United States Code Annotated CurrentnessTitle 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos)Chapter 73. Obstruction of Justice (Refs & Annos)
§ 1503. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influ-ence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officerwho may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or othercommitting magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or prop-erty on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been suchjuror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property onaccount of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letteror communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due ad-ministration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs inconnection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation of this section involves the threat of physicalforce or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be thehigher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offensecharged in such case.
(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is--
(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112;
(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which the offense was committed against a petit juror andin which a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine under this title,or both; and
(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.
1948 Acts. Based on Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 241 (Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 135, 35 Stat. 1113; June 8, 1945,c. 178, § 1, 59 Stat. 234).
The phrase “other committing magistrate” was substituted for “officer acting as such commissioner” in order toclarify meaning.
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
1982 Acts. Senate Report No. 97-532, see 1982 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 2515.
1994 Acts. House Report Nos. 103-324 and 103-489, and House Conference Report No. 103-711, see 1994 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1801.
1996 Acts. House Report No. 104-549, see 1996 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 3401.
Amendments
1996 Amendments. Subsec. (a). Pub.L. 104-214, § 1(3), added provisions increasing the possible term for an of-fense under this section occurring in connection with a trial of a criminal case and involving the threat or use ofphysical force.
Pub.L. 103-322, § 60016(2), substituted “punished as provided in subsection (b)” for “fined not more than$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both”.
Pub.L. 103-322, § 330016(1)(K), directed that “under this title” be substituted for “not more than $5,000”. Lan-guage in question had been deleted earlier by section 60016(2) of Pub.L. 103-322.
Pub.L. 97-291, § 4(c)(2), (3), substituted in text “grand” for “witness, in any court of the United States or beforeany United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, or any grand” after “or impede any”, and struckout “injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended suchcourt or examination before such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate, or on account of histestifying or having testified to any matter pending therein, or” after “discharge of his duty, or”.
Change of Name
United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of this title to be known as United States magistrate judgeafter Dec. 1, 1990, with any reference to United States magistrate or magistrate in Title 28, in any other Federalstatute, etc., deemed a reference to United States magistrate judge appointed under section 631 of Title 28, seesection 321 of Pub.L. 101-650, set out as a note under section 631 of Title 28.
United States commissioners, referred to in text, were replaced by United States magistrates pursuant to Pub.L.90-578, Oct. 17, 1968, 82 Stat. 1118. See chapter 43 (section 631 et seq.) of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Pro-cedure.
Effective and Applicability Provisions
1982 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 92-291 effective Oct. 14, 1982, see section 9(a) of Pub.L. 97-291 set out as anEffective Date note under section 1512 of this title.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of officers, jurors, or witnesses, see 18 USCA § 201 et seq.Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see 18 USCA § 401.Persons convicted prohibited from serving as administrator, fiduciary, etc., or consultant to employee be-nefit plan, see 29 USCA § 1111.“Racketeering activity” defined to be any act indictable under this section, see 18 USCA § 1961.Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under thissection, see 18 USCA § 2516.
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
See Federal Sentencing Guidelines §§ 2J1.2, 3C1.1, 18 USCA.
LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES
Contrasting the prosecution of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 1512: Why §1512 better serves the government at trial. Note, 9 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 57 (2004).
Obstruction of Justice. Tracey B. Fitzpatrick and Stacey L. Parker, 31 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 747 (1994).
Presumed guilty: The Court of Appeals versus Scott Turow. H. Richard Uviller, 136 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1879(1988).
Responding to a government environmental investigation: Shaping the defense. Francis J. Burke, Jr., Kar-en A. Potts, Leigh Lani Brown, Robin L. De Respino and Michael R. Hall, 34 Ariz.L.Rev. 509 (1992).
Speak no evil: settlement agreements conditioned on noncooperation are illegal and ethical. StephenGillers, 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 1 (2002).
A new role for the victim?--The Federal Victim Protection Act of 1982. Abraham S. Goldstein, 100 FRD94 (1984).
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982. William D. Graves, 100 FRD 104 (1984).
The victim in the States in the Tenth Circuit. Katherine Tambly, 100 FRD 92 (1984).
LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Obstructing Justice 6, 21.
Key Number System Topic No. 282.
Corpus Juris Secundum
CJS Aliens § 1281, Definitions Under IIRIRA.CJS Conspiracy § 281, General Principles.CJS Grand Juries § 221, Federal Grand Jury.CJS Grand Juries § 225, Liabilities for Interference With Jury.CJS Obstructing Justice or Governmental Admin. § 4, Federal Offenses.CJS Obstructing Justice or Governmental Admin. § 6, Jurors.CJS Obstructing Justice or Governmental Admin. § 15, Federal Officers.CJS Obstructing Justice or Governmental Admin. § 30, Federal Witness Tampering.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
64 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 579, What Constitutes “aggravated Felony” for Which Alien Can be Deported or Re-moved Under § 237(A)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(A)(2)(A)(iii))(INA)--Obstruction of Justice, Perjury...
26 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 229, Corrupt or Forcible Interference With Administration of Internal Revenue LawsUnder 26 U.S.C.A. § 7212(a).
27 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 297, Construction and Application of “Official Victim” Sentencing Enhancement of
United States Sentencing Guideline § 3a1.2(A), 18 U.S.C.A., Concerning Government Officer or Employee,Former Government Officer or Employee...
36 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 95, Validity, Construction, and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5k2.8, Providing for UpwardSentence Departure for Extreme Conduct.
49 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 333, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 373, Proscribing Solicit-ation to Commit Crime of Violence.
8 ALR, Fed. 893, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1505 Making it a Federal Offense to ObstructProceedings Before Federal Departments or Agencies or Congressional Committees.
18 ALR, Fed. 875, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1510 Punishing Obstruction of Criminal In-vestigations.
20 ALR, Fed. 731, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 Making it a Federal Offense to En-deavor to Influence, Intimidate, Impede, or Injure Witness, Juror, or Officer in Federal Court, or to Obstruct theDue...
53 ALR, Fed. 140, Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial Conflict of Interests Between Criminal Defendantand Defense Counsel--Federal Cases.
62 ALR, Fed. 303, Meaning of Term “Corruptly” for Purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 Making it a Federal Of-fense to Corruptly Endeavor to Influence, Intimidate, Impede, or Injure Witness, Juror, or Officer in FederalCourt, or To...
64 ALR, Fed. 678, Venue of Prosecution for Unlawfully Influencing, Intimidating, or Impeding a Federal Of-ficer, Witness, of Juror, Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503.
76 ALR, Fed. 700, Evidence Offered by Defendant at Federal Criminal Trial as Inadmissible, Under Rule 403 ofFederal Rules of Evidence, on Ground that Probative Value is Substantially Outweighed by Danger of UnfairPrejudice, Confusion...
111 ALR, Fed. 295, Giving False Information to Federal Department or Agency as Violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1001, Making it Criminal Offense to Make False Statements in Any Matter Under Jurisdiction of Department orAgency of United...
121 ALR, Fed. 323, Increase in Base Offense Level Under Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.3 (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3)for Abuse of Position of Public or Private Trust Significantly Facilitating Commission or Concealment Of...
131 ALR, Fed. 465, Stranger's Alleged Communications With Juror, Other Than Threat of Violence, as Prejudi-cial in Federal Criminal Prosecution.
168 ALR, Fed. 575, What Constitutes “Aggravated Felony” for Which Alien Can be Deported or Removed Un-der § 237(A)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(A)(2)(A)(iii)).
178 ALR, Fed. 87, Crime-Fraud Exception to Work Product Privilege in Federal Courts.
185 ALR, Fed. 1, Construction and Application of Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(B).
185 ALR, Fed. 493, Construction and Operation of “Willfulness” Requirement of U.S.S.G., § 3c1.1, Pertainingto Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice.
186 ALR, Fed. 147, Construction and Application of Federal Domestic Terrorism Sentencing Enhancement,U.S.S.G. § 3a1.4.
164 ALR, Fed. 61, Downward Departure from United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 1a1.1 et seq.)Based on Aberrant Behavior.
130 ALR, Fed. 269, Construction and Application of § 2J1.3 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §2J1.3), Pertaining to Sentencing for Perjury, Subornation of Perjury, Witness Bribery, and Departures...
125 ALR, Fed. 477, When Do Corroborating Circumstances Clearly Indicate Trustworthiness of Hearsay State-ment Tending to Expose Declarant to Criminal Liability and Offered to Exculpate Accused, So as to Permit Ad-mission of Statement Under...
108 ALR, Fed. 380, Books, Papers, and Documents Subject to Discovery by Defendant Under Rule 16 of Feder-al Rules of Criminal Procedure.
103 ALR, Fed. 422, Propriety, Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517(5), of Interception or Use of Communications Relat-ing to Federal Offenses Which Were Not Specified in Original Wiretap Order.
97 ALR, Fed. 273, What Conduct of Federal Law Enforcement Authorities in Inducing or Co-Operating inCriminal Offense Raises Due Process Defense Distinct from Entrapment.
100 ALR, Fed. 667, Liability, Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C.A.§§ 1961-1968) for Retaliation Against Employee for Disclosing or Refusing to Commit Wrongful Act.
89 ALR, Fed. 498, Effect of Prosecutor's Failure to Warn Grand Jury Witness of Status as Target or Subject ofGrand Jury Investigation Upon Subsequent Prosecution of Witness for Perjury Based on Testimony BeforeGrand...
83 ALR, Fed. 624, Entrapment to Commit Bribery Offense Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 201.
71 ALR, Fed. 928, What Constitutes Forgery of Signature of Federal Judge or of Other Officer of Federal Court,So as to Violate 18 U.S.C.A. § 505.
68 ALR, Fed. 628, Statute of Limitations in Prosecution Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 for Conspiracy to CommitOffense Against or to Defraud United States.
60 ALR, Fed. 76, Determination of “Materiality” Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623, Penalizing False Material Declara-tions Before Grand Jury or Court.
47 ALR, Fed. 639, Effect of Rule 801(D)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Upon the Admissibility of aWitness' Prior Consistent Statement.
36 ALR, Fed. 371, Sufficiency of United States Attorney General's Appointment of Special Attorney Under 28U.S.C.A. § 515(a).
25 ALR, Fed. 8, Accused's Right to Bill of Particulars in Criminal Prosecution for Evasion of Federal IncomeTaxes.
9 ALR 6th 363, Crime-Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege in State Courts--Contemplated Crime.
66 ALR 5th 397, What Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting Officer, in Absence of Actual Force.
87 ALR 5th 597, Defenses to State Obstruction of Justice Charge Relating to Interfering With Criminal Investig-ation or Judicial Proceeding.
49 ALR 5th 619, Criminal Liability of Attorney for Tampering With Evidence.
3 ALR 5th 963, Threats of Violence Against Juror in Criminal Trial as Ground for Mistrial or Dismissal of Jur-or.
8 ALR 4th 769, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Imposing Criminal Penalties for Influ-encing, Intimidating, or Tampering With Witness.
39 ALR 4th 800, Impeachment of Verdict by Juror's Evidence that He was Coerced or Intimidated by FellowJuror.
9 ALR 3rd 203, Modern Status of Doctrine of Res Judicata in Criminal Cases.
18 ALR 3rd 259, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different Counts of Indictment or Information.
40 ALR 3rd 169, Fabrication or Suppression of Evidence as Ground of Disciplinary Action Against Attorney.
63 ALR 3rd 512, Federal Income Tax Conviction as Constituting Nonprofessional Misconduct Warranting Dis-ciplinary Action Against Attorney.
92 ALR 3rd 1164, Admissibility, as Against Interest, in Criminal Case of Declaration of Commission of Crimin-al Act.
98 ALR 3rd 357, Attorney's Conviction in Foreign or Federal Jurisdiction as Ground for Disciplinary Action.
97 ALR 3rd 96, Instructions Urging Dissenting Jurors in State Criminal Case to Give Due Consideration toOpinion of Majority (Allen Charge)--Modern Cases.
37 ALR 3rd 375, Comment Note.--Impossibility of Consummation of Substantive Crime as Defense in CriminalProsecution for Conspiracy or Attempt to Commit Crime.
27 ALR 139, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Before Grand Jury.
31 ALR 1479, Power of Court to Pass on Competency. Legality, or Sufficiency of Evidence on Which Indict-ment is Based.
48 ALR 746, What Constitutes Offense of Obstructing or Resisting Officer.
53 ALR 399, Amount of Bail Required in Criminal Action.
62 ALR 136, Evidence as to Threats Made to Keep Witness Away from Criminal Trial.
66 ALR 1311, Instruction or Evidence as to Conspiracy Where There is No Charge of Conspiracy in Indictmentor Information.
72 ALR 801, Factors in Fixing Amount of Bail in Criminal Cases.
97 ALR 137, When Does Statute of Limitations Begin to Run Against Civil Action or Criminal Prosecution forConspiracy.
104 ALR 1430, Conspiracy to Commit Adultery or Other Offense Which Can Only be Committed by the Con-certed Action of the Parties to It.
105 ALR 326, Admissibility of Telephone Conversations in Evidence.
113 ALR 1179, What Amounts to Conviction or Satisfies Requirement as to Showing of Conviction, WithinStatute Making Conviction a Ground for Refusing to Grant or for Canceling License or Special Privilege.
116 ALR 1104, Necessity of Alleging Specific Facts or Means in Indictment or Information Charging One asAccessory Before or After the Fact.
131 ALR 917, Right to Severance Where Two or More Persons Are Jointly Accused.
146 ALR 369, Relief in Habeas Corpus for Violation of Accused's Right to Assistance of Counsel.
152 ALR 1193, Comment Note.--Ultimate Fact, as Distinguished from Evidentiary Fact, as Regards Effect ofJudgment as Estoppel.
157 ALR 428, Testimony of Incriminating Character Which Witness was Compelled to Give, by Virtue of Im-munity Statute or Otherwise, as Admissible in a Prosecution of the Witness for an Offense Subsequently Com-mitted.
159 ALR 1240, Use in Criminal Case of Testimony Given on Former Trial, or Preliminary Examination, by Wit-ness Not Available at Present Trial.
160 ALR 753, Competency of Juror as Affected by His Participation in a Case of Similar Character, But Not In-volving the Party Making the Objection.
162 ALR 1373, Validity and Construction of Statutes Making Conspiracy to Deprive or Deprivation of Constitu-tional Right a Federal Offense.
167 ALR 845, Effect, as to Prior Offenses, of Amendment Increasing Punishment for Crime.
169 ALR 315, Comment Note.--Duty in Instructing Jury in Criminal Prosecution to Explain and Define OffenseCharged.
175 ALR 784, Governing Law as to Existence or Character of Offense for Which One Has Been Convicted in aFederal Court, or Court of Another State, as Bearing Upon Disqualification to Vote, Hold Office, Practice Pro-fession, Sit On...
165 ALR 1098, Right of Corporation to Engage in Business, Trade, or Activity Requiring License from Public.
125 ALR 694, Plea of Former Jeopardy Where Jury is Discharged Because of Illness or Insanity of Juror.
120 ALR 437, Matters Within Investigating Power of Grand Jury.
120 ALR 1171, Former Jeopardy as Regards Successive Prosecutions for Perjury Charged to Have Been Com-mitted in the Same Action or Proceeding.
112 ALR 319, Communicating With Grand Jury or Member Thereof as a Criminal Offense.
82 ALR 484, Joinder in Same Indictment of Defendant Charged Singly With One Offense and CodefendantCharged Jointly With Him With Another Offense.
67 ALR 1372, Failure of Instruction on Reasonable Doubt to Include Phrase “Lack of Evidence” or Equivalentas Reversible Error.
61 ALR 1153, Mistaken Belief as to Constitutionality or Unconstitutionality of Statute as Affecting CriminalResponsibility.
52 ALR 816, Charge of Bribery or Cognate Offense Predicated Upon an Unaccepted Offer by or to an Official.
56 ALR 407, Rule as to Corroborative Evidence in Prosecutions for Subornation of Perjury.
10 ALR 982, Sufficiency of Indictment as Affected by Bill of Particulars.
Encyclopedias
16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 493, Liability for Abusive Language.
10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 289, “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” Under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
Am. Jur. 2d Obstructing Justice § 27, Applicability of Statutes.
Am. Jur. 2d Obstructing Justice § 39, Overview of Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982.
Forms
Federal Procedural Forms § 20:77, Release Orders.
Federal Procedural Forms § 20:105, Order--For Pretrial Release [18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(C), (H); Fed. R. Crim. P.46].
Federal Procedural Forms § 20:320, Plea Agreement--Guilty Plea--Conspiracy to Defraud and Obstruct Justice [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 981, 984, 1001, 1503, 1505, 1510, 1621, 1623, 3013, 3571, 3611, 3663A, 3664; Fed. R. Crim. P.11].
Federal Procedural Forms § 20:109, Order--For Pretrial Release--Participation in Substance Abuse TreatmentProgram [18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(x); Fed. R. Crim. P. 46].
5 West's Federal Forms § 7124.10, Appearance Bond--Southern District of California.
2B West's Federal Forms § 1775, Scheme to Defraud and to Steal Jewels.
Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms Federal Criminal Procedure § 32, Order--For Pretrial Release--Conditions of Release.
Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms Federal Criminal Procedure § 33, Order--For Pretrial Release--Conditions of Release-
-Participation in Substance Abuse Treatment Program.
Treatises and Practice Aids
Federal Evidence App C, C. Legislative and Committee History.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:60, Special Venue Statutes.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:250, Offenses for Which Interception May be Authorized.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 26:657, Sanctions.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 77:222, Burden of Proof.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 77:223, Admissibility and Sufficiency of Evidence.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 80:367, Person Against Whom Acts Are Directed.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 80:368, Constitutionality of Statute.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 80:369, Interplay Between General Prohibition (18 U.S.C.A. § 1503) andStatute Specific to Witnesses (18 U.S.C.A. § 1512).
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:1580, Obstruction of Justice.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:2209, Denial of Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 Motion for Severance--How isPrejudice Shown.
Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 48:1588, Tax and Nontax Offenses.
Handbook of Federal Evidence § 609:4, Rule 609(A)(2): Crimes With Element of a Dishonest Act or FalseStatement.
Handbook of Federal Evidence RuleHIST 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
Immigration Law and Crimes § 7:33, Definition of Aggravated Felony--Obstruction of Justice, Perjury, Sub-ornation of Perjury, Bribery of a Witness.
Administration of justice 7Alteration of documents or papers, offenses within section 9Concealment of information, offenses within section 10Conspiracy, offenses within section 11Constitutionality 1Construction 2Construction with other laws 3Contempt of court 21Court of United States 5Destruction of documents or papers, offenses within section 12Disclosing secret grand jury testimony, offenses within section 13False testimony, offenses within section 14Impeding investigation of officers, offenses within section 15Influencing jurors, offenses within section 16Influencing witnesses, offenses within section 17Miscellaneous offenses, offenses within section 19Offenses within section 8-19
Offenses within section - Generally 8Offenses within section - Alteration of documents or papers 9Offenses within section - Concealment of information 10Offenses within section - Conspiracy 11Offenses within section - Destruction of documents or papers 12Offenses within section - Disclosing secret grand jury testimony 13Offenses within section - False testimony 14Offenses within section - Impeding investigation of officers 15Offenses within section - Influencing jurors 16Offenses within section - Influencing witnesses 17Offenses within section - Miscellaneous offenses 19Offenses within section - Threats to counsel 18
Officers or agencies within section 6Purpose 4Separate and distinct offenses 20Threats to counsel, offenses within section 18
1. Constitutionality
Omnibus provision of obstruction of justice statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to attorney's lit-igation-related criminal conduct in course of various legal proceedings, which was motivated by attorney's per-sonal financial interest in protecting third party's illegal gambling enterprise; attorney's financial interest formedbasis of attorney's requisite corrupt intent. U.S. v. Cueto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1998, 151 F.3d 620, certiorari denied 119S.Ct. 1249, 526 U.S. 1016, 143 L.Ed.2d 347, habeas corpus denied 2005 WL 3448030. Obstructing Justice104
Given the absence of any colorable claim to First Amendment protection with respect to conduct of defendant inpassing secret grand jury information only to coconspirators and grand jury targets, application of obstruction ofjustice statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1503] to defendant was neither overbroad under the First Amendment nor void forvagueness under the Fifth Amendment. U.S. v. Jeter, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1985, 775 F.2d 670, certiorari denied 106S.Ct. 1796, 475 U.S. 1142, 90 L.Ed.2d 341. Constitutional Law 2117; Constitutional Law 4509(21);Obstructing Justice 104
Omnibus clause of this section clearly states that it punishes all endeavors to obstruct due administration ofjustice and gives fair notice that it outlaws the giving of false testimony before grand jury. U. S. v. Griffin,C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 589 F.2d 200, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 48, 444 U.S. 825, 62 L.Ed.2d 32. ObstructingJustice 108; Obstructing Justice 141
Since statutory omnibus clause prohibiting influencing, obstruction or impeding of due administration of justiceclearly proclaims that all obstructions of justice are prohibited, this section gave defendants, who were convictedof conspiring to obstruct due administration of justice based on attempt to sell transcripts of secret grand jurytestimony to persons under investigation for suspected federal banking law violations, constitutionally requiredfair notice of offending conduct. U. S. v. Howard, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 569 F.2d 1331, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct.116, 439 U.S. 834, 58 L.Ed.2d 130. Obstructing Justice 104
This section is not unconstitutional as being vague. Anderson v. U. S., C.A.6 (Ky.) 1954, 215 F.2d 84, certioraridenied 75 S.Ct. 208, 348 U.S. 888, 99 L.Ed. 698, rehearing denied 75 S.Ct. 291, 348 U.S. 922, 99 L.Ed. 723.Obstructing Justice 104
Omnibus clause of obstruction of justice statute was not impermissibly vague, in proscribing corrupt endeavorsto obstruct justice, as applied to defendant's conduct of destroying documents within scope of grand jury invest-igation, even though did not specifically prohibit defendant's precise means of violating statute; means, throughlawful in themselves, became unlawful if done with corrupt intent to accomplish what statute forbade. U.S. v.Triumph Capital Group, Inc., D.Conn.2003, 260 F.Supp.2d 470. Obstructing Justice 104
This section, by incorporating the word “corruptly,” does not thereby suffer from unconstitutional vagueness. U.S. v. Mitchell, D.C.D.C.1974, 397 F.Supp. 166, affirmed 559 F.2d 31, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, certiorari denied97 S.Ct. 2641, 431 U.S. 933, 53 L.Ed.2d 250, rehearing denied 97 S.Ct. 2992, 433 U.S. 916, 53 L.Ed.2d 1103.Obstructing Justice 104
2. Construction
Alien defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting attempt to escape custody did not constitute “aggravatedfelony,” within meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as offense relating to obstruction of justice,and thus, alien was not precluded from cancellation of removal based on his residing in United States continu-ously for over 7 years. Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, C.A.9 2008, 551 F.3d 857. Aliens, Immigration, And Cit-izenship 321
This section is strictly construed. U. S. v. Ryan, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 455 F.2d 728. Obstructing Justice 105
This section is a criminal statute and must be strictly construed. Haili v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1958, 260 F.2d744. See, also, U.S. v. Baker, C.A.Ky.1974, 494 F.2d 1262; U.S. v. Scoratow, D.C.Pa.1956, 137 F.Supp. 620.
General words, which follow specific words in the enumeration of prohibited acts in this section must, underrule of ejusdem generis, be construed to embrace only acts similar in nature to those acts enumerated by the pre-ceding specific words. Haili v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1958, 260 F.2d 744. See, also, U.S. v. Essex,C.A.Tenn.1969, 407 F.2d 214.
3. Construction with other laws
Under Sentencing Guidelines, terrorism adjustment could be applied to sentence for obstructing justice and soli-citing crime of violence, notwithstanding that defendant was not convicted of “federal crime of terrorism,”where purpose of his soliciting FBI informant was to promote federal crime of terrorism, namely murder of fed-eral district court judge. U.S. v. Hale, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 448 F.3d 971, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied ,certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1020, 549 U.S. 1158, 166 L.Ed.2d 783, post-conviction relief denied 2010 WL2921634, adhered to on denial of reconsideration 2011 WL 5104630, affirmed 710 F.3d 711, petition for certior-ari filed 2013 WL 4079644. Sentencing And Punishment 757
Statute generally proscribing influencing or endeavoring to influence justice permits conviction for witness tam-pering, despite removal of specific reference to witnesses from statute and concomitant addition of new statutespecifically dealing with tampering with witness. U.S. v. Moody, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1992, 977 F.2d 1420, certioraridenied 113 S.Ct. 1348, 507 U.S. 944, 122 L.Ed.2d 730. Obstructing Justice 136
Fact that another statute more specifically addressed improper conduct involving witnesses did not precludecharging defendant with obstruction of justice involving corrupt persuasion of grand jury witness under generalobstruction of justice statute that contained omnibus clause criminalizing defendant's acts that influence, ob-struct or impede or endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede due administration of justice. U.S. v. Kenny,C.A.4 (Va.) 1992, 973 F.2d 339. Criminal Law 29(5.5)
Congress, by removing reference to witnesses in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503, which proscribes obstructing justice, andby enacting the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 1512, did not intend that protection of wit-nesses falls solely under the Act, and it was proper to charge defendants under the former statute with interferingwith due administration of justice where conduct of defendants related to tampering with witness. U.S. v.Rovetuso, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 768 F.2d 809, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 838, 474 U.S. 1076, 88 L.Ed.2d 809, cer-tiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1951, 476 U.S. 1106, 90 L.Ed.2d 360. Obstructing Justice 137
By enacting section 1512 of this title to address certain kinds of witness intimidation and simultaneously delet-ing from this section all references to witnesses, Congress did not intend that threats against witnesses would fallexclusively under section 1512 of this title and be exempt from prosecution here under this section remains ap-plicable to obstruction of the administration of justice by attempts to influence witnesses. U.S. v. Wesley, C.A.5
Conduct expressly covered by this section prohibiting influencing, obstructing or impeding due administrationof justice may occur in view of the court and there is no reason to require summary contempt proceedings, pur-suant to section 401 of this title which authorizes summary punishment and which was confined to courtroommisconduct to curb judicial abuse of contempt power, when government wishes to proceed by indictment in suchcases. U. S. v. Howard, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 569 F.2d 1331, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 116, 439 U.S. 834, 58L.Ed.2d 130. Criminal Law 29(5.5)
Defendant, who was connected with letter stating that certain photographs of government witness in posed lesbi-an acts would not be released to neighbors and relatives if witness did not make court appearance, was subject toprosecution under section 876 of this title, making it an offense to use the mails in furtherance of extortion, sincewitness' testimony was a thing of value within meaning of such section; defendant was not required to be pro-secuted under this section. U. S. v. Zouras, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 497 F.2d 1115. Criminal Law 29(3); PostalService 33
Enactment of statutory provision prohibiting evidence tampering, as part of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, did notremove document destruction from ambit of statutory provision prohibiting obstruction of justice; Congress didnot make any express change to provision prohibiting obstruction of justice when it enacted evidence tamperingprovision, courts had consistently construed obstruction of justice provision to apply to document destruction,and congressional reports and testimony with respect to evidence tampering provision only evidenced congres-sional intent to prohibit broader array of conduct, not for provision to be exclusive vehicle for prosecution of ob-struction of justice based on document destruction. U.S. v. Jahedi, S.D.N.Y.2009, 681 F.Supp.2d 430. Obstruct-ing Justice 133
Obstruction of justice was sufficiently pleaded as a predicate act for claim by competitor of government con-tracts bidder that bidder violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in connectionwith bidding on satellite launch services contract while making use of competitor's confidential and proprietaryinformation; competitor alleged that employee of bidder lied by giving false deposition in another case that hehad never shared competitor's confidential information with any third party. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. BoeingCo., M.D.Fla.2005, 357 F.Supp.2d 1350. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70
United States did not waive its immunity under federal obstruction of justice statute, and thus sovereign im-munity barred requestor's suit against Department of Education officials for obstructing justice due to their fail-ure to produce Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents, absent allegation that officials acted ultra vires.Scherer v. U.S., D.Kan.2003, 241 F.Supp.2d 1270, affirmed 78 Fed.Appx. 687, 2003 WL 22376994. UnitedStates 125(9)
Aguilar 's holding that catchall provision of obstruction of justice statute requires “nexus” in time, causation, orlogic between act and judicial proceedings cannot be imported to statute prohibiting tampering with witness,victim, or informant. U.S. v. Gabriel, S.D.N.Y.1996, 920 F.Supp. 498, affirmed 125 F.3d 89. Obstructing Justice
Statute prohibiting corruption or influencing of parties to judicial proceeding proscribes forms of witness tam-pering not covered by narrow language of statute specifically addressed to protection of witnesses. U.S. v.Montgomery, S.D.N.Y.1987, 675 F.Supp. 164, affirmed 860 F.2d 15, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 846, 488 U.S.1033, 102 L.Ed.2d 978. Obstructing Justice 136
Once immunity has been granted, a witness may be required to testify, and if a witness refuses to testify, districtcourt has power under section 1826 of Title 28 to find him in contempt; sanctions under this section and section1622 of this title also exist to deal with persons who seek to obstruct justice by corruptly influencing a grandjury witness or by suborning perjury. In re Special Grand Jury, E.D.Wis.1979, 480 F.Supp. 174. Witnesses21; Witnesses 304(1)
This section and sections 1505 and 1510 of this title pertaining to obstruction of criminal investigation or in-quiry before initiation of proceedings and to obstruction of judicial, agency or congressional proceedings follow-ing their commencement are mutually exclusive and are applicable to different governmental activities as wellas separate chronological periods. U. S. v. Mitchell, S.D.N.Y.1973, 372 F.Supp. 1239, appeal dismissed 485F.2d 1290. Obstructing Justice 105; Obstructing Justice 111(1)
Fact that this section and section 371 of this title making it a crime to obstruct justice and making it a crime toconspire to defraud the United States overlap to some extent does not bar a prosecution under either of them. US v. Bonanno, S.D.N.Y.1959, 177 F.Supp. 106, on subsequent appeal 285 F.2d 408. Criminal Law 29(5.5)
Where accused was not prosecuted under section 934 of Title 10 which authorizes punishment of “crimes andoffenses not capital,” but was instead prosecuted for violation of those clauses of section 934 proscribing“disorders and neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline” or “conduct of a nature to bring discreditupon the armed forces,” use of this section as guide to drafting specifications did not dictate that offense of ob-structing administration of military justice in violation of those clauses charged be thereafter limited to onlyconduct and elements within purview of this section. U. S. v. Ridgeway, ACMR 1982, 13 M.J. 742. MilitaryJustice 690; Military Justice 756; Military Justice 774
4. Purpose
This section and section 1510 of this title which make it an offense to obstruct justice or to obstruct criminal in-vestigations have as their intent to protect individuals who are assisting in a federal investigation or judicial pro-ceeding. U. S. v. Cuesta, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 597 F.2d 903, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 451, 444 U.S. 964, 62L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 452, 444 U.S. 964, 62 L.Ed.2d 377. Obstructing Justice 103
This section proscribing obstructing “due administration of justice” is designed to achieve the twin goals of pro-tecting the participants in a specific federal proceeding and preventing a miscarriage of justice in a case pendingin a federal court. U. S. v. Metcalf, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1970, 435 F.2d 754. Obstructing Justice 103; Obstruct-ing Justice 108
District court of the Virgin Islands is not a “court of the United States” for purposes of this section making it acrime by threats of force to endeavor to influence, intimidate or impede any officer of a court of the UnitedStates in the discharge of his duty. U. S. v. George, C.A.3 (Virgin Islands) 1980, 625 F.2d 1081. ObstructingJustice 111(1)
Superior Court of the District of Columbia was not a “court of the United States” for purposes of former provi-sions of this section which prohibited efforts to influence witnesses in any “court of the United States,” sinceSuperior Court was not a court under U.S.C.A. Const. Art. III, § 1 et seq., but a local court with jurisdictionequivalent to that of state courts. U. S. v. Regina, D.C.Md.1980, 504 F.Supp. 629. Obstructing Justice 136
District court of Territory of Alaska was not a “court of the United States” within former provisions of this sec-tion which provided that whoever corruptly endeavored to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any“court of the United States”, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or be imprisoned not more than five years, orboth. U S v. Bell, D.C.Alaska 1952, 108 F.Supp. 777, 14 Alaska 142. Obstructing Justice 135
6. Officers or agencies within section
Bankruptcy trustee was an “officer in or of the court” within meaning of obstruction of justice statute, prohibit-ing the impeding of a federal court officer in the discharge of officer's official duties; although trustee wasprivate party, not government employee, or an officer of the court in the traditional sense, Bankruptcy Actdefined the term “officer” to include a trustee, and Supreme Court precedent cited federal statute listing court of-ficers and employees, as illustrative of types of officers who would qualify as “court officers,” and statute in-cluded trustees. U.S. v. Crispo, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 306 F.3d 71, on remand 2003 WL 328304. ObstructingJustice 118
Federal district judge was “officer in or of” federal district court within this section prohibiting corruptly influ-encing, impeding, or intimidating any officer in or of any federal court in discharge of his duty. U. S. v. Mar-goles, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1961, 294 F.2d 371, certiorari denied 82 S.Ct. 367, 368 U.S. 930, 7 L.Ed.2d 193. Bribery
1(2)
The fact that a commissioner [now magistrate] did not himself hold “any court of the United States” did not pre-vent an assault upon him from coming within the prohibition of R.S. § 5399, if the assault could or did obstructjustice in the particular case in court. U.S. v. McLeod, C.C.N.D.Ala.1902, 119 F. 416.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an investigating arm rather than a judicial arm of the government and it isnot engaged in “administration of justice” within this section having made it crime to influence or injure officer,juror, or witness in administration of justice, and alleged activities of defendant in obstructing an investigationby the Bureau did not form basis for prosecution under such section. U. S. v. Scoratow, W.D.Pa.1956, 137F.Supp. 620. Obstructing Justice 111(1)
“Administration of justice” means performance of acts or duties required by law in discharge of duty. Rosner v.U.S., C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1926, 10 F.2d 675. See, also, U.S. v. Cohen, D.C.Conn.1962, 202 F.Supp. 587. Obstruct-ing Justice 100
The words “due administration of justice” import a free and fair opportunity to every litigant in a pending causein a federal court to learn what he may learn concerning material facts, and to exercise his option as to introdu-cing testimony as to such facts. Wilder v. U.S., C.C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1906, 143 F. 433, 74 C.C.A. 567, certioraridenied 27 S.Ct. 787, 204 U.S. 674, 51 L.Ed. 674.
