+ All Categories
Home > Documents > 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and...

1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and...

Date post: 14-Apr-2018
Category:
Upload: juanma-vessant-roig
View: 213 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend

of 13

Transcript
  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    1/13

    The following ad supports maintaining our C.E.E.O.L. service

    Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty: New Social Movements in the UnitedStates and West Germany

    Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty: New Social Movements in the United States andWest Germany

    by Jost Halfmann

    Source:

    PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1 / 1988, pages: 015-025, on www.ceeol.com.

    http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/
  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    2/13

    NEW SOCIALMOVEA1.ENTS IN WESTGERMANYANDHUNGARYRISK AVOIDANCE ANEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ISTATES AND WEST ,........, ""

    lost HalfmannI Introduction

    Risks for which undisputed solutions are neither available nor visible in thenear future are the central problem of advanced industrial (capitalist andsocialist) societies. Threats to physical identity, health, and security emanatefrom the industrial exploitation of nature as well as from the political use ofcatastrophic technologies. The risks which stem from the industrial andpolitical use of modern technologies are global (they have no geographiclimitations), universal (they threaten humans, animals, and plants), and insome cases irreversible (they produce adverse effects for many futuregenerations). The central problems of the past-justice, equality, abolition ofpoverty-have been met either by "solving" them or by devising at leasttheoretical solutions which wait to be realized. t

    In stark oversimplification one might say that the dominant way of"solving" the social problems of the 19th and early 20th century was the"social democratization" of capitalism (with the notable exception of theUnited States).2 The "integration" of the working class, the establishmellt ofthe welfare state, and the juridification of social relations were the basis for thefull unleashing of the productive forces and the immense accumulation ofwealth in the Western hemisphere. No doubt, political cleavages, classantagonism, sexism, and racism are still very much present in Westernsocieties. But none of these problems seems to translate into political struggleswhich attempt to change the path ofmodernization along the demands of theold social movements. Instead, we witness the defense of the establishedmodeofwelfare capitalism by organized labor rather than the abolition of capitalismand the pursuit of legal and social equality by the mainstream of the women'smovement rather than the overthrow of patriarchal society.At the same time, new social movements emerge which address theproblems of the societal production of technological risks. These movementspoint at formerly latent and hidden consequences ofmodern capitalism, at thecollective costs of capital accumulation, which grew in unprecedented dimensions during the social accord between the industrial anctiPolitical elites andthe old social movements. New social movements have politicized theexternalities of capitalism which reemerge as potential ecological, technological, and military catastrophes. As these movements uncover one of the mainunresolved problems of modern societies, new social movements are verymuch in the tradition of old social movements. But the differences betweenPraxis International8: 1April 1988 0260-8448 $2.00

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    3/13

    Praxis International 15new and old social movements are nevertheless obvious. This paper willdiscuss the implications of the novelty of new social movements. Stress belaid on the content of new social movements rather than on the forms ofpolitical action. (American) political scientists-if they are willing to identifythese movements as new-tend to view the emergence of new socialmovements as a result of deficiences in the political process. This is not theperspective chosen in this paper. New social movements are related tomacro-social change; the examining of new social movements will be directedto the question of whether they are an independent source or mere indicatorsof, alternative paths of societal modernization. this respect, new socialmovements are treated in the same way as old or revolutionary socialmovements.Five questions will be addressed in this paper:(1) What are new social movements?(2) What are the socio-economic and socio-political evolutionary precon-ditions for new social movements?(3) What are risk technologies?(4) How do social movements "produce" themselves?(5) What are the differences between North American and West German.new social movements?

    What are new social movements?In the present debate very different social expressions and organizedactivities are comprised under the notion of new social movements. Thenovelty of new social movements supposedly consists in their diversity andtheir "colourfulness": squatters, gays, lesbians, feminists, environmentalists,members of the alternative culture, peace activists-this diversity of politicaland life styles is viewed as the common denominator of new socialmovements. 3I will exclude from my definition of new social movements all movementswhich struggle for the political and legal recognition of (human) rights and allmovements with revolutionary goals. Gays and lesbians for instance strugglefor the recognition of their life style preferences and thus highlight culturalchanges which result from diverse developments like the erosion of thetraditional family, the individualization of self-definition, the autonomy of

    cultural spheres like art, science, law, the erosion of male domination in thedivision of labor. I place these movements in the tradition of struggles forrights of citizenship (in T.H. Marshall's terms). Although these movementsexpress new cultural developments, they still belong to the tradition of oldmovements or- i f they are not intervening politically-to the tradition ofcultural movements. 4 I propose to distinguish between three types of socialmovements: revolutionary movernents (the socialist/communist wing of thelabor movement, the radical feminist wing of the women's movement),(human) rights movements (the social-democratic part of labor; the mainstream

