe interaction between nature and society. Anyparticular rationalization is not natural but has adistinctive form that constrains options for humaninteractions with nature (Murphy, 1994).

Since sociologists assume that social organiza-tion does not take some sort of ideal form, theorganization of human interactions with nature isa subject of particular interest to sociologists.Given an infinite number of possible forms oforganization, why are similar forms of organiza-tion widely dispersed across a wide range ofsocial and natural environments? This questionhas become especially salient with the emergenceof the processes of globalization (Yearley, 1996).Economic, environmental and social organizationdisplays some striking similarities in far-flungparts of the world. This organizational isomor-phism is of growing interest to sociologists(Buttel, 1997; Frank, 2002; Frank et al., 2000;

3INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY

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Schelhas and Pfeffer, 2005; Pfeffer et al., 2006).But just as interesting to sociologists are some ofthe distinctive ways that these organizations arerefashioned by local interests and the local natural

resource base (Pfeffer et al., 2001, 2005).

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSETSAND EXTERNALITIES

Many economic sectors directly affect many ofthe very assets on which they rely for success.Economic systems at all levels rely on the value ofservices flowing from the total stock of assets thatthey influence and control, and five types of asset,natural, social, human, physical and financial cap-ital, are now recognized as being important. Thereare, though, some advantages and misgivings with

the use of the term capital. On the one hand, cap-ital implies an asset, and assets should be caredfor, protected and accumulated over long andintergenerational periods. On the other, capital canimply easy measurability and transferability.Because the value of something can be assigned amonetary value, then it can appear not to matter ifit is lost, as the required money could simply beallocated to purchase another asset, or to transferit from elsewhere. But nature and its wider valuesis not so easily replaceable as a commodity(Coleman, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1993;Flora and Flora, 1996; Benton, 1998; Uphoff,1998, 2002; Costanza et al., 1997; Pretty and

Ward, 2001; Pretty, 2003; MEA, 2005).Nonetheless, as terms, natural, social andhuman capital have become widespread in helpingto shape concepts around basic questions aboutthe potential sustainability of natural and humansystems. The five capitals have been defined in thefollowing ways:

1 Natural capitalproduces environmental goodsand services, and is the source of food (bothfarmed and harvested or caught from the wild),wood and fibre; water supply and regulation;treatment, assimilation and decomposition ofwastes; nutrient cycling and fixation; soil forma-tion; biological control of pests; climate regula-tion; wildlife habitats; storm protection and floodcontrol; carbon sequestration; pollination; andrecreation and leisure.

2 Social capitalyields a flow of mutually benefi-cial collective action, contributing to the cohe-siveness of people in their societies. The socialassets comprising social capital include norms,values and attitudes that predispose people tocooperate; relations of trust, reciprocity and obli-gations; and common rules and sanctions mutu-ally agreed or handed down.These are connectedand structured in networks and groups.

3 Human capitalis the total capability residingin individuals, based on their stock of knowledgeskills, health and nutrition. It is enhanced byaccess to services that provide these, such as

schools, medical services and adult training.Peoples productivity is increased by their capac-ity to interact with productive technologies andwith other people. Leadership and organizationalskills are particularly important in making otherresources more valuable.

4 Physical capital is the store of human-madematerial resources, and comprises buildings, suchas housing and factories, market infrastructure,irrigation works, roads and bridges, tools and trac-tors, communications, and energy and transporta-tion systems, that make labour more productive.

5 Financial capital is more of an accountingconcept, as it serves in a facilitating role rather

than as a source of productivity in and of itself. Itrepresents accumulated claims on goods andservices, built up through financial systemsthat gather savings and issue credit, such as pen-sions, remittances, welfare payments, grants andsubsidies.

As economic systems shape the very assets onwhich they rely for inputs, there are feedbackloops from outcomes to inputs. For instance, someeconomists emphasize the way that marketsrespond to resource scarcity is by pushing upprices, encouraging substitution and searching fortechnical change (Beckerman, 1996). However,

such market feedbacks cannot work properly ifenvironmental assets come for free. Thus, whilesustainable systems will have a positive effect onnatural, social and human capital, unsustainableones feed back to deplete these assets, leavingfewer for future generations. For example, an agri-cultural system that erodes soil whilst producingfood externalizes costs that others must bear. Butone that sequesters carbon in soils through organicmatter accumulation helps to mediate climatechange. Similarly, a diverse system that enhanceson-farm wildlife for pest control contributes towider stocks of biodiversity, whilst simplifiedmodernized systems that eliminate wildlife do not.Agricultural systems that offer labour-absorptionopportunities, through resource improvements orvalue-added activities, can boost local economiesand help to reverse rural-to-urban migration pat-terns (Carney, 1998; Dasgupta and Serageldin,1998; Ellis, 2000; Morison et al., 2005; Prettyet al., 2006).

Any activities that lead to improvements inthese renewable capital assets thus make a contri-bution towards sustainability. However, the idea ofsustainability does not suggest that all assets areimproved at the same time. One system that con-tributes more to these capital assets than another


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can be said to be more sustainable, but there maystill be trade-offs with one asset increasing asanother falls, though some environmental assetsare essentially irreplaceable and vital, so they can-

not be substituted see the discussion of the ideaof sustainability below. In practice, though, thereare usually strong links between changes in natu-ral, social and human capital, with systems havingmany potential effects on all three.

Many economic systems are, therefore, funda-mentally multifunctional. They jointly producemany environmental goods and services. Clearly,a key policy challenge, for both industrialized anddeveloping countries, is to find ways to maintainand enhance economic productivity. But a keyquestion is: can this be done whilst seeking bothto improve the positive side-effects and to elimi-nate the negative ones? It will not be easy, as mod-

ern patterns of development have tended to ignorethe considerable external costs of harm to theenvironment.

VALUING THE ENVIRONMENT

The idea that the environment and the services itprovides can be valued strikes some as antitheticalto the intrinsic values of environmental resourcesand the role that these resources play in society,history and culture. How can we possibly assignan economic or monetary value, it might be asked,to unique biodiversity such as the bald eagle or the

snow leopard, to views of the Alps or the RockyMountains, or to water resources that are essentialto life and that many societies consider to bean inherent human right? If economic/monetaryvalues of these and similar resources can be esti-mated, how can they possibly be accurate ifunderlying conditions of scarcity change, as theyinevitably will, leading to changes in associatedscarcity values? And, if economic/monetary val-ues are assigned to resources, whatever thosevalues may be, does this valuation in and of itselfinevitably lead to political trade-offs that maydegrade those resources in the interests ofeconomic development or other goals?

For these and many other reasons, the valuationof environmental resources is often fraught withcontention, both conceptually and certainly inpractice, where many empirical estimation andmeasurement issues arise. Yet, as mentionedabove, the treatment of environmental assets asnatural capital and associated exercises in meas-urement, valuation and evaluation are increasinglycommon in both academic analysis and policy-making. This is for several reasons. First, withoutsuch valuations, society has done a remarkablypoor job in managing its stewardship of environ-mental resources; surely, any mechanism that can

help improve on societys past dubious record inenvironmental policy is an advance. Second, sinceat least the 1960s and 1970s, the environmentalimpacts of economic development and human

interventions in the landscape have been central topolicy debates as society has increasingly beenconcerned with both the direct effects and oppor-tunity costs of those interventions e.g. what islost when development proceeds. Third, in the twodecades since the publication of the BrundtlandReport (WCED, 1987), issues of sustainabilityhave achieved much higher prominence in publicdebate in many countries, highlighting the needsof future generations in decisions made todayabout resource use. This has increased interest inhow to trade off current versus future demands onthe environment and how to deal with associatedintergenerational equity concerns, which, in turn,

has increased interest in mechanisms, like eco-nomic valuation, that permit these intertemporalcomparisons.