As used in R.S. §§ 5399, 5404, the words “the due administration of justice therein” meant the enforcement ofthe law of the land in individual cases brought or sought to be brought before the courts. U.S. v. McLeod,C.C.N.D.Ala.1902, 119 F. 416. See, also, Ex parte McLeod, D.C.Ala.1903, 120 F. 130.
Latter part of this section is all-inclusive, is designed to meet any corrupt conduct in an endeavor to obstruct orinterfere with due administration of justice, and covers any act, committed corruptly, in an endeavor to impedeor obstruct due administration of justice. U. S. v. Cohen, D.C.Conn.1962, 202 F.Supp. 587. Obstructing Justice
108
8. Offenses within section--Generally
Under this section prohibiting corrupt endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice,offense charged must be similar to those specifically enumerated in statute, applying doctrine of ejusdem gener-is. U. S. v. Ryan, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 455 F.2d 728. Obstructing Justice 105
Omnibus clause of this section which prohibits obstruction of justice proscribes conduct that impedes adminis-tration of justice beyond those acts specifically enumerated in this section. U.S. v. Caron, E.D.Va.1982, 551F.Supp. 662, affirmed 722 F.2d 739, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1602, 465 U.S. 1103, 80 L.Ed.2d 132. Obstruct-ing Justice 108
Perjury and obstruction of justice, or conspiracy to commit either, are crimes. U S v. Bonanno, S.D.N.Y.1959,177 F.Supp. 106, on subsequent appeal 285 F.2d 408. Conspiracy 28(3); Obstructing Justice 100; Per-jury 1
This section denouncing various activities aimed at interfering with the due administration of justice, by the om-nibus provision directed toward whoever corruptly obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, orimpede the due administration of justice, includes any corrupt conduct in an effort to obstruct or interfere withthe due administration of justice. U S v. Solow, S.D.N.Y.1956, 138 F.Supp. 812. Obstructing Justice 108
9. ---- Alteration of documents or papers, offenses within section
Conduct of attorney in forging signatures of district court judge and deputy clerk to bogus order requiring hisown clients to pay substantial sum in resolution of lawsuit, when, in fact, genuine order issued by the court gran-ted summary judgment in favor of those clients and absolved them of all liability, came within ambit of“omnibus” clause of this section proscribing obstruction of due administration of justice. U.S. v. London,C.A.11 (Ga.) 1983, 714 F.2d 1558. Obstructing Justice 108
Defendant who altered or destroyed corporate records with knowledge that records were being sought by a grandjury investigating company's activities could be convicted of obstruction of justice. U. S. v. Faudman, C.A.6(Mich.) 1981, 640 F.2d 20. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
10. ---- Concealment of information, offenses within section
Defendant's endeavor to conceal documents requested by grand jury subpoena duces tecum fell within scope ofstatute prohibiting obstruction of justice notwithstanding agreement to temporarily extend return date on thatsubpoena; extension agreement changed, but did not nullify, obligation under subpoena. U.S. v. Lench, C.A.9(Cal.) 1986, 806 F.2d 1443. Obstructing Justice 132
Deliberate concealment by defendant of his identity from federal magistrate, before whom defendant was to betried for aiding and abetting aliens in eluding inspection, was within prohibition of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503, govern-ing offense of obstruction of justice, where fact of defendant's identity could not be readily verified and defend-ant's giving of false name to magistrate effectively prevented magistrate from gathering facts necessary for prop-er exercise of its discretion in sentencing defendant. U.S. v. Plascencia-Orozco, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1985, 768 F.2d1074. Obstructing Justice 132
To convict defendant of obstruction of justice for concealed subpoenaed documents, grand jury must have beenengaged in due administration of justice, defendant must have known that jury was conducting investigation andwhat documents were covered by subpoena, and, knowing particular documents were covered by subpoena, de-fendant must have willfully concealed or endeavored to conceal them from grand jury. U. S. v. Rasheed, C.A.9(Cal.) 1981, 663 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1031, 454 U.S. 1157, 71 L.Ed.2d 315. Obstructing Justice
111(2)
Defendant's concealment of information relevant and germane to grand jury's functions would support convic-tion for obstructing justice. U. S. v. Cohn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 452 F.2d 881, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1196, 405U.S. 975, 31 L.Ed.2d 249. Obstructing Justice 132
“Obstruction of justice” did not include alleged concealment or withholding of discovery documents. RichmarkCorp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., D.Or.1990, 730 F.Supp. 1525. Obstructing Justice 132
Obstruction of justice may take the form of concealing from an authorized tribunal information germane to itsfunctions. U S v. Bonanno, S.D.N.Y.1959, 177 F.Supp. 106, on subsequent appeal 285 F.2d 408. See, also, U.S.v. Cohen, D.C.Conn.1962, 202 F.Supp. 587. Obstructing Justice 132
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for conspiring to obstruct justice by altering flight logs of policeofficers assigned to police department's aviation section; evidence showed that when grand jury subpoenas forproduction of flight logs arrived, coconspirator bought new logbook and transcribed entries from defendant's loginto it; both defendant and coconspirator inspected log books of other officers and, on several occasions, defend-ant directed officers to make changes to their records; one officer testified that defendant told him to “correct”his log and take it to coconspirator for review; thus, it could reasonably be inferred that defendant and cocon-spirator were acting pursuant to an agreed objective of preventing certain information from reaching grand jury.U.S. v. Mullins, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1994, 22 F.3d 1365. Conspiracy 47(13)
Defendant's identity as bribed juror, in prosecution of former juror for obstructing justice by accepting money inexchange for voting to acquit reputed member of organized crime family, was supported by evidence that de-fendant deceived court during jury voir dire with respect to defendant's relationship with head of gang that hadfrequent illegal business dealings with organized crime family and defendant's testimony that meetings withgang leader occurred throughout trial while defendant served as juror and admissions that defendant asked gangleader for a job following trial. U.S. v. Radonjich, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 1 F.3d 117, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct.897, 510 U.S. 1079, 127 L.Ed.2d 89. Criminal Law 566
There was sufficient evidence to support jury's verdict that defendant border patrol officers, with knowledge thatthey were under indictment, conspired with each other to obstruct due administration of justice by deliveringfalse documents to their counsel and causing him to transmit these records to attorneys for the United States.U.S. v. Davila, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1983, 704 F.2d 749. Conspiracy 47(13)
While defendant did not successfully obstruct justice because United States Attorney became aware of his ac-tions, he did endeavor to do so and could have successfully conspired to defraud the government and to obstructjustice prior to time that United States Attorney became aware of his plans, and thus he could be held liable forconspiracy to obstruct justice and for wilfully attempting to obstruct justice by expressing his opinion aboutcauses of city election voting machine breakdowns less forcefully than he initially intended. U. S. v. Shoup,C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 608 F.2d 950. Conspiracy 34
Evidence including testimony of confidential informant and defendant's own intercepted conversations estab-lished with unmistakable clarity the existence of a plan and an association for the purpose of hindering the gov-ernment's investigation of narcotics traffic and fully warranted conviction of defendants on charges of conspir-acy to obstruct justice and obstruction of criminal investigations. U. S. v. Cuesta, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 597 F.2d903, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 451, 444 U.S. 964, 62 L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 452, 444 U.S.964, 62 L.Ed.2d 377. Conspiracy 47(13)
In prosecution for conspiracy to influence or injure an officer, juror or witness, jury could find a conspiracybetween the two defendants who had actually shot the witness and against whom the government had establisheda substantive case without the necessity of the government establishing that they had conspired with the remain-ing defendants. Ferina v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1962, 302 F.2d 95, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 35, 371 U.S. 819, 9L.Ed.2d 59. Conspiracy 47(13)
Evidence of the same intent or knowledge is required to convict defendants for conspiring to obstruct justice andcommit perjury as would be required to convict them of the substantive offenses. U.S. v. Bufalino, C.A.2 (N.Y.)1960, 285 F.2d 408. Conspiracy 28(3); Conspiracy 34
A conspiracy to endeavor to obstruct or impede due administration of justice was complete, regardless of suc-cess, when the first overt act to carry it out was committed. U.S. v. Minkoff, C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1943, 137 F.2d 402. Conspiracy 34
Persons who conspire together to obstruct justice in proceedings before United States commissioner [nowUnited States magistrate] or in a federal district court, which they expect or fear will be instituted, may be pro-secuted for conspiracy to endeavor to obstruct the due administration of justice even if it be assumed that theycould not be found guilty of the substantive crime of obstructing justice, provided one of them does an overt actdesigned to consummate their purpose and the commission of that act affects a pending proceeding. U.S. v. Perl-stein, C.C.A.3 (N.J.) 1942, 126 F.2d 789, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1106, 316 U.S. 678, 86 L.Ed. 1752. Conspir-acy 34
A conspiracy contemplating the payment of money to induce a circuit judge to exercise his judicial power in fa-vor of bribe givers without regard to the merits, became complete the instant the conspiracy was formed, wheth-er the object of the conspiracy ever was consummated, or, if consummated, whether the decisions finallyrendered in pursuance of the conspiracy were legally sound or not. U.S. v. Manton, C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1939, 107F.2d 834, certiorari denied 60 S.Ct. 590, 309 U.S. 664, 84 L.Ed. 1012. Conspiracy 34
Crime of conspiracy to obstruct due administration of justice in certain criminal prosecution was completedwhen defendants agreed on scheme; conspiracy is essentially crime of intent. Craig v. U.S., C.C.A.9 (Cal.) 1936,81 F.2d 816, certiorari dismissed 56 S.Ct. 670, 298 U.S. 637, 80 L.Ed. 1371, certiorari dismissed 56 S.Ct. 671,298 U.S. 637, 80 L.Ed. 1371, rehearing denied 83 F.2d 450, certiorari denied 56 S.Ct. 959, 298 U.S. 690, 80L.Ed. 1408, rehearing denied 57 S.Ct. 6, 299 U.S. 620, 81 L.Ed. 457. Conspiracy 34
Conspiracy to impede and obstruct justice by perjury is a criminal conspiracy, whether perjury be consummatedor not. Outlaw v. U.S., C.C.A.5 (Tex.) 1936, 81 F.2d 805, certiorari denied 56 S.Ct. 747, 298 U.S. 665, 80 L.Ed.1389. Conspiracy 24.10
Concert between the juror and the person seeking to influence him being of the essence of the offense created byformer section 241 of this title, that concert cannot be charged as a conspiracy. U.S. v. Sager, C.C.A.2 (N.Y.)1931, 49 F.2d 725.
Conviction of defendant of conspiracy to obstruct justice requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that conspiracyto obstruct justice charged by Government did exist, that defendant knowingly and willfully became member ofthat conspiracy, and that one of conspirators did some overt act to accomplish object of conspiracy. U.S. v. La-Rouche Campaign, D.Mass.1988, 695 F.Supp. 1265. Conspiracy 34
12. ---- Destruction of documents or papers, offenses within section
Defendant did not obstruct justice or obstruct proceeding of federal agency by merely calling for destruction ofdocuments that were within scope of grand jury and agency subpoenas and document requests, since defendanthad to have known that his corrupt actions were likely to have affected those proceedings. U.S. v. Quattrone,C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 441 F.3d 153, mandamus dismissed 224 Fed.Appx. 106, 2007 WL 1475627. ObstructingJustice 111(2); Obstructing Justice 133
Jury could convict defendant of obstruction of justice if it found that defendant destroyed bank documents sub-poenaed in connection with investigation by federal grand jury into alleged illegal money laundering scheme bybank, and that defendant knowingly, willfully, and corruptly attempted to impede administration of justice inmatter under investigation. U.S. v. McKnight, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1986, 799 F.2d 443. Obstructing Justice 133
Where it was testified that defendant directed second person to burn records in Oct., 1981, called second personin Nov. to ascertain whether the records had in fact been destroyed and called family friend twice in Apr., 1982,in attempt to have such family friend remove any records that had not been destroyed, destruction of suchsecond person's records on Oct. 21 had no bearing on prosecution of defendant for continuing his endeavors,after Nov. 2, to have all of such records destroyed, and count alleging such facts properly charged offense des-pite contention that alleged obstruction of justice had been completed before Nov. 2 plea agreement was signedand that agreement was breached by prosecution of the prior crime. U.S. v. Brimberry, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1984, 744F.2d 580. Indictment And Information 87(2)
One who intentionally withholds or destroys tangible “evidence” which he knows to be target of grand jury in-vestigation can reasonably be said to be one who “corruptly * * * obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influ-ence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice * * *” within this section. U. S. v. Walasek, C.A.3(Pa.) 1975, 527 F.2d 676. Obstructing Justice 111(2); Obstructing Justice 132; Obstructing Justice
133
Evidence, in prosecution for obstruction of justice, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that de-fendant, a salesman for an investment firm which was under investigation, lied to federal agents when he toldthem, after they served him with a subpoena to testify before the grand jury and to bring with him any and all re-cords relating to the firm, that he had given all such records back to the firm; a witness testified that defendanthad told him, in a telephone conversation, that he had made a bonfire of office documents. U.S. v. Kirkland,D.Or.2004, 330 F.Supp.2d 1151. Obstructing Justice 170(3)
Defendants who allegedly withheld and destroyed documents sought during the discovery of a civil action couldbe prosecuted for such conduct under the obstruction of justice statute. U.S. v. Lundwall, S.D.N.Y.1998, 1F.Supp.2d 249. Obstructing Justice 132; Obstructing Justice 133
Evidence with respect to instructions to employees as to how to testify before grand jury and destruction of evid-ence after defendant and employees had been subpoenaed to appear before grand jury in investigation of defend-ant's business was sufficient to sustain conviction for obstruction of justice. U. S. v. Simmons, E.D.Pa.1978, 444
A person who knows that a federal grand jury is investigating certain possible violations of federal law, and whohas reason to believe that certain incriminating document is likely to come to grand jury's attention, and who in-tentionally causes destruction of that document in order to prevent it from falling into hands of grand jury, mayproperly be convicted of obstruction of justice. U.S. v. Fineman, E.D.Pa.1977, 434 F.Supp. 197, affirmed 571F.2d 572, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 2847, 436 U.S. 945, 56 L.Ed.2d 786. Obstructing Justice 133
Where defendants were charged with conspiracy to obstruct due administration of justice in connection withgrand jury investigation of person who had allegedly recanted testimony given for prosecution, original notesmade by one of the defendants in meeting with such witness bore a reasonable relationship to the subject matterof inquiry and destruction of same with the substitution of other notes would constitute a violation of this sec-tion. U S v. Siegel, S.D.N.Y.1957, 152 F.Supp. 370. Conspiracy 34
Where grand jury was engaged in an investigation and defendant allegedly knew that certain correspondencewas relevant to the investigation and had reason to believe that he would be called as a witness and that produc-tion of the correspondence would be ordered, defendant by allegedly willfully destroying the correspondence toprevent their production before the grand jury interfered with the due administration of justice notwithstandingnonservice of a subpoena duces tecum upon the defendant for the production of the correspondence. U S v. So-low, S.D.N.Y.1956, 138 F.Supp. 812. Obstructing Justice 133
13. ---- Disclosing secret grand jury testimony, offenses within section
Defendant's noncoercive conduct in obtaining secret grand jury information from friend who was a typist for afederal court reporter service could reasonably be characterized as attempt at obstruction of justice within themeaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503. U.S. v. Jeter, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1985, 775 F.2d 670, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1796,475 U.S. 1142, 90 L.Ed.2d 341. Obstructing Justice 158
Violating secrecy of grand jury proceeding by selling transcripts of confidential grand jury testimony came un-der statutory omnibus clause which prohibits influencing, obstructing or impeding due administration of justiceand which proscribes any conduct that has same effect as specific acts enumerated in first part of this sectionspecifically forbidding influencing, intimidating or impeding any witness, juror or court official. U. S. v.Howard, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 569 F.2d 1331, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 116, 439 U.S. 834, 58 L.Ed.2d 130. Ob-structing Justice 111(2)
14. ---- False testimony, offenses within section
Government informant obstructed justice by making false statements to indictee's attorney which could havebeen used to impeach informant if he had testified and which, thus, limited government's use of evidence at in-dictee's trial and resulted in dismissal of one charge; even though statements were never introduced at indictee'strial, informant knew statements were false and that they were likely to be introduced in court, and false state-ments materially altered government's treatment of indictee. U.S. v. Barfield, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 999 F.2d 1520
Former employer did not commit obstruction of justice as predicate offense for Racketeer Influenced and Cor-rupt Organizations Act suit brought by former employee; alleged perjury committed by various employees offormer employer claimed to constitute obstruction occurred in connection with state workers' compensation pro-ceedings brought by former employee and obstruction of justice statute relied upon by former employee appliedonly to federal cases. O'Malley v. New York City Transit Authority, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 896 F.2d 704. Obstruct-ing Justice 141
That false testimony to grand jury concerning third person's presence at meeting was also a lie did not removethe testimony from scope of statute which proscribes obstruction of justice [18 U.S.C.A. § 1503], where obstruc-tion count of indictment did not charge defendant only with making false statements, but also accused him ofconcealing evidence concerning the third person and the meeting, and several of defendant's answers on thosetopics were obviously evasive and constituted concealment of evidence. U.S. v. Langella, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1985,776 F.2d 1078, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1207, 475 U.S. 1019, 89 L.Ed.2d 320. Obstructing Justice 141
False testimony given by defendant before federal grand jury which had natural effect of dissuading grand juryfrom investigation of alleged loansharking was material for purposes of obstruction of justice prosecution. U. S.v. Griffin, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 589 F.2d 200, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 48, 444 U.S. 825, 62 L.Ed.2d 32. Ob-structing Justice 141
A witness who testified, at Securities and Exchange Commission's investigative hearings to determine beneficialownership of several large blocks of securities, that he could remember practically nothing about a series ofmeetings other than his attendance and that they concerned dispute over distribution of stock was guilty of ob-structing or impeding the due and proper administration of the law. U. S. v. Alo, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 439 F.2d751, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 86, 404 U.S. 850, 30 L.Ed.2d 89, rehearing denied 92 S.Ct. 307, 404 U.S. 961, 30L.Ed.2d 282. Obstructing Justice 131
Defendant's act of filing a false affidavit in federal district court in support of an accused's motion for new trialin a criminal case, wherein defendant alleged that she had had sexual intercourse with several petit jurors whilejury in criminal case was sequestered for deliberations, did not constitute a “contemptuous act” within meaningof this section. U. S. v. Essex, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1969, 407 F.2d 214. Obstructing Justice 129
In prosecution for conspiracy to commit perjury and obstruct justice by giving false and evasive testimony con-cerning a gathering which defendants attended, evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions, for lack of suf-ficient evidence to support a finding that defendants had agreed to lie about the gathering, or that they had hadreason to anticipate that any of them would be called to testify under oath about the gathering. U.S. v. Bufalino,C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1960, 285 F.2d 408. Conspiracy 47(13)
Falsely testifying before grand jury will allow conviction for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct, impede, or influ-ence due administration of justice, if such testimony has effect of blocking off flow of information to grand jury.
U.S. v. Barfield, S.D.Ala.1991, 781 F.Supp. 754, reversed 999 F.2d 1520. Obstructing Justice 141
Count charging that defendant's testimony was “intentionally evasive, false and misleading and designed to con-ceal defendant's true knowledge of the facts from the Grand Jury” was sufficient to support charge of obstructionof justice. U.S. v. Spalliero, C.D.Cal.1984, 602 F.Supp. 417. Obstructing Justice 164(5)
15. ---- Impeding investigation of officers, offenses within section
Where evidence demonstrated that investigation by United States Attorney and by grand jury were conductedjointly, defendant knew that his report on causes of widespread malfunctioning of voting machines in city gener-al election would likely be submitted to grand jury and that he would be called to testify about his findings, andhis actions were taken during pending judicial investigation and would have affected grand jury's inquiry into al-leged voting fraud had he established his goal, defendant, to extent he endeavored to impede investigation con-ducted by the United States Attorney, obstructed justice. U. S. v. Shoup, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 608 F.2d 950. Ob-structing Justice 111(2)
Grand juror's advising person who he believed to be target of grand jury investigation that the person was a tar-get, providing some details of the investigation, and warning the person against specific activity constituted“corrupt” disclosures for purposes of obstruction of justice statute and would support conviction thereunder,even though there was no evidence of any bribe or any attempt at monetary gain or its equivalent. U.S. v. Peas-ley, D.Me.1990, 741 F.Supp. 18. Obstructing Justice 108
16. ---- Influencing jurors, offenses within section
Action of defendant in contacting his former housemate to ascertain if her sister was on jury hearing the case ofone of defendant's friends and to communicate to her sister the idea that the person on trial was a nice guy andprobably innocent constituted an endeavor to corruptly influence a petit juror. U. S. v. Lazzerini, C.A.1 (Mass.)1979, 611 F.2d 940. Obstructing Justice 143
Veniremen come within proscription of this section providing penalty for corruptly endeavoring to influence andimpede jurors. U. S. v. Jackson, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1979, 607 F.2d 1219, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1032, 444 U.S.1080, 62 L.Ed.2d 763. Obstructing Justice 143
In prosecution for jury tampering, jury was justified in finding that defendant was not entrapped and that hemade voluntary, willful, knowing and corrupt attempt to approach juror with offer of money and that he did sowith specific unlawful intent to influence her vote in a criminal case. U. S. v. Quinn, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1976, 543F.2d 640. Bribery 11; Criminal Law 569
Approaching a juror through an intermediary is sufficient to constitute an endeavor to influence and impede apetit juror. U. S. v. Roe, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1975, 529 F.2d 629. See, also, U. S. v. Forrest, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1980, 623F.2d 1107, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 327, 449 U.S. 924, 66 L.Ed.2d 153. Obstructing Justice 143
Noncoercive but corrupt attempt to influence, e.g., by bribery, is within conduct proscribed by this section. U. S.v. Walasek, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1975, 527 F.2d 676. Obstructing Justice 108
Successful bribing of juror or doing any act which has ultimate bribing of juror as its purpose is a criminal of-fense. U. S. v. Osborn, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 350 F.2d 497, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 644, 382 U.S. 1023, 15L.Ed.2d 538, affirmed 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L.Ed.2d 394, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938,17 L.Ed.2d 813. Bribery 1(2)
Corpus delicti of crime of willfully endeavoring to influence, intimidate, and impede petit juror in discharge ofhis duties was the offering of a bribe by third person to a juror in a prior action involving a violation of section186 of Title 29. U. S. v. Hoffa, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 349 F.2d 20, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 645, 382 U.S. 1024,15 L.Ed.2d 538, affirmed 87 S.Ct. 408, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 970, 386 U.S.940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 971, 386 U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880.Obstructing Justice 143
The delivery to the foreman of the grand jury, by one who thought that a certain charge would be preferredagainst him, of a letter asking permission to make a statement, and if such permission were denied, asking thejury to consider the facts therein stated, though addressed to the grand jury as a body and intended to be seen byall of the jurors, violated former section 241 of this title. Duke v. U.S., C.C.A.4 (Va.) 1937, 90 F.2d 840, certior-ari denied 58 S.Ct. 33, 302 U.S. 685, 82 L.Ed. 528, motion denied 58 S.Ct. 135, 302 U.S. 649, 82 L.Ed. 503,motion denied 58 S.Ct. 261, 302 U.S. 650, 82 L.Ed. 504, rehearing denied 58 S.Ct. 135, 302 U.S. 775, 82 L.Ed.600, stay granted 58 S.Ct. 53. Grand Jury 44
Internal process of jury should be inviolable, even in court proceedings, in order to protect jury's integrity andindependence. U. S. v. Miller, D.C.Conn.1968, 284 F.Supp. 220, appeal dismissed 403 F.2d 77. Criminal Law
857(1)
Liability insurance companies' out-of-court publication of advertisements and distribution of pamphlets allegingthat excessive awards by juries were raising insurance rates and cost of living did not present such an extremelyhigh degree of imminence of improper influence upon prospective jurors as would justify punishment by citationfor contempt. Hoffman v. Perrucci, E.D.Pa.1953, 117 F.Supp. 38, appeal dismissed 222 F.2d 709. Contempt
8
It was a crime for a person, for the purpose of influencing the action of a grand jury, to send to them any letteror communication relating to any matter pending before them, or pertaining to their duties, without a previousorder of the court. In re Charge to Grand Jury, C.C.Cal.1872, 30 F.Cas. 992, 2 Sawy. 667, No. 18255.
It was a crime, under Act Mar. 2, 1831, c. 99, § 2, 4 Stat. 488, to endeavor to influence a juror by conveying orimparting information to him, out of the jury box, for the purpose of affecting his conduct or judgment, or to en-deavor to persuade him by arguments or appeals of any kind except those addressed to him by counsel in opencourt. In re Charge to Grand Jury, D.C.Or.1869, 30 F.Cas. 986, No. 18251.
17. ---- Influencing witnesses, offenses within section
See, also, Notes of Decisions under section 1512 of this title.
Obstruction of justice statute proscribes subornation of perjury. U.S. v. Miller, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1998, 161 F.3d977, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1275, 526 U.S. 1029, 143 L.Ed.2d 369. Obstructing Justice 103; Perjury
13
Witness tampering was actionable under obstruction of justice statute's omnibus clause, even though Congress,in Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), removed all references to witnesses in that statute and enactednew provision that specifically addressed influencing of witnesses, victims, and informants. U.S. v. Ladum,C.A.9 (Or.) 1998, 141 F.3d 1328, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 225, 525 U.S. 898, 142 L.Ed.2d 185, certioraridenied 119 S.Ct. 549, 525 U.S. 1021, 142 L.Ed.2d 457. Obstructing Justice 136
Defendants could be convicted of obstruction of justice on basis of offers made to witness despite claim that, attime of meeting, witness was acting as part of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) investigation,not grand jury investigation, where ATF agent testified that he had arranged meeting in order to determinewhether witness' most recent version of the events surrounding firearm record was truthful and government hadconvened grand jury specifically to investigate “the accuracy of this form and the circumstances surrounding it.”U.S. v. Tackett, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1997, 113 F.3d 603, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certior-ari denied 118 S.Ct. 879, 522 U.S. 1089, 139 L.Ed.2d 868, appeal after new sentencing hearing 193 F.3d 880.Obstructing Justice 137
Witness tampering was actionable under obstruction of justice statute; although Congress removed all referencesto witnesses in that statute, enacted Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), and enacted statute dealingwith witness intimidation and harassment, omnibus clause of obstruction of justice statute encompassed acts thatobstructed or impeded due administration of justice, and fact that witness intimidation statute more specificallyaddressed improper conduct involving witness did not necessarily prevent prosecution under a broader statute.U.S. v. Maloney, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 71 F.3d 645, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certior-ari denied 117 S.Ct. 295, 519 U.S. 927, 136 L.Ed.2d 214. Obstructing Justice 136
False statements to FBI agents in endeavor to get FBI agents to give false information to grand jury is not signi-ficantly different from influencing witness before grand jury to give false testimony; effect, that of obstructinggrand jury investigation, is same. U.S. v. Grubb, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1993, 11 F.3d 426, habeas corpus denied 859F.Supp. 227, affirmed as modified 65 F.3d 167. Obstructing Justice 139
Statute generally proscribing influencing or endeavoring to influence justice permits conviction for witness tam-pering, despite removal of specific reference to witnesses from statute and concomitant addition of new statutespecifically dealing with tampering with witness. U.S. v. Moody, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1992, 977 F.2d 1420, certioraridenied 113 S.Ct. 1348, 507 U.S. 944, 122 L.Ed.2d 730. Obstructing Justice 136
Witness tampering does not come within the obstruction of justice clause of statute pertaining to influencing or
injuring officer or jury generally, particularly in light of 1982 amendment deleting all references to witnessesfrom the statute and in light of 1988 amendment adding noncoercive tampering to witness tampering statute.U.S. v. Masterpol, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 940 F.2d 760. Obstructing Justice 136
Conviction for obstructing witness' grand jury testimony with respect to fraudulent trust was supported by suffi-cient evidence; witness, who had purchased trust package and kept his income in Montana bank under fictitiousname, testified that defendant smiled and asked witness “well, you don't own any trusts, do you?” and “you don'thave any bank accounts in Montana, do you?” U.S. v. Tranakos, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1422, denial ofhabeas corpus affirmed 968 F.2d 1225. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Defendant was properly charged with obstruction of justice upon writing threatening letters to witnesses beforehis trial; fact that all reference to “witnesses” was deleted in amendment of obstruction of justice statute did notalter fact that on face of language remaining in statute, threatening witnesses was prohibited. U.S. v. Branch,C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988, 850 F.2d 1080, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 816, 488 U.S. 1018, 102 L.Ed.2d 806. ObstructingJustice 137
Evidence that potential witness in prosecution of third party for lying to grand jury told defendant charged withobstruction of justice that witness would “tell all” if he were subpoenaed to testify in prosecution of third party,and evidence that defendant assisted witness in obtaining job out of country so that witness could not be sub-poenaed in third party's trial, was sufficient to support conviction for obstruction of justice. U.S. v. WashingtonWater Power Co., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1986, 793 F.2d 1079. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Evidence that defendants promised grand jury witness that they would take care of his expenses, provide attor-ney, forgive debt, and visit him in jail if he were imprisoned for remaining silent, that they informed witness thatthe government was not “gonna shadow you all their life” and that grand jury witness spent 18 months in jail forrefusing to testify was sufficient to support defendants' convictions for conspiring to obstruct justice by cor-ruptly influencing grand jury witness to refuse to testify. U.S. v. Arnold, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 773 F.2d 823. Con-spiracy 47(13)
Evidence in prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct justice, including fact that defendant encouraged her daughterto remain silent during investigation into murder of federal judge, was sufficient to sustain conviction. U.S. v.Harrelson, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 754 F.2d 1153, rehearing denied 766 F.2d 186, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 277,474 U.S. 908, 88 L.Ed.2d 241, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 599, 474 U.S. 1034, 88 L.Ed.2d 578, on remand 638F.Supp. 1389. Conspiracy 47(13)
By enacting the 1982 amendment of this chapter, Congress intended that intimidation and harassment of wit-nesses should thereafter be prosecuted under section 1512 of this title specifically covering witness intimidation,and no longer fall under this section proscribing obstruction of justice by influencing or injuring an officer, jur-or, or witness, from which all references to witnesses had been deleted. U.S. v. Hernandez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1984,730 F.2d 895. Obstructing Justice 137
Counts of indictment charging defendant with engaging in misleading conduct in order to influence testimony ofdoctors evaluating his mental competence to stand trial and with obstructing justice by feigning diminished men-tal capacity during prosecution were not impermissibly duplicitous; first count charged conduct aimed at anotherfor purpose of influencing his testimony, whereas second count charged conduct of defendant himself. U.S. v.Bellomo, E.D.N.Y.2003, 263 F.Supp.2d 561. Indictment And Information 125(42)
18. ---- Threats to counsel, offenses within section
Newspaper editorial stating in effect that federal district attorney, though technically correct in his contentionthat alien's appeal unaccompanied by stay order was insufficient ground for further delay of alien's deportation,had moral obligation to intervene to permit appeal to be heard prior to deportation was not “threatening commu-nication” within this section proscribing threatening communication impeding officer in United States court indischarge of his duty, with result that even if statute provided a civil remedy the attorney's action against news-paper did not arise under law of United States within section 1331 of Title 28 giving federal district courts ori-ginal jurisdiction in such an action. Mainelli v. Providence Journal Co., C.A.1 (R.I.) 1962, 312 F.2d 3. FederalCourts 192
The carrying of weapons into the room of an examiner in chancery of the circuit [now district] court in thecourse of an examination in a pending cause and threatening the life of one of the counsel, resulting in the ad-journment of the hearing, constituted an offense under R.S. § 5399. Sharon v. Hill, C.C.Cal.1885, 24 F. 726, 11Sawy. 122.
19. ---- Miscellaneous offenses, offenses within section
This section's proscription against corrupt endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration ofjustice is not limited to impeding or threatening conduct, and therefore, the principle of ejusdem generis did notpreclude the conviction of defendant who allegedly attempted to warn the target of a valid search warrant in or-der to prevent discovery and seizure of a quantity of heroin. U. S. v. Brown, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1982, 688 F.2d 596.Obstructing Justice 118
Attempt by defendant to get possession of automobile purchased with stolen money did not fall within this sec-tion proscribing obstructing the “due administration of justice” where automobile had not become involved inspecific judicial proceeding and no threats or force were involved. U. S. v. Metcalf, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1970, 435F.2d 754. Obstructing Justice 108
Former provisions of this section making it a crime to obstruct or impede due administration of justice throughinfluencing or injuring officers, jurors, or witnesses was not violated by defendant merely because he regularlyassociated with woman who, by the terms of her probation, was prohibited from having anything to do with him.Haili v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1958, 260 F.2d 744. Obstructing Justice 111(1)
Conduct of defendant in suggesting to another that if such other would pay defendant certain amount of moneydefendant would undertake to see to it that such other person would get probation and would not serve one day
of sentence imposed upon him, without any attempt on part of defendant to write to, personally contact, or try tocontact any official who at any time had any connection with prosecution of such other person, did not constitutea violation of this section making it unlawful to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice. Ethridge v.U. S., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1958, 258 F.2d 234. Obstructing Justice 108
Under U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 4, 5, and 6, prohibition against unreasonable searches, and guaranties of dueprocess of law and effective representation by counsel, government agent's intrusion upon conferences betweenaccused and his counsel invalidated conviction under this section and D.C.Code 1951, § 22-701. Caldwell v.U.S., C.A.D.C.1953, 205 F.2d 879, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 355. Constitutional Law 4800; Criminal Law1853; Searches And Seizures 23
Advising another to disregard letter of district attorney requesting him to plead to information is not obstructingdue administration of justice. Rosner v. U.S., C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1926, 10 F.2d 675. Obstructing Justice 108
A surety on the bond of the accused, who corruptly persuaded the accused not to appear in court in accordancewith the condition of her recognizance, is guilty of obstructing the administration of justice as effectually as ifhe had been a stranger to the bond; the theory of the law that the accused is committed to the custody of his bailnot giving the latter a right to induce the accused to refrain from appearance. Astwood v. U.S., C.C.A.8 (Mo.)1924, 1 F.2d 639.