    AccessviaCEEOL NL Germany

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    4/13

    16 Praxis Internationalof the women's movement, civil rights movements), and risk (controllavoidance) movements (the new social movements). In proposing these distinctions, I follow Touraine's suggestion to differentiate between culturalmovements, social movements, and crisis (conduct) movements like thefascist movements. 5 I will only briefly discuss revolutionary movements in thefollowing analysis and focus instead on new and old social movements ..I suggest the following definition of old and new social movements. Oldsocial movements are or have been preoccupied with the establishment ofdemocracy through the introduction or extension of (individual) rights. Newsocial movements, however, are concerned about "(dread) risks" and try toachieve sovereignty rather than liberty. New social movements claim access todecisions over technologies and policies (or: collective goods) which have beenconcentrated in or furthered by central political authorities. New socialmovements politicize technologies with catastrophic potentials: nuclearweapons (the peace movement), nuclear energy (the antinuclear movement),toxic pollution (the environmental movement), and, probably, genetic engineering (a coherent movement has not emerged yet; so far only the women'smovement and the ecology movement are addressing some of the issues of thisnew techology). New social movements are neither revolutionary norreformist.Before supporting this narrow definition of new social movements, I willbriefly deal with the argument that anti-technology and anti-risk movementshave existed since the beginning of rapid technological progress, and,consequently, that there is nothing new about new social movements. Afterall, one might argue, people have resisted the steam engine and railroadtransportation for instance on the grounds that high speed is hazardous toone's health. There are at least four reasons why modern protest movementsagainst risk differ from earlier anti-technology movements:(a) Traditional anti-innovation protests were motivated by the perceivedthreats of new technologies to established socio-economic statuses, skills, andsets of habits. Protest against new technologies was grounded in the perceivedsocial risks of these innovations. On the other hand protest against modernrisk-technologies is not motivated by the above considerations .. The socialstrata of protest (professionals of the service sector, marginal labor force,segments of the primary sector like farmers) are not threatened by skill orstatus changes through new technologies.

    Cb) Resistance to risk technologies is not motivated exclusively by technical considerations, but also by concerns about the social capacity to control theeffects of certain technologies. In the view of new social movements theconcept of social progress and the trajectory of technological development aredissociated.(c) Modern risk technologies produce global, universal and irreversiblehazards. Some of these technologies have a proclivity for accidents whichcannot be prevented by technical and organizational mea'sures. Accidents arenormal in these technologies, and some of these accidents have catastrophicconsequences.6(d) Resistance to risk technologies is part of a larger process which

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    5/13

    Praxis International 17concerns of science technology on oneview of new social movements riskavoidance is associated unrestricted pursuit of life-chances (cultural andsovereignty). New social movements are not primarily anti-technological, anti-technocratic.8These considerations to the most important condition for emerg-ency of protest movements against risk technologies: the central role of thestate as of risk technologies, as administrator of collectiveimplications of risk technologies, and as main counterpart of new socialmovements.9

    new social movements have emerged not only because of the relativenovelty of technologies with catastrophic potential, but also in response to twoparallel processes of modern industrial societies: the increase in externalities(social costs) of industrial production and subsequently the growing role ofcollective goods and services on the one hand and the formation of aninterventionist and welfare state on the other hand. 10 The welfare state is centralfor modern capitalism because it provides the resources and authority fordealing with the social preconditions and costs of industrial production. Thehigh risk technologies to which new social movements are responding are byand large developed as collective goods with private benefits (with theexception of military risk technologies). New social movements express theirprotest against the imposition of risk technologies by the state; they react tothe unequal distribution of costs and benefits, but also to the global anduniversal effects of these technologies. raising topics of relevance to all ofhumanity, these movements continue the tradition of old and revolutionarymovements; in the formulation of their meta-goals they don't . New socialmovements question such consequences and how the state regulates collectivegoods like security, and physical identity.Marshall has developed a model of citizenship which helps tounderstand how these movements could emerge. This model, however, doesnot, as I will argue, suffice to grasp the dynamics and the cultural and politicalcontent of new social movements themselves. Marshall's theory was veryfruitful reconstructing links between the development of industrialcapitalism, the causation of social problems, the emergency of socialmovements, and the institutionalization of a partial, but effective solution tothe claims raised by social movements. 12 Marshall argues that the modernwelfare state is a result of struggles by social movements like the labormovement for the recognition of civil, political, and social rights. New socialmovements were made possible-if we extend Marshall's analysis into themost recent past-by the side-effects of a modern liberal capitalism whichcould intensify production enormously on the basis of a far reaching social