In addition to these general factors stimulatinginterest in environmental valuation, efforts at eco-nomic and monetary valuation of the environmenthave flourished over the past several decadesbecause they address several additional specificneeds that are increasingly evident in environmen-tal policymaking. First, the importance of thedivergence between social valuation of resourcesand their incomplete (or non-existent) valuation inthe market is increasingly apparent. How can webegin to address the problem of global warming,

for example, if the externalities of industrialpollution are so poorly measured and understood,and consequently devalued in the policy arena,compared with the measurable jobs and incomethat are created? Second, as the human populationexpands and many formerly abundant resourcesare increasingly scarce clean water and clean air,wilderness, open space, even silence accountingfor, and valuing, the public good dimensions ofthese resources has become increasingly impor-tant in prioritizing their survival in policy debates.How else, outside of moral suasion, will thescarcity value of public goods be understood andtaken into account? Third, as the demand for eco-nomic valuation has expanded since the 1960sand 1970s, specific valuation methods and estima-tion procedures have also improved significantly,permitting a more accurate though stillfrequently problematic estimation of economicand monetary values of environmental resourcesand associated services.

An additional factor has to do with the responseto policymaking itself. The limitations of com-mand and control and fences and finesapproaches to environmental policymaking havebecome increasingly evident, both in industrial-ized countries, where the institutions are often in


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place to deal effectively with at least some envi-ronmental problems, and certainly in developingcountries, where such institutions are often non-existent, irrelevant or functionally powerless. Yet,

command and control policy and regulatoryapproaches often generate responses by privatedecision-makers that are, at best, socially ineffi-cient and wasteful of resources, and, at worst,stimulate rent-seeking behaviour and strategicdecision-making that yield perverse outcomes. Isit not preferable to develop policies and regulatoryframeworks that are compatible with privateincentives and that, in fact, employ these incen-tives and knowledge of human behaviour in inno-vative ways to lead to socially desired outcomes?Much of the recent interest in environmentalvaluation has been concerned with precisely thesequestions, specifically, the development of incen-

tive-compatible policies and regulatory approachesthat yield desired outcomes in ways that may beless costly and more socially efficient. Hence, theinterest in tradable emissions permits, carbon-trading schemes, the pricing of heretofore freewater resources, valuation, compensatory andpayment transfer mechanisms for environmentalservices, and other such innovations.

Although alternative typologies exist, one com-mon framework for organizing our thinking aboutresource valuation distinguishes four types ofecosystem values (Pearce and Turner, 1990): (1)direct use values, due to the direct utilization ofresources and ecosystem services; (2) indirect use

values, attributable to the externalities of ecosys-tem services; (3) option value, due to preservingthe option for future use of the resource (alsodirectly addressing sustainability criteria); and(4) non-use values, which are attributable to avariety of intrinsic ecosystem characteristics. Thisnomenclature aside, perhaps inevitably, much ofthe attention in environmental valuation hasfocused on specific methodologies and analyticalapproaches to assigning economic and monetaryvalues to resources, especially those resources thathave typically been outside the formal market(Hanley and Spash, 1993; Freeman, 2003).

Accordingly, as discussed further in severalchapters in Section II, these approaches are com-monly divided into expressed (or stated) prefer-ence approaches and revealed preferenceapproaches. The former approaches ask consumersand other private agents to assign resource valuesand rankings directly; these approaches includecontingent valuation methodologies in whichpeople are asked for their willingness-to-pay topay for environmental benefits, for example. Thelatter approaches indirectly elicit consumer valua-tions through methods such as the travel costapproach and hedonic pricing, which estimateresource values through statistical analysis of

factors underlying human behaviour and the pref-erences (e.g. values) that are thus revealed. All ofthese methods have acknowledged strengths anddeficiencies (also discussed in Section II). Yet,

they have achieved wide acceptance because theycontinue to be at least partially successful in giv-ing policy analysts and policymakers usefulmechanisms and standards for achieving a betterunderstanding of the values of environmentalresources, thus enabling them to make better deci-sions regarding resource management, includingthe conservation and preservation of environmentalresources in the face of competing uses.

THE CONSUMPTION TREADMILL

Since the World Commission on Environment and

Development began deliberating on the linksbetween environment and economy, there havebeen at least a couple of hundred further defini-tions of sustainability, and the term has nowentered our common language. But where are wenow with this sustainability idea? Does it offersome new hope for the world, or has it just hiddena much greater problem? The biggest challenge tosustainable development is now the consumptiontreadmill. The figures are worrying. People inNorth America now consume 430 litres of waterper day; in developing countries, 23% have nowater. In North America, 308 kg of paper are con-sumed by each person annually; in Europe 125 kg,

in China 34 kg, and in India and Africa just 4 kg. InNorth America, there are 75 motor vehicles per 100people, in Japan 57, in Europe 24, and in China,India and Africa just six to nine (see Table 1.1).Worldwide, some 400,000 hectares of croplandare paved per year for roads and parking lots (theUSAs 16 million hectares of land under asphaltwill soon reach the total area under wheat). Theworld motor-vehicle fleet grows alarmingly, as thenearly wealthy look to other parts of our globalcommunity for guidance as to what to buy. Byalmost every measure of resource consumption orproxy for waste production, the USA and Europelead the way. And what model is being held up asthe one to aspire to? There are now few people inthe world who do not now aspire to the same lev-els of consumption as North America, which is,after all, presented as the pinnacle of economicachievement.

This consumer boom is already happening (seeMeadows et al., 1972; Bell, 2004; see also Frank,1999; Kasser, 2002; Schwartz, 2004; Nettle,2005). The new consumers (Myers and Kent,2003, 2004) have already entered the global econ-omy, and are aspiring to have lifestyles currentlyenjoyed by the richest. A number of formerly poorcountries are seeing the growing influence of


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affluence, as the middle classes of China, India,Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea,Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia andMexico engage in greater conspicuous consump-tion. The side-effects are already being felt theaverage car in Bangkok spends 44 days a yearstuck in traffic. But there is still a long way to go.The car fleet of the whole of India is still smaller

than that of Chicago, and that of China is half thenumber of cars in greater Los Angeles. At thesame time as a consumer boom is occurringamong newly affluent urban elites, poor people insuch countries as India and China lack access tothe basics such as clean water and health care.

This is now the concern: the idea of sustainableeconomic development seems to imply that theworld can be improved, or even saved, by bringingeveryone up to the same levels of consumption asthose in the industrialized countries. We can, it issaid, grow out of many kinds of economic trouble.This cannot be done, as we would need six worldsat European and eight to nine at North Americanlevels and patterns of consumption (Rees et al.,1996; Rees, 2002, 2003). How much, we mightwonder, would be enough (see Suzuki, 1997)?

