180 Report on the Impact of Unexp...Er Submunitions in Serbia 2009

Regional office South East EuropeNorwegian People’s Aid

Report on the impact of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia

January 2009Norwegian People’s Aid, Regional office South East Europe, Kosovska 8/3 , 11ooo Beograde, Serbia in coopera-tion with Norwegian People’s Aid, Storgt. 33A, 0028 Oslo, Norwaywww.npa.org.rs; www.npaid.org

Publisher Norwegian People’s Aid, Regional office South East Europe

Published by Emil Jeremić

Report prepared by Darvin Lisica, Šerif Bajrić

Photographer John Rodsted

Design Šerif Bajrić

Project team Programme manager: Darvin LisicaProject manager: Mirko Miličić, Surveyors: Rusmir Trumić, Staniša Đurić, Nebojša Štrbac, Goran Vladić, Sead Kličić, Miroslav Pisarević, Ervin Omeragić i Branislav Jovanović

Monitoring team Amela Balić, Šerif Bajrić

4 Norwegian People’s Aid, Report on impact of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia, 2009

Contents

Acknowledgements ...............................................................................................................................8Executive summary ...............................................................................................................................9

Timeframe and objectives of the General Survey .......................................................................9Results of the cluster hazard assessment .......................................................................................9Hazard and accidents caused by cluster contamination ...........................................................10Risk behaviour ................................................................................................................................10Economic impact of cluster contamination ...............................................................................11Size of risk area in Serbia ..............................................................................................................11

Introduction .........................................................................................................................................12Terms of reference and methodology ...............................................................................................16

Terms of reference .........................................................................................................................16Standard operating procedures ....................................................................................................18Database ..........................................................................................................................................20

General assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia .................24Unexploded cluster submunition hazard in Serbia ...................................................................25

Unexploded cluster submunitions as cause of hazard .........................................................25Assessment of extent and characteristics of suspected areas ..............................................29

Suspected Areas: Status at the Beginning of Survey operations ..................................29Procedure and Results of Exclusion of Suspected Areas through Land Cancellation ........................................................................................................................31Suspected Area Contaminated by Cluster Submunitions – Status at the Beginning of November 2008 ...........................................................................................34What will be the final extent of risk areas for clearance in Serbia? ..............................36

Social and economic impact of unexploded cluster submunitions ..............................................39Cluster submunitions accidents and incidents ..........................................................................40Vulnerability analysis of the population at risk .........................................................................43

Affected Communities ............................................................................................................43Age Structure ............................................................................................................................44Entry of Population into Risk Areas ......................................................................................44

Analysis of blocked resources ......................................................................................................47Reports on general survey of risk areas ............................................................................................50

Selection of priorities for clearance .............................................................................................52

Norwegian People’s Aid, Report on impact of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia, 2009 5

List of tablesTable 1: Geo-coded entities...................................................................................................................................................... 23

Table 2: Cluster ordnance deployed by NATO forces in the Republic of Serbia ..............................................................27

Table 3: Estimate of the number of cluster ordnance used and remaining unexploded cluster submunitions ...........28

Table 4: Cluster submunitions, quantity per municipality ..................................................................................................29

Table 5: Municipalities affected by unexploded cluster submunitions ............................................................................. 35

Table 6: Number of suspected areas with regard to hazard levels and blocked resources ..............................................48

Table 7: Extent of suspected areas with regard to hazard levels and blocked resources..................................................49

Table 8: Risk location priority matrix .................................................................................................................................... 52

Table 9: Matrix for identifying the level of hazard ............................................................................................................... 53

Table 10: Matrix for identifying environmental impact risk ............................................................................................... 53

Table 11: Data on threatened communities in the Municipality of Bujanovac ................................................................. 57

Table 12: Land blocked due to unexploded cluster submunitions contamination in the Municipality of

Bujanovac in km2 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 58

Table 13: Data on threatened communities in the Municipality of Preševo .....................................................................59


Preševo in km2 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 60

Table 15: Data on threatened communities in the Municipality of Kuršumlija ................................................................ 61


Kuršumlija in km2 .................................................................................................................................................................... 52

Table 17: Districts in Serbia affected by unexploded cluster submunitions ......................................................................79

Case studies ....................................................................................................................................56Municipality Bujanovac .....................................................................................................56Municipality of Preševo .....................................................................................................59Municipality of Kuršumlija ...............................................................................................61

Project quality managment ................................................................................................................63General survey monitoring ..........................................................................................................63

General survey: Quality control .............................................................................................64General survey results: Quality assurance ............................................................................64

Strategic assumptions and indicators................................................................................................69Conclusions ..........................................................................................................................................71Appendixes ...........................................................................................................................................72Appendix A: Acronyms and terms used...........................................................................................72Appendix B: Criteria for cancellation of land from the areas suspected of hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions ....................................................................................................77Appendix C: Land use classification system ....................................................................................78Appendix D: Data by districts, municipalities and settlements ....................................................79Appendix E: Calculation of failure severity .....................................................................................84Appendix F: Calculations of risk area for clearance .......................................................................86Literature ..............................................................................................................................................90


List of graphsGraph 1: Extent of cancelled area, by cancellation criteria .................................................................................................. 32

Graph 2: Analysis of cancelled area in relation to previously assessed hazard levels ...................................................... 33

Graph 3: Analysis of cancelled area in relation to intended use of land ............................................................................ 33

Graph 4: Share in the extent of suspected area per hazard level ........................................................................................ 35

Graph 5: Number of suspected areas and average extent by hazard level ........................................................................ 35

Graph 6: Unexploded cluster submunitions clearance, by year .........................................................................................39

Graph 7: Number of accidents and incidents, by year ........................................................................................................ 40

Graph 8: Number of accidents and incidents, by type of cluster submunitions .............................................................. 41

Graph 9: Cluster submunitions casualties ............................................................................................................................. 41

Graph 10: Exposure of local communities to the risk of unexploded cluster submunitions ..........................................43

Graph 11: Age structure of the affected population ..............................................................................................................45

Graph 12: Entry into surveyed risk area – identified groups ..............................................................................................45

Graph 13: Entry into surveyed risk area – frequency and numbers .................................................................................. 46

Graph 14: Distance of the surveyed risk areas from nearest settlement/household ....................................................... 46

Graph 15: Relation of the number and extent of suspected areas, by blocked resources ................................................47

Graph 16: Time spent on preparing general survey reports ............................................................................................... 51

Graph 17: Share of risk areas, by vulnerability levels and potential benefit levels ............................................................54

Graph 18: Share of risk areas by hazard levels and environmental impact levels ............................................................. 55

Graph 19: Share of risk areas for clearance, by priority levels ............................................................................................. 55

Graph 20: Ratio of failure frequency and their risk factor ................................................................................................. 66

Graph 21: Pareto chart of errors identified during the control of survey reports ............................................................67

Graph 22: Population structure in local communities where survey of individual risk areas was carried out ............82

Graph 23: Employment structure in affected communities ................................................................................................ 83

List of mapsMap 1: Areas of cluster ordnance deployment, according to data received from NATO ...............................................26

Map 2: Distribution of cluster-ordnance deployment zones in the territory of Serbia (without Kosovo) ...................30

Map 3: Classification of affected municipalities by size of suspected areas ...................................................................... 37

Table 18: Settlements affected by unexploded cluster submunitions ................................................................................ 80

Table 19: Suspected area and the number of directly threatened inhabitants per threatened community ................... 81

Table 20: Calculation of failure severity ................................................................................................................................82

Table 21: Scale for evaluation of the Failure Severity Degree .............................................................................................. 85

Table 22: Scale for evaluation of the Failure Occurrence Probability ................................................................................ 85

Table 23: Scale for evaluation of the Difficulty in Failure Detection .................................................................................. 85

Table 24: Calculation of risk area for clearance based on the magnitude and number of suspected areas ..................86

Table 25: Calculation of risk area for clearance based on land release rate by hazard levels ..........................................87

Table 26: Calculation of risk area for clearance based on the surveyed risk areas ...........................................................88

Table 27: Calculation of risk area for clearance – options ...................................................................................................89


List of figuresFigure 1: Organizational structure .......................................................................................................................................... 17

Figure 2: Flow Chart: Process of general survey of cluster-ordnance deployment areas ................................................ 21

Figure 3: Data Flow Chart for General Survey Database ....................................................................................................22

Figure 4: Position of the general assessment of the situation in planning for clearance of areas contaminated by

unexploded ordnance in the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia – Model ...................................................24

Map 4: Locations of accidents and incidents .......................................................................................................................42

Map 5: Municipality of Bujanovac ..........................................................................................................................................56

Map 6: Map of risk areas, Bujanovac municipality ............................................................................................................. 58

Map 7: Municipality of Preševo ..............................................................................................................................................59

Map 8: Map of risk areas, Preševo municipality .................................................................................................................. 60

Map 9: Municipality of Kuršumlija ........................................................................................................................................ 61

Map 10: Map of risk areas, Kuršumlija municipality ...........................................................................................................62

List of picturesCollecting and processing data in field ................................................................................................................................. 19

Cluster submunition found in Sjenica ................................................................................................................................... 25

Parts of cluster submunitions found in Kuršumlija .............................................................................................................27

Urgent marking sings installed on acces road to suspected area ........................................................................................31

Part of cluster bomb found in Preševo ..................................................................................................................................36

Cluster submunition victim ................................................................................................................................................... 40

Parts of cluster submunitions found in Sjenica ....................................................................................................................44

Parts of cluster submunitions found in Bujanovac ..............................................................................................................45

Urgent marking sign installed by survey team during field activities ...............................................................................50

Household in suspected area ..................................................................................................................................................54

Populated area suspected to contain cluster submunitions ................................................................................................56


Acknowledgements We wish to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financing this project. Many thanks to photographer John Rodsted for taking the pictures for the survey report, and to Susan Høivik for language-editing the English version of the report. We are indebted to the Civil Protection in Serbia for providing us with necessary information on affected municipalities and areas, facilitat-ing data collection in the field for our surveyors. We also thank the Serbian Mine Action Centre and its director, Petar Mihajlović, for support and co-operation. Finally, we would like to stress that any shortcomings or omissions in this report are solely the responsibility of the NPA!


1Executive summary

Timeframe and objectives of the General SurveyThe general survey in Serbia was carried out by NPA between 9 November 2007 and 30 Novem-ber 2008. The immediate objectives were to assist the Mine Action Centre and the Government of the Republic of Serbia in defining the scale of the problem, identify contaminated areas and assist in capacity building to enable the Mine Action Centre to manage operations of surveying and clearing areas contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions. The long-term objective of the project has been to create a secure environment for the local population, free of hazards of unexploded cluster submunitions.

Results of the cluster hazard assessmentA detailed assessment of the characteristics of deployment zones was carried out in the third phase of the general survey. Survey reports were prepared, data mapping was conducted and the results were entered into the database. By the end of November 2008, the survey teams had prepared 100 reports. The total risk area covered by these reports is 8.3 km,2 which will neces-sitate multi-annual operations of clearance of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia. Each report on the general survey contains 313 items of data: thus, a total of 31,300 data entries have been recorded in the database. In addition, there are 100 sketch drawings of risk areas with co-ordinates of breakpoints, 100 drawings of the wider areas, 231 photographs of risk areas, 168 photographs of installed signs of emergency marking, 48 minutes of interviews conducted, and 100 orders/requests for general survey. The number of working hours spent on field operations, data processing and report preparation was 4,424, or an average of 44.24 hours for the prepara-tion of each survey report.

The results of the general survey show a total of 105 cluster ordnance deployment zones located in the territory of Serbia, in 15 municipalities. In these deployment zones, 196 cluster bomb units were used, containing 37,032 pieces of cluster submunitions. Immediately after deployment, the cluster submunitions and bomb remnants were typically collected by military, police and civil defence units. However, records on the removal of unexploded ordnance were not available to the survey teams of the NPA. It is estimated that there are still 2,547 pieces of unexploded cluster submunitions scattered in 105 deployment zones, or an average of 24.06 pieces of cluster submu-nitions per deployment zone. General survey field activities were completed by early November 2008. All results were processed and entered into the database. The database on the total suspected areas contains 390 polygons, in all 30.7 km2, with an average size of 0.079 km2 per polygon. It


was possible to reduce the total suspected area in comparison to the initial assessment of Febru-ary 2008, for two reasons: (1) reduction in the number of deployment zones after cancellation of non-existent deployment zones of cluster ordnance, and cancellation of deployment zones of graphite cluster submunitions; and (2) more precise assessment and ensuing cancellation of some previously suspected areas. The distribution of suspected areas in relation to the level of assessed hazard was as expected. The lowest share consisted of areas categorized as representing an extremely high hazard. Suspected areas assessed as having higher hazard levels (extremely high, very high and high hazard) constituted 21.52% of the total, or 6.6 km.2

Hazard and accidents caused by cluster contaminationAccidents and incidents have been caused by four types of cluster submunitions: BLU 97, BLU 97 A/B, Mk-4 and Mk-118. Cluster submunitions of the type BLU 97 are the most frequent cause (46.6% of instances), followed by submunitions of the type Mk-4 (in 34.3% of cases). Accidents recorded to date have resulted in 191 victims: 31 fatalities (16.2%), and 160 persons injured (83.8%). The greatest number of casualties occurred during the 1999 deployment of NATO air forces: 27 fatalities, and 152 persons wounded. From the end of the NATO campaign until November 2008, there were an additional 12 casualties, four of them fatalities: three children and one farmer; whereas eight persons have been injured: two de-miners, one farmer and five children.

The hazard of cluster submunitions is not evenly distributed, affecting 28 local communities (mesne zajednice) in 16 different municipalities in Serbia, and a total of 12 out of 30 districts. Some 162,000 people live in the affected local communities. According to the latest assessments, 88,000 are living in the immediate vicinity of suspected areas, and can thus be considered as exposed to daily risk.

Risk behaviourRisk behaviour of the population was registered in 91.8% of the surveyed risk areas. In most cases (56.2%), such behaviour involved the entry of adults from affected settlements. (See Graph 12.) Children are second in the number of registered cases. They enter together with adult villagers (in 28% of the cases), and less frequently together with adults and “other persons” – i.e. individuals not living in the affected communities. Those living in the affected local communities apparently do not feel directly vulnerable to cluster submunitions. They know that surface-level removal of unexploded cluster submunitions has been undertaken, and assume that what remains is mainly located underground. On the other hand, they do take certain precautions: children tend to enter suspected areas in the company of adults, and group entry is more common than individual entry. Entry into risk areas, proximity to settlements, and children as a vulnarable group are included in the criteria for selection of priorities for clearance of unexploded cluster submunitions.


Economic impact of cluster contaminationIt is mostly agricultural land that is blocked due to the presence of unexploded cluster submu-nitions: 29.7% of the suspected locations relate to agricultural land, or 33.4% of the total area suspected. The second largest barrier caused by unexploded cluster submunitions is the impos-sibility of reconstructing the infrastructure of settlements and utility facilities (19.9% of the total suspected area). The third largest problem is the impossibility of renovating or restoring housing units (14.2%). Further significant blockage problems relate to the following categories of land use: forest exploitation and maintenance (8.8%), tourism development (9.6%), road communications (6.4%), and new industrial production (4.2%). The analysis confirms that the hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions in combination with blocked resources has a significant impact on the socio-economic situation of the communities affected. The likelihood of fatalities has been reduced, but the number and frequency of incidents is such that the probability of activating unexploded submunitions will rise with the growing needs of the population to use the blocked land.

Size of risk area in SerbiaThe extent of risk area still to be cleared of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia has been calculated to be approximately 15 km2 !


On 3 December 2008, 94 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Oslo, Norway. The Convention prohibits state parties from buying, selling, storing, us-ing or transferring cluster munitions in the future. The CCM is expected to contribute to

speeding up the process of clearing countries and territories affected by cluster munitions and to provide necessary assistance to victims – both to the victims of cluster munition accidents, and to their families. Furthermore, stockpile destruction will be a priority: destroying millions of cluster submunitions so that they will never kill, hurt or maim innocent civilians during or after conflicts.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions is a great achievement. It was possible due to fruitful co-operation between progressive countries, civil society organizations, relevant UN agencies, the ICRC and the Red Cross Movement working together within the Oslo Process aimed at banning cluster munitions. We hope and expect that the CCM will be adhered to also by states that do not sign the convention, as has been the case with the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997. The Oslo Process aimed at banning the indiscriminate weapon of cluster munitions was truly a success, producing a strong convention in less than two years. The CCM will enter into force six months after 30 states have ratified it. It grants to affected states 10 years to clear their own territories of cluster bombs.

However, it is important to point out that the Convention itself cannot solve anything: it is merely a tool for solving the problems related to cluster bombs for affected people and states in the longer term. One prerequisite for solving the problem of cluster contamination is identifying and understanding the nature of the issue. Without data collection on affected communities, as-sessment of the number of people and communities threatened by cluster munitions, how they live with the threat, how they earn a living and how the threat affects them, and without collect-ing and systematizing this information, it is not possible to solve the problems of the individual communities or the states affected by cluster munitions.

Systematic and efficient removal of unexploded cluster submunitions remaining after the ac-tivities of NATO forces on the territory of Serbia depends on a clear understanding of the level of hazard and socio-economic impacts of the problem today. These issues had not been sufficiently investigated previously, and the reliability of earlier assessments was not acceptable to the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia. This meant that conditions have not been in place for the preparation of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with this problem. The NPA started planning the general survey of areas suspected to be contaminated with cluster munitions in Serbia at the end of 2006. The Standard Operation Procedures were drafted by NPA Mine Action Programme Manager in Bosnia and Herzegovina Darvin Lisica, and project implementation started in Novem-

2Introduction


ber 2007. The project has been planned, implemented and monitored in a regional co-operation involving the NPA humanitarian mine action programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian Mine Action Centre, and the NPA regional office for southeast Europe in Belgrade.

The project had three phases: (1) project preparation, (2) preliminary assessment of the situation regarding unexploded cluster submunitions, and (3) on-the-ground survey and general assess-ment of areas of cluster ordnance deployment. The preparatory phase started at the end of 2006 and lasted until project implementation began in November 2007. Work in this phase included preparing project documents, drafting standard operating procedures for the general survey, se-lection of personnel and their material and professional preparations, and accreditation with the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia. Phase two, preliminary assessment of the situation related to areas contaminated with unexploded cluster submunitions, lasted from the beginning of the project in November 2007 until mid-February of 2008. It started with logistical prepara-tions and seven-day training of personnel. During this phase, the first part of the general survey was completed – identification of areas suspected to contain unexploded cluster submunitions. During this period the team entered into the database a total of 1,241 records of data collected and 1,039 records of data assessed, which served as the basis for the later field activities of the general survey. Phase three, survey in the field and general assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia, lasted from mid-February till mid-November 2008. The office was relocated from Šid in northern Serbia to Mladenovac in central Serbia in order to obtain bet-ter operating conditions, closer to the areas of cluster ordnance deployment. During this phase, the work of survey teams focused on surveying suspected areas, in line with the priorities of the Mine Action Centre. This phase included the collection of additional data in the field, measuring of hazardous areas, risk assessment, as well as cancelling from the list of suspected areas land that was found beyond any doubt not to contain any unexploded cluster submunitions.

