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Moral Deficiencies as Determining Intellectual FunctionsAuthor(s): Georg SimmelReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Jul., 1893), pp. 490-507Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2375336 .

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490 InternationalYournal of Ethics.

MORAL DEFICIENCIES AS DETERMINING INTEL-LECTUAL FUNCTIONS.*

SINCE Socrates defined irtue s a science,attempts o dis-covera constant and fundamental elationbetween intellectand moralityhave not ceased to be made. On the one hand,higher intelligencehas been looked upon as cause of bettermorality; and on the other,moral perfectionhas been re-

garded as an instrumentf intellectualprogress. Inversely,intellectual imitation as often een considered conditionofa certainmoral elevation-e.g., the blessednessof the "poorin spirit," he alleged evil effectsf "enlightenment," tc.,-and likewise t has been thoughtthat superiorunderstandingmightbe attainedon the pathof moral depravity. Finally,instead of connecting these two movementsby immediate

causality, hey may be regardedas separategrowthsfromcommon root, and hence indirectly onnected. The directoppositionbetween such assertions, ll of whichhave an ap-parentvalidity, ointsto a fault n themannerof puttingthequestion. This errorprobably ies in the fact that thesedis-cussions deal with conceptionsof too vague and general anature. The conceptionof knowledge, ike thatof morality,

covers countless acts,which partake in some degree of thequalitydesignated,ust as is the case with theparticulars n-cluded under the general ideas of happiness or egotism orliberty. It is to be hopedthat suchvague, generalconceptionsin scientific thics will soon give way to the description fspecific, sychological processes, ncluded under the generalheads,-a parallel to the achievementof Herbart in regard

to " SeeZenverinogen." certainpreparation or hisend may,however,be found n developingclearlythe contradictionsnthegeneralrelationsbetween ntellect nd Morality. In illus-

* This article s partofthe secondvolumeof theauthor's" Einleitungn dieMoralwissenschAft,"hich is shortlyo appear. The readerfindsherehardlymorethan generaloutline f the originalarticle. From wantof space, t hasbeen considerablyhortenedwithout eingable to consult heauthor.



Moral Deficiencies s Determining ntellectual unctions. 49 I

tration f this point,thefollowing onsiderations re offeredas removing heapparentparadox thatdevelopmentof intel-

lect can be broughtabout by moral insufficiency,r, viceversa,that deficiency funderstandingnd thought hould gowithmorality.

It may be admitted t once that in manycases intellectualdevelopment s united with moral elevation. We need butname Socrates, Jesus, Spinoza. Despite this, it may beasserted that certainspecific xperiencesare not compatible

with absolute purityof morals. Morality, o be sure, s aneffectualmeans towards the understanding f human nature,because, through the destruction f the personally egoisticbarriersbetweenmen, t becomes easier for hepsychic phe-nomena in the lifeof one individual to be experienced sym-pathetically by another. In order to understanda manfully it is necessary to put one's self in his place, or, at

least, to bear a psychologic resemblance to him. In thecase of sin or of weakness in the face of temptation, hepure and the noble obviouslycannot compete in thorough-ness of comprehensionwith those to whom the reproductionof sinful onditions s an easy matter. The moral man lacksthe psychical experiencewhich gives the immoral one sothorough comprehension f the immorality fothers. Justas theman of owand mean mind s unable to understand hehigh-mindedand noble one and regardshim as a problem,explicable only by attributing o him secret thoughtsandpurposes similarto his own,in like manner thepureman istoo unlike the scoundrel to comprehend him completely.Criminalsbecome valuable assistantsof the police,not onlybecause of theirknowledgeof thepracticesof rogues and oftheir hiding-places, ut ratherby their much betterunder-standingof the processes and motivesof the criminalmind.This knowledge permits hemtodraw definitenferencesromgiven situations. For them it is an easy matterto forgeapsychologicalchainwithscattered inksof evidence.