The currently dominant idea about theinevitable benefits of progress would appear to bea modern invention. Indigenous peoples do notbelieve that their current community is any betterthan those in the past. To them, past and future arethe same as current time. Their ancestors, andthose of animals too, constantly remind them to behumble as they move about their landscapes. Butthe myth of progress permits the losses of bothspecies and special places, as it is believed that

losses can be offset by doing something else thatis better. The myth permits a belief in technologi-cal fixes, which are indeed effective in manyways, but rarely seem to make everyone happier,even if some of them contribute to humanlongevity and reduce suffering. Environmentalproblems are, after all, human problems. Newtechnologies will make improvements, but possi-

bly not fast enough to save us. They also bringsome new risks, possibly rendering societymore vulnerable. To come soon will be fabulouselectronic memory, a genomics revolution, renew-able energy, and human brains augmented bycomputers, though as Rees (2002) puts it, asuper-intelligent machine could be the last inven-tion humans ever make. Rees recounts the 1937efforts by the US National Academy of Sciencesto predict breakthroughs for the rest of the lastcentury. They made a good stab at agriculture,rubber and oil, but completely missed nuclearenergy, antibiotics, jet aircraft, space travel andcomputers (see also Gray, 2002, 2004).

It is now clear from a variety of studies of peoplein the USA and Europe that people were happierin the 1950s compared with today. We can onlyguess more about earlier times, as the datado not exist in comparable form. But it doesseem that our programmed happiness is aboutstriving for, not actually increasing, happiness(Frank, 1999; Kasser, 2002; Schwartz, 2004;Nettle, 2005). One reason is that we compareour consumption with others around us, and wedo not necessarily feel better off or happier if oth-ers consumption is also increasing. There isalways a nagging gap between present levels of


Table 1.1 Indicators of consumption from different countries and regions of the world (datafrom 200405)

Latin

Central

USA Europe China India Asia Africa America World Passenger cars per 100 people 75 24 7 6 17 9 6 9

Annual petrol and diesel consumption 1624 286 33 9 47 36 169 174

(litres per person)

Annual energy consumption 8520 3546 896 515 892 580 1190 1640

per person (kg oil equivalent)

Annnual carbon dioxide 20.3 812 2.7 0.99

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contentment and how it could be. We believe wewill be happier in the future, but seldom are. Wealso are constantly worrying about how future lifeevents affect our happiness. As Bell (2004) has

pointed out, we could work four hours per day, orjust for about half a year, if we consumed at 1940slevels, yet be equally happy. But would anyonechoose this option if they could?

EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ONPOPULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Population will continue to grow in many coun-tries at least until mid-century, posing consider-able problems in relation to providing for basicneeds and dealing with environmental damage insome. Yet population is already declining is some

rich countries, and others population can beexpected to stabilize then to decline, as the agestructure of the population shifts and social prac-tices change. A psychological problem yet to befaced is the consequence of coming populationdecline. Thomas Malthus (1798) argued thathuman population growth would always outstripresources. Population, when unchecked, he said,increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistenceincreases only in an arithmetric ratio. A slightacquaintance with numbers will shew the immen-sity of the first power in comparison with the sec-ond. Since then, most policies and practiceregarding natural resources and food have been

shaped by concerns about our growing numbers.Humans are, after all, an extraordinarily success-ful species. When agriculture emerged, some10,000 years ago, there were probably five millionpeople worldwide. To the mid-19th century, worldpopulation then doubled eight times. Since then ithas doubled four more times, and will continue togrow to probably eight and a half billion peopleby the middle of the 21st century. It will then sta-bilize for a while, and subsequently fall. Notbecause of wars, climate change or infectious dis-eases (though they may contribute to greaterdeclines), but because of changing fertility pat-terns. More choices about contraception anddecreasing poverty reduces the need to have somany children, and changing lifestyles among therich delay child-bearing ages. When one genera-tion produces fewer daughters, and fewer daugh-ters are produced by them, then the replacementrate soon falls below the 2.1 needed to maintainpopulation stability.

Today, the average woman in industrializedcountries has fewer than 1.6 children, in the leastdeveloped countries 5 children, and in the otherdeveloping countries 2.6. The lowest fertility ratesare now in southern Europe, at 1.1 children perwoman. In the mid-1970s, the average Bangladeshi

woman had six children; today she has about three;in Iran, fertility has fallen from more than fivechildren in the late 1980s to just over two today.The worldwide annual gain is still 76 million peo-

ple (down from 100 million in 1990), but this isexpected to fall to zero by 2050 as the number ofchildren falls from todays average of 2.55 to 2.0.Life expectancy at birth was 47 years in 195055,rose to 65 years by 200005, and will rise again to75 years worldwide by 204550. By then, thenumber of people over 60 will have tripled to1.9 billion, and the number over 80 will haverisen from todays 86 million to 395 million. Ofcourse, these changes will not be evenly spread.Some countries are predicted to triple their num-bers by 2050: these include Afganistan, BurkinaFaso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, DRTimor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,

Niger and Uganda. But the populations of 51countries will fall, including Germany, Italy,Japan and most of the former USSR (UN, 2004,2005a).

What will happen after this peak, less than twogenerations away from us now? The UnitedNations (2005b) has made population predictionsfor the next 300 years, and uncertain though thesemust be, the medium fertility estimates suggest atleast a levelling of world population for 250 moreyears at 8.5 to 9 billion. At low fertility (at thekind of levels we are already seeing today afterall, 93 out of 222 countries already have fewerthan 2.1 children per women, and 37 have less

than 1.5), world population declines to 5.5 billionby the end of this century, to 3.9 billion by 2150,and down to 2.3 billion by 2300. Which track weend up on depends entirely on early changes infertility. Demographers cannot, of course, agreeon the probability of stability or decline. But anykind of fall will bring huge changes. In 2000, peo-ple on average retired two weeks before mean lifeexpectancy (at 65 years); by 2300, people willretire more than 30 years short of life expectancy(unless age of retirement changes), when on aver-age women will live to 97 and men to 95 years.This does not take account of potentially revolu-tionary changes to human longevity that newmedical technologies might bring.

Caldwell (2004) says that the low scenario isby no means implausible, and that the low projec-tions would probably portend to many the fear ofhuman extinction. Governments would try toraise fertility levels, but it could be very difficultto achieve, as people do not always do the biddingof their governments. What, then, will happen toall those settlements we do not need? What of thefields and farms that become surplus to require-ments? What of the wild animals will we seetheir return to places where they had long sincebeen eliminated (not the extinct species, of course,


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as they are gone forever)? Or might the vision bequite different of spreading urban wastelands, offorgotten linkages to nature, of the nightmare ofdecivilization (a term coined by Timothy Garton

Ash, in Porritt, 2005)?

DUALISM, SEPARATIONAND CONNECTIONS

In recent years, with growing concerns for sus-tainability, the environment and biodiversity,many different typologies have been developed tocategorize shades of deep to shallow green think-ing. Arne Naess sees shallow ecology, for exam-ple, as an approach centred on efficiency ofresource use, whereas deep ecology transcendsconservation in favour of biocentric values. Other

typologies include Donald Worsters imperial andarcadian ecology (Worster, 1993) and the resourceand holistic schools of conservation. For some,there is an even more fundamental schism whether nature exists independently of us, orwhether it is characterised as post-modern or aspart of a post-modern condition. Nature to scien-tific ecologists exists. To some post-modernistperspectives, though, it is mostly a cultural con-struction. The truth is, surely, that nature doesexist, but that we socially construct its meaning tous. Such meanings and values change over time,and between different groups of people.