Charge that defendant gave disguised and misleading handwriting exemplars requested by grand jury wascharged conduct embraced by this section. U.S. v. Beatty, E.D.N.Y.1984, 587 F.Supp. 1325. Obstructing Justice
111(2)
The taking away of a vessel by her owner after she had been attached by a marshal, but while not in his actualcustody, or that of a keeper, was not an offense under Act Mar. 2, 1831, c. 99, § 2, 4 Stat. 488. U.S. v. Seeley,C.C.N.Y.1844, 27 F.Cas. 1010, No. 16248A.
Defendant could be indicted for obstruction of justice, after he caused baseless Uniform Commercial Code(UCC) financing statements to be filed against Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who was prosecutinghim for drug violations, despite claim that frivolous nature of statements, and resulting liens, precluded determ-ination that they could have any negative impact on AUSA. U.S. v. Ramirez, S.D.N.Y.2004, 2004 WL 203034,Unreported. Obstructing Justice 110
20. Separate and distinct offenses
Joinder of obstruction of justice count with preceding counts charging mail fraud and extortion in connectionwith a scheme to obtain property assessment reductions was proper when counts were “inextricably connected”because evidence of defendant's involvement in alleged extortion and mail fraud tended to establish a motive forobstruction of justice and evidence of his efforts to enforce another's grand jury testimony tended to establish hisguilty consciousness of illegal payoffs. U. S. v. Berardi, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1982, 675 F.2d 894. Indictment And In-formation 130
Conduct may be violative of this section providing penalty for obstruction of justice and also violative of section401 of this title. U. S. v. Walasek, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1975, 527 F.2d 676. Contempt 6; Obstructing Justice108
This section proscribing any endeavor to influence juror corruptly or by threats or force defines an offense sep-arate and distinct from that defined in section 201 of this title proscribing offer or promise of anything of valueto public official with intent to influence official act. U.S. v. DeAlesandro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 361 F.2d 694,certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74. Indictment And Information 129(1); Obstruct-ing Justice 109
Conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstruction of justice are separate offenses in that each requires proof of factexclusive of the other. U.S. v. Osticco, M.D.Pa.1984, 580 F.Supp. 484, affirmed 738 F.2d 424, certiorari denied105 S.Ct. 904, 469 U.S. 1158, 83 L.Ed.2d 919, affirmed 738 F.2d 426. Conspiracy 28(3)
21. Contempt of court
Former section 241 of this title did not include the power to punish for contempt under former section 385 ofTitle 28 [now section 401 of this title]. Ex parte Savin, U.S.Cal.1889, 9 S.Ct. 699, 131 U.S. 267, 33 L.Ed. 150.See, also, U.S. v. Huff, D.C.Ga.1913, 206 F. 700; Ex parte McLeod, D.C.Ala.1903, 120 F. 130.
Alien's offense of contempt of court was one “relating to obstruction of justice,” and thus an “aggravatedfelony” for which he could be deported; alien, who was advised by the district court that he had been grantedimmunity from prosecution, informed that the grand jury was investigating possible criminal activity andwarned that he would be prosecuted if he failed to testify, refused to testify before grand jury. Alwan v. Ash-croft, C.A.5 2004, 388 F.3d 507. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 273
This section is contempt statute allowing punishment of actions taken with specific intent to impede administra-tion of justice; so long as defendant has such specific intent he may not circumvent court's contempt power bypressing empty technicalities. U. S. v. Simmons, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 591 F.2d 206.
This section which does not forbid interference with doing “justice” in sense of “fairness” and “rightness,” al-though undoubtedly it has effect to do so, but instead forbids interferences with the “administration of justice,”is a contempt statute and as such is directed at disruptions of orderly procedure and thus whether defendants' ac-tion in selling transcripts of grand jury testimony had any ultimate effect on outcome of grand jury investigationwas wholly irrelevant; question was whether they disturbed procedure of the investigation. U. S. v. Howard,C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 569 F.2d 1331, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 116, 439 U.S. 834, 58 L.Ed.2d 130. ObstructingJustice 111(2)
This section is designed not only to protect participants in judicial proceedings but also to prevent miscarriagesof justice; this section is also a contempt statute, part of legislative scheme to divide contempts between thoseoccurring in court, or very near, and those taking place away from court. U. S. v. Walasek, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1975,527 F.2d 676. Obstructing Justice 103
That defendant may have been guilty of contempt, or some other crime, with respect to alteration of documentssought by grand jury subpoena duces tecum, did not support conviction for obstructing justice. U. S. v. Ryan,C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 455 F.2d 728. Obstructing Justice 131
This section prohibits contemptuous conduct away from court. U. S. v. Essex, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1969, 407 F.2d 214. Obstructing Justice 108
False testimony alone does not amount to contempt of court, there must be added to essential element of perjurythe further element of obstruction to court in performance of its duty, and presence of such obstruction must beclearly shown in every case where power to punish for contempt is exerted. U. S. v. Campbell, W.D.Pa.1972,350 F.Supp. 213. Contempt 13
II. ELEMENTS OF OFFENSES
<Subdivision Index>
Generally 51Corruptly 52Customs Service investigation, judicial proceedings 62Endeavor 53-55
Endeavor - Generally 53Endeavor - Relevance 54Endeavor - Success of endeavor 55
Essential elements which must be alleged in indictment for violation of omnibus clause of statute prohibiting ob-struction of justice are that there was pending judicial proceeding, that defendant had knowledge or notice ofpending proceeding, and that defendant acted corruptly with specific intent to obstruct or impede proceeding ordue administration of justice. U.S. v. Neal, C.A.5 (La.) 1992, 951 F.2d 630. Obstructing Justice 164(2)
In prosecution for violation of this section prohibiting person from corruptly endeavoring to influence, intimid-ate, or impede witness in federal court or influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice, govern-ment need only prove, to obtain the conviction, that, as to each of three persons named in indictment, defendanthad corruptly endeavored either to influence, intimidate, or impede him as witness in pending cases and that de-fendant had corruptly endeavored either to influence, or obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice byfiling of the allegedly false affidavit and petition. Smith v. U.S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1956, 234 F.2d 385. IndictmentAnd Information 179; Obstructing Justice 165
52. Corruptly, elements of offenses
Requirement that endeavor to obstruct justice must be made “corruptly,” generally means government mustshow that defendant knowingly and intentionally took action from which obstruction of justice was reasonablyforeseeable result. U.S. v. Barfield, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 999 F.2d 1520. Obstructing Justice 109
Statute prohibiting obstructing due administration of justice has mens rea requirement that limits scope to thosewho “corruptly” or intentionally seek to obstruct justice; this requires that one impede due administration ofjustice with general intent of knowledge as well as specific intent of purpose to obstruct. U.S. v. Bashaw, C.A.6(Tenn.) 1992, 982 F.2d 168. Obstructing Justice 109
Term “corruptly” in omnibus clause of obstruction of justice statute describes specific intent of crime and canvary in meaning with context of prosecution. U.S. v. Thomas, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1990, 916 F.2d 647. ObstructingJustice 109
Under obstructing justice statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1503], offending conduct must be prompted, at least in part, bya corrupt motive and, if there is a fair doubt as to whether defendants' conduct is embraced within the prohibi-tion, policy of lenity requires that doubt be resolved in favor of the accused. U.S. v. Brand, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1985,775 F.2d 1460. Obstructing Justice 109
Word “corruptly” as used in this section means that act must be done with purpose of obstructing justice. U. S.v. Rasheed, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1981, 663 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1031, 454 U.S. 1157, 71 L.Ed.2d 315.Obstructing Justice 109
Term “corruptly”, as used in this section, does not superimpose a special and additional element of the offensesuch as a desire to undermine the moral character of a juror; rather, it is directed to the effort to bring about aparticular result such as affecting the verdict of a jury or the testimony of a witness and such is per se an ob-
struction of justice. U. S. v. Ogle, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1979, 613 F.2d 233, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 87, 449 U.S.825, 66 L.Ed.2d 28, rehearing denied 101 S.Ct. 594, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L.Ed.2d 487. Obstructing Justice143
Under this section the endeavor, whether successful or not, is the gist of the offense and there is no requirementthat any sort of money or other consideration be received before the endeavor can be considered corrupt. U. S. v.Cioffi, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1974, 493 F.2d 1111, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 195, 419 U.S. 917, 42 L.Ed.2d 155. Ob-structing Justice 136
“Corrupt” in this section means for evil or wicked purpose. U. S. v. Ryan, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 455 F.2d 728. Ob-structing Justice 109
Any endeavor to influence a witness or to impede and obstruct justice falls within connotation of the word“corruptly”, as used in former section 241 of this title. Broadbent v. United States, C.C.A.10 (Utah) 1945, 149F.2d 580. Obstructing Justice 139
Where defendant had for a price offered to procure a light sentence for one who had been convicted and was en-deavoring to persuade assistant district attorney to be lenient for reasons falsely assigned, defendant's endeavorwas “corrupt” because it was a fraud, and because defendant was actually working for himself when in appear-ance he was working for person awaiting sentence, it being as corrupt to persuade a public officer by lies as bybribes, and to influence by fraud is not far afield from influencing by “threats or force” also prohibited byformer section 241 of this title. U.S. v. Polakoff, C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1941, 121 F.2d 333, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct.107, 314 U.S. 626, 86 L.Ed. 503. Obstructing Justice 118
The word “corruptly” is capable of different meanings in different connections, and as used in former section241 of this title any endeavor to impede and obstruct the due administration of justice in the matter under invest-igation is corrupt. Bosselman v. U.S., C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1917, 239 F. 82, 152 C.C.A. 132.
Former Secretary of Interior could be indicted for violating statute prohibiting obstruction of justice, in connec-tion with giving of alleged false testimony before grand jury, without government being required to charge thatSecretary had engaged in “transitive” conduct intended to corrupt another person. U.S. v. Watt, D.D.C.1995, 911F.Supp. 538. Obstructing Justice 164(5)
In former provisions of this section which provided that whoever “corruptly” endeavored to influence, intimid-ate or impede any witness, juror or officer in or of any court was guilty of obstructing justice, term “corruptly”did not mean any endeavor to influence jurist; allocution for leniency vel non to sentencing judge in open courtcannot have been construed as “corruptly” endeavoring to influence sentencing judge. U. S. v. Fasolino,W.D.N.Y.1978, 449 F.Supp. 586, affirmed 586 F.2d 939. Obstructing Justice 143
“Corruptly” is capable of different meanings in different connections, and in this section, includes any endeavorto influence a witness or to impede and obstruct justice. U. S. v. Cohen, D.C.Conn.1962, 202 F.Supp. 587. Ob-
In the provision of former section 241 of this title as to endeavor to influence a petit juror, the use of the word“endeavor” avoided the technical difficulties which would have been involved by using the word “attempt,” anddefendant, who visited the wife of a petit juror and conveyed to her an intimation that the juror would have beenpaid for returning a verdict favorable to one accused of an offense, was guilty of the endeavor, though his actshad not progressed far enough to amount to an attempt, since, under such section, it was the endeavor that waspunished, and not its success. U.S. v. Russell, U.S.Ill.1921, 41 S.Ct. 260, 255 U.S. 138, 65 L.Ed. 553. Bribery
1(2)
“Omnibus” clause of obstruction of justice statute, which applies to one who corruptly influences, obstructs, orimpedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, due administration of justice does not require proof thatdefendant actually influenced court officer; instead, government must only prove that defendant acted with in-tent to influence judicial proceedings, such that defendant at least undertook action from which obstruction ofjustice was reasonably foreseeable result. U.S. v. Atkin, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1997, 107 F.3d 1213, post-conviction re-lief denied 80 F.Supp.2d 779. Obstructing Justice 109
Omnibus clause of obstruction of justice statute encompasses any act committed in corrupt manner in endeavorto impede or obstruct justice, and government need not prove that administration of justice was actually obstruc-ted or impeded; “endeavor” requirement is satisfied and offense is complete upon any effort or assay to obstructjustice or conduct in which natural and probable effect would be interference with due administration of justice.U.S. v. Barfield, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 999 F.2d 1520. Obstructing Justice 108; Obstructing Justice 110
It is an endeavor to obstruct justice for one who has received a grand jury subpoena and turned over documentspursuant to that subpoena to fabricate records to provide an innocent gloss to the records already before thegrand jury; defendant's preparation of false minutes, for a meeting which never took place, after he had submit-ted certain documents to grand jury violated this section where the minutes were prepared to provide an innocentexplanation for some of the documents submitted to the grand jury. U.S. v. McComb, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1984, 744F.2d 555. Obstructing Justice 131
Term “endeavor,” as used in indictment charging that defendant corruptly did “endeavor” to influence a memberof a federal grand jury, was interchangeable with the term “willful” and charged an intentional act. U. S. v.Haas, C.A.5 (Ala.) 1978, 583 F.2d 216, rehearing denied 588 F.2d 829, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 1788, 440 U.S.981, 60 L.Ed.2d 240. Obstructing Justice 109
Telling third party to offer bribe to potential juror is corrupt “endeavor to influence” within this section. U. S. v.Osborn, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 350 F.2d 497, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 644, 382 U.S. 1023, 15 L.Ed.2d 538, af-firmed 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L.Ed.2d 394, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17 L.Ed.2d813. Obstructing Justice 143
The solicitation of a juror is an “endeavor” to influence him within meaning of this section penalizing anyonewho corruptly “endeavors” to influence or impede any grand or petit juror. Kong v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1954,216 F.2d 665. Criminal Law 45.35; Obstructing Justice 143
The word “endeavor” described any effort or essay to do or accomplish the evil purpose that former section 241of this title was enacted to prevent. Broadbent v. United States, C.C.A.10 (Utah) 1945, 149 F.2d 580.
The endeavor need not be accompanied by payment or promises of payment of money as such an interpretationwould quite unreasonably restrict the obvious purpose of the legislation. Bosselman v. U.S., C.C.A.2 (N.Y.)1917, 239 F. 82, 152 C.C.A. 132.
Counselling an individual to lie when appearing as a witness before a grand jury is an “endeavor” under the ob-struction of justice statute. U.S. v. Bucey, N.D.Ill.1988, 691 F.Supp. 1077. Obstructing Justice 139
54. ---- Relevance, endeavor, elements of offenses
Evidence that defendant was not reprimanded by his employer, had been promoted to company's executiveboard, and had not been called as witness or interviewed in connection with grand jury or Securities and Ex-change Commission (SEC) investigations, was relevant to government's position, that defendant's lie to top com-pany lawyer about whether he knew about government investigation that occurred two years previously wasconsciousness of guilt, in defendant's trial on obstruction charges for sending email to subordinates to deletecomputer files, since evidence had tendency to show that defendant was simply mistaken when he spoke to toplawyer. U.S. v. Quattrone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 441 F.3d 153, mandamus dismissed 224 Fed.Appx. 106, 2007WL 1475627. Obstructing Justice 169
In order to convict defendant of obstruction of justice by altering documents requested by grand jury subpoena,government did not have to prove, as an element of the crime, that alterations were relevant to grand jury's in-vestigation. U.S. v. Mullins, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1994, 22 F.3d 1365. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
55. ---- Success of endeavor, elements of offenses
Requirement that there be a nexus in time, causation, or logic between act and judicial proceedings under ob-struction of justice statute requires only that charged conduct have natural and probable effect of interfering withdue administration of justice; success is not necessary, and an endeavor suffices. U.S. v. Erickson, C.A.10(Utah) 2009, 561 F.3d 1150, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 173, 558 U.S. 865, 175 L.Ed.2d 109, post-conviction re-lief denied 2011 WL 1226113. Obstructing Justice 108
“Endeavor” element of offense of obstruction of justice describes any attempt or effort to obstruct justice; it isnot necessary that individual succeed in actually obstructing justice to violate statute. U.S. v. Thomas, C.A.11(Ga.) 1990, 916 F.2d 647. Obstructing Justice 110
Defendant's forged letters to sentencing judge in another defendant's proceeding satisfied statutory requirementfor attempt to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice notwithstanding the fact that for-gery was discovered prior to sentencing, as letters purporting to be from other defendant's victims could have af-fected sentencing if falsity had not been discovered. U.S. v. Barber, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 881 F.2d 345, rehearingdenied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1956, 495 U.S. 922, 109 L.Ed.2d 318. Obstructing Justice 131
This section proscribed endeavors to obstruct, and actual obstruction is not an element of proof. U. S. v.Rasheed, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1981, 663 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1031, 454 U.S. 1157, 71 L.Ed.2d 315.Obstructing Justice 110
For purposes of prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct and impede due administration ofjustice, endeavor need not be successful. U. S. v. Tedesco, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1980, 635 F.2d 902, certiorari denied101 S.Ct. 3112, 452 U.S. 962, 69 L.Ed.2d 974. Obstructing Justice 110
For purposes of prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, successor lack of success in endeavoring to influence witness was not in itself determining factor in deciding whetherformer provisions of this section had been violated, as former provisions required only proof of an endeavor, ir-respective of its success, and made that act a crime if the endeavor was a corrupt one. U. S. v. Baker, C.A.4(N.C.) 1979, 611 F.2d 964. Obstructing Justice 136
Success is not prerequisite to conviction for obstruction of justice, and all that must be proved is that defendant“endeavored” to obstruct justice. U. S. v. McCarty, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1979, 611 F.2d 220, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct.1319, 445 U.S. 930, 63 L.Ed.2d 764. Obstructing Justice 110
One may endeavor to obstruct justice without actually succeeding in that endeavor. U. S. v. Shoup, C.A.3 (Pa.)1979, 608 F.2d 950. Obstructing Justice 110
Within purview of this section providing penalty for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede jurors, gistof offense is corrupt endeavor, which includes noncoercive but corrupt attempt to influence, and success is notessential. U. S. v. Jackson, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1979, 607 F.2d 1219, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1032, 444 U.S. 1080,62 L.Ed.2d 763. Obstructing Justice 143
In order to be convicted of obstructing justice, defendant need only have had knowledge or notice that success inhis actions would likely result in an obstruction of justice; notice is provided by the reasonable foreseeability ofthe natural and probable consequences of his acts. U. S. v. Neiswender, C.A.4 (Md.) 1979, 590 F.2d 1269, certi-orari denied 99 S.Ct. 2410, 441 U.S. 963, 60 L.Ed.2d 1068. Obstructing Justice 109
Where offeree was on jury panel expected to try criminal case at time defendant endeavored to bribe him, un-lawful endeavors were not rendered lawful because jury panel of which offeree was member did not eventuallytry the case. U. S. v. Osborn, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1969, 415 F.2d 1021, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 567, 396 U.S. 1015,24 L.Ed.2d 506. Bribery 3
It is not necessary that defendant succeed in his attempt to unlawfully endeavor to influence a witness undersubpoena to appear before a grand jury for a conviction for obstructing justice to be sustained. U. S. v. Knohl,C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1967, 379 F.2d 427, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 472, 389 U.S. 973, 19 L.Ed.2d 465. ObstructingJustice 136
Success or failure of endeavor to obstruct justice is immaterial to question of guilt of offense of endeavoring toobstruct justice. Knight v. U. S., C.A.5 (Ga.) 1962, 310 F.2d 305. Obstructing Justice 110
Any corrupt endeavor to influence any party or witness, whether successful or not, constitutes obstruction ofjustice prohibited by this section respecting the influencing or injuring of an officer, juror or witness. Roberts v.U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1956, 239 F.2d 467. Obstructing Justice 135
Any corrupt endeavor to influence, intimidate or impede any party or witness, commissioner [now magistrate],or any grand or petit juror, etc., whether successful or not, constitutes obstruction of justice prohibited by thissection. Catrino v. U. S., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1949, 176 F.2d 884. Obstructing Justice 108
Success in an endeavor to obstruct justice is not a prerequisite to prosecution for influencing or injuring officer,juror or witness. U.S. v. Cortese, M.D.Pa.1983, 554 F.Supp. 1227. Obstructing Justice 110
Under this section forbidding the corrupt influencing, obstructing or impeding of due administration of justice,success is not the criterion, although it may aggravate the offense, and this section condemns any effort or essayto do or accomplish the evil purpose that it was enacted to prevent. U S v. Siegel, S.D.N.Y.1957, 152 F.Supp.370. Obstructing Justice 108
This section proscribing corrupt endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice wasenacted for purpose of safeguarding due administration of justice, and it matters not that endeavor was abso-lutely ineffective; and, accordingly, it was immaterial whether person to whom defendant allegedly gave moneyfor purposes condemned by this section was a prospective witness. U. S. v. Mannarino, W.D.Pa.1956, 149F.Supp. 351. Obstructing Justice 103
This section denouncing the various activities aimed at interfering with the due administration of justice con-demns not only the corrupt obstruction of the administration of justice but also any endeavor to corrupt the dueadministration of justice, and corrupt endeavor spells out the crime, although success may aggravate the offense.U S v. Solow, S.D.N.Y.1956, 138 F.Supp. 812. Obstructing Justice 108
This section prescribing punishment for endeavoring to influence witness or any grand or petit juror is not direc-ted at success in corrupting witness or juror, but at endeavor to do so, and success may aggravate accused's guilt,but is not condition thereof nor necessary to complete crime. U S v. Brothman, S.D.N.Y.1950, 93 F.Supp. 924.Bribery 1(2)
56. Force, threats, or violence, elements of offenses
Force or threats need not be used before there is a corrupt effort to influence a juror for purpose of offense ofknowingly and corruptly endeavoring to influence, impede and obstruct the due administration of justice. U. S.v. Ogle, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1979, 613 F.2d 233, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 87, 449 U.S. 825, 66 L.Ed.2d 28, rehear-ing denied 101 S.Ct. 594, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L.Ed.2d 487. Obstructing Justice 143
Crime of corruptly endeavoring to influence the court or affect the due administration of justice is one that canbe committed merely by words. U. S. v. Fasolino, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 586 F.2d 939. Obstructing Justice108
This section does not require that there be proof of direct threats or actual use of force. U. S. v. Cioffi, C.A.2(N.Y.) 1974, 493 F.2d 1111, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 195, 419 U.S. 917, 42 L.Ed.2d 155. Obstructing Justice
136
One may “obstruct justice” by merely failing to aid, but to “obstruct administration of justice” requiressomething more than nonaction. Rosner v. U.S., C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1926, 10 F.2d 675. Obstructing Justice113
The expressions “obstruct ” and “impede” refer only to direct acts of violence or menace, disturbing the ordinaryfunctions of the court. U.S. v. Seeley, C.C.N.Y.1844, 27 F.Cas. 1010, No. 16248A.
57. Intent or purpose, elements of offenses
Statute prohibiting “endeavor” to obstruct due administration of justice makes conduct punishable if defendantacts with intent to obstruct justice and in manner likely to obstruct justice, even if he or she is foiled in someway, but use of term does not require criminal liability for any act done with intent to obstruct justice. U.S. v.Aguilar, U.S.Cal.1995, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 515 U.S. 593, 132 L.Ed.2d 520. Obstructing Justice 109
The intent to obstruct the administration of justice could not be imputed from the intent to commit the unlawfulact of compelling a master to discharge his servants, and the servants to leave the service of their master in viol-ation of an injunction, since the unintended wrong was not a natural and probable consequence of the intendedwrongful act, and the intended wrongful act was not an offense against the United States, but against a separatesovereignty, the State of Idaho. Pettibone v. U.S., U.S.Idaho 1893, 13 S.Ct. 542, 148 U.S. 197, 37 L.Ed. 419.Obstructing Justice 109
Nexus in time, causation, or logic existed between defendants' falsification of backdated contract extensions forpublic construction projects and federal grand jury investigation, as supported convictions for obstructing andimpeding a federal grand jury; defendants created false documents to deliver to grand jury in response to its sub-poena, and documents compromised grand jury's ability to make its own determination whether work was au-thorized. U.S. v. Erickson, C.A.10 (Utah) 2009, 561 F.3d 1150, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 173, 558 U.S. 865,175 L.Ed.2d 109, post-conviction relief denied 2011 WL 1226113. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
District court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding internal discussions by company's leg-al compliance lawyers concerning distribution of broad document preservation notices, in defendant's trial onobstruction charges for sending email to subordinates to delete computer files after becoming aware of govern-ment investigations, since such notices were never communicated to defendant; fact that company's in-housecounsel did not issue document preservation notices could not absolve defendant from criminal liability, andevidence did not have any bearing on question of whether defendant acted with innocent or with wrongful intent.U.S. v. Quattrone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 441 F.3d 153, mandamus dismissed 224 Fed.Appx. 106, 2007 WL1475627. Obstructing Justice 169
In order to convict someone of violating obstruction of justice statute, government must prove that there was ajudicial proceeding underway that defendant's actions were intended to obstruct. U.S. v. Mullins, C.A.6 (Mich.)1994, 22 F.3d 1365. Obstructing Justice 108
To prove violation of statute proscribing obstruction of justice, the government must show that each defendantknew of pending judicial proceeding and specifically intended to impede its administration. U.S. v. Guzzino,C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 810 F.2d 687, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1957, 481 U.S. 1030, 95 L.Ed.2d 529. ObstructingJustice 109
Obstruction of justice statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1503] contains a clear mens rea requirement that limits its scope tothose who corruptly or intentionally seek to obstruct the due administration of justice, and one must impede thedue administration of justice with the general intent of knowledge as well as the specific intent of purpose to ob-struct. U.S. v. Jeter, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1985, 775 F.2d 670, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1796, 475 U.S. 1142, 90L.Ed.2d 341. Obstructing Justice 109
Actual contact or even attempt to contact person having authority to affect result need not be shown to prove vi-olation of this section proscribing corrupt endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration ofjustice; instead, while term “corruptly endeavors” requires intent, such intent may be inferred from proof thatdefendant had knowledge or notice that his corrupt actions would obstruct justice then actually being admin-istered. U.S. v. Buffalano, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1984, 727 F.2d 50. Obstructing Justice 108; Obstructing Justice
109
Evil purpose in the sense of a fiendish motive is not a necessary element of offense of knowingly and corruptlyendeavoring to influence, impede and obstruct the due administration of justice, such as by attempting to influ-ence a juror. U. S. v. Ogle, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1979, 613 F.2d 233, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 87, 449 U.S. 825, 66L.Ed.2d 28, rehearing denied 101 S.Ct. 594, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L.Ed.2d 487. Obstructing Justice 109
Defendant who called the attorney representing a defendant in a criminal trial and told him that, for $20,000, hecould insure the trial would come out the right way could be convicted of obstructing justice even though thegovernment conceded that the defendant's primary intent was to defraud, as the natural consequences of the de-fendant's acts, had he convinced the attorney that a juror really was under his control, would have been to reducethe attorney's efforts in defending his client. U. S. v. Neiswender, C.A.4 (Md.) 1979, 590 F.2d 1269, certioraridenied 99 S.Ct. 2410, 441 U.S. 963, 60 L.Ed.2d 1068. Obstructing Justice 109
Defendant's failure to use the word “kill” did not require his acquittal of charge of obstructing justice; whetherdefendant actually desired or intended that eyewitness to offense for which defendant was awaiting trial bekilled was peripheral to such offense and government presented substantial evidence that defendant endeavoredto obstruct justice by, in some manner, preventing the witness from testifying. U. S. v. Brinklow, C.A.10 (Colo.)1977, 560 F.2d 1008. Obstructing Justice 138(1)
Finding of specific intent to interfere with witness in pending judicial proceeding is essential element of offenseof obstructing justice, but it may be established by circumstantial evidence. U. S. v. White, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1977,557 F.2d 233. Obstructing Justice 135; Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Specific intent to impede administration of justice is essential element of offense of obstructing justice. U. S. v.Ryan, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 455 F.2d 728. Obstructing Justice 109
Act of telling third party to offer bribe to potential juror is not insulated from prosecution as jury tampering byfailure or by lack of actual intent on part of third party ever to make the approach. U. S. v. Osborn, C.A.6(Tenn.) 1965, 350 F.2d 497, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 644, 382 U.S. 1023, 15 L.Ed.2d 538, affirmed 87 S.Ct.429, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L.Ed.2d 394, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17 L.Ed.2d 813. ObstructingJustice 109
Specific intent must exist in order for there to be violation of this section prohibiting obstructing justice andsuch specific intent must be to do some act which tends to influence, obstruct or impede due administration ofjustice. Knight v. U. S., C.A.5 (Ga.) 1962, 310 F.2d 305. Obstructing Justice 109
In order to constitute the offense of influencing or injuring an officer, juror or witness, it is not sufficient merelyto establish an assault, but it must be shown that the assault was made with intent on the part of the assailant topunish victim for his past conduct or to intimidate him in connection with impeding proceedings. Ferina v. U. S.,C.A.8 (Mo.) 1962, 302 F.2d 95, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 35, 371 U.S. 819, 9 L.Ed.2d 59. Obstructing Justice
135; Obstructing Justice 143
In prosecution for endeavoring to influence or impede a juror the purpose of defendant in seeking to influencethe juror is immaterial. Kong v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1954, 216 F.2d 665. Criminal Law 45.35; Obstruct-ing Justice 143
Conduct of alien, a native of Cameroon, in purposefully submitting forged adoption certificate, decree, and letterto court in support of his naturalization application, was sufficient to establish intent to obstruct justice by influ-encing an officer, so as to constitute an unlawful act that barred a finding of good moral character necessary toprevail in naturalization proceeding; alien's conduct impeded investigation because it required special agent toconduct a two month investigation into legitimacy of documents, and alien had engaged in acts of forgery in thepast. Etape v. Napolitano, D.Md.2009, 664 F.Supp.2d 498. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 703(2)
If a defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect a pending judicial or grand jury proceeding,
he necessarily lacks the requisite intent to obstruct to sustain conviction under omnibus clause of obstruction ofjustice statute. U.S. v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., D.Conn.2003, 260 F.Supp.2d 470. Obstructing Justice109
To find that defendant had intent to obstruct, impede, or influence due administration of justice, evidence neednot exclude all possibilities that defendant did not act with corrupt motive, only the reasonable ones. U.S. v.Barfield, S.D.Ala.1991, 781 F.Supp. 754, reversed 999 F.2d 1520. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
In order to satisfy obstruction of justice state of mind requirement, Government must prove that defendant's solepurpose was to contribute to bringing about one of events that constituted obstruction of justice. U.S. v. La-Rouche Campaign, D.Mass.1988, 695 F.Supp. 1265. Obstructing Justice 109
58. Judicial proceedings, elements of offenses--Generally
Catchall provision of obstruction of justice statute requires “nexus” in time, causation or logic between act andjudicial proceedings and, thus, uttering false statements to investigating agent who might or might not testify be-fore grand jury is insufficient; false testimony to investigator who has not been subpoenaed to appear beforegrand jury would not have “natural and probable effect” of interfering with due administration of justice. U.S. v.Aguilar, U.S.Cal.1995, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 515 U.S. 593, 132 L.Ed.2d 520. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
The obstruction of the due administration of justice in any court of the United States, corruptly or by threats orforce, is indeed made criminal, but such obstruction can only arise when justice is being administered. Pettibonev. U.S., U.S.Idaho 1893, 13 S.Ct. 542, 148 U.S. 197, 37 L.Ed. 419.
Defendant interfered with “judicial proceeding,” within meaning of statute prohibiting obstruction of justice, byremoving gold coins from his safe deposit box at bank after court had issued order stating that government hadownership interest in coins, or at least right to possession or control over coins, although government had askedbank to maintain but freeze box pending outcome of civil action against defendant. U.S. v. Sussman, C.A.3(N.J.) 2013, 709 F.3d 155. Obstructing Justice 111(1)
Federal obstruction of justice statute is limited to obstruction of judicial proceeding. U.S. v. Van Engel, C.A.7(Wis.) 1993, 15 F.3d 623, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2163, 511 U.S. 1142, 128 L.Ed.2d 886. Obstructing Justice
111(1)
The omnibus clause of this section cannot be construed to proscribe conduct which takes place wholly outsidethe context of an ongoing judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and thus defendant, who allegedly attempted tothwart target of valid search warrant in order to prevent discovery and seizure of quantity of heroin, could not beconvicted under this section. U. S. v. Brown, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1982, 688 F.2d 596. Obstructing Justice 108
This section is not applicable until, at the earliest, a complaint has been filed with a United States commissioner[now United States magistrate]. U. S. v. Metcalf, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1970, 435 F.2d 754.