A general assessment provides necessary input to the strategic as well as operational planning of activities leading to the elimination of unexploded cluster submunitions. It enables the rel-evant authorities to make informed choices regarding priority setting, so that, for example, areas where cluster munitions pose a real risk to the local population are given priority over remote, uninhabitated areas. Without data on the nature and scope of the hazard posed by cluster muni-tions it is not possible to set the right priorities, as long as the baseline data for priority setting are lacking. As such, a general assessment is a necessary precondition for efficient use of limited resources for clearance. A general assessment also facilitates good communication between opera-tors and donors, as it provides baseline data on the nature and scope of the risk. Such information is critical to relevant state institutions as well as to other stakeholders, for solving the problem in a cost-effective and timely manner. As such, the general assessment facilitates a clearer selection of priorities and hence efficient clearance, better communication with donors and international organizations, and provides baseline data on the scope of the problem, so that progress can be measured and reports related to commitments to relevant international agreements can be pro-duced. The general assessment includes an evaluation of the hazard of unexploded cluster sub-munitions and an assessment of their socio-economic impacts.

Continuation of the general survey to accompany the clearance process is necessary, so that the remaining suspected areas can be analysed in detail and the necessary documents be prepared. Continuation of the project has been secured in 2009, with funds from the US State Department


through the International Trust Fund for Demining and Victims Assistance. With greater inter-est on the part of all stakeholders for resolving the unexploded cluster submunitions problem in Serbia, the need for prioritizing clearance tasks will also increase. A clear and transparent system for determining priorities should be put in place as part of the national policy of mine action, including uniform prioritization criteria, to be followed by relevant state authorities and other bodies or organizations involved in the process.

Regular measures of warning the population and marking suspected areas need to be under-taken, to prevent misperceptions as to the absence or presence of unexploded cluster submuni-tions. Removal of the threat is the only long-term solution to the problem. That will produce the following results: (1) increase in general safety, (2) reduction of risk, especially for people living in contact with risk areas, (3) increase in the number of users of land now blocked, as indicated by the employment structure in the threatened local communities.

No International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) exist on general survey of areas contaminated with cluster munitions. For state parties to the CCM, surveys must be conducted in order to solve the problems in their respective countries. Without information about the type and character of the threats posed by cluster munitions, it is not possible to make a plan for solving the problem. The CCM specifies that affected states are to have cleared their territories of cluster munitions within ten years of ratifying the Convention. Clearly, there is an urgent need for International Mine Ac-tion Standards regulating the survey of areas suspected to be contaminated with cluster munitions. A survey should form the basis for priority setting of clearance of affected areas, and hence is a prerequisite for solving the problem in affected states and territories. It is our hope that the work carried out by the NPA in Serbia can serve as a basis for the development of IMAS standards for cluster survey, thereby providing affected states with this vital tool as soon as possible.

Developing instruments for monitoring in connection with the Convention on Cluster Muni-tions represents a challenge regarding the compliance of state parties to the Convention. One basis for a future monitoring system could be provided by the experience gained by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines related to monitoring compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty through the yearly publication Landmine Monitor. However, that monitoring system relates to antiperson-nel landmines and not cluster munitions, and is as such not compatible with the requirements of the CCM. We hope that the concept and indicators developed by the NPA in this report may prove useful in the process of developing a monitoring system for states affected by cluster muni-tions, and their compliance to the Convention. This relates particularly to defining the scope of the problem in affected states, as a baseline for measuring progress in munitions clearance.

Finally, a note to the reader: this General Survey Report is intended for various target groups. We hope and expect that it will be of interest to practitioners on the ground in affected areas, as well as to national mine action authorities, donors, academics, journalists, policy-makers and others. The report is of technical character – that lies in the nature of the matter. On the other hand, we do not foresee that the technical form of the report should be a challenge to readers less familiar with the terminology or the methodology used. Work on a general survey is neces-sarily of a technical character, involving the development of standard operating procedures and their implementation. We believe that practitioners or operators can learn from the work done in Serbia, so we have chosen to publish the survey report in its present technical form. Practitio-ners, including operators and mine action authorities like national mine action centres, might


want to focus on the “Terms of reference and methodology” (16-24) and the chapter “General assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster munitions in Serbia” (24-39). Furthermore, this group of readers might find useful the section on “Project quality management” (63-69). Donors and policy-makers may be especially interested in “Social and economic impact of unexploded cluster munitions” (39-41) and “Reports on general survey of risk areas” (50-62). Journalists will probably find the chapter on “Social and economic impact of unexploded cluster munitions” (39-49) of greatest relevance!

Belgrade, February 2009

Emil JeremićRegional Director


3Terms of reference and methodology

Organized activities related to the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war in the Republic of Serbia have been underway since 2001. The focus has been on systemic solutions to the problem of minefields in the border area with the Republic of Croatia, in

order to heighten security, promote cross-border mobility and prevent illegal cross-border ac-tivities. Most of these priority activities regarding mine clearance have now been realized, so the state authorities of the Republic of Serbia may be expected to shift the focus of mine action to the removal of other types of explosive remnants of war – primarily the clearance of areas con-taminated by unexploded cluster submunitions.

The systematic and efficient removal of unexploded cluster submunitions remaining after the activities of NATO forces in the territory of Serbia depends on adequate understanding of the level of hazard and social/economic impacts of the problem today. These issues had not been suf-ficiently investigated, and the reliability of previous assessments was not acceptable to the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia.1 Consequently, the conditions have not been in place for the preparation of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with this problem. In 2007, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) took on the task of performing a survey and assessing the situation related to remaining cluster submunitions in Serbia. The terms of reference were accepted in October 2007, and the financial assistance was provided by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1 A similar survey has not been planned for the territory of Kososvo, where the removal of landmines and other unexploded ordnance is under the purview of the UNMIK and not the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia.

Terms of referenceThe Cluster Survey Project in Serbia was carried out between 9 November 2007 and 30 November 2008. The long-term objectives were to create a secure environment for the local population, free of hazards of unexploded cluster submunitions; to assist the Mine Action Centre and the Government of the Republic of Serbia in defining the scale of the problem, identifying contaminated areas; and to assist in capacity building to enable the Mine Action Centre to manage the operations of sur-veying and clearing the areas contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions. The immediate objective of the project was to prepare a general assessment of the situation regarding unexploded cluster submunitions – including the identification of areas suspected of cluster submunitions hazard, collecting data in the field, performing risk assessment and preparation of project docu-ments for the operations of clearing, reducing or marking of hazardous areas. It was undertaken as a project of regional cooperation in Southeast Europe. The NPA Mine Action Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to take on responsibility for this project due to its many years of


FIGURE 1

Organizational structure Regional Director for

Southeast Europe

Mine Action Program Manager in Bosnia and

Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Project Manager / Operation Manager

(Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Database Consultant (Serbia)

Monitoring Team: Operations Manager and Planning and

reporting officer (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Leader of Survey Team 2 (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Surveyor (Serbia)


Surveyor (Serbia)


Surveyor (Serbia)


Surveyor (Serbia)

Finanace and Administration: Regional

Office Southeastern Europe: (Serbia)

Project Manager Assisstant for liaison with the community

(Serbia)

Logistics officer(Serbia)

experience in general surveying. This programme has supported the activities of the Mine Action Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina with seven survey teams with capacity for general surveying of areas contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) since 2005. Realization of the project included personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Ten persons were directly engaged. In addition to the project manager, from the NPA Mine Action Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina four surveyors with several years of experience were selected to serve as survey team leaders. An additional six persons were employed in Serbia: a liaison assistant for threatened communities, a logistician and 4 surveyors with no previous experience in general surveying.

Monitoring of all activities was carried out by the Demining Programme Manager, along with the monitoring team and under the supervision of the NPA Regional Director for South-eastern Europe. The Monitoring Team consisted of the operations manager and the planning/reporting officer from the NPA Mine Action Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all with experience in managing survey projects and quality management. Logistics and financial assistance to the project were arranged through the NPA Regional Office in Belgrade. A consultant for the general survey database was also engaged in Serbia. The project had three phases: (1) project preparation, (2) preliminary assessment of the situation regarding unex-ploded cluster submunitions in Serbia, and (3) on-the-ground survey and general assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia.


The preparatory phase started at the end of 2006 and lasted until the actual project began in November 2007. Work in this phase included preparing project documents, drafting standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the general survey of the area of cluster ordnance deployment, selection of personnel and their material and professional preparations, and accreditation with the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia. In addition, cooperation was also arranged with the Serbian Ministry of Defence – Civilian Defence Sector, municipal authorities and rep-resentatives of communities at risk.

Phase two, preliminary assessment of the situation related to unexploded cluster submuni-tions, lasted from the beginning of the project in November 2007 until mid-February of 2008. It started with logistical preparations and seven-day training of personnel. Logistical preparations included transport of vehicles and some of the equipment from Bosnia and Herzegovina and procurement of the remaining equipment in Serbia, and establishing an office in the territory of Serbia, in Šid. The seven-day training of personnel focused on cluster submunitions information, survey methodology according to approved SOPs, use of measurement instruments in the field, and data processing and work on the database. During this phase, the first part of general survey was completed – identification of areas suspected to contain unexploded cluster submunitions. This work started on 10 December 2007 and lasted until 7 February 2008. This meant 34 working days in all: six days for processing the available data, 19 days for collecting additional data in the field by questionnaires and mapping, and nine days for data analysis and preparing the prelimi-nary assessment. During this period the team entered into the database a total of 1,241 records of data collected and 1,039 records of data assessed, which served as the basis for the later field activities of the general survey.

Phase three – survey in the field and general assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia – lasted from mid-February till mid-November 2008. The office was re-located from Šid to Mladenovac in order to obtain better operating conditions. During this last phase the work of survey teams focused on surveying suspected areas, in line with the priorities of the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia. This phase included the collection of addi-tional data in the field, measuring of hazardous areas, risk assessment, deleting from the ‘suspected areas’ list land that was found beyond any doubt not to present a danger of unexploded cluster submunitions, report preparation, data mapping, and entering data into the database. Sufficient levels of accuracy and quantity of data were ensured for the detailed risk assessment from the micro-location level to the general assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia (excluding Kosovo). The results obtained were entered into the database. On the basis of such data, clearance tasks will be planned and strategic assumptions and indicators determined: thus favourable conditions will be created for efficient future operations and strategic planning under the Mine Action Centre of the Republic of Serbia.

Standard operating proceduresGeneral survey of locations with unexploded cluster submunitions involves a process of assessment of hazard, extent, form and characteristics of suspected areas, from the level of micro-locations to general assessment at the national level. This assessment was based on data collection and process-


ing and identifying hazards of unex-ploded cluster submunitions, without applying technical methods for their removal. The objective of general sur-vey is to identify the level of priorities and operating conditions necessary for the successful planning and orga-nizing of the removal of unexploded cluster submunitions through hazard assessment and environmental impact assessment. This involved the follow-ing elements: (1) collecting, sorting and processing available data on iden-tified suspected locations and supple-menting the database as necessary; (2) carrying out the previous assessment of scope and impact of the problem related to the remaining cluster submunitions for the country and individual local communities; (3) planning, organizing and implementing the field collection of new data, performing hazard assessment and identifying priorities for clearance and all other activities to reduce the risk of unexploded cluster submunitions; (4) preparing project documents for clear-ance and other activities to reduce the risk of unexploded cluster submunitions; and (5) enabling more precise short-term and long-term planning in terms of time periods and scheduling.

Standard operating procedures for general survey are formed as a process-oriented activity based on the requirements of the beneficiaries – vulnerable individuals and groups, as well as potential users of land that is contaminated or suspected of being contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions. The basic process of general survey of areas of cluster ordnance deployment consists of three sub-processes: (1) identification of areas suspected of cluster ordnance hazards, (2) on-site activities of general survey, and (3) risk assessment and project design.

Identification of areas suspected of cluster ordnance hazards is the first sub-process of general survey, during which all available data are analysed, without any addi-tional field collection of data. Hazard is assessed from the levels of local communities to the general hazard assess-ment for the country. At the local community level, the perimeters, area and other characteristics of suspected areas are defined, for later use in the preparation and or-ganization of general survey field activities. In addition, these data, statistically processed and sorted by higher-level administrative areas, are used to complement the general assessment of mine action. Identification of ar-eas suspected of cluster ordnance hazard involves six process steps: (1) collection and processing of available data, (2) sorting the documents collected, estimating their quality and entering them into the database, (3)

Normative framework of standard operating procedures for general survey of the areas affected by cluster ordnances: 1) ISO 9001:2000, Quality Management Systems – Requirements 2) ISO 9004:2000, Guidelines for Performance Improvements 3) ISO 14001:1996, Environmental Management Systems 4) ISO/IEC 51:1999, Safety Aspects – Guidelines for their inclusion in standards5) AS/NZS 4360:1999, Risk Management 6) IMAS 04.10:2003, Glossary of Mine Action Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations 7) IMAS 10.10:2001, Safety and Occupational Health 8) IMAS 08.10:2003, General Mine Action Assessment

Collecting and processing data

in field


classifying information by micro-location and mapping, (4) comparative analysis of data and the reconstruction of cluster-ordnance deployment zones, (5) mapping the areas suspected of cluster ordnance hazards, and (6) monitoring of process and results.

Field activities are the second sub-process of general survey. The collection and processing of missing data is performed as well as detailed measurements related to the area where a hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions has been identified. This work is performed at each individual location by the survey team, in line with the priorities and plan of the national mine action body. It consists of five process steps: (1) analysis of missing data, (2) preparation for field visits, (3) collecting data in the field and control of their quality, (4) corections of deployment zone and cancellation of hazard-free land from the list of suspected areas, and (5) topographic measure-ments at hazardous locations.

Risk assessment of unexploded cluster submunitions and preparing terms of reference for clear-ance (including technical survey and marking) constitutes the third sub-process of the general survey. The scale of the problem is assessed (risk magnitude), as well as the priorities and plan for managing the risk at given locations contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions. This involves four process steps: (1) identification and characterization of affected population groups, (2) risk evaluation and priority-setting, (3) assessment of operating conditions for clearing risk areas, and (4) preparing clearance tasks for risk areas.

The results of the general survey process represent input for the process of risk management, which may involve clearance, reduction, marking of contaminated area or/and education of the local population. The results of the risk management process, like the satisfaction of direct and indirect users of the land released to them for use, will depend on the quality of general survey management, the quality of its results and the selection of priorities. The flow chart of the general survey process (see Figure 2) shows that normative requirements in these SOPs are maximized, with clear inputs and outputs from the sub-process and process steps. This was necessary to enable testing the quality of the process, including the objective and subjective capacities of the survey teams. It is also a flexible process that can be used for surveys elsewhere, whether in its entirety or in individual sub-processes and process steps. Testing during the survey in Serbia confirmed its applicability and contributed to improving the final version of SOPs accepted by the Mine Action Centre as relevant for future general survey activities in Serbia.

DatabaseData collected during the general survey are kept in three model data repositories: (1) the archives, where all collected and generated documents are sorted by basic administrative units, and within them, by data type; (2) the relational database, where all data on surveyed risk areas are organized in a man-ner that provides for easier manipulation of the data, generation of necessary reports and creation of terms of reference for clearance; (3) the file-based data repository, where geo-coded spatial data are kept in files easy to view and process with software intended for manipulating spatial data.

The archives consists of data collected and reports on the general survey of the area where cluster ordnance was deployed. The total number of reports on accidents collected is 24, number of reports on military and police removal is 23, there are 13 reports on clearance and found cluster ordnance, and 76


FIGURE 2

Flow Chart: Process of

general survey of cluster-ord-nance deploy-

ment areas

Available data collecting and processing

Sorting collected documents, their quality assurance and entering into

database

Classification of information per microlocations and mapping

Data comparative analysis and reconstruction of deployment zones

Mapping the areas suspected of cluster ordnance hazard

Process and results monitoring

Missing data analysis

Preparation for field visits

Collecting data in the field and quality control of these data

Corections of deoloyment zones and cancelling suspected areas

Topographic measurement at hazardous locations

Identification and characterisation of affected population groups

Risk estimation and priority setting

Assessment of operating conditions for clearance of risk areas

Producing clearance tasks for risk areas

Suspected area identification criteria

Criteria for cancelling suspected areas

GPS data on cluster ordnance deployment, database and archives, data from local

communities, previous surveys, data from armed forces, police

and civil defence, data from other sources

Suspected area

Area not suspected

Database of areas suspected of cluster

ordnance hazard

Map of situation with cluster submunition

remnants

General assessment of the situation with remnants of cluster

submunitions

Cancelled area

Risk area

Interview report, questionnaire, data collected by observation

(photographs, drawings, descriptions)

Clearance database

General survey database

Generalsurvey report

Project task for clearance

Project for donors

Priority list

Start of clearance of cluster submunitions risk areas

Yes

Yes

No

No

Identification of areas suspected of cluster ordnance hazard

General survey field activities

Risk assessment and creating terms of reference

questionnaires. The archives contain 100 survey reports, along with accompanying documents, maps and cadastral maps of areas intended for clearing unexploded cluster submunitions, photographs of markings emplaced and risk areas, interviews, etc.


FIGURE 3

Data Flow Chart for General Survey Database

The logics of SOPs was incorporated into the relational database. The data flow chart (see Figure 3) for the general survey database presents the procedure of creating clearance tasks for risk areas and entering data into the database. All activities, data and data flows presented in the chart are defined by SOPs. The activity of ‘Hazard Assessment’ has the input data necessary for hazard assessment: data on incidents and accidents and the consequences thereof, data on cluster-ordnance deployment zones, and estimation of probability of presence of cluster submunitions. These data were entered into the database, and serve as the basis for assessing the level of hazard.