There are many dangers in the persistent dual-

ism that separates humans from nature. It appearsto suggest that we can be objective and independ-ent observers rather than part of the system andinevitably bound up in it. Everything we knowabout the world we know because we interact withit, or it with us. Thus, if each of our views isunique, we should listen to the accounts of othersand observe carefully their actions. Another prob-lem is that nature is seen as having boundaries the edges of parks or protected areas. At the land-scape level, this creates difficulties, as the whole isalways more important than each part, and diver-sity is an important outcome (Foreman, 1997;Klijn and Vos, 2000).

This can lead to the idea of enclaves socialenclaves such as reservations, barrios orChinatowns, and natural enclaves like nationalparks, wildernesses, sites of special scientificinterest, protected areas or zoos. Enclave thinkingcan lead us away from accepting the connectivityof nature and people, though it has the advantageof creating niches for specialization. Oneconsequence is that biodiversity and conservationcan be considered to be in one place, andproductive agricultural activities in another (Crononet al., 1992; Deutsch, 1992; Brunkhorst et al.,1997; Pretty, 2002). It is no longer acceptable

to cause damage in some natural landscapes, pro-vided we leave some areas protected. Enclavesalso act as a sop to those with a conscience thewider destruction can be justified if we fashion a

small space for natural history to persist.By continuing to separate humans and nature,

the dualism also appears to suggest that technolo-gies can always intervene to reverse damagecaused by this very dualism. The greater vision,and the more difficult to define, involves lookingat the whole, and seeking ways to redesign it.Cartesian dualism that puts humans outside natureremains a strange concept to many humancultures. It is only modernist thinking that hasseparated humans from nature in the first place,putting us up as distant controllers. Most peoplesdo not externalize nature in this way. From theAshninha of Peru to the forest dwellers of former

Zaire, people see themselves as just one part of alarger whole, as do many people who adhere tomajor modern religions even Christians who areoften accused of treating nature as something tobe plundered. Their relationships with nature areholistic, based on both/with rather thaneither/or (Benton, 1998; Gray, 1999). Recentresearch on the biophilia hypothesis of E. O. Wilsonis indicating that natural or green places are goodfor mental health, irrespective of social context(Kellett and Wilson, 1993; Pretty, 2004; Prettyet al., 2005).

The idea of the wilderness struck a chord in themid-19th century, with the influential writers

Henry David Thoreau and John Muir setting out anew philosophy for our relations with nature. Thisgrew out of a recognition of the value of wildlandsfor peoples well-being. Without them, we arenothing; with them, we have life. Thoreaufamously said in 1851, in wildness is the preser-vation of the world. Muir in turn indicated that:wildness is a necessity; and mountain parks andreservations are useful not only as fountains oftimber and irrigating rivers, but as fountains oflife. But as Roderick Nash, Max Oelschlaeger,Simon Schama and many other recent commenta-tors have pointed out, these concerns for wilder-ness represented much more than a defence ofunencroached lands. (For the Thoreau quote, seeNash, 1973, p. 84 quoted in turn from a speechby Thoreau on April 23rd, 1851, to the ConcordLyceum. For the Muir quote, see Oelschlaeger,1991. See also Nash, 1973; Schama, 1996; andVandergeest and DuPuis, 1996.) It involved theconstruction of a deeper idea, which proved to behugely successful in reawakening in NorthAmerican and European consciences the funda-mental value of nature.

Debates have since raged over whetherdiscovered landscapes were virgin lands orwidowed ones, left behind after the death of


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indigenous peoples. Did wildernesses exist, or didwe create them? Donald Worster, environmentalhistorian, points out for North America that nei-ther adjective will quite do, for the continent was

far too big and diverse to be so simply genderedand personalised (Worster, 1993). In other words,

just because they constructed this idea does notmean to say it was an error. Nonetheless, theywere wrong to imply that the wildernesses in, say,Yosemite were untouched by human hand, asthese landscapes and habitats had been deliber-ately constructed by Ahwahneechee and othernative Americans and their management practicesto enhance valued fauna and flora.

Henry David Thoreau developed his idea ofpeople and their cultures as being intricatelyembedded in nature as a fundamental critique ofmechanical ideas that had separated nature from

its observers. His was an organic view of theconnections between people and nature (For agood review of Thoreau, see Oelschlaeger, 1991,pp. 133171). In hisNatural History, Thoreau cel-ebrates learning by direct intercourse and sympa-thy and advocates a scientific wisdom that arisesfrom local knowledge accumulated from experi-ence combined with the science of inductionand deduction. But he still invokes the coreidea of wilderness untouched by humans eventhough his Massachusetts had been colonized

just two centuries earlier and had a longhistory of taming both nature and local nativeAmericans.

The question, is a landscape wild, or is it man-aged, are perhaps the wrong ones to ask, as itencourages unnecessary and lengthy argument.What is more important is the notion of humanintervention in a nature of which we are part.Sometimes such intervention means doing noth-ing at all, so leaving a whole landscape in a wildstate, or perhaps it means just protecting the lastremaining tree in an urban neighbourhood orhedgerow on a field boundary. Preferably, interven-tion should mean sensitive management, with alight touch on the landscape. Or it may mean heavyreshaping of the land, for the good or the bad.

So it does not matter whether untouched andpristine wildernesses actually exist. Nature existswithout us; and with us is shaped and reshaped.Most of what exists today does so because it hasbeen influenced explicitly or implicitly by thehands of humans, mainly because our reach hasspread as our numbers have grown, and as theeffects of our consumption patterns have com-pounded the effect. But there are still places thatseem truly wild, and these exist at very differentscales and touch us in different ways. Some are ona continental scale, such as the Antarctic. Othersare entirely local, a woodland amidst farmedfields, a saltmarsh along an estuary, a mysterious

urban garden, all touched with private and specialmeanings.

In all of these situations, we are a part, con-nected, and so affecting nature and land, and being

affected by it. This is a fundamentally differentposition to one which suggests that wilderness isuntouched, pristine, and so somehow betterbecause it is separated from humans who, ironyof ironies, promptly want to go there in large num-bers precisely because it appears separate. But anhistorical understanding of what has happened toproduce the landscape or nature we see before usmatters enormously when we use an idea to forma vision that clashes with the truth. An idea thatthis place is wild, and so these local people shouldbe removed. Another idea that this place is ripe fordevelopment, and so a group of people should bedispossessed. The term wilderness has come to

mean many things, usually implying an absenceof people and presence of wild animals, but alsocontaining something to do with the feelings andemotions provoked in people. Roderick Nash(1973) takes a particularly Eurocentric perspec-tive in saying, any place in which a person feelsstripped of guidance, lost and perplexed may becalled a wilderness, though this definition mayalso be true of some harsh urban landscapes. Theimportant thing is not defining what it really is,but what we think it is, and then telling storiesabout it.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The classical approaches to understanding thestructure of society shared two basic features. Onewas the ambition to provide ways of conceptualiz-ing the large-scale structural features of wholesocieties, and to situate them in the context oflong-term historical change and in relation to thealternative social forms and historical tendenciesin the rest of the world. The other was the insis-tence that human social and historical life was adistinct order of reality in its own right, not to beexplained away in terms of the biological sciencesof the day: industrial development, social inequal-ity, crime, suicide rates, gender divisions and thelike were to be understood in terms of social andcultural causes, not racial inheritance, geneticendowment or physiological constitution. Thissecond feature was the basis for a process of sep-arate development, through which the life andsocial sciences proceeded in ignorance of oneanother: nature and culture were distinct andcontrasting realms, knowing and needing to knownothing of one another (Benton, 1996, 2001).