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    6/13

    18 Praxis Internationalaccord. The unbound productive forces of industrial capitalism and theintensified rivalry among the industrialized nations have put the state in acentral position: as promoter of risk technologies and as designated administrator of the collective consequences of accumulation.

    The establishment of the modern welfare and interventionist statedesigned to solve the social problems of 19th century capitalism-has led to anew source of social problems: the collective "bads" (costs) of capitalismthreaten to undermine the fabric of economic wealth and social consensus.New social movements were the first social forces to pick up on thecatastrophic implications of state-led technology promotion. New socialmovements differ from old social movements in that they challenge the publicadministration of risk and dread; they no longer claim the extension or theenforcement of individual rights against the state or the overthrow of the stateand the capitalist mode of production. New social movements do not want totackle the modern risks by strategies of juridification or by a change in societalstructure. Because of this new problematic constellation, new socialmovements concentrate on the problem of sovereignty-the practice ofanti-technocratic self-rule. 13

    IV What are risk technoloiges?Risk or high risk is defined very differently depending on the kind ofrationale one applies to the assessment of risk. 14 Experts and lay people forinstance hold very different opinions on risk and the toleration of risk. Isuggest that the definition of risk consists of two components: the content ofrisk perception (subjective dimension) and the properties of technical systems(objective dimension). I will follow Perrow's argument in defining the

    objective dimension of risk technologies. Risk technologies are technologiesfor which accidents are normal and which embody catastrophic potential.Catastrophic potential is defined by the hazards a technology can inflict onthird- and fourth-party victims (i.e. innocent bystanders and future generations).I5 Accidents are normal in technologies which are interactively complex(which entail hidden and unforeseen interactions) and which are tightly coupled(component failures can bring down the whole system). Since these technicalproperties cannot be significantly improved through organizational or technical measures, accidents are normal for such systems. Some of these tightlycoupled and interactively complex technologies ("systems that transformpotentially explosive or toxic raw materials or which exist in hostile environments"16) have a high potential for catastrophic accidents: among these arenuclear energy, nuclear weapons, genetic technologies. I?Risk is also defined as perceived risk. Risk perception research has foundthat experts and lay people differ substantially with respect to risk assessment.While experts apply quantitative criteria to risk (cost-benefit analysis, fatalityrates per operation time etc.), lay people judge risk according to qualitativestandards. Lay people rated "dread" as the strongest indicator of risk.

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    7/13

    Praxis I ntemational 19Characteristics of "dread" are: lack of control over the actIvIty, highcatastrophic potential, inequitable distribution of risks and benefits, the beliefthat risks are increasing and not easily reducible, involuntariness of risk. IS Inresponding to risk perception questionnaires (which in the case of researchdone by Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein was not restricted to technologies)lay people rated the following activities as highest on the dread risk scale:nuclear weapons, nuclear power, warfare, nerve gas, terrorism, crime,national defense.

    V How do social movements "produce" themselves?Risk assessment analysis, however, only tells us about perceptions andattitudes, but not about the dynamics of people engaging in collective actionvis-a-vis risk technologies and policies. The next question is: how do socialmovements "produce" themselves? How do they establish a certain level ofcoherence and how do they coordinate their immediate goal of risk-avoidancewith their strategic meta-goal of sovereignty? Unlike old and revolutionarymovements, new social movements have to overcome and compensate for asystematic lack of organizational stability and strategic consistency. Old socialmovements usually represented a rather homogeneous social group or stratum; their political actions could depart from well-defined constellations ofinjustice and inequality; their strategic goals could be read out of theprevailing culturally and socially legitimized concepts of social organization.Since the French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence,equality and liberty are an undisputable basis for all rights movements.Similarly, revolutionary movements start from systematic class-or genderrelated deprivations; they represent a homogeneous social class or interest;