Input data for the activity ‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ are: ‘General Data on Community’, ‘Data on Deployment Impact’, ‘Data on Level of Threat to Population’, and ‘Data on Potential Benefits after Clearance’. The level of environmental impact is assessed on the basis of these data. The activity ‘Priority Identification’ has input data that are the outputs of the previous two activities: ‘Level of Haz-ard in Risk Area’ and ‘Level of Environmental Impact’. On the basis of these inputs, the priority level is identified. ‘Assessment of Operating Conditions’ involves the input data on soil properties, on climate conditions, on liaison officers, and descriptions of the risk area. The activity ‘Assessment of Additional Activities’ employs input data generated by previous activities: priority level, data on accidents/victims and assessment of the need for additional activities. The data generated in previous activities are used for preparing the necessary reports.

All data necessary for statistical analyses, generation of survey reports and preparation of project documents for unexploded cluster submunitions clearance are contained in the relational database.

A1

HAZARDASSESSMENT

A2

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

ASSESSMENT

A3

IDENTIFICATION OF PRIORITY

LEVEL

A4

OPERATING CONDITIONS

ASSESSMENT

A5

ADDITIONALACTIVITIES

A6

REPORTGENERATION

Data on accidents/victims

Data on cluster ordnance deployment zone

Data on removing cluster ordnance Estimation of probability of presence of

cluster ordnance

General data on the communityData on deployment impact

Estimation of threat to population Estimation of potential benefits

Soil properties Climate conditions

Data on liaison officers Risk area description

Assessment of need for additional activities

Report on GS

Clearance Project

Clearance tasks

Hazard level in risk area

Priority level

Level of environmental impact

SOP

DBMS

Data base on general survey of cluster ordnance deployment area

Hazard assessment data

Environmental impact data

Data on additional activities

Data on operating conditions

Data on priority level

Data on environmental impact

Data on hazard assessment

Data on operating conditions

Data on additional activities

Data on priority level

Data on victims


TABLE 1

Entity Number of Attributes Number of Records Number of Data

Entriesered

Original data

Military and police clearance 7 23 161

Accidents 13 24 312

Depleted uranium 8 11 88

NATO GIS cluster 4 13 217 2,821

GIS cluster 3 15 312 4,680

GIS cluster 2 16 48 768

GIS cluster 1 13 143 1,859

Clearance – found 9 211 1,899

Clearance 12 13 156

Questionnaire – suspected area 9 120 1,080

Questionnaire – ERW 9 123 1,107

Assessed Data

Excluded area 9 600 5,400

Settlement 8 72 576

Suspected area 10 392 3,920

Deployment zone 13 105 1,365

Operating Data

Risk area 14 100 1,400

Access road 6 32 192

Marking 10 168 1.680

Incidents 13 50 650

Total 207 2,764 30,114

Geo-coded entities

Large items, like photographs, are referenced within the base by hyperlinks. They are then placed in a folder with accompanying documents, for practical reasons.

The file-based repository stores spatial data, as well as geo-coded topographic and cadastral maps of the locations where the survey was performed. The data in this repository may be classified as raster data and vector data. The raster data are: geo-coded topographic maps at the scale of 1:25,000, cadastral maps at the scale of 1:1,000, and geographic maps of Serbia at the scales of 1:200,000 and 1:300,000. Topographic and cadastral maps are geo-coded only for the area of the locations under survey. The vector data consist of geo-coded spatial data collected or generated during the general survey. The files represent the entities that, in addition to geographic location, have some other defining attributes. In total, the files contain 30,114 entered data describing the entities. (See Table 1.)

The original and assessed data are the geo-coded input data collected during the first sub-process of the general survey (identification of areas suspected of cluster ordnance hazard), supplemented during the ensuing sub-processes. The original data are geo-coded data obtained from the data source of the general survey, whereas the assessed data are the result of the work of general survey teams evaluat-ing the location and characteristics of cluster-ordnance deployment zones and suspected areas. The operating data class includes the geo-coded data on risk areas, access lanes and installed signs warning of the immediate proximity of areas suspected of unexploded cluster submunitions hazard!


4General assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia

FIGURE 4

Position of the general assess-ment of the situ-ation in planning for clearance of areas contaminat-ed by unexploded ordnance in the Mine Action Cen-tre of the Republic of Serbia – Model

The objective of the situation assessment is to provide as exact as possible a picture of the consequences of cluster ordnance deployment in the territory of Serbia. The general assessment enables the following: successful strategic and operational planning of the activities leading

to the elimination of unexploded cluster submunitions; clearer selection of priorities and efficient clearance; better communication with donors and international organizations; status updating and information on observing the commitments undertaken by international agreements.

The general assessment includes an evaluation of the hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions and an assessment of their social and economic impacts. Along with the appraisal of operating capacities for clearance it forms the general assessment for actions against landmines and other explosive remnants of war, including cluster submunitions. International mine action standards set such an assessment as a requirement to be met by affected countries.1

1 Requirements under International Mine Action Standards, IMAS 08.10:2003, General Mine Action Assessment, http://www.mineactionstandards.org/IMAS_archive/Final/IMAS_0810.pdf.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WITH UNEXPLODED

CLUSTER SUBMUNITIONS IN SERBIA

HAZARD ASSESSMENT GENERAL SURVEY

ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT

INTERNATIONALAGREEMENTS

NEEDS OF AFFECTEDCOMMUNITIES IN SERBIA

PREPARING CLEARANCE TASKS FOR RISK AREAS

SELECTION OF CLEARANCE PRIORITIES – GOVERNMENT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

STRATEGIC PLANNING CLEARANCE OPERATING PLAN

CLEARANCE OF AREAS CONTAMINATED BY UNEXPLODED CLUSTER SUBMUNITIONS


Cluster submu-nition found in

Sjenica

Unexploded cluster submunition hazard in SerbiaIn considering its problems with unexploded ordnance, a affected country starts with hazard assess-ment. The task of this assessment is to identify the cause of the problem through its manifestations in the field, then to identify hazardous areas and all related circumstances where people, property or the environment may be exposed to hazard. The assessment of hazard related to unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia included the following: identification and reconstruction of cluster-ordnance deployment zones, assessment of the extent and characteristics of hazardous areas, estimation of the hazard level and assessment of risk areas for clearance.

The assessment of the extent and characteristics of hazardous areas was carried out at two qualitatively different levels. It included an assessment of suspected areas and the assessment of risk areas for clearance. Suspected areas are those for which, from the analysis of available information, there are clear indications or reasonable suspicion of the presence of unexploded ordnance. The number, quality and accuracy of the defined characteristics of the suspected areas are selected in such a manner so as to enable an objective assessment of the hazard, from the level of the affected community to the level of the entire country. This area is the smallest unit for planning the tasks of the general survey during which additional collection of data and identification of risk areas for clearance took place. The survey of risk areas is undertaken in line with the priorities of the state authorities. For each individual risk area, the hazard of explosive ordnance was assessed, detailed measurements were carried out, soil properties and operating conditions for clear-ance were identified, and the current negative impact and potential benefits for the land after removal of the hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions were evaluated.

An assessment of suspected areas was carried out for the territory of Serbia, except for Kosovo, where mine and ERW clearance lies under the purview of UNMIK. In February 2008, the preliminary hazard assessment was performed, as a necessary first step in general survey activities. November 2008 saw the completion of the assessment of the hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia, aimed at enabling efficient strategic and operational planning, a transparent system for priority identification, and assisting the Serbian state authorities in presenting the problem more clearly to donors and relevant international organizations.

Unexploded cluster submunitions as cause of hazardIdentification and reconstruction of cluster-ordnance deployment zones were carried out based on the data obtained from available sources, and by collecting and verifying data in the field. The state authorities of the Republic of Serbia had received some data on the areas of cluster ordnance deployment from NATO Headquarters. However, the data on deploy-ment zones proved incomplete, containing only the coordinates of the deployment loca-tions and the number of ordnances deployed, without any particulars as to which type(s)


MAP 1

Areas of cluster ordnance deploy-ment, according to data received from NATO


TABLE 2

Cluster ord-nance deployed

by NATO forces in the Republic of

Serbia

Cluster Ordnance

Type

Submunitions Type

Dispenser Cluster

Submunitions Quantity per

Bomb

Failure Rate

Failure Rate per

Manufacturer %

Average Empirical

Failure Rate %

Maximum Expected

Failure Rate (%)

Diameter (m)

Length (m)

Mass (kg)

AGM-154/A BLU 97 2,698 4,07 484 154 5,00% 30,00%

CBU-87/B BLU - 97 A/B 0,397 2,33 430 202 5,00% 8,00% 30,00%

CBU-94 BLU - 114/B 0,406 2,06 460 166 5,00% 30,00%

CBU 99 A/B Mk - 118 247 5,00% 30,00%

BL 755 MK1, MK4 0,42 2,45 264 147 5,00% 11,80% 30,00%

of ordnance had been used. Data were submitted for 217 deployment zones, as follows: 142 deployment zones in Kosovo, 3 deployment zones in Vojvodina and 70 deployment zones in central Serbia. (See Map 1.) The coordinates for two deployment zones were outside the territory of Serbia. The Serbian Mine Action Centre provided data on previous surveys and records of earlier clearances, and prepared the terms of reference. Data on accidents and incidents caused by cluster submunitions were also used as a source for identifying deployment zones.1

All these data were not sufficient for the reconstruction of deployment zones, so the sur-vey teams of the NPA had to perform additional field collection and verification through questionnaires and on-site visits. The teams collected data by filling in questionnaires for each affected municipality and by visiting 76 cluster-ordnance deployment areas in order to get an overview of the situation. On the basis of available data and time-constrained field activities, the survey teams were able to reconstruct the location and extent of deployment zones, identify which cluster ordnance had been used and in which numbers, and estimate the quantity of unexploded cluster submunitions. At that time it was estimated that NATO forces had deployed five types of cluster bomb units with a total of seven types of cluster submunitions. It was assessed that there were a maximum of 177 deployment zones, in which 298 cluster bomb units were used.

A more detailed assessment of deployment zone characteristics was carried out in the second phase of the general survey. After new data had been collected and existing data had been verified in the field, it was possible to cancel 98 deployment zones, since they were found to be deployment zones not of cluster ordnance, but of other bombs or cluster ordnance without explosive

1 Data on incidents and accidents from the study prepared by the Norwegian People’s Aid on the consequences of NATO activities in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. ‘Yellow Killers’ were a starting point for identifying locations of cluster submunitions deployment.

Parts of cluster submuni-

tions found in Kuršumlija


Cluster Ordnance Type

Number of Identified

Deployment Zones

Number of Ordnance Projected

Munitions Type Number of Munitions Projected

Assessed Number of Unexploded Cluster

Submunitions

AGM 154/A 4 6 BLU 97 882 112

CBU 87 61 82 BLU 97 16,564 1,061

CBU 87 9 42 BLU 97 A/B 8,484 644

CBU 99 5 14 Mk-118 3,458 290

RBL 755 2 2 Mk-1 294 21

RBL 755 24 50 Mk-4 7,350 419

105 196 37,032 2,547

Estimate of the number of cluster ordnance used and remaining un-exploded cluster submunitions

payloads. Furthermore, during the general survey field activities, 26 new deployment zones were identified. The latest results of the general survey show that, in all, 105 cluster-ordnance deployment zones have been located in the territory of Serbia, in 15 municipalities. In these deployment zones, 196 cluster bomb units were used, containing 37,032 pieces of cluster submunitions. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 3

Immediately after deployment, the cluster submunitions and bomb remnants were col-lected by military, police and civil defence units. However, records on the removal of unex-ploded ordnance were not available to the survey teams of the NPA. By collecting additional data in the field, the survey teams found that removal by military and police forces had been undertaken at 24 locations, and that approximately 990 pieces of unexploded cluster sub-munitions of various types had been removed from these locations. Although this removal operation certainly reduced the probability of casualties, the hazard has remained: local farmers have since come across more cluster submunitions and remnants of cluster bombs. Thus it may be assumed that the collection of unexploded ordnance was undertaken in haste, mostly of unexploded ordnance visible on the surface, without applying international standards for ERW clearance. Most ordnance was collected in 1999. Since then, it has mainly been a case of spot clearance of unexploded ordnance, as reported by civilians.

Clearance operations carried out in line with international standards are now underway, supervised by the Serbian Mine Action Centre. During the clearance operations 226 pieces of unexploded cluster submunitions were removed and destroyed, 56.19% of which were found on the surface, and 43.81% at depths of 10 to 50 cm.

The survey teams assessed the remaining unexploded cluster submunitions for each de-ployment zone separately, taking into account the assessment of the failure rate and the data on removal of cluster submunitions to date. It is estimated that there are still 2,547 pieces of unexploded cluster submunitions scattered in 105 deployment zones, which means an average of 24.06 pieces of cluster submunitions per deployment zone.

The largest number of unexploded cluster submunitions in the territory of Serbia has been identified in Niš and in six municipalities in the south of the country. It has been as-sessed that in the territory of the Niš municipality of Crveni Krst there are 800 pieces, or


Cluster submu-nitions, quantity per municipality

Municipality Number of Zones Number of Cluster

Ordnance Projected

Assessed Number of Unexploded Submunitions

Pieces %

Knić 2 2 24 0.94%

Raška 2 2 30 1.18%

Sopot 1 1 32 1.26%

Leposaviæ 2 2 35 1.37%

Vladimirci 1 2 42 1.65%

Stara Pazova 1 2 46 1.81%

Gadžin Han 1 1 50 1.96%

Mediana 6 6 64 2.51%

Brus 10 10 116 4.55%

Kraljevo 13 13 141 5.54%

Sjenica 11 11 155 6.09%

Preševo 12 16 192 7.54%

Bujanovac 14 36 302 11.86%

Kuršumljija 13 34 518 20.34%

Crveni Krst 16 58 800 31.41%

Total 105 196 2547 100.00%

TABLE 4

31.41% of the total amount of unexploded cluster submunitions. For the municipalities of Bujanovac, Kuršumlija, Preševo, Sjenica, Kraljevo and Brus, it has been assessed that there are 1,424 pieces, or 55.91% of the total amount of unexploded cluster submunitions. The remaining unexploded cluster submunitions are located in the territories of eight other municipalities.

Assessment of extent and characteristics of suspected areas

Suspected Areas: Status at the Beginning of Survey operations The characteristics of the suspected areas1 were assessed on the basis of the reconstructed de-ployment zones, other data collected, and sketch drawings made by the survey teams during field visits. Each suspected area is a vector polygon with its perimeters defined in the map on the scale of 1:25,000. The perimeters of each suspected area were defined on the basis of the assessed hazard level, land-use, and topographic characteristics of the land.

During December 2007 and January 2008, NPA survey teams processed and entered into the database drawings of 790 sites with a total area of 77.13 km2. Areas with graphite munitions deployment are not considered to be a hazard for the population. There were a total of 60 such identified sites, with an overall area of 7.02 km2. Accordingly, it was assessed that 720 sites are suspected of unexploded cluster submunitions hazard, some 70.11 km2 in total.

Suspected areas were classified into five hazard levels: extremely high hazard (7 suspected ar-eas), very high hazard (15), high hazard (154), middle hazard (307) and low hazard (247).

1 Suspected area characteristics: suspected area parameters, suspected area extent, being part of a certain administrative unit, level of hazard and intended use of land. The hazard level is identified in line with the matrix provided in the General Survey Standard Operating Procedures. The intended use of land indicates which resources are blocked, identified on the basis of the classification system of land use approved by the Serbian Mine Action Centre.


MAP 2

Distribution of cluster-ordnance deployment zones in the ter-ritory of Serbia (without Kosovo)


Urgent marking sings

installed on acces road to

suspected area

The initial status of the suspect-ed area changed during the gener-al survey field activities carried out from February till November 2008. Changes in the shape and number of polygons and the extent and char-acteristics of the suspected areas re-sulted from adjustments and more precise defining of the characteristics of the deployment zone, or a higher number of smaller suspected areas due to a more precise definition of their characteristics. However, their extent did not exceed the number of 937 polygons and the area of 78.1 km2. This is the largest possible suspected area identified in Serbia for remnants of cluster submunitions, prior to any cancellation of the land due to additional new data.

Procedure and Results of Exclusion of Suspected Areas through Land Cancellation During the field part of the survey, which was the second sub-process of the general survey, the teams assessed all the data collected, the situation on the ground and the defined risk areas. These data were compared with the initial assessment of the suspected area in the cluster-ordnance deployment zone under survey. The survey teams focused on the following questions: (1) Whether the data collected during the field visit confirm the previously collected data, or if they are different, and why; (2) To which extent the data collected influence the accuracy of the previous assessment of the deployment zone characteristics and whether it is possible to carry out correction of the deployment zone, (3) To which extent the data collected influence the characteristics of the suspected areas in the deployment zone, and which of the characteristics may be changed; (4) Whether a part of the suspected area may be ‘cancelled’ (i.e. removed from the list of suspected hazard sites) due to change in the deployment zone characteristics or use of the land.

The collection of new data and the checking of facts resulted in a more accurate assessment of the situation in the micro-location under survey. The survey teams were able to assess more objectively the position and characteristics of the adjacent suspected areas. Such assessments generally led to the cancellation of certain parts of the suspected areas, as it could be positively determined that they pre-sented no hazard. The re-assessment of the deployment zone and its suspected areas was undertaken in the manner described in the sub-process of identifying areas suspected of hazards of cluster ordnance. Land was ‘cancelled’ if one of the criteria for the cancellation of land from the area suspected of cluster ordnance hazard was met.1 The land thus cancelled was deleted from the records in the database for the relevant suspected area and, using identical perimeters, was entered into the database of cancelled land. This enabled monitoring of the timeframe and control of the land cancellation procedure.

In the period from February to November 2008, cancellation of land from the suspected area was undertaken in 593 cases. The size of the areas cancelled was 47.4 km2, or 60.67% of the area previously

1 See Appendix B: Criteria for cancellation of land from area suspected of cluster ordnance hazards, 82. page


defined as suspected. In the greatest number of cases, 282, land was cancelled because only graphite munitions had been used, or other types of air ordnance that do not carry cluster munitions (Criterion C9). Such data were specially processed so as to enable any hazard of ordnance to be removed by meth-ods different from clearing unexploded cluster submunitions. The total size of the cancelled area, under this criterion, was 24.5 km2. The second largest cancelled area (14.6 km2) was directly related to a more precise defining of the deployment zone parameters (Criterion C10). Those are areas which are not in use because of suspicion of cluster submunitions on the part of the civilian population, and which are at a distance from the nearest deployment zone of at least half the longer axis, and where no traces of cluster munitions deployment have been found. Cancellation took place in 133 such cases. The third largest cancelled area (7.2 km2) was related to land-use (Criterion C8): farmland outside the deployment zone which had been cultivated for at least two years without finding any traces of cluster munitions deployment. Cancellation was possible in 72 such cases. Cancellations under other criteria were negli-gible in comparison with those above. The average size of each cancelled area was 0.080 km2.