A common feature of the classics was theirinsistence on human social and cultural life as anorder of reality in its own right, irreducible to the


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biological realm. Through most of the 20th cen-tury, this was taken to be an unquestioned assump-tion: social processes were to be explained interms of social causes. This resistance to biologi-

cal explanation was strongly reinforced by wide-spread revulsion at the consequences of Nazidoctrines of racial superiority, and the racistunderpinning of much European imperial domina-tion of non-Western peoples. With the rise of newsocial movements from the 1960s onwards, chal-lenging established inequalities and social exclu-sions based on gender difference and sexualorientation, the terms nature and natural cameto be viewed with suspicion. Sociologists sympa-thetic to the struggle for womens emancipation orgay rights critically exposed the way dominantideologies justified oppression in the name of adistinction between what was natural and what

was unnatural, and therefore pathological. Inthis way, the strong links between sociology andprogressive social movements reinforced theassumption already built into the main sociologi-cal traditions that biology, the natural, should beheld at arms length and viewed with suspicion. Itbecame a standard procedure for sociologists, andespecially those who identified with a criticalstance towards established society, to call intoquestion all authoritative claims to knowledge ofnature or reality (Soper, 1995; MacNaughtenand Urry, 1998).

Then, from the late 1970s onwards, develop-ments in linguistics and cultural theory became

very influential, and approaches which (followingWeber and Simmel, among the classics) focusedon symbolic meaning and the role of language inshaping our experience of the world flourished.Questions about the material reality of nature andour relation to it now became excluded as a mat-ter of methodological principle: all experience ofthe world is to be understood as mediated by lan-guage and culture. But there is no way anyone canstand outside the available language and culture tosee reality in itself: we are left with the task ofcharacterizing the role played in social life by var-ious different and often conflicting linguistic andcultural constructions of reality. It is important toremain neutral and agnostic about which, if any,of these constructions is true. Critical sociologycan aid emancipatory social struggles by exposingthe constructed character of the prevailing oppres-sive accounts of what is natural, thus decon-structing them and challenging their authoritativehold over peoples lives. These are the core insightsof the approaches called constructionist.

The sensitivity of sociology to the social andcultural movements and issues in the wider worldoutside the academy now presented it with a deepchallenge: from the early 1960s the progressivesocial movements with which many sociologists

had become identified also included a burgeoningradical environmental movement whose intellec-tual leaders (often dissident natural scientists)raised public alarm about the growing threat

posed by our affluent, growth-oriented throwawaysociety to its own planetary life-support systems.Here was a new and powerful basis for a radical,critical politics, but one which celebrated nature,and claimed authoritative knowledge of the terri-ble destruction of it unleashed by contemporarysociety. This was a deep challenge in two ways.First, it was an intellectual challenge. Sociologyhad established its right to exist as a distinct disci-pline by a radical separation of the realms ofnature and culture, but now faced pressing ques-tions about the consequences of the mutual inter-connection, the shared fate, of natural processesand social life. The second challenge was rooted

in the normative commitment of critical sociolo-gists and was particularly strongly felt by thosewho sympathized with such emancipatory move-ments as anti-racist, gay rights and womens liber-ation activism but were also drawn to the emergentgreen politics with its passionate defence ofnature.

There emerged two very broad, and to someextent conflicting, ways of addressing the newenvironmental agenda. One, typically construc-tionist, and deriving from the modest tradition,tended to avoid large-scale theorizing. The greatstrength of this tradition has been its detailed casestudies of particular environmental issues, social

movements, campaigns and episodes of conflict.Rather than use the new environmental agenda asan occasion for questioning the basic inheritedassumptions of the discipline, this sort of approachhas concentrated on treating environmental issuesas a new field in which to demonstrate the value ofalready-established sociological concepts andstyles of argument. For instance, this approach hasdebunked many myths about the environmentalmovement. It was found that while parts of themovement retain a radical and progressive edge,many had evolved into highly professional lobbyorganizations seeking insider status in govern-ment decision making through moderating theirdemands (Dalton, 1994). At the same time, manymembers do little or nothing beyond giving anannual donation, having little or no direct involve-ment in local politics and living remarkably stan-dard middle-class lives. The key standard conceptsturn out to be institutionalization as a consequenceof the problem of resource mobilization, which inturn derives from rational choice by individuals todo little, as captured in the Prisoners Dilemmametaphor and other models of collective actionfailure (Jordan and Maloney, 1997).

For sociologists of science, the natural sciencesare thoroughly social in character, their conceptual


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organization, research priorities and methodologicalprocedures all shaped by social interests and cul-tural values generally subservient to the domi-nant group or elite interests. Similarly with

technologies these are designed to serve power-ful interests and cannot be fully understood inde-pendently of the social practices and relationshipswhich their use either maintains or transforms.This way of understanding scientific and technicalinnovation has much to offer in the environmentalfield. It opens up the possibility of analysis of thekinds of pressures, power relationships, forms ofregulation, etc., which promote environmentallydamaging technologies, and also suggests thesorts of social and economic change which mightencourage more benign forms of technicalchange.

Contructionist approaches have also produced

valuable research in the field of environmentalsocial movement mobilization and organization.The key insight which informs their approach isrecognition that there is no one-to-one correspon-dence between the existence of, say, air pollution,or biodiversity loss, on the one hand, and theemergence of a social movement which identifiesit as an unacceptable condition and campaignsfor change, on the other. A leading constructionistenvironmental sociologist, John Hannigan (1995),provides an illuminating set of concepts foranalysing the social and cultural processesinvolved in constructing an environmental prob-lem. First, a problem-claim has to be assembled:

evidence, including scientific evidence, has to becollected and put together in such a way as toshow that the state of affairs is significant enoughto justify public concern and action. Next, it has tobe presented: the problem has to be character-ized in ways which will attract attention, and pro-voke the desired public concern. Since the mediaare now so central to communication to widerpublics, this will also involve ways of engagingwith the media in such a way as to ensure not onlytheir attention, but also that media representationscoincide with the movements own framing ofthe issue. The case of Greenpeaces use of dramaticfilm footage of whaling is a good example. Thevisual images were irresistible material for the elec-tronic media, and their vivid portrayal of the vio-lent death of great and beautiful creatures hadmore impact on public conscience than a thousandbooks. Perhaps, too, the constructionists mightargue that the ethical and aesthetic power of theseimages far outweighed the influence of detailedscientific studies of the population dynamics andrisk of extinction of the different whale species.

Finally, Hannigan notes that success on the partof social movements in making their problem-claim is not the end of the matter. In each case,interests will be threatened by the raising of an

issue in the case of whaling, for example, theindustry itself, and spin-off processing and retailinterests, as well as consumer cultures in certaincountries and indigenous people for whom whal-

ing is central to their whole way of life. So, theraising of an issue will generally be met withcounter-arguments, and competition for mediaframing and public acceptance. Hannigan callsthis the contestation of movement claims. Socialmovement theory also has developed concepts foranalysing the processes involved in establishing,maintaining and coordinating social movementactivity, for studying the culture of such movementsand how they shape the identities of individuals whoparticipate in them (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991;Yearley, 1991, 1994; Munck, 1995).