Vileness and temptation re powerless to touch certainnatures. Even in schools, which are oftenhot-beds of themost unclean thoughtsand words, nd in which the immo-



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ralityof a fewcorrupted ndividualsbecomes endemic, hereare always some pure natures which are innocuous to the

poison and in whose presence the obscene talk ceases. Asensitive owerofreaction gainstevilwhichholdsknowledgeof immorality o be a taint, nd which looks upon initiationinto it as participationn guilt, s ethically dmirable. It iscertainlymost desirablethat as many as possible should livein a sphere of moral purity. The gain, however, s at theprice of losing a knowledgeof certainactive powers in the

life of mankind. It is a noteworthy act that the conceptionof an act forms he first nclination o its execution, ince apsychophysical ssociation exists between the thoughtof anactionand the stepstowards tsperformance. When the ten-dencyto actionis completely emovedbyother auses,a cleartheoretical ecognitionnd conception f it is an impossibility.It is an acknowledged fact that the occupationof themind

with forbidden houghtsis frequentlyhe incentive owardsaction, and success in leading the thoughtsaway fromtheforbidden ruitmeans prevention f the act. Inversely, er-sonal consummation f the deed is the conditionof pursuingit in thought to its logical consequences. Who can saywhetherthose high natures that combinea deep comprehen-sion of the being of man with elevated morality-who cansay whether it was not in hours of temptation, f moralconfusion, f alienationfromGod (forthe noblest men leastof all escape such troubles), hattheyattainedtheirclear andpenetratingnsight nto man's soul ?

Genius, ndeed, s able toconcentraten itself heexperiencesof the entirerace in such a way that it can express the mostprofound ruths oncerning ffairs f which it has no personalexperience. The psychological conditions of the achieve-

ments of a man of genius are very oftennot of his ownmaking,but of innate organization,ust as is the case withso-called instinctive ction or knowledge. A highly giftedjudge ofhumannaturemay, ccordingly,e able tocomprehendfully he depthsof the criminal oul, or thepurity f a Jesusor a Francis of Assisi, without experiencingthe emotionsinvolved,-usually a necessary ondition f suchpsychological



Moral Deficiencies s Determiningntellectual unctions. 493

comprehension. In any case, however, heman of genius, ndindeed every one who has any trace of insight,must possess

an inherited onstitution, hich,by reacting n a determinedway upon the presentor imagined situation,may lead tothe fullcomprehension f it. Unless we wish to assume apre-establishedharmony or miracle, the organic conditionproduced by any passion remains the only source of itsfurtheruggestions. Moral imperfections therefore condi-tionof thecomprehension f immoral passions. In order to

bring out the consequences of this necessity, et me directattention o a single point. The countlessworks on moralphilosophydo not contain a description f themoral life s itreally is, but rather a compendium of an ideally perfectmorality. The moralistsdescribe ifeas it ought to be, and,though theymaybe convinced hat the conditions re differentin real life, till they ook upon the ideal rather han on thedeviationsfrom t as the subjectof their tudy. Ethics withsuch a goal inview seems a most useless science,and fullydeservesthe cold glances bestowed on it,notby practicalmenalone, but by representatives f other sciences as well. Thechief ause for hiserror s to be sought in a practical, thicalidealism and enthusiasm,which substitutes exhortationforphilosophy nd converts hemoralphilosopher ntoa teacherof morality. Theory should hold itself aloof from any

approval or disapproval of its objects. In making humanacts thesubjectof scientifictudy, he studentmust not allowhis high regardformorality, ny more thanhis abhorrenceofvice,to exerciseany influence pon the form r matter f hisinvestigation. In a modernwork on ethics,the statementmaybe found that the studentof ethicswrites n a differentframe fmind from hat of the anthropologist r the botanist.

This seems radicallywrong,-i.e., not that it is not the case,for t is so most frequently,ut that, s far as the welfareofscience is concerned, t ought not to be the case. It is justas if the anatomist,n his work of dissection,were asked totake into consideration hebeautyor uglinessof thebody onthe dissecting-table. Whatever the source of the desire forknowledge maybe, it seems properto consider t historically

VOL. III.-No. 4 33



494 International ournal of Ethics.

as an aid in the strugglefor existencewhichhas come to bevalued for ts own sake. The truestand purest research s

that which is an aim in itself,nd in which all moral endswhichitmight erveretirento thebackground. It will there-forebe of great benefit o ethics as a science, f the studentdoes not allow his personal enthusiasmformorality o exertany influence upon his investigations. A description ofmorality egenerates nto an emptyscheme if immoralitysnot placed in juxtaposition,in reference o which the true

meaningand purpose of ethical rules can alone be grasped.To describe eitherby itself s as unmethodical as to writethe history f spiritualismwithoutconstant reference o ma-terialism.