GRAPH 1

Extent of cancelled area, by cancellation criteria

The analysis of cancelled area in relation to the hazard and intended use of land confirms earlier as-sumptions that the rate of land release was in connection with the previously assessed hazard and the intended use of land. In accordance with earlier forecasts, there were most cancellations in connection with suspected areas of low and medium levels of hazard. For suspected areas with low hazard level, there were 187 cancellations (total size 17.5 km2), and for suspected areas of medium hazard level, 211 cancella-tions (14.4 km2). However, the highest cancellation rate – 62.48% – was for suspected areas with a high priority level. This is not in line with the previous assumption that the release rates for suspected areas of extremely high, very high and high levels of hazard would be significantly less than for the remaining two, lower, levels. The explanation should be sought in the initial caution exercised by the survey teams: lacking sufficient input data for hazard assessment during the preliminary assessment, they opted for a ‘higher’ level of hazard in borderline cases. The areas categorized as representing a high level of hazard were mostly located on the outside perimeters of the deployment zone. During the second phase, the survey teams made the relatively largest number of adjustments in relation to these, partly cancelling

0

5

10

15

20

25

Criterion for cancellation of suspected area

Cancelled Area (km²)

km² 0.274 0.176 0.011 0.023 0.007 0.505 0.029 7.271 24.526 14.616

C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10


GRAPH 2

Analysis of cancelled area in relation to previ-

ously assessed hazard levels

GRAPH 3

Analysis of cancelled area

in relation to intended use of

land

them, and partly lowering their priority level. In 60 cases, a total area of 7 km2 was cancelled since it referred to deployment zones where only graphite submunitions had been used.

As to the structure of the cancelled land areas, land intended for agriculture, exploitation and main-tenance of forests and reconstruction of infrastructure and utility facilities was predominant. Agricul-tural land (Criterion N11) totalling 19.8 km2 was cancelled in 250 instances; land intended for forest exploitation and maintenance (Criterion N01) totalling 13.3 km2 was cancelled in 165 instances; and land intended for reconstruction of infrastructure of settlements and utility facilities (Criterion N12) totalling 5.8 km2 was cancelled in 69 instances. Important cancellations also took place regarding land intended for the development of tourism (Criterion N02), reconstruction of power distribution system and other electrical power facilities (Criterion N10) and the regulation of rivers and reconstruction of canals and embankments (Criterion N07).

28.60%

4.50%

62.48%55.11% 58.71%

100.00%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Extremely high Very high High Medium Low Graphite

submunitions

Previously assesed hazard level

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%Land release rate (%)

Cancelled area

Remaining suspected area

Land release rate

Area km²

83.1

3%

52.1

7%

0.00

%

0.00

%

0.06

%

0.00

%

100.

00%

0.37

%

32.0

1%

90.6

5%

65.9

2%

48.9

0%

14.4

5%

67.3

4%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

N01 N02 N03 N04 N05 N06 N07 N08 N09 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14

Previously assessed intended use of land

Area km²

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Land release rate (%)

Cancelled area

Renaining suspected area

Land release rate


GRAPH 4

Share in the ex-tent of suspected area per hazard level

Suspected Area Contaminated by Cluster Submunitions – Status at the Beginning of November 2008 The field activities of the general survey, including the collection of additional data in the field, measurements, recording data and the mapping thereof, were of twofold importance. Firstly, they enabled an evaluation of the situation and the preparation of project docu-ments for risk areas of priority for clearance. Secondly, they ensured sufficient data for a more precise assessment of the total suspected area and its reduction after non-hazardous portions had been cancelled.

By early November 2008, general survey field activities were completed. All the re-sults were processed and entered into the database. The database on the total suspected area contains 390 polygons, in all 30.7 km2, with an average size of 0.079 km2. The total suspected area could be reduced in comparison to the initial assessment of February that year for two reasons: (1) reduction in the number of deployment zones after cancellation of non-existent deployment zones of cluster ordnance, and deployment zones of graphite cluster submunitions; and (2) more precise assessment and ensuing cancellation of previ-ously suspected area.

The distribution of suspected areas in relation to the level of assessed hazard was as ex-pected. The lowest share consisted of areas categorized as representing an extremely high hazard. Suspected areas assessed as having higher hazard levels (extremely high, very high and high hazard) constituted 21.52% of the total, or 6.6 km2. (See Graphs 4 and 5.) These are areas located within a deployment zone. Such areas are not expected to see any addi-tional significant cancellations as the general survey continues, and they will be treated by measures for clearing unexploded cluster submunitions. The share of higher hazard levels in the total number of 390 suspected areas stands at 17.18 %.

Medium

11.766

38%

Low

12.366

40%

Extremely high

0.627

2% Very high

1.139

4%

High

4.852

16%


17

6

44

186

1370.105

0.067

0.110

0.063

0.090

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Extremely high Very high High Medium Low

0.000

0.020

0.040

0.060

0.080

0.100

0.120

Number of suspected areas

Suspected area averagemagnitude km²

Hazard level

Number of suspected areas Average magnitude of suspected area km²

GRAPH 5

Number of sus-pected areas and

average extent by hazard level

TABLE 5

Municipalities

Suspected Areas Status

Extremely High Hazard

Very High Hazard

High Hazard Medium Hazard Low Hazard Total

No. km2 No. km2 No. km2 No. km2 No. km2 No. km2 %

Crveni Krst 2 0.104 13 1.597 28 2.658 29 2.115 72 6.474 21.05%

Sjenica 1 0.052 39 3.364 9 0.982 49 4.398 14.30%

Medijana 67 2.099 19 1.971 86 4.070 13.23%

Kraljevo 10 0.393 20 2.989 30 3.382 11.00%

Kursumlija 2 0.190 8 1.035 3 0.340 5 0.511 18 2.078 6.76%

Brus 2 0.397 9 0.774 6 0.594 17 1.764 5.74%

Stara Pazova 2 0.297 3 0.228 5 0.828 10 1.353 4.40%

Bujanovac 1 0.035 6 0.271 8 0.646 3 0.238 14 1.189 3.87%

Leposavic 7 0.675 4 0.488 11 1.164 3.78%

Knic 1 0.106 2 0.173 1 0.092 17 0.705 21 1.077 3.50%

Presevo 2 0.209 4 0.194 7 0.611 1 0.044 1 0.003 15 1.061 3.45%

Raska 1 0.118 3 0.259 3 0.334 7 0.711 2.31%

Vladimirci 1 0.115 1 0.054 3 0.116 7 0.373 12 0.658 2.14%

Sopot 1 0.193 1 0.106 4 0.242 6 0.541 1.76%

Cacak 5 0.289 5 0.128 10 0.416 1.35%

Gadzin Han 1 0.115 4 0.195 3 0.105 8 0.415 1.35%

6 0.627 17 1.139 44 4.852 186 11.766 137 12.366 390 30.751 100.00%

Municipalities affected by un-

exploded cluster submunitions

The hazard of cluster submunitions is not evenly distributed, affecting 28 local commu-nities (“mesne zajednice”) from 16 different municipalities in Serbia, and a total of 12 out of 30 districts. Currently the largest suspected area is in the districts of Nišavski, Zlatibor-ski and Raški. (See Appendix D: Status of Suspected Areas by Districts, Municipalities and Settlements.).


Crveni Krst, Sjenica, Medijana and Kraljevo are municipalities with the largest suspected areas, totalling 18.3 km2 in size, or 59.59% of the to-tal current suspected area in Serbia. However, the picture is somewhat different if suspected areas of higher hazard levels (extremely high, very high and high hazard), are taken into account, as 73.93% of such areas (4.8 km2) are located in four municipali-

ties: Crveni Krst, Kuršumlija, Preševo and Bujanovac. If a more profound evaluation of the pri-orities in view of the hazard level is undertaken, it may be concluded that the suspected area of extremely high hazard is recorded only in the municipalities of Bujanovac, Kuršumlija, Preševo and Sopot. If the “very high” level of hazard is added to the “extreme” level, then the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Stara Pazova head the list of suspected areas, with 56.97% of the total. This brief analysis shows that in the selection of priorities it is necessary to evaluate the level of hazard by comparing individual locations within an affected community; similarly, communities or municipalities may be ranked internally.

What will be the final extent of risk areas for clearance in Serbia?The most difficult assessment of all concerns the final extent of the risk areas to be fully treated by international-standard procedures of cluster ordnance clearance. A statistical analysis was undertaken that included: calculation of risk areas based on the extent and number of suspected areas, calculation of the risk areas based on the land release rate according to hazard levels, cal-culation of risk areas for clearance based on the surveyed risk areas, and calculation of risk areas based on the deployment zones.

The calculation of risk areas based on the extent of suspected areas starts from the latest status of the suspected areas on 1 November 2008 and the structure of the land cancelled until this date. (See Table 24, page 84.) By using the release-rate indicators1 and the cancellation structure, the structure of suspected areas could be projected and the extent of the suspected areas assessed. Similarly, calculations based on the number of locations were performed, using the indicators of average extent of suspected areas and number of areas, in addition to the land release rate. It had been assumed that areas where partial land cancellation had been undertaken would not significantly alter in extent. Using this method, it was assessed that the final risk areas for clear-ance would be slightly larger than 5 km2. The weakness of this calculation is that it started on the basis of the indicators for previous reductions of suspected areas, without taking into account that such land release rate may not be achieved for two reasons: because the number of completely cancelled areas would be dramatically reduced, and because the release rate is inversely propor-tional to the level of precision of assessed data.

This assessment is conservative and may not be valid as a result for the entire suspected area.

1 Land release rate is the percentage of land cancelled in relation to the size of the suspected areas.

Part of cluster bomb found in Preševo


MAP 3

Classification of affected munici-

palities by size of suspected

areas


Instead, it should be considered as an indicator of the final extent of higher-level risk areas.The calculation of risk areas based on the results of land cancellation per hazard levels

was based also on the latest status of the suspected areas, but here the structure of cancelled areas was analysed in relation to the priority level. (See Table 25, page 85.) It was assumed that the land release rate, expressed by hazard levels, would remain the same in future sur-veys of suspected areas. In addition to the average assessment, the upper and lower limits were calculated for a standard deviation of the release rate. In this case the lower assessed limit proved to be similar to the previous calculation based on the surveyed area structure. The average assessment of 13.7 km2 represented 44.69% of the latest assessed suspected area, or 17.58% of the initial assessment for the extent of the suspected area. That is less in comparison with indicators in other countries in the Western Balkans where similar gen-eral surveys have been undertaken: these surveys have shown the rate of reduction of the suspected area to the risk area for clearance to be between 20% and 25%.

The third calculation of the risk area for clearance, based on the surveyed risk areas, is similar to the previous one, but it takes into account the surveyed risk area planned for clearance. It involves 93 polygons with a total risk area of 8.1 km2, where no additional land cancellations are expected. This area was not included in the calculation of the average re-lease rate, but was added to the final assessment of the clearance area. The lower assessed limit of the suspected area of 12.5 km2 is slightly less than the average assessed area in the previous case. The average assessed limit of 18 km2 is 23.03% of the initial assessment of the extent of the suspected area, and the upper assessed limit of 23.5 km2 is 30.07% of this.

Calculations of risk areas based on deployment zones were carried out for the reconstructed dimensions of 105 deployment zones. The average size of a deployment zone is 114,779 m2. Their total common area is 12 km2, which is in accordance with the lower limit of risk area in the previous calculation. This is acceptable from the perspective of assessing the risk area, which will always be larger than the cluster-ordnance deployment zone. Scattering makes it is impossible to determine the outer perimeters of a cluster-ordnance deployment zone precisely, so an additional safety belt is cleared around the assessed deployment zone. Ac-cording to the current rules in Serbia, a safety belt of 100 metres is to be cleared from the outermost cluster submunitions found. Including this safety belt zone in the calculation as a safety ring around the deployment zone yields an assessment of 24.5 km2. By reducing this area by 3 km2, which is the area cleared of cluster submunitions between 2003 and 2007, the result is that the area of 21.5 km2 as the upper assessed limit below which is the final risk area for clearance. This upper limit may be further reduced due to overlapping of deploy-ment zones. The average value according to this calculation is 15 km2. Since the risk area is always larger than the deployment zone for a given safety belt, it may be concluded that the area to be cleared of cluster ordnance will not be smaller than 15 km2.

This analysis shows that the third and the fourth calculations are consistent in their results, and the first and second calculations imply certain trends in the reduction of the suspected areas. The calculation based on the deployment zone indicated the extent of the risk areas to be between 15 km2 and 21.5 km2. That will serve as a framework for in-depth assessment based on the third calculation. The following assumptions are crucial for the analysis of the final assessment:


GRAPH 6

Unexploded cluster submuni-

tions clearance, by year

1. During future land cancellation, the standard dispersal of the results will be smaller, or the results will be grouped around the average land release rate.

2. The release rate for suspected areas with high hazard level will decrease; with areas of extremely high and very high levels of hazard there probably will not be further cancel-lations due to the procedures of data processing involved.

3. Release rates for suspected areas of lower levels of hazard will rise, approaching 100% for the low hazard level as conditions for cancellation are created during clearance.

4. For 28 existing suspected areas (total area of 2 km2) land cancellation has been per-formed, and further reductions should not be expected. The release rate does not apply to this area, and it is added into the final calculation of the clearance area.

The final analysis provides for two options for the assumptions given (See Table 25, page 85.). It may be predicted that the extent of the risk area still to be cleared from unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia is between 15 km2 and 16 km2.

Given the current average area clearance of 0.682 km2 a year, clearance of cluster-ordnance deployment zone will take about 23 years to complete. (See Graph 6.) It is clear that more resources must be allocated to clearance in order to solve the problem of unexploded cluster munitions in Serbia within a reasonable time-frame.

Social and economic impact of unexploded cluster sub-munitionsThe assessment of social and economic impact of unexploded cluster submunitions is the other part of the general assessment of the situation. It starts from the hazard as the source of risk, being more complex and dynamic. Its results are more short-term, contingent upon changes in the environment caused primarily by human activities and changes in nature.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

0.000

0.200

0.400

0.600

0.800

1.000

1.200

Cleared area (km²)

Cleared areaCluster sumbmunitions found

Number of cluster submunitions found


GRAPH 7

Number of accidents and incidents, by year

Cluster submu-nition victim

The assessment of socio-economic impact undertaken here involves the following elements: (1) analysis of accidents and incidents to date; (2) vulnerable analysis of the popu-lation at risk; and (3) analysis of blocked resources. These provide the information necessary for se-lecting priorities for clearance of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia.

Cluster submunitions accidents and incidentsData on accidents and incidents caused by cluster submunitions were collected in all the phases of the general survey. In all, 73 such were recorded: 21 instances of accidents, and 52 incidents without harmful effects to human life and health. At the beginning of the survey there were data on 20 accidents and one incident caused by cluster submunitions. With regard to this initial situation, the survey teams found data on one more accident and 51 incidents. (See Graph 7.) These data were mapped and used in the assessment of hazards from unexploded cluster submunitions.

The most recent accident took place in 2005 in the industrial zone of Niš, and the most recent incident happened in 2008 in the settlement of Reljan, in Preševo municipality. Accidents and incidents were caused by four types of cluster submunitions: BLU 97, BLU 97 A/B and Mk-4 and Mk-118. Cluster submunitions of type BLU 97 were the most frequent cause (46.6% of instances), followed by submunitions of type Mk-4 (in 34.3% of cases). (See Graph 8.)

0

5

10

15

20

Year

Accidents 17 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

Incidents 16 9 4 10 1 1 3 2 4 2

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of accidents/incidents


Number of accidents and

incidents, by type of cluster submunitions

GRAPH 8

GRAPH 9

Cluster submu-nitions casualties

The accidents recorded to date have resulted in 191 victims: 31 fatalities (16.2%), and 160 per-sons injured (83.8%). The largest number of casualties occurred during the 1999 deployment of NATO air forces: 27 fatalities, and 152 persons wounded. From the end of the NATO campaign until November 2008, there were an additional 12 casualties, 4 of them fatalities: 3 children and one farmer died, whereas 8 persons have been injured: 2 deminers, 1 farmer and 5 children .

Casualties were caused by three types of cluster submunitions: BLU 97A/B, BLU 97 and Mk-4. Most casualties were caused by BLU 97 A/B cluster submunitions during the NATO deployment to Niš. For casualties after the NATO deployment, the share of all types of submunitions is evenly distributed.

0

5

10

15

20

25

BLU 97A/B BLU 97 Mk-4 Mk-118

Cluster submunitions type

Incidents

Accidents

Number of accidents/incidents

0

50

100

150

Cluster submunitions type

Number of casaulties

Fatalities 15 2 14

Wounded 143 12 5

BLU 97A/B BLU 97 Mk-4


MAP 4

Locations of accidents and incidents


GRAPH 10

Exposure of local communities to the

risk of unexploded cluster submunitions

Vulnerability analysis of the population at risk

Affected Communities The survey found that 28 local communities (“mesne zajednice”) are affected by unexploded cluster submunitions. In these communities there are about 162,000 inhabitants. According to the current assessment, 88,000 people live in the immediate vicinity of a suspected area, and can thus can be said to be exposed to daily risk. Of these, a full 66.1% live in the settlement of Duvanište in Niš. (See Table 18, page 78.) On average there are 2,881 directly affected inhabitants for each affected local community (“mesne zajednice”). However, if Duvanište is excluded from the assessment, the average for the other communities falls to 1,125 inhabitants.

The risks of exposure to unexploded ordnance are not evenly distributed. Graph 10, showing the exposure of local communities to the risk of unexploded ordnance, combines two parameters of risk exposure: (1) share of those directly threatened among the population of the local commu-nity, and (2) share of the suspected area within the threatened local community. The graph clearly shows that the affected communities are concentrated into three groups. The first group covers three communities – Merdare, Duvanište and Medoševac – where both parameters are higher than elsewhere. Group two consists of 7 communities – Buštranje, 12. Februar, Reljan, Strezovce, Šibnica, Belo Brdo and Donji Komren – which are represented in the upper part of the graph due to their larger share of directly threatened population, but with a relatively smaller suspected area. The remaining communities are grouped around low values, below 20% under both of the parameters, except for Lađevci, which has the relatively largest suspected area but also a minimal number of persons directly threatened. These conclusions may serve as a point of reference for selecting priorities in planning clearance operations for unexploded cluster submunitions.