The essence of perjury is that the untruthful testimony be given under oath, and falsehoods given before non-judicial inquiries are not within this section. U.S. v. Bufalino, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1960, 285 F.2d 408. ObstructingJustice 131; Perjury 8
The substantive offense punished by former section 241 of this title regarding the obstruction of due administra-tion of justice was the obstruction of justice or the endeavor to obstruct it before a United States commissioner[now United States magistrate] or in a court of the United States. U.S. v. Perlstein, C.C.A.3 (N.J.) 1942, 126F.2d 789, certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1106, 316 U.S. 678, 86 L.Ed. 1752. Obstructing Justice 108
The influencing of a juror was none the less a violation of former section 241 of this title because the cause wasa civil one to which the United States was not a party, since the proceeding being in a federal court, the justicebeing administered was the justice of the United States. Sneed v. U.S., C.C.A.5 (Tex.) 1924, 298 F. 911, certior-ari denied 44 S.Ct. 635, 265 U.S. 590, 68 L.Ed. 1195.
Obstruction of justice, consisting of alleged erasure of tape-recorded telephone meeting and submission ofaltered tape in state court proceedings, could not constitute predicate act for claim under Racketeer Influencedand Corrupt Organizations Act, as act did not relate to proceeding in a federal court. Bologna v. Allstate Ins.Co., E.D.N.Y.2001, 138 F.Supp.2d 310. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104
To establish violation of obstruction of justice clause of statute proscribing influencing officer or juror theremust be pending judicial proceeding, defendant must have knowledge or notice of that proceeding, and defend-ant must act corruptly with specific intent to obstruct justice or impeded proceeding in its due administration ofjustice. U.S. v. Jackson, D.Kan.1994, 850 F.Supp. 1481. Obstructing Justice 109
Embellished threats, delivered after defendant had consumed a few drinks, made to police chief who testifiedduring trial that defendant was a “good friend,” advising police chief to let third party out of jail or else “YouI'm going after personally,” and that “There will be bloodshed and we'll burn this town down,” was not “conductdesigned to interfere with process of arriving at an appropriate judgment in a pending case and which would dis-turb the ordinary and proper functions of the court,” within context of this section, where police chief hadalready turned over custody of third party to federal officials and had no remaining duties concerning thirdparty, and where statements of defendant could have in no way influenced the outcome of the trial involvingthird party. U. S. v. Knife, D.C.S.D.1974, 371 F.Supp. 1345. Obstructing Justice 123
Former provisions of this section which prohibited influencing witnesses condemned injurious acts upon a wit-ness before, during, or after trial. U. S. v. Verra, S.D.N.Y.1962, 203 F.Supp. 87. Obstructing Justice 136;Obstructing Justice 137; Obstructing Justice 142
59. ---- In-court conduct, judicial proceedings, elements of offenses
Defendant did not violate statute prohibiting obstructing due administration of justice by staring at jurors whilethey were in jury box during his brother's trial. U.S. v. Bashaw, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1992, 982 F.2d 168. ObstructingJustice 143
False statement did not have to be used in court or delivered to court officer to satisfy “endeavor” element in ob-struction of justice statute. U.S. v. Fields, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1988, 838 F.2d 1571, rehearing denied 845 F.2d 1032.Obstructing Justice 121
This section, pertaining to threatening a judge or prosecutor in the discharge of his duty reaches in-court con-duct, not just extrajudicial threats and conduct, even though such in-court conduct would also be summarily pun-ishable as contempt. U. S. v. Jones, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1981, 663 F.2d 567. Obstructing Justice 143
60. ---- Pending proceedings, judicial proceedings, elements of offenses
Judicial proceeding was pending as required for offense of obstruction of justice where, when defendant, whofailed to report to Probation Office as required under condition of supervised release and who fled the country,made threat to murder a judge, the Probation Office had filed a petition to revoke defendant's supervised releaseand a warrant had been issued for his arrest. U.S. v. Weber, C.A.9 (Alaska) 2003, 320 F.3d 1047. ObstructingJustice 111(1)
Even assuming omnibus clause of obstruction of justice statute included a “pending judicial proceeding” re-quirement, such requirement was met with respect to charges that defendant submitted false reports to UnitedStates Probation Office (USPO) in violation of a court order during term of supervised release; defendant's mis-conduct occurred while judicial proceeding was “pending” because the relevant conduct occurred prior to sen-tencing and within the time after sentencing for filing a request for reduction of sentence. U.S. v. Novak, C.A.8(Mo.) 2000, 217 F.3d 566, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 640, 531 U.S. 1043, 148 L.Ed.2d 546. Obstructing Justice
111(1)
For purposes of proving obstruction of justice charge, which alleged that defendant endeavored to influence andintimidate judge in the discharge of his duties, judge was still engaged in the discharge of his duties when de-fendant sent judge documents purporting to charge judge with crimes and to authorize judge's arrest, eventhough judge had already recused himself from defendant's bankruptcy case, where judge was still involved inadjudicating other cases, and the danger of defendant's actions lay in their potential to intimidate judge and todissuade him from zealous execution of his ongoing official duties. U.S. v. Fulbright, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1997, 105F.3d 443, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1836, 520 U.S. 1236, 137 L.Ed.2d 1041. Obstructing Justice 111(1)
Judicial proceeding was “pending,” against defendant, for purposes of convicting him of obstructing justicebased on his attempt to intimidate witness into lying for him; at time defendant approached witness, supersedingindictment had already been returned. U.S. v. Casel, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 995 F.2d 1299, certiorari denied 114S.Ct. 472, 510 U.S. 978, 126 L.Ed.2d 424, vacated 114 S.Ct. 1289, 510 U.S. 1188, 127 L.Ed.2d 644, certioraridenied 114 S.Ct. 1308, 510 U.S. 1197, 127 L.Ed.2d 659. Obstructing Justice 111(1); Obstructing Justice
137
Evidence that defendant made threatening statements to jurors who had served in his brother's criminal trial afterjurors completed their service and had been discharged was insufficient to support conviction for obstructingdue administration of justice, absent evidence that jurors would be part of pool of jurors to be called for sub-
sequent trials. U.S. v. Bashaw, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1992, 982 F.2d 168. Obstructing Justice 143; ObstructingJustice 170(1)
Trial court unreasonably limited inquiry into whether subpoenas were issued to secure presently contemplatedpresentation of evidence before grand jury, thus preventing obstruction of justice defendants from showing thatno judicial proceedings were pending at time they produced allegedly fabricated letter in response to subpoena;though grand jury was sitting at time United States Attorney obtained subpoenas, defendants were entitled toshow that subpoenas were not secured in contemplation that evidence would be presented to grand jury. U.S. v.Nelson, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1988, 852 F.2d 706, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 262, 488 U.S. 909, 102 L.Ed.2d 250. Ob-structing Justice 169
Evidence was sufficient to establish that assistant United States Attorney was engaged in “the discharge of hisduties” when defendant threatened him on the street after defendant's brother had been sentenced, thus support-ing conviction for threatening a federal officer engaged in discharge of his duties; attorney's involvement as pro-secutor in defendant's brother's case did not end when sentencing proceeding ended, because there remainedpossibility of appeal or postsentencing motions. U.S. v. Fernandez, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1988, 837 F.2d 1031, certioraridenied 109 S.Ct. 102, 488 U.S. 838, 102 L.Ed.2d 78. Extortion 39(2)
State troopers could be convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice in connection with alleged attempt to cover updeath of arrestee, although federal judicial proceeding was not yet pending; primary purpose of conspiracycharge was total prevention of judicial proceeding by deliberately concealing evidence that could form basis of afederal prosecution. U.S. v. Messerlian, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1987, 832 F.2d 778, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1291, 485U.S. 988, 99 L.Ed.2d 501. Conspiracy 28(3)
In prosecution for obstructing justice, judicial proceeding was pending at time defendant made false statementsto probation officer where, even though complaint had not actually been filed at time of the interview with theprobation officer, defendant had been in custody and had signed consent form agreeing to waive her right to trialand sentencing before district court judge before the interview took place. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Mares, C.A.9 (Cal.)1985, 752 F.2d 1485, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 3540, 473 U.S. 913, 87 L.Ed.2d 663. Obstructing Justice121
Evidence of steps taken by assistant United States attorney to secure witness' appearance before grand jury wassufficient to establish existence of a pending proceeding. U.S. v. Vesich, C.A.5 (La.) 1984, 724 F.2d 451, re-hearing denied 726 F.2d 168. Obstructing Justice 139; Obstructing Justice 170(7)
For purposes of this section proscribing obstruction of justice, criminal action remains pending in district courtuntil disposition is made of any direct appeal taken by defendant assigning error that could result in new trial. U.S. v. Johnson, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1979, 605 F.2d 729, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 677, 444 U.S. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 652.
A threat to a federal witness in violation of former provisions of this section must have related to possible testi-mony of witness in a pending federal proceeding. U. S. v. Baker, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1974, 494 F.2d 1262. Obstructing
The term “due administration of justice” in this section proscribing obstructing due administration of justice islimited to pending judicial proceedings. U. S. v. Metcalf, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1970, 435 F.2d 754. Obstructing Justice
111(1)
To demonstrate obstruction of justice, government must prove that there was pending judicial proceeding, thatdefendant had knowledge or notice of pending proceeding, and that defendant acted corruptly, i.e., with intent toinfluence, obstruct, impede that proceeding in its due administration of justice. State of W.Va. v. Moore,S.D.W.Va.1995, 897 F.Supp. 276. Obstructing Justice 109
District of Columbia police officer could not be charged with obstruction of justice under federal statute for al-legedly failing to turn in all of the counterfeit cocaine which he had seized, where there was no pending judicialproceeding in that, at time of officer's actions, no criminal charges had been filed and no grand jury investiga-tion was pending; it was not sufficient that, at that time, officer had every reason to believe that judicial proceed-ings would have been imminent. U.S. v. Smith, D.D.C.1990, 729 F.Supp. 1380. Obstructing Justice 132
There was no pending judicial proceeding known to individuals at time they allegedly obstructed justice by dis-closing information concerning pending drug investigation where, although federal grand jury was impaneled,no subpoenas had been issued and grand jury had not been apprised of drug investigation and there was little orno evidence showing individuals knew of federal grand jury proceeding. U.S. v. Ellis, S.D.Miss.1987, 652F.Supp. 1451. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
Indictment which charged defendant with obstruction of justice was not defective because there was no actionpending against him at time he sent threatening communications, since portion of this section which defendantwas charged with violating, an attempt “to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice,” isnot by its terms confined to situations in which an action is pending; in addition, even if section were so con-fined, federal courts were in fact still vested with jurisdiction over defendant's civil suit when communicationswere allegedly sent, since defendant was appealing matter at the time. U.S. v. Blohm, S.D.N.Y.1984, 585F.Supp. 1112. Obstructing Justice 123
To constitute an offense under this section proscribing use of threats and influence to obstruct due administra-tion of justice, act must be in relation to proceeding pending in federal court, and proceeding is not therepending until at least complaint has been filed with commissioner [now magistrate]. U. S. v. Scoratow,W.D.Pa.1956, 137 F.Supp. 620 Obstructing Justice 111(1)
A case is pending when a complaint is lodged with a commissioner [now magistrate] charging a violation of thelaws of the United States. U.S. v. Bittinger, W.D.Mo.1876, 24 F.Cas. 1149, No. 14598.
Pendency of criminal proceedings of some sort was essential to successful prosecution under former provisionsof this section which defined offense of influencing or injuring officer, juror or witness generally. U. S. v.
Ridgeway, ACMR 1982, 13 M.J. 742. Military Justice 790
61. ---- Grand jury investigations, judicial proceedings, elements of offenses
Defendants, who were convicted of obstructing and impeding a federal grand jury, failed to show that there wasno reasonable probability that documents sought by government, including contracts, invoices, and any otherdocuments relative to all transactions between county special services district and construction contractors,would produce information relevant to general subject of grand jury's investigation, as would render subpoenainvalid. U.S. v. Erickson, C.A.10 (Utah) 2009, 561 F.3d 1150, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 173, 558 U.S. 865,175 L.Ed.2d 109, post-conviction relief denied 2011 WL 1226113. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
Substantial evidence established that FBI was gathering and presenting evidence sporadically to grand jury in-vestigating union's activities, and thus that there was a pending judicial proceeding when defendant allegedlytold union member to lie to law enforcement, supporting his conviction for obstruction of justice; FBI servedunion with grand jury subpoena four years before indictment was returned, at that time defendant agreed withother members to cease attacks on movie theaters due to increased investigatory heat, union member participatedin several FBI interviews and recorded conversations with defendant and others to gather information related toattacks, and defendant was served with grand jury subpoena shortly after conversation in question was tape re-corded. U.S. v. Macari, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 453 F.3d 926, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 688, 549 U.S. 1054, 166L.Ed.2d 518. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Evidence that defendant had lied to grand jury with intent to impede due administration of justice supported de-fendant's conviction for obstruction of justice; defendant's conduct amounted to “corrupt” obstruction of due ad-ministration of justice. U.S. v. Russo, C.A.D.C.1997, 104 F.3d 431, 322 U.S.App.D.C. 388. Obstructing Justice
170(7)
There was evidence from which properly instructed jury could find defendant guilty of obstruction of justice;reasonable juror could conclude that defendant had bought marijuana from seller with whom he had substantialbusiness relationship, and that defendant was refusing to testify before grand jury in order to protect relation-ship. U.S. v. Banks, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 988 F.2d 1106. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
Finding that defendant knew of grand jury's investigation when he advised witness to remain silent was suppor-ted by evidence, so that defendant was properly convicted for obstruction of justice, where long before defend-ant's final effort to persuade witness to remain silent, investigation by grand jury was known to public in generaland to those who had participated with defendant in illegal job-selling activity. U.S. v. Capo, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1986,791 F.2d 1054, on rehearing 817 F.2d 947. Obstructing Justice 138(1); Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Specific intent to impede grand jury investigation is essential element of obstruction of justice conviction under18 U.S.C.A. § 1503; however, that intent may be inferred by jury from all surrounding facts and circumstances.U.S. v. Petzold, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 788 F.2d 1478. Obstructing Justice 109
Investigation by law enforcement agency ripens into pending grand jury investigation for purposes of this sec-
tion if officials of such agency apply for, and cause to be issued, subpoenas to testify before sitting grand jury; itis not required that grand jury be cognizant of the subpoena or otherwise involved in the investigation. U. S. v.Simmons, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 591 F.2d 206. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
Grand jury investigation constituted requisite criminal proceeding for purposes of defendants' convictions ofconspiring to obstruct the “due administration of justice,” in connection with their attempt to sell transcripts ofsecret grand jury testimony, under this section which forbids interference with the administration of justice andwhich requires as a prerequisite a pending criminal proceeding. U. S. v. Howard, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 569 F.2d1331, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 116, 439 U.S. 834, 58 L.Ed.2d 130. Conspiracy 34
Where investigation of business practices of corporation had been assigned by United States attorney's office toregularly sitting grand jury, and witness had been called to testify and, on witness' refusal, petition for immunityhad been filed and granted, grand jury proceeding was “pending” for purposes of this section. U. S. v. Walasek,C.A.3 (Pa.) 1975, 527 F.2d 676. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
Grand jury, which was treated by everyone concerned as grand jury and which, pursuant to stipulation at trial oncharges of obstructing justice, was referred to as active and sitting grand jury had power to indict and thus couldhave been subject of obstruction, even though acting beyond its term. Shimon v. U. S., C.A.D.C.1965, 352 F.2d449, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 152. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
Refusal to testify before grand jury can support conviction for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct, impede or in-fluence due administration of justice, since such refusal would prevent grand jury from performing its investig-ative function. U.S. v. Barfield, S.D.Ala.1991, 781 F.Supp. 754, reversed 999 F.2d 1520. Obstructing Justice
140
This section proscribing offense of endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justicerequires that there be an obstruction of a judicial proceeding such as a grand jury investigation. U. S. v. Hub-bard, D.C.D.C.1979, 474 F.Supp. 64. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
Where duly impaneled grand jury had issued subpoenas to produce toll telephone records charged to defendant'stelephones and thereafter issued subpoenas to compel defendant and certain of his employees to testify and tobring certain documents, grand jury investigation was pending, for purposes of establishing offense of obstruct-ing justice in connection with defendant's ensuing conduct, though subpoenas were issued on application of as-sistant United States attorney and grand jury had not yet heard any testimony concerning the investigation. U. S.v. Simmons, E.D.Pa.1978, 444 F.Supp. 500. Obstructing Justice 118
What government was required to show in obstruction of justice prosecution was that federal grand jury wasduly empanelled and engaged in administration of justice, and that defendant corruptly sought to impede grandjury's efforts. U.S. v. Fineman, E.D.Pa.1977, 434 F.Supp. 197, affirmed 571 F.2d 572, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct.2847, 436 U.S. 945, 56 L.Ed.2d 786. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
62. ---- Customs Service investigation, judicial proceedings, elements of offenses
Wiretap, instituted as part of criminal investigation undertaken by Customs Service, was not “pending judicialproceeding” within meaning of federal obstruction of justice statute, even if wiretap was subject to judicial su-pervision, and, thus, defendant could not be convicted of violating obstruction of justice statute for intentionallyinterfering with wiretap. U.S. v. Davis, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1999, 183 F.3d 231, amended 197 F.3d 662. ObstructingJustice 109
63. ---- Internal Revenue investigations, judicial proceedings, elements of offenses
Conviction for corruptly endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede administration of justice was supportedby evidence that defendant filed fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petition against district judge presiding overdefendant's girlfriend's trial for tax evasion, in period between her conviction and sentencing, in response towhat he perceived as “injustices” in her trial. U.S. v. McBride, C.A.6 (Ohio) 2004, 362 F.3d 360, rehearing enbanc denied. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
Investigation by Internal Revenue Service or any other governmental agency would not constitute a “judicialproceeding”, for purposes of obstructing justice prosecution. U. S. v. Ryan, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 455 F.2d 728.Obstructing Justice 111(3)
64. ---- FBI investigations, judicial proceedings, elements of offenses
Although an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) does not always constitute a pending ju-dicial proceeding, for purposes of catchall provision of obstruction of justice statute, such an investigation fallswithin statute's purview when the FBI undertakes an investigation with the intention of presenting evidence be-fore the grand jury. Torzala v. U.S., C.A.7 (Wis.) 2008, 545 F.3d 517, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing enbanc denied, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 1637, 173 L.Ed.2d 998. Obstructing Justice 109
Making false and misleading statements to FBI is not “obstruction of justice” under “omnibus clause” in stat-utory prohibition against influencing officer or juror, even though FBI investigation may result in producingevidence presented to grand jury; that provision requires a pending judicial proceeding. U.S. v. Aguilar, C.A.9(Cal.) 1994, 21 F.3d 1475, certiorari granted 115 S.Ct. 571, 513 U.S. 1013, 130 L.Ed.2d 488, affirmed in part ,reversed in part 115 S.Ct. 2357, 515 U.S. 593, 132 L.Ed.2d 520, on remand 80 F.3d 329. Obstructing Justice
111(2)
Obstruction of justice requires acts to thwart some aspect of government's judicial function; investigation con-ducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or some other governmentalagency, does not constitute “judicial proceeding.” U.S. v. Tham, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1991, 960 F.2d 1391. ObstructingJustice 111(1); Obstructing Justice 111(3)
“Corrupt advice” under former provisions of this section defining offense of wrongfully endeavoring to influ-ence a witness must have related to investigation by grand jury, not Federal Bureau of Investigation. U. S. v.Fayer, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 573 F.2d 741, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 108, 439 U.S. 831, 58 L.Ed.2d 125. Obstruct-
Federal judge's utterance of false statements to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents did not violate stat-ute prohibiting endeavor to obstruct due administration of justice, absent evidence that judge knew that his falsestatements would be provided to grand jury; agents had not been subpoenaed or otherwise directed to appear be-fore grand jury at time of judge's statements. U.S. v. Aguilar, U.S.Cal.1995, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 515 U.S. 593, 132L.Ed.2d 520. Obstructing Justice 111(2)
It is essential that a person accused should know that the witness or officer was a witness or officer to support aconviction of the charge of influencing, intimidating, or impeding the witness or officer, and so it is necessaryfor him to have knowledge or notice or information of the pendency of proceedings in the United States court orthe progress of the administration of justice before he can be found guilty of obstructing or endeavoring to ob-struct the same. Pettibone v. U.S., U.S.Idaho 1893, 13 S.Ct. 542, 148 U.S. 197, 37 L.Ed. 419.
A defendant's awareness that a subpoena seeks documents, coupled with his actions taken to place those docu-ments beyond grand jury's reach, clearly would meet requirement that there be nexus in time, causation, or logicbetween act and judicial proceedings under obstruction of justice statute; it is enough if he knows that a sub-poena calls for a category of documents, or even one particular document, and then takes steps to place thosedocuments beyond reach of grand jury. U.S. v. Erickson, C.A.10 (Utah) 2009, 561 F.3d 1150, certiorari denied130 S.Ct. 173, 558 U.S. 865, 175 L.Ed.2d 109, post-conviction relief denied 2011 WL 1226113. ObstructingJustice 111(2)
Generally, in order to convict defendant under omnibus clause of obstruction of justice statute, Governmentmust show that defendant knowingly and intentionally undertook action from which obstruction of justice wasreasonably foreseeable result, and although Government is not required to prove that defendant had specific pur-pose of obstructing justice it must establish that conduct was prompted at least in part by “corrupt motive.” U.S.v. Thomas, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1990, 916 F.2d 647. Obstructing Justice 109
Federal statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1503] proscribing obstruction of justice does not require government to provethat proceedings which defendant intended to obstruct were known by defendant to be federal in nature. U.S. v.Ardito, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1986, 782 F.2d 358, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1792, 475 U.S. 1141, 90 L.Ed.2d 338,certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 2281, 476 U.S. 1160, 90 L.Ed.2d 723. Obstructing Justice 109
To find a violation of this section, there must not only be a pending judicial proceeding, but accused must haveknowledge or notice of that fact. U.S. v. Vesich, C.A.5 (La.) 1984, 724 F.2d 451, rehearing denied 726 F.2d 168.Obstructing Justice 109
Knowledge and intent are necessary ingredients of the offense of obstruction of justice. U. S. v. Haas, C.A.5(Ala.) 1978, 583 F.2d 216, rehearing denied 588 F.2d 829, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 1788, 440 U.S. 981, 60L.Ed.2d 240. See, also, U.S. v. Vesich, C.A.5 (La.) 1984, 724 F.2d 451, rehearing denied 726 F.2d 168. Ob-
The only intent involved in the crime of corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct and impede due administra-tion of justice is the intent to do the forbidden act, and an accused must have had knowledge of the facts, thoughnot necessarily the law, that made his act criminal. Caldwell v. U.S., C.A.D.C.1954, 218 F.2d 370, 95U.S.App.D.C. 35, certiorari denied 75 S.Ct. 773, 349 U.S. 930, 99 L.Ed. 1260, rehearing denied 75 S.Ct. 880,349 U.S. 969, 99 L.Ed. 1290. Obstructing Justice 109
In prosecution for obstructing the due administration of justice by the alleged destruction of correspondence toprevent their introduction before the grand jury, proof may establish actual knowledge of the defendant that heknew that justice was being duly administered, or that he had reasonable grounds to believe and did in fact be-lieve that the documents would be ordered by the grand jury, the test being a subjective one in that there must beactual knowledge or belief. U S v. Solow, S.D.N.Y.1956, 138 F.Supp. 812. Obstructing Justice 133
66. Personal contact, elements of offenses
Whatever can be accomplished through intimidating or influencing a witness, juror or court official constitutesobstruction of justice since each of the actors has certain duties imposed by law and interference with his per-formance of these duties necessarily disrupts the processes of the criminal justice system; the same interferencecan occur despite absence of any personal contact with a juror, witness or official. U. S. v. Howard, C.A.5 (La.)1978, 569 F.2d 1331, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 116, 439 U.S. 834, 58 L.Ed.2d 130. Obstructing Justice135; Obstructing Justice 143
III. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
<Subdivision Index>
Admissibility of evidence 118-129Admissibility of evidence - Generally 118Admissibility of evidence - Affidavits 119Admissibility of evidence - Coconspirator's declarations 120Admissibility of evidence - Exculpatory statements doctrine 121Admissibility of evidence - Hearsay 122Admissibility of evidence - Illegally seized evidence 123Admissibility of evidence - Immunized testimony 124Admissibility of evidence - Inconsistent prior statements 125Admissibility of evidence - Other acts 126Admissibility of evidence - Privileged communications 127Admissibility of evidence - Recordings 128Admissibility of evidence - Stipulations 129
Affidavits, admissibility of evidence 119Affirmance 150Bill of particulars 105
Burden of proof 117Civil actions 94Coconspirator's declarations, admissibility of evidence 120Comments or conduct of counsel 115Comments or conduct of court 114Coram nobis 152Corrupt endeavor, instructions 142Corrupt endeavor, weight and sufficiency of evidence 135Defenses 106-112
Disbarment of attorneys, sentence and punishment 146Dismissal of indictment or information 102Double jeopardy, defenses 107Duplicitous allegations, indictment or information 98Election by prosecutor, indictment or information 96Entrapment, defenses 108Estoppel, defenses 109Examination of jurors 116Examination of witnesses 130, 131
Examination of witnesses - Generally 130Examination of witnesses - Physical examination 131
Exculpatory statements doctrine, admissibility of evidence 121Expert witnesses 132Guilty plea 153Harmless or prejudicial error 149Hearsay, admissibility of evidence 122Illegally seized evidence, admissibility of evidence 123Immunized testimony, admissibility of evidence 124Impossibility, defenses 110Inconsistent prior statements, admissibility of evidence 125Indictment or information 95-104
Indictment or information - Generally 95Indictment or information - Dismissal of indictment or information 102Indictment or information - Duplicitous allegations 98Indictment or information - Election by prosecutor 96Indictment or information - Miscellaneous indictments insufficient 104Indictment or information - Miscellaneous indictments sufficient 103Indictment or information - Requisite allegations 97Indictment or information - Specificity of allegations 99
Indictment or information - Surplusage 100Indictment or information - Variance 101
Instructions 141-143Instructions - Generally 141Instructions - Corrupt endeavor 142Instructions - Intent or purpose 143
Intent or purpose, instructions 143Intent or purpose, weight and sufficiency of evidence 136Issues reviewable 148Jurisdiction 91Knowledge, weight and sufficiency of evidence 137Limitations, defenses 111Miscellaneous indictments insufficient, indictment or information 104Miscellaneous indictments sufficient, indictment or information 103Mitigating factors, sentence and punishment 145aMixed questions of law and fact 140New trial 147Other acts, admissibility of evidence 126Persons liable 93Physical examination, examination of witnesses 131Privileged communications, admissibility of evidence 127Questions for court 139Questions for jury 138Recordings, admissibility of evidence 128Requisite allegations, indictment or information 97Reversal 151Sentence and punishment 145, 145a, 146
Sentence and punishment - Generally 145Sentence and punishment - Disbarment of attorneys 146Sentence and punishment - Mitigating factors 145a
Severance 113Specificity of allegations, indictment or information 99Speedy trial, defenses 112Stipulations, admissibility of evidence 129Suppression of evidence 133Surplusage, indictment or information 100Variance, indictment or information 101Venue 92Verdict 144Weight and sufficiency of evidence 134-137
Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Generally 134Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Corrupt endeavor 135Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Intent or purpose 136Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Knowledge 137
Federal district court was not deprived of jurisdiction of prosecution of defendant for endeavoring by threats andforce to intimidate a United States commissioner [now United States magistrate] and for forcibly assaulting aUnited States deputy marshal while engaged in performance of his official duties because his complaints againstgovernment agencies, state and federal, for redress of alleged grievances, had not yet been processed. Hodgdonv. U. S., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1966, 365 F.2d 679, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 759, 385 U.S. 1029, 17 L.Ed.2d 676.Criminal Law 102
Where District of Columbia police officer was charged with obstruction of justice under federal statute and withtampering with evidence and theft in violation of the District of Columbia Code, and the federal charge was dis-missed, it would not be appropriate for United States District Court for the District of Columbia to retain juris-diction over the local offenses, even if it had discretion to do so, in that no matters of legitimate federal concernremained. U.S. v. Smith, D.D.C.1990, 729 F.Supp. 1380. Criminal Law 102
92. Venue, practice and procedure
Venue was proper in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York with respect to obstruction ofjustice count against defendant, where defendant made false statements to FBI investigators to allow securitiesfraud conspiracy to continue by protecting co-conspirator from law enforcement authorities, and to impede agrand jury investigation in the Eastern District of New York. U.S. v. Royer, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 549 F.3d 886,certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 83, 558 U.S. 934, 175 L.Ed.2d 237, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 85, 558 U.S. 935, 175L.Ed.2d 237. Criminal Law 113
Venue in prosecution for obstructing justice in case in which acts occur in district other than that in which pro-ceeding sought to be obstructed is pending is proper in district in which proceeding sought to be obstructed ispending; overruling United States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70 and disagreeing with United States v. Nadolny, 601F.2d 940; United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053; United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416; United States v.Bachert, 449 F.Supp. 508. U.S. v. Reed, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1985, 773 F.2d 477. Criminal Law 113
Where defendants were charged with endeavoring to obstruct upcoming criminal trial in Northern District ofGeorgia, venue of prosecution for endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice was proper in that dis-trict, even though alleged kidnapping underlying prosecution occurred in Michigan. U.S. v. Johnson, C.A.11(Ga.) 1983, 713 F.2d 654, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1295, 465 U.S. 1030, 79 L.Ed.2d 695. Criminal Law113
Since this section did not prescribe venue for offense, it was necessary to determine from other sources the placewhere the offense must be deemed to have been committed. U. S. v. O'Donnell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1975, 510 F.2d1190, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2400, 421 U.S. 1001, 44 L.Ed.2d 668. Criminal Law 113
Denial of motion for change of venue based on assertion that radio, television and newspaper coverage of de-fendant's past conduct prejudiced his right to fair and impartial trial was not abuse of discretion, where judge
was of the opinion that conditions had changed sufficiently to remove any presumption that defendant could notreceive fair trial, no question of prejudice was made to appear on part of any juror during voir dire, and no jurorwas challenged for cause by either side. Overton v. U. S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1968, 403 F.2d 444. Criminal Law126(1)
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a continuance or change of venue to defendant incase involving alleged attempt to obstruct justice, merely upon a recitation of publicity in another similar case,the defendant in which was associated with present defendant. U. S. v. Bell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 351 F.2d 868,certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1200, 383 U.S. 947, 16 L.Ed.2d 210. Criminal Law 121; Criminal Law 591
Where defendant was charged with “endeavoring to obstruct justice” and the acts constituting the alleged viola-tion took place entirely within the Middle District of Pennsylvania, venue was proper only in that district, eventhough the “administration of justice” sought to be impeded was located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.U. S. v. Bachert, E.D.Pa.1978, 449 F.Supp. 508. Criminal Law 113
Under information charging defendant with violation of this section in that she willfully caused to be filed afalse affidavit, venue properly lay in district where affidavit was filed, and fact that venue might also have exis-ted in District of Columbia upon some other charge, such as perjury, or even upon the same charge, could notoperate to deny venue. U. S. v. Essex, E.D.Tenn.1967, 275 F.Supp. 393, reversed on other grounds 407 F.2d 214. Criminal Law 113
93. Persons liable, practice and procedure
Defendant, as a conspirator, was liable for the substantive acts of his coconspirators which amounted to obstruc-tion of justice. U.S. v. Lester, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1984, 749 F.2d 1288. Conspiracy 41
An attorney who allegedly advised his client to hide witness so that he could not be served with a subpoenacould be charged under this section making it a felony to impede a witness or judicial officer in addition to beingprosecuted under section 1501 of this title. U.S. v. Schaffner, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1983, 715 F.2d 1099. Criminal Law
29(5.5)
Persons other than court officials may be guilty of a conspiracy to procure the corrupt administration of justice,even though no court official is corrupt. U. S. v. Johnson, C.C.A.3 (Pa.) 1947, 165 F.2d 42, certiorari denied 68S.Ct. 355, 332 U.S. 852, 92 L.Ed. 421, motion granted 68 S.Ct. 357, rehearing denied 68 S.Ct. 457, 333 U.S.834, 92 L.Ed. 1118, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 355, 332 U.S. 852, 92 L.Ed. 422. Conspiracy 34
The willful and corrupt violation of R.S. § 5399, by a justice of the peace of a state in the exercise of his officerendered him liable to indictment in a federal court. U.S. v. Kindred, C.C.E.D.Va.1880, 5 F. 43. Justices Of ThePeace 30
Since this section making it a criminal offense to obstruct justice was passed in interest of the public, allegeddischarge of employees because they testified under subpoena before grand jury that allegedly indicted employ-er, would not constitute a tort against the discharged employees, so as to entitle them to maintain civil actionagainst employer for damages, unless discharge of employees amounted to a tort at common law. Odell v.Humble Oil & Refining Co., C.A.10 (N.M.) 1953, 201 F.2d 123, certiorari denied 73 S.Ct. 833, 345 U.S. 941,97 L.Ed. 1367. Labor And Employment 777; Labor And Employment 819
Federal obstruction of justice statute does not provide private right of action. Scherer v. U.S., D.Kan.2003, 241F.Supp.2d 1270, affirmed 78 Fed.Appx. 687, 2003 WL 22376994. Action 5
Defendant in criminal prosecution, after aborted trial, had no cause of action under Federal Tort Claims Act,sections 1346(b) and 2671 et seq. of Title 28, for alleged jury tampering by prosecutors and others associatingwith them in the prosecution. Jones v. U. S., E.D.Ark.1975, 401 F.Supp. 168, affirmed 536 F.2d 269, certioraridenied 97 S.Ct. 735, 429 U.S. 1039, 50 L.Ed.2d 750. United States 78(5.1)
Complaint wherein discharged state game and fish commission employee, who, pursuant to section 1983 of Title42, sought reinstatement with back pay and damages, alleged in effect that discharge was due in part to fact thathe testified in federal criminal case, stated cause of action. Miller v. Hulsey, E.D.Ark.1972, 347 F.Supp. 192.Civil Rights 1395(8)
If any cause of action existed in favor of person claimed to have been damaged by violation of former provisionsof this section making it offense to influence or injure officer, juror, or witness in federal court, it must havebeen cause of action which existed under or was created by state law and over which federal district court hadno jurisdiction in absence of diversity of citizenship. Mainelli v. Providence Journal Co., D.C.R.I.1962, 207F.Supp. 453, affirmed in part , vacated in part on other grounds 312 F.2d 3. Federal Courts 192
95. Indictment or information, practice and procedure--Generally
Where defendant had not raised issue whether failure of indictment specifically to connect alleged act of con-spiring to impede United States attorney to the stated crime of conspiracy to obstruct justice denied him his rightunder U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 to be indicated by grand jury or his right under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6 toreceive adequate notice of crimes with which he was charged, indictment would be upheld if necessary facts ap-peared in any form, or by fair construction could be found within terms of indictment. U. S. v. Shoup, C.A.3(Pa.) 1979, 608 F.2d 950. Indictment And Information 202(5)
Indictment which charged that obstruction of justice with which defendant was charged was carried out “by oth-er means” in addition to those specified was not defective on theory that it did not protect defendant from pos-sibility of subsequent prosecution; the phrase “by other means” effectively broadened scope of the acts to whichjeopardy would attach and correspondingly reduced the opportunity for subsequent prosecutions for the allegedobstruction of justice in question. U. S. v. Haldeman, C.A.D.C.1976, 559 F.2d 31, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, certi-orari denied 97 S.Ct. 2641, 431 U.S. 933, 53 L.Ed.2d 250, rehearing denied 97 S.Ct. 2992, 433 U.S. 916, 53L.Ed.2d 1103. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)
False declarations alleged in counts one and two of indictment formed basis for obstruction of justice charges incounts three and four against defendant and thus counts three and four stated offense under this section. U.S. v.Caron, E.D.Va.1982, 551 F.Supp. 662, affirmed 722 F.2d 739, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1602, 465 U.S. 1103,80 L.Ed.2d 132. Obstructing Justice 164(2)
Although defendants contended that facts alleged in first count of indictment charged a crime which was morespecifically described under this section than under section 241 of this title governing conspiracy to violate civilrights, government properly charged defendants with violation of section 241 of this title in light of fact thatthere was simply no proof of essential element of obstruction of justice crime. U. S. v. Bufalino, S.D.N.Y.1981,518 F.Supp. 1190. Conspiracy 28(3)
96. ---- Election by prosecutor, indictment or information, practice and procedure
A defendant who successfully endeavored to procure witness to testify falsely for defendant at criminal prosecu-tion was guilty of obstructing justice and of subornation of perjury, and the prosecution was not required to electwhich offense it would prosecute. Catrino v. U. S., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1949, 176 F.2d 884. Indictment And Informa-tion 132(5)
Granting or refusing to compel election as to which of several counts prosecution will proceed on, and time attrial when election will be compelled is usually within sound discretion of trial court. Bedell v. U S, C.C.A.8(Iowa) 1935, 78 F.2d 358, certiorari denied 56 S.Ct. 151, 296 U.S. 628, 80 L.Ed. 447, certiorari denied 56 S.Ct.152, 296 U.S. 628, 80 L.Ed. 447. Indictment And Information 132(3)
Government was not required to elect between prosecuting defendant for obstruction of justice or for allegedlylesser included offense of false declarations before a grand jury. U. S. v. Hubbard, D.C.D.C.1979, 474 F.Supp.90, affirmed 668 F.2d 1238, 215 U.S.App.D.C. 206, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1971, 456 U.S. 926, 72 L.Ed.2d440. Indictment And Information 132(2)
97. ---- Requisite allegations, indictment or information, practice and procedure
An indictment was fatally defective, in failing to aver, in terms, that the object of the conspiracy was to obstructthe administration of justice in the federal courts, and to aver that defendants were served with process, or in anymanner notified of the issue of the writ. Pettibone v. U.S., U.S.Idaho 1893, 13 S.Ct. 542, 148 U.S. 197, 37 L.Ed.419.