    and they develop societal utopias from which political strategies can bederived. Thus, these two types of social movements have less problems insustaining a movement organization and in improving their internal anexternal movement consistency in the political process.New social movements, however, differ substantially from old and revolutionary movements in these respects. For them a serious problem of"self-production," of sustaining a movement organization and a politicalmomentum arises. There are three causes for this organizational "weakness".19 (a) The socio-structural basis of new social movements is veryheterogeneous. New social movements often comprise protesters from verydifferent societal segments: producers of the primary sector (i.e. farmers wholive close to risk technology sites), urban professionals (who share moreabstract interests in the rational use of public collective goods), and segmentsof the marginal labor force like students (who introduce radical grievancesinto the political protest against risk technologies and policies). (b) New socialmovements do not depart from a clearly defined deprivation. Risk technologies and their related policies entail hidden hazards for which senseperception often is an insufficient basis of judgement. Some of these risks are

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    8/13

    20 Praxis Internationalnot to be perceived without scientific knowledge.20 (c) New social movementsdevelop neither a sophisticated model of societal utopia nor do they want toreform society as a whole. Often, new social movements instead devisestrategic perspectives which are drawn from the past , such as advocating the"deindustrialization" of society. A craft-oriented production in small commuties, some of their leaders argue, cannot produce universal, global andirreversible risks. 21New social movements are "loosely-coupled" organizations and need tocompensate for the permanent threat of disintegration and diffusion. Theyhave one central problem of self-production: how to establish a set offundamental beliefs and truths ("communicable evidences") on which to basepolitical action even after periads of disintegration of the movement. I suggestthat this basis of communicative integration, of "Vergemeinschaftung" ("community") in new social movements is the result of the interplay betweenshared perceptions of risks and the notion of risk-avoidance on the one handand the shared political meta-goal of sovereignty on the other hand. The wishto avoid risks which are universal, global and irreversible is widely supportedin modern societies as opinion polls ShOW. 22 a society where the productionand maintenance of public collective goods no needs to be directed byconsiderations about "fundamental" scarcity, a new type of rationalityemerges which Perrow calls "social rationality" and which he contrasts to"absolute rationality" (the rationality of economic optimization). Social rationality suggests that risk technologies and policies should be avoided if they havecatastrophic consequences, even if-from the point of view of absoluterationality-these risk technologies and policies provide a superior materialwelfare. A significant part of the population no longer subordinates socialrationality to absolute rationality. 23 Conflict arises from the perception thatthe state-as main promoter and administrator of risk technologies/policiesdoes not apply social rationality in dealing with hazardous technologies, butsides with those interests which support the logic of absolute rationality.New social movements emerge at the juncture where the shared perceptionof the existential threat of risks clashes with the elite concept of economicgrowth and of legal and legitimate policy-making. I want to argue that ideaof sovereignty is the political catalyst for collective struggles against the state'simposition of risks. Sovereignty is an entrenched political concept liberalcapitalist societies and can serve as a medium for the self-production of newsocial movements. In the process of the movements' self-production, however, the notion of sovereignty undergoes a significant semantic change froman individualistic to a collective idea. The concept of sovereignty as individualautonomy can be viewed as an American invention. Freedom is conceived ofas the power and the right to pursue one's life-chances without infringementby other individuals or the state. 24 Freedom is the precondition for individualautonomy. This irldividualistic concept of sovereignty prevails in a societywith a limited amount of public production and maintenance of collectivegoods. The struggles of the old social movements resulted the spreading ofthe right to individual sovereignty through all of society, regardless of class,status or gender. Only recently has it been acknowledged that there are severe

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    9/13

    Praxis International 21obstacles to the pursuit sovereignty which cannot be traced backto the historical practices of repression, prejudice and arbitrary rule. Thegrowing adverse effects of economic externalities and the risk-prone management of collective goods by the state have demonstrated that individualsovereignty is restricted to the acquisition ofmaterial goods and the possessionof individual political rights. Sovereignty as individual autonomy is nonoperational when it comes to certain public collective goods like security,health, environmental protection, and physical identity. 25What new social movements learn in the process of self-production is thatsovereignty as a political meta-goal can no longer be interpreted as individual