The ethical studentswho treatmorality roman abstractand one-sidedpointof vieware like artistswhoworkwithoutmodels. True, the artistmust not represent he realitywith

the variedand accidentalmixtureof all its componentparts,but a side of it drawnfrom certainpointof view. For allthat,the certa dea which Raphael thoughtnecessaryfortherepresentationf beautifulforms s merely guide, teachinghow to combine certainfeatures f reality, lthough a com-pleteknowledgeof the subject is the condition underwhichone side of the same can be correctly epresented. Tempta-tionand sin,selfishnessnd the depthsofsensuality,humilia-tion,remorse, nd purification,-all hese experiences,withoutwhichthemorallifeof mankindwould be a colorless, ncom-prehensiblemechanism,wouldfail obe understoodfpersonalexperiencewere not at hand to fill out in part, t least,theempty phrases. The task of understandingthese powerfulelementary assions of the human soul is verydifficult romtheheightof official tation, s well as in the normal nd cor-

rect ife ed bymanyscholars. The danger s alwaysat hand,eitherof givingus at best an anatomyof the moral ife,whilethe questionunderdiscussion s reallyone of its physiology,or of falling nto a one-sided optimism. Undeniably,thisis a pointin whicha theoreticalknowledge gains depthandthoroughnessfromexperience of comparative immorality,eitherpresentor past.




The possible intellectual esultsof immorality iscussedupto this point are two. First, our immorality nables us to

recognize the presenceof immoralityn others, nd thus fur-thersknowledge. Second,immorality,n dealingwith certaindefinitefields f knowledge,develops intellect s a function,and strengthens ts power independently f the object onwhich its force s exercised. From this latter pointof view,there s no immoralinstinctwhich cannot,under certain ir-cumstances, roduce a sharpeningof the intellect. Since a

knowledgeof affairs s a means to increaseof powerand tobetter attainment f all one's ends, therefore t is furthereddirectly n proportion o the degreein which fitness f meansto ends is secured.

In turning rom he pointof viewof objectivescientific e-search to practical ife, glance is sufficiento show that forreaping selfishbenefits,or ttaining ersonalends,much more

acuteness and intellectual ctivityof everykind is broughtintoplay than is the case where the ends in view are altruistic.The existence of immorality eing assumed, the impulse toindividual advantage roused by it makes much greaterde-mands on shrewdness, rudence, nd ingenuity hanwould bemade in similarcircumstancesby a pure moral disposition.The liarmusthave a good memory. Everyform f immoral-itypresupposes sharpnessofobservation, aution, nd calcula-tion of resultsunnecessary oa moralman. The maintenanceof an unusual position always calls for ncreased ntellectualeffort,ecause otherdevices are requiredthanthose involvedin a typicalmode of life. The immoralman swims againstthe stream, and hence, ceteris aribus,needs more strengthand morequicknessthan he who is bornealong withthegen-eral current,hereforehe mostdangerousknave is the shrewd

one. The " Hexenhammer"of I487 assertsthatdevils repar-ticularly emarkable or heir agacity. It is impossiblefor m-morality omaintaintself ong whencombinedwith tupidity.Througha wantof adaptation f means to ends, tsooncomesinto collision withsocial morality,nd is then made harmlesseitherby directparalysisof its facultiesor by punishment.The saying," Honesty is the best policy," can be accepted



496 International ournall of Ethics.

onlyin the sense that, s a rule,the intellectualand othermeans at the disposal of immorality o not suffice or void-

ing a collision with the normal arrangement f the world;at the same timetheproverb mpliesthatdishonesty as needofcertain xpedients,n order osucceed,withwhicha straight-forward areercan successfully ispense,providedno hostilepowersare broughtto bear againstit. As soon as theneces-sityof a powermakes itself elt,he" eternalfitnessf things"provides forthe possibilityof its development. Since it is

impossiblefor mmoralpersons-in whom thesequalities arelacking-to maintain heirposition, selectingprocessamongthem is necessary, nd shrewdnessmustbe developedas themostfittingnstrumentf evil.

However, t is notthis indirect onnectionwhich,by virtueofits utility,makes mmoralitymeansof ntellectual evelop-ment. This takesplace ina moredirectwaywhere mmorality

does notconcern tselfwithdeeds,forwhichthoughtand thestimulation f thought n others re relativelyminorpoints,butwithcases in which immoralitytandsincloser relation o

thesetheoretical onditions,-i. e.,where lie is involved. We

are not concernedhere withthe lie in the light of its evo-lution,butwith ts reflex ction upon the spiritof the liar.There is no doubt thata lie develops many powers whichwould have remained latent n case of adherenceto truthful-ness. The mindgrowswary nd cautious,comprehensivendat the same time concentrated, elicate and yet strong, o a