Donji Komren

Jastrebac LađevciSamaila Sjenica Vojka Bapsko Polje

Buštranje

Duvanište

Gare

Guncati Jalovik Karadnik

Lisina

Medoševac

Merdare

Ravnište

Reljan

Šibnica

Strezovce

SvinjišteVapa

12 Februar

Belo Brdo

Bogdanovac

Bresnica

Bumbarevo brdo

Cedovo 0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00% 45.00% 50.00%

Percentage of population directly at risk in affekted communities

Percentage of territory defined as suspected areas in affected communities

GRAPH 11


Age structure of the affected population

Age Structure The population structure of the threatened communities was analysed on the basis of data

for all 22 threatened communities where individual risk areas were surveyed. There is an almost even distribution of all age categories if the overall population in threatened communities is taken into account. However, the average share of age groups per threatened communities is a more realistic indicator, since it eliminates the effect of communities with an especially high number of inhabitants, like Duvanište. Then the structure moves in the direction of the older population groups, to 37.9% for those over 60 years of age. (See Graph 11.)

Age structure per threatened local communities is not evenly distributed. The elderly dominate in the communities of Merdare, Reljan, Gare and Jastrebac, whereas young people up to 19 years of age have a larger share in Buštranje, Strezovce, Sjenica, Vojka, Vapa and Bumbarevo Brdo. (See Graph 21 in Appendix D.)

Entry of Population into Risk Areas Risk behaviour of the population was registered in 91.8% surveyed risk areas. In most cases (56.2%), such behaviour involved the entry of adults from threat-ened settlements. (See Graph 12.) Chil-dren are second in the number of reg-istered cases. They enter together with adult villagers (in 28% of the cases), and less frequently together with adults and

15.8%

14.2%

26.7%

23.4%

19.9%

13.4%

10.1%

17.6%

21.1%

37.9%

Up to 14

15-35 years of age

25-39 years of age

40-59 years of age

Over 60

As regards the total

number of inhabitants

in threatened

communities

As regards average age

structure per threatened

communities

Parts of cluster submunitions found in Sjenica


GRAPH 12

Entry into surveyed risk

area – identified groups

Parts of cluster submunitions

found in Bujano-vac

“other persons” – i.e. individuals not living in the threatened communities. The correlation between the frequency and numbers of entry into risk area indicates that there

are two dominant types of behaviour concerning entry to risk areas. (See Graph 13.) In most cases it was individual and occasional entry of villagers into the risk area. The other dominant type is daily entry of groups of villagers into the risk area.

The behaviour of the population is influenced by the distance of the households from the risk areas (Graph 14). In 29.2% of all cases, the risk area is in the immediate vicinity of the houses. In 50% of the cases the distance is up to 300 metres, and in 69.8 % cases the distance is up to one kilometre from the risk area. Thus, in most cases the population is living near the source of hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions.

Conclusion of the analysis indicates that people in af-fected communities seem to underestimate threat posed by unexploded cluster submunitions. They assume that surface-level removal of unexploded cluster submunitions has been undertaken, and that what remains is mainly located underground. On the other hand, they do take certain precautions: children tend to enter the suspected area in the company of adults, and group entry is preferred over individual entry. Entry into risk areas, proximity to settlements, and children as a vulnerable group are in-cluded in the criteria for selection of priorities for clear-ance of unexploded cluster submunitions.

1.1%

1.1%

13.5%28.1%

56.2%

Adult villagers

Adults and children

Adults and children, others

Others

Unknown


Distance of the surveyed risk areas from near-est settlement/household

GRAPH 14

Entry into surveyed risk area – frequency and numbers

GRAPH 13

DailyOccasianllyVery rarely

Unknown

Group

Group and individual

Individual

Unknown

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35Number of risk areas

In groups or individualy Frequency of entry into risk area

29.2%

12.5%

16.7%

19.8%

13.5%

8.3%

0-5 meters

6-100 meters

101- 300 meters

301-1000 meters

1001-2000 meters

Over 2000 meters


GRAPH 15

Relation of the number and ex-

tent of suspected areas, by blocked

resources

Analysis of blocked resourcesOne of the parameters used in assessing a suspected area is determining the predominant intended use of the land not being used, or which natural or other resources are blocked in the suspected area. The intended use of land was determined in line with the classification system approved by the Serbian Mine Action Centre. (See Appendix C.) As shown in Graph 15, it is mostly agricultural land that is blocked due to the presence of unexploded cluster submunitions hazards: 29.7% of the suspected locations relate to agricultural land, or 33.4% of the total areas suspected. The second largest barrier due to unexploded cluster submunitions is the impossibility of reconstructing the infrastructure of settlements and utility facilities, representing 19.9% of the total suspected area. The third largest problem is the impossibility of renovating or restoring housing units, at 14.2%. Further significant reasons for blocking relate to the following categories of land use: forest ex-ploitation and maintenance (8.8%), tourism development (9.6%), road communications (6.4%), and new industrial production (4.2%). The remaining categories of land use have individual shares of less than 1.5% of the total suspected area. The employment structure of threatened local com-munities is dominated by agriculture, hunting and fishing. Especially prevalent are the following business activities: processing industry, commerce, traffic and communications, public admin-istration and construction engineering. (See Graph 22 in Appendix D.) Clearly, the structure of blocked resources is reflected in these activities.

However, blocked agricultural land is for the most part (7.7 km2 out of 10.3 km2 of the suspected total) of only low or medium hazard, being located on the outside perimeters of the deployment zone. The share of areas of low and medium hazard is similar with regard to blocked reconstruc-tion of settlement infrastructure (5 km2 out of 6.1 km2 of the suspected area) and housing units (3.9 km2 out of 4.4 km2 of the suspected area). (See detailed calculations in Tables 6 and 7.) Since the rate of cancellation of suspected areas is generally higher in low hazard areas, the share of higher levels of hazard (extremely high, very high and high hazard) can be expected to be greater

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

N 01 N 02 N 03 N 04 N 05 N 06 N 07 N 08 N 09 N 10 N 11 N 12 N 13 N 14

0.000

2.000

4.000

6.000

8.000

10.000

12.000

Number of suspected areas

Magnitude of suspected areas

Magnitude of suspected areas (km²)Number of suspected areas

Blocked resources


TABLE 6

Number of suspected areas with regard to hazard levels and blocked resources

Structure of resources blocked due to presence of unexploded cluster submunitions

Extremely high

hazard

Very high

hazard

High hazard

Medium hazard

Low hazard

Total %

Forest exploitation and maintenance 1 3 7 13 15 39 10,00%

Tourism development 0 0 3 12 8 23 5,90%

Employment incentives 0 0 0 0 1 1 0,26%

Reconstruction of educational, religious and cultural facilities 0 1 0 4 2 7 1,79%

Passability of transport communications 0 0 5 8 4 17 4,36%

Construction of communications facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,00%

River regulations, reconstruction of canals and embankments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,00%

Water supply 0 0 0 2 2 4 1,03%

Starting industry production 0 0 1 8 13 22 5,64%

Reconstruction of power transmission lines and power facilities 0 1 0 1 0 2 0,51%

Restoring agricultural land use 3 7 17 43 46 116 29,74%

Reconstruction of settlement infrastructure and utilities 0 2 8 27 28 65 16,67%

Reconstruction of housing units 1 0 3 68 18 90 23,08%

Other 1 3 0 0 0 4 1,03%

Total 6 17 44 186 137 390 100,00%

% 1,54% 4,36% 11,28% 47,69% 35,13% 100,00%

in the final risk area for clearance. If we look at the extent of the suspected area only for the higher levels of hazard, the sequence in the structure of blocked land is somewhat different. The share of blocked agricultural land remains dominant, and then the blocked resources follow in this order: reconstruction of settlement infrastructure, forest exploitation and maintenance, road commu-nication lines, development of tourism, and reconstruction of housing facilities.

The analysis of blocked resources confirms that the hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions in combination with blocked resources has a significant impact on the socio-economic situation of the communities affected.

The likelihood of fatalities has been reduced, but the number and frequency of incidents is such that the probability of activating unexploded submunitions will rise with the growing needs of the population to use the blocked land. The structure of blocked land for higher levels of haz-ard indicates another possible hazard. Any potential use of areas contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions, prior to clearance, involves the disturbance of soil – whether agriculture is the main potential activity, or other land-uses predominate. Regular measures of warning the population and marking suspected areas need to be undertaken, to prevent misperceptions as to the absence/presence of unexploded cluster submunitions.

The positive effects of the removal of unexploded cluster submunitions will be reflected in the following: (1) increase in general safety, (2) reduction of risk, especially for people living in contact with risk areas, (3) increase in the number of users of land now blocked, as indicated by the employment structure in the affected local communities!


TABLE 7

Extent of suspected areas

with regard to hazard levels and blocked resources

Structure of resources blocked due to presence of unexploded cluster submunitions

Extremely high

hazard

Very high

hazard

High hazard

Medium hazard

Low hazard

Total %

Forest exploitation and maintenance 0,057 0,120 0,739 0,899 0,884 2,699 8,78%

Tourism development 0,000 0,000 0,515 1,240 1,202 2,957 9,62%

Employment incentives 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,094 0,094 0,30%

Reconstruction of educational, religious and cultural facilities 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,319 0,091 0,411 1,34%

Passability of transport communications 0,000 0,000 0,610 0,907 0,446 1,963 6,38%

Construction of communications facilities 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,00%

River regulations, reconstruction of canals and embankments 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,00%

Water supply 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,080 0,097 0,177 0,57%

Starting industry production 0,000 0,000 0,057 0,543 0,678 1,278 4,15%

Reconstruction of power transmission lines and power facilities 0,000 0,149 0,000 0,098 0,000 0,247 0,80%

Restoring agricultural land use 0,402 0,563 1,648 3,014 4,645 10,272 33,40%

Reconstruction of settlement infrastructure and utilities 0,000 0,155 0,961 2,345 2,650 6,111 19,87%

Reconstruction of housing units 0,133 0,000 0,323 2,320 1,581 4,357 14,17%

Other 0,035 0,152 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,187 0,61%

Total 0,627 1,140 4,853 11,765 12,368 30,753 100,00%

% 2,04% 3,71% 15,78% 38,26% 40,22% 100,00%


5Reports on general survey of risk areas

Urgent mark-ing sign installed by survey team during field activities

Preparation of the general survey report is the first step in generating the clearance tasks for risk areas. These reports represent the sum of information collected from a range of sources by applying various methods of data collection: questionnaires, in-

terviews, observations and measurements. The general survey report is a standardized form where the data and the results of data processing are entered in the form of estimates, descrip-tions, coordinates and other records. The structure of the general survey report is based on the general survey process, thus reminding the survey teams of the requirements to be met during survey activities. Integral to the report on general survey are minutes of interviews, photographs, and sketch drawings of the risk area.

The main parts of the survey report are as follows: general data on the areas surveyed, hazard assessment, environmental impact assessment, and assessment of operating conditions for clearance. Hazard assessment contains information on accidents, victims, deployment zone characteristics, and previous activities of removal of unexploded cluster submunitions and other unexploded ordnance. On the basis of this information, the survey team assesses the level of hazard in each risk area. Environmental impact assessment involves general data on the community where the risk area is located, data on the consequences of cluster sub-munitions deployment in the community, assessments of the population vulnerability and estimates of the potential benefits of clearance. On the basis of all these elements, the survey team prepares an assessment of the environmental impacts of the risk. The assessment of operating conditions includes data on characteristics of the risk-area land, prevailing local climate conditions, contact information on persons from the local community, information on each location in relation to the wider area, as well as a description of the risk area covered by

the report, and additional activities identified by the survey team to be taken in addition to clearance.

By the end of November 2008, the survey teams had prepared 100 reports. The total risk area covered by these reports is 8.3 km2. This is sufficient for multi-annual opera-tions of clearance of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia.

Each report on the general survey


GRAPH 16

Time spent on preparing

general survey reports

contains 313 pieces of data, which means that a total of 31,300 data entries have been recorded in the database. In addition, there are 100 sketch drawings of risk areas with coordinates of breakpoints, 100 drawings of the wider area, 231 photographs of risk areas, 168 photographs of installed signs of emergency marking, 48 minutes of interviews, and 100 orders/requests for general survey. The number of working hours spent on field operations, data processing and report preparation was 4,424, or an average of 44.24 hours for the preparation of each survey report. Bearing in mind the activities, the distribution of time is as expected, apart from the time spent on trips to survey locations and return. (See Graph 16.)

The general survey reports are integral parts of the project documentation on unexploded

cluster submunitions clearance prepared by the Serbian Mine Action Centre. Based on these reports, this Centre prepares other project documents: proposals for donnors, clearance tasks, and other relevant documents.

Selection of priorities for clearanceFundamental elements in identifying priorities for clearance are the nature of risk, risk source (expressed through hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions), and the environmental impact. The matrix for identifying priorities for risk areas is generated by combining the hazard level scale and the environmental impact scale for risk. In order to survey the areas contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia, a matrix with nine levels of priority was prepared for ranking risk locations. This matrix was constructed on the basis of five levels of hazard and five levels of environmental impact assessed during the survey.

Levels of hazard within the matrix are classified as: extremely high hazard (EH), very high hazard (VH), high hazard (H), medium hazard (M) and low hazard (L).

13

7

109

4

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Working hours spent on

survey location


preparing the survey and

analysis of documentation


travelling to the location

and back


preparing reports and

accompanying documents


entering data into the

data base and preparing

project documents

Activity

Hours per report


TABLE 8

Priority level for risk areasHazard level

EH VH H M L

Environemental impact level

EH 1 2 3 4 5

VH 2 3 4 5 6

H 3 4 5 6 7

M 4 5 6 7 8

L 5 6 7 8 9

Risk location priority matrix

Hazard as a source of risk is described on the basis of the position and characteristics of the risk area in question. The level of hazard is identified on the basis of data on consequences of accidents/incidents and the assessed probability of the presence of unexploded cluster submunitions in the risk area. The matrix for estimating the level of hazard has been generated by combining the scale of consequences of accidents/incidents caused by unexploded cluster submunitions and the scale of probability of presence of unexploded cluster submunitions in the suspected area.

The consequences of accident/incidents caused by cluster submunitions to date have been clas-sified according to the following scale:

1) accident with fatal consequence or wounding of one or more persons2) incident with animal casualties3) incident without consequences for people or animals4) no incidentsThe probability of presence of unexploded cluster submunitions in the suspected area has been

determined in accordance with the following scale and relevant cumulative criteria:1) Almost certain presence of unexploded cluster submunitions. Criteria to be met:

a. data indicating that the area lies within the zone of scattering of cluster submunitions, the area is not in use, or that

b. during use of the area, cluster submunitions or other remnants indicating the deploy-ment of cluster ordnance have been found.

2) Highly probable presence of unexploded cluster submunitions. Criteria: a. data indicating that the area lies within the zone of scattering of cluster submunitions,

the area is not in use, there have been some activities on partial removal of unexploded clus-ter submunitions without application of international standards or expert monitoring of the competent body.

3) Low probability of presence of unexploded cluster submunitions. Criteria: a. area contiguous with the zone of scattering of cluster submunitions, the area is not in

use, or b. data indicating that the area lies within the zone of scattering of cluster submunitions,

the area is in use, there have been some activities on partial removal of unexploded cluster submunitions without application of international standards or expert monitoring of the com-petent body.

4) No probability of presence of unexploded cluster submunitions. Criteria:


TABLE 9

Matrix for level of hazard

Matrix for hazard level

Consequences of accidents/incidents to date

Death or injury

to persons

Death or injury

to animals

Incidnts without

consequencesNo incidents

Probability of presence

of unexploded cluster

submunitions

Almost certain EH EH VH H

High probable VH H M M

Low probability M M L L

Not probabile L

TABLE 10

Matrix for identifying

environmental impact risk

Environmental impact risk matrixVulnerability population level

High Medium Low

Potential benefits level

Category 1 EH VH H

Category 2 H M M

Category 3 M M L

a. area is not in use, due to the suspicion of unexploded cluster submunitions hazard.Levels of hazard within the matrix are classified as: extremely high hazard (EH), very high hazard

(VH), high hazard (H), medium hazard (M) and low hazard (L).The environmental impact of the risk of unexploded cluster submunitions has been estimated

by comparing adverse circumstances and potential possibilities. Adverse circumstances are ex-pressed by the level of vulnerability of the population, and potential possibilities by the expected benefits of clearing areas currently contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions. The vulnerability level of the population in relation to a given risk area has been determined in ac-cordance with the following scale:

1) High vulnerability level. Criteria: daily presence of the population in the immediate vi-cinity of the risk area, or multiple entries into the risk area, or definite information that children move about in the immediate vicinity of the risk area.

2) Medium vulnerability level. Criteria: population occasionally present in the vicinity of the risk area, or no population present in the immediate vicinity of the risk area.

3) Low vulnerability level. Criteria: no definite information on the presence of population in the vicinity of the suspected area, or population rarely present.

The potential benefits of clearance have been defined by the affected communities themselves, based on the criteria identified by the relevant authorities. In principle, the criteria are grouped according to their importance, where category one is of highest importance. The environmental impact matrix has been generated by combining these two scales. Also here, the levels of environ-mental impact are classified as extremely high impact (EH), very high impact (VH), high impact (H), medium impact (M), and low impact (L).


GRAPH 17

Share of risk areas, by vulner-ability levels and potential benefit levels

Household in suspected area

For all risk areas surveyed by the NPA in Serbia, the level of priority was determined as described above. As for hazard levels, survey teams as-sessed them in the suspected area first, later confirming them during the de-tailed survey of the suspected area and their ‘conversion’ into risk areas. The distribution of risk areas per hazard levels for the areas surveyed so far is normal. Medium-level hazard has the

maximum share, and from there the values decrease on both sides. (See Graph 18.)

Regarding the threat-level assessment, high level of threat dominates, with 70.07% of the surveyed areas. This could have been expected, since the activities of the survey teams were directly precisely at the most hazardous locations, and in those communities where assess-ments indicated highest vulnerability for the population. Almost all locations belong to cat-egory 1 of potential benefits, because there are no clearly elaborated criteria on the basis of which risk areas may be categorized in relation to this characteristic. These criteria need to be determined by the competent bodies as soon as possible, as only then will the system for identifying priorities be fully effective. (See Graph 17.)