    liberty. Risk production by interventionist and welfare state can hardly becountered on the basis of the extension and enforcement of individual rights.Modern social movements, therefore, always search for a collective definitionand fornl of sovereignty.26 One might say that the new social movements arethe only collective actors who try to pursue a policy of sovereignty as acollective attempt at dealing with collective goods (and their inherent risks)without trying to change the capitalist mode of production. Sovereignty,therefore, should be regarded as a paradoxical concept of solving collectivegood problems through non-utopian "communitarian" strategies Of-to useHabermas's terminology-by taking recourse to "life-world" practices intrying to solve problems of the "systems of instrumental action."New social movements are forced to learn that sovereignty is defined as acollective rather than an individual goal. New social movements are locked ina practical paradox which results from the loose coupling of their organizatio

    nal framework and from the thematic imprecision of the goal of sovereignty.These movements are facing a practical and strategic dilemma which I want tocall the practical paradox of new social movements: since the risks emanatingfrom certain technologies and policies are experienced in the context of threatsto people's health (i.e. radiation, chemical poisoning), physical identity (i.e.genetic engineering), and environment, new social movements tend toconsider their struggles as defenses of their life-chances (their life-world, inHabermas's terms). Topics of fear, identity, and community dominate muchof the discourse of new social movements. On the other hand, the power tocontrol risk technologies and collective goods is concentrated in governmentalinstitutions. Thus, new social movements are forced to develop calculi andactivities of strategic collective behavior if they want to intervene successfullyinto the decisions over modernization. Typically, new social movements aretorn between two extremes: that of seclusion within the movement culture andisolation from the "system" and that of challenging the, ,established valuesof modernization and the state authority in promoting high-risk technologiesand managing collective goods. I will attempt to show that the cases of theUnited States and West Germany exemplify these two extremes.

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    10/13

    22are

    Praxis Internationaldifferences between North American

    new social movements? German

    I will not try to develop a differentiated comparison of new socialmovements in the United States and West Germany.27 I will rather concentrate on one aspect: the different formulae of the sovereignty concept in thesetwo countries. I want to argue that North American new social movementspursue a strategy of seclusion from the political system and a policy ofcommunitarian autarchy and that West Germany new social movements pursuea strategy of intervention into the political process. They seek to establish ananti-technocratic mode of societal decision-making (i.e. referendums, minorityvetos in questions of existential character, etc.). It goes without saying thatthis distinction between new social movements in these two countries is"ideal-typical" and that the reality is ffillCh more differentiated and lessclear-cut.New social movements in the United States

    New social movements in the United States have rarely challellged thepublic administration of collective goods. The concept of sovereignty in theNorth American social movements is generally geared towards a revival ofsocial and economic autarchy in local communities. Isolation from the state ormoderate participation the social and political process rather than control ofpublic decisions form the strategy of North American new social movements.This strategy is embedded in a tradition which is peculiar to the United States:the tradition of religious and socialist small communities with a "border view"of society.28 I

    Douglas and Wildavsky put risk movements in the tradition of the religioussectarian "politicization" of nature. doing so, tlley acknowledge that"America is a border country" where there is "plenty of resonance in earlyAmerican political life with a sectarian culture". 29 Apart from the culturaltraditions which encourage a view of endangered society and nature from acommunitarian perspective, there is another feature of American societywhich suggests seclusion-oriented strategies to "loosely-coupled" socialmovements. This is the tradition of the American political system. Thestructure of political opportunity in the United States either invites assimilativestrategies (like lobbying, petitioning, intervention in licensing procedures)rather than confrontational strategies or seclusion. 3DI want to point out three features of the structure of political opportunity inthe United States which are relevant for new social movements:(a) The anti-absolutist tradition during the founding of the United States isresponsible for the rather fragmented structure of the political system.Bureaucracies are not well developed in terms of a functioning hierarchy oforganizational levels through which public policies can be implemented fromthe federal to local level, and hence the difficulties for collective actors toaddress "the" state as a coherent political body. (b) Political parties do not

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    11/13

    Praxis International 23function as mediators between interests and claims of the citizens andthe government, as a forum for political bargaining; hence theproclivity for assimilative strategies. (c) The tradition of individualism precluded the development a collective vision of the polity on a national level,and hence restriction of communitarian concepts of political life to thelocal context.