degreewhichwould neverhave been reached, f t had alwaysprogressed n a straight ine and in thepath of truth. False-

hood, so to speak, creates new worlds which, however,

may have connectionat many pointswithactual existence.The popular saw, " One lie breedsseven,"expresseswell the

factthata lie, in order to attain itsend,must call out an in-ventionwhichhas a close relationship o poetry. Falsehoodmustbe capable of alteringand polishingthe forms f logicand udgment, he universally ecognizedpremisesof thought,in such a way that they may suggesta conclusion which,nevertheless,heyessentiallyexclude. The liar must at all

times hold in his consciousness two trainsof thought,two




entirely ifferentrders of deas,-the one which he knows tobe true, nd the false one formedon entirely ifferentrin-

ciples which,however, s to appear to the deceived to be thetrue one. This state of affairs resupposesa psychologicalintelligence which s one of the most importantweapons inthe arsenal of the liar. Besides this, t clearly produces anddevelops a powerof invention, nd on the theoretical ide aconsistency nd objectivity, he intellectual ffect f which isonly weakened because the logical consequences of the lie,

and themask of uprightnesswithwhich t facesothers, ome-timesmake a victimof the liarhimself. For instance,whenthe same falsehood is reiteratedagain and again, the liarfinally elieves in it himself. Here, it is true, he lie loses itsvalue as a means ofsharpening he intellect nd of ncreasingits objectivity,ince now the double series of mages, betweenwhich,otherwise, he liar has to maintain some sort of har-

mony,no longer exists. The necessityof maintaining ucha harmony reates a mobility f mind,a great readiness inmeetingan objectionraised by one trainof ideas by makinga variation n the other eries. This double objectivitywhichthe two series require are confounded n the mind of thedupe.

But the possible improvement f the intellect throughfalsehood s often hanged intoits contrary. The very dual-ism of the logical series,which sharpens the intellectwhenthe divisionbetween them is kept distinct,makes the samedull when this separation is no longer successfullymain-tained,the appreciationand the instinctof truth and thetrueconceptionof ts standardsbeing lost. This is especiallytrue of great, ll-permeating alsehoods,which form part nthe lives of so many people. They are not merelyverbal

fictions,ut enacted lies. Our public and private ife howsat everypointremainsofformerlyfficientorms, hichstandin direct contradiction to modern thought and, from thisstand-point,must be regardedas falsehoods. Upon criticalexamination of the participation f the educated classes inthe lifeof the church,or the relation of higherand lowerofficialsn all circles and walks of life, alsehood nword and




deed is met t every tep,producedby cowardice, onvenience,habit, nd even by thehonest beliefthata revoltagainst the

evil wouldworkmoremischief hana laissez-faire olicy. Insuch a case a clear, intellectualacuteness in the conceptionof scientific ruthsmust suffer,lthough it can coexistwitha fullrecognition f the falseness n a partof our existence.Indeed,thevery onsciousnessofthe falsity fsuch a positionhas oftenbeen the spur to a purer and clearerconceptionofreality. Immorality an onlybe looked upon as guiltywhen

it is clearlyrecognized s such. The act whichmakesit so-setting hefalsehood n its true ight-is, at thesame time, hesource ofa wide-spread nd penetrating nowledge. Anotherfact which takes away from the intellectualvalue of theso-called social lies is theirpassive acceptance by the indi-vidual,who,for he most part, imply ives on in themannertraditionallynjoineduponhim. The free, ormativelement

is lacking,as well as the necessityof measuringone's ownstrength t everystepwith a worldwhose aim is an entirelyopposite one, and of maintaining, y constantmodifications,the logical consequences of word and deed,-in all of whichparticulars the specificfalsehood proved its strengtheningeffectsn the intellectual owers.

The strengtheningf the mind,which we denoted to bedirectly onnectedwith mmorality,s notgenerally heresultofa wrongmotive; but the case is differenthenthemotive-poweris self-love. Wit and learningare groundsforvanity,a passion which prompts us to energetic mental activity.This example, though simple,needs especial considerationbecause of the attitude f disapproval assumed towardsthissubjectivemotive as annihilating he value of all knowledgethus gained. Of all motives of intellectualactivitywhich

are not absolutelypure,vanity eems,however, east of all tomodify he resultsobtained. In contradistinctiono politicalprejudiceas influencing istoricalresearch,-bigotrycreepinginto a studyof natural law, or the predeterminationf theresult to which investigationwill lead,-in contradistinctionto all this,the vain desireof appearing especiallyclever orlearnedseems comparatively armless. For theveryreason