It is increasingly common for constructioniststo defend a more limited or contextual construc-

tionism, which does not deny either the reality orthe importance of actual environmental change.So, there is a convergence between constructionistand the alternative realist approaches in theirunderlying philosophy. Even so, the rhetoric of amore radical constructionism is often retained,and a lack of analysis of the crucial ambiguities ofconcepts such as construction itself can givethe impression that an account of the culturalconstruction of an environmental change as anissue somehow also explains the socio-economiccauses of the change itself. In other words, theconstructionist approaches may be true to thenature-sceptical critical traditions, but they do

not, in the end, address the need to revise thosetraditions to reconnect our understanding of societywith its material basis in nature.

The four basic types of approach are, first, thenew environmental paradigm advanced in thelate 1970s, second, reflexive modernization, asadvocated by Giddens, Beck and others, third, amore recent cluster of approaches referred to asecological modernization, and, finally, a rangeof approaches deriving from the Marxist, or his-torical materialist, tradition in various combina-tions with green, feminist and anti-racist ideas.These latter approaches can be collectivelyreferred to as radical political economy. The pio-neers of the first approach were the US sociolo-gists, R. E. Dunlap and W. R. Catton. In a series ofarticles from the late 1970s onwards (see Cattonand Dunlap, 1978, 1980; Dunlap and Catton,1994) they criticized mainstream sociology forworking with a human exemptionalistparadigm:that is, sociologists had tried to understand humansocieties in abstraction from their interdependencewith the rest of nature, as if we were exemptfromthe laws of nature which apply to all other beings.Instead, they proposed a new environmental para-digm which would locate human societies withinthe wider web of environmental interactions.


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Clearly, their proposal was for an ecology-inspired radical revision of the whole sociologicaltradition. Very much in line with these originalproposals is an influential approach which attempts

to measure the scale of materials and energy takenup by and emitted by particular societies at differ-ent historical periods. Key concepts in materialsand energy flow accounting are the metabolismbetween societies and nature, and colonisation ofnature and natural resources by social processes(Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1993; Foster,1999; Schandl and Schulz, 2000). This approachoffers a means of quantitative measure of theextent of ecological modernization over time inthe industrialized countries (Adrianne et al., 1997;Matthews et al., 2000).

Whereas the focus of the radical political econ-omy analyses is modern capitalism, its expansion-

ary tendencies and political implications, thekey concept for these other approaches is moder-nity and the key process modernization. Theshift from modern as an adjective, to the idea ofmodernity as a way of characterizing a wholesociety or historical period (Craib, 1992, 1997;Stones, 1998) is associated with a tradition knownas functionalism. This approach assumed anevolutionary development in the history of soci-eties toward more complex and functionally dif-ferentiated societies. The Western societiesrepresented the highest developmental stage, andmodels were devised to foster development inthe rest of the world, on the assumption that it

would follow the model already achieved in thewest. This process was modernization. Its out-come would be capitalist and liberal-democratic.Modernity was the state we in the West hadalready attained, and, by implication, one towhich everyone else would, or should, aspire. Inthis early version the notion included three aspects:modernity was the destiny of the whole world, theWest was leading the way, and this was a goodthing. Initially influential as a cold-war ideology,this assumed more triumphalist forms with the fallof Soviet and East European state-centralistregimes at the end of the 1980s (Fukuyama, 1992).This period also marked a revival in the use of theterms modernity and modernization by sociolo-gists, often as a way of avoiding the morepolitically contentious term capitalism.

Most relevant to our theme have been two the-oretical approaches which have linked moder-nity and modernization with ecological changeand environmental social movements: ecologicalmodernization theory and the notion of reflexivemodernization associated with Ulrich Beck andAnthony Giddens. Both approaches see moder-nity as a phase in historical development as wellas a type of society, and both subdivide modernityitself into successive developmental phases.

In this respect, reflexive modernization theorists,especially, incorporate some of the themes ofpost-modernism as characterizing a significanttransition within modernity. Beyond this, the two

traditions diverge quite radically.Ecological modernization theory had its origins

in the 1970s. Its earliest advocates shared the opti-mistic evolutionary/developmental perspective ofthe American functionalist versions. They distin-guished an early phase of modernity, a phase ofindustrial construction, in which increased pro-duction was won at the cost of increased environ-mental degradation, from a more recent phase ofreconstruction. In this latter phase, industrialproduction and consumption were increasingly gov-erned by a new, ecological rationality. Scientificand technical innovation was increasingly devotedto adapting the industrial society to environmental

constraints (Murphy, 2000).The idea of reflexive modernization, too, has atwo-phase model of development within moder-nity. Modernity itself is defined (in Giddenssversion) as a combination of four distinct institu-tional dimensions: a liberal democratic state,concerned with surveillance, a military establish-ment which monopolizes the legitimate use offorce, an economic system, characterized by pri-vate property and market, and industrial technolo-gies as the mode of appropriation of nature.However, in recent decades, this model of sim-ple modernity is rendered increasingly inappro-priate by three interrelated social processes.

Globalization, which, for Giddens, is primarily amatter of increased international flows of commu-nication and information, opens up all closedcommunities and stable traditions to the existenceof alternatives. A new cosmopolitanism emergesin which it is impossible to maintain traditions inthe traditional way. So, along with globalizationcomes de-traditionalization. Freed from the con-straints of localism and traditionalism, both indi-viduals and institutions become more reflexive:more self-conscious, and consequently more opento revising their practices and identities. Instead ofa life whose main outlines are determined by thecontingencies of birth class, sex, locality weare increasingly required to turn our lives into areflexive process of flexibly inventing andre-inventing our identities. Traditional forms ofgender relation and family forms, establishedauthority relations and norms of conduct and espe-cially the traditional political divisions of left andright, rooted in traditional class identities, areexpected to dissolve in the acid of reflexivity(Giddens, 1994; for commentary, see OBrienet al., 1999; Benton, 2000).

Beck and Giddens concur in their expectationthat the mass politics of left and right, like theclass identities which that expressed, will fade


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away, to be replaced by a new politics beyondleft and right. Giddens speaks of this as a politicsof life-style and voluntary activity, whilstBecks hope is for a new modernity in which

non-institutionalized social activism will demanddemocratic accountability from technocrats andpoliticians in the way science and technology aredeveloped and introduced.

In the face of such analyses from the reflexivemodernizers, and from the developments of the rad-ical political economy approach, the contemporaryadvocates of ecological modernization have signif-icantly reworked their inherited theory. Writerssuch as A. Weale, G. Spaargaren, A. P. J. Mol,M. A. Hajer and others have acknowledged thatthe advance of their hoped-for ecological ration-ality is more problematic than earlier writers suchas Huber and Janicke had supposed (Weale, 1992;

Hajer, 1995; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). Recentwork in this tradition differs from the earlier inthree main respects. First, the earlier emphasis ontechnology is broadened to include the importanceof accompanying changes in culture, consumerbehaviour, organization and governmental inter-vention and regulation as fostering environmentaladaptation. Along with this is a shift away fromthe functionalism of the earlier version in favourof recognition of the role of social agency inbringing about change, and, finally, the recogni-tion that ecological modernization is a project,facing resistance, obstacles and reverses, not aninherent, smoothly operating tendency inherent in

the historical development of modernity.The ecological modernizers remain, however,significantly more optimistic about the environ-mental prospects of modernity than either theanalysts of risk society (Beck 1992) or the radi-cal political economists (for more on theseapproaches, see Chapter 6). In favour of the eco-logical modernizers is the evidence that theadvanced industrial societies have made signifi-cant progress in environmental regulation andgreen taxation, most have ministries devoted toenvironmental policy, significant gains have beenmade in combating important sources of air, waterand soil pollution, recycling, materials substitution,and increasingly energy and resource-efficienttechnologies have been developed and employed.Evidence on materials and energy flow over atwenty-year period for some of the industrializedcountries does indeed show the looked-fordecoupling of economic growth measured infinancial terms from measurable environmentalimpact: industry in these countries does appear tobe increasingly ecologically efficient per unit ofeconomic value produced.