    I suggest that within North American context, the more collectiveactors who address risk problems tend to use assimiliative strategies, the lesscan they be distinguished from other established interest groups; and themore they choose seclusion strategies the more they approach the politics ofnew social movements. 31New Social movements Germany

    Sovereignty in Gern1an context is conceived predominantly in thetradition of anti-technocratic collective control over state activites (rather thanin the tradition anti-etatist decision-making and of communitarian seclusion). Typically, political strategies of new social movements in WestGermany are more confrontational assimilative. 32 The political oppor-tunity structure directs the risl

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    12/13

    24 Praxis International7. O. Renn, Risikowahrnehmung der Kernenergie (Frankfurt, 1984), 199 ff; Beck, Risikogesellschaft,254ff.8. Touraine, The Voice and the Eye, 21ff.9. }. Halfmann "New Soziale Bewegungen und Staat. Hichtintendierte Folgen neokorporatistischerPolitik," Soziale welt, 3,294-312.

    10. F. Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, 1978).11 Claus Offe, Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates (Frankfurt, 1973).12. T .H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," in Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Chicago,1977), 71-134.13. Many studies of new social movements include the women's movement in the category of new social

    movements (Brand, Hirsch Roth). I tend to classify the mainstream of the women's movement as a(human) rights movement and radical factions (which intend to reorganize society along gender lines)as revolutionary. However, in looking at concrete politics of the women's movement this rigiddistinction might not be fully defendable. Let us take the case of the abortion campaigns. Someorganizations of the women's movement treat the abortion question as a rights issue when theyconsider the legal autonomy of women with regard to their body and body functions as the primaryclaim; other women's groups (like factions within the Green party in West Germany) take the s tancethat life should be protected and furthered in every respect; here unborn children are looked at as acollective good; this view the.D suggests a sovereignty-position in abortion politics.

    14. "Risk may be defined as a compound measure of the probability and magnitude of adverse effect".Technical definitions of risk are not very useful in identifying the social and cultural basis for newsocial movements. Lowrence "The Nature of Risk," Schwing and Albers ed., Societal Risk Assessment(New York, 1980), 51.15. First-party victims are the operators of technical systems; second-party victims are non-operatingpersonnel or system users. See Perrow, Normal Accidents, 67.

    16. Perrow, Normal Accidents, 330.17. Not all interactively complex and tightly coupled systems have a potential for catastrophe. Spacemissions for instance are technologies for which accidents are normal, but they do not effect third--orfourth-party victims. Other technologies have produced disasters in terms ofmany victims, bu t they arenot necessarily high risk technologies. Dams, for instance, can cause many deaths i f they break, butthese systems can be improved such ~ a t accidents are no longer normal (Perrow, Normal Accidents).

    18. P .Slovic, B .Fischoff and S.Lichtenstein, "Facts and Fears," in Schwing and Albers ed., Societal RiskAssessment, 99.

    19. K.P. }app, "Neue Soziale Bewegungen und die Kontinuitat der Moderne," in J.Berger, DieModeme-Kontinutiiten und Ziisuren, 311-333.

    20. Hence the crucial role of scientific expertise in the self-production of new social movements. Thetreatment of science by new social movements highlights the double process of politization whichscience is undergoing in the last decades. The recognition of its indispensability and the socialdestruction of the traditional aura of t ruth and neutrality of science coincide in modern societies whenthey are viewed as "risk societies" (Beck, Risikogesellschaft).21. R.Bahro, "Fur eine okologische Antwort auf die Wirtschaftskrise," in M. Ernest-Porksen ed.,Alternative der Okonomie-Okonomie der Alternativen (Berlin, 1984).

    22. H.Kessel, Environmental Awareness in the Federal Republic ofGennany, England and the United States(Berlin, 1984).

    23. R. Inglehart, "Values, Ideologies and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements," paper presentedat the Conference on New Social Movements, Florida State D., Tallahasse, Florida, 4/2-4, 1987.24. Staughton Lynd, Intellectual Origins ofAmerican Radicalism (Cambridge, 1982).

    25. This is exactly the problem Fred Hirsch was addressing in his book "Social Limits to Growth". Hecould, however, not identify a social force which would pursue the strategy of "quasi-altruism" whichhe believed to be the only remedy for capitalism. The new social movements are exactly the carriers of"quasi-altruism" even though it seems rather improbable that they alone will solve the problems ofcapitalism as identified by Hirsch.