Moral Deficiencies s Determiningntellectual unctions.499

that vanitybears so purelypersonal a character, twill notincline to a deviationof udgment such as mightbe the case

where the wrong motivehas a certain objective result ndtendencyin view. A peculiar resemblanceis here particu-larly noticeablebetween the most objective and the mostsubjective pursuits. In both cases, although for differentmotives, that inequality n the treatment f subjects disap-pears, which is usually present as the outcome of a specialleaning towardsone side or the other. An entirely npreju-

diced attitude, ecause an indifferentne, towards both sidesmay arise equally well from a principle of truth-seeking,whichrequires unquestioningacceptanceof the factstaughtby realities, s from pure subjectivity hichtakesno interestin matters or heirown sake.

In practice, he integrity f this position uffers rom socio-psychological bias, by which vanity s more gratified y the

attainment f certainresultsthan by the attainment f others.If one of two scientistsdiscovers a cure forconsumption ndthe other brings to light a remedy foremphysema, houghthe twomighthave exerted equal ingenuitynd labor in theirresearch,the formerwould be admired incomparablymorethanthe latter, orthe accidental reason thathis workwouldenjoya wider range ofutility han thatof his fellow-scientist.In like manner, he practical interesttaken in the resultofinvestigation s reflected n the importance f the processofthoughtby whichthe end is reached. If the appreciation fresearch were in exact and unchangingproportion to theamount of intellectual exertion involved,and depended onthatalone,then vanity f recognition ould not workmischiefto the honestyof thought by a prejudice in favorof certainresults. In point of fact, however,popular opinion sees

evidenceof deeper thought in certainresults han in others,which leads to the temptation o obtainthese conclusionsatany cost. This is manifestedmostof all in criticism,n pes-simism, n scepticism, riefly,n the negation of thought incontradistinctiono its assertion. A simple,positive truth,no matterhow much acuteness and penetrationts discoverymay involve,does not possess the same fascination f inge-



500 International 7ournal f Ethics.

nuity or he generality fpeoplewhichbelongsto destructivecriticism-to Mephistopheleannegation of everything radi-

tionallytrue and beautiful. In condemningan action or ausage, or, in fact, nything n actual existence, he critic nso doing raises himself bove the object of his attack. Hestands upon a higher plane and feels himselfmasterof thegeneralrules and restrictionso which the matterunderdis-cussion is subject. This position s the moreeasily obtainedthemore criticism s purelynegative,forweak pointswillbe

foundto exist in everything mpirical, ven though tbe themostcompleteof its kind. A significanthrug, lthoughnoreasonmaybe assignedfor t, s sufficient ith some to indi-cate the existenceof extraordinary idden clevernesson thepartof thecritic. This modeofcriticismwins forhim notonlyan unassailable reputationforpowersof judgment,but alsoa mysteriousauthorityover his listener. Furthermore,he

moreextendedand the more inclusive the rangeof a judg-ment, he moreenlighteneddoes the critic ppear to himselfand to others; and the most comprehensiveudgments aredeclared in negative, sceptical, and pessimistic assertions.A positive udgment,being definite,s also limited n itself.While it is difficult o mentionthe qualitieswhicha certainthing possesses, it is an easy matter to point out its de-ficiencies, nd easiest of all to look at the matterfrom asceptical pointof view. An unfavorable riticismwillthere-forebe apt to be clothedin generalities nd will seem to dealwiththe subjectin its entirety. Finally, f pessimism,n itspopular and accidental formeven more than n its scientificand essential one,not only judges, but condemns the wholeworld, f it despises thatwhich is revered by many, nd re-gards as a matter f ndifferencehatto othersseemsworthy

of attainment venby struggle,-by thatveryact ofcriticismit will appear to rise above the level of the commonplace.The polite literatureof the present day,as well as popularphilosophyand our topics of conversation,like indicatethisrank growth of pessimisticviews, only too frequently heproduct of vanityand morbid self-analysis,which, in turn,flourish estin the soil of pessimism.