Indictment charging obstruction of justice and conspiracy in regard thereto, although poorly drawn, was notfatally defective for failing to identify judicial proceeding that defendant allegedly conspired to obstruct or to al-lege how his grand jury testimony obstructed justice, where defendant did not claim to have been misled at anytime as to what proceeding was involved, and did not request bill of particulars to clarify any ambiguities. U.S.v. Perkins, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 748 F.2d 1519. Conspiracy 43(11); Obstructing Justice 164(2)
Indictment alleging that defendant attempted to obtain money from his client under pretext of “fixing” the case,
so that client and his brothers, upon entering guilty pleas, would receive sentences of probation and his wifewould go free, was sufficient to charge influencing, obstructing, or impeding due administration of justice ele-ment of offense of corruptly endeavoring to so act. U.S. v. Silverman, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 745 F.2d 1386. Ob-structing Justice 164(2)
Where indicting grand jury found probable cause to believe that defendant impeded investigation conducted byUnited States attorney, and investigation by United States attorney and grand jury into alleged voting fraud wereconducted jointly, question whether construction of United States attorney's inquiry was equivalent to impair-ment of federal grand jury's investigation was legal determination and consequently failure of indictment to al-lege specifically that defendant conspired to impede federal judicial investigation did not deny him his right un-der U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 to be indicted by grand jury for this specific charge by usurping grand jury'sfunction of determining probable cause. U. S. v. Shoup, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 608 F.2d 950. Indictment And In-formation 56
Whether a defendant's testimony is described in indictment as “evasive” because he deliberately concealedknowledge or “false” because he blocked flow of truthful information is immaterial to charge of obstructingjustice; however, government must charge in indictment and prove at trial that testimony had effect of impedingjustice. U. S. v. Griffin, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 589 F.2d 200, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 48, 444 U.S. 825, 62L.Ed.2d 32. Obstructing Justice 164(5)
Since this section is also a contempt statute, the obstructive element, that is, impeding court in conduct of itsbusiness or endeavoring to do so beyond mere rendering of false testimony, must be alleged and proved beforeconviction can be had under it. U. S. v. Essex, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1969, 407 F.2d 214. Obstructing Justice 165
Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully endeavored to impede due administration of justice in districtcourt did not fail to state offense although it did not allege that defendant was successful, and was not rendereddefective due to failure to allege that defendant intended to obstruct administration of justice. Knight v. U. S.,C.A.5 (Ga.) 1962, 310 F.2d 305. Obstructing Justice 164(2)
Indictment charging defendant with corruptly endeavoring to influence a juror was not rendered defective be-cause of failure to allege a purpose on his part to obstruct administration of justice. Holland v. U.S., C.A.5 (Fla.)1957, 245 F.2d 341. Obstructing Justice 164(2)
An indictment charging that defendant did “endeavor” to influence and impede the due administration of justicein that he unlawfully, feloniously and corruptly endeavored to influence, intimidate and impede a named indi-vidual who was then a trial juror duly impaneled and sworn is not insufficient because the word “corruptly” didnot appear before the first word “endeavor”. Kong v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1954, 216 F.2d 665. Criminal Law
45.35; Obstructing Justice 11
Indictment charging defendant with violating statute proscribing corruptly influencing, obstructing, or impeding,or endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice that alleged defendant took certain
actions “corruptly” encompassed knowledge of judicial proceeding and intent to impede it, and thus sufficientlyalleged elements that had to be proven at trial so as to withstand motion to dismiss, notwithstanding claim thatindictment should be dismissed because it failed to allege defendant knew of pendency of allegedly obstructedgrand jury proceeding. U.S. v. Schwimmer, E.D.N.Y.1986, 649 F.Supp. 544. Obstructing Justice 164(1)
Indictment in obstruction of justice prosecution alleging defendant to have corruptly endeavored to influencepetit juror, his wife, in federal criminal trial was not insufficient for failure to allege that overt act of asking jur-or to vote not guilty was intimidating. U.S. v. Cortese, M.D.Pa.1983, 554 F.Supp. 1227. Obstructing Justice
164(1)
Allegations, in indictment for obstructing justice, that defendant had been found guilty, was sentenced, and theconviction appealed, were immaterial. U. S. v. Verra, S.D.N.Y.1962, 203 F.Supp. 87. Indictment And Informa-tion 119
In indictment for conspiracy to obstruct the due administration of justice in connection with grand jury investig-ation by allegedly destroying original notes of meeting between person under investigation and one of the de-fendants, it was not necessary to allege that defendants knew or reasonably should have known that documentsand notes destroyed were material to the inquiry. U S v. Siegel, S.D.N.Y.1957, 152 F.Supp. 370. Conspiracy
43(11)
An indictment charging defendant obstructed the due administration of justice by the destruction of certain cor-respondence allegedly to prevent their introduction before the grand jury was not defective for failure to containspecific allegations that the correspondence was involved in the due administration of justice and at time of theiralleged destruction, the defendant knew that justice was being duly administered. U S v. Solow, S.D.N.Y.1956,138 F.Supp. 812. Obstructing Justice 164(4)
Defendant waived claim that indictment charging him with witness tampering was defective, in that it citedwrong statute, by failing to raise claim before trial. U.S. v. Fortunato, E.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21056974, Unre-ported. Indictment And Information 196(5)
98. ---- Duplicitous allegations, indictment or information, practice and procedure
Even though counts charging violations of this section and section 201 of this title charged essentially same acts,indictment was not duplicitous. U.S. v. DeAlesandro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 361 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 87S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74.
Convictions for obstructing justice by shooting government witness and for conspiracy to commit such crime didnot result in duplication of offenses on theory that joint action was required for completion of substantive of-fense under allegations. Ferina v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1965, 340 F.2d 837, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1446, 381U.S. 902, 14 L.Ed.2d 284. Conspiracy 28(3)
An indictment charging a conspiracy to obstruct the administration of justice in violation of a criminal statuteand also to defraud the United States was not bad for duplicity. U.S. v. Manton, C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1939, 107 F.2d834, certiorari denied 60 S.Ct. 590, 309 U.S. 664, 84 L.Ed. 1012. Indictment And Information 125(5.5)
Indictment which contained count charging that defendants on March 15th endeavored to influence juror by of-fering him $200 to render verdict in certain case in favor of four defendants therein, and count charging that de-fendants on March 16th endeavored to influence administration of justice by offering same juror $100 to votenot guilty as to two defendants in same case, was not bad for duplicity. Bedell v. U S, C.C.A.8 (Iowa) 1935, 78F.2d 358, certiorari denied 56 S.Ct. 151, 296 U.S. 628, 80 L.Ed. 447, certiorari denied 56 S.Ct. 152, 296 U.S.628, 80 L.Ed. 447. Indictment And Information 125(1)
Indictment which alleged that, by arranging to kill assistant United States attorneys, defendant endeavored to in-terfere with an officer of the court and to impede the administration of justice was not duplicitous. U.S. v.Wilson, S.D.N.Y.1983, 565 F.Supp. 1416. Indictment And Information 127
99. ---- Specificity of allegations, indictment or information, practice and procedure
Use of statutory phrase “corruptly endeavors,” in indictment charging obstruction of grand jury proceeding byshredding relevant documents, was sufficient to allege fully and unambiguously that defendant knew grand juryproceeding was pending and intended to obstruct it. U.S. v. Monus, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1997, 128 F.3d 376, rehearingdenied, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 67, 525 U.S. 823, 142 L.Ed.2d 53, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed20 Fed.Appx. 511, 2001 WL 1216958. Obstructing Justice 164(4)
Facts alleged in indictment were sufficiently specific to charge defendant with obstructing justice by giving falsetestimony in affidavit supporting recusal motion even absent specification of particular manner in which affi-davit had effect of obstructing justice; there was no basis for requiring greater specificity in obstructing justicecases than in others. U.S. v. Rankin, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 870 F.2d 109, rehearing denied. Obstructing Justice164(5)
Indictment charging defendant with obstructing justice was not vague because of failure to state which portionof quoted conversation represented the defendant's attempt to influence a witness' testimony where the quotedconversation was not lengthy and the date of the occurrence was given. U.S. v. McComb, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1984, 744F.2d 555. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)
Indictment for obstruction of justice need not meet the same specificity requirements as an indictment for mak-ing false statements, even though the obstruction of justice count is based upon solicitation of false statement. U.S. v. Friedland, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1981, 660 F.2d 919, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2268, 456 U.S. 989, 73 L.Ed.2d1283. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)
Indictment for obstruction of justice, modeled on the language of this section, need not contain technical termsof knowledge and intent if it recites facts and uses language which, taken as a whole, indicate knowledge and in-tent. U. S. v. Haas, C.A.5 (Ala.) 1978, 583 F.2d 216, rehearing denied 588 F.2d 829, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct.
1788, 440 U.S. 981, 60 L.Ed.2d 240. Indictment And Information 110(21)
Indictment, which charged that accused corruptly endeavored to obstruct justice by failing to produce documentsaccused was commanded to produce by subpoena issued by grand jury investigating alleged fraudulent scheme,was sufficient, notwithstanding contention that indictment was insufficient for failure to more specifically allegethe conduct by which accused endeavored to obstruct justice. U. S. v. Weiss, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1974, 491 F.2d 460,certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 58, 419 U.S. 833, 42 L.Ed.2d 59. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)
Indictment charging defendant with obstruction of justice during his testimony before the grand jury sufficientlycharged all the elements of the offense, and was not impermissibly vague where language used by governmenttracked the language of the statute, and fairly informed defendant of what he must defend against because itquoted the exact testimony that the government contended was obstructive. U.S. v. Peterson, M.D.Ga.2008, 544F.Supp.2d 1363. Indictment And Information 110(21); Obstructing Justice 164(5)
Search warrant affidavit, alleging that person had attempted to destroy documentary evidence subject to and un-der a subpoena duces tecum, sufficiently alleged that property to be seized was evidence of the crime of obstruc-tion of justice. In re Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas, D.C.W.Va.1984, 593 F.Supp. 184. Searches AndSeizures 111
100. ---- Surplusage, indictment or information, practice and procedure
Allegation in indictment that defendants were attempting to coerce witness to testify falsely was surplusage andnot necessary element of proof under former provisions of this section making it unlawful to intimidate a wit-ness and to influence, obstruct or impede justice; thus, prosecution's alleged failure to prove that defendantswere attempting to coerce witness to testify falsely did not require reversal of conviction. U. S. v. Good Shield,C.A.8 (S.D.) 1976, 544 F.2d 950. Indictment And Information 167; Obstructing Justice 165
101. ---- Variance, indictment or information, practice and procedure
Indictment charging defendant with obstruction justice by creating and producing false document in response togrand jury subpoena was not impermissibly amended when trial judge's jury charge permitted convictionpremised only upon “submission” of false document, without reference to its creation. U.S. v. Jespersen, C.A.2(N.Y.) 1995, 65 F.3d 993, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1571, 517 U.S. 1169, 134 L.Ed.2d 669. Indictment And In-formation 159(2)
There was no variance between indictment which alleged that defendant solicited money from an attorney to in-sure that a juror would vote to acquit the attorney's client and evidence which showed that defendant attemptedto obtain money from the attorney by falsely telling him that he could, for certain sum, insure the outcome of thetrial. U. S. v. Neiswender, C.A.4 (Md.) 1979, 590 F.2d 1269, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2410, 441 U.S. 963, 60L.Ed.2d 1068. Obstructing Justice 165
No variance between pleadings and proof on obstructing justice count resulted when proof at trial showed that
more wrongdoing occurred at time referred to in count than was originally thought. U. S. v. Bonacorsa, C.A.2(N.Y.) 1976, 528 F.2d 1218, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 2647, 426 U.S. 935, 49 L.Ed.2d 386. Obstructing Justice
165
There was no variance between indictment and proof adduced thereunder in prosecution for participation in con-spiracy to obstruct justice, despite defendant's contention that conspiracy, if any, in which he participated was aseparate and “lesser” conspiracy from that referred to in indictment. U. S. v. Brasseaux, C.A.5 (La.) 1975, 509F.2d 157, rehearing denied 511 F.2d 1192. Conspiracy 43(12)
102. ---- Dismissal of indictment or information, practice and procedure
Indictment against defendant who raised privilege against self-incrimination before grand jury when appearingbefore it in response to subpoena would not be dismissed on theory that grand jury might not have indicted de-fendant if it had been properly instructed concerning defendant's rights against self-incrimination, when therewas adequate direct evidence against defendant to warrant his indictment for endeavoring to obstruct justice. U.S. v. Bell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 351 F.2d 868, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1200, 383 U.S. 947, 16 L.Ed.2d 210. In-dictment And Information 144.1(2)
Charge that defendant obstructed grand jury's investigative efforts by failing to produce his travel records wouldnot be dismissed even though defendant claimed that subpoenas did not require such production where, if evid-ence substantiated government's allegation that defendant had reason to believe that documents in question werewithin scope of investigation, issue could be submitted to jury. U.S. v. Najarian, D.Minn.1996, 915 F.Supp.1460. Obstructing Justice 173
Indictment charging defendant with obstruction of justice was not subject to dismissal on ground that, becausegovernment agreed to enter a nolle prosequi upon completion of diversion program, defendant was not a poten-tial witness in the pending criminal case, since question of whether criminal action was pending at the time ofdefendant's alleged offer to testify falsely was a question of fact. U. S. v. Regina, D.C.Md.1980, 504 F.Supp.629. Indictment And Information 144.1(1)
The offense of endeavoring to influence witness before grand jury is not type of substantive crime that precludescount of indictment for conspiracy by offender and another to commit such offense, and alleged conspirators'motion to dismiss conspiracy count on face of indictment must be denied as at best premature. U S v. Brothman,S.D.N.Y.1950, 93 F.Supp. 924. Conspiracy 34; Indictment And Information 144
103. ---- Miscellaneous indictments sufficient, indictment or information, practice and procedure
An indictment charging an endeavor to influence a juror, contrary to former section 241 of this title, which al-leged that defendant knew the person to be influenced was a petit juror in the discharge of his duty was suffi-cient to bring the charge within such section, though that person had not yet been selected and sworn as a juror.U.S. v. Russell, U.S.Ill.1921, 41 S.Ct. 260, 255 U.S. 138, 65 L.Ed. 553. Bribery 6(1)
Indictment charging defendants with obstructing justice with respect to grand jury investigation into alleged taxevasion adequately notified defendants of the offense conduct for which they were being tried, notwithstandinggovernment's failure to allege any acts specifically aimed at obstructing the grand jury, where indictment real-leged and incorporated 26 factual paragraphs contained in count for conspiracy to commit tax evasion, detailingthe defendants' actions in allegedly conspiring to hide income in an offshore company and then to cover up thateffort to evade paying taxes on that income, and additionally specified the time period in which the defendantsallegedly acted. U.S. v. Fassnacht, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003, 332 F.3d 440, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Ob-structing Justice 164(2)
Indictment alleging that defendant forged letter from his employer and submitted it to court in support of leni-ency during parole revocation hearing was sufficient to charge defendant with obstruction of justice, eventhough indictment did not allege that forged letter influenced court's decision; letter had natural and probable ef-fect of impeding justice. U.S. v. Collis, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1997, 128 F.3d 313. Obstructing Justice 164(4)
Indictment was not required to allege particular statements Government intended to prove were false in order toadequately charge defendant with obstruction of justice; defendant was informed that alleged obstruction relatedto false statements he made to FBI agents concerning conveyance of car, and count gave defendant notice ofconduct for which he was charged and would enable him to later plead double jeopardy. U.S. v. Wood, C.A.10(N.M.) 1992, 958 F.2d 963, opinion amended on denial of rehearing. Obstructing Justice 164(2)
Indictment which specifically stated that defendant presented to grand jury $900,000 note which defendant wellknew was not true evidence of any loan made to defendant properly charged offense of obstruction of justice.U.S. v. O'Keefe, C.A.5 (La.) 1983, 722 F.2d 1175. Obstructing Justice 164(4)
Where indictment charged obstruction of justice, tied it specifically to this section, and alleged that defendantimpeded investigation conducted by United States attorney, defendant was thereby apprised both of acts onwhich grand jury based its charge and fact that prosecution had to prove that he conspired to obstruct operationsof judicial body, and thus, despite less than perfect draftsmanship, indictment gave defendant sufficient notice ofnature of charges to enable him to defend against them. U. S. v. Shoup, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 608 F.2d 950. Indict-ment And Information 71.4(3)
Where count which charged five defendants with conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstruction of criminal in-vestigations alleged a common intent to frustrate grand jury proceedings by arranging for the murder of a gov-ernment informant, obstructing justice by supplying persons under investigation with inside information and byagreeing to provide false testimony and where the count set forth 11 overt acts naming persons, times andplaces, count was sufficient to specifically inform defendants of the crimes forming the object of the conspiracyand, therefore, count sufficiently stated an offense. U. S. v. Cuesta, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 597 F.2d 903, certioraridenied 100 S.Ct. 451, 444 U.S. 964, 62 L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 452, 444 U.S. 964, 62 L.Ed.2d377. Indictment And Information 71.4(3)
Indictment which charged that defendant unlawfully and knowingly corruptly influenced and obstructed the dueadministration of justice in connection with an investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investig-
ation by making cash payments and offers of other benefits to defendants in a pending case for the purpose ofconcealing the identity of the persons who were responsible for and had knowledge of the activities which werethe subject of the investigation was sufficient to permit proof that the obstruction was accomplished, in part,through misuse of the Central Intelligence Agency. U. S. v. Haldeman, C.A.D.C.1976, 559 F.2d 31, 181U.S.App.D.C. 254, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 2641, 431 U.S. 933, 53 L.Ed.2d 250, rehearing denied 97 S.Ct.2992, 433 U.S. 916, 53 L.Ed.2d 1103. Obstructing Justice 164(2)
Indictment, charging conspiracy to obstruct administration of justice, setting out dates within which conspiracywas formed, reciting names of conspirators, alleging jurisdiction and venue, alleging objects of conspiracy andvarious overt acts, and reciting facts and circumstances giving rise to conspiracy was sufficient to enable de-fendant to know what he was charged with, to prepare his defense, and to plead jeopardy in event of subsequentconviction for same offense. Hunt v. U. S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1968, 400 F.2d 306, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 629, 393U.S. 1021, 21 L.Ed.2d 566. Conspiracy 43(11)
Language of indictment for alleged endeavor to obstruct justice, which followed words of this section, was suffi-cient to fairly apprise defendant of crime intended to be alleged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense andto make judgment, whether of acquittal or conviction, a complete defense to second prosecution for same of-fense. U. S. v. Bell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 351 F.2d 868, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1200, 383 U.S. 947, 16L.Ed.2d 210. Indictment And Information 110(21)
Indictment charging defendants with endeavoring to impede due administration of justice, in that defendants al-legedly promised a named person, in consideration of payment of money, that they would alter testimony of onedefendant and of another person in pending criminal prosecution against the named person in federal districtcourt, was sufficient, stated criminal offense, and imputed required scienter to defendants. Anderson v. U. S.,C.A.6 (Ky.) 1954, 215 F.2d 84, certiorari denied 75 S.Ct. 208, 348 U.S. 888, 99 L.Ed. 698, rehearing denied 75S.Ct. 291, 348 U.S. 922, 99 L.Ed. 723. Obstructing Justice 164(5)
Indictment charging defendant with endeavoring to influence a juror, which was sufficient to tell defendant allthat he needed to know for his defense and specified offense so that defendant would be in no danger of doublejeopardy, was sufficient. Hicks v. U.S., C.A.4 (Va.) 1949, 173 F.2d 570, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 1501, 337U.S. 945, 93 L.Ed. 1748. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)
Indictment that alleged defendant endeavored corruptly to influence or obstruct justice by destroying documentsthat he believed grand jury would likely seek was not legally insufficient because it did not allege that docu-ments were under subpoena at time of their destruction or that defendant knew that grand jury would subpoenadocuments, as whether defendant knew or expected that his actions were likely to affect grand jury proceedingswas matter of evidence for trial, not element to be alleged in indictment. U.S. v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc.,D.Conn.2003, 260 F.Supp.2d 470. Obstructing Justice 164(4)
Indictment that charged defendant with obstruction of justice was sufficient; indictment alleged statutory ele-ments of obstruction of justice, stated that charge was directed at grand jury investigation in particular districtcourt, and gave date on which crime allegedly occurred and judicial district in which it occurred. U.S. v. Par-
Indictment alleging destruction of cash summary folders, miscoding of customer cash deposits as check depositsand instructing of brokerage firm cashiers to hold back cash from customer's account was sufficient to state of-fense of obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice. U.S. v. Tota, S.D.N.Y.1987, 672 F.Supp. 716,affirmed 847 F.2d 836, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 218, 488 U.S. 888, 102 L.Ed.2d 209. Conspiracy 43(11); Obstructing Justice 164(1)
Indictment which alleged that defendant willfully endeavored to impede due administration of justice by falselytestifying concerning matter under investigation by grand jury was technically sufficient to state an offense un-der this section. U.S. v. Caron, E.D.Va.1982, 551 F.Supp. 662, affirmed 722 F.2d 739, certiorari denied 104S.Ct. 1602, 465 U.S. 1103, 80 L.Ed.2d 132. Obstructing Justice 164(5)
Indictment's 18th count was sufficient in that it tracked language of this section making it an offense to endeavorcorruptly to influence an officer of the court or the due administration of justice, and in that it gave defendantnotice of the conduct specifically at issue, namely, his alleged endeavor to cause designated company custodianof records to give false testimony to grand jury concerning deposit of cash into company's safe deposit boxes byfraudulently misrepresenting to the company's custodian of records that no cash was ever deposited into safe de-posit boxes and that there were no records reflecting any such deposits. U. S. v. Abrams, S.D.N.Y.1982, 543F.Supp. 1184. Indictment And Information 110(21)
Indictment which charged that defendant endeavored to obstruct justice by threatening a witness contained a leg-ally sufficient statement of defendant's status as a principal. U. S. v. Raineri, W.D.Wis.1980, 521 F.Supp. 16.Obstructing Justice 164(5)
Count charging defendants with preparing and assisting in giving false and misleading testimony in order to im-pede investigatory function of grand jury was sufficient to charge defendants with violating this section pro-scribing offense of endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice. U. S. v. Hubbard,D.C.D.C.1979, 474 F.Supp. 64. Obstructing Justice 164(5)
Omnibus clause proscribing impeding or endeavoring to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration ofjustice embraces the widest variety of conduct that impedes the judicial process and count charging defendantwith endeavoring to influence, obstruct and impede due administration of justice by paying $2,850 for obtaininggovernment documents in connection with various pending criminal matters sufficiently charged acts which vi-olated this section. U. S. v. Rosner, S.D.N.Y.1972, 352 F.Supp. 915, petition denied 497 F.2d 919. ObstructingJustice 108; Obstructing Justice 164(2)
Allegations that defendant presented false statements to federal grand jury and caused to be presented a falselysigned lease contract stated offense under this section, although they may also have alleged perjury. U. S. v. Co-hen, D.C.Conn.1962, 202 F.Supp. 587. Obstructing Justice 164(4)
Indictment charging defendants with conspiring to defraud United States, to obstruct justice and to commit per-jury based on alleged agreement among defendants at a meeting that if they were asked by anyone, includingfederal grand juries, about nature and circumstances of meeting, they would endeavor to frustrate the inquiry byevasion, silence or lies, alleged criminal offenses and not just a conspiracy to conceal a crime, and indictmentwas sufficient. U S v. Bonanno, S.D.N.Y.1959, 177 F.Supp. 106, on subsequent appeal 285 F.2d 408. Conspir-acy 43(6); Conspiracy 43(10); Conspiracy 43(11)
104. ---- Miscellaneous indictments insufficient, indictment or information, practice and procedure
Allegations that federal prosecutors participated in an attempt to “cover up” the death of a prisoner awaiting ar-raignment, that they engaged in a conspiracy to prevent investigation and prosecution of those alleged to havecaused the prisoner's death, and that the tentacles of that conspiracy extended and infiltrated into various govern-ment organizations were insufficient to establish a cause of action for embracery. Hoston v. Silbert,D.C.D.C.1981, 514 F.Supp. 1239, reversed in part on other grounds 681 F.2d 876, 220 U.S.App.D.C. 361, on re-mand 566 F.Supp. 1125. Conspiracy 18
Counts of complaint of United States attorney alleging that newspaper publisher maliciously and corruptly en-deavored to obstruct, impede, influence, and intimidate him in performance of his duties by publication of cer-tain editorial, and that publisher conspired with persons unknown to so obstruct, impede, influence, and intimid-ate him in performance of his official duties failed to state claim under former provisions of this section whichmade it offense to influence or injure officer, juror, or witness in federal court. Mainelli v. Providence JournalCo., D.C.R.I.1962, 207 F.Supp. 453, affirmed in part , vacated in part on other grounds 312 F.2d 3. Officers AndPublic Employees 113
105. Bill of particulars, practice and procedure
Defendant was not prejudiced by denial of request for bill of particulars specifying the pending judicial proceed-ing obstructed by him where his counsel was provided with pretrial memorandum by the government acknow-ledging the “pendency” requirement of this section and detailing the facts establishing pendency, the govern-ment's proof closely tracked memorandum and the instructions, to which no relevant objections were made, sub-mitted the case in the manner consistent with the prosecution's theory as outlined in the memorandum. U.S. v.Vesich, C.A.5 (La.) 1984, 726 F.2d 168. Criminal Law 1167(1)
Though bare allegation in indictment, charging obstruction of justice, that defendant endeavored to influenceand impede a member of federal grand jury “by communicating information over the telephone” about the mat-ter being considered by the grand jury was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, allegation did not appearto meet fully the government's obligation to permit defendant to prepare a defense; in such a situation, appropri-ate method to seek additional information was by bill of particulars. U. S. v. Haas, C.A.5 (Ala.) 1978, 583 F.2d216, rehearing denied 588 F.2d 829, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 1788, 440 U.S. 981, 60 L.Ed.2d 240. IndictmentAnd Information 121.1(4)
Denial of pretrial motion for bill of particulars as to exactly what defendant accused of intimidating witness was
alleged to have said to witness on occasions as set forth in indictment was not abuse of discretion, where failureto have bill of particulars resulted in no surprise during trial, and indictment itself contained ample allegations toput defendant on notice as to time, place and persons involved in each conversation. Overton v. U. S., C.A.5(Tex.) 1968, 403 F.2d 444. Indictment And Information 121.2(1)
Where defendant was indicted for corruptly influencing juror and for conspiracy to obstruct justice and influencejurors and the indictment and numerous overt acts pleaded by the government failed to give names of, or identi-fy, the acquaintances through whom, it was alleged, the defendant sought to interfere with jurors, the defendantwas entitled to a bill of particulars, and refusal of trial court to order government to file bill of particulars consti-tuted an abuse of discretion. Cefalu v. U.S., C.A.10 (Colo.) 1956, 234 F.2d 522. Indictment And Information
121.2(1)
Request for bill of particulars in prosecution of defendant for having corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct,and impede due administration of justice by causing creation of false and fabricated document and its submis-sion to a special grand jury would be denied, except that Government would be required to particularize its al-legations regarding defendant's role in submission of document to grand jury, where it was not clear whetherGovernment contended defendant himself produced document for grand jury or caused it to be prepared for sub-mission by or through another. U.S. v. Schwimmer, E.D.N.Y.1986, 649 F.Supp. 544. Indictment And Informa-tion 121.2(1)
In prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct justice by influencing petit juror and for corruptly endeavoring to influ-ence juror in discharge of his duty, in view of allegation in indictment that a juror was given $1,000 and “otherthings of value,” government would be directed, on motion, to clarify such vague phrase and provide list of spe-cific items, and to provide dates or approximate dates of “approximately six occasions” on which money wasgiven to juror and to indicate whether allegations in one count were tape recorded or otherwise monitored, and,if so, indicate tape and section thereof on which statement appeared. U.S. v. Osticco, M.D.Pa.1983, 563 F.Supp.727. Indictment And Information 121.2(1); Indictment And Information 121.2(3)
In prosecution for interfering with the due administration of justice by the destruction of correspondence to pre-vent their production before the grand jury, indictment was not defective for failure to allege that the destructiondid in fact obstruct the grand jury inquiry because the bill of particulars served by the government disclosed thatat a subsequent date, the grand jury did obtain one of the items of correspondence and that it had familiarity withthe sender and addressee of the remaining correspondence. U S v. Solow, S.D.N.Y.1956, 138 F.Supp. 812. Ob-structing Justice 164(4)
106. Defenses, practice and procedure--Generally
Defendant's claim that he had been “erroneously convicted” of obstruction of justice for “providing false oral re-sponses under oral questioning from [corporation's] outside counsel and the [Securities and Exchange Commis-sion (SEC)]” was non-jurisdictional and was waived by defendant's guilty plea, where indictment had fully ap-prised defendant of elements of his offense under “catchall,” or omnibus clause, that was intended to prohibit allobstructive behavior, and there was sufficiently close relationship in time, causation, and logic between defend-ant's conduct and likely judicial proceedings. U.S. v. Kumar, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2010, 617 F.3d 612, certiorari denied
131 S.Ct. 2931, 180 L.Ed.2d 238. Criminal Law 273.4(1)
Obstruction of justice statutes, including obstruction by intimidating or injuring federal officers, were not anoverbroad content and viewpoint regulation in violation of First Amendment free speech provision, as applied todefendant's conduct of filing official document or filing of lawsuit against judge, where it was not the filing ofauthorized court documents that was punishable, and thus, no legitimate free speech interest was implicated.U.S. v. Fulbright, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1997, 105 F.3d 443, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1836, 520 U.S. 1236, 137L.Ed.2d 1041. Constitutional Law 2085; Obstructing Justice 104
Even if client voluntarily acceded to attorney's actions aimed at sending client to jail in order to protect personsallegedly involved in operation of illegal gambling and loansharking businesses, this did not give rise to defenseto obstruction of justice charges leveled against attorney. U.S. v. Cintolo, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1987, 818 F.2d 980,certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 259, 484 U.S. 913, 98 L.Ed.2d 216. Obstructing Justice 160
Crime of obstruction of justice was complete when subpoenaed documents were directed to be destroyed or con-cealed, and prosecutor's excusing defendant from further production was not a defense. U. S. v. Rasheed, C.A.9(Cal.) 1981, 663 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1031, 454 U.S. 1157, 71 L.Ed.2d 315. Obstructing Justice
132
Conscientious belief that a law is unconstitutional or contrary to the common law is no defense to a criminalcharge; hence, a defendant's belief that U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 16 validating the federal income tax was uncon-stitutional was no defense to charge of attempting to corruptly influence a juror sitting in a tax case by attempt-ing to distribute to her a book teaching that tax crimes are not true crimes and espousing defendant's view of“jury nullification”, i.e., that a juror may acquit when he feels that the law is unfair and infringes on fundamentalrights. U. S. v. Ogle, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1979, 613 F.2d 233, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 87, 449 U.S. 825, 66L.Ed.2d 28, rehearing denied 101 S.Ct. 594, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L.Ed.2d 487. Criminal Law 37.20
Fact that defendant who called home of person who had been sworn as a juror in a trial and talked with husbandof the juror and not to the juror directly about the trial was not a defense to charge of corruptly endeavoring toinfluence and impede a petit juror, nor was it of any moment whether the effort to influence the juror was suc-cessful or that the effort to influence was subtle or circuitous. U. S. v. Roe, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1975, 529 F.2d 629.Obstructing Justice 143; Obstructing Justice 160
Fact that government knew of defendant's attempts to obtain information related to grand jury investigation fromUnited States attorney's office through undercover agent acting in guise of corrupt policeman did not precludeconviction of conspiracy, endeavoring to obstruct justice and bribery on theory that crimes were legally incap-able of attainment. U. S. v. Rosner, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 485 F.2d 1213, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 3080, 417 U.S.950, 41 L.Ed.2d 672. Bribery 3; Conspiracy 38; Obstructing Justice 160
Congressional concern with obstruction of justice may not be avoided by empty technicalities. Shimon v. U. S.,C.A.D.C.1965, 352 F.2d 449, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 152. Obstructing Justice 100
It is not a defense to a charge under former section 241 of this title, that the person assaulted, who had testified,and who afterward testified as a witness at the time of the assault was not under subpoena. Smith v. U.S.,C.C.A.8 (Ark.) 1921, 274 F. 351. Obstructing Justice 137
107. ---- Double jeopardy, defenses, practice and procedure
Where defendant was charged with making false statements and obstruction of justice, but district court granteddefendant's motion to dismiss obstruction charge for failure to identify false statements which were alleged tohave obstructed justice, and making false statement conviction was reversed for trial error, retrial on obstructioncharge was not barred by Double Jeopardy Clause; defendant sought dismissal of that charge on grounds unre-lated to his factual guilt or innocence, and making false statement charge and obstruction charge were not sameoffense for purposes of Double Jeopardy. U.S. v. Wood, C.A.10 (N.M.) 1992, 958 F.2d 963, opinion amendedon denial of rehearing. Double Jeopardy 91(1); Double Jeopardy 107.1
Defendant failed to show by convincing and competent proof that in returning verdict of not guilty to charge ofaltering absentee ballot without consent of voter, it was necessary for jury to find that absentee voter had con-sented to cancelling marked vote for purpose of precluding, on grounds of collateral estoppel, second trial of de-fendant for obstruction of justice by endeavoring to influence absentee voters, as state witnesses, to provide un-truthful testimony relating to alteration of absentee ballots, where in coming to its verdict it was not necessaryfor jury to find in defendant's favor on issue of absence of consent to cancellation of mark, rather, jury need onlyhave found that state failed to establish proof of formulation of fraudulent scheme or proof of conspiracy. U.S.v. Hogue, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1987, 812 F.2d 1568, rehearing denied 826 F.2d 15. Judgment 751
Defendant, who attempted to hire other party to kill grand jury witness, could be convicted both under 18U.S.C.A. § 1503, prohibiting any party from obstructing or attempting to obstruct administration of justice, andunder 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512, prohibiting any party from intimidating or harassing witnesses, without violating de-fendant's rights under double jeopardy clause of Fifth Amendment; conviction under former statute requiredproof of defendant's knowledge of pending judicial proceeding, which was expressly not element of violationunder latter statute. U.S. v. Risken, C.A.8 (Iowa) 1986, 788 F.2d 1361, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 329, 479 U.S.923, 93 L.Ed.2d 302. Double Jeopardy 150(1)
Pretrial diversion agreement concerning defendant's violation of statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1501] prohibiting ob-struction of process and his subsequent trial for violation of statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1503] prohibiting obstructionof justice was not multiplicitous and did not violate rules of double jeopardy, res judicata and collateral estoppel,where indictment upon which defendant was tried charged him with only one count, violation of statute prohibit-ing obstruction of justice, and at time of trial, charge of obstruction of process was dismissed with prejudice.U.S. v. Schaffner, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1985, 771 F.2d 149. Double Jeopardy 22; Judgment 751
Where indictment for obstruction of justice stated the name of the grand juror whom defendant allegedly en-deavored to influence and the location of the relevant grand jury and where the indictment specified the matterbefore the grand jury, connected the information that was allegedly communicated to the matter before the grandjury and set forth the means whereby defendant allegedly communicated with the grand juror, indictment con-tained basic facts necessary to apprise defendant of the charge and to prevent double jeopardy. U. S. v. Haas,
C.A.5 (Ala.) 1978, 583 F.2d 216, rehearing denied 588 F.2d 829, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 1788, 440 U.S. 981,60 L.Ed.2d 240. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)
Defendant who had previously been convicted in state court under state penal code for felonious assault withloaded pistol with intent to kill was not placed in double jeopardy by being prosecuted for obstructing and con-spiring to obstruct justice by injuring government witness with pistol, in violation of former provisions of thissection. Ferina v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1965, 340 F.2d 837, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1446, 381 U.S. 902, 14L.Ed.2d 284. Double Jeopardy 186
In prosecution for conspiring to obstruct justice where defendant's plea of “double jeopardy” incorporated thestenographic minutes which disclosed that on former trial only 11 jurors returned to court room, thus authorizinginference that one of the jurors was incapacitated to continue, overruling plea of double jeopardy was not error,since under the circumstances the court on prior trial had discretion to discharge the jury even if both parties hadconsented to proceed with reduced number of jurors. U.S. v. Potash, C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1941, 118 F.2d 54, certior-ari denied 61 S.Ct. 1103, 313 U.S. 584, 85 L.Ed. 1540. Double Jeopardy 99
An indictment for subornation of perjury was not bad as so vague and indefinite that it did not sufficiently ap-prise defendant of nature of offense charged so as to relieve him of danger of second prosecution for same acts.Walker v. U.S., C.C.A.8 (Mo.) 1938, 93 F.2d 792. Indictment And Information 71.4(11)
Conviction for conspiracy to transport liquor was not a bar to an indictment under former section 241 of this titlefor conspiracy to get a member of the former conspiracy out of the state. Pollock v. U.S., C.C.A.4 (Md.) 1929,35 F.2d 174.