In the domain of environmental politics, thegreen movements in most advanced industrialsocieties have changed their role from a marginal,

oppositional and outsider status, to insiders,collaborators with business, government and tech-nocrats in setting mainstream policy objectives.In the international sphere, the EU has gained

democratic legitimacy for its vigorous espousal ofenvironmental issues, both in relation to the widerglobal scene and in relation to the record of mem-ber states. At the global level, a series of confer-ences leading up to Rio in 1992 have provided anoverarching concept of sustainable developmentembracing both social justice and long-term envi-ronmental protection, as well as internationalagreements on, among other important issues,trade in endangered species, climate change, ozonedepletion and conservation of biological diversity.

There is a major debate about how effectivethese agreements are, and indeed about whateffectiveness means (Underdal, 1992; Young and

Levy, 1999; Sprinz and Helm, 2000). Internationalagreements do not operate in isolation from eachother and they frequently have negative side-effects on other environmental problems (Wardet al., 2004). For instance, some substitutes forCFCs are powerful greenhouse gases, so theMontreal Convention on ozone-depleting sub-stances has side-effects on the Kyoto Protocol,eventually leading to international action. Becauseof such interconnections and side-effects the realissue is whether the system of international envi-ronmental agreements promotes sustainability onbalance (Ward et al., 2004). There is evidence thatit does do so, pushing countries beyond what they

would otherwise have done to promote sustain-ability (Ward, 2006).As the constructionists clearly demonstrate, the

formation and transformation of environmentalissues as an agenda for public attention andpolicy-making depends on complex interactionsbetween social movement activists, researchers,media communicators, policy networks and com-munities, industrial lobbies, government depart-ments, international organisations and many othersorts of actors. In the realist approaches favouredhere, recognition of the roles played by these het-erogeneous and often conflicting social actors hasto be complemented by acknowledgement of theactive causal role played by non-human beings,relations and forces: both those purposively mobi-lized in the course of technologically mediatedhuman social interaction with nature, and thoseunintentionally and often unexpectedly strikingback. Scholars have an important place in theeffort to understand the systemic connectionsbetween the social, economic, political andbiophysical dimensions of our increasingly prob-lematic metabolism with non-human nature. Theintellectual demands of such an enterprise, and thegreat divisions of interest and of value judgementat stake in it suggest that it will always be


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a thoroughly contested enterprise. The lessencouraging aspect of our situation, however, isthat the socio-ecological processes of destructionand degradation escalate as we argue.

SECTION I: ENVIRONMENTALTHOUGHT PAST AND PRESENT

In the first chapter of this Handbook (Chapter 2)on the enlightenment and its legacy, Ted Bentonsketches some of the historical background to ourcontemporary debates about the relationshipbetween human society and the rest of nature.This chapter begins with the influence of the 17thcentury scientific revolution on the thinkers of theEnlightenment. The views of Hobbes, Locke andRousseau are compared, to illustrate the great

diversity of thought within the Enlightenment.Rousseau, especially, is introduced as a precursorof the Romantic movement, which challenged theprevalent view of nature as merely a set of resourcesto be utilized for human purposes. Instead, theRomantics offered views of our relationship tonature as one in which aesthetic appreciation evenawe and wonder at natures magnificence wereessential to full human flourishing.

Benton goes on to note the importance of thelegacy of romanticism for Darwins revolutionaryunderstanding of the historical character of evolv-ing nature, and for his sense of wonder at theimmense diversity of life. Despite Darwins own

initial reluctance to elaborate on the implicationsof evolution for our understanding of humannature and prospects, he was soon drawn into theintense debates about these questions that fol-lowed the publication of his Origin of Species.Here, Benton attempts to show that the influenceof Darwins ideas on social thought were muchmore diverse than is often recognized.

Damian White and Gideon Kossoff then assessthe history of anti-authoritarian thought in anar-chism, libertarianism and environmentalism in thesecond chapter (Chapter 3). They trace the diverseconnections between anarchism, the broader liber-tarian tradition, environmentalism and scientificecology. Anarchists maintain that it is the verycoercive ideologies, practices and institutions ofmodernity that are the source of the disorder andsocial chaos they are designed to prevent. Theauthors demonstrate that the resistance many con-temporary forms of ecological politics holds forconventional leadership patterns, individualismand division of labour has a long pedigree. At thesame time, social anarchist, left libertarian andecological anarchist currents have all influencedthinking about socialnature relations. It is appar-ent that many politics going under the loose termecology continue to find these traditions invaluable

sources of ideas and innovation. The search forself-organizing societies continues, as does con-cern for the establishment of sustainable cities andother settlements.

In the third chapter (Chapter 4) of this section,Mary Mellor analyses the development of think-ing around ecofeminism, gender and ecology (seealso Mellor, 1992). Ecofeminism is based on theclaim that there is a connection between exploita-tion and degradation of the natural world and thesubordination and oppression of women. It alsotakes the view of the natural world as intercon-nected and interdependent, with humanity system-atically gendered in ways that subordinates,exploits and oppresses women. Unlike some otherwriters, Mellor does not make a claim that womenhave a superior vision, or higher moral authority,but indicates that an ethics that does not take

account of the gendered nature of society isdoomed to failure, as it will not confront the struc-ture of society and how that structure impacts onthe material relationship between humanity andnature.

The problem, of course, is how political changecan occur. Should it be driven from the top, ordoes political agency need to come from peopleand groups who are exploited, marginalized andexcluded by the existing social and ecologicalstructures? Mellor indicates that building coali-tions and coordinated political action are essen-tial. The basis for this position is that knowledgeabout the natural world will always be partial, and

so awareness of pervasive uncertainty should bethe starting point of all other knowledge.Humanity is part of a dynamic iterative ecologicalprocess where the whole is always more than thesum of the parts. Far from being a restriction onfeminism, ecofeminism offers analyses that showhow exploitative and ecologically unsustainablesystems have emerged through the gendering ofhuman society. Such an analysis demands radicalchange.

In the fourth chapter (Chapter 5) on deep ecol-ogy, Ted Benton suggests that the orientations tonature expressed in the art and literature of theRomantic movement (Chapter 2) find more sys-tematic philosophical and political expression inthe stream of modern environmentalism known asdeep ecology. Benton presents an outline ofthe thought of the Norwegian philosopher,Arne Naess, who is generally recognized as thefounding figure of the deep ecology movement.Naess made a sharp contrast between shallowecology, which seeks mainly to manageresources for human purposes, and his own, deepecological perspective, which understandshumans and nature as bound together in a singleindivisible totality, every part of which is(in principle) equally valuable. Not surprisingly,


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Naesss distinction itself, as well as the implica-tions of his deep ecological alternative to main-stream environmentalism have been verycontroversial. Benton goes on to present some of

the main arguments of the critics of deep ecology,and the replies offered by the deep ecologists andother ecocentrics. The debate is presented asopen-ended, and as having much to offer to ourcurrent practice of environmental politics.