Moral Deficiencies s Determiningntellectual unctions. 5o I

Another applicationof this principleforms n integralpartof our theme,-the sexual relation. When the importance

of the sexual passions in all the relationsof life is takenintoconsiderationand the strength f the feelings oncerned, heinterestn thematter s an entirelynatural one; nevertheless,everydiscussionof the topic outsidea most limitedcircle isconsideredoffensive. Hesitationis manifestedn approachingthe subjecteven n a mostseriousand scientificmood,becauseof the consciousnessof arousinga foreign nterest. In con-

sequence,less scientific ttentionhas been paid to the life ofthe sexes from psychological and social stand-point hanwould be the case were it co-ordinatedwithall othersciencesand without the fearof arousing forbiddendesires. Botanyand psycho-physicswould nowshowa veryhigh gradeof de-velopment,had as universal n interest been manifestednthemas in thequestion n hand. If, cting n the spirit fthe

Rigorists,we hold this interest o be an immoralone, still itsexistence mightbe made of some use to knowledge. Thepleasurablecharmpeculiarto thisfieldhas led to experiencesand thoughtsscarcely to be matched by those on any othersubject. The light which might thus be thrown on deeppsychological, ociological,and psychiatricquestions s with-held,because even amongmen of sciencethere s to be founda hesitancy n using impulsesusuallyconsidered immoralasa means of obtainingknowledge. In opposition to thissen-timent, homas Aquinas significantlyemarked, Since Godhimselfmakes use of thesins ofmankind n carrying ut Hisends, etus nothesitateto imitatehim."

The foregoing iscussion has shown immoralityn the ightof a positive cause of theoreticalprogress, nd as containingin itselfpowerswhich,when given a certainimpetus, ed to

intellectual advancement. Immoralitymay aid in bringingabout thisresult n still anotherway,-that is, clearingawayobstacles whichmorality sually places in thepath ofknowl-edge. Of these immoralconditionsof knowledge, indiffer-ence towards the subject must be mentionedfirst. Herethetotal exclusion of personalor sympathetic onsiderationstakes on the semblance ofhard-heartedness.Vivisection,not



502 International7ournalf Ethics.

in its therapeutic,ut in its purely cientific,haracter,ur-nishesa most noteworthyxample. It frequentlyappens

that man has tosteelhimselfgainst hemoodsand incli-nations fhis ownheartnorder o placehimselfompletelyat the serviceof knowledge.The idealofSpinoza,whichdemands hat man shouldfeelneitherorrownor oy overhuman ffairs,utthatheshouldunderstandhem, ests ponthe assumptionhat he formermotions tand n theway ofa full omprehensionf hings. He whofeels ympathyith

others,r remorse verhis owndeficiencies,annot,ccord-ingto Spinoza nd theStoics, e considereds standingpontheheight f intellectualevelopment. n order o attain othispoint fview, t is necessaryo cast aside feelings ni-versally eldto be moral n tendency. It is not throughpositive mmorality,ut stillby means of an indifferencetowards he demands fethics hat theway is clearedto a

completeomprehensionfphenomena. t oftensnecessaryto strike direct low at theduty fpietyf clear, bjectivejudgmentfpersonss tobe obtained.

This situation rings o mindthe cruel characterf anaestheticnterestn things. In certain andscapes,poor,tumble-down,ecayinghuts possess poetical charm. Inlookingforbeauty, ut one faceofphenomenas regarded,and no attentions paid to the existence f another ide,which,f t cameunder urobservation,ould rouse thicalemotions estructivef the aesthetic ualities f the object.When theamount fmiseryn theworld s taken nto on-sideration,nd theappealforsympathynd aid,fromwhichno one penetratingelowthe surface fthings an escape,itbecomes vident hat certain aralysis f thesensibilitiestowards he emotional ide of events s necessaryorcom-

plete bsorptionnaestheticnterests.Thiscallousness, hichfromhe ethicalpoint fview s to be condemned, ay, er-haps,serveas an explanation f the moral deficienciesofrequentlymanifestedn artistic nd aestheticallynclinednatures. Chamisso,n hispoemof TheCrucifix,"as givenmostpowerfulxpressiono thisneglect ftheethicalnthepresence fthe~estheticemand.



Moral Deficienciess Determiningntellectual unctions. 503

This connectionbetween theoreticalnterest nd a lack ofcertainethicalemotionsmakes an extremelyrationalisticnd

strictlyogical habitof mind take pleasure in creatingrigor-ous maxims of morality. The Stoic, it is true,knows notangernor ndignation;butsympathynd clemency re equallystrange to him; and it is well knownhow muchthe rational-ismofKant has beenreproached or lack ofhumanemotions.In the degree nwhichwe are accustomed to look upon thesenaturalfeelingsas necessaryparts of the morallife, t is im-