Level of environmental impact was estimated on the basis of the estimation of the vulner-ability level, and of potential benefits of clearance. Since the results of both these evaluations are in the upper parts of the scale, the distribution of risk areas in terms of environmental impact level is also located in the upper part of the scale. Thus the normal distribution of

70.07%

29.93%

0.00%

94.73%

5.27%0.00%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

High vulnerability/Category 1 Medium vulnerability/Category 2 Low vulnerability/Category 3

Vulnerability level/Categories of potential benefits

Vulnerability level

Potential benefit level

Share in surveyed risk area (%)


GRAPH 18

Share of risk areas by

hazard levels and environmental

impact levels

GRAPH 19

Share of risk areas for clear-

ance, by priority levels

risk area otherwise characteristic of hazard assessment is missing. The share of extremely high environmental impact is at the maximum, and then decreases sharply down the scale to the medium level of environmental impact, which has the smallest share. No areas with low environmental impact were identified. (See Graph 18.)

The share of risk areas by priority levels indicates a regular distribution of risk areas, with the maximum at the fourth level of priority. (See Graph 19.) Due to the results obtained for environmental impact assessment, there was a slight but not significant shift toward higher priority levels. This confirms that the effect of particular factors influencing the identifica-tion of priorities is sufficiently balanced, and that the system is capable of compensating for extreme values.

5.81% 7.74%

36.84%

43.30%

6.31%

67.13%

27.60%

3.65% 1.62% 0.00%0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

Extremely high Very high High Medium Low

Hazard level

Environmental impact level

Share in risk area (%)

Environmental impact level

8.00%5.96%

29.86%

36.33%

17.68%

1.14% 1.04% 0.00% 0.00%0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Share in risk area (%)

Priority levels


Municipality of Bujanovac

This analysis has shown how impor-tant it is to have a system for defining priorities in making planning decisions. This is crucial for operational planning. Along with the growing interest in re-solving the problems of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia, the need to set priorities among clearance tasks will also increase. Donors wish to see priorities set in a clear and transparent manner, the users want to have a fair

and just order for resolving their problems, and the government wishes to channel clearance activities into legal and normative frameworks. Another important reason for identifying priorities is that, un-der conditions where financial and other resources are not sufficient, as is the case in Serbia, available funds should be directed to where they will yield the most positive effects for the people.

The Serbian Mine Action Centre has approved implementation of this model for prioritizing as part of the NPA standard operating procedures. The next step is to make identifying priorities part of the national policy for mine action, including uniform criteria for prioritization, to be followed by all state authorities and other bodies or organizations involved.

Case studies

Municipality BujanovacThe municipality of Bujanovac is situated in the south of Serbia. It borders on the municipalities of Preševo, Gnjilane, Kosovska Kamenica, Vranje and Trgovište to the west, north and east, and to the south with the Republic of Macedonia. Its area covers 462 km2. According to the latest census (2002), the population of Bujanovac was 12.011.

Populated area suspected to contain cluster submunitions


TABLE 11

SettlementArea of the Community

Number of Inhabitants

Number of Households

Number in workforce

Workers in agriculture

Bogdanovac 17 101 33 47 24

Jastrebac 5 19 19 7 7

Karadnik 12 455 107 164 27

Svinjište 10 103 35 38 24

Total 44 678 194 256 82

Data on threatened com-

munities in the Municipality of

Bujanovac

During the 1999 bombing, NATO aircraft deployed cluster ordnance and other ordnance against positions of the Serbian military located in this area. After the war, areas contaminated by unexploded cluster submunitions remained in four local communities of the municipality: Jastrebac, Karadnik, Bogdanovac and Svinjište. Immediately after bombing, military and civil defence personnel carried out surface removal of unexploded cluster submunitions. However, a certain quantity of cluster submunitions that remained hidden in the vegetation or underground could not be detected by surface removal.

The total area of affected local communities in the municipality of Bujanovac is about 17 km2 and has (according to the 2002 census) 1,259 inhabitants. Most of the population earn a livelihood from agriculture and forest exploitation.

Since the end of the NATO bombing there have been three victims to date in this municipal-ity: two fatalities and one wounded person. In ten cases, members of the local population have found cluster submunitions during agricultural activities, hunting, herding cattle, etc. The first accident involving unexploded cluster submunitions took place on 6 August 1999, and involved two children. One child was killed, the other wounded. At the accident site, ten more pieces of cluster submunitions were found. On 18 July 2001, a boy was killed by cluster submunitions under unknown circumstances. Probably he or someone else passing through the area where cluster ordnance had been deployed found the cluster ordnance, took it outside the risk area, and activated it. In 2001, 2002 and 2007 there were six incidents recorded involving the finding of cluster ordnance. In all, 30 additional pieces were found: three in 2001, seven pieces in 2002, and 20 pieces in 2007.

At the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, the NPA started its general survey of areas of cluster ordnance deployment in Serbia, assessing the hazards, extent, shape and characteristics of the suspected areas. On the basis of the NATO data on cluster submunition deployment, data on accidents, removal by military and police forces, and questionnaires completed by informants assigned by the local government, 17 cluster-ordnance deployment zone were identified. It was assessed that there were 361 pieces of cluster submunitions: 110 pieces of BLU 97 and 251 pieces of Mk-4. The initial suspected area in the municipality of Bujanovac measured 7.5 km2. After existing data had been analysed, new data collected and compared against the situation in the field, certain parts of suspected areas could be cancelled, as it could be positively determined that there was no hazard. Thus the suspected or risk area was more precisely defined. By the end of the survey of all suspected areas within the municipality, the extent of total risk area in Bujanovac was reduced to 1.8 km2, with agricultural land and forest predominating.


MAP 6

Risk areas, Bujanovac municipality

Map of risk areas, Bujanovac municipality

TABLE 12

Settlement Agricultural

Land Forest Industrial land Other Total

Svinjiste 0.175 0 0 0 0.175

Karadnik 0.056 0 0.183 0 0.239

Bogdanovac 0.051 0.102 0 0.153 0.306

Jastrebac 0.245 0.323 0 0 0.568

Total 0.527 0.425 0.183 0.153 1.288

Land blocked due to unex-ploded cluster submunitions contamination in the Municipality of Bujanovac in km2


Opština Preševo



Preševo

Municipality of PreševoThe municipality of Preševo is located in the south of Serbia. Its geographic area covers 252 km2. Ac-cording to the latest census (2002), there are 13,426 inhabitants. The municipality borders on the mu-nicipalities of Gnjilane and Bujanovac to the west and to the east, and on the Republic of Macedonia in the south.

Three local communities, Buštranje, Reljan and Strezovice, have problems with remnants of unex-ploded cluster submunitions after the NATO bombings of 1999. After deployment, military and police personnel performed surface removal of unexploded cluster submunitions, but not of submunitions that had penetrated the soil or remained hidden in dense undergrowth.

The total area of threatened local communities in the municipality of Preševo is about 38 km2. Ac-cording to the 2002 census, the population of these local communities is 2,599, most of whom earn a

Settlement Area of the Local

Community Population


Number in workforce


Bustranje 10 872 201 284 175

Reljan 19 692 174 231 125

Strezovce 9 995 284 266 158

Total 38 2559 659 781 458

TABLE 13

livelihood from agriculture and forest exploitation.From the NATO bombing and till September 2008, in the territory of this municipality, 11 persons

have been victims of cluster submunitions remnants: eight killed and three wounded. On 15 April 1999, during the NATO bombing, seven soldiers of the Serbian military were killed in the local community of Reljan. On 27 July 1999, one boy was killed and two were injured in the local community of Buštranje, when a boy activated the cluster ordnance he was playing with together with his friends. In May 2008

Municipality of Preševo


TABLE 14

Map of risk areas, Preševo municipality



Bustranje 0,258 0 0 0 0,258

Reljan 0,681 0 0 0 0,681

Strezovce 0,067 0,052 0 0 0,119

Total 1,006 0,052 0 0 1,058

MAP 7

there was another incident in Buštranje: in the course of farming activities, a villager found three pieces of unexploded cluster submunitions remnants.

12 deployment zones were reconstructed. The initial suspected area was 4.295 km2. Later on, dur-ing the second phase of the general survey, detailed assessments of suspected areas were undertaken. After existing data had been analysed, new data collected and compared against the situation in the field, certain parts of the suspected areas were found not to be hazardous and could be cancelled, so the suspected or risk area was more precisely defined. The total risk area in the municipality of Preševo was reduced to 1 km2.

Risk areas,Preševo municipality

Land blocked due to unex-ploded cluster submunitions contamination in the Municipality of Preševo in km2


Municipality of Kuršumlija

Municipality of KuršumlijaThe municipality of Kuršumlija is located in the south of Serbia. To the west it borders on the municipality of Podujevo, to the north it borders on the municipalities of Brus and Blace, and to the east and west the municipalities of Prokuplje and Medveda. There is only one threatened community in the municipality of Kuršumlija: Merdare, in the south-west. Merdare covers an area of 6 km2, and has a population of 139, according to the 2002 census.

During the 1999 bombing, NATO aircraft deployed cluster and other ordnance in this local community. Immediately after the bombing, military and the civil defence personnel carried out surface removal of unexploded cluster submunitions, but also here a certain quantity remained hidden in the vegetation or under the surface.

TABLE 15

Settlement Area of the Local

Community Population


Number in workforce


Merdare 6 139 52 41 5

Ukupno 6 139 52 41 5

During the NATO deployment on 11 April 1999, there were seven victims: five killed and two wounded in Merdare. Concerning unexploded cluster submunitions, there have been no casual-ties after the NATO bombing, except for one incident where an animal was killed. Additionally, there were four more incidents where unexploded cluster submunitions were found, in 1999 and 2000.

The initial suspected area was 2.7 km2. After existing data had been analysed, new data col-



Kuršumlija


MAP 8

TABLE 16



Merdare 0,274 1,406 0,397 2,077

Total 0,274 1,406 0 0,397 2,077

lected and compared against the situation in the field, certain parts of suspected areas where it was clear that there was no hazard were cancelled, also here enabling more precise identification of the suspected or risk area. The total risk area in the municipality of Kuršumlija was reduced to 2 km2 much of which is covered in trees. A special problem in this local community is the large risk area located in courtyards and homesteads !

Risk areas,Kuršumlija municipality

Land blocked due to unex-ploded cluster submunitions contamination in the Municipality of Kuršumlija in km2

Map of risk areas, Kuršumlija municipality


6Project quality managment

The general survey of the cluster-ordnance deployment areas in Serbia is one project of the NPA that has employede a regional approach to mine action in Southeast Europe. The project was carried out by the NPA Mine Action Programme from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On 23 October 2007, NPA applied to the Serbian Mine Action Centre for approval of standard operating procedures for mine action and general survey of the cluster-ordnance deployment areas and accreditation for performing humanitarian demining and survey in the territory of Serbia.

Following the completed accreditation procedure, the Serbian Mine Action Centre granted approval for the NPA Mine Action Programme from Bosnia and Herzegovina to carry out the following operations: de-mining of mine fields; de-mining/clearance of land and facilities from unexploded ordnance; and general survey of areas of cluster bomb deployment. This permission was valid for one year, from 5 November 2007 till 5 November 2008.

The Serbian Mine Action Centre assisted the NPA in establishing cooperation with other state authorities, above all with the Administration for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia. As early as 12 December 2007 the head of the Administration for Emergency Situations sent a letter to district departments for emergency situations, instructing these departments to establish cooperation with the NPA survey teams and enable them to col-lect data in the field.

Following completion of the project, the NPA delivered to the Serbian Mine Action Centre the database and archives containing the sorted documents generated during the survey or received from other data sources.

General survey monitoringMonitoring of the general survey of the cluster-ordnance deployment areas in the Republic of Serbia was the task of the management of the NPA and a special team for survey monitoring. The activities of the Regional Director of the NPA for Southeast Europe and the Programme Manager of the Mine Action Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina were directed at ensuring realization of the planned project objectives and terms of reference. The special team for survey monitoring consisted of the head of operations and the planning and reporting officer from the NPA Mine Ac-tion Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The overall objective of the monitoring was to ensure consistent implementation of SOPs and the verification of processes and sub-processes for input and output data. The monitoring was carried out through two basic activities: (1) general survey quality control, and (2) quality assurance of general survey input data and final outcomes.


General survey: Quality controlGeneral survey quality control involved (1) supervision the activities of survey teams, and (2) realization of planned project objectives. The activities of survey teams in adhering to the SOPs was continuously followed by the monitoring team through inspections or control of docu-ments delivered. Inspection included: (1) control of compliance of the survey team activities with the prescribed procedures, (2) checking database entries, and (3) checking the accuracy of measurements. The Regional Director and the Programme Manager inspected the teams from time to time, and continuously monitored the schedule of realization of the tasks planned.

During the first sub-process – identification of areas suspected of cluster ordnance hazard – the verification of first entries into the database and the mapping thereof were undertaken. It was determined that the survey teams had not been transforming the coordinates into the coordinate system used by the relevant national body for mine action. Additional training of the teams was then carried out, and all data previously entered and coded were re-entered. Such verification was a regular activity and was carried out every fifteen days until the end of phase two of the project. It involved all the entries into the database. Any errors detected were removed.

The second phase of the project, involved field work of the general survey including risk as-sessment and production of relevant documents. Each of the survey teams was subject to several days’ inspection of activities, during which time any omissions identified in relation to database entries, or in relation to the preparation of survey reports as part of project documents for the clearance of the risk areas, were rectified. Since the testing of the database was carried out in parallel and under actual operating conditions, on three occasions it was necessary to adapt the base to the requirements of the process. During the control of the preparation of project documents, it was found that the quality of three survey reports, 3.1% of the total number of reports prepared, failed to meet the requirements set by the standard operating procedures. All three reports were withdrawn, and the order was given for the survey to be carried out again. Otherwise, there were no other significant errors in the preparation of project documents that would affect the final result.

The general conclusion of the quality control is that the survey teams observed the SOPs for general survey and that all the tasks as planned by general survey project in Serbia were com-pleted. The errors that occurred were not permanent and did not affect project results. Some difficulties in obtaining cadastral maps slowed down the project to a certain extent, during phase two. However, by investing additional effort the survey teams managed to overcome this problem, so there were no significant deviations from the schedule.

General survey results: Quality assuranceQuality assurance included the following: (1) input data quality control by failure modes and ef-fects analysis method (FMEA) in combination with the Pareto priority method; (2) SOP testing; (3) general survey results verification by statistical analysis of random samples.

The FMEA method was selected because it enables the identification of weaknesses in the general survey process and their reflection on the final results. Thus a preventive identification of


problems, before they can adversely affect the results, was made possible. The combination of this method with the priority method allowed the focus on the causes of errors with greatest potential effects on final quality. Random sample statistical analysis was used for evaluating the accuracy of the assessed parameters of the cluster-ordnance deployment zone, or of the risk area. On the basis of the appropriate random sample of cluster-ordnance deployment zones and a sample of completed reports on the general survey, the critical parameters were verified: (1) hazard level, (2) environmental impact level, (3) priority level, and (4) intended use of land.

Testing of standard operating procedures for the general survey of the cluster-ordnance de-ployment area was carried out twice: (1) at the beginning of phase one of the project, and (2) at the beginning of phase two of the general survey of cluster-ordnance deployment area. The first testing showed that SOPs enabled the realization of the first sub-process of the general survey, resulting in identification of the suspected areas. The second testing was carried out on the first ten reports prepared on the risk area survey. FMEA employed during this testing led to the con-clusion that certain amendments would have to be introduced to improve the SOPs in the pro-cedure for assessment of hazard level and for cancelling of land previously part of the suspected area. In the former case this involved improving the criteria for assessing the probability of the presence of unexploded cluster submunitions in a suspected area. In the latter case it involved SOP amendment: there was a process step carried out in practice (adjustment of deployment zone characteristics and cancelling land from suspected areas) which had not been described in the standard operating procedures. The necessary amendments were introduced by the Programme Manager and analysed together with members of the general survey team and the monitoring team. These modifications to the SOPs were accepted by the Serbian Mine Action Centre.

Verification of the general survey results included evaluation of the work of the teams in de-termining the deployment zone parameters and the control of general survey reports. Analysis of assessed cluster-ordnance deployment zone parameters was carried out on the random sample of the deployment zone. The quality of input data, the accuracy of cluster-ordnance deployment zone parameters and compliance with the criteria under the SOPs were evaluated. The checking was carried out on a simple random sample without repetition. The sample was selected from the 177 deployment zones identified during the previous assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster ordnance, and consisted of 62 cluster-ordnance deployment zones.1 The results of the analysis showed that for 12 deployment zones, 17.4% of the selected sample, no irregularities were found. As for 39 deployment zones (62.9% of the sample), minor adjustments were necessary to the pa-rameters assessed. In 17 cases (27.4% of the sample), adjustments of the deployment zone centre were made, and in 12 cases (17.4% of the sample), adjustments of the dimensions and directions of the deployment zone locations were made. The mentioned mistakes were the cause of the er-rors in defining suspected areas. Most often they resulted in an increase in the dimensions of the suspected area and inaccuracies in defining their shape. For 24 deployment zones included in the random sample, it was found that they did not in fact exist at all, as they had been projected on the basis of incorrect input data on cluster-ordnance deployment zones. The direct consequence of these earlier errors was the later cancellation of the suspected area. Analysis of failure modes was carried out by the Pareto chart. Four causes of incorrect assessment of the deployment zone parameters were identified: (1) insufficient quantity and quality of available data for reconstruc-tion of the deployment zone, (2) incorrect input data from NATO – other types of ordnance

1 The size of random sample was identified for the confidence level of 95% and interval of +/- 10%.


(not cluster ordnance) had been deployed at some locations, (3) imprecise data collected by the survey teams from local-level sources, and (4) incorrect input data from NATO – there had been no deployment in some locations. In 18 cases it was found that the general survey teams did not have all input data, or that the quality of their input data was insufficient for identifying the deployment zone parameters, so they had reconstructed the deployment zone on the basis of knowledge and experiences. In 17 cases, the data received from NATO referred to the deployment of other (non-cluster) ordnance; in four cases of data supplied by NATO, the deployment zones proved non-existent. In 14 cases it was determined that the local data sources did not have correct information. During phase two of the general survey, these errors and irregularities were removed and additional information was collected. Then precise measurement was undertaken, and the data and the reconstruction of all deployment zones in the database were checked.

By the FMEA method, the mistakes identified were analysed, and their risk factor was determined. Its value was determined on the basis of the previously defined scale for the level of failure, the prob-ability of failure incidence, and the difficulty of discovering the failure.(See table 20, page 82.) The highest values of the risk factor related to failures where the cause was incorrect data from NATO (cluster-ordnance deployment zone and the suspected area are not present at all). In the analysis of failure modes it was found that 33.08% of the input data from NATO did not refer to cluster ordnance, but to other types of ordnance that had been used in these locations; moreover, 7.55% of the NATO data were totally incorrect, since there had been no NATO deployment at the coordinates indicated. During phase one of the survey, the teams were not able to check all input data due to time limitations and winter weather conditions.