    26. There are two other interpretations of the basis of "communicative evidence" in new socialmovements: one stems from social systems' theory, cf. LUhmann, Okologische Kommunikation(Opladen, 1986); }app, "Neue soziale Bewegungen und die Kont inui tat der Moderne"; Japp,"Kollektive Akteure oder Soziale Systeme? in Dnverfehrt ed., System und Selbstproduktion

  • 7/30/2019 1.8 - Halfman, Jost - Risk Avoidance and Sovereignty. New Social Movements in the United States and West Ger

    13/13

    Praxis International 25(Frankfurt, 1986), 166-191; the other from critical sociology, Offe, "Die Utopie der Null-Option,":in Berger, Die Moderne-Kontinuitiiten und Ziisuren (Frankfurt, 1986). Eng. translation in: PraxisInternational, Vel. 7 , No. 1 (April 1987). (a) Social systems' theory: Japp argues that new socialmovements constitute themselves through the communication of anxiety. Anxiety is immediatelyevident when communicated and cannot be subjected to (rationalist) doubts. The evidence characterof anxiety allows reference to a common denominator for members of new social movements.Communication of anxiety will guarantee the coherence of the movement despite the structural lack oforganizational consistency; it will also allow to constitute a difference ( system's boundary) betweennew social movements and their environment. In order to avoid sterile "self-reference" (a tendencytoward "negative community", see Sennett , The Fall of Public Man (N.Y. 1979) or attritioncommunication of anxiety has to translate into conflict: communication of anxiety has to be "hooked"to deprivations, contradictions or risks in the environment of new social movements (Japp "Neuesoziale Bewegung, und, die Kontinuitat der Moderne", 325). The main problem with this approachis that it is overly "constructivist". It overemphasizes the contingency-problem for new socialmovements Okologische Kommunikation (as to the centrality of contingency in social systems theory,see Luhnlann. By claiming that new social movements are not at all reacting to "objective" problemsin their environment, this theory postulates that new social movements not only constitutethemselves, but also the problems they are addressing. In such a theoretical construction, new socialmovements are hardly capable of producing themselves such that they can create "resonance" in thesocial systems. (b) Critical sociology: Offe argues that communicative evidence is established throughthe cOlnmuniction ofpain (See "Die Utopie der Null-Option"). Offe's notion of the "self-production"of new social movements is too basic: it is hard to iInagine how social movements can develop fromcommunities of shared pain to collective political actors. In addition, the concept of pain is not generalenough to comprise all new social movements as Offe defines them (student movement, women'smovements, civil r ights' movement, peace movement, environmental movement, antinuclearmovement, squatters' movement).27. I-I.Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest," British Journal of PoliticalScience, 16, 57-85; H.Siegmann, The Conflicts Between Labor and Environmentalism in the FederalRepublic ofGermany and United States (Aldershot, 1985).28. Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley, 1983). I do not subscribe to the labels whichDouglas and Wildavsky "stick" on "border-view" movements. Since they start from the assumptionthat "hierarchy is a solution to the problems of voluntary organization" (p.103) and that collectivistorientations in social organizations are by definition anti-democratic they come to the conclusion thatrisk movements are sectarian and restricted to a "border" position in society. By restricting riskmovement politics to sectarian traditions, they equate these movements with "negative communities"in Sennett's sense where all societal problems are caused by the fact that the outside world is not likethe sect C" . . . the society is polluted ... the sect inside is pure", 122). I argue in this paper that thereare other solutions to voluntary organization besides hierarchy, namely communication of sovereignty, and that this marks the difference between new social movements and sects.29. "In America there was never a question of a border because states existed before there was a nation.Always the question was whether there would be a center", (Douglas and Wildavsky, 153).30. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest," 66.31. I wish to argue that the American literature which describes social movements, especially theliterature in the tradition of "resource mobilization" theory, is focussing on interest group politicsrather than on social movements (see the terms "social movement sector" or "social movementindustry"). Only if social movements dealing with technological risks adopt a border view should theybe treated as new social movements. In this sense, fonn (= the political opportunity structure)modulates content (= risk avoidance politics). New social movements seem to be rather invisible toAmerican political and social scientists. There seem to be two reasons for this: Ca) the most visiblesocial movements like the women's and the civil rights' nl0vements are old social movement (b) newsocial movements in the United states tend to choose seclusion strategies and are thus not part of theestablished political process. See, McCarthy and ZaId, "Resource Mobilization and SocialMovements: A Partial Theory," in American Journal ofSociology, 6, 1212-124l.

    32. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest," 68-9.33. Peter Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State(Philadelphia, 1987).


Recommended