In the fifth chapter (Chapter 6) on greening theleft, Ted Benton explores some of the historicalbackground to the present tendency for social jus-tice (a traditional concern of the political left) tobe linked closely to the demand for environmentalprotection (a central concern of the green move-ment). He suggests that there has been a long his-tory of the intertwining of these two sets ofconcerns in the thought and practice of some of

the traditions of the left. Beginning with Marx andEngelss ways of analysing the different historicalforms of human society and historical change interms of their metabolismwith the rest of nature,he suggests that they have valuable insights tooffer to todays environmental movements thisdespite the dreadful environmental record of manyof the regimes established in Marxs name (seealso Benton, 1989, 1996; Foster, 1999).

With the re-emergence of radical environmentalpolitics in the 1960s, some of the radical thinkersof the left responded by drawing on and develop-ing the legacy of the earlier socialist traditions.Their aim was to address what they saw as the

close connections between the social and ecologi-cal crises of our own times. The work of the late19th century designer, artist, craftsman, environ-mentalist and socialist, William Morris, has beenan important inspiration. Benton also discussesthe more recent ideas of Andre Gorz and theAmerican eco-Marxist, James OConnor, goingon to introduce an approach called World SystemTheory. This is an attempt to understand thecauses of continuing inequalities in the globaleconomy and in the relations between differentnation states. Benton suggests that this approachhas much to offer in explaining global ecologicaldegradation and the current lack of success intackling its causes.

The sixth chapter (Chapter 7) of this sectioncontains an exposition by Warwick Fox on theproblems that need to be addressed by a theory ofgeneral ethics. Old ethics has generally occurredin a closed moral universe, whilst new ethics, thatconducted in a whole earth, or Gaian, contextseeks to work in an expansive moral universe.There are problems, though, with new ethics. Ifbiodiversity is important to preserve, what do wemake of introduced (or alien) species that are eco-logically destructive? Should they be removed,even if they increase net biodiversity? What if they

are sentient themselves? The consideration of theholistic integrity of ecosystems is further consid-ered, along with the difficulties of being bothcomprehensive and consistent. In this article,

eighteen problems as they relate to interhumanethics, animal welfare ethics, life-based ethics,ecosystem integrity ethics, and the ethics ofhuman-constructed environments are discussedand analysed. This effectively sets out a map ofthe ethical terrain for those addressing environ-mental and society-related issues and the likelydilemmas they will encounter.

The final chapter of this section (Chapter 8) isby Damian White, Chris Wilbert and Alan Ruddy,and addresses the contemporary and growingproblem of anti-environmentalism. The emer-gence of the Lomborg controversy was seen bysome as a new phase of criticism of environmen-

talism, by some even a unique critique. Yet therewere many antecedents, arising from left, rightand technocratic sources to post-war environmen-talism, then to the global environmentalism of the1990s (after the Rio conference and as a result ofthe efforts to establish international treaties) andthen the modern contrarians exemplified byLomborg and others. There remains a fundamen-talist form of contrarianism that is at the centre ofgreenwash attempts by anti-environmental indus-try. Yet framing of debates as primarily beingbetween contrarians and radical ecologists missesmany important developments in both thinkingand action. There are, for example, distinct

tendencies of green optimism in industrial ecol-ogy, sustainable architecture and sustainable agri-culture. At the same time, there are others whoframe arguments in technologically pessimisticterms.

SECTION II: VALUINGTHE ENVIRONMENT

In the first chapter of this section (Chapter 9),Thomas Crocker examines the basic economicquestions underlying the social choice of environ-mental management instruments and institutions.The author argues that, at its root, this socialchoice is motivated by competing deontologicalversus individualistic visions and their associ-ated management options. Neither vision, in itsextreme, is seen as an accurate or realistic basis forenvironmental management. Rather, the authorsuggests that environmental management is basedon discovering collective procedural rationality,not to be confused with the limited elementalrationality of the individual. To the extentthat exchange institutions markets and otherincentive-compatible environmental policiesand instruments accurately reflect available


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information and options, they can help createcollectively rational mechanisms which guidepeople to their own interests. This process is basedon market prices which provide incentives for col-

lectively rational behaviour, but that are themselvessubject to a variety of limitations which interferewith achieving efficient outcomes: incompleteinformation, non-zero transactions costs, misdi-rected incentives, and undefined, non-transparentor illegitimate initial distribution of rights overassets. The conclusion is that topdown decision-making of environmental authorities regarding theselection of control instruments and effort spent onmonitoring and compliance to mandate what to doand how to do it is obsolete, assumes scarce orincomplete information, and is expensive due tostrategically interdependent decisions of theauthority and users. But neither will the total priva-

tization of environmental decision-making byindividuals typically be collectively rational.The best, then, that authorities can often do is

help guide asset owners and resource users tomake private decisions which lead to environmen-tal outcomes that are compatible with collectivelyrational mechanisms. In the past 20 years, thisprinciple has been extended to numerous exam-ples, including effluent charges, tradable permitsand liability standards. The chapter offers anextended example of the use of tradable permits toaddress biodiversity conservation, specifically thewildlife habitat requirements mandated by the USEndangered Species Act. Achieving a lower-cost,

lower-risk incentive-compatible outcome isshown to be dependent on a clear definition of thehabitat units to be traded, the baseline distributionof units, and a carefully defined institutionalframework for exchange. In this and other similarexamples, public goods constraints are a furtherobstacle to least-cost collectively rational out-comes and also must be considered. In general,collectively rational institutions for environmentalmanagement require three things: the crediblecommitments of economic agents, transparentmarket or shadow prices, and effective arbitrageopportunities. In the end, for these instruments towork and represent an effective alternative to com-mand-and-control policies, careful initial attentionmust be given to institutional design based on afully informed understanding of the use and usersof the natural asset.

The next chapter (Chapter 10) by Ian Batemanprovides a comprehensive review of three centralquestions related to the valuation of environmen-tal impacts. The first is comparison and contrast ofthe two principal approaches used in the evalua-tion of environmental impacts: costbenefit analy-sis (CBA) and environmental impact analysis(EIA). The author states that CBA assumesan anthropocentric approach, growing out of

economic analysis, and typically focuses on theprecise measuresment and evaluation of multipleimpacts, discounted to the present. In execution, itis highly quantitative and attempts to incorporate

multiple impacts into a single money valuenumeraire, with the attendant pros and cons. It isnot good, however, at addressing the distributionof costs and benefits among different groupsnor in assessing sustainability dimensions. Bycontrast, EIA does not attempt to assess monetaryimpacts comprehensively but focuses on evaluat-ing diverse physical environmental impacts, bothquantitatively and qualitatively. Its wide variety ofimpact assessment measures is a positive featureof this approach, enabling long-term sustainabilityimpacts to be more easily be incorporated thanin CBA. However, by failing to incorporatethe assessment of multiple impacts into a single

measure, it becomes more difficult to compareprojects and interpret their results using compatiblecriteria.

The author also discusses and summarizes anumber of important conceptual and empiricaldistinctions that arise in valuing environmentalimpacts. To begin with, prices do not equate withvalues for either private or public goods (due tonon-zero co

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