Quality assurance of phase two of the general survey was carried out for 20 selected general sur-vey reports. In all 10,400 data items were examined, out of which 6,260 in the relational base (20% of

GRAPH 20

Ratio of failure frequency and their risk factor

all items entered into this database), and 4,140 geo-coded data (13.75% of all entries into the files with geo-coded data). Special attention was paid to the accuracy of the assessment of risk area parameters:

Erro

neou

s as

sess

men

t of

depl

oym

ent z

one

para

met

ers

Erroneous assessment of hazard

level

Erroneous assessment of

probability of cluster

submunitions presence

Drawing not in accordance with

the SOP

Erroneous assessment of threat

to population


environmental impact

Report form not in accordance

with the SOP

Access Base not in accordance

with the amendments to the

SOP

Inco

rrec

t ent

ry in

to th

e ba

se

Two intended uses of land

recorded

Superficial or deficient rationaleIncomplete data

Photographs not filed in project

documents


priority level

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Failure Classification

Risk factor


hazard level, environmental impact level, priority level and intended use of land. These parameters were selected because incorrect assessment here could be expected to have the greatest impact on the final output, reports on the general survey of cluster-ordnance deployment areas.

In all 14 different errors were identified, found in 129 instances. All were analysed by the FMEA (See Appendix E: Calculation of failure severity) method in combination with the priority method. The severity of failure was determined under the FMEA method as the product of frequency of fail-ure and its risk factor (Ibid.) A Pareto chart was drawn up, showing that the failures with the greatest impact on the final results were the following: wrong assessment of priority level, wrong assessment of hazard level, and wrong assessment of the probability of the presence of cluster submunitions (Graph 21). Their cumulative share in the severity of failures is 84%. In addition, a high level of risk factor was represented by the wrong assessment of environmental impact, but its incidence was low, so it had no significant impact on the overall results. Other errors had no direct consequences for the end result. However, correcting them required additional efforts from the survey teams.

All the mistakes identified were discussed with the survey teams and remedied. Of the total con-trolled data, errors were found in 1% cases, and in only 0.42% cases they were errors with any significant impact on the results, according to the Pareto chart.

Error analysis of the selected sample of 20 survey reports showed that the monitoring team had ap-propriately determined the priorities in the quality control of the results for three parameters: priority level, hazard level and environmental impact level. As the probability of the presence of cluster submuni-tions is a parameter for determining the levels of hazard and priority, the three errors mentioned above are interrelated. Thus the high position of the presence of cluster submunitions in the Pareto chart is not surprising. From the qualitative part of the analysis it became clear that determining priorities is the critical process step in the general survey, and that control here should be a focal activity of internal monitoring. Quantitative analysis showed that the incidence of failures of 1% in relation to the overall number of data is low, and acceptable in terms of quality assurance of the final results.

GRAPH 21

Pareto chart of errors identified during the control of survey reports

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

Erro

neou

s as

sess

men

t of p

rior

ity

leve

l

Erro

neou

s as

sess

men

t of h

azar

d

leve

l

Erro

neou

s as

sess

men

t of

prob

abili

ty o

f clu

ster

sub

mun

itio

ns

pres

ence

Dra

win

g no

t in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith

the

SOP

Erro

neou

s as

sess

men

t of t

hrea

t to

popu

lati

on

Erro

neou

s as

sess

men

t of

envi

ronm

enta

l im

pact

Erro

neou

s as

sess

men

t of

depl

oym

ent z

one

para

met

ers

Repo

rt fo

rm n

ot in

acc

orda

nce

wit

h th

e SO

P

Acc

ess

Base

not

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith

the

amen

dmen

ts to

the

SOP

Inco

rrec

t ent

ry in

to th

e ba

se

Two

inte

nded

use

s of

land

reco

rded

Supe

rfic

ial o

r def

icie

nt ra

tion

ale

Inco

mpl

ete

data

Phot

ogra

phs

not f

iled

in p

roje

ct

docu

men

ts

Failure Classification

0.00%10.00%20.00%30.00%40.00%50.00%60.00%70.00%80.00%90.00%100.00%

Failure severity (risk factor x incidence)


It may be concluded that the monitoring of the general survey fulfilled its function. The critical points in the general survey process were determined: in the first sub-process, the quality of input data; in the second and third sub-process, hazard assessment and identifying priorities, respectively. On the whole, the monitoring contributed to the improvement of the general survey process, the quality of work car-ried out by the survey teams, and the reliability of results obtained through the general survey!


7Strategic assumptions and indicators

The one year of work on the survey, the data collected and the results of the general assess-ment of the situation have enabled the NPA to define certain strategic assumptions that are the preconditions for successful resolution of the problem of unexploded cluster submuni-

tions in Serbia. Strategic assumptions and their indicators are part of the strategic and operating planning that lies within the purview of the Serbian Mine Action Centre.

1. strategic assumption: In the territory of Serbia, 105 deployment zones of cluster ord-nance containing explosive submunitions were identified. It was determined that 196 pieces of cluster ordnance were deployed in these zones (five different types of bombs and other missiles). These deployment zones are not evenly distributed across the Republic.

2. strategic assumption: Almost in all deployment zones, units from the military, police and civil defence had removed unexploded ordnance from the surface, but hazards remained hidden underground. This has made the identification of unexploded cluster submunitions more difficult, and increases the extent of areas for clearance. It is estimated there are still 24.06 cluster submunitions to be removed per deployment zone, giving a total of 2,647 unexploded cluster submunitions in the territory of Serbia (excluding Kosovo).

3. strategic assumption: By November 2008, 390 polygons had been identified, the area suspected of cluster submunitions hazard being 30.7 km2. The average extent of the suspected area is 0.079 km2. This area has formed the basis for the general assessment of the situation con-cerning unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia and for projecting future activities related to survey and clearance. The detailed survey will define all the elements necessary for planning clearance assignments, and aid the decision on possible cancellation of parts of the land found not to contain any remnants of unexploded cluster submunitions.

4. strategic assumption: The extent of risk area to be cleared of unexploded cluster sub-munitions in Serbia has been assessed at 15 km2 to 16 km2. The area surveyed so far is about 8 km2, or 26.7% of the currently suspected total. Continuation of the general survey to accompany the clearance process is necessary for the remaining suspected area to be analysed in detail and for the necessary documents to be prepared.

5. strategic assumption: Given current assessments of the number of unexploded cluster submunitions and the risk area for clearance, the average number of unexploded cluster submu-nitions per area unit is 171 pieces/km2 of the risk area. It is the success indicator for designing clearance assignments. The average number of cluster submunitions found in the cleared areas in previous years is 74 pcs/ km2 of the cleared area.

6. strategic assumption: According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the clear-ance of unexploded cluster submunitions is to be completed in the course of 10 years. It is ex-


pected that the Republic of Serbia will join this Convention and that the Convention will enter into effect at the beginning of 2010. This means that the obligation of clearing unexploded cluster submunitions will have to be met by 2020. Given the average to date of 0.682 km2 of cleared area annually, it would take about 23 years to complete clearance of the cluster-ordnance deployment zones. In order to honour its international commitments, Serbia will need to undertake measures to increase the average cleared area to 1.5 – 1.6 km2 a year.

7. strategic assumption: The survey found that 28 local communities were affected by unexploded cluster submunitions. The assessment of their exposure to the cluster submunitions risk may serve as guide for prioritizing in planning the operations of unexploded cluster submu-nitions clearance.

8. strategic assumption: About 162,000 people live in the affected local communities. Ac-cording to current assessments, 88,000 are living in the immediate vicinity of suspected areas, and can thus be considered as exposed to daily risk. Inhabitants of the affected local communities do not feel directly endangered by cluster submunitions, but they do undertake certain precaution-ary measures, mostly with regard to children, who generally enter the suspected area only in the company of adults; in addition, group entry is preferred to individual entry into the suspected area. The vicinity, entry into the risk area, and children as a threatened group were included in the criteria for selecting priorities for clearance of unexploded cluster submunitions.

9. strategic assumption: In addition to agricultural land as a blocked resource, the largest negative impact is the impact of the impossibility of reconstructing settlement infrastructure, for-est exploitation and maintenance, road communication lines, tourism development and housing facilities. Those are also criteria to serve as the basis for the state authorities of Serbia in defining potential benefits as one of the elements for assessing clearance priority.

10. strategic assumption: With greater interest on the part of all stakeholders for resolv-ing the unexploded cluster submunitions problem in Serbia, the need for prioritizing clearance tasks will also increase. A clear and transparent system for determining priorities should be put in place as part of the national policy of mine action, including uniform prioritization criteria, to be followed by all state authorities and other bodies or organizations involved in the process!


ConclusionsThe ‘Cluster Survey in Serbia’ project started on 9 November 2007, and implementation contin-ued until 30 November 2008. It was carried out as a project of regional cooperation in Southeast Europe. The Mine Action Programme of the NPA in Bosnia and Herzegovina took on respon-sibility for this project because of its years of experience with general survey. Implementation of the project involved staff from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Serbia. The Serbian surveyors were trained for independent work in the future, as assistance to the Serbian Mine Action Centre. The project was carried out in three phases: (1) project preparation, (2) preliminary assessment of the situation of unexploded cluster submunitions, and (3) on-the-ground survey and general assessment of areas of cluster ordnance deployment.

The general assessment of the situation included assessment of unexploded cluster submuni-tions hazards and of their socio-economic impact. According to the latest results of the general survey, 105 cluster-ordnance deployment zones are located in the territory of Serbia, in 15 mu-nicipalities. Into these deployment zones, 196 cluster ordnances had been fired, involving a total of 37,032 pieces of cluster submunitions. The area suspected of unexploded cluster submunitions was identified. The database of suspected areas contains 390 polygons of the total area of 30.7 km2. Analysis of blocked resources confirmed that the hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions, in combination with the blockage of resources, seriously affects the local socio-economic situation. The general assessment showed that removal of unexploded cluster submunitions will have posi-tive impacts, as follows: (1) improvement of general safety, (2) reduction of risk, especially for the population living in contact with risk areas, (3) increase in the number of the users of currently blocked land, as indicated by the employment structure of threatened local communities.

Monitoring of all activities was carried out by the Mine Action Programme Manager, together with the special team for monitoring, and with monitoring by the NPA Southeast Europe Regional Director. Such monitoring contributed to improving the general survey process, the quality of the work done by the survey teams and the reliability of the results obtained.

The Serbian Mine Action Centre has taken over the general survey database along with all the documents collected, for use in future surveys and preparing terms of reference for clearance tasks!


Appendixes

Appendix A: Acronyms and terms used

ACRONYM DESCRIPTION

AS/NZS Australian and New Zealand Standard

CCM Convention on Cluster Munitions

CCW

UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional

Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate

Effects, which came into effect in 1983 (abbreviated: the Convention on Conventional

Weapons).

ERW Explosive remnants of war

IMAS International Mine Action Standards

ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization

NPA Norwegian People´s Aid

UXO Unexploded ordnance

Glossary OECDGlossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, OECD, Develop-

ment Co-operation Directorate, 2002.

SOP Standard operating procedures

UN United Nations

UN MA Policy Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy


TERMS DEFINITION SOURCEaccident undesired event resulting in harm IMAS 04.10

accreditation

the procedure by which a de-mining organisation is formally recognised as

competent and able to plan, manage and operationally conduct mine action

activities safely, effectively and efficiently

IMAS 4.10

beneficiaries

individuals, groups or organizations, whether targeted or not, which benefit,

directly or indirectly, from development interventions

related terms: target groups

Glossary OECD

cluster bomb unit – CBU

an expendable aircraft store consisting of a dispenser and submunitions;

a bomb containing and dispensing submunitions that may be mines (anti-

personnel or anti-tank), penetration (runway cratering) bomblets, fragmen-

tation bomblets, etc.

IMAS 04.10

cluster ordnanceair bombs, ballistic and artillery missiles projected from ground and air,

serving to transport and scatter cluster sub-munitions

cluster submunition

any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition,

mines or munitions that form part of a cluster bomb unit (CBU), artillery

shell or missile payload

IMAS 04.10

consequence

outcome of an event expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, which has

turned into a loss, harm, setback or gain; may be a series of possible out-

comes related to the event

AS/NZS 4360:1999

environmental impact

assessment

process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and reducing the biophysical,

social and other relevant environmental impacts of mine actions to be un-

dertaken

IMAS 04.10

event

an incident or situation occurring in a particular place at a particular point

in time

situation made up of particular set of circumstances

AS/NZS 4360:1999

ISO 73:2002

explosive ordnance

conventional munitions containing explosives, with the exception of mines,

booby traps and other devices as defined in Protocol II of the CCW Conven-

tion as amended on May 3, 1996

CCW Protocol V

explosive remnants of

warunexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance CCW Protocol V

frequencyincidence of an event expressed as a number of occurrences of an event in a

given period of time AS/NZS 4360:1999


TERMS DEFINITION SOURCE

general mine action as-

sessment

process for obtaining a comprehensive inventory of all reported and/or sus-

pected locations of mine or ERW contamination, the quantities and types of

explosive hazards, and information on local soil characteristics, vegetation

and climate; assessment of the scale and impact of the landmine and ERW

problem on the individual, community and country

IMAS 04.10

harminjury or damage to human health, or damage to property or the environ-

ment ISO 51:1999

harmful event event where hazardous situation results in damage ISO 51:1999hazard assessment combines the process of hazard identification and hazard level assessment

hazardous situationcircumstances where people, property or environment are exposed to one or

more hazards ISO 51:1999

incidentan event that gives rise to an accident or has the potential to lead to an ac-

cident

intended useuse of products, processes or services in line with the information prepared

by the supplier ISO 51:1999

likelihood used as a qualitative description of probability or incidence AS/NZS 4360:1999

markingemplacement of a measure or combination of measures to identify the posi-

tion of a hazard or the boundary of a hazardous area IMAS 04.10

mine

munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other sur-

face area, to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or

a vehicle

IMAS 04.10.

mine action

Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities:

mine risk education1.

humanitarian de-mining, incl. the following:2.

mine clearance

survey

mapping

marking

landmine victim assistance, rehabilitation and reintegration3.

stockpile destruction 4.

advocacy5.

IMAS 04.10


TERMS DEFINITION SOURCE

mine and ERW clearance

includes technical survey, mapping, marking, clearance, post-clearance

documentation, relating mine action to the community and the delivery and

acceptance of cleared land

UN MA Policy

monitorto check, supervise, critically review or record progress in an activity, action

or system, on a specified basis, in order to identify changes AS/NZS 4360:1999

probability

likelihood of a particular event or outcome, measured as a relation of a

particular event or outcome to the total number of potential events or out-

comes; probability is expressed as a number between 0 and 1, where 0 indi-

cates an impossible event or outcome, and 1 indicates that an event or out-

come is certain

AS/NZS 4360:1999

protective measures measures to reduce risk ISO 51:1999risk combination of probability of an event and its consequences ISO 73:2002risk acceptance communicated decision that the consequences and potential of certain risk AS/NZS 4360:1999

risk analysissystematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate risk; pro-

vides a basis for risk evaluation, risk treatment and risk acceptance ISO 73:2002

risk area

area for which hazard of mines and/or ERW has been assessed, for which

detailed measurements have been undertaken and characteristics of the land

determined, as well as the negative impact and potential benefits after clear-

ance risk assessment overall process including risk analysis and risk evaluation ISO 51:1999

risk communicationexchange or sharing of information on risk between decision-makers and

other stakeholders ISO 73:2002

risk control

part of risk management involving the implementation of policies, stan-

dards, procedures and physical modifications to eliminate or minimize

harmful risk

AS/NZS 4360:1999

risk criteria requirements to be met in assessing risk significance ISO 73:2002risk estimation process used for determining values for probability and consequences ISO 73:2002risk identification process of finding, listing and characterizing elements of risk ISO 73:2002

risk reductionselective implementation of appropriate techniques and management prin-

ciples for reducing the likelihood of an event or its consequences, or both AS/NZS 4360:1999


TERMS DEFINITION SOURCEsafety absence of unacceptable risk ISO 51:1999stakeholders the persons and organizations that may influence, be influenced by, or ob-

serve that they may be influenced, by decisions or activities

the individuals, groups or organizations that may influence, be influenced

by, or observe that they will by influenced by risk

AS/NZS 4360:1999

ISO 73:2002

suspected area area d efined on the basis of analysis of available information on potential

hazard of mines and ERW, representing the basis for general survey opera-

tions. technical survey detailed topographic and technical examination of known or justifiably sus-

pected risk areas identified as such during the general survey

modified as regards

IMAS 04.10tolerable risk risk accepted within the given context and based on the current social values ISO 51:1999unexploded ordnance explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise pre-

pared for use or used; it may have been fired, dropped, launched or project-

ed but has remained unexploded, through malfunction or design or for any

other reason

IMAS 04.10.

unexploded ordnance (similar Protocol V

CCW)victim an individual who has suffered harm as a result of an accident and/or the de-

pendants of a mine casualty

IMAS 04.10


CODE CRITERIA /DESCRIPTION

C1 Asphalt or concrete road surface without any visible major damage.

C2 Surface of macadam roads that are used regularly or occasionally, without visible major damage to hard layer.

C3 Surfaces with asphalt or concrete sub-layer in place before cluster ordnance deployment, except for places damaged by explosive ordnance deployment.

C4 Areas where agricultural works have been carried out after bombing, to depths of more than 50 cm.

C5 Areas where new construction structures, now in use, have been erected.

C6 Areas with reconstructed construction structures where roofs have been replaced, and are in use.

C7Agricultural areas in deployment zone, where ploughing has been carried out to depths of 30 cm and more, which have been cultivated for at least two years and where no traces of cluster submunitions deployment have been found.

C8 Agricultural areas outside a deployment zone, which have been calculated for a minimum period of two years and where no traces of cluster submunitions deployment have been found.

C9 Areas where, according to available data on cluster ordnance deployment, only graphite munitions were used, or other types of air ordnance.

C10Areas not in use because of suspicion of cluster submunitions, and where the distance from the closest deployment zone of cluster ordnance is at least half of the longer axis, and where no traces of cluster submunitions deployment have been found.