108. ---- Entrapment, defenses, practice and procedure
Statement of informer to defendant charged with endeavoring to bribe member of jury panel in prospective fed-eral criminal trial that informer knew some members of jury panel and that one of them was his cousin affordeddefendant, at most, opportunities or facilities for commission of criminal offense and did not establish entrap-ment as matter of law. Osborn v. U. S., U.S.Tenn.1966, 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L.Ed.2d 394, rehearingdenied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17 L.Ed.2d 813. Criminal Law 739.1(3)
Evidence in prosecution for conspiring to bribe and influence a federal judge sustained finding that informant'sconduct did not coerce defendants, but merely tempted them with an opportunity, and that defendants “took thebait.” U.S. v. Marcello, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1984, 731 F.2d 1354. Criminal Law 569
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents violated no right of defendant or codefendants when they coached juror'sson and witness, who were voluntarily cooperating with Bureau, as to what they should say in talking with de-fendant and codefendants and told informers what questions to ask and suggested answers that should be givento certain questions should those questions be asked, and thus conduct of agents did not overstep bounds of per-missibility so as to constitute entrapment as matter of law. U. S. v. Quinn, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1976, 543 F.2d 640.Criminal Law 37(5)
Defendant who was charged with violating this section could not rely on defense of entrapment where he refusedto admit his guilt of the charged offense. U. S. v. Mitchell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1975, 514 F.2d 758, certiorari denied96 S.Ct. 86, 423 U.S. 847, 46 L.Ed.2d 68. Criminal Law 37(6.1)
Defendant's testimony, that she had mentioned to shoe store manager that she knew someone with same name asthe person named as defendant in narcotics conspiracy case in which store manager was serving as juror and thathe had responded “How well do you know Armone? Maybe I could get a shoe store out of this for myself”., astatement he immediately qualified by saying he was only kidding, furnished insufficient basis to support sub-mission of question of entrapment to jury in prosecution for attempting to bribe juror. U.S. v. DeAlesandro,C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 361 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74. Criminal Law
739.1(3)
109. ---- Estoppel, defenses, practice and procedure
Charges contained in first count charging defendant with corruptly endeavoring by threats to influence, intimid-ate and impede a prosecution witness were included in the slightly broader charges contained in second countwhich charged defendant with corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration ofjustice by conveying to same prosecution witness threatening communications; thus, where jury returned verdictof not guilty as to first count and where mistrial was declared as to second count, government was collaterallyestopped from retrying defendant on second count. U. S. v. Bowman, C.A.D.C.1979, 609 F.2d 12, 197U.S.App.D.C. 246. Judgment 751
110. ---- Impossibility, defenses, practice and procedure
Fact that informer, who had allegedly been employed by defendant to contact prospective juror in federal crim-inal case, never intended to carry out scheme did not preclude conviction, on theory of impossibility, for en-deavoring to bribe member of jury panel. Osborn v. U. S., U.S.Tenn.1966, 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17L.Ed.2d 394, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17 L.Ed.2d 813. Bribery 3
Impossibility of accomplishing goal of obstruction of justice does not prevent prosecution for endeavor to ac-complish the goal. U.S. v. Brimberry, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1984, 744 F.2d 580. Obstructing Justice 108
111. ---- Limitations, defenses, practice and procedure
Statute of limitations for a conspiracy to defraud United States, to obstruct justice, and to commit perjury is in-definitely extended. U S v. Bonanno, S.D.N.Y.1959, 177 F.Supp. 106, on subsequent appeal 285 F.2d 408.Criminal Law 150
In prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct administration of justice, where evidence established commission ofovert acts in furtherance of conspiracy within three-year period of limitations preceding indictment so that pro-secution was not barred, motions by defendants for acquittal were denied. U. S. v. Johnson, M.D.Pa.1947, 76F.Supp. 542, affirmed 165 F.2d 42, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 355, 332 U.S. 852, 92 L.Ed. 421, motion granted68 S.Ct. 357, rehearing denied 68 S.Ct. 457, 333 U.S. 834, 92 L.Ed. 1118, certiorari denied 68 S.Ct. 355, 332
112. ---- Speedy trial, defenses, practice and procedure
Defendant is not denied a speedy trial, because grand jury's indictment is placed on a secret file for somethingless than three months before it is openly filed on ground that juror whom defendant is charged with endeavor-ing to influence is one of the jury impaneled to try a prosecution under the Smith Act, section 2385 of this title,and that the judge believes it might create a prejudicial climate to some of the defendants in the case, where de-fendant offers no evidence of prejudice and states that there is none. Kong v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1954, 216F.2d 665. Criminal Law 573
Where indictment charging violation of this section pertaining to assault on federal officer was returned on Mar.5, 1968 and motion to dismiss for denial of speedy trial was made on May 29, 1970, and government had failedto assign case for trial because defendant was appealing conviction of violation of former section 902 of Title 15and defendant had been physically available for trial between Mar. 5 and Nov. 16, 1969, but at time of hearingon defendant's motion his counsel did not know of defendant's whereabouts, and part of the delay resulted fromconsideration of defendant's motions and delay was not shown to have been prejudicial, there was no denial ofright to speedy trial. U. S. v. Brown, E.D.La.1971, 321 F.Supp. 681. Criminal Law 577.15(4)
113. Severance, practice and procedure
No prejudice resulted from lack of testimony from defendant's counsel of record concerning defendant's attemptto influence potential witness since counsel was not present at time defendant telephoned witness and later metwith him and because, regardless of timing of agent's remarks, defendant knew or should have known of poten-tial witness' status, and thus defendant was not entitled to severance of obstruction of justice counts from under-lying fraud counts on theory that counsel's testimony would have clarified potential witness' status as a nonwit-ness. U.S. v. Davis, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 752 F.2d 963. Criminal Law 622.7(3)
Trial of one defendant for obstructing justice with other defendants was not prejudicial to her, although that de-fendant was not alleged to have had any role in other defendants' activities until a certain date, in view of factthat actions attributed to her at trial were not complex. U. S. v. Barton, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 647 F.2d 224, certi-orari denied 102 S.Ct. 307, 454 U.S. 857, 70 L.Ed.2d 152. Criminal Law 622.7(3)
District court did not abuse discretion in denying defendant's motion for a separate trial on count charging de-fendant and his codefendants with conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstruction of criminal investigationswhere, even though defendant was not charged with involvement in related drug conspiracy which led to the al-leged conspiracy to obstruct justice and despite defendant's assertion that he had no knowledge of his codefend-ants' drug activities and that he would be prejudiced by a joint trial at which there was evidence concerning hiscodefendants' criminal activities, defendant's trial was not unduly complex or lengthy and the district court fullyinstructed the jury regarding the limited admissibility of coconspirators' statements and cautioned the jury toconsider each count and the evidence against each defendant separately. U. S. v. Cuesta, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 597F.2d 903, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 451, 444 U.S. 964, 62 L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 452, 444U.S. 964, 62 L.Ed.2d 377. Criminal Law 622.7(4); Criminal Law 622.7(8)
No “substantial prejudice” resulted from the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to sever tax counts fromthe indictment's other counts, since most, if not all, of the evidence on the extortion and obstruction of justicecounts would have been admissible on the tax evasion count, and since the false exemption counts were suffi-ciently discrete that there was no danger of prejudicial spillover. U. S. v. Ochs, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1979, 595 F.2d1247, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 435, 444 U.S. 955, 62 L.Ed.2d 328, rehearing denied 100 S.Ct. 695, 444 U.S.1027, 62 L.Ed.2d 663. Criminal Law 1166(6)
Denial of defendant's motion for separate trial on count charging making and use of false documents in applica-tion to the Small Business Administration for a disaster loan and count charging knowingly and corruptly en-deavoring to obstruct the administration of justice by endeavoring to have grand jury witness testify falsely wasnot an abuse of discretion or reversible error, where if severance had been granted evidence, including transcriptof grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses who admitted it was false, would have been substantially thesame in separate trials as presented in toto at the one trial. U. S. v. Rajewski, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 526 F.2d 149,certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 2231, 426 U.S. 908, 48 L.Ed.2d 833. Criminal Law 620(6); Criminal Law1166(6)
Even if testimony of one defendant, during presentation of her defense to charge of conspiracy to obstructjustice and suborn perjury, tended to establish a link between her and codefendants and that link had been sup-plied only inferentially in government's case, such did not by itself require trial court to sever a codefendant'scase, particularly where defendant's testimony in no way indicated that she had worked with codefendant in at-tempting to prevent certain person from testifying before grand jury. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 366 F.2d259, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 321, 385 U.S. 948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 324, 385 U.S. 948,17 L.Ed.2d 226, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 502, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 503,385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445. Criminal Law 622.7(7)
False declaration and obstruction of justice charges against defendant were not required to be severed fromRICO count relating to alleged involvement of organized crime and local union in moving and storage industry,where defendant as named in RICO count, and Government intended to prove that false declaration and obstruc-tion of justice counts would be offered to prove defendant's guilt of RICO conspiracy and related substantive of-fenses. U.S. v. Rastelli, E.D.N.Y.1986, 653 F.Supp. 1034. Criminal Law 620(6)
All counts of indictment charging defendant with knowingly and willfully causing to be made false and fictitiouswritten statements as to material fact in matter within jurisdiction of Department of Housing and Urban Devel-opment, with inducing another to make material misrepresentation to obstruct official investigation, and with at-tempting to persuade another to give false testimony before grand jury, could be joined for trial where all of-fenses arose out of defendant's scheme to acquire property from Department which had been earmarked for own-er-occupied homesteaders, by fraud, for investment purposes, or out of defendant's attempt to cover-up thatscheme once government began investigating defendant's activities. U. S. v. Reynolds, S.D.Ohio 1980, 503F.Supp. 56. Criminal Law 620(1)
In prosecution for conspiring to obstruct federal justice and to transport fugitive from state authority into anotherstate, facts, if true, that one defendant was not a party to the main conspiracy, that his defense would be antagon-
istic to that of other defendants and might be overwhelmed by weight of their numbers, and that all other de-fendants had past criminal records and defendant had not would not warrant granting of a severance as to suchdefendant. U S v. Dioguardi, S.D.N.Y.1956, 20 F.R.D. 10. Criminal Law 622.7(6); Criminal Law622.7(8)
114. Comments or conduct of court, practice and procedure
Testimony of federal district judge, and his wife, that they were upset and concerned when they learned of ac-tions of defendant, who had appeal pending from judge's dismissal of civil action defendant had filed, in at-tempting to file invalid lien against them was relevant to defendant's intent to influence judicial or grand juryproceedings through filing of lien, and thus was admissible in prosecution for obstruction of justice. U.S. v.Fleming, C.A.9 (Cal.) 2000, 215 F.3d 930. Obstructing Justice 169
Trial judge presiding over prosecution of an attorney for obstruction of justice did not abuse his discretion in re-fusing to disqualify or recuse himself even though judge, following receipt of threats against his safety, had beenremoved as trial judge in prior criminal action in which attorney had represented one of defendants. U.S. v. Wi-lensky, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1985, 757 F.2d 594. Judges 51(4)
Judge's comment on his disbelief in defendant's testimony of his lack of memory of events at his trial for ob-struction of justice was within the compass of right of a judge in a federal court trial to comment on evidence. U.S. v. Woodmansee, C.A.2 (Vt.) 1965, 354 F.2d 235. Criminal Law 656(6)
115. Comments or conduct of counsel, practice and procedure
Even if tape recordings of conversations in prison between prisoner and defendant charged with conspiracy toobstruct justice and suborn perjury on part of prisoner were unconstitutionally obtained, prosecutor's question insummation as to whether there was any way of knowing whether, had defendant denied that she had offeredmoney to prisoner, government could otherwise have proved offer of money did no more than suggest posses-sion of further proof by government and, although improper, did not amount to use at trial of unconstitutionallyobtained evidence. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 366 F.2d 259, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 321, 385 U.S.948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 324, 385 U.S. 948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct.502, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 503, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445. Criminal Law
392.39(4)
In prosecution for attempting to bribe a juror, it was fair argument for prosecutor to state that in order to acquitdefendant jury would have to find alleged offeree and his corroborators (whose testimony was in direct conflictwith that of defendant) to be perjurors; and prosecutor's remark that in order to acquit defendant another govern-ment witness would also have to be found to be a perjurer was, as discounted by comments of court in sustainingdefense objection, not prejudicial to defendant. U.S. v. DeAlesandro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 361 F.2d 694, certior-ari denied 87 S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74. Criminal Law 1171.3; Criminal Law 2098(5)
Fact that assistant United States attorney conducted allegedly obstructed grand jury proceeding did not bar him
from conducting or assisting conduct of government's case in prosecution for obstructing justice and conspiracyto obstruct justice. Shimon v. U. S., C.A.D.C.1965, 352 F.2d 449, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 152. Criminal Law1694
Under circumstances, conduct of defense counsel in interviewing jurors, after verdict, concerning communica-tion to some jurors during trial, did not require disciplinary action. U. S. v. Miller, D.C.Conn.1968, 284 F.Supp.220, appeal dismissed 403 F.2d 77. Attorney And Client 42
116. Examination of jurors, practice and procedure
Limiting access of former juror charged with endeavoring to obstruct justice by accepting money in exchangefor voting to acquit reputed member of organized crime family to former fellow jurors did not interfere with de-fendant's right to present defense; defendant was permitted to interview only consenting jurors and only injudge's presence. U.S. v. Radonjich, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 1 F.3d 117, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 897, 510 U.S.1079, 127 L.Ed.2d 89. Criminal Law 868
Trial judge has broad discretion concerning extent of inquiry into potential juror prejudice, and is not required toconduct an individual inquiry where race is not a central aspect of the case. U. S. v. Kibler, C.A.4 (Md.) 1982,667 F.2d 452, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2037, 456 U.S. 961, 72 L.Ed.2d 485. Jury 131(13)
117. Burden of proof, practice and procedure
Obstruction of justice prosecution cannot rest solely on allegation of or proof of perjury; rather, what also mustadditionally be proven is that false statements given, in some way, either obstructed or were intended to obstructdue administration of justice. U.S. v. Grubb, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1993, 11 F.3d 426, habeas corpus denied 859F.Supp. 227, affirmed as modified 65 F.3d 167. Obstructing Justice 141
Trial court created mandatory rebuttable presumption impermissibly shifting burden of proof in obstruction ofjustice case, by instructing jury that unless witness' purported fear of harm to himself or family if he testified be-fore grand jury was genuine, substantiated and sole motive for refusing to testify, such fear could not have effectof negating element of willfully and corruptly refusing to testify. U.S. v. Banks, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 988 F.2d1106. Criminal Law 778(6)
It was incumbent upon prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant acted either corruptly or bythreats in endeavor either to influence, intimidate or impede witness. Overton v. U. S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1968, 403F.2d 444. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
After establishing that third person had willfully endeavored to influence, intimidate, and impede petit juror inthe discharge of his duties, government had burden of connecting defendant with the crime as an aider and abet-tor. U. S. v. Hoffa, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 349 F.2d 20, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 645, 382 U.S. 1024, 15 L.Ed.2d538, affirmed 87 S.Ct. 408, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 970, 386 U.S. 940, 386U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 971, 386 U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880. Obstruct-
Government's burden on obstruction of justice charge was not satisfied merely by proof that defendant renderedfalse testimony but, rather, government had to further demonstrate that testimony thwarted or impeded grandjury's investigation in order to demonstrate “added element of obstruction.” U.S. v. Caron, E.D.Va.1982, 551F.Supp. 662, affirmed 722 F.2d 739, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1602, 465 U.S. 1103, 80 L.Ed.2d 132. Obstruct-ing Justice 135; Obstructing Justice 168
118. Admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure--Generally
District court did not abuse its discretion by allowing redacted temporary restraining order, preliminary injunc-tion, and final order stating that government had ownership interest in coins in defendant's safety deposit box atbank, or at least right to possession or control over those coins, to be admitted into evidence and used by juryduring deliberations, rather than confining reference to them to stipulation of their existence, in defendant's trialon charges of theft of government property and obstruction of justice, since those documents inevitably assistedjury when it considered defendant's intent in removing coins because they set forth situation that he faced withrespect to control of coins and made benefit clear that he could hope to obtain by gaining possession of them.U.S. v. Sussman, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2013, 709 F.3d 155. Criminal Law 429(2); Criminal Law 858(3)
Evidence of defendant's substantial compensation as head of investment banking department, that was contem-poraneous to alleged acts of obstruction that related to investigation by Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC), was admissible; it was relevant to defendant's motive to protect his reputation and that of department ofcompany, and it was not unduly prejudicial because government specified during its opening statement and sum-mation that evidence of defendant's compensation was to be used for limited purpose of establishing motive toobstruct and could not be used to convict defendant simply because of his wealth. U.S. v. Quattrone, C.A.2(N.Y.) 2006, 441 F.3d 153, mandamus dismissed 224 Fed.Appx. 106, 2007 WL 1475627. Criminal Law338(7); Obstructing Justice 169
In prosecution for extortion, conspiracy and obstruction of justice, in view of evidence that particular defendantstated that he would kill debtor if latter did not pay his debt, in view of such defendant's statements that personssupplying the money which he loaned were violent persons, and in view of telephone conversations with suchdefendant clearly threatening violence toward debtor, handguns seized during search of premises pursuant to ad-mittedly valid search warrant were relevant and admissible. U. S. v. Cifarelli, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 589 F.2d 180.Criminal Law 404.65
In prosecution for knowingly and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the administration of justice by endeavoringto induce grand jury witness to testify falsely there was no error in admitting in evidence excerpts from thosewitnesses' grand jury testimony which such witnesses, while testifying for government at trial, stated was false,since that testimony was clearly probative of issue, contrary, to defense claim that prosecution sought to intro-duce prior inconsistent statements as substantive rather than impeachment evidence. U. S. v. Rajewski, C.A.7(Ill.) 1975, 526 F.2d 149, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 2231, 426 U.S. 908, 48 L.Ed.2d 833. Obstructing Justice
In prosecution under this section, evidence of indictments which had been pending at time of the charged of-fense was admissible as a necessary ingredient to establish motive. U. S. v. Mitchell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1975, 514F.2d 758, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 86, 423 U.S. 847, 46 L.Ed.2d 68. Criminal Law 371.20; Criminal Law
372.55
In prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct justice and with obstruction of justice by endeavoring to influence wit-ness in another prosecution for making of illegal loan, evidence of events preceding conspiracy was admissibleto prove intent, purpose and aim of parties to conspiracy. U. S. v. Cioffi, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1974, 493 F.2d 1111, cer-tiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 195, 419 U.S. 917, 42 L.Ed.2d 155. Criminal Law 422(3)
Juror's testimony that he had been offered a bribe by defendant's principal was admissible to establish that acrime had been committed and to corroborate testimony of another witness as to statements made by defendantto other witness. U. S. v. Hoffa, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 349 F.2d 20, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 645, 382 U.S.1024, 15 L.Ed.2d 538, affirmed 87 S.Ct. 408, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 970, 386U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 971, 386 U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d880. Obstructing Justice 169; Witnesses 414(1)
Evidence that defendant, charged with accepting money from a designated individual as part of conspiracy toobstruct, influence or impede due administration of justice by obtaining leniency for another, had on prior occa-sions received gifts from such individual, was relevant and properly admitted by judge who restricted it to showrelationship between them, and judge's conclusion that its relevancy outweighed any tendency to undue preju-dice was not abuse of discretion. U. S. v. Kahaner, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1963, 317 F.2d 459, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct.62, 375 U.S. 835, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 478, 375 U.S. 982, 11 L.Ed.2d 429, certiorari denied84 S.Ct. 73, 375 U.S. 836, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 74, 375 U.S. 836, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, rehearingdenied 84 S.Ct. 263, 375 U.S. 926, 11 L.Ed.2d 169. Criminal Law 673(5)
Evidence that defendant, charged with endeavoring to obstruct justice, had visited witness and offered him sumnot to appear in court against him and stated that, if witness did appear, defendant would kill him or have himkilled was admissible, with respect to defendant's intent in soliciting assistance of witness' employee, who testi-fied that defendant had offered to pay her $100 to put illegal whiskey in witness' bar. Knight v. U. S., C.A.5(Ga.) 1962, 310 F.2d 305. Criminal Law 371.47
In prosecution for attempting to influence a juror, evidence as to what occurred between defendant's intermedi-ary and juror was properly admitted, since it was fact that conversation with juror took place, and not truth orfalsity of what was said in course of it, which was material to the charge. Hicks v. U.S., C.A.4 (Va.) 1949, 173F.2d 570, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 1501, 337 U.S. 945, 93 L.Ed. 1748. Criminal Law 419(2)
Evidence of jury tampering arising out of defendant's friends contacting state police officer whose wife was jur-or's cousin relative to his going out in state police car in uniform and attempting to contact juror despite sequest-ration order was admissible to same extent as similar matters showing consciousness of guilt where there wasdirect testimony that defendant instituted, suggested or approved attempt to reach juror through officer. U. S. v.Bellomini, W.D.Pa.1978, 454 F.Supp. 44. Criminal Law 351(8)
In prosecution for obstruction of justice, testimony relating to an alleged scheme or plot dealing with priorityscofflaw notices whereby defendant writ server allegedly intended to divert funds from city was admissible, un-der limiting instructions, for purposes of establishing defendant's motive for the charged obstruction of justice.U. S. v. Simmons, E.D.Pa.1978, 444 F.Supp. 500. Criminal Law 673(5)
Alleged attempt by defendants to obtain grand jury minutes, material under section 3500 of this title and thedraft of an indictment was an offense wholly unrelated to crime of subornation of perjury for which they wereawaiting trial in other proceeding and incriminating statements assertedly elicited from one defendant while hewas under the other indictment in absence of counsel were admissible as to the unrelated charges. U. S. v. Ros-ner, S.D.N.Y.1972, 352 F.Supp. 915, petition denied 497 F.2d 919. Criminal Law 410.8
Records of telephone calls between phone numbers listed in names of defendants in prosecution for corruptlyendeavoring to influence a petit juror sitting in trial of a civil action, and of attorney and law firm which repres-ented plaintiff in the civil action, were admissible over objection that, insofar as they tended to prove motive,they were irrelevant, motive not being an element of the offense, where chain of connection from juror led backby positive and direct evidence to defendants, and thus, the records had effect of closing circle of circumstantialevidence around defendants, as proof of motive tends to render it probable that act was committed. U. S. v.Torquato, W.D.Pa.1970, 316 F.Supp. 846. Obstructing Justice 169
Evidence that defendant was convicted may not properly be brought to jury's attention in subsequent prosecutionof defendant for obstructing justice in connection with his trial. U. S. v. Verra, S.D.N.Y.1962, 203 F.Supp. 87.Criminal Law 368.61
119. ---- Affidavits, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
In prosecution for endeavoring to bribe member of jury panel in prospective federal criminal trial, permittinggovernment, on rebuttal, to introduce informer's affidavit alleging commission of specific criminal offense andto show circumstances under which tape recording of conversation between informer and defendant had beenauthorized by federal district judges was proper as relevant response to defendant's testimony that it was inform-er, at instigation of government, who had initiated plan to approach prospective juror. Osborn v. U. S.,U.S.Tenn.1966, 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L.Ed.2d 394, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17L.Ed.2d 813. Criminal Law 683(1)
120. ---- Coconspirator's declarations, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Coconspirators' statements concerning defendants' attempts to conceal arson-for-profit scheme were admissible,where conspiracy to maliciously destroy property by explosives and commit mail fraud in order to obtain insur-ance benefits for remodeling purposes continued throughout period of all statements in question. U.S. v. Zabic,C.A.7 (Ill.) 1984, 745 F.2d 464. Criminal Law 422(1)
Where conspiracy to violate prospective witness' civil rights terminated with her death and purpose of testimonyof defendant's accomplice, whose testimony as only eyewitness to murder was essential and whose credibility
was subject to attack, regarding statements made without defendant's authority by defendant's wife, uncle andfriends, who were not available for cross-examination, implicating defendant in witness' murder was to get be-fore jury fact that defendant's associates believed him guilty, accomplice's testimony was not admissible as de-clarations of coconspirator made in course of conspiracy or as evidence of acts designed to show illegal activityon part of conspirators or as admissions by defendant's agents but was inadmissible hearsay. U. S. v. Pacelli,C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1974, 491 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 43, 419 U.S. 826, 42 L.Ed.2d 49. Criminal Law
410.40; Criminal Law 419(10); Criminal Law 422(1); Criminal Law 1169.1(9)
121. ---- Exculpatory statements doctrine, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Where government agent testified that defendant had told him that she did not know of any narcotics trial inNew York and that she had nothing to do with any juror in such trial and such testimony was contradicted by de-fendant's own testimony at trial injury tampering case, the exculpatory statements doctrine was applicable. U.S.v. DeAlesandro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 361 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74.Criminal Law 783(1)
122. ---- Hearsay, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
In obstruction of justice prosecution, union member's statement to defendant that another union member was in-volved in the grand jury and that he was the second person that month was offered to provide context for defend-ant's instructions to union member that he should lie to law enforcement, and thus was not hearsay; without uni-on member's statement, defendant's response of “you don't know nothing” and “just play stupid” would not havemade sense. U.S. v. Macari, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 453 F.3d 926, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 688, 549 U.S. 1054, 166L.Ed.2d 518. Criminal Law 419(2)
In prosecution for conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice, admission of portion of tran-script of attachment hearing during which defendant called corporate employee to provide foundation for intro-duction of altered corporate ledger which was used in an attempt to defeat order of attachment was not inadmiss-ible hearsay as transcript was read into record in criminal trial not for truth of corporate employee's statementsbut as direct evidence of defendant's act of obstruction of justice. U. S. v. Coven, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 662 F.2d162, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1771, 456 U.S. 916, 72 L.Ed.2d 176. Criminal Law 419(12)
Testimony of cafe waitress as to remarks of cafe proprietor, made after defendant in prosecution for endeavoringto obstruct justice by jury tampering left the cafe, that defendant had offered proprietor $30,000 to tamper withjury, was admissible in evidence as a spontaneous utterance. U. S. v. Bell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 351 F.2d 868,certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1200, 383 U.S. 947, 16 L.Ed.2d 210. Criminal Law 368(3)
Testimony, in prosecution for willfully endeavoring to influence, intimidate, and impede petit jurors in dischargeof their duties, that one defendant had told a juror's son that he needed certain information from son about jurorbecause he had to make a call to Louisville by nine o'clock was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rulesince it was a statement as to the one defendant's intent to do an act, as evidence of probable doing of it. U. S. v.Hoffa, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 349 F.2d 20, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 645, 382 U.S. 1024, 15 L.Ed.2d 538, af-firmed 87 S.Ct. 408, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 970, 386 U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951,
17 L.Ed.2d 880, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 971, 386 U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880. Criminal Law419(2.40)
123. ---- Illegally seized evidence, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Any violation of defendant's rights which occurred when he was arrested and then driven 107 miles for arraign-ment, with the appearance being conducted in secret in order to prevent his arrest on charges of obstruction ofjustice from prejudicing an ongoing trial did not require dismissal of the charges against defendant; even if hisarrest and detention were illegal, suppression of illegally obtained evidence would provide a proper sanction. U.S. v. Neiswender, C.A.4 (Md.) 1979, 590 F.2d 1269, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2410, 441 U.S. 963, 60 L.Ed.2d1068. Arrest 70(2)
Witness' testimony before grand jury that occurred without prior advisement of rights was admissible in prosec-ution of witness for obstruction of grand jury regardless of whether there was right to warnings similar to Mir-anda warnings in grand jury context, where indictment and bill of particulars bound Government to prove ob-struction of justice by showing false or misleading statements to grand jury; unwarned testimonial evidence ofperjury was not suppressible at subsequent perjury trial, even if there had been constitutional right to warningswhich were not given. U.S. v. Gillespie, N.D.Ind.1991, 773 F.Supp. 1154, affirmed in part 974 F.2d 796,amended on denial of rehearing. Criminal Law 411.3; Criminal Law 539(2)
124. ---- Immunized testimony, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Since alleged obstruction of justice, if it occurred at all, had to have taken place following court's grant of im-munity under section 6002 of this title to defendant, grant of immunity did not bar use of immunized testimonyagainst defendant on obstruction of justice charges. U.S. v. Caron, E.D.Va.1982, 551 F.Supp. 662, affirmed 722F.2d 739, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1602, 465 U.S. 1103, 80 L.Ed.2d 132. Criminal Law 42.6
125. ---- Inconsistent prior statements, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Witness' testimony, which was to effect that one defendant, charged with corruptly endeavoring to influencepetit jurors sitting in civil action, claimed to have worked for or been silent partner in firm handling litigationand which was introduced to contradict testimony of member of law firm that defendants had never been em-ployed by the firm was not inadmissible as claim of an alleged agent to establish agency but was admissible asstatements of a party defendant inconsistent with testimony produced by defendant's own witness at time of trial;it was immaterial when statements were made. U. S. v. Torquato, W.D.Pa.1970, 316 F.Supp. 846. Witnesses
406
126. ---- Other acts, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Use of other acts evidence to establish background of scheme to obstruct justice in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1503 is proper and often crucial. U.S. v. Arnold, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 773 F.2d 823. Criminal Law 368.92;Criminal Law 372.55
Evidence of defendant's attempt to bribe a police officer to perjure himself about where and how gravity knifewas found in defendant's car was admissible as showing consciousness of guilt and as an act of concealment rel-evant to the charge of wilful evasion of income taxes. U. S. v. Ochs, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1979, 595 F.2d 1247, certior-ari denied 100 S.Ct. 435, 444 U.S. 955, 62 L.Ed.2d 328, rehearing denied 100 S.Ct. 695, 444 U.S. 1027, 62L.Ed.2d 663. Criminal Law 351(8); Internal Revenue 5294