possibleto include them all in the circleof a logical theorybecause of the number and varietyof theirsources, and thecompletelyndependent ositionof each one in ourconscious-ness. If a certainfundamental octrine s used as a guide ofconduct,and is followed o its rationalconsequences, a pointis usually reached fromwhich the way to a gratificationfmoraldesiresbranches offfromhe logical continuation fthe

course previously dhered to. From Descartes's extremelyspiritualconceptionof the soul, and the strictlymechanicalcharacter ssignedby himto the corporeal world in antithesisto the former dea, he deduced the belief that animals aremere machines. He declared that their expressions of feel-ing-e.g., the cry upon being struck-did not come in therangeofconscious action,but followed s mechanically s thesound froman organ when a key is touched. Some Carte-sians pushed this logical deduction so farthat theypractisedcruelty o animals in order to prove to otherstheirbelief inthe mechanical natureof beasts. There is no doubt thatthemoral sensibility f thesemen stood in inwardopposition otheir ction; in order to be logical,it was necessaryto over-come thisfeeling. In orderto act strictlyn accordancewiththe rulesof knowledge, t becomes necessary o ignore ertain

ethical impulses. Even if there s a commonroot forethicalfeelings and logical forms,t certainly ies far enough awayfrom hem n the present tage of theirdevelopment o allowthemto appear as absolutely ndependent ormations. Theirpaths run side by side withoutcoming in contactwith eachother; it is only occasionally that it is impossible to walkon both at a time,and that it becomes necessaryto leave




the one entirely n order to keep within the limitsof theother.

And now, as a final consideration of the relation underdiscussion, t must be observed that the attainment f certainknowledge s morallyforbidden,nd that penetration nto thesame is a sin. The traditional llustration f this point is tobe found in the story of the fall of man: "And when thewomansaw that the tree . . . was to be desired to make onewise,she took of the fruit hereof nd did eat." To Adam

and Eve the knowledge itselfmust have appeared as some-thingsinful,without ts being necessaryto investigate urtheras to the reason for his prohibition.

The story of the Image of Sais shows this perhaps evenmore plainly. Truth here appears as something holy and-withoutfurther ause being assigned-not to be approached.The despair of the youth after he consummation f the deed

does not appear in the light of a punishment nflicted n himby deity because of the violation of a command,but as thenecessary result brought about by the mere psychologicalimpression f an untimely iew of truth. The conception ofholiness, although produced by practical and teleologicalconsiderations, inally oses sight of these beginnings andfastens itself upon the object, which thereupon possessessanctity s a concrete quality,-a part of the essence of itsbeing. The pious Jewfeelsan aversion owards he" unclean"without recognizing each time the social fitness nd thereligious elementswhich connect this feelingwith the objectin question. In like manner,sanctity cleaves to ideas andthoughts nd engenders hesitation n layinghands on them,whichdoes not seek any further ause, and whose violation sconsidered sign of immorality.

In cultivatedcircles, his dutybecomes a universaldiscre-tion,because of a knowledgeof the feelingsof others. Thedesireto keep secretcertainmatters f muchpersonalconcernwas of coursethe origin of this discretion,nd theconsidera-tion taken for this point of view by others was but onemanifestation f the general, altruistic nterest. The affairsof a thirdperson took on sacredness as an essentialquality,



Moral Deficienciess Determining ntellectual unctions. 505

and the duty of respectbecame such forevery person ofculture, not because its violation might have injurious re-

sults, but because itwas immoral n itself Hence, a generalrestraint, suppression of the natural impulse of curiosity,even where no harm could accrue to the thirdpersonfromyieldingto it. Justas prying nto the affairs f others, venwithoutderiving he slightestadvantagefrom t,is a sourceof pleasure formany people, so refrainingherefrom, ith-out any consideration of practical results,becomes a duty.

The prohibition gainst laying hands on anything"that ishis" extends n itswidest applicationeven to the intellectualseizure of anythingnot voluntarily evealed to us. The im-moralcharacterof indiscretion oes notbelong merely o thecrude means ofknowingthe circumstances fothers,-for n-stance, heiroutwardaction or bearing. A moredelicate andmore dangerous as well as a much more interesting thical

problem is a penetrationnto another'ssoul, to which oneattains by reflection nd by a combiningof revelationsspon-taneouslymade by the person in question. Very often,menbetray their most secret affairs-especially questions andevents of their soul-life-through the very words which,though designedto hide their ruecharacter,yet furnish hepsychologistwitha key to a knowledgeof thingswhich theymost desired to keep secret. The fact here to be noticed isthat some knowledge can be gained onlyat the expense ofmorality. Moreover,this is true in the sense that it is notthroughsome consequence or particular f that knowledge,that it acquires the character f immorality,ut because theknowledgeitself s prohibited.