Appendix B: Criteria for cancellation of land from the areas suspected of hazard of unexploded cluster submunitions


CODE INTENDED USE

N01 Forest exploitation and maintenance

N02 Tourism development

N03 Employment incentives

N04 Reconstruction of educational, religious and cultural facilities

N05 Transport communications (roads, railways, bridges, ports)

N06 Construction of communications facilities

N07 River facilities, reconstruction of canals and embankments

N08 Water supply

N09 New industrial production

N10 Reconstruction of power transmission lines and other power facilities

N11 Restoring agricultural land use

N12 Reconstruction of settlement infrastructure and utilities

N13 Reconstruction of housing units

N14 Other

Appendix C: Land use classification system


Appendix D: Data by districts, municipalities and settlements

District Suspected Area Status

km2 %

Nišavski 10.959 35.64%

Zlatiborski 4.398 14.30%

Raški 4.093 13.31%

Pčinjski 2.251 7.32%

Toplički 2.078 6.76%

Rasinski 1.764 5.74%

Sremski 1.353 4.40%

Kososvsko-mitrovački 1.164 3.78%

Šumadijski 1.077 3.50%

Mačvanski 0.658 2.14%

Grad Beograd 0.541 1.76%

Moravički 0.416 1.35%

Total 30,751 100%

Districts in Serbia affected by unexploded cluster submu-

nitions


Settlement Municipality Suspected Area Status

km2 %

1 Medosevac Crveni Krst 4.1638 13.54%

2 Medijana Mediana 4.0695 13.23%

3 Ladjevci Kraljevo 2.7772 9.03%

4 Sjenica Sjenica 2.3144 7.53%

5 Merdare Kuršumlija 2.0776 6.76%

6 Ravniste Brus 1.7643 5.74%

7 Vapa Sjenica 1.7429 5.67%

8 12 Februar Crveni Krst 1.7302 5.63%

9 Vojka Stara Pazova 1.3526 4.40%

10 Belo Brdo Leposavić 1.1637 3.78%

11 LIsina Raška 0.7112 2.31%

12 Reljan Preševo 0.6845 2.23%

13 Jalovik Vladimirci 0.6582 2.14%

14 Donji Komren Crveni Krst 0.5802 1.89%

15 Bumbarevo brdo Knić 0.5796 1.88%

16 Jastrebac Bujanovac 0.5686 1.85%

17 Sibnica Sopot 0.5410 1.76%

18 Guncati Knić 0.4970 1.62%

19 Samaila Kraljevo 0.4304 1.40%

20 Bresnica Cacak 0.4165 1.35%

21 Gare Gadžin Han 0.4150 1.35%

22 Cedovo Sjenica 0.3409 1.11%

23 Bogdanovac Bujanovac 0.3058 0.99%

24 Bustranje Preševo 0.2580 0.84%

25 Svinjiste Bujanovac 0.1754 0.57%

26 Bapsko Polje Kraljevo 0.1739 0.57%

27 Karadnik Bujanovac 0.1396 0.45%

28 Strezovce Preševo 0.1188 0.39%

30.7507 100.00%

Settlements affected by un-exploded cluster submunitions


Settlement Municipality Suspected Area

(km2)

Number of Directly

Threatened Inhabit-

ants

Number of Directly

Threatened Inhabit-

ants per km2 of sus-

pected area

12 Februar Crveni Krst 1.7302 23,500 13,582,2

Bapsko polje Kraljevo 0.1739 10 57,5

Belo Brdo Leposavić 1.1637 500 429,7

Bogdanovac Bujanovac 0.3058 15 49,1

Bresnica Čačak 0.4165 8 19,2

Bumbarevo brdo Knić 0.5796 50 86,3

Buštranje Preševo 0.2580 785 3,042,6

Cedovo Sjenica 0.3409 0,0

Donji komren Crveni Krst 0.5802 1,750 3,016,2

Duvanište Medijana 4.0695 58,600 14,399,8

Gare Gadžin Han 0.4150 7 16,9

Guncati Knić 0.4970 30 60,4

Jalovik Vladimirci 0.6582 200 303,9

Jastrbac Bujanovac 0.5686 0,0

Karadnik Bujanovac 0.1396 40 286,5

Lađevci Kraljevo 2.7772 5 1,8

Lisina Raška 0.7112 10 14,1

Medoševac Crveni Krst 4.1638 950 228,2

Merdare Kuršumlija 2.0776 139 66,9

Ravnište Brus 1.7643 10 5,7

Reljan Preševo 0.6845 456 666,2

Samaila Kraljevo 0.4304 15 34,9

Sibnica Sopot 0.5410 350 647,0

Sjenica Sjenica 2.3144 300 129,6

Strezovce Preševo 0.1188 650 5,471,4

Svinjište Bujanovac 0.1754 10 57,0

Vapa Sjenica 1.7429 30 17,2

Vojka Stara Pazova 1.3526 200 147,9

Total 30.7508 88,620 2,881,9

Suspected area and

the number of directly

threatened inhabitants

per threatened community


Population structure in local communities where survey of individual risk areas was carried out

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Baps

ko P

olje

Belo

Brd

o

Bogd

anov

ac

Bres

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Bum

bare

vo B

rdo

Bušt

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e

Duv

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te

Gare

Gunc

ati

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c

Lađe

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Lisi

na

Mer

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12. F

ebru

ar

Ravn

ište

Relja

n

Sibn

ica

Sjen

ica

Stre

zovc

e

Vapa

Vojk

aAffected communities

Share in Population

Structure (%)

0-4 years 5-9 years 10-14 years 15-19 years 20-24 years 25-29 years 30-34 years 35-39 years40-44 years 45-49 years 50-54 years 55-59 years60-64 years 65-69 years 70-74 years 75-79 years


Employment structure in affect-

ed communities

0.00

%

0.46

%

13.5

4%

2.06

%

3.82

%

5.60

%

1.11

%

4.56

%

0.45

%

1.00

%

4.94

%

3.02

%

3.19

%

1.60

%

0.03

%

0.01

%

5.83

%

4.33

%

0.01

%

0.10

%

17.1

3%

2.64

%

6.48

%

14.9

3%

2.78

%

7.56

%

1.93

%

3.46

%

9.13

%

8.24

%

11.7

3%

3.35

%

0.02

%

0.02

%

6.14

%

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

12.00%

14.00%

16.00%

18.00%

20.00%

Agric

ultu

re, h

untin

g an

d

fore

stry

Fish

ing

Min

ing

Proc

ess

indu

stry

Agric

ultu

re

Hou

se b

uild

ing

Com

mer

ce

Hot

els

and

rest

aura

nts

Infr

astr

uctu

re

Fina

nnci

al in

stitu

tions

Real

est

ate

Stat

e ad

min

istr

atio

n

Educ

atio

n

Hea

lth s

ecto

r

Othe

r ser

vice

pro

visi

on

Priv

ate

hous

ehol

ds

Othe

r org

anis

atio

ns a

nd

bodi

es Unk

now

n

Employee structure - average percentage for affected communities

Employee structure – share in the total number of employees in the affected communities

48.7

6%


Failure Description

Total Num-

ber of Fail-

ures

Risk Factor

Failure Sever-

ity =Number

of Failures x

Risk Factor

Erroneous assessment of priority level 16 405 6480

Erroneous assessment of hazard level 14 225 3150

Erroneous assessment of probability of cluster ordnance presence 11 225 2475

Drawing not in accordance with the SOP 10 50 500

Erroneous assessment of threat to population level 6 75 450

Erroneous assessment of environmental impact 3 100 300

Erroneous assessment of deployment zone parameters 8 35 280

Report form not in accordance with the SOP 18 10 180

Access Base not in accordance with the amendments to the SOP 18 10 180

Incorrect entry into the base 15 5 75

Two intended uses of land entered 2 30 60

Superficial or deficient rationale 11 5 55

Incomplete data 10 5 50

Photographs not filed in project documents 3 10 30

Appendix E: Calculation of failure severity Calculation of

failure severity


Failure Severity Degree

Very slight failures that do not affect the quality of the report. The failure will not affect the correct assessment of priority. 1

Slight failures that affect assessments. A failure may influence a slight degradation in priority assessment. 2 , 3

Medium failure of erroneous assessment. Significantly affects priority determination. 4 , 5 , 6

Severe failures of erroneous assessment which result in a completely wrong idea of the priority level. 7, 8, 9

Extremely severe failure, where the failure involves potential consequences related to safety. 10

Failure Occurrence Probability

Very low probability 1

Low probability of failure occurrence 2 , 3

Medium probability of failure occurrence 4 , 5 , 6

High probability of failure occurrence 7, 8, 9

Extremely high probability of failure occurrence. Failure occurrence almost certain 10

Difficulty in Failure Detection

Low probability that the failure will remain undetected. Failure is obvious. 1

Low probability that the failure will remain undetected. 100% control. 2 , 3

Medium probability that the failure will be detected. Random sample control. 4 , 5 , 6

High probability that a report with failure will be accepted. Sporadic control. 7 , 8 , 9

Extremely high probability that a report with failure will be accepted. Failure difficult to detect. 10

Scale for evaluation of

the Failure Severity Degree


the Failure Occurrence Probability


the Difficulty in Failure Detec-

tion


ASSE

SSM

ENT

OF

AREA

FOR

CLEA

RAN

CE B

ASED

ON

TH

E PR

OJE

CTED

STRU

CTU

RE O

F SU

S-

PECT

ED A

REA

AND

RE-

LEAS

E RA

TE

NUMBER OF AREAS

AREA (km2)

AVERAGE LOCATION MAGNITUDE

(km2)

CAN

CELL

ATIO

N S

TA-

TUS

CALC

ULA

TIO

N B

ASE

D O

N S

URV

EYED

ARE

A S

TRU

CTU

RE

CALC

ULA

TIO

N B

ASE

D O

N N

UM

BER

OF

ARE

AS

(NU

MBE

R O

F LO

CATI

ON

S

%, A

VER

AGE

MAG

NIT

UD

E O

F A

REA

)

PRO

JECT

ED S

USP

ECTE

D A

REA

A

SSES

SMEN

T O

F

LAN

D R

ELEA

SED

AREA FOR CLEARANCE

PROJECTED SUSPECTED

AREA

ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

RELE

ASE

D L

AN

D

AREA FOR CLEARANCE

NU

MBE

R O

F LO

-

CATI

ON

S A

REA

Rele

ase r

ate

Cancelled area

(km2)

Rele

ase r

ate

Cancelled area (km2)

Shar

e

Num

ber

of in

ci-

dent

s

Shar

eA

rea

(km

2 )

SUSP

ECTE

D A

REA

WIT

HO

UT

LAN

D C

AN

-

CELL

ATIO

N

344

27,57

50,

080

100

% ca

ncel

latio

n91

.37%

314

91.4

7%25

.222

100.

00%

25.22

20.

000

25.19

510

0.00

%25

.195

0.00

0

Part

ial c

ance

llatio

n

<100

%8.

63%

308.

53%

2.353

14.6

1%0.

344

2.00

92.

380

14.6

1%0.

348

2.03

2

TOTA

L 10

0.00

%34

410

0.00

%27

.575

25.56

62.0

0927

.575

25.54

32.0

32

SUSP

ECTE

D A

REA

WIT

H P

ART

IAL

LAN

D

CAN

CELL

ATIO

N

463,1

760,

069

No

canc

ellat

ions

10

0.00

%46

100.

00%

3.176

0.00

%0.

000

3.176

3.176

0.00

%0.

000

3.176

TOTA

L RE

MA

ININ

G

SUSP

ECTE

D A

REA

39

030

,751

0,07

95.1

855.2

08

Appe

ndix

F: C

alcu

latio

ns o

f risk

area

for c

lear

ance

Cal

cula

tion

of r

isk

area

fo

r cl

eara

nce

bas

ed o

n t

he

mag

nit

ude

an

d n

um

ber

of

susp

ecte

d ar

eas


ASSESSMENT OF RISK

AREA BASED ON

LAND RELEASE RE-

SULTS BY HAZARD

LEVELS

NU

MBE

R O

F LO

CATI

ON

S

SUSP

ECTE

D A

REA

(km

2 )

AVER

AGE

RELE

ASE

RAT

E

(%)

RELE

ASE

RAT

E ST

AN

DA

RD

DEV

IATI

ON

(%) ASSESSMENT FOR CAN-

CELLED AREA (km2)

ASSESSED AREA FOR CLEAR-

ANCE (km2)

HAZARD LEVELSUPPER

(Sd+)

AVER-

AGE

LOWER

(Sd-)

LOWER AVER-

AGE

UPPER

EXTREMELY HIGH 6 0.627 28.60% 50.06% 0.493 0.179 -0.135 0.134 0.448 0.762

VERY HIGH 17 1.139 4.50% 36.72% 0.469 0.051 -0.367 0.669 1.088 1.506

HIGH 44 4.852 62.48% 21.28% 4.064 3.032 1.999 0.788 1.821 2.853

MEDIUM 186 11.766 55.11% 26.14% 9.560 6.485 3.409 2.206 5.281 8.357

LOW 137 12.366 58.71% 22.64% 10.060 7.261 4.461 2.306 5.106 7.905

TOTAL 390 30.751 24.648 17.008 9.368 6.103 13.743 21.383

Calculation of risk area for

clearance based on land release rate by hazard

levels


ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

CLEA

RAN

CE A

REA

BASE

D O

N S

URV

EYED

RISK

ARE

AS

SUSP

ECTE

D

ARE

A (k

m2 )

RISK

ARE

A

REM

AIN

ING

SUSP

ECTE

D

ARE

A

AVERAGE RELEASE RATE (%)

RELEASE RATE STANDARD DEVIA-

TION (%)

ASS

ESSM

ENT

FOR

CAN

-

CELL

ED A

REA

(km

2 )

ASS

ESSE

D A

REA

FO

R

CLEA

RAN

CE (k

m2 )

NUMBER OF LOCATIONS

AREA (km2)

NUMBER OF LOCATIONS

AREA (km2)

NUMBER OF LOCA

AREA (km2)

HA

ZARD

LEV

ELS

UPPER

AVERAGE

LOWER

LOWER

AVERAGE

UPPER

EXTR

EMEL

Y H

IGH

60.

627

50.

471

10.

156

28.6

0%50

.06%

0.12

30.

045

-0.0

330.

505

0.58

30.

661

VER

Y H

IGH

17

1.139

120.

628

50.

511

4.50

%36

.72%

0.21

10.

023

-0.16

50.

928

1.116

1.304

HIG

H

444.

852

292.9

8815

1.865

62.4

8%21

.28%

1.562

1.165

0.76

83.2

903.6

874.

084

MED

IUM

18

611

.766

423.5

1114

48.

255

55.11

%26

.14%

6.70

74.

550

2.392

5.058

7.216

9.37

4LO

W

137

12.36

65

0.51

113

211

.855

58.7

1%22

.64%

9.64

56.

961

4.27

72.7

225.4

068.

090

TOTA

L 39

030

.751

938.

109

297

22.6

4218

.247

12.74

37.2

3812

.504

18.0

0823

.512

Cal

cula

tion

of r

isk

area

fo

r cl

eara

nce

bas

ed o

n t

he

surv

eyed

ris

k ar

eas


ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

CLEA

R-

AN

CE A

REA

BA

SED

ON

SURV

EYED

RIS

K A

REA

S

SUSP

ECTE

D

ARE

A

RISK

ARE

A

REM

AIN

ING

SUSP

ECTE

D

ARE

A W

ITH

-

OU

T CA

N-

CELL

ATIO

N

AVER

AGE

RE-

LEA

SE R

ATE

(%)

ASS

ESSM

ENT

FOR

CAN

-

CELL

ED A

REA

(km

2 )

REM

AIN

-

ING

SU

S-

PECT

ED

ARE

A W

ITH

CAN

CELL

A-

TIO

N

ASS

ESSE

D C

LEA

R-

AN

CE A

REA

(km

2 )

NUMBER OF LOCATIONS

AREA (km2)

NUMBER OF LOCATIONS

AREA (km2)

NUMBER OF LOCATIONS

AREA (km2)

OPTION 1

OPTION 2

OPTION 1

OPTION 2

NUMBER OF LOCATIONS

AREA (km2)

OPTION 1

OPTION 2

HA

ZARD

LEV

ELS

EXTR

EMEL

Y H

IGH

6

0.62

75

0.47

10

0.00

00.

00%

0.00

%0.

000

0.00

01

0.15

60.

627

0.62

7V

ERY

HIG

H

171.1

3912

0.62

84

0.23

40.

00%

0.00

%0.

000

0.00

01

0.27

71.1

391.1

39H

IGH

44

4.85

229

2.988

151.7

8016

.00%

0.00

%0.

285

0.00

00

0.08

54.

568

4.85

3M

EDIU

M

186

11.76

642

3.511

132

7.504

60.0

0%60

.00%

4.50

24.

502

120.

751

7.263

7.263

LOW

13

712

.366

50.

511

118

11.0

9190

.00%

100.

00%

9.98

211

.091

140.

764

2.385

1.275

TOTA

L 39

030

.751

938.

109

269

20.6

0814

.769

15.59

328

2.034

15.9

8215

.158

Cal

cula

tion

of r

isk

area

for

clea

ran

ce –

opt

ion

s


AS/NZS 4360:1999, Risk Management 1. Circle of impact: The Fatal Footprint oc Cluster Munitions on People and Communities, 2. Handicap International, Brussels, May 2007, 172 pages Explosive remnanats of war and mines other than anti-personnel mines, Global survey 2003-3. 2004, Landmine action, London, 2005., 172 pagesForeseeable harm, The use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006, Landmine 4. action, London, 2006., 52 pagesHumanitarian, Military, technical and legal chalenges of cluster munition, ICRC, 88 pages5. IMAS 04.10:2003, Glossary of Mine Action Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations 6. IMAS 08.10:2003, General Mine Action Assessment 7. IMAS 10.10:2001, Safety and Occupational Health 8. ISO 14001:1996, Environmental Management Systems 9. ISO 9001:2000, Quality Management Systems – Requirements 10. ISO 9004:2000, Guidelines for Performance Improvements 11. ISO/IEC VODIČ 51:1999, Safety Aspects – Guidelines for their inclusion in standards12. Lisica Darvin: Standard operating procedures for general survey of the areas affected by 13. cluster ordnancesLisica Darvin: Risk managment in mine action planning, Norvegian people’s Aid, Sarajevo, 14. 2006., 251 pagesM85, An analysis of reliability, Norwegian people’s Aid, 2007., 63 pages15. Yellow killers, The impact of cluster munitions in Serbia and Montenegro, Norwegian People’s 16. Aid, Belgrade, 2007., 72 pages

Literature

Project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Report on the impact of unexploded cluster submunitons in Serbia

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180 Report on the Impact of Unexp...Er Submunitions in Serbia 2009

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