Allegations in pending civil forfeiture action against owner of commercial real estate, and Iranian state-ownedbank, were relevant to motive and state of mind of defendant, the president of non-profit foundation promotingIslamic culture and Persian language which was formed by owner to avoid paying substantial taxes on rental in-come from owner's real estate, in allegedly discarding documents responsive to federal grand jury subpoena, andthus, were admissible in defendant's criminal prosecution for obstruction of justice; defendant's knowledge of in-vestigation underlying subpoena was appropriate line of inquiry at trial, and to extent that grand jury's investiga-tion involved entities associated with Iranian government, defendant's knowledge of that and of alleged relation-ships was relevant to motive and state of mind required for obstruction of justice crimes. U.S. v. Jahedi,S.D.N.Y.2009, 681 F.Supp.2d 430. Obstructing Justice 169
127. ---- Privileged communications, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Attorney-client privilege did not protect attorney's conversation with his client relating to plan to bribe juror inclient's trial. Matter of Doe, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1977, 551 F.2d 899. Privileged Communications And Confidentiality
154
128. ---- Recordings, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
Tape recording, which related conversation between informer and defendant, which was unquestioned as to itsaccuracy, and which was authorized by judges of federal district court in response to detailed factual affidavit ofinformer alleging commission of specific criminal offense directly affecting administration of justice in federalcourts was properly admitted in prosecution for endeavoring to bribe member of jury panel in prospective feder-al criminal trial. Osborn v. U. S., U.S.Tenn.1966, 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L.Ed.2d 394, rehearing denied87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17 L.Ed.2d 813. Criminal Law 438.1
Admission of tape recording of conversations between defendant, government agent posing as a “freelance hit-man,” and individual who introduced the agent to defendant was not error, in prosecution for obstructing justice,where trial court reviewed the tapes in camera and required that appropriate foundation be established as to theirauthenticity. U. S. v. Brinklow, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1977, 560 F.2d 1008. Criminal Law 444.15
Fact that witness had surreptitiously recorded defendant's statements by means of a hidden mechanical device inwitness' apartment did not render recordings inadmissible, in prosecution for obstructing justice. U. S. v. Knohl,C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1967, 379 F.2d 427, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 472, 389 U.S. 973, 19 L.Ed.2d 465. Criminal Law
392.21
Defendant who was not party to recorded telephone conversations lacked standing, in prosecution for obstruct-
ing justice, to raise either objections under U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 4 and 6 or section 502 of Title 47 to ad-missibility of recorded statements. Shimon v. U. S., C.A.D.C.1965, 352 F.2d 449, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 152. Crim-inal Law 392.41
Because witness' consent to recording of telephone conversation was coerced, the listening into telephone con-versation was an interception in violation of section 605 of Title 47, and the intercepted conversation could notbe used as evidence. Laughlin v. U. S., C.A.D.C.1965, 344 F.2d 187, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 93. Criminal Law392.21; Telecommunications 1440
129. ---- Stipulations, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure
In defendant's trial for conspiracy to obstruct justice, in which parties had prepared a stipulation, which coveredevents through Oct. 3, 1972, in order to permit the jury to understand the background of the case, evidence ofactivities between October 3 and November 9, the date on which the conspiracy was alleged to have started, wasproperly admitted to bridge the gap in time between that covered by the stipulation and that covered by the in-dictment so that jury would not become confused and have to speculate about the period. U. S. v. Partin, C.A.5(Ga.) 1977, 552 F.2d 621, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 298, 434 U.S. 903, 54 L.Ed.2d 189. Criminal Law 661
130. Examination of witnesses, practice and procedure--Generally
In prosecution for obstruction of justice in which insanity was raised as a defense, trial judge's improper inter-ruption of both direct and cross-examination of defendant's expert witness, a psychiatrist, with questions delvingdeeply into basis for opinion as to defendant's sanity and extent of defendant's involvement with usage of drugs,while approaching level of prejudicial error, was harmless in view of overwhelming evidence supporting convic-tion. U.S. v. Wilensky, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1985, 757 F.2d 594. Criminal Law 1166.22(5)
It was not error to curtail attempts of defendant, charged with corruptly endeavoring to influence a juror by at-tempting to distribute to her a handbook espousing defendant's view of jury nullification, i.e., that if a juror'sconscience dictated against enforcement of a particular law he could vote for acquittal, to explain the researchand study which were the basis of his beliefs since defendant's views were entirely contrary to law and weremerely a variation of the unacceptable concept that individual good faith is a complete defense. U. S. v. Ogle,C.A.10 (Colo.) 1979, 613 F.2d 233, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 87, 449 U.S. 825, 66 L.Ed.2d 28, rehearingdenied 101 S.Ct. 594, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L.Ed.2d 487. Obstructing Justice 169
Where what, if anything, juror's son may have done for Federal Bureau of Investigation in prior years had noth-ing to do with whether defendant attempted to bribe juror or with what juror's son did in assisting Bureau in de-veloping case against defendant, government was not guilty of any outrageous conduct in its dealings with jur-or's son and his testimony did not present any real question of credibility, defense counsel, who was not permit-ted to inquire into nature and extent of prior dealings between juror's son and Bureau, was not unduly restrictedin cross-examining witness. U. S. v. Quinn, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1976, 543 F.2d 640. Witnesses 372(2)
In prosecution for endeavoring to violate this section, once defense counsel implicitly attacked credibility of
coindictee, who was government's key witness, by eliciting that coindictee had not yet been sentenced on guiltyplea, it was within trial court's discretion to permit government to elicit from coindictee's attorney that coindict-ee had received no promises for his testimony. U. S. v. Mitchell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1975, 514 F.2d 758, certioraridenied 96 S.Ct. 86, 423 U.S. 847, 46 L.Ed.2d 68. Witnesses 376
Court, trying prosecution for conspiracy, involving charge of attempt to obtain leniency for one who was to besentenced, was warranted in excluding question to a defendant as to whether he had discussed with judges indistrict, after his retirement as United States attorney there, practice of such judges as to receiving pre-sentenceinformation, and in excluding questions addressed to character witness as to whether he had ever spoken to fed-eral judge before sentencing concerning a man whom he did not represent, and in rejecting an offer to prove thattwo judges in the district considered it proper to receive information concerning persons about to be sentenced.U. S. v. Kahaner, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1963, 317 F.2d 459, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 62, 375 U.S. 835, 11 L.Ed.2d 65,rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 478, 375 U.S. 982, 11 L.Ed.2d 429, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 73, 375 U.S. 836, 11L.Ed.2d 65, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 74, 375 U.S. 836, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 263, 375 U.S.926, 11 L.Ed.2d 169. Criminal Law 338(1)
In prosecution for income tax evasion for 1951 through 1953, and for corruptly endeavoring to influence witnessbefore grand jury, wherein government witness testified that he had destroyed certain records at defendant's in-sistence, and government introduced working papers of witness in 1951 income tax return to prove his claimedpay-off to defendant in that year, and on cross-examination defendant sought to discredit witness, trial court didnot abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination of witness by excluding questions as to correctness of wit-ness' 1952 and 1953 returns. Berra v. U.S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1955, 221 F.2d 590, certiorari granted 76 S.Ct. 190, 350U.S. 910, 100 L.Ed. 798, rehearing denied 76 S.Ct. 297, 350 U.S. 943, 100 L.Ed. 822, affirmed 76 S.Ct. 685,351 U.S. 131, 100 L.Ed. 1013. Witnesses 330(3)
131. ---- Physical examination, examination of witnesses, practice and procedure
Defendant in prosecution for obstructing justice, wherein he was alleged to have assaulted a prospective witness15 months previously, was not entitled to physical examination of that witness. U. S. v. Verra, S.D.N.Y.1962,203 F.Supp. 87. Criminal Law 650
In action for injuries, where defense elicited testimony from a witness that a material witness was unavailableand that counsel was advised that witness was injured by an assault with the apparent motive of keeping himfrom testifying in court, request of counsel for plaintiff to have a physician accompany marshal and bring thewitness into court provided he was found to be in physical condition to appear was properly granted. Russell v.Monongahela Ry. Co., W.D.Pa.1958, 159 F.Supp. 650, affirmed 262 F.2d 349. Witnesses 20
132. Expert witnesses, practice and procedure
In prosecution wherein defendants were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States of due administra-tion of justice and of impeding due administration of justice by manipulating “blind draw” system of judicial as-signment in bankruptcy court, expert testimony was highly probative and appropriate to assist jury in interpret-ing statistical significance of distribution and was critical to refute defense theories, and was properly admitted.
U.S. v. August, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1984, 745 F.2d 400. Criminal Law 476.6
In prosecution for endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice, district court did not abuse its discretionin admitting testimony of police officer as emergency medical technician expert, notwithstanding government'sfailure to inform defendants before trial that police officer would testify as expert. U.S. v. Johnson, C.A.11 (Ga.)1983, 713 F.2d 654, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1295, 465 U.S. 1030, 79 L.Ed.2d 695. Criminal Law629.5(7)
133. Suppression of evidence, practice and procedure
Statement made by juror during interview in trial judge's chambers with respect to telephone call which hadbeen made to juror's house by defendant on the evening after juror had been sworn did not come within provi-sions of section 3500 of this title and, as the statement was incorporated in the transcript of the record of the trialin which the juror sat, government did not suppress or conceal any exculpatory statements with respect to chargeof corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede a petit juror. U. S. v. Roe, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1975, 529 F.2d 629.Criminal Law 627.7(3)
134. Weight and sufficiency of evidence, practice and procedure--Generally
Evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant's obstruction of justice offense involved aggravatingcircumstances not adequately taken into consideration by Sentencing Commission, warranting six-level en-hancement under Sentencing Guidelines; following September 11 terrorist attacks, defendant concocted andwent considerable distance towards executing elaborate scheme to feign his death in attempt to avoid prosecu-tion for passport fraud by lying to his attorney, researching identities of individuals killed in terrorist attacks tosupport his contention, while posing as his “brother,” that he was killed in attacks, and attempting to commitfraud on court and city. U.S. v. Leung, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 360 F.3d 62. Sentencing And Punishment 761
Evidence, while not uncontradicted, nevertheless supported conviction for obstruction of justice; testimony in-dicated that corporate minutes requested by grand jury had been altered after date of original subpoena and thatsome of original minutes remained missing, and defendant did not produce some originals until year after re-quest, although defendant explained that he had recently found some of minutes under rug in his home and thatalterations in minutes had been undertaken in order to make corrections for purposes of unrelated civil suit. U.S.v. Brooks, C.A.4 (Va.) 1997, 111 F.3d 365. Obstructing Justice 170(6)
Evidence that, in response to grand jury subpoena for documents relating to contractor's repairs to defendant'shome while defendant was employed as contracting officer by Internal Revenue Service (IRS), defendant pro-duced backdated contract that fraudulently showed that contractor had been paid for work performed was suffi-cient to support conviction for obstructing justice by impeding grand jury investigation. U.S. v. Jespersen, C.A.2(N.Y.) 1995, 65 F.3d 993, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1571, 517 U.S. 1169, 134 L.Ed.2d 669. Obstructing Justice
170(6)
Neither fact that the defendant had already been indicted at time of alleged threats intended to hinder investiga-
tion nor fact that obstruction may not have been successful foreclosed defendant's conviction for obstruction ofjustice; government only had to prove that defendant knew of pending judicial proceeding and that he attemptedto impede its administration, and fact that defendant had already been indicted did not foreclose possibility offurther interference. U.S. v. Edwards, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 36 F.3d 639, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed inpart, remanded in part 129 F.3d 1268, rehearing denied. Obstructing Justice 137
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of obstructing justice for attempting to influencegrand jury witness to testify falsely, notwithstanding defendant's contention that evidence was insufficient toshow that what he sought to have witness say was false. U.S. v. Kenny, C.A.4 (Va.) 1992, 973 F.2d 339. Ob-structing Justice 170(7)
Conviction for endeavoring to obstruct administration of justice was sufficiently supported by evidence that de-fendants were aware of grand jury investigation at time they concealed incriminating documents, even if somedocuments involved lacked investigatory value. U.S. v. Ruggiero, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 934 F.2d 440. ObstructingJustice 132; Obstructing Justice 170(6)
Defendants' convictions for obstructing justice by giving false testimony to grand jury were supported by evid-ence that they denied any knowledge of the matters under investigation, that they had in fact participated in thematters under investigation, that they had intimate knowledge of all aspects of the matter under investigation,and that their persistent, flat, total denials of any knowledge were intended and calculated to impede the grandjury's investigation. U.S. v. Williams, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1989, 874 F.2d 968, rehearing denied 878 F.2d 1435. Ob-structing Justice 170(7)
Defendants' conviction for obstructing administration of justice was supported by evidence that defendant at-tempted to induce party to withdraw his appeal and pay $50,000 for sentence modification, notwithstanding de-fendants' claim that they had no intention of attempting to accomplish promised reduction of sentence. U.S. v.Machi, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1987, 811 F.2d 991. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
Evidence that defendant entered into series of fictitious real estate transactions and was aware that grand jurywas investigating similar transactions entered into by third party was sufficient to support finding that defend-ant's acts were done for purpose of impeding grand jury investigation, for purposes of obstruction of justice con-viction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503. U.S. v. Petzold, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 788 F.2d 1478. Obstructing Justice170(6)
In prosecution for obstruction of justice in regard to criminal investigation into certain banking practices, evid-ence that defendant bank attorney gave evasive and false answers before grand jury in regard to identity of per-son who controlled bank account under investigation was sufficient to sustain conviction. U.S. v. Perkins,C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 748 F.2d 1519. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Evidence showing that defendant, a city councilman, had accepted money to have salvage yard rezoned and thatwhen salvage yard owner informed defendant that he had been subpoenaed to testify in front of federal grand
jury, defendant advised him first to tell grand jury that he had never given defendant any money and later thatmoney was a loan for an automobile was sufficient to support conviction for obstructing justice. U.S. v. Slavens,C.A.8 (Mo.) 1984, 746 F.2d 1338. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede due ad-ministration of justice by virtue of engaging in scheme to “fix” criminal charges by means of cash payment fromdefendant. U.S. v. Silverman, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 745 F.2d 1386. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to uphold an obstruction of justice charge. U. S. v. Turcotte, C.A.2 (N.Y.)1975, 515 F.2d 145, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 564, 423 U.S. 1032, 46 L.Ed.2d 406. Obstructing Justice170(1)
Defendant's conviction in state court on charge of impersonating a police officer with intent to defraud anotherof a sum of money was a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and was admissible in trial for alleged en-deavor to obstruct justice, and the matter of time, crime having occurred 20 years before, went to weight of thetestimony and not to its competence. U. S. v. Bell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 351 F.2d 868, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct.1200, 383 U.S. 947, 16 L.Ed.2d 210. Witnesses 337(28)
Evidence of use of money in efforts to obtain leniency for person about to be sentenced permitted jury to finddefendants guilty of conspiring to violate this section proscribing attempts corruptly to influence, obstruct or im-pede due administration of justice. U. S. v. Kahaner, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1963, 317 F.2d 459, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct.62, 375 U.S. 835, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 478, 375 U.S. 982, 11 L.Ed.2d 429, certiorari denied84 S.Ct. 73, 375 U.S. 836, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 74, 375 U.S. 836, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, rehearingdenied 84 S.Ct. 263, 375 U.S. 926, 11 L.Ed.2d 169. Conspiracy 47(13)
In prosecution for obstruction of justice, evidence that defendant knew that grand jury was investigating possibleviolations of federal law and intentionally caused destruction of incriminating document was sufficient to sus-tain defendant's conviction; fact that such document had not been subpoenaed by grand jury at time it was des-troyed did not preclude defendant's conviction. U.S. v. Fineman, E.D.Pa.1977, 434 F.Supp. 197, affirmed 571F.2d 572, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 2847, 436 U.S. 945, 56 L.Ed.2d 786. Obstructing Justice 133; Ob-structing Justice 170(6)
135. ---- Corrupt endeavor, weight and sufficiency of evidence, practice and procedure
Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant's conduct had the natural and probable effect of interfering withthe due administration of justice, as required to support conviction for obstruction of justice, under the endeavor-ing theory; evidence showed that defendant was long-time member of organized crime family, and that he ob-tained detailed information from grand jury proceedings investigating another family in the organization, whichhe provided to targets of the grand jury investigation, including lists of the people to be indicted, charges onwhich they were to be indicted, the names of some extortion victims who were being investigated, and evidenceand methods used by government in the investigation. U.S. v. Giovanelli, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 464 F.3d 346, cer-tiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 206, 552 U.S. 886, 169 L.Ed.2d 145. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
Evidence was sufficient for rational trier of fact to conclude beyond reasonable doubt under catchall provision ofobstruction of justice statute that defendant acted with corrupt, wrongful, or immoral intent to obstruct grandjury's administration of justice, when he sent email directing investment bankers to delete computer files accord-ing to document retention policy after he became aware of grand jury subpoena's call for documents relating toinitial public offering (IPO) allocation process that were in possession of investment bankers, and lied to com-pany's lawyer by stating that he was not aware of regulatory investigations. U.S. v. Quattrone, C.A.2 (N.Y.)2006, 441 F.3d 153, mandamus dismissed 224 Fed.Appx. 106, 2007 WL 1475627. Obstructing Justice170(6)
Evidence was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant judge's purpose in lying to FBI about his involve-ment in bribery of county sheriff and his purpose in supplying false reasons why sheriff hired friend of judgewas in an endeavor to stymie grand jury investigation so as to support obstruction of justice conviction; convic-tion was not based on mere false statements to FBI agent as claimed by defendant. U.S. v. Grubb, C.A.4 (W.Va.)1993, 11 F.3d 426, habeas corpus denied 859 F.Supp. 227, affirmed as modified 65 F.3d 167. ObstructingJustice 170(3)
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in view of evidencethat defendant was owner and operator of illegal house of prostitution, that defendant had repeatedly evidenceddesire that two witnesses not cooperate with law enforcement officials, that it was in defendant's interest thatthey not testify, and that defendant supplied one witness with a powerful sedative which adversely affected herability to testify, evidence supported conclusion that defendant's endeavor to impede was corrupt, and thus evid-ence was sufficient to sustain conviction. U. S. v. Baker, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1979, 611 F.2d 964. Obstructing Justice
170(7)
Evidence was sufficient to support finding that by threatening life of witness scheduled to testify in criminalprosecution against him, defendant corruptly endeavored to influence and obstruct due administration of justice,as required to sustain conviction for obstruction of justice; defendant solicited third person to facilitate and parti-cipate in attempt to fabricate recantation by victim and to murder her so she could not testify at trial. U.S. v.Casteel, S.D.Iowa 2010, 721 F.Supp.2d 842, affirmed 663 F.3d 1013, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied ,certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 1779, 182 L.Ed.2d 557. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Evidence that defendants entered into an agreement to intimidate witnesses in first defendant's prosecution forbeing an unlawful user of controlled substances in possession of a firearm was sufficient to support defendants'convictions for conspiracy to corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct, and impede the due administration ofjustice; in recorded telephone conversation, first defendant told second defendant, who was his brother, that twopeople he identified by their first names were going to testify against first defendant, second defendant statedsomething to the effect that it was time to go on a murder run or to get a murder on, and first defendant agreedthat something had to be done, and defendants immediately proceeded to discuss where one of the intended wit-nesses lived and worked. U.S. v. Bertling, N.D.Iowa 2006, 461 F.Supp.2d 929, reversed and remanded 510 F.3d804, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 1757, 552 U.S. 1304, 170 L.Ed.2d 554, appeal after new sentencing hearing 611F.3d 477. Conspiracy 47(13)
136. ---- Intent or purpose, weight and sufficiency of evidence, practice and procedure
Substantial evidence established that defendant corruptly intended to influence a judicial proceeding when headvised union member to lie to grand jury about union's criminal activities, supporting his conviction for ob-struction of justice; defendant was aware of the pending grand jury investigation into union's activities and therewas a logical relationship between defendant directing union member to fabricate to law enforcement and the ef-fect it was likely to have of keeping information from reaching the grand jury. U.S. v. Macari, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006,453 F.3d 926, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 688, 549 U.S. 1054, 166 L.Ed.2d 518. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Convictions for obstruction of justice under statute making it a crime to corruptly endeavor to influence, ob-struct, or impede due administration of justice could not be sustained under Pinkerton theory of liability whenevidence was insufficient to establish that alleged coconspirators specifically intended to influence testimony oftheir respective relatives before federal grand jury. U.S. v. Bruno, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 383 F.3d 65. Conspiracy
41
Evidence in prosecution for obstructing justice supported findings that defendant had specific intent to thwarthis arrest warrant and pending supervised release revocation proceeding, and that his threat had a relationship intime, causation, or logic with the issuance of the arrest warrant and pending revocation proceeding; evidenceshowed that, inter alia, defendant left a voice mail message threatening to murder judge who sentenced him tothe supervised release and who issued arrest warrant for purposes of revoking his supervised release, that de-fendant knew of the arrest warrant when he left the voice mail message, and that the voice mail message waspart of a pattern of communication between defendant and the individuals associated with him in the prior pro-secution. U.S. v. Weber, C.A.9 (Alaska) 2003, 320 F.3d 1047. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
Evidence that defendant composed minutes to reflect a meeting which never occurred in order to provide a coverstory for a loan and that documents regarding the loan had been submitted to grand jury was sufficient to showdefendant's intent to obstruct justice. U.S. v. McComb, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1984, 744 F.2d 555. Obstructing Justice
170(6)
Even though there was ample proof that ledger and loan agreements produced pursuant to subpoena were falselyback dated, there was no evidence of defendant's corrupt intent in producing them, as required to support convic-tion for knowingly submitting false and misleading documents to grand jury with intent corruptly to impede itsinvestigation. U.S. v. Sun Myung Moon, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 718 F.2d 1210, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 2344,466 U.S. 971, 80 L.Ed.2d 818. Obstructing Justice 170(6)
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede petit jurors, evidence from which jury couldreasonably conclude that defendant willfully, knowingly and with specific intent sought to influence namedmembers of jury panel to abrogate legal duties as jurors, including testimony as to defendant's suggestion to pro-spective jurors that they listen for word “harassment,” permitted finding that defendant acted “corruptly,”without proof that defendant threatened or bribed either prospective juror or told him how to vote. U. S. v. Jack-son, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1979, 607 F.2d 1219, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1032, 444 U.S. 1080, 62 L.Ed.2d 763. Ob-structing Justice 170(1)
False affidavit and letter which tended to mislead grand jury to believe that purported aliases were names of realpersons, evidence which indicated defendant's awareness of grand jury investigation, and evidence of defend-ant's request to turn over reports and notes potentially subject to future grand jury subpoena supported inferenceof defendant's specific intent to impede administration of justice and, therefore, satisfied requirements for con-spiracy to obstruct justice indictment. U.S. v. Rogers, D.Colo.1986, 636 F.Supp. 237. Indictment And Informa-tion 10.2(10)
137. ---- Knowledge, weight and sufficiency of evidence, practice and procedure
Evidence was sufficient for rational trier of fact to conclude beyond reasonable doubt under catchall provision ofobstruction of justice statute that nexus in time, causation, or logic existed in knowing act of defendant, as headof department that conducted investment-banking activity, in sending email directing investment bankers to de-lete computer files according to document retention policy and his awareness of grand jury subpoena's call fordocuments relating to initial public offering (IPO) allocation process that were in possession of investmentbankers. U.S. v. Quattrone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 441 F.3d 153, mandamus dismissed 224 Fed.Appx. 106, 2007WL 1475627. Obstructing Justice 170(6)
Evidence did not support convictions for conspiracy to obstruct justice, even if defendants knowingly entered in-to agreement to impede potential grand jury proceeding or to obstruct justice in connection with their roles intwo shootings, given absence of showing that, at time of alleged agreement, defendants reasonably could haveforeseen grand jury investigation, and of evidence that either defendant or alleged coconspirator specifically in-tended that statements which they made to their relatives, denying involvement in shootings, would eventuallybe passed along to grand jury, or asked such relatives to lie to grand jury. U.S. v. Bruno, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 383F.3d 65. Conspiracy 47(13)
Evidence was sufficient to support jury's findings of a nexus between statements and actions of defendants, withrespect to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation into alleged tax evasion, and a grand jury investiga-tion into defendants' tax returns, as required to sustain guilty verdict for obstruction of justice; evidence demon-strated that defendants concocted a cover story to obscure any wrongdoing with regard to their handling of a$1.35 million incentive fee, and tape-recorded conversations and other evidence with references to the grandjury indicated that defendants became aware that a federal grand jury was involved in the investigation, but con-tinued to rely on the cover story, making false statements to investigating agents. U.S. v. Fassnacht, C.A.7 (Ill.)2003, 332 F.3d 440, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Evidence that defendant encouraged mother of suspect to destroy evidence was insufficient to support convic-tion for endeavoring to obstruct grand jury investigation; evidence showed that defendant knew that FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI) was investigating suspect, but there was no evidence that defendant knew that in-vestigation was connected to a grand jury. U.S. v. Frankhauser, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1996, 80 F.3d 641. ObstructingJustice 170(6)
Evidence was sufficient to support determination that judicial proceeding was pending against county judge, andthat county judge was aware of proceeding, for purposes of charge against county judge for obstruction ofjustice; bailiff who acted as bagman for county judge stated that, prior to county judge's inquiry as to whether at-
torney was “standing tall” in face of government investigation, bailiff was asked questions about his passing ofbribes to county judge. U.S. v. Maloney, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 71 F.3d 645, rehearing and suggestion for rehearingen banc denied, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 295, 519 U.S. 927, 136 L.Ed.2d 214. Obstructing Justice 170(1)
Evidence that defendant knew of grand jury investigation into Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contracting prac-tices when he had falsified contract prepared showing that contractor had been paid by defendant for work per-formed on defendant's home at time defendant was employed as IRS contracting officer, and submitted contractto grand jury in response to grand jury subpoena was sufficient to establish defendant's corrupt intent, as re-quired to support conviction for obstructing justice by impeding grand jury investigation. U.S. v. Jespersen,C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 65 F.3d 993, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1571, 517 U.S. 1169, 134 L.Ed.2d 669. ObstructingJustice 170(6)
Evidence that attorney made no effort to inform party with whom his client had contracted of client's true iden-tity when third party referred to client by another name, coupled with attorney's trial testimony that he could notrecall having introduced client to anyone by that name, was insufficient to support conviction for endeavoring toobstruct justice by testifying falsely in federal civil proceeding with knowledge of pending grand jury investiga-tion; no evidence was introduced that attorney himself knew or referred to client by that name. U.S. v. Thomas,C.A.11 (Ga.) 1990, 916 F.2d 647. Obstructing Justice 170(7)
Evidence, in prosecution for obstruction of justice, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that de-fendant, a salesman for an investment firm which was under investigation, knew grand jury proceeding was tak-ing place when he destroyed office documents; defendant admitted reading two newspaper articles mentioningthe grand jury investigation, and federal agents served him with a subpoena to testify before the grand jury andto bring with him any and all records relating to the firm. U.S. v. Kirkland, D.Or.2004, 330 F.Supp.2d 1151. Ob-structing Justice 170(6)
138. Questions for jury, practice and procedure
Defense of entrapment, in prosecution for endeavoring to bribe member of jury panel in prospective federalcriminal trial, was for jury determination. Osborn v. U. S., U.S.Tenn.1966, 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17L.Ed.2d 394, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17 L.Ed.2d 813. Criminal Law 739.1(3)
In prosecution for influencing witnesses and impeding a grand jury investigation, defendant's guilt was for jury.Grunewald v. U.S., U.S.N.Y.1957, 77 S.Ct. 963, 353 U.S. 391, 1 L.Ed.2d 931. Obstructing Justice 173
Evidence created jury questions whether inmate's refusal to testify before grand jury was based solely upon real-istic and reasonable perception that giving testimony would result in imminent harm to inmate or members offamily and whether inmate was entitled to acquittal on charge of obstructing justice; inmate was aware of in-stances in which “snitches” had been murdered in same prison, inmate's life had been directly threatened, andhome of close family member was sprayed with machine gun fire during period when inmate was interviewedand called before grand jury. U.S. v. Banks, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1991, 942 F.2d 1576, appeal after new trial 988 F.2d1106. Obstructing Justice 173
In prosecution of defendant for conspiracy and obstruction of justice, jury issue of overt acts was made by evid-ence that prisoner placed phone call to defendant's brother, alleged coconspirator, to facilitate defendant in con-tacting prisoner, that flight money was transferred from defendant to prisoner, and that prisoner traveled fromSouth Dakota to Iowa in car rented by defendant. U. S. v. McCarty, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1979, 611 F.2d 220, certioraridenied 100 S.Ct. 1319, 445 U.S. 930, 63 L.Ed.2d 764. Conspiracy 48.1(2.1)
Notwithstanding the alleged total unreliability of government's witness, the jury was the proper arbiter of suchwitness' credibility and there was sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of obstruction of justice. U.S. v. Cravero, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1976, 530 F.2d 666. Conspiracy 48.1(2.1); Obstructing Justice 173; Per-jury 36
Whether conversation between a juror and defendant which give rise to charge of corruptly endeavoring to influ-ence and impede a petit juror was innocent, and whether reference during the conversation to the case in whichjuror was sitting was so incidental as to be innocuous, were questions for the jury. U. S. v. Roe, C.A.4 (W.Va.)1975, 529 F.2d 629. Obstructing Justice 173
Whether one defendant was member in conspiracy to obstruct justice and suborn perjury was jury question. U.S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 366 F.2d 259, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 321, 385 U.S. 948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, cer-tiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 324, 385 U.S. 948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 502, 385 U.S. 984, 17L.Ed.2d 445, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 503, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445. Conspiracy 48.1(2.1)
Defendant's testimony furnished insufficient basis to support submission of question of entrapment to jury inprosecution for attempting to bribe juror. U.S. v. DeAlesandro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 361 F.2d 694, certioraridenied 87 S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74.