The interventionf divine authorityforthe prohibition fknowledge, s took place in the legendof the Fall of Man,

finds arthlymeans of execution. The orthodox,Catholic n-habitants fa certaindistrictnAmericaprevented geologistfrom xaminingthe mountains n that place on theplea thatit was sufficiento know thatGod had made the mountainsas theywere, nd that t was unnecessaryto find ut ofwhattheyconsisted. Dante makes Odysseus tell of ourneysmadeafterhis return to Ithaca, and intimates that the curiosity



5o6 InternationalYournal of Ethics.

which drove him to themwas of a sinfulnature. Any pene-tration nto the plan of creation,any intellectual spirations

beyondthespherethat seems designated forman, s in itselfimmoral.

In this onnection,redo, uia absurdurmsworthy f mention;in certainrespects, t may be considered the superlativeofJesus'sdeclarationof the blessedness of the " poor in spirit."According to this point of view knowledge is a matterofindifferences far s its contentsare concerned, nd is,more-

over,a hinderanceto morality; consequently, heforms ndconditionsof knowledge in general should be renouncedaltogether. Illogical methodsof thought,which are not atall adapted to the consideration of realities are,in spiteoftheir deficiencies,o be adopted by the believer,who, by sodoing,givesproofofhispiety. A passage inDante illustratesthismethod of reasoning more clearly: " If divine justice

appears unjust in the eyes of mortals, t is a proofof theirbelief, nd notwickedheresy." This statementmust be ex-plained as follows. In the degree nwhichGod's methods reunderstood nd agreewithourlogical and ethicalconceptions,we have to a certainextent a proofof His existence and ofthe realization f our ideals in Him. Belief becomesa neces-sityonlywhen our reasonfailsto aid us, so that n thecredo,

quiaabsurdum,he accent fallson credo. What I know, do

nothave to believe. The more difficult he matterwhich thereason succeeds in digesting nd themore n opposition o itsdictates, o much greateris the merit n believing t,and somuch stronger s man's faith rovedto be. This unquestion-ing acceptanceof a contradiction an only proceed from hedeepesthumility owards God, and a complete renunciationof the ego and everythingcontributing o its logical self-

preservation.Goethe'sviewof theworld, lso, has in itan elementwhich

forbids certainmode of obtainingknowledge,but it is de-duced from n entirelydifferentointof view and gives it adifferent orm. He considers calm adoration of the " un-fathomable" requisiteof elevatedmorality. The disintegra-tion and the dismembermentf nature,the continuation f



Discussions. 507

researchup to the point where the beautifulharmony n theappearance ofobjectsis destroyed, ppearsto himan offensive

impiety, misconception f the boundswhich nature has setforman. He dislikedpeople thatwore spectacles because itseemed improper o see more than naturehad intended; hedislikedto think about thoughtand despised transcendentalanalysis,considering tfarbetter o confineourselves to phe-nomena and to the unmistakabletasks set beforeus, and tolimit knowledge to that which nature voluntarilyoffers s,

withoutbeing violentlyforced ogive up hersecrets. At theroot of theseopinionslies the conviction hat theposition ndimportanceof a reasoning being are subject to certain in-evitable imitationswhichrequireno prooffrom demonstra-tionofprinciplesorconsequences. In itself hetransgressionof these limits s immoral and reprehensible. The eternalobscurity f the Noumena of Kant's conception s analogous

to Goethe's " Mystery fNature," ntowhich t is improper openetrate ven if itwere possible to do so. For theformer,the prohibition f thatwhich lies beyond tangible existenceis a logical obstacle,for he latter n ethicalone.

GEORG SIMMEL.UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN.

DISCUSSIONS.

THE NATURE OF ETHICAL SCIENCE.

HAVING had occasion recently o write an introductory ketchofthe science of Ethics, I have been led to give some attention o theconsiderationof thescope and method of thatscience; and as theviewwhich I have adopted seems to disagreewith that of several

otherwriterswith whom in the main I am strongly n sympathy,have thought hatit mightbe desirable to insert fewwords hereon the reasons that have led me to differfromthese authorities.The chief point of disagreement s with regard to the questionwhetherEthics is to be regardedas a positiveor as a normativescience-i.e., whether it simplysets itself to studythe facts andconditions of human conduct, or endeavors, in addition to this,to definean ideal, fromwhichprinciples or laws of action maybe

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