Evidence of attempt to tamper with jury was sufficient to go to jury in prosecution for attempt to obstruct admin-istration of justice. U. S. v. Medlin, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 353 F.2d 789, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1860, 384 U.S.973, 16 L.Ed.2d 683, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 14, 385 U.S. 889, 17 L.Ed.2d 123. Obstructing Justice 173
Denial by defendant who allegedly endeavored to obstruct justice, that he went to cafe and talked to governmentwitness, coupled with latter's testimony that defendant solicited his aid at cafe for purpose of tampering withjury, presented a question of fact as to guilt for jury to determine. U. S. v. Bell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 351 F.2d868, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1200, 383 U.S. 947, 16 L.Ed.2d 210. Obstructing Justice 173
Whether defendant had been fully informed and had been ready to seize opportunity which he saw provided bypolice officer whom defendant employed to investigate jurors was jury question, in jury tampering case whereindefendants relied on defense of entrapment. U. S. v. Osborn, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 350 F.2d 497, certiorari gran-ted 86 S.Ct. 644, 382 U.S. 1023, 15 L.Ed.2d 538, affirmed 87 S.Ct. 429, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L.Ed.2d 394, rehear-ing denied 87 S.Ct. 951, 386 U.S. 938, 17 L.Ed.2d 813. Criminal Law 739.1(3)
Whether obstruction of due administration of justice had taken place by defendant's “advice” to witness before a
grand jury investigation in connection with testimony he might give to plead U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, andwhether defendant had, corruptly, and by influence and threats and consideration paid, caused it were for jury.Cole v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1964, 329 F.2d 437, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1630, 377 U.S. 954, 12 L.Ed.2d 497.Obstructing Justice 173
Whether defendant intended to obstruct justice by inducing employee of witness against defendant in pendingprosecution to place illegal whiskey in bar of witness, who was on probation, was jury question. Knight v. U. S.,C.A.5 (Ga.) 1962, 310 F.2d 305. Obstructing Justice 173
139. Questions for court, practice and procedure
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice by endeavoring to influenceanother to obtain information from petit jurors in a specified case, before return of verdict therein, constructionof this section was question of law for court. Caldwell v. U.S., C.A.D.C.1954, 218 F.2d 370, 95 U.S.App.D.C.35, certiorari denied 75 S.Ct. 773, 349 U.S. 930, 99 L.Ed. 1260, rehearing denied 75 S.Ct. 880, 349 U.S. 969, 99L.Ed. 1290. Criminal Law 734
140. Mixed questions of law and fact, practice and procedure
Question whether defendant endeavored to influence witness “corruptly” is mixed question of law and fact, ifnot one of fact alone. U. S. v. Fayer, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1975, 523 F.2d 661. Obstructing Justice 173
141. Instructions, practice and procedure--Generally
District court did not have to list “nexus” requirement as fourth element in instructions that court gave to jury re-garding elements of prima facie case of obstruction of justice, since it adequately covered that requirement inother instructions that court gave to jury; court explained that third element of acting corruptly with intent of in-fluencing, obstructing, or impeding proceeding in due administration of justice was nexus requirement in that acthad to have relationship in time, causation, or logic with judicial proceedings, or, in other words, endeavor hadto have natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice. U.S. v. Sussman, C.A.3(N.J.) 2013, 709 F.3d 155. Criminal Law 829(3)
Jury instruction in prosecution for obstruction of justice, which defined “corruptly” as “with the purpose ofwrongfully impeding the due administration of justice,” fairly and accurately summarized the law. U.S. v.Ashqar, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2009, 582 F.3d 819, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 130 S.Ct.1722, 559 U.S. 974, 176 L.Ed.2d 185, post-conviction relief denied 2011 WL 4540729. Obstructing Justice174(1)
Jury instruction in prosecution for obstruction of justice, that jury had to find that “in defendant's mind, his or itsconduct had the natural and probable effect of obstructing or interfering with the grand jury proceeding,” suffi-ciently conveyed high degree of certainty required by criminal statute, even without defendant's proposed addi-tion of phrase “he knew that” after “in the defendant's mind.” U.S. v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., C.A.2(Conn.) 2008, 544 F.3d 149. Obstructing Justice 174(2)
Conviction for obstruction of justice by intimidating or injuring federal officers had to be vacated where instruc-tions allowed conviction based on either defendant's mailing of document purporting to charge judge withcrimes or based on his filing of document purporting to authorize the arrest of the judge, and although the evid-ence would support conviction for the former act, evidence did not support conviction for latter act becausethere was no proceeding pending when second document was filed. U.S. v. Fulbright, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1997, 105F.3d 443, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1836, 520 U.S. 1236, 137 L.Ed.2d 1041. Criminal Law 1172.1(3)
Trial court committed reversible error, in obstruction of justice case, by giving instruction that impermissiblyshifted burden of proof on question of whether witness' fear of reprisal was sufficient to negate claim that he hadrefused to testify before grand jury for willful or corrupt reason; evidence against defendant was not overwhelm-ing, as government had presented no specific evidence as to his intent and was relying upon inference. U.S. v.Banks, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 988 F.2d 1106. Criminal Law 1172.2
District court was required, by law of case doctrine to give instruction, regarding obstruction of justice, that de-fendant knew or should have known his failure to testify before grand jury would be likely, as natural or prob-able consequence, to deprive grand jury of relevant information; Court of Appeals had ordered giving of that in-struction on appeal from defendant's conviction in earlier trial. U.S. v. Banks, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 988 F.2d1106. Criminal Law 1192
Obstruction of justice instruction was improper, was plain error for failure to include some discussion of rela-tionship between defendant's motivation and fear of reprisal for testifying before grand jury, and entitled defend-ant to new trial; instruction stated that fear of reprisal could not provide lawful justification for refusing to testi-fy and failed to explain that fear could be defense if refusal was based solely upon realistic and reasonable per-ception that giving testimony would result in imminent harm to safety of defendant or members of family, anduse of generalized statements of legal principles failed to convey to jury need for proof that defendant knew orshould have known that failure to testify would be likely, as natural and probable consequence, to deprive grandjury of relevant information. U.S. v. Banks, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1991, 942 F.2d 1576, appeal after new trial 988 F.2d1106. Criminal Law 1038.1(4); Criminal Law 1172.1(4); Obstructing Justice 174(5)
While isolated sentences of the trial court's charge could be construed to render obstruction of justice a strict li-ability offense, the charge, viewed as a whole, could not fairly be said to have misled the jury in the proper ap-plication of the law, or to have permitted it to convict defendant in the absence of mens rea. U. S. v. Johnson,C.A.5 (Tex.) 1978, 585 F.2d 119. Criminal Law 822(6)
Charge in prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede a petit juror that each member of thejury was a petit juror, as was the juror who was alleged to have been corruptly contacted, did not transgress thebounds of propriety on the theory that it had the effect of telling the jurors to place themselves in the position ofthe victim rather than the defendant. U. S. v. Roe, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1975, 529 F.2d 629. Obstructing Justice174(1)
Court, which gave the standard credibility, informer's and accomplice's testimony instruction and the falsus inuno, falsus in omnibus instruction, did not err in refusing defendant's tendered instruction relating to government
witness' status as a perjurer in prosecution for submitting false documents in connection with disaster loan andfor knowingly and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the administration of justice in endeavoring to have grandjury witness testify falsely. U. S. v. Rajewski, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 526 F.2d 149, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 2231,426 U.S. 908, 48 L.Ed.2d 833. Criminal Law 822(14)
Court was not obliged to give requested instruction in prosecution for obstructing justice where substance of re-quested instruction was covered in instructions given. U. S. v. Friedman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 445 F.2d 1076, cer-tiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 326, 404 U.S. 958, 30 L.Ed.2d 275. Criminal Law 829(1)
That defendant rested his case and moved for acquittal at close of government's case for conspiracy to obstructjustice and suborn perjury did not warrant instruction that jury should consider against him only evidence ad-duced in government's case and there was no reason why jury should not also have been free to consider testi-mony of codefendants. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 366 F.2d 259, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 321, 385 U.S.948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 324, 385 U.S. 948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct.502, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 503, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445. Criminal Law
783.5
It was appropriate for trial court, in jury tampering case, to tell jurors that if they were satisfied of guilt beyondreasonable doubt, neither sympathy nor any other reason should cause them to hesitate to render verdict againstdefendant “as a clear warning to all that no one can tamper with the American, impartial jury system, which isthe very cornerstone of our democratic institutions, and get away with it.” U.S. v. DeAlesandro, C.A.2 (N.Y.)1966, 361 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74. Criminal Law 768(1)
Instruction that each defendant charged with being jointly engaged in commission of bribery endeavors was en-titled to have his case determined from his own acts and statements and from other evidence in case which mightbe applicable to him or admitted by the court as to him was proper. U. S. v. Hoffa, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1965, 349 F.2d20, certiorari granted 86 S.Ct. 645, 382 U.S. 1024, 15 L.Ed.2d 538, affirmed 87 S.Ct. 408, 385 U.S. 293, 17L.Ed.2d 374, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 970, 386 U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880, rehearing denied 87S.Ct. 971, 386 U.S. 940, 386 U.S. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 880. Criminal Law 673(4)
With evidence supporting government's theory that after debacle, in attempt to obtain leniency for person whowas to be sentenced, a conspiracy continued with objective of reducing his sentence through restitution by himof funds, court properly charged that jury must first determine whether conspiracy ended on date of such de-bacle, that if it so found it must in deciding whether a defendant had been member, exclude all evidence of resti-tution plan other than his particular admissions, but that, if it found that conspiracy continued beyond date ofsuch debacle, it might consider acts or declarations of all co-conspirators during that period in furtherance ofconspiracy's objectives. U. S. v. Kahaner, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1963, 317 F.2d 459, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 62, 375U.S. 835, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, rehearing denied 84 S.Ct. 478, 375 U.S. 982, 11 L.Ed.2d 429, certiorari denied 84S.Ct. 73, 375 U.S. 836, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 74, 375 U.S. 836, 11 L.Ed.2d 65, rehearingdenied 84 S.Ct. 263, 375 U.S. 926, 11 L.Ed.2d 169. Criminal Law 779
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence a juror, trial court's instruction respecting character evid-ence was erroneous for failing to tell jury that character testimony might be such that it alone may create a reas-onable doubt although without it the other evidence would be convincing. Holland v. U.S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1957,245 F.2d 341. Criminal Law 776(5); Criminal Law 1186.4(8)
142. ---- Corrupt endeavor, instructions, practice and procedure
In prosecution for endeavoring to influence a witness to testify falsely before a grand jury, instruction defining“endeavor to obstruct the due administration of justice” which did not include language that some threat or in-timidation was necessary was not erroneous. U. S. v. Nicosia, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1980, 638 F.2d 970, certiorari denied101 S.Ct. 3110, 452 U.S. 961, 69 L.Ed.2d 972. Obstructing Justice 174(5)
Requested instruction that word “corruptly”, as used in offense of corruptly endeavoring to influence a juror,meant an endeavor, done with a wicked or evil purpose, to influence a juror in performance of his or her dutiesor to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice unless specific intent to impede or influencewas essential element of the offense was properly refused, in view of instruction given. U. S. v. Ogle, C.A.10(Colo.) 1979, 613 F.2d 233, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 87, 449 U.S. 825, 66 L.Ed.2d 28, rehearing denied 101S.Ct. 594, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L.Ed.2d 487. Criminal Law 829(3)
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede petit jurors, court properly instructed jury as toessential elements by instructing that, to find guilt, jury must find that defendant contacted specific jurors whohad been selected to serve on panel from which petit jurors were to be selected in pending criminal action, thatjurors must find that by such contact defendant endeavored to influence and impede such prospective jurors indischarge of their duties as members of the jury and that jury must find that defendant's actions were done cor-ruptly. U. S. v. Jackson, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1979, 607 F.2d 1219, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1032, 444 U.S. 1080, 62L.Ed.2d 763. Obstructing Justice 143; Obstructing Justice 174(1)
Trial court's charge on the indictment's obstruction of justice count was not plainly erroneous, even though thecourt inexplicably stated at one point that “The word ‘corruptly’ does not add an additional element to thecrime.” U. S. v. Ochs, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1979, 595 F.2d 1247, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 435, 444 U.S. 955, 62L.Ed.2d 328, rehearing denied 100 S.Ct. 695, 444 U.S. 1027, 62 L.Ed.2d 663. Criminal Law 1038.1(4)
Instruction which informed jury that the word “corruptly,” as used in this section prohibiting anyone from cor-ruptly impeding the due administration of justice, means to proceed with an improper motive and with bad orevil or wicked purposes, that the endeavor need not be successful, and that the administration of justice is theperformance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as a witness was not plain erroron theory that it failed to inform the jury that this section did not encompass an attempt to influence a witness totestify truthfully. U. S. v. Partin, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1977, 552 F.2d 621, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 298, 434 U.S. 903,54 L.Ed.2d 189. Criminal Law 1038.1(4); Obstructing Justice 174(1)
143. ---- Intent or purpose, instructions, practice and procedure
Where defendant's theory of case relied on several innocent explanations for his conduct and each had somebasis in record, erroneous instruction that relieved jury of having to make findings regarding defendant's intentin sending email to colleagues to delete computer files was not harmless, when assessing criminal liability underobstruction statutes, although government did offer proof that defendant knew that grand jury and Securities andExchange Commission (SEC) sought documents that may have been found in his department, and wrongful in-tent, corrupt intent, and nexus requirement were correctly defined. U.S. v. Quattrone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 441F.3d 153, mandamus dismissed 224 Fed.Appx. 106, 2007 WL 1475627. Criminal Law 1172.1(3); Ob-structing Justice 174(4)
Court's charge to jury contained all essential elements of offense of corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct,or impede due administration of justice; court properly refused defendant's proposed instruction incorrectly ex-plaining “specific intent” by placing burden on the government to prove that purpose and object of defendant'sendeavor was to influence or obstruct due administration of justice, since Government needed only to show thatdefendant had knowledge or notice that his conduct would have likely resulted in obstruction of justice. U.S. v.Silverman, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 745 F.2d 1386. Obstructing Justice 174(1)
Trial court properly instructed jury on issue of specific intent in obstructing justice prosecution where court in-structed that specific intent had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that act is done willfully if done volun-tarily and intentionally with specific intent to do something law forbids, that is, with bad purpose, either to dis-obey or disregard the law and that government had to prove that defendant did actions corruptly, or by threats offorce with endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede someone who was witness in court of law. U. S. v. John-son, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1981, 657 F.2d 604. Obstructing Justice 174(5)
Trial court properly instructed jury that it had to find an intent to obstruct justice and that it is ordinarily reason-able to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or undertaken.U. S. v. Neiswender, C.A.4 (Md.) 1979, 590 F.2d 1269, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2410, 441 U.S. 963, 60L.Ed.2d 1068. Obstructing Justice 174(1)
It was proper for trial court to charge the jury that it could take all the circumstances surrounding charge of ob-struction of justice into account in determining the existence of specific intent. U. S. v. Haldeman,C.A.D.C.1976, 559 F.2d 31, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 2641, 431 U.S. 933, 53 L.Ed.2d250, rehearing denied 97 S.Ct. 2992, 433 U.S. 916, 53 L.Ed.2d 1103. Obstructing Justice 174(1)
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice, by endeavoring to influenceanother to obtain information from petit jurors in a specified case, defendant's objection to instruction explainingnature of crime, that jury should have been instructed that they must go beyond finding attempt to ascertain theopinions of the jurors, and that they must find that there was actual intent to effect it, did not state respect inwhich charge was inaccurate. Caldwell v. U.S., C.A.D.C.1954, 218 F.2d 370, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 35, certioraridenied 75 S.Ct. 773, 349 U.S. 930, 99 L.Ed. 1260, rehearing denied 75 S.Ct. 880, 349 U.S. 969, 99 L.Ed. 1290.Criminal Law 844(1)
A conviction for obstructing justice by endeavoring to cause a witness to testify falsely, would not be reversed,because acquittal on count charging subornation of perjury based on same general facts was inconsistent. Ca-trino v. U. S., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1949, 176 F.2d 884. Criminal Law 878(4)
In prosecution for corruptly obstructing the administration of justice by filing false letters and affidavits fraudu-lently obtained to obtain dismissal of a pending action, defendant was not entitled to directed verdict on groundthat court did not have jurisdiction of pending action or that plaintiff therein had no power to act as administrat-or. Nye v. U.S., C.C.A.4 (N.C.) 1943, 137 F.2d 73, certiorari denied 64 S.Ct. 62, 320 U.S. 755, 88 L.Ed. 449.Obstructing Justice 173
145. Sentence and punishment, practice and procedure--Generally
Federal district court judge's statement of reasons for imposing within-Guidelines sentence in perjury/ob-struction of justice prosecution was legally sufficient, even though it was brief and did not explicitly state thatjudge had considered and rejected defendant's arguments for departure or non-Guidelines sentence, and why;judge's comments made clear that he had listened to each argument, was aware of defendant's arguments basedon physical ailments, fear of prison retaliation and military service, and had found those circumstances insuffi-cient to warrant outside-Guidelines sentence. Rita v. U.S., U.S.2007, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 551 U.S. 338, 168 L.Ed.2d203, rehearing denied 128 S.Ct. 19, 551 U.S. 1181, 168 L.Ed.2d 795, post-conviction relief denied 2009 WL322149, appeal dismissed 366 Fed.Appx. 477, 2010 WL 604682. Sentencing And Punishment 996
The sentencing guideline providing for a cross-reference to the accessory-after-the-fact sentencing guideline,which resulted in sentencing enhancement, applied to defendant convicted of obstruction of justice under an en-deavoring theory; the cross-reference guideline was the only section of the guidelines that applied specifically toobstruction of justice, and the guideline commentary stated that it covered conduct that was part of an effort.U.S. v. Giovanelli, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 464 F.3d 346, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 206, 552 U.S. 886, 169 L.Ed.2d145. Sentencing And Punishment 653(9)
Sentence of 480 months for two counts of obstructing justice and one count of soliciting crime of violence, inconnection with defendant's involvement in plot to have federal district court judge murdered after judge hadentered judgment against his white supremacist organization, was reasonable, in that government, through in-formant, did not use extraordinary inducements to elicit criminal activity, and, although defendant lacked priorcriminal record, he was law school graduate, and his father was retired police officer, district court was aware ofsuch facts, considered them, and explained at length why defendant merited sentence imposed. U.S. v. Hale,C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 448 F.3d 971, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1020, 549U.S. 1158, 166 L.Ed.2d 783, post-conviction relief denied 2010 WL 2921634, adhered to on denial of reconsid-eration 2011 WL 5104630, affirmed 710 F.3d 711, petition for certiorari filed 2013 WL 4079644. SentencingAnd Punishment 645
Evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant's obstruction of justice offense, premised on his at-tempt to fake his death to avoid prosecution on fraud charges, resulted in “substantial interference with the ad-ministration of justice,” warranting three-level sentence enhancement; while there may have been overlapbetween expenditure of governmental resources due to defendant's obstruction and expenditure of resources as
consequence of his bail-jumping, by faking his death, defendant forced government to expend substantial addi-tional resources which otherwise would have been unnecessary, including those spent consulting with MissingPersons Unit, Law Department, and others. U.S. v. Leung, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 360 F.3d 62. Sentencing AndPunishment 761
Defendant convicted of making false statements to United States Attorney and FBI during money laundering in-vestigation could not be sentenced under obstruction of justice Sentencing Guideline rather than fraud guidelinepursuant to fraud guideline's “offense specifically covered by another guideline” cross-reference; indictmentmade no mention of any grand jury or other judicial proceedings, no grand jury was ever convened, and indict-ment provided no explanation for why defendant lied to investigators, precluding proof of intent element of ob-struction offenses that government contended triggered cross-reference. U.S. v. Genao, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 343F.3d 578. Sentencing And Punishment 653(7); Sentencing And Punishment 761
District court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defendant probation, even though original presen-tence report had recommended probation, and in ordering defendant to recommence service of four-year sen-tence for obstructing justice. U.S. v. Martinez, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1988, 837 F.2d 861. Sentencing And Punishment
1886
Fact that evidence which was relevant in proving existence of conspiracy to obstruct justice was also relevant orvital in proving entirely different fact of motivation in both the substantive count of obstructing justice and con-spiracy count did not result in merger or identity of offenses and sentencing to two consecutive terms on convic-tion of both counts did not impose double punishment for the same offense. Cardarella v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.)1967, 375 F.2d 222, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 129, 389 U.S. 882, 19 L.Ed.2d 176. Conspiracy 37; Senten-cing And Punishment 559(3)
Consecutive sentences were legally permissible for obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice. U.S.v. Osticco, M.D.Pa.1984, 580 F.Supp. 484, affirmed 738 F.2d 424, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 904, 469 U.S.1158, 83 L.Ed.2d 919, affirmed 738 F.2d 426. Sentencing And Punishment 559(3)
145a. ---- Mitigating factors, sentence and punishment, practice and procedure
Defendant's special circumstances in perjury/obstruction of justice prosecution, namely ill health, fear of retali-ation in prison due to history as law enforcement officer, and long military record, did not render within-Guidelines sentence unreasonable as a matter of law; sentence took health into account by seeking assurance thatbureau of Prisons (BOP) would provide treatment, record did not establish basis for unusual fear or retaliation,and there was no claim that military service ordinarily should lead to more lenient sentence. Rita v. U.S.,U.S.2007, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 551 U.S. 338, 168 L.Ed.2d 203, rehearing denied 128 S.Ct. 19, 551 U.S. 1181, 168L.Ed.2d 795, post-conviction relief denied 2009 WL 322149, appeal dismissed 366 Fed.Appx. 477, 2010 WL604682. Sentencing And Punishment 109; Sentencing And Punishment 117
146. ---- Disbarment of attorneys, sentence and punishment, practice and procedure
Fact that attorney had been convicted of a felony in federal court for violating this section did not automaticallylead to his disbarment from the Connecticut courts. U. S. v. Sobotka, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1980, 623 F.2d 764. Attor-ney And Client 39
Crimes of receiving kickbacks in connection with union pension fund loan, obstruction of justice, and filing offalse and fraudulent income tax returns involved moral turpitude, thus justifying suspension. U. S. v. Friedland,D.C.N.J.1980, 502 F.Supp. 611, affirmed 672 F.2d 905. Attorney And Client 39
147. New trial, practice and procedure
Unsworn letter from former county commissioner to defense counsel, which stated that audit prepared by countyspecial services district's regular outside auditor regarding district's paving and hauling contracts “showed abso-lutely no improprieties” could not support motion for new trial under Brady, in prosecution for obstructing andimpeding a federal grand jury. U.S. v. Erickson, C.A.10 (Utah) 2009, 561 F.3d 1150, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct.173, 558 U.S. 865, 175 L.Ed.2d 109, post-conviction relief denied 2011 WL 1226113. Criminal Law 2001
In prosecution for obstruction of justice, where sole foreseeable consequence for which defendant could be heldcriminally responsible on record was lulling of about-to-be-sentenced defendant into false belief that lenient sen-tence would be imposed, jury charge which did not confine jury's consideration to such single theory warrantednew trial. U.S. v. Buffalano, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1984, 727 F.2d 50. Criminal Law 922(3)
Fact that a juror by affidavit had impeached his verdict and jury verdict finding defendant guilty of attemptedbribery of a witness before grand jury, did not entitle defendant to a new trial. Parsons v. U.S., C.A.5 (Ga.)1951, 189 F.2d 252. Criminal Law 957(2)
Defendant's motion for new trial, grounded on communication to jurors which had been revealed to court duringtrial, would be deferred until after action on defendant's application for certiorari, where court of appeals' man-date on affirmance had been stayed and defendant was at liberty under bond. U. S. v. Miller, D.C.Conn.1968,284 F.Supp. 220, appeal dismissed 403 F.2d 77. Criminal Law 959
148. Issues reviewable, practice and procedure
Because failure of indictment to charge criminal offense would be jurisdictional defect, court of appeals had toconsider question whether failure of indictment specifically to connect alleged act of conspiring to impedeUnited States attorney to the stated crime of conspiracy to obstruct justice denied defendant his right underU.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 to be indicted by grand jury or his right under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6 to receiveadequate notice of crime with which he was charged. U. S. v. Shoup, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 608 F.2d 950. CriminalLaw 1134.36
Upon appeal from conviction for attempting to influence action of a juror, defendant would not be heard to com-plain of trial judge's action in asking questions of witnesses for purpose of elucidating facts of case, in absenceof showing that questions asked were improper. Hoffler v. U.S., C.A.4 (Va.) 1956, 231 F.2d 660. Criminal Law
149. Harmless or prejudicial error, practice and procedure
In prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States by operation of a tax fixing ring and for influencingwitnesses and impeding a grand jury investigation, permitting prosecuting attorney to ask defendant on cross-examination whether he had invoked his privilege against self-incrimination under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5before grand jury in response to the same or similar questions in response to which he had testified fully on thetrial constituted prejudicial error under circumstances of the case. Grunewald v. U.S., U.S.N.Y.1957, 77 S.Ct.963, 353 U.S. 391, 1 L.Ed.2d 931. Criminal Law 1170.5(5); Witnesses 277(2.1)
District court committed harmless error when it instructed jury that government was not required to prove thatofficial proceeding was actually pending against county judge or about to be instituted at time of offense forcounty judge to be convicted of obstructing justice; factual circumstances of case suggested that jury could nothave convicted without evidence of pending criminal proceeding. U.S. v. Maloney, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 71 F.3d645, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 295, 519 U.S. 927, 136L.Ed.2d 214. Criminal Law 1172.1(3)
District court's error in denying defendant access to jurors who sat with allegedly targeted juror was harmless inprosecution for endeavoring to influence juror and did not entitle defendant to new trial; targeted juror's com-plaints about jury service or remarks about potential threat did not indicate concrete desire to find way to get offjury; miscellaneous testimony relating to juror's credibility added little to portrait of juror; and defendant's argu-ment that testimony about juror's drinking habits could have enabled attorney to unearth from unknown bar jur-or's drinking buddy who would have betrayed juror's real motive for getting off jury was simply too speculativeto suggest prejudice. U.S. v. Bailey, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1988, 846 F.2d 1. Criminal Law 1168(2)
Instruction to effect that what a defendant does or fails to do may indicate intent or lack of intent to commit theoffense charged and that it is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable con-sequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted, with the court informing the jury that they may drawthe inference that the accused intended the natural results of acts he knowingly did or failed to do, was not plainerror. U. S. v. Ogle, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1979, 613 F.2d 233, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 87, 449 U.S. 825, 66L.Ed.2d 28, rehearing denied 101 S.Ct. 594, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L.Ed.2d 487. Criminal Law 1038.1(4)
Where testimony of law enforcement investigator to effect that the investigator had contacted the coroner's of-fice to learn if a certain informant was dead was introduced to establish that the government had made reason-able efforts to locate the informant and where the investigator did not hint that defendant or codefendant hadthreatened or harmed the informant and also stated that the informant's body was not at the coroner's office, theinvestigator's testimony, did not improperly link defendant to a crime not charged or otherwise constitute preju-dicial error, in prosecution for conspiracy and endeavoring to influence an officer of a federal court. U. S. v.Glickman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1979, 604 F.2d 625, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1032, 444 U.S. 1080, 62 L.Ed.2d 764.Criminal Law 373.2
Any constitutional error in connection with in camera hearing from which defendant, codefendants and their at-torneys were excluded and at which Federal Bureau of Investigation agent testified with respect to his dealingswith juror's son in prior years was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not result in improper restrictionof defendant's inquiries into prior relationship between Bureau and juror's son, who voluntarily cooperated withBureau in developing case against defendant, in prosecution for jury tampering. U. S. v. Quinn, C.A.8 (Neb.)1976, 543 F.2d 640. Criminal Law 1168(2)
Even if admission in prosecution for endeavoring to violate this section was improper, admission of the indict-ments was harmless where defendant's credibility had properly been impeached by evidence of a prior convic-tion on one of the indictments and trial judge had instructed that an indictment was only a means by which de-fendants were brought before the court and was not evidence. U. S. v. Mitchell, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1975, 514 F.2d758, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 86, 423 U.S. 847, 46 L.Ed.2d 68. Criminal Law 1169.11
Marking for identification the bill of indictment involved in earlier case giving rise to prosecution for jury tam-pering was not prejudicial error on theory that defendant was shown to have been charged with a criminal of-fense, inasmuch as the indictment was never admitted into evidence and it would have been impossible to trycase without bringing to jury's attention the fact that the earlier trial had been a criminal trial. U. S. v. Hykel,C.A.3 (Pa.) 1972, 463 F.2d 1192. Criminal Law 1168(1)
Refusal to exclude Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, who overheard defendant's incriminating statementsand who had not yet testified from courtroom while other agent who overheard such statements was testifyingdid not require reversal of obstruction of justice conviction, in absence of showing of actual prejudice. U. S. v.Missler, C.A.4 (Md.) 1969, 414 F.2d 1293, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 912, 397 U.S. 913, 25 L.Ed.2d 93. Crimin-al Law 1168(2)
In prosecution for obstructing justice by influencing federal grand jury witness, if failure to instruct that extraju-dicial statements of defendant's codefendant were not admissible or to be considered as against defendant waserror, the error was harmless where no objection was made to testimony of codefendant, and except in minormatters his testimony was substantially the same as testimony of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, and de-fendant made no request for any limiting instruction in respect to codefendant's testimony. Courtney v. U. S.,C.A.9 (Cal.) 1968, 390 F.2d 521, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 98, 393 U.S. 857, 21 L.Ed.2d 126, rehearing denied89 S.Ct. 440, 393 U.S. 992, 21 L.Ed.2d 457. Criminal Law 1173.2(9)
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice, by endeavoring to influenceanother to obtain information from petit jurors in specified case, wherein there was no evidence of any circum-stance which might create justification, privilege, or excuse, failure to instruct jury that there might be such cir-cumstances in some cases, if error, was harmless. Caldwell v. U.S., C.A.D.C.1954, 218 F.2d 370, 95U.S.App.D.C. 35, certiorari denied 75 S.Ct. 773, 349 U.S. 930, 99 L.Ed. 1260, rehearing denied 75 S.Ct. 880,349 U.S. 969, 99 L.Ed. 1290. Criminal Law 1186.4(9)
On basis of showing made, and particularly in view of prospect of speedy trial, court of appeals affirmed orderrefusing to reduce bail set at $100,000 to answer to an indictment charging crime of conspiracy to violate thissection and section 1073 of this title. U S v. Dioguardi, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1956, 237 F.2d 57. Bail 53
151. Reversal, practice and procedure
In view of other, overwhelming and direct evidence against defendant, convictions for using extortionate meansto collect extension of credit and of conspiracy and obstruction of justice would not be reversed by reason offact that statement made by codefendant as part of his grand jury testimony was admitted into evidence withoutopportunity to defendant to cross-examine. U. S. v. Cifarelli, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1979, 589 F.2d 180. Criminal Law
662.60
In prosecution for jury tampering, assuming that statements which were not made in presence of defendant andwhich tended to incriminate him ceased to be admissible against defendant upon government's failure to makesubmissible case against codefendants, statements were not so incriminating as far as defendant was concernedas to require grant of mistrial or reversal of defendant's conviction where implication of defendant by codefend-ants was comparatively minor and strength of government's case against defendant lay in government's proof ofwhat defendant said and did personally. U. S. v. Quinn, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1976, 543 F.2d 640. Criminal Law867.12(4); Criminal Law 1169.7
Prisoner's right to challenge sufficiency of evidence against him was not affected by his post-trial admission ofguilt and, in any event, matter did not provide ground for reversal of conviction of defendants charged with con-spiracy to obstruct justice and suborn perjury in connection with their efforts to prevent prisoner from testifyingagainst one defendant. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966, 366 F.2d 259, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 321, 385 U.S.948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 324, 385 U.S. 948, 17 L.Ed.2d 226, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct.502, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 503, 385 U.S. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 445. Criminal Law
1186.1
Prosecutor's alleged misconduct would not require reversal of conviction for attempting to bribe juror where noobjection to alleged misstatement was interposed at time it was made. U.S. v. DeAlesandro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1966,361 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 94, 385 U.S. 842, 17 L.Ed.2d 74.
152. Coram nobis, practice and procedure
Although it appeared that prosecutor failed to disclose Federal Bureau of Investigation reports relating to an in-vestment by individual whose indictment for bankruptcy fraud had triggered alleged conspiracy to obstructjustice, and by person who was claimed to have furnished indicted individual with most of bribe money, and byanother person who allegedly received bribe money from indicted individual and paid it to petitioner, petitioner,who claimed that evidence within the reports would have materially strengthened his claim that he ever receivedany part of bribe money, was not entitled to coram nobis relief, where at time prosecutor received reports he hadno reason to anticipate that defense would suggest that individual who allegedly paid bribe money to petitionerhad returned most of money, and information in reports would not have created a reasonable doubt of petition-er's guilt in mind of a juror who was otherwise satisfied. U. S. v. Keogh, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 440 F.2d 737, certi-
orari denied 92 S.Ct. 285, 404 U.S. 941, 30 L.Ed.2d 254. Criminal Law 1505
Where report that allegedly strengthened claim of defendant, who was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct dueadministration of justice, and that allegedly cast doubt on finding that there was no conscious or deliberate with-holding of another report by government, was received in evidence, in evidentiary hearing dealing with allegedsuppression, but was not developed by cross-examination or otherwise, and matter was not briefed to UnitedStates district court, order dismissing petition for writ of error coram nobis was affirmed without prejudice tofiling new petition. U. S. v. Keogh, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1969, 417 F.2d 885. Criminal Law 1182
Assertions, based in most instances on desire of witnesses to change details of testimony given before grand juryor at trial, in petition for writ of error coram nobis on grounds of newly discovered evidence to set aside convic-tion of conspiracy to obstruct due administration of justice were insufficient to present any basis for granting ofrelief. U. S. v. Keogh, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 391 F.2d 138, on remand 289 F.Supp. 265. Criminal Law 1536
153. Guilty plea, practice and procedure
Defendant's guilty plea to violating catchall provision of obstruction of justice statute was knowing and volun-tary; charging information and signed plea agreement accurately set forth each of the elements of the offense, atplea hearing defendant admitted that he knew there was an ongoing investigation by the Federal Bureau of In-vestigation (FBI) into real estate fraud when he made false statements to FBI agent, and that investigation re-lated to pending grand jury proceedings. Torzala v. U.S., C.A.7 (Wis.) 2008, 545 F.3d 517, rehearing and sug-gestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 1637, 173 L.Ed.2d 998. Criminal Law273.1(5)
18 U.S.C.A. § 1503, 18 USCA § 1503
Current through P.L. 113-55 (excluding P.L. 113-54) approved 11-27